Developing a Security Regime for Eastern Europe

8/13/2019 Developing a Security Regime for Eastern Europe

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? Journal of Peace Research, vol. 30, no. 4, 1993, pp. 427-444

Developing a SecurityRegime for EasternEurope*MALCOLM CHALMERSDepartment of Peace Studies, Bradford University

Without a security regime to replace the vacuum left by the collapse of the Soviet empire,democratization in formerly communist Europe may be insufficient to prevent a prolonged period ofmilitary insecurity and conflict. Criteria for the use of military force in support of a security regime inEastern Europe should be developed, drawing on just-war theory. The objectives of militaryintervention should be legitimate, the costs involved should outweigh the benefits, and there should belegitimate authority for action. The article recommends a commitment by CSCE to the principle ofmilitary action in defence of existing international borders and/or in order to avoid massive loss of lifewithin a member-state as a result of government action. Within this framework, CSCE members couldthen, where appropriate, make explicit statements of intent to come to the aid of states under threat ofattack, backing up such commitments militarily, for example by basing multinational military forces inthe countries concerned. The article suggests that peacetime security guarantees should be given tothose former communist countries that have progressed furthest towards creating modern democraciesand which have adopted moderate policies towards their neighbours. But it argues that, given theparamount need to prevent a future conflict with Russia, it is not appropriate at this stage to includeformer Soviet states in a system of formal guarantees.

1. Peace, Democracy and the End ofEmpireSince 1989, the European settlement de-cided upon in 1945 has finally come apart.The division of Germany has ended. TheSoviet bloc in Eastern Europe, the creationof which was the proximate cause of theCold War, has collapsed. And the end of theSoviet Union itself in December 1991 hasadded a further dimension to the sense ofsystemic transformation.At first the popularity of democraticpolitical models in the East encouraged thehope that the West European security com-munity could rapidly be expanded toencompass the rest of a newly united conti-nent. The vision of 'a new era of cooper-ation and solidarity' set out in the Charter ofParis in November 1990 would become areality. The triumph of liberal democraticideas throughout the continent would en-* This article owes much to discussions over a longperiod in the European Security Research Unit,Department of Peace Studies. I would particularlyliketo thank my colleagues Andrew Cottey, Owen Greeneand Oliver Ramsbotham, together with Nils PetterGleditsch, Pierre Hassner, Stephen van Evera and ananonymous referee for their helpful comments.

sure that Europe's 'zone of peace' could begreatly enlarged.This optimism resulted, in part, from awidespread acceptance of the propositionthat liberal democracies are much less likelyto go to war with each other than with otherstates (Doyle, 1986; Fukayama, 1992; Gled-itsch, 1992; Mueller, 1989; Russett & Starr,1992; Weede, 1992). Those analysts (such asMearsheimer, 1990) who predicted that theremoval of the bipolar Cold War structurewould lead to new military rivalries emerg-ing, both in the West and East, were widelycriticized for failing to take account of theimpact of democracy on war-proneness (forexample in Jervis, 1991192;van Evera, 1990/91).Yet, just as the democracy/peace argu-ment seemed to be winning the debateagainst those who emphasize the role ofbalance of power and deterrence in theavoidance of war, its proponents have hadto face the problem of explaining why thespread of democracy in Eastern Europe andthe former Soviet Union has been ac-companied by the spread of armed conflict.The reason for the absence of armed con-flict in Eastern Europe during the Cold War

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428 Malcolm Chalmersis clear. Throughout this period, the auth-ority of the communist regimes of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact states was backed up bythe threat, and on several occasions the use,of Soviet military power. The Soviet Unionitself was held together by a Russian-domi-nated army and party, both committed tosuppressing any movement towards inde-pendence by non-Russian republics. EvenYugoslavia, although not part of the Sovietbloc, was in part kept together by theknowledge that any internal dissensionmight have allowed the Soviet Union toextend its hegemony southwards, as indeedStalin attempted in the late 1940s.The continuance of a Soviet empire waspart of the price that was paid, mostly by thepeoples of Eastern Europe, for preventingmajor war. It not only sustained regimes inpower which might never have been able tosurvive for so long on their own. It also gavethe Soviet Union the power it needed toprevent any reconsideration of the new in-ternational borders drawn up in 1945. Vic-tory in World War II had allowed the SovietUnion to divide Germany and to occupypart of its capital with Soviet troops. It hadforced Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hung-ary to transfer large areas of their territoryto the Soviet Union, more than reversingthe losses it had suffered immediately afterthe October revolution. And it had permit-ted the reassertion of Russian control overEstonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, which hadbeen briefly independent between 1919 and1940.Soviet commitment to freezing the 1945territorial settlement therefore derived mostof all from a concern to protect the integrityof its own borders and from a desire to pre-vent future German expansion. The policy,however, also had a further effect. Itprovided the basis for the longest periodwithout major border changes which theregion had ever experienced. The map ofEastern Europe in 1991 was the same as in1945. Any movements for secession or forself-determination, whether in Eastern Eur-ope or in the Soviet Union itself, werequickly and ruthlessly suppressed. Inter-national order was enforced by total Soviethegemony.

With the breakup of the Soviet empire,however, the international and inter-republican boundaries created and sus-tained by that system rapidly became thefocus for a series of disputes. Within twoyears of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 22 newstates have been created and one (the Ger-man Democratic Republic) has been dis-solved. Only 20 of the people of theregion are citizens of the same states as theywere in 1990.'

Despite these massive upheavals, most ofEastern Europe and the former SovietUnion is still at peace, even where - as inboth the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia -states have broken up. But, two years afterthe end of the Soviet Union, the omens arefar from hopeful. The initial euphoria of lib-eration and statehood is being replaced by aperception that the new states are now ontheir own militarily. Moreover, events havetended to confirm the hard truth that, as inthe Cold War, military power is an effectiveinstrument of political objectives. As Bosniahas recently learnt to its cost, militarilyweak states or groups, no matter the level oftheir public support, are defenceless in theface of stronger and more ruthless neigh-bours.A move towards national self-reliance indefence is not necessarily disastrous if, as inScandinavia or South America, the map ofthe region has been widely accepted as legit-imate. But in Eastern Europe it has not.The opportunities for small groups to seizestate power by force might not exist wherethere are civilian authorities based on a longtradition of liberal democracy. But in muchof the region such a tradition does notexist.2 As a consequence, the securityvacuum created by the end of Soviet powerhas released forces of extreme nationalismwhich threaten to destroy all previous hopesof a united and prosperous Europe.3 In ad-dition, the breakdown of traditional partyauthority, and the lack of a strong liberaldemocratic culture to replace it, has meantthat a political vacuum can develop in whichonly military force becomes the arbiter ofstate power.Most governments in the region have sofar resisted the more extreme demands of



