Deterrence and Defense in Second Nuclear Age

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A N A L Y S I S C E N T E R P A P E R S

March 2009

BY

ROBERT P. HAFFA, JR.

RAVI R. HICHKAD

DANAJ. JOHNSON

PHILIPW. PRATT

Deterrence and Defense inThe Second Nuclear Age


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Deterrence and Defense in The Second Nuclear Age


CONTENTS

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ....................................................................................................................................1

INTRODUCTION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE ........................................................................................3

DEFINING THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE ...............................................................................................5

THE STRUCTURE OF THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE ........................................................................5

ACTORS AND CAPABILITIES IN THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE ......................................................7

THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE: LOOKING FORWARD....................................................................11

DETERRENCE IN THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE

......................................................................................12NUCLEARARMS CONTROL: CONSTRAINING U.S. AND RUSSIAN NUCLEARFORCES..........12

NUCLEARPOSTURE REVIEWS: U.S. NUCLEARWEAPONS POLICY...........................................13

TAILORED DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE.......................................................14

TAILORING DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE: MODERNNUCLEARSTATES .................................................................................................................................14

TAILORING DETERRENCE FOR THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE: ROGUE STATES,NUCLEARASPIRANTS, AND NON-STATE ACTORS........................................................................17

DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE...............................................................................................22

MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE FIRST NUCLEARAGE ...........................................................................22

TAILORING BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE .......................24

MISSILE DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE: HOW MUCH IS ENOUGH? ...................27

SYNCHRONIZING DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE ..........................31

PREVIOUS EFFORTS ..............................................................................................................................31

OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION .................................................................................................33

ACHIEVING OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION...........................................................................33

OPERATIONAL SYNCHRONIZATION: AN ILLUSTRATIVE SCENARIO ..........................................34

CONCLUSION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE IN THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE ...............................39

ABOUT THEAUTHORS .................................................................................................................................41


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The United States, the other sovereign members of the nuclear club, and a number of

would-be proliferators have now entered what has been described as the second nuclear

age. This paper examines the deterrence and defense requirements presented by this new

age, arguing for the value to be gained through their integration. Offense-defense integra-

tion will provide to national decision-makers timely and informed choices of security

options needed to address the spectrum of conflict likely to unfold within the second

nuclear age.

The second nuclear age has some similarities with the first, but also exhibits marked con-

trasts. The security environment has transitioned from the first nuclear age, a bipolar, long-

term competition between two technologically sophisticated states and their allies, to one

of multi-polarity with emerging threats, unstable actors, and varied inventories of nuclear

weapons and delivery means. In addition to the post-Cold War nuclear capabilities of

Russia and China, new challenges are emerging from rogue states, fractured nuclear states,

nuclear aspirants, and non-state actors. To deal with the uncertain environment and range

of actors characteristic of the second nuclear age, the United States must revisit its policies

and force structure underwriting the missions of deterrence and defense.

The 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) outlined a tailored deterrence strategy.

This concept is built on the understanding that, owing to the range of actors present in the

second nuclear age, Cold War deterrent theories, strategies and forces alone will not effec-

tively address the new security environment. Tailoring nuclear deterrence for the future will

require a careful mix of the strategies and forces proven in the first nuclear age, coupled with

new policies and capabilities to meet the emerging threats from new nuclear actors. These

will include modernization of the traditional nuclear triad of intercontinental ballistic mis-

siles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and bomber forces to

enhance their deterrent capability and credibility.

The first nuclear age stressed the value of deterrence over defense. U.S. policy choices specif-

ically rejected anti-ballistic missile systems to enable the stability engendered by the bipolar

balance popularly characterized as mutually assured destruction. However, the new actors

in the second nuclear age give little indication they will be similarly deterred. Therefore, the

second nuclear age demands the development and deployment of layered missile defenses

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY


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capable of meeting a wide range of threats and a strategy leveraging their capabilities. This

system will require persistent awareness, global warning, tracking and handoff, and mobile,

flexible, rapidly deployable missile defenses capable of intercepting inbound warheads in

their boost, ascent, mid-course and terminal phases of flight.

Critical to these new capabilities, and central to our argument, is a strategy to integrate andsynchronize deterrent and defensive systems to meet future threats, thereby providing a

broad range of flexible, integrated, and time-sensitive options for U.S. decision-makers.

Offense-defense integration unifies and synchronizes the operational elementsintelli-

gence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), command and control, layered missile

defense, and a range of offensive capabilitiesto strengthen deterrence and defense across

a spectrum of plausible contingencies.

Fashioning a strategy that unifies and synchronizes the offensive and defensive elements of

our military capabilities to provide a range of options is imperative to meet the challengesof the second nuclear age. Important steps toward this goal include:

The U.S. Department of Defense should use the opportunity of the pending QDR and NuclearPosture Review (NPR) to sustain and strengthen the overall credibility and capability of the tradi-tional nuclear triad.

New investments should be directed toward increased awareness and understanding of emergingthreats coupled with a prompt global strike capability to hold those threats at risk. A conventionalintercontinental ballistic missile, either sea- or land-based, and a next-generation bomber are deter-rent capabilities that should be called for in the next QDR and NPR and funded for fielding adecade from now.