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SecurityRegimefor Eastern Europe 429their nationalist and authoritarian com-patriots, and have appeared genuinelycommitted to the creation of liberal democ-racies. But the descent into war has alreadystarted in several regions. In the Balkans,declarations of independence by the Yugo-slav republics of Slovenia and Croatia inJune 1991 precipitated war with the Serb-dominated Yugoslav army. In April 1992,the war spread to Bosnia-Herzegovina, andfurther conflict involving newly independentMacedonia and the Serb provinces ofKosovo and Sandzak cannot be ruled out(Glenny, 1992; Zametica, 1992). In theCaucasus, a brief but bloody civil war tookplace in Georgia in 1992, and Azerbaijanand Armenia continue to fight for control ofboth the enclave of Nagorno-Karabakhitself and for the corridor connecting itwith Armenia. Russian troops have beeninvolved in serious clashes in Moldavia,Tajikistan and Georgia, as well as inattempts to combat secessionist movementswithin the Russian Federation itself.4

2. The Western ResponseAs the crises in Eastern Europe have mul-tiplied, Western leaders have continued torefuse to make specific security commit-ments to the states of the region. It is recog-nized that the stability of Eastern Europe isan important concern of both Western Eur-ope and the USA. But the habits of fourdecades of practiced non-involvement diehard. In the Middle East, the USA and theUK have used military power frequently inorder to pursue their interests, most notablyin support of Israel, in Lebanon, and in the1991 Gulf War. Deployments of militaryforce here, therefore, can fit into a well-established pattern. In Eastern Europe, bycontrast, Soviet domination has onlyrecently ended, and the West has not yetcome to terms with the implications for itsmilitary policy.The inadequacy in Western policy to-wards Eastern Europe was demonstratedmost clearly as the Yugoslav war developedfrom the summer of 1991 onwards. Despiteclear evidence of aggression against the newstates, Western states made clear from the

outset that recognition did not bring with itany prospect of rendering military assistanceto them. This lack of commitment in turngravely undermined the mediation andpeace-keeping efforts of both the EuropeanCommunity and the United Nations(Chalmers, 1993; Sharp, 1993).Comparisons are sometimes drawn be-tween the situation facing the leadingdemocracies today and the position immedi-ately after World War II. Faced with econ-omic collapse and the threat of politicalextremism, the USA was far-sighted enoughto provide the security guarantees, econ-omic assistance and institutional supportthat not only made recovery possible butpaved the way for the most sustained econ-omic boom ever seen, and for the creationof the stable security community we seetoday. Now, it is argued, it is time foranother Marshall Plan, complemented by apan-European security system and a univer-sal promotion of human rights and democ-racy.5While such a parallel has many merits, itis important to emphasize an essentialdifference between the end of World War IIand the end of the Cold War. In 1945 thedefeated powers were occupied, and theoccupying powers had little choice but totake responsibility for every aspect of life inthese countries. By contrast, the SovietUnion has not been militarily defeated andis not occupied by foreign forces. The newgovernments in Eastern Europe and theformer Soviet Union are themselves thesovereign entities responsible for decisionson political and economic reform and onsecurity policy. Compared with 1945, there-fore, the West has both (a) much morechoice as to how far to become involved inthe resolution of these problems and (b)much less direct control over how any par-ticular solutions are implemented. Takentogether with the lack of a clear and directmilitary threat, such as was seen to be devel-oping in 1945-47, it is possible to under-stand why both the USA and many ECstates still hesitate before increasing theirdegree of commitment to the East.Yet Western states are becoming increas-ingly involved in the future of Eastern Eur-



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430 Malcolm Chalmers

ope. The development of aid programmesfor the former Soviet Union is now a centralconcern of the IMF, the World Bank andthe European Community. The West con-tinues to urge the new states to developpluralistic institutions and to respect therights of individuals and minorities. And,gradually, Western-led institutions areinvolving Eastern states in a series of secur-ity-related discussions (Mortimer, 1992;Zielonka, 1992). CSCE is set to play an im-portant role in the development of conflictprevention mechanisms as well as having thepotential - along with the Council of Europe- of providing a code of conduct in the fieldof human rights (Walker, 1993). NATO hasset up the North Atlantic CooperationCouncil (NACC) as a means of involvingthe former Warsaw Pact members (thoughnot the former neutrals such as Sweden andYugoslavia) in discussions about military-related issues (Simon, 1993). NA TO itself isincreasingly taking on a primary role in pro-viding peace-keeping capabilities for theUN and CSCE in Eastern Europe, mostnotably in its provision of staff and equip-ment for the UN in Bosnia (White, 1992).The European Community has concludedassociation agreements with a number ofEast European states, and the prospect offuture Community membership is likely toplay an important role in the economic andpolitical development of Poland, the CzechRepublic, Hungary and perhaps others.Finally, the United Nations, which initiallyseemed content to delegate responsibilityfor European security to European regionalorganizations, is now being used as the mainforum through which to authorize collectivemilitary responses to the situation in theformer Yugoslavia.Yet behind this apparent ferment of or-ganizational activity remains a continuingreluctance on the part of many Westerngovernments to become involved in securityguarantees for Eastern Europe. In part thisreluctance stems from the West's abstinencefrom any role in Eastern Europe for the last47 years. But the force of habit is reinforcedby an uneasiness about the very differentnature of the security situation facing East-ern Europe in the 1990s compared with the

well-defined bipolar situation of the ColdWar. NATO has managed to retain broadpolitical support, albeit not without dissent,in part because it has never had to fire a shotin anger (although it should not be forgottenthat the Cold War confrontation appearsless dangerous in retrospect than it did inthe late 1940s, when many leaders werefearful of the very real possibility of a thirdmajor European war). In the confused situ-ation of Eastern Europe, by contrast, mili-tary force is more likely to be used, albeit ina manner much more limited than envisagedin Cold War scenarios.Reluctance to become involved in fillingthe security vacuum in Eastern Europe isreinforced by fear of failure. The record ofWestern and Western-allied states over thelast 40 years suggests fairly consistentsuccess in 'conventional' wars against con-ventional armies - notably in Korea in1950-53, the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeliwars, and the 1991 Gulf War. The record in'unconventional' wars, however, is muchmore mixed: as evidenced by US failures inVietnam and Lebanon. Western statesremain reluctant to impose internal politicalsolutions by force, as evidenced recently bythe abrupt end to hostilities in the Gulf Waronce Iraqi forces had been expelled fromKuwait. There is a fear that thousands oftroops could be tied down indefinitely in alow-level war of attrition, perhaps evenmore costly than the British experience inNorthern Ireland since the early 1970s.6To these US and UK fears, born out oftheir experience of quasi-colonial wars, isadded the continuing ability of Germany todeploy its own forces for action abroad.More than any other NATO army, the Bun-deswehr has relied for its legitimacy on thefact that it has never had to be used.Although there are signs that this could bechanging, evidenced by the recent decisionto deploy a German battalion in Somalia,nevertheless it adds a further constraint onmajor power action during this crucialperiod.Van Evera (1992) has argued that, whilethe West should seek to promote peacefulconduct by states in the former Soviet em-pire, it should do so largely through the use



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Security Regime for Eastern Europe 431of economic leverage. While both economicaid and economic sanctions have importantroles to play in encouraging peace and stab-ility, however, they may not always beeither sufficient or optimal. Economicmeasures do not prevent either territorialacquisition or subsequent 'ethnic purifi-cation' of occupied regions. They thereforerisk being sidelined by leaders willing toaccept short-term pain in order to create apolitical fait-accompli on the ground. More-over, while economic measures minimizethe risk of Western casualties, they mayincrease the hardship endured by the sub-jects of the government against whom thesanctions are directed, as well as prolongingthe suffering of those against whom thatgovernment is directing its aggression, thusreducing the chances of long-term reconcili-ation. A policy that relied upon economicmeasures alone, therefore, could lead togreater human suffering than one which wasable to call upon both economic and militarylevers.

3. Criteria or the use of military powerWithout clearer military commitments fromoutside, it is hard to see how a prolongedperiod of military insecurity, and indeedconflict, can be avoided throughout muchof the former communist world. And suchinsecurity will in turn make hopes for a'Euro-Atlantic community' of prosperousdemocracies, stretching from Vancouver toVladivostok, seem increasingly forlorn.The debate about whether, and in whatcircumstances, to use or threaten to usemilitary force in Eastern Europe centresaround three key issues. First, what objec-tives justify military intervention? Second,what costs are acceptable? Third, underwhose authority should intervention takeplace?3.1 ObjectivesA 'pure collective security' approach to con-structing a security regime might suggestthe simple rule that any attempt to changeexisting international frontiers by forceshould be met, if necessary, by a collectivemilitary reaction.8 The inviolability of exist-

ing international borders, after all, was oneof the foundation stones of the post-1945settlement in Europe, and was central toCSCE's establishment in the 1970s. Agree-ments to maintain colonial borders, how-ever artificial, in Africa and Asia alsohelped to reduce the incidence of inter-stateconflict during the Cold War. The principleof protecting recognized international fron-tiers is thus widely recognized as a keystoneof international order. Indeed the very clar-ity of this principle was one of the factorsthat contributed to the degree of inter-national support for the UN's stance againstIraq in the Kuwait crisis of 1990-91.Yet making this the sole legitimate pur-pose of intervention runs up against threeinterrelated problems. First, there is often adifferentiation in practice between the inter-national status of established states on theone hand and newly formed states on theother. Once states are formally recognizedas independent, this distinction has no legalbasis. Nevertheless, the longer a state is inexistence the more that it is usually able tosolidify its position as part of the stableorder of international society, even if itsborders continue to be disputed by others.By contrast, newly established states, evenif recognized formally, have not had time tobecome part of the settled order and are as aresult often perceived as having a more pro-visional, or probationary, status. Over timethey can hope to acquire the same status asolder states. Immediately after their forma-tion, however, they find it more difficult toplead support of the status quo in theirdefence as their very creation has violatedthe previous territorial status quo.

In Eastern Europe today, this distinctionhas meant that outside powers are likely todifferentiate between attempts to changethe international borders of establishedstates - such as Hungary or Romania - andattempts to change borders that were untilrecently only administrative boundaries be-tween the republics of Yugoslavia and theSoviet Union. Although the latter have nowbeen given the status of internationalborders, there is a marked reluctance on thepart of outsiders to interfere when attemptsare made to change them to reflect the new



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circumstances of independent states. Indeedthe perception that the legitimacy of a stateis at its lowest just after its formation maytend to precipitate military action beforeother states become used to its existence.(To take an example from another conti-nent, Indonesian annexation of East Timorin 1975 took place almost immediately afterthe Portuguese had left.)The reluctance to support newly formedstates is often tied directly to a second prob-lem - how far military protection should beprovided to states seeking to preserve theirexisting borders if under challenge fromminorities with ethnic links to other states.Do the rights of states to self-defence alwaystake priority over the rights of peoples toself-determination? And if not how canthese be reconciled?There are few states in Europe which donot have serious conflicts between groupsdefining themselves on grounds such as lan-guage, ethnicity or religion. With humanrights issues now an important part of thepan-European agenda, for example throughCSCE and the Council of Europe, govern-ment reaction to such conflicts can no longerbe seen as a purely internal matter. Never-theless, various inter-group conflicts will bemore or less disruptive of the internationalsystem, and thus more or less likely tosuggest an international response. First, atone end of the spectrum are conflicts involv-ing minorities who seek greater recognitionof their cultural, economic and politicalrights within existing states but do not seekany separate territorial autonomy or inde-pendence. Typically, this category includesgroups that have settled in a dispersedfashion, often in urban areas (North Afri-cans in France, Irish Catholics, Afro-Carib-beans and South Asians in the UK, Turks inGermany, gypsies in much of Europe). Sec-ond, there are conflicts involving groupsthat seek self-government or independencefor a particular region within an existingstate, often sustaining that claim by refer-ence to a perceived ethnic or cultural dis-tinctiveness (Catalonia, Scotland, Slovakia,Quebec). Such conflicts, however, are typi-cally seen as largely internal matters for thestates concerned, albeit with an increasing

human rights monitoring role. Third, how-ever, there are conflicts involving groupswhich not only seek some form of self-government for a particular region or groupbut also see themselves as linked to nearbystates. In these circumstances, the groups inquestion are often seen as having dividedloyalties between their own governmentand a 'foreign' government. The 'foreign'government, because it will have defined itsidentity in terms of the national group inquestion, usually sees itself in some form ofguardianship role with respect to its co-nationals, often reserving a special right tointervene militarily on their behalf and attimes also making claims to take over theterritory in question.Precisely because such conflicts can leadto conflict between states, either directly orindirectly, they pose the greatest threat tostability in Eastern Europe today, particu-larly when combined with the creation ofnew states. New states disturb the previouspattern of stability in both intrastate andinterstate relations. With leaders who typi-cally achieved office through their leader-ship of the struggle for indep.endence, theyaspire to complete the project of nationalliberation through unifying their wholegroup under one state (for example, Arme-nia annexes Nagorno-Karabakh; Serbia andCroatia divide up Bosnia).The ideology of the nation-state cannotprovide an answer to these conflicts withoutunacceptable human suffering. Aspirationsfor a 'Greater Germany' may have been laidto rest in part by the forced westward move-ment of millions of German-speakers in thelate 1940s. But the attendant human suffer-ing was enormous, acceptable to Germanyonly because it had no say in the matter.Similar 'ethnic cleansing' by Croatian andSerbian forces in Bosnia will produce alegacy of bitterness and continued conflictfar into the future.The position of Serb minorities in Croatiaand Bosnia once the latter declared inde-pendence is all too similar to the position ofthe 25 million Russians now living outsideRussia in other former Soviet republics.Owing little loyalty to their new rulers,these minorities often perceive themselves



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Security Regime for Eastern Europe 433as being vulnerable to discrimination andunemployment. So far the Russian govern-ment has been restrained in its response todemands from Russian minorities in neigh-bouring states. Already, however, leadingmembers of the government are making itclear that it does not rule out military inter-vention on their behalf. The Army has stillnot agreed to a final withdrawalfrom Latviaand Estonia. The 14th Army is becomingincreasingly drawn into the conflict indefence of Trans-Dnestran separatists inMoldavia. And Russia and Ukraine con-tinue to dispute ownership of Crimea, onlytransferred to Ukraine by Krushchev in1956.