A layered system of global, rapidly deployable sea-, land-, air-, and space-based capabilities to defend

against ballistic missiles in all phases of flight should be high on the list of the nations defensepriorities.

A distributed, automated, real-time, collaborative planning capability that is multi-dimensional(vertical through the strategic-operational-theater command structure and horizontal among geo-graphic combatant commanders and joint force commanders) and multi-mission (encompassing allmissions from ISR to missile defense and offensive options) needs to be implemented to supportthe operational synchronization of deterrence and defense.

Sustained support for operational planning and exercise activities conducted by the combatantcommands and the service components is required to implement operational synchronization andto familiarize key decision-makers with its capabilities.

This paper examines policies and programs needed to underwrite new approaches to com-

bining deterrence and defense across the spectrum of conflict in the second nuclear age.

Planning towards the operational synchronization of offensive and defensive forces will

provide for a future in which national decision-makers are given a range of options to deter

an enemy from striking U.S. or allied interests, or to defend in stages if deterrence fails. The

second nuclear age demands a military strategy integrating the policies, practices, and capa-

bilities of deterrence and defense.


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INTRODUCTION: DETERRENCE AND DEFENSE

In his 1983 book titled The Nuclear Future, MichaelMandelbaum posited that the nuclear future wouldbe much like the past.1 The reason that the nuclearfuture would follow a middle path, he argued, wasthat the alternatives, disarmament and war, were

either too difficult to achieve or too terrible to risk.This belief formed the basis of American defense

policy and nuclear strategy during the Cold War.The delicate balance of terror existing between thetwo nuclear superpowers could be made less sothrough strategies designed to deter and forces fieldedto enhance stability. A credible nuclear triad ofstrategic bombers, intercontinental ballistic missiles(ICBMs), and ballistic-missile launching submarines(SSBNs) was seen as a guarantor of deterrence andstability. Considerable investment was dedicated tothat triad of forces throughout the Cold War to

ensure there could be no single point of failure.

There was not such a failure and, despite the fears ofFred Ikle and others, nuclear deterrence managed tolast through the 20th century.2 It survived, it seems,owing to a condition termed mutual assureddestruction (MAD) in which the shared vulnerabil-ity of the two nuclear superpowers created a sense ofstability. The Cold War nuclear arsenals of the for-mer Soviet Union and the United States were soconservatively planned and technically redundantthat neither state could completely destroy the

others retaliatory force by launching first, even inthe worst no-warning casea bolt from the blue.The result of such a non-splendid first strike

promised, in the worst case, to be the destructionof the aggressors population and industry after acounter-value response.

The primacy of deterrence (currently defined by

Joint Publication 1-023

as the prevention fromaction by fear of the consequences) over defenseduring the first nuclear age goes back to the earliestdays of the Cold War and deliberations over strate-gic containment of the Soviet Union within theTruman and Eisenhower Administrations. Withinthe Kennedy Administration, the McNamaraPentagon calculated the contribution of strategicoffensive and defensive forces toward reaching theobjectives of assured destruction and damage-limitation.4 Secretary McNamaras inclinationtoward a strategy of assured destruction was ini-

tially strengthened by a 1964 report authored byAir Force Lieutenant General Glenn Kent conclud-ing that a damage-limiting strategy mixing missileand civil defenses was far from cost-effective: theeconomic advantage remained decidedly with theoffense.5 As the missile defense debate continuedthrough the 1960s, additional studies by theDefense Secretarys Systems Analysis office added

weight to Kents earlier thesis, arguing the Sovietscould easily offset the effect of any plausibleattempt to defend the U.S. from ICBM attack.McNamaras decision against deploying theNike-X

system designed to defend the U.S. solidified thedominance of deterrence over defense that was tolast throughout the first nuclear age.6

Deterrence and Defense in

The Second Nuclear Age

1 Michael Mandelbaum, The Nuclear Future, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983.2 See Fred Ikl, Can Nuclear Deterrence Outlast the Century?Foreign Affairs, January 1973.3 Joint Publication 1-02 Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, U.S. Department of Defense, 2008, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/.4 Alain Enthoven and K. Wayne Smith,How Much is Enough, New York: Harper, 1971, p. 176. Damage-limiting forces included both offensive strikes and defensive systems.5 See Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983, pp. 320-25.6 Enthoven and Smith, op.cit.pp. 188-194. Subsequent programs to defend ICBM sites received greater support, and the ABM Treaty allowed 200 ABMs in two sites for

both sides. However, the U.S. eventually fielded only one site, and soon dismantled it.


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The United States, the other sovereign members ofthe nuclear club, and a number of would-be prolif-erators have now entered what has been describedas the second nuclear age.7 As we look to thenuclear future in this new age, can we remain asconfident as Mandelbaum was that the world will

not stray from a middle path between disarmamentand nuclear weapons use? And should we remainas fixed in our beliefs and policy prescriptionsregarding a policy choice between deterrence anddefense? In a classic Cold War bifurcation of whathe termed the two central concepts of general warstrategy, Glenn Snyder warned that debates onnational security policy were often inconclusivebecause participants argued from different perspec-tives: those of deterrence or defense. For Snyder,those differing premises were striking:

Deterrence works on the enemys intentions, whiledefense reduces his capabilities.

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Deterrence is by definition a peacetime objective,while defense is a wartime value.

Nuclear weapons are designed and deployed to deter,conventional weapons are planned for defense.

Despite describing the differences between deter-

rence and defense in the first nuclear age, Snyderwas prescient in anticipating the needs of the sec-ond. Thus, he argued, We must find some way ofcombining their value on bothyardsticks, in orderaccurately to gauge their aggregate worth or util-ity and to make intelligent choices among the vari-ous types of forces available.8 In examining thesecond nuclear age from a policy perspective, this

paper argues that a prudent road towards enhanceddeterrence and defense in the future begins byappreciating the necessity of integrating their valueto enable timely and informed choices of national

security options available along a spectrum of con-flict populated by actors and threats very differentfrom those of the first nuclear age.

7 See Fred Ikl, The Second Coming of the Nuclear Age, Foreign Affairs, January/February 1996; Colin S. Gray, The Second Nuclear Age, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1999;Keith B. Payne,Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, Lexington: University of Kentucky, 1996; Paul Bracken, The Se cond Nuclear Age,Foreign Affairs, January/February2000; and the discussion in the following section.

8 Glenn H. Snyder, Deterrence and Defense: A Theoretical Introduction, in Head a nd Rokke (eds.)American Defense Policy, Third Edition, Ba ltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,1973, p. 100.


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Defining the second nuclear age provides a founda-tion for examining the roles of nuclear deterrenceand defense within the post-Cold War world.9

During the first nuclear age, Cold War nuclearstrategy was driven by clearly stated intentions and

demonstrated capabilities of the two principals toensure a bipolar nuclear balance of power. The sec-ond nuclear age features new actors whose posses-sion of nuclear weapons capability is likely to leadto a destabilized international security environment.

The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age

Understanding the structure of the second nuclearage may best begin by comparing it to the first. Atits core, the first nuclear age was a contest of strat-egy between the Soviets, the Americans, and their

respective Cold War allies.That confrontation wasbipolar in structure, featur-ing nation-states with alle-giances or ties to one side ofthe ideological divide or theother. Nuclear weapons andtheir delivery systems weredeveloped, acquired, com-manded, and controlled

with the goal of maintaining

stable and credible levels ofmutual deterrence. We cansummarize the first nuclearage as being characterizedby:

A bipolar, long-term competition between two tech-nologically sophisticated states and their allies.

Large inventories of strategic nuclear weapons.

Sophisticated command, control, and communica-tions systems.

Multiple phenomenological approaches to ensureaccurate and timely strategic and tactical warning.

Continuing communications through arms controlnegotiations.

Crisis management procedures and mechanisms toavoid or contain accidental launches or weaponssystem testing.

Relative transparency of fielded forces through armscontrol counting rules.

Open discussions of nuclear doctrine and

declared policy. Escalation restraint.

Mutual rationality postulat-ing that neither side wouldultimately risk the destructiveconsequences of nuclear war.

The stand-out feature of thesecond nuclear age is thatthe competition is nolonger confined to two

principal players. Its actors,

extensive and growing inboth number and nature,add a level of complexityand volatility to todays

DEFINING THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE

9 On the role of nuclear weapons see G eorge Schultz, Bill Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn (A World Free of Nuclear Weapons,Wall Street Journal, January 4, 2007, p.A15). See a lso the response to that position by Harold Brown and John Deutch ("The Nuclear Disarmament Fantasy,"Wall Street Journal, November 19, 2007, p. A19),Interim Report of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States of December 15, 2008, and the findings of the CSIS Beyond Goldwater-Nichols report, "The Department of Defense and the Nuclear Mission in the 21st Century" (March 2008) authored by Clark Murdock. We find ourselves in agreement withthose authors that the United States will have nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future.

The second nuclear agefeatures new actors whose

possession of nuclearweapons capability is likely

to lead to a destabilized

international securityenvironment.

respective Cold War allies.That confrontation wasbipolar in structure, featur-ing nation-states with alle-giances or ties to one side ofthe ideological divide or theother. Nuclear weapons andtheir delivery systems weredeveloped, acquired, com-manded, and controlled

with the goal of maintain-

ing stable and credible levelsof mutual deterrence. Wecan summarize the firstnuclear age as being charac-terized by:


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10 See Paul Bracken, The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age, Orbis, Summer 2003, pp. 399-413.11 Marshall speaks in reference to the work of Yale economist Martin Shubik. See for example, Douglas McGray, The Marshall Plan,WIRED, February 2003. The recent

tragic Mumbai terrorist attacks provide a baseline for assaults using conventional weapons.12 Paul Bracken, The Structure of the Second Nuclear Age. Foreign Policy Research Institute E-Note, September 25, 2003, http://www.fpri.org/enotes/20030925.ameri-

cawar.bracken.secondnuclearage.html.13 From a 1965 speech to Pakistans National Assembly.

security environment making it increasingly diffi-cult to assess the role of nuclear weapons and theirimplications for policy.10 Additionally, the rationalactor model on which deterrence rested has beenbrought into question.