This brings us to the third crucial point: inconstructing a security regime it is as difficultas ever to draw a rigid distinction betweeninterstateand intrastateaffairs. The 19th cen-tury Concert of Europe was as much analliance of ruling elites against the forces ofrevolution as it was an attempt to prevent amajor power war. NATO members wereable to preserve their unity for 40 years notonly because of a common threat from out-side but because of their common commit-ment to democratic capitalism inside theirborders. The League of Nations, it can beargued, was eventually undermined not onlyby the weakness of collective security butalso by fundamental ideological clashes be-tween liberal, communist and fascist modelsfor national society. The whole attempt tocreate a way out of the Cold War throughCSCE was founded on the premise that thehuman and military dimensions of Euro-pean security were closely linked. And it isgenerally perceived that building peace andsustaining democracy in Eastern Europe areclosely linked. Western states still at timesturn a blind eye to authoritarian regimeswhen confronted with what appears to bethe lesser of two evils (for example in re-lations with some of the states of CentralAsia) (Hunter, 1992). But there is never-theless a clear trend towards 'political con-ditionality', in which Western powers useeconomic aid as a carrot not only to forceeconomic reforms but also to induce desiredchanges in the internal order of the coun-tries concerned.

Indeed, even if violations of human rightsby a government are not judged sufficientlyserious to justify direct intervention, theymay affect the willingness of outside powersto defend it from external threat. Denial ofcivic rights to minority groups, ranging fromdiscriminatory franchise and employmentlaws to sustained harassment, is a majorpotential cause of international friction inmany parts of the region. Croatian treat-ment of its Serbian minority contributed tothe legitimacy of those Serbs seekingsecession through 1991. The initial reluc-tance of Estonia and Latvia to grant fullvoting rights to Russian speakers contri-buted to tension with Moscow. Throughoutthe region concepts of nationalism based onethnicity rather than citizenry are in dangerof gaining ground.Indeed, there may be circumstances inwhich the international community decidesthat the rights of a country's citizens takeprecedence over the right to sovereignty ofits government, and that military interven-tion is required to protect the former(Greenwood, 1993). When there is thepotential for massive human suffering, asin much of Iraq after the March 1991 cease-fire, the international community has ac-cepted the case for intervention even againstthe wishes of the government concerned(Mayall, 1991). Even if massive abuse ofhuman rights in a European country posesno direct security threat to other states, itshould be a matter of legitimate inter-national concern. And if other means ofintervention have failed, military interven-tion should not be ruled out simply out ofrespect for the principle of governmentsovereignty.How far the right to intervene in a state'sinternal affairs should go without the con-sent of that state's government is not clear.Proposals for intervention to prevent geno-cide or suffering on a massive scale have amoral force of considerable appeal. Yet bytheir nature they can only work by replac-ing, or at least threatening to replace, theauthority of the government of the region orstate involved. Those who intervene musttherefore take into account the likelihoodthat what at first is humanitarian interven-



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434 Malcolm Chalmerstion will soon become intensely political innature as they are faced with the task ofconstituting a new government authority,and supporting it for an extended period oftime. It is therefore crucial that any suchintervention has clear political objectives,together with a viable 'exit strategy'.Thus, if the USA-led coalition hadmarched to Baghdad in March 1991, assome would have wished, it would no doubthave been welcomed with open arms bythose who had suffered most from Saddam'srule. But this support could have rapidlyturned to nationalist resentment unless theUN had been able to organize a handover ofpower to new authorities as soon as poss-ible. The US intervention in Somalia inDecember 1992 was widely welcomed as ameans of permitting food shipments toreach those in need. But the hardest part -the negotiation of a sustainable politicalsettlement - is still to come.In establishing 'safe havens' within exist-ing states, perhaps similar to the one set upin Kurdish Iraq after the Gulf War, the in-ternational community may encouragethose arguing for secession. Yet this shouldnot, by itself, rule out the future use of thismethod of intervention. A case can be madein retrospect, for example, that a morepeaceful solution to the Bosnian crisis mighthave been possible if the UN had organizedplebiscites on whether parts of Bosniawished to join one of the neighbouringrepublics. It is important to preserve theprinciple that borders should not bechanged by force. But peaceful secessionmay - as in the departure of Eritreafrom Ethiopia after the April 1993 refer-endum - be more conducive to long-termstability than a rigid adherence to the statusquo.In a world in which the experience of col-onialism is still a living memory for many,any movement in the direction of 'protector-ates' and 'trusteeship' would have to becarefully circumscribed.9 Former coloniesare likely to be suspicious of proposals thatappear to be a new form of Northern domi-nation, even if many of those in the occupy-ing forces are - as in Cambodia - from otherThird World countries. Former colonial

powers are also well aware that what is atfirst welcomed as an attempt to imposepeace and order can all too easily come tobe seen as an alien intrusion.

3.2 CostsA discussion of the circumstances in whichthe use or threat to use military force is jus-tified which focuses entirely on whether theobjectives of that intervention are legit-imate, however, is incomplete. Collectivesecurity proponents rightly criticize a purelycase-by-case approach to military interven-tion, fearing the precedent that failure toprevent aggression in one case will have onthe ability to deter other violations of inter-national law elsewhere. Yet the oppositepolicy - automatic use of military forcewhenever borders are violated or genocideis threatened - creates a different series ofproblems. The wider demonstration effectsof actions taken have to be estimated ratherthan assumed. And the desire to achievelegitimate ends has to be weighed againstthe feasibility and cost of the specific meansby which it is proposed to achieve thoseends.Just-war tradition suggests that just causeis not sufficient for a war to be morally legit-imate.1' In particular, the proportionalitycriterion means that, in addition, the gainsfrom any particularuse of force must exceedthe costs, measured in both human and ma-terial terms. A victory that is too expensiveis not a victory at all.What is not clear in attempts to deriveoperational significance from this criterion,however, is whether one should measuresimply the estimated gains and costs for thecitizens of those countries contemplatingmilitary action or, alternatively, those for allthe individuals potentially affected, what-ever their nationality. The answer to thisquestion will be a crucial determinant notonly of whether or not intervention takesplace, but also what form it takes.From the time of the Crusades, therehave been occasions when it has beenthought acceptable to assume that the livesof those of other races or nationalities wereof lesser value than those of one's own