A number of nations, some of which could bedescribed as having rogue leadership at the helm,have either acquired nuclear weapons or demon-strated an interest in pursuing the capabilitiesneeded to develop them. In addition to these coun-tries, the rise of transnational actors suggests thereare terrorist organizations, some state-supportedand some not, actively seeking nuclear weapons notfor deterrence but for use as weapons of mass ter-ror. Andrew Marshall, the Pentagons long-timeDirector of the Office of Net Assessment, has citedthe utility of thinking historically, within a time-line that represents the level of available technol-ogy from antiquity to today, about the number of

people ten determined individuals can kill beforebeing killed themselves.11 Given proliferationtrends linked to global terrorism, that number ishigher today than at any other point in history.

Some of the actors in the second nuclear age bene-fit from what some have called a free-ride tonuclear know-how.12 Much of the technologicalunderpinnings, strategic thinking, and planning ofnuclear forces are open to actors no longer requiredto undertake difficult and expensive research anddevelopment. This free-ride enables actors of thesecond nuclear age to estimate whether the benefitsof pursuing or expanding a nuclear weapons capa-bility outweigh the risks. The consequences of thislatent proliferation are several. First, any actor withmodest technical and economic resources has the

potential to exercise the option of going nuclear or,in some cases, to grow existing nuclear capabilities(although many actors, protected by the U.S. nuclearumbrella, have chosen not to or have disbanded

ongoing developmental efforts). Second, identify-ing opportunities and actions to dissuade thoseactors from going nuclear have met considerable

challenges. Finally, it will likely fall to the UnitedStates and its closest allies to offset or counter thesenuclear choices.

Acquiring a nuclear weapons capability in the sec-ond nuclear age (as it was in the first) is seen as a

symbol of prestige and power it puts one frontand center on the world map. This is particularlytrue among aspiring new powers; their perceivedstatus within the international community mightrise through nuclear empowerment. However,nuclear empowerment can be a two-edged sword:the level of investment put forth by an impover-ished state or non-state actor to indigenouslydevelop, steal, or buy nuclear weapons capabilitiesmay be disproportionate when compared to theireconomic strength and political clout. To illustrate,the late Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then Foreign Ministerand later Prime Minister of Pakistan, said of obtain-ing the atomic bomb, We will eat grass or leaves,even go hungry, but we will get one of our own. 13

Given such sentiments, the costs associated withdeveloping or acquiring nuclear weapons may easilydisplace the prudent planning and resourcesneeded to manage them once they are in hand.Therefore, the extensive command and controlinfrastructure contributing to reliability and stabil-ity among players in the first nuclear age may not

apply in the second. In times of crisis, a new mem-ber of the nuclear club lacking a strong commandauthority might too easily reach for a nuclear

weapon. Lastly, a nations investment in nuclearweapons capabilities may also come at the expenseand marginalization of its conventional capabilities.As a result, the second nuclear age has the makingsof creating players with second-rate armies andnavies relying primarily on a nuclear-based militarystrategy. During times of crisis, this may create asituation of escalating tensions, dangerous unpre-dictability, and limited response options.

Although motives for acquiring nuclear weapons inthe second nuclear age may not differ widely from


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those of the first, what does vary is the evolvingcomplexity of how national interest in pursuing anuclear capability translates to national security.14

In the case of nation-states, a countrys pursuit ofnuclear weapons rests on the belief that its security

will be enhanced. On the other hand, the notion ofnational security as a basis for acquisition amongnon-state terrorist networks has little meaning. Theirmotives are likely to be organizational image and

pursuit of a radical agenda, rooted in a willingnessto inflict as much destruction as possible to achievetheir objectives.15 Thus, in the second nuclear age,the traditional security dilemma of international

politics takes on a troubling dimension. Rather thanthreatening another nations security by enhancingones own, a non-state actor seeks nuclear weaponssolely to threaten the security of others.16

The characteristics of the second nuclear age, incontrast to the first, can be summarized as:

A multi-polar security environment involving near-term and emerging threats and unstable regimes.

Varied inventories of nuclear arsenals ranging fromemerging capability to sophisticated threats.

Collaboration among state and non-state actors onproliferating nuclear technologies and weaponcapabilities.

Weak or non-existent nuclear command, control,

and communications systems. Limited communications channels among would-be

adversaries.

Little protection against accidental/rogue launch.

Uncertain capabilities and intentions among manynuclear actors.

Questionable doctrine well removed from tradi-tional deterrence.

Escalation and first-use as plausible options.

The presence of non-deterrable actors.

Domestic pressures to acquire nuclear weaponsoutweigh external pressures to discontinue nuclearweapon proliferation.

Actors and Capabilities in the SecondNuclear Age

The previous section offered a general overview ofthe second nuclear age, but this ages developmentsare best examined in greater detail through an assess-ment of key players. Todays nuclear weapons activi-ties involve both state and non-state actors; someare responsible powers and others are not. It is thecombination of these governments and entities andthe challenges they present that defines the secondnuclear age and that dictates policy and force plan-

ning implications for U.S. deterrence and defense.17

The Modern Nuclear State

The threat posed by a modern (peer or near-peerare other terms frequently used) nuclear state ismost reflective of what the U.S. faced in the firstnuclear age, and it continues to be one that cannotbe ignored in the second. This case is representedby Russia and China.

Russia at times looks strikingly reminiscent of the

former Soviet Union.

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It rarely sees eye-to-eyewith the U.S. on security issues, real democraticactivity and open media are scarce, and it interferesin the domestic and foreign affairs of neighboringformer Soviet republics by exploiting their depend-ence on Russian energy resources.19 These trendshave been labeled in different ways, but the notionof Russian revanchism may not be far off themark.20 Moscow appears bent on reclaiming its

14 An excellent analysis of this subject may be found in Scott D. Sagan, Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?: Three Models in Search of a Bomb, International Security,Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter, 1996-1997), pp. 54-86. Furthermore, examining the instances of states that have pursued a nuclear capability but have subsequently chosen to deferor stop their pursuit, may offer insights for deterrence and defense as well as for counter-proliferation efforts. Strategies of nuclear reversal and nuclear hedging areaddressed in Ariel E. Levite, Never Say Never Again: Nuclear Reversal Revisited,International Security, Vol. 27, No. 3 (Winter 2002/03), pp. 59-88.

15 Harold Brown, New Nuclear Realities, The Washington Quarterly, Winter 2007-8, pp. 10-11.16 Unless the non-state actor is interested in increasing its own power at the expense of other non-state actors, e.g.,Al-Qaeda by becoming the leading Islamic terrorist organiza-

tion to which other terrorist organizations swear allegiance.17 It is not necessary to forecast rapid proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities to define the second nuclear age; the current actors possessing a range of capabilities and

intentions do that quite well. For a good review of contemporary social science research on nuclear proliferation dynamics see William C. Potter and GaukharMukhatzhanova, Divining Nuclear Intentions,International Security, Summer 2008, pp. 139- 169.

18 Certainly the comparison has been drawn recently given Russian military moves into the Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. See Russia, Pledging to LeaveGeorgia, Tightens Its Grip,The New York Times, August 18, 2008, p. A1; and Stephen Sestanovich, What Has Moscow Done? Foreign Affairs, November/December2008, pp. 12-28.

19 Steven Woehrel,Russian Energy Policy Toward Neighboring Countries, CRS Report for Congress, RL34261, updated March 27, 2008, pp. 7-13.20 See for example, Richard A. Clarke, While You Were at War,The Washington Post, December 31, 2006, B01; and Paul Reynolds, New Russian world order: The five

principles, BBC News, September 1, 2008 at http://news.bbc.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/europe/7591610.stm.


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strategic dominance and geopolitical influence lostfollowing the end of the Cold War. In contrast tothe United States policy of decreasing its relianceon nuclear forces, Russia is expanding its nuclear

weapons capability, deploying more road-mobileand silo-based ICBMs, fielding both a new class of

ballistic missile submarine and associated SLBMforces, and pursuing a new long-range bomber.21

Former President and current Prime Minister ofRussia Vladimir Putin has also stressed that work tofield entirely new land-based systems beyond currentRussian TopolICBMs continues.22 Furthermore,Russia has repeatedly engaged in provocative mili-tary exercises involving nuclear assets, has fore-

warned the U.S. and its allies that it will targetproposed European missile defense sites, and hasthreatened to withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. All indicationsare that Russias modernized nuclear arsenal willremain a defining factor of its force posture. 23

Therefore, despite the view suggested in the 2001NPR that Russia was not a nuclear adversary to

plan against, a preponderance of evidence arguesthat Russia will continue to prompt major consid-erations for U.S. nuclear strategy and deterrentcapabilities in the second nuclear age.24 In this age,the United States and Russia no longer view eachother as open adversaries locked in a battle forstrategic superiority, yet diplomatic relationshipsbetween the two nuclear superpowers are strained.25

Within this semi-adversarial relationship, the twoprimary actors of the first nuclear age maintainlarge nuclear arsenals in various stages of readiness.Here, the second nuclear age remains remarkablyreminiscent of the first.

China is becoming a regional political and economicpower with expanding global influence, raisingconcerns over its growing military power and risingspace and defense spending.26 Much of Chinasstrategic focus continues to be centered on its claimof sovereignty over Taiwan. It is Beijings official

position that an independent Taiwanese state mustbe prevented at any cost.27 This statement impliesthat China deems escalation to nuclear war to be a

credible deterrent threat in the event of a militaryconflict involving Taiwan. However, Taiwan is notChinas sole security concern. China is also prepar-ing its military for other contingencies such as con-flict over resources and disputed territories.28

21 Russia: Sevmash Launch of New Borey- Class SSBN Yuriy Dolgorukiy, Bulava Update, MoscowKrasnaya Zvezda, April 17, 2007. Translated in Open Source Center, Doc.ID: CEP20070417330001; Aleksey Nikitin, Who Will More Rapidly Obtain a New Generation Bomber, InternetNatsionalnaya Informatsionnaya Gruppa. Translated inOpen Source Center, Doc. ID: CEP20070717358004.

22 Putin Says Russia Developing Completely New Strategic Missile Systems, Moscow:Rossiya TV, October 18, 2007. Transcribed in Open Source Center, Doc. ID:

CEP20070707950033.23 Another factor is the large number of tactical nuclear warheads Russia has retained, and the nuclear moves suggested in response to U.S.-supported missile defense in EasternEurope, to include stationing nuclear weapons in Cuba or pointing nuclear warheads at Ukrainian territory. See Gabriel Schoenfeld, Russias Nuclear Threat is More ThanWords, The Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2008, p. A11.