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Security Regimefor Eastern Europe 435

group. Yet to accept such an assumptiontoday, either explicitly or implicitly, wouldbe to reverse a fundamental principle under-lying modern democratic societies. Anymorally legitimate approach to the issue ofEuropean security must reject any attemptto distinguish the value of human life purelyon the basis of race or nationality.Just-war tradition makes clear that, wherethere is no alternative, it may be legitimateto kill those who are themselves fighting inopposition to a just cause, even if they aresimply obeying orders. Yet it also makesclear that this legitimation does not extendto the lives of prisoners and non-comba-tants, who should be accorded the samebasic rights (for example to medical treat-ment, food, and so on) as are extended toother members of humankind. Moreover,acceptance of the principle of humanequality suggests that any loss of life,whether as a result of action or inaction,whether of one's own citizens or not,and whether military or civilian, must beequally weighted in the calculus or propor-tionality.Such an assumption did not inform theactions of Western states in their responseto the unfolding conflict in Yugoslavia since1991. Western public opinion was outragedby the reports of concentration camps, or-ganized rape and ethnic cleansing on a mas-sive scale in Bosnia. But the prospect ofsignificant casualties amongst Westernpersonnel - probably more, for example,than were suffered by the allied forces in the1991 Gulf War - meant that UN militaryaction was so limited in nature as to beincapable of responding adequately to thescale of the catastrophe (Sharp, 1993). Foralmost two years it appeared that Westerngovernments were unwilling to risk thepossibility of losing the lives of severalhundred of their soldiers, even if the conse-quence of their inaction was that tens ofthousands of civilians were killed or deliber-ately starved for the 'crime' of belongingto the wrong religion or ethnic group. Incontrast, were the lives and property ofCroatian or Bosnian civilians seen to havebeen of equal value to those of citizens ofthe USA or France, there is little doubt that

those countries would have been willing totake military action on their behalf.Yet any workable moral code has to takeaccount of the political realities of the day,and the nature of modern liberal societies isthat their citizens are increasingly less will-ing to accept casualties in war, at least whennational territory is not directly affected.The opposition to the USA's war in Viet-nam was driven in large measure by the re-alization that it was an unjust war, seekingto prop up a corrupt and repressive regimeat the cost of massive suffering to the peopleof the whole of Indo-China. But one of itslasting effects on the US polity was that nofuture government will ask its people toaccept American casualties on a comparablescale, even in a much more clearly justcause, and even with a much clearer pros-pect of success. Unless there is an immedi-ate national interest involved in the conflictin question, therefore - and this will gener-ally not be the case - a credible concept forproviding security guarantees for EasternEurope will have to seek means of reducingWestern casualties to the lowest possiblelevel.

Other things being equal, such a require-ment would clearly command universal sup-port. In practice, however, its applicationwill continually throw up difficult moral di-lemmas. How many lives, of soldiers andcivilian aid workers, should be put at risk toprovide food to a besieged city? How farshould Western forces rely on using ad-vanced technologies to minimize their owncasualties, even if the cost is to endanger thelives of more civilians on the ground? Howgreat a commitment should be made to re-establish order in divided communities,even if (as in Northern Ireland) the result isa steady trickle of casualties from guerrillaattack?There are no easy answers to suchquestions. Yet the pursuit of common secur-ity for Europe, or indeed more widely, isbound in some circumstances to lead to theloss of soldiers' lives. The onus of proofshould be on those proposing action todemonstrate that the loss of life from mili-tary action is clearly outweighed by thenumbers of lives saved by that action. In



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436 Malcolm Chalmerssuch a calculation, however, all lives mustbe weighted equally. Young men do not losetheir status as members of the human racesimply by virtue of wearing the uniform ofan enemy. The costs of war include thosekilled and injured in the forces of all partici-pants. Even if modern military technologymeans that a battle can be fought with mini-mal casualties for UN forces, as in the 1991Gulf War, the prospect of large-scale enemycasualties may make that battle unaccept-able.3.3 AuthorityTraditionally, states were seen as providingsufficient legitimate authority for militaryaction in national self-defence. When actionis taken in order to enforce internationallaw, however, some form of collective auth-orization is now widely seen as desirable.More specifically, UN authorization, orpossibly that of a regional security bodysuch as the CSCE, has increasingly beenseen as a necessary precondition for the useof military force in situations other than di-rect self-defence.Yet the legitimacy of these organizations,based as they both are on disputed decision-making mechanisms, is not universallyrecognized. To be perceived as legitimate, itis important that collective military actionbe seen to be supported by small states aswell as by great powers, and the presence ofsuch states in both the UN Security Counciland the CSCE helps to ensure this. Providedthat overwhelming support for a course ofaction has been demonstrated in these fora,however, a Chinese veto in the UN SecurityCouncil may not always be enough to pre-vent collective action being taken to preventrequests from a government in Eastern Eur-ope for military assistance. Nor is it self-evident that a veto of Greece or Romania inthe CSCE should have the same effect.Yet the UN and CSCE do provide necess-ary mechanisms through which countries areobliged to consult widely before takingaction, coordinate their plans with those ofother states, and thus minimize the temp-tation to resort to unilateral action. One ofthe important goals of any security regimefor Eastern Europe must be to avoid the

escalation of local conflicts through the uni-lateral involvement of outside powers.Yugoslavia's neighbours have so farabstained from direct intervention. But,were the war to extend southwards toKosovo and Macedonia, it could draw inGreece and Albania. Nor can one entirelyrule out Hungarian involvement to protectthe Hungarian minority in Vojvodina. Else-where, too, local crises threaten to suck inoutside powers. Russia, Turkey and Irancould become involved in the war betweenArmenia and Azerbaijan. The conflict inMoldavia threatens to provoke confron-tation between Russia and Romania. One ofthe functions of collective security must beto replace unilateral intervention by inter-ested powers, even in pursuit of legitimateobjectives, by collective intervention inorder to uphold agreed norms of behaviour.Whether that collective intervention mustalways necessarily involve the full authorityof the UN or CSCE, however, may be amatter of continuing legitimate debate.

4. Commitmentsin AdvanceEven if military intervention is justified insome circumstances, it is often argued thatthe states concerned should be given themaximum flexibility to decide, on a case-by-case basis, as to whether and when force isappropriate. It is difficult to decide inadvance whether a particular aggressioncould not be met by other means, orwhether the costs involved justify the politi-cal ends sought. All options, it is contended,must therefore be kept open.As in the debate about deterrence duringthe Cold War, however, the desire for flexi-bility has to be balanced against the preven-tive effect that a predictable response canprovide. Total flexibility risks leaving thesecurity of Eastern European states at themercy of short-term trends in Western poli-tics. The perceived domestic political payofffrom intervention, itself heavily influencedby the nature of media coverage, could playa disproportionate role in deciding Westernpolicy. Those countries with powerful over-seas lobbies (Croatians in Germany, Ukrai-nians in Canada) would be more able to



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Security Regime for Eastern Europe 437secure help than those without. AndWestern intervention would tend to takeplace, if at all, only after the results of inac-tion had been made painfully clear, and onlyafter the situation on the ground had be-come much more complex - as indeed wasthe case as the Bosnian war developedthrough 1992 and 1993.Moreover, one of the lessons of history isthat military prevention is much cheaperthan an intervention once conflict hasstarted. In contrast to Britain's timely de-ployment of troops to Kuwait in July 1961,forcing Iraq to draw back from invasion, theambiguity of the US position 29 years laterhelped create the conditions for a secondIraqi attempt. As in Korea in 1950, the lackof a clear Western security guarantee toKuwait made war more likely while failingto limit subsequent Western involvement.Reactive deployment of UN peace-keep-ing forces has also been criticized. Peace-keeping deployments in Croatia and Bosniaundoubtedly helped the humanitarian reliefeffort and may have reduced the level ofatrocities to some extent. On the otherhand, as Barry Posen has argued:

As a general rule, the UN does not make peace: itnegotiates cease-fires. . . . The UN thus protects,and to some extent legitimates, the military gains ofthe winning side. . . . This approach by the inter-national community to intervention in ethnic con-flict helps create an incentive for offensive militaryoperations (Posen, 1993, pp. 33-34).Nor has 'flexibility' proven to be an effectivemeans of avoiding eventual involvement inwar, as US experience this century hasdemonstrated. Lack of a clear US commit-ment to European security helped precipi-tate war in both 1914 and 1939, but it did notin the end prevent US involvement in thosewars. The clear commitment of the USA toNATO since 1949, by contrast, contributedto European peace and stability for 40 yearsdespite pronounced ideological antagonism.NATO members were willing to makestrong commitments to come to the defenceof fellow members if they were attacked,even if that country was marginal to itsshort-term national interests. A securityregime like NATO works in part because, inany particular crisis, states will be commit-

ted to defending a set of rules and an agreedinternational order. The Western alliescould have acceded to Soviet pressure overBerlin in 1948 without seriously weakeningtheir economic or military position. Yet if ithad done so, there is little doubt that thecredibility of their commitments elsewherewould have been seriously undermined, andthe risks of a wider conflict thus increased.In contrast to the Cold War, there is noone single threat to the security of Europe,and to this extent the task of providing ef-fective guarantees is more difficult. Butthere are precedents for multidirectionalguarantees in Europe - one quite successful(the Concert of Europe), one largely unsuc-cessful (the League of Nations). The experi-ence of the 19th century suggests that someform of concerted security policy might bebetter than the lack of such a policy (Jervis,1985; Kupchan & Kupchan, 1991; Zelin-kow, 1992). What both cases suggeststrongly, however, is that the test of such apolicy is in crises. It was the failure ofBritain and France to react decisively toeither the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in1935 or to Germany's breach of armscontrol commitments in the same year thatfatally undermined the League. Any systemof law, domestic or international, tends inthe last resort to depend on having an effec-tive mechanism for its enforcement. Whenlaw is well established and widely accepted,enforcement may rarely be necessary. Inorder for a new set of rules to gain thatacceptance, however, it must first establishits credibility. The NATO treaty per se wasnot enough to secure the credibility of theWestern alliance. That required a demon-strated preparedness by the USA and othersto make commitments to the defence ofWestern Europe, both through the forwardbasing of forces and through the nature oftheir response to successive crises. In post-Cold War Europe, outside military inter-vention in a particularcrisis, or lack of suchintervention, is bound to be seen as settinga precedent for other similar crises in theregion. If intervention takes place and issuccessful in punishing aggression, it can beexpected that it will help to deter otherpotential aggressors. Yet if the West



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abstains from intervention in one place,then this could lead to the opposite expec-tation.We have already outlined the three maincriteria that need to be taken into accountwhen considering the wisdom of interven-tion: whether the objectives of interventionare legitimate, whether the costs areoutweighed by the benefits, and whetherthere is legitimate authority for action.What does this imply, however, for priorcommitments to the use of military force.First, it suggests the need for a commit-ment in principle by international bodiessuch as the CSCE that it will consider auth-orizing military action in defence of existinginternational borders and/or in order toavoid massive loss of life within a member-state as a result of government action. Atpresent, CSCE policy specifically rules outthe use of its peace-keeping forces inenforcement operations (Foreign Office,1992, p. 21). A reversal of this policy wouldsend a clear signal to potential aggressorsthat they would have to take into account anincreased possibility that they would be metby a collective military response. And itwould provide a base on which a system ofmore specific guarantees could then be de-veloped. Even before such guarantees couldbe developed, a general declaration of will-ingness to use force where necessary woulditself be an important step forward.Second, on the basis of this general com-mitment, CSCE members would be able todevelop policies of guarantees and deploy-ment in response to particular crises as theydevelop. An important aspect of such poli-cies would be to emphasize preventionthrough explicit statements of intent tocome to the aid of particular states ifattacked. In order for such commitments tobe taken seriously, they might be backedup militarily, for example by basing multi-national military forces in the countries con-cerned, supported by the ability to reinforcepermanent units if necessary.Given the capabilities available for re-inforcement from Western Europe, theforces needed for preventive deployment ofthis sort would not be large or expensive.Rather their main purpose would be to

signal, to both host country and potentialaggressor, the seriousness of internationalcommitment. To be credible, however, theforces deployed would have to be clearlyprotective in function. A monitoring-onlycommitment, such as is common with tra-ditional UN peace-keeping forces, wouldnot be sufficient. But, if UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali's recentproposals are accepted, 'peace enforcement'units engaged in 'preventive deployment' inEurope could come under the command ofthe United Nations (Boutros-Ghali, 1992).In cases where prevention has notworked, or has not been tried, the costsinvolved in military intervention are likelyto be greater. It is a matter for conjecturewhether or not a timely display of UNmilitary force could have deterred Serbian/Federal Army assaults on Croatia and Bos-nia in 1991 and 1992. What is clear is thatattempts to restore the status quo ante bymilitary means are increasingly difficultonce policies of 'ethnic cleansing' changethe composition of the population in dis-puted areas.Whether or not intervention 'after thefact' in Croatia and Bosnia is feasible, thereremains the possibility of preventive deploy-ments in those states that meet the con-ditions we have outlined. If Serbia doesinvade Macedonia, or if it attempts to expellarge numbers of Albanians from theirhomes in Kosovo, there is a very real possi-bility that the war could spread to involveAlbania, Turkey, Bulgaria and Greece:making subsequent Western involvementincreasingly difficult to avoid. Despite therisks involved, therefore, the arguments fora clear security guarantee to Skopje maysoon come to be decisive. The December1992 decision to deploy 500 UN peace-keepers to Macedonia was a welcomeadvance in this direction, and by May 1993the USA appeared ready to commit itsforces to this mission. Yet it is far from clearhow these forces would be expected to reactwere Macedonia now to be attacked. Thechances of preventing the internationaliz-ation of the Balkan conflict may, paradoxi-cally, be improved if clear internationalcommitments are made to take decisive



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Security Regime for Eastern Europe 439

military action in the event of further ag-gression.Yet it is often difficult for clear militaryguarantees to be made in a crisis. Outsidepowers may not wish to antagonize a poten-tial aggressor while attempts to achieve apeaceful settlement have still not beenexhausted. Moreover, the problemsinvolved in speedily reaching multilateralagreement between several major powers,each with competing priorities for attention,is such that potential aggressors can pre-empt the possibility of such guarantees byswift action of their own. Throughout thedeveloping Yugoslav crisis, Western stateshave been criticized as being both tooprecipitate and too tardy in their responses.Both critiques have some merit, but the keylesson to be drawn may be that, where pos-sible, policies need to be developed that donot rely so much on timing for their success.In addition, therefore, the possibility ofthe provision of peacetime security guaran-tees to Eastern European states should beconsidered, provided that the states fulfiltwo key conditions. First, they shouldrenounce any claims to the territory of otherstates and demonstrate in practice - forexample in government interpretations ofnationalist mythologies - that this renunci-ation is meaningful. Second, they shouldgrant full civil rights to national minorities inorder to remove the contribution which theexistence of such minorities can make to in-ternational conflict. In both cases it isreasonable for a Western commitment topromote security in the region to bematched by a similar commitment by thestates which benefit from this commit-ment.11Western governments remain reluctant tofollow this path because they fear that theymight then be committed to defending stateswhose policies they did not support. Incontrast to a policy of admitting states toNATO membership, therefore, it may bemore acceptable to make clear that anyguarantees would depend on the continuingadherence to these two conditions and couldbe reversed if they were not met. As confi-dence grew on the long-term commitment ofthe states in question to democracy and non-