24 The fact that Russia suspended observing the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty and announced the INF treaty no longer serves Russian interests adds credenceto this conclusion.

25 Stephen J. Blank lists several examples of American growing wariness about Russian intentions. See Blank,Towards a New Russia Policy, Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army WarCollege, February 2008. See also Edward Lucas, The New Cold War, New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008.

26 Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress: Military Power of the Peoples Republic of China 2008, p. 1.27 Xinhua: Full Text of White Paper titled Chinas National Defense, 2004, Beijing :Xinhua, December 27, 2004. Transcribed in Foreign Broadcast Information Service,

Doc. ID: CPP200412270000034.28 Annual Report to Congress, op. cit., p. 1.

A preponderance ofevidence argues that

Russia will continueto prompt majorconsiderations for U.S.nuclear strategy and

deterrent capabilities inthe second nuclear age.


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With those scenarios in mind, how is China mod-ernizing its strategic nuclear weapons? ShouldChina, for planning purposes, be regarded as asmall modern nuclear state or a large rogue?China has at least ten types of ballistic missile sys-tems either operational or in development, and is

pursuing further SLBM deployments.29 Despite aprofessed no first use policy for its nuclearweapons, Chinas military leaders have occasionallyindicated otherwise, particularly in a situation fac-ing American conventional capabilities.30 A book

published by the Peoples Liberation ArmysSecond Artillery, the division of the Chinese mili-tary that oversees strategic nuclear missiles, notedthat a reduction in the nuclear use threshold beinstituted during wartime as a deterrent to enemyconventional strikes on the mainland.31 In the sec-

ond nuclear age, China, like Russia, may increas-ingly rely on its nuclear capability to underwrite itsforeign policy objectives.

In the case of modern nuclear states such as Russiaor China, one must also acknowledge the less overtthreats that may emerge from a large, complex, and

potentially risk-prone nuclear infrastructure. Theseactivities range from illicit technology transfer orleakage, to the inadvertent or unauthorized launchof a nuclear weapon. Prescriptions for future U.S.nuclear policy and strategic defense must recognize

these myriad dangers.

The Fractured Nuclear State

The fractured nuclear stateone that hasachieved a nuclear weapons capability yet lacks the

political stability to ensure its sovereignty and thesecurity of those weaponsis one of the most wor-risome prospects of the second nuclear age.Pakistan may be the greatest concern in this regard.

Pakistans nuclear weapons complex is thought to

be limited and distributed, however the reliabilityof its command and control of these weapons hasbeen questioned.32 Radical Islamic elements

sympathetic to various extremist causes are knownto be present in sectors of the Pakistani militaryand intelligence organizations, raising the prospectthat Pakistans nuclear weapons may fall into radi-cal hands. Moreover, Islamabads historical antago-nisms and conventional force shortfalls vis visIndia, another nuclear power, illuminates a worri-some scenario in the event of a regional armed con-flict. Additionally, high levels of political upheavaland domestic strife suggest that Pakistan may atbest remain a fractured state and at worst become afailed one. While there is no obvious reason toconsider Pakistan as antagonistic towards U.S.interests, there are serious concerns about Pakistansnuclear course, given its unpredictable future.

The Rogue State

If the previous cases are questionable regarding theactors nuclear weapons capabilities and intentions,the threat posed by a rogue state is highly unpre-dictable. North Korea illustrates this type of actor.

North Korea claims to have demonstrated itsnuclear weapons capability in a 2006 test. While ithas been suggested that the demonstration mayhave actually been a nuclear device that misfired, alater test might prove more successful. Coupled

with that consideration is North Koreas longrecord of developing WMD and fielding ballisticmissiles capable of striking U.S. soil.33 While aNorth Korean nuclear weapons capability has beendismissed as simply a powerful diplomatic tool forits rogue leadership, its potential for employment isreal. Pyongyang has historically leveraged itsnuclear activities through a string of broken inter-national commitments; there is little evidence tosuggest a more transparent or reliable course. Evenin light of North Koreas most recent pledge (andrecantation) to dismantle its nuclear weapons pro-gram, its checkered past calls for continued U.S.

wariness. Absent the verification that North Koreano longer poses a threat, holding Pyongyangsfledgling but potentially devastating ICBM force at

9



29 U.S. China Economic and Security Review Commission,2006 Report to the Congress, November 2006, p. 136.30 Joseph Kahn, Chinese General Threatens Use of A-Bombs if U.S. Intrudes,New York Times, July 15, 2005.31 The Science of the Second Artillery Campaigns, Beijing: Press of the PLA, March 2004, p. 394.32 David E. Sanger, S o, What About Those Nukes, The New York Times, November 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/11/weekinreview/11sanger.html.33 Steven A. Hildreth, North Korean Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, CRS Report for Congress, January 3, 2007, RS21473. North Korea is thought to have

enough plutonium to make between six to ten nuclear weapons. See Disarming North Korea, The Economist, July 19, 2008, p. 51.


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34 Kenneth Katzman, Iran: U.S. Concerns and Policy Responses, CRS Report for Cong ress, December 5, 2007, RL32048.35 Ibid.36 See for example, Martha Raddatz, The Case for Israels Strike on Syria,ABC World News, October 19, 2007.37 Austin Long,DeterrenceFrom Cold War to Long War; Lessons from Six Decades of RAND Research. RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 2008, p. 81.38 Ibid.39 Ibid., p. 83.

riskand defending against itis a prudent hedg-ing strategy in this evolving nuclear age.

The Nuclear Aspirant

The nuclear aspirant is defined as having a desire

for nuclear weapons capability yet lagging behindthe rogue in terms of progress towards that goal.Iran and Syria provide good examples.

Irans nascent nuclear program has also generatedmuch international attention, but Tehrans capabili-ties and intentions remain largely unknown.Although a recently released National IntelligenceEstimate deemed Tehrans nuclear weapons programon hold, indications are that Iran could have thecapability and resources to produce a nuclear weapon

within several years if it continues its peaceful

nuclear program.34 Added to that are the troublingfacts that Irans leadership continues to support andfinance terrorist organizations, to improve therange and payload of Irans long range missiles, andto declare opposition to Israels existence.35

Syria has long been thought to have had an interestin developing nuclear weapons, alongside its other

pursuits of stockpiling chemical and biologicalagents as well as acquiring advanced missile capabili-ties. How far along it may be or how considerable itsinterest in that capability remains uncertain.

However, Israel judged Syrias path toward develop-ment unacceptable enough to have recentlybombed a suspected Syrian nuclear site. If the spec-ulation that Syria received a reactor for producing

plutonium from North Korea is true, this would bethe latest on a long list of Pyongyangs proliferation

pursuits.36 If Damascus maintains a desire fornuclear weapons, its long-standing relationship ofclandestine technology transfer with North Koreasuggests a path for that pursuit.

The Non-State Actor

The non-state actor is characterized by two differ-ent categories: (1) regional armed groups and

(2) transnational terror networks and spontaneousterror cells.37 The former category includesregional armed groups such as Hezbollah and theLiberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) that maycontrol, or attempt to control, territory and popu-lation, and may have organizational structure andaccess to substantial resources. Because of thesecharacteristics, this category of actor may be some-

what predictable and deterrable in a more tradi-tional sense.38 Alternatively, the second category ofnon-state actor is characterized by a diffusion ofideology, high motivation and ruthlessness, and theuse of operational methods across wide geographi-cal areas.39 Little to nothing is predictable aboutnuclear weapons acquired by transnational terroristorganizations other than their desire to obtainthem. The most visible of these groups have already

applied other unconventional weapons with devas-tating results, and some, includingAl Qaeda, havemade it known that they seek nuclear weapons.

Given the potential for proliferation today, non-state actoracquisition of nuclear weapons may arisethrough numerous routes: direct transfer from a

patron state or government actor within that state;theft or purchase of fissile material from any num-ber of compromised state nuclear complexes; ordevelopment of the technical base and materialsneeded to construct a bomb from scratch. While

the last of those possibilities is highly unlikely, thefirst two are certainly not. Clearly, the prospect ofnuclear weapons in the hands of individuals orsmall groups is the most uncertain dimension ofthe second nuclear age.

The potential for collaboration among the actorsdescribed above is also worrisome. A nuclear actor

prompted by state-sponsored terrorism or moti-vated by state-supported religious zeal offers alikely scenario of weapons acquisition in the sec-ond nuclear age. Pakistan is often cited as an

example largely because of the combination of itsnuclear capabilities, sympathy and sanctuary forIslamic insurgents, and internal instability.


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Government-to-government collaboration is alsolikely, given a supplying government fraught with

political volatility. Pakistans record supports thetrend of collaborating with other nationsIran,North Korea, and Libya to facilitate nuclear pro-liferation.40 Recently, an assessment by theInstitute for Science and International Securitydocumented that A.Q. Khan, widely consideredthe father of Pakistans bomb and chief purveyor ofits illicit nuclear proliferation network, wasinvolved with the planned sale of blueprints forsmall highly-sophisticated nuclear weapondesigns.41

There is no shortage of actors with the capabilityto threaten the security of American interests andthose of its allies. If we envision a threat landscape

that stretches across the challenges of the secondnuclear age, we can position the types of nuclearactors based on their capabilities and intentions.As Figure 1 depicts, the categories of actors appearalong a spectrum, and the threat each poses is gen-erally defined by two inversely related qualities, the

probability of an attack and that attacks intensity.Throughout this paper, the spectrum will serve as a

visual reference for how the effectiveness of deter-rence and defense changes with the characteristicsof the threat.

The Second Nuclear Age: Looking Forward

Nuclear weapons will continue to be leveraged invarious ways: politically, as the proverbial big stickbehind soft words, and militarily, as the absolute

weapon.42 Will deterrence prevail as a strategy of

non-use as in the first nuclear age? Or is the use ofnuclear weapons more likely in a world of continu-ing proliferation, potential loose nukes,unguarded or unaccounted fissile material, unreli-able command and control equipment and proce-dures, and duplicitous and rogue governments?

It is within the uncertain environment of this sec-ond nuclear age that the United States must craftits strategic policy and plan the necessary forcesand defenses to support it. Almost two decadesafter the collapse of the Soviet Union, it would be

wise to examine how U.S. strategic offensive forcesand defenses originally deployed to deter theU.S.S.R. may now address a broader range of dan-gers. Does the deterrent strategy of assured second-strike carried over from the earlier age still hold?Should the long-held calculation asserting thatstrategic defenses may prove destabilizing in timesof crisis be revisited? The definition of deterrencemust be updated with considerations of strategicdefense to address the motivations and capabilitiesof new nuclear adversaries.