aggression, these guarantees might form thebasis for admittance to full NATO or WEUmembership. If some states succeed in theirattempts to join the EC, WEU (and there-fore, if requested, NATO) membershipwould in any case follow. But the formu-lation suggested here would bring the time-table for admitting countries into theWestern security club forward, making animmediate contribution to filling the secur-ity vacuum now developing in Eastern Eur-ope (Simon, 1993).Such guarantees would not initially beuniversal. Indeed, negotiation of such ar-rangements might initially be restricted tothese countries - such as Poland, Hungary,the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Slovenia- already seeking to pursue moderate poli-cies, but receiving little in the way of con-crete assistance from the West in thisregard. The precedent created, however,could have a powerful impact on otherstates' behaviour, helping to create overtime an expanding area of stability.'2 Howfar this area could expand cannot be pre-dicted in advance. But the carrot of securityguarantees would provide a lever to affectthe policies of states in benign ways, allow-ing the West to act as a catalyst for settle-ments.By making it clear that guarantees couldbe reversible, such a policy should also helpmake clear that states cannot expect the in-ternational community to protect their legit-imate security needs if they do not also pur-sue policies that meet the security needs ofother states. Were guarantees to be avail-able, some of the current support for moremilitant nationalists might in any case bereduced. But were it not, for example ifadvocates of territorial expansion were totake power in Budapest or Bucharest, theformula suggested here would allow pre-vious commitments to be retracted.

5. Russia: Limits of a Security RegimeSpecial caution would be required in takingany step that might lead to military conflictbetween the major military powers of Eur-ope, and in particular between Russia andNATO. The possibility that Russia will



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440 Malcolm Chalmersinvade one of the other ex-Soviet republicscannot be ruled out, given the tensions overthe treatment of Russian minorities in thosecountries and the strength of nationalistfeeling in Russia itself. Yet, while such aninvasion would be bound to seriously affecteconomic and political cooperation, andcould trigger economic sanctions, it wouldnot be a serious enough cause for the Westto risk the possibility of a major Europeanwar.Such a refusal does not derive from a fail-ure to weigh the lives of Ukrainian or Esto-nian citizens equally with those of France orGermany. Rather it is a result of a calcu-lation that it would not be possible toreverse a Russian invasion of Ukraine orEstonia without massive loss of human lifeand ultimately the risk of failure. Even ifnuclear weapons were not used, and even ifWestern superiority in conventional armssecured the liberation of the state that hadbeen attacked, the costs incurred in fightingsuch a war would be disproportionate to thegains made.Such a calculation was the basis ofWestern leaders' consistent refusal, fromthe late 1940s onwards, to adopt the policyof 'rollback' advocated by critics of theYalta settlement. NATO leaders made cleartheir disapproval of the Soviet invasion ofHungary in 1956, the Warsaw Pact invasionof Czechoslovakia in 1968, and the scarcelyveiled threats to invade Poland in 1981. Butthey were not prepared to risk world war inorder to deter or reverse these violations ofinternational law.Yet NATO was clearly prepared to riskworld war in order to prevent Soviet ag-gression against any of its own members.For such an attack, in contrast to the attackson Hungary or Czechoslovakia, would havebeen seen as a threat to the entire com-munity of states, not only to the stateinitially under attack. In order to deter athreat of this order, NATO was prepared torisk world war. In the unlikely event of oneof NATO's members being attacked byRussia tomorrow, other NATO membersremain committed to coming to its defence.Expanding formal membership of NATOto incorporate some of the states of Eastern

Europe could in current circumstances beopen to the objection that it wouldstrengthen the hand of hardliners in Mos-cow, thus increasing the risks of a militarilyassertive Russia. Were a Russian attack onone of its ex-Soviet neighbours to occur,however, the attempt to moderate Russianforeign policy would already have been lost.West European states would come underenormous pressure to provide explicit secur-ity guarantee to states bordering the formerSoviet Union (notably to Finland andPoland). Given the commitment to admitthese states to the EC eventually, the casefor accepting these demands would be astrong one. It would make clear to Russiathat, as in the Cold War, there were limits toits ability to use militarypower to achieve itsaims. It would reassure the peoples of thecountries concerned, and thus safeguardtheir progress to full EC membership.Provided that any associated military de-ployments were strictly defensive in nature,they would provide a measure of stabilityfor the regions concerned.This in turn raises the question of how farguarantees against Russian attack should beextended to countries that are not at presentmembers of NATO. The WEU has agreed,in the Petersberg declaration, to allow allEC members the right to join WEU as fullmembers. This has far-reaching impli-cations. By 1996, Austria, Finland andSweden could be members of the EuropeanCommunity, with an automatic right to jointhe Western European Union as fullmembers should they so choose. By the endof the century several ex-communist statesin Eastern Europe could be in a similar pos-ition. The further down the road to ECmembership these two groups of states go,therefore, the more difficult it will be todeny them explicit security guarantees(Chalmers, 1992, pp. 25-35).In time, it may also become possible tooffer some of the states of the former SovietUnion the same degree of military protec-tion that is now offered to Germany, andmay soon be offered to Finland or Poland.The pace of such a process will, however,depend on both the internal democratiza-tion of the states concerned and the willing-



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SecurityRegimefor Eastern Europe 441ness of Russia to give up its droit de regardover its immediate neighbours. That goal ismore likely to be achieved in a series ofsteps, building on success in tackling poten-tial crises and expanding the scope of con-ditional security guarantees, than by a newsecurity system built ab initio.The inclusion of the former republics ofthe Soviet Union in a system of securityguarantees cannot be ruled out if the long-term goal of creating a law-governed com-munity of European states is to be re-alized.13 Yet for the next few years theprovisional status of the new post-Sovietstates must be recognized. Although theyenjoy full independence as subjects of inter-national law, their independence continuesto be severely limited in practice, in somecases more than in others. Their economiesare closely linked with each other, and inmost cases they have just begun to createindependent armed forces. Indeed, the veryexistence of the Commonwealth of Indepen-dent States suggests the need to account forthe special nature of the independence ofthe states concerned.Perhaps of greatest concern as a potentialsource of future conflict is that Russia, thesuccessor state to the Soviet Union, has yetto renounce its right to unilateral militaryaction in these territories. In the immediatefuture, moreover, such a renunciation is un-likely. Many Russians now live outside Rus-sia, and recent policy statements suggestthat the Russian government may be unwill-ing to rely on the international communityto ensure their protection (Dick, 1992). Thepace of troop withdrawals from Latvia andEstonia has been linked to concerns aboutthe treatment of ethnic Russians in thosestates. The Russian ambassador to Kiev de-scribed Ukrainian independence as a tem-porary phenomenon, and Russia, unlikemost of Ukraine's neighbours, has refusedto sign a treaty recognizing their mutualborder (Economist, 1993).Yet, even if Russia does not yet supportfull membership in a collective securitysystem for the former Soviet republics,there is more that the rest of Europe can doto contribute to the military stabilization ofthe region. At present the main Russian

government concerns regarding the situ-ation in neighbouring states are similar tothose of the Western powers: to prevent thebreakdown of order and to protect humanrights (particularly for ethnic Russians).Provided that its ultimate right to act unilat-erally were not threatened, the Russiangovernment might be very willing to sharethe burden of conflict resolution and peace-making in these states. A greater Westernwillingness to respond to such requestsmight in turn make it less likely that Russiafelt impelled to further its concerns throughunilateral use of force. Even more than inthe former Yugoslavia, there are likely to besevere limits on the extent to which thecountries of Western Europe are willing torisk the lives of their soldiers to protect thepeace in Armenia or Tajikistan. If the Westis serious about extending its security com-munity eastwards, however, such a commit-ment should not be ruled out.Some commentators draw a parallel be-tween Germany in 1945 and Russia in 1992 -a defeated power that should be incorpor-ated as quickly as possible as an equalpartner in a new postwar security system.While such an argument has some reso-nance, however, the differences betweenthe two situations are in many ways asinstructive as the parallels. West Germanycould be incorporated into the Westernsecurity system in the mid-1950s because,over the previous decade, the occupyingpowers had enforced a thorough democrati-zation of its society and armed forces,helped by the fact that until 1933 Germanyhas been a parliamentary democracy. Inaddition, Marshall aid and the Germaneconomic miracle marginalized politicalextremists and provided a material basis formoderation. And, even after these pro-cesses were complete, the threat from theEast enabled the Western powers to enforcea subordinate status on the FederalRepublic that reassured friend and potentialfoe alike.In contrast, Russia has not lost a real warand it has not been occupied. The Sovietarmy is in crisis, but it has not been dis-banded. And the process of creating a demo-cratic culture is likely to be slower in a



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country without any history of democracy.The long-term goal of including Russia in apan-European security community shouldplay a central role in shaping West Europeanpolicy. But the achievement of that goal ismore likely if the scale of the transformationstill required within Russia is recognized.

6. ConclusionThe risk of war in Eastern Europe hasincreased because the sudden collapse of theSoviet state has left a security vacuum in theregion. The countries of Eastern Europecannot provide a viable alternative securityregime by themselves. For such a regimewould be rejected by non-Russian statesbecause it would resemble too closely theWarsaw Pact; and Russia itself does nothave the ability or desire to play a hegemo-nic role, except perhaps in those ex-Sovietrepublics with large Russian minorities. If acredible security regime is to be created,therefore, much of the burden of enforce-ment must fall on those outside states whichalone have the military capability to enforcecollective decisions.It will be a difficult step for many of thekey countries to take. The USA believesthat Europeans should take on the main re-sponsibility for European security, yet Ger-many remains constrained for both histori-cal and constitutional reasons and both theUK and France are reluctant to bear themajor share of the burden of collectivedefence. If West European armed forces areto have any role in the future, however,then it is much more likely to be in small-scale conflicts in Eastern Europe than in a

major war over the future control of thewhole continent. There are clearly risks intaking on security commitments to the East.The risks of involvement now, however,must be balanced against the increased risksof conflict occurring if such commitmentsare not made. The 'Yellowstone Park'option ('let it burn'14) is not acceptable,given what this would imply for aspirationstowards a united continent. If developmentis to take place in the East, to the benefit ofthe whole continent, then the rest of Europemust play its part in securing peace.

NOTES1. The only states to remain unchanged since 1990 arePoland, Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria and Albania.2. The prospects for the survival of democracy mayvary between different parts of the region. Thepolitical systems of countries with relatively well-developed 'civil societies' may be better able toweather economic shocks. Others may be morelikely to revert to patterns of political rule consis-tent with clientalist structures (Puttnam, 1993).3. Growing support for extreme nationalism may alsobe the result of economic crisis (Snyder, 1993).Trade has collapsed, both between COMECONmembers and between former Soviet republics;steep cuts in Soviet arms production now threatenthe livelihoods of millions; and the attempts totransform command systems into market econom-ies through 'shock therapy', even if eventually suc-cessful, have contributed to growing income in-

equality, falling output, and an increasingpossibility of hyperinflation. If democratic govern-ments fail to tackle these problems, others maytake their place.4. These conflicts suggest that the democracy/peacehypothesis may not hold in new states with dis-puted borders. Croatia, Serbia, Bosnia, Armeniaand Azerbaijan have all held multiparty electionsin the recent past, and have allowed a much greaterdiversity of views than was possible under commu-nist rule. Most studies of the issue would, however,not count them as democracies. Doyle (1986), forexample, includes only those governments thathave been in existence for at least three years.5. A useful discussion of possible conditions forWestern aid to the former Soviet republics is con-tained in Hopf (1992).6. However, Gallagher (1993) has commented thatthis analogy, used publicly by UK Foreign Sec-retary Douglas Hurd in order to oppose WEU mili-tary action in October 1991, 'has been a rude shockfor the non-violent Ulster majority, drawn fromboth religious groups, many of whom feel them-selves expendable, and certainly peripheral toBritain's core interests'.7. By a security regime we mean a 'set of implicit andexplicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expec-

tations converge' in the area of military securitypolicy (Krasner, 1983, p. 2).8. For further discussion of the meaning of 'purecollective security', see Kupchan & Kupchan(1991, p. 120) and Betts (1992). For an overview ofpast attempts at creating European securityregimes, see Holsti (1991).9. Helman & Ratner's work (1992/93) contains a use-ful discussion of these issues.10. Walzer (1992). For an extended discussion of apossible ethical framework for intervention, seeLewer & Ramsbotham (1993).11. One example of such linkage was the EuropeanCommunity's 1991 decision to base recognition ofthe former Yugoslav republics on their policies onhuman rights and minority rights. The Badinter



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Security Regime for Eastern Europe 443Commission was established to assess whichrepublics, if any, met these conditions. The credi-bility of the EC's policy, however, was badlydented by its refusal to recognize Macedonia on theone hand (despite its having satisfied the Badintercommission), and its recognition of Croatia on theother (despite the commission's reserved judge-ment on the treatment of the Serb minority in thatrepublic).12. A policy of selective security guarantees would notexclude the possibility of military action in otherparts of the region, provided that the three criteria- legitimate objectives, benefits outweighing costs,and legitimate authority - are met. Indeed, bymaking clear the willingness of the internationalcommunity to make a military commitment toEastern security, it should strengthen the percep-tion that such action is possible.13. I discuss this further in Chalmers (1990, 1991).

14. Van Evera (1992, p. 366). The parallel is with theUS Forest Service letting Yellowstone Park burnduring the summer of 1989. Van Evera does nothimself advocate such a policy.

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Documents

Developing a Security Regime for Eastern Europe