40 Richard P. Cronin, et al., Pakistans Nuclear Proliferation Activities and the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission: U.S. Policy Constraints and O ptions, CRS Reportfor Congress, May 24. 2005, RL32745.

41 David Albright, Swiss Smug glers Had Advanced Nuclear Weapons Designs, Institute for S cience and International Security, June 16, 2008.42 In reference to Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon, New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1946.

Figure 1. Spectrum of Conflict in the Second Nuclear Age: A Threat Landscape.

Likelihood of Attack

ModernNuclear States

FracturedNuclear States

Rogue States

NuclearAspirants

Non-stateActors

HIGHERLOWER

IntensityofAttack

HIGHER

LOWER


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43 Then President-elect Obama stated, As long as nuclear weapons exist, I will retain a strong, safe, secure and reliable nuclear deterrent to protect us and our allies.But I will not authorize the development of new nuclear weapons and related capabilities.Arms Control Today 2008 Presidential Q&A: President-elect Barack Obama athttp://armscontrol.org.

44 Despite Russian threats to break it, the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) also limits the nuclear capabilities of both sides, but we are principally concerned here withstrategic nuclear forces.

45 See George P. Schultz, et al., Toward a Nuclear-Free World, The Washington Post, January 15, 2008, p. A13.

DETERRENCE IN THE SECOND NUCLEARAGE

This paper examines the second nuclear age from apolicy perspective, with the specific intention ofadvocating the integration of offensive and defen-sive capabilities to meet the challenges of this newera. Issues of reducing the number of nuclear

weapons, slowing proliferation, and avoiding thepossibility of nuclear weapons use remain high onthe national agenda, and there are choices withinthe structure of the nuclear triad, both old andnew, that must be made.43 This section of the

paper details how current policy and force struc-ture commitments will affect future assessmentsand choices.

The policy setting for nuclear weapons choices inthe second nuclear age is framed by two objectivescarried over from the first: reducing launchers/war-

head numbers in accordance with internationalarms control agreements and treaties, and specify-ing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. defense pol-icy. The documents defining the parameters of the

policy choices in these issue-areas are the StrategicArms Reduction Treaty (START I), in effect untilDecember 2009, and the Strategic OffensiveReductions Treaty (SORT, otherwise known as theMoscow Treaty), with a target of 1700-2200deployed nuclear warheads on each side by 2012.The Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) of 1993 and2002 stand as guidance for how the U.S. will

implement those treaty agreements. In FY 2008legislation, Congress directed that an NPR be con-ducted in 2009.

Nuclear Arms Control: Constraining U.S.and Russian Nuclear Forces

START I is the one major nuclear arms reductionagreement remaining from the Cold War. TheStrategic Arms Reductions Treaty, first proposedby President Reagan in the early 1980s, was signedin July 1991, and entered into force in December1994.44 The principal focus of START I was notonly to reduce deployed nuclear weapons launchersystems (land and sea-based ballistic missiles andlong-range bombers) to 1600 for the United Statesand Russia, but also to establish counting rules lim-iting each side to 6,000 warheads. The deployment(and destruction) of warheads to reach this number

was to be verified by an intrusive regime requiringon-site inspections and regular information

exchanges as well as continued reliance onnational technical means, i.e., overhead surveil-lance satellites. Although the Treaty is scheduled toexpire on December 5, 2009, it can be extended infive-year increments, and both sides have expressedinterest in applying key provisions of STARTs veri-fication regime to monitor force levels agreed tounder the 2002 Moscow Treaty reductions.45

SORT is the second major arms control agreementaffecting future U.S. nuclear force size and struc-ture. Signed in 2002 and entered into force the fol-lowing year, SORT commits the U.S. and Russia toreduce their deployed strategic nuclear forces to1700-2200 warheads. The Treaty allows each country


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to determine for itself the number of bombers, mis-siles and SSBNs that would compose the force anddeploy those warheads. This deployed warheadlimit takes effect on the day the Treaty expires,December 31, 2012. After that, each side is free toadjust their deployed nuclear forces as they see fit.

Because SORT lacks verification mechanisms, theinspection regime instituted under START I couldbe applied to reductions taken under SORT. But,as noted above, START I is due to expire at theend of 2009, three years before the Moscow Treatylimits must be reached.

Nuclear Posture Reviews: U.S. NuclearWeapons Policy

The U.S. Department of Defense has conductedtwo major reviews of its nuclear posture in an

attempt to adjust American strategic nuclear forcesto a post-Cold War world. The first of thesereviews, chartered in 1993, concluded that despitethe international upheavals that brought about thedemise of the Soviet Union, nuclear weaponsremained an essential part of American military

power.46

In considering the size and role of U.S. nuclearforces in a post-Cold War world, the 1993 NPRdeclared that it was the proliferation of nuclear

weapons, not Russias nuclear arsenal (although

those might be related), that posed the greatest riskto the United States. Therefore, the context of theNPR became lead but hedge. That is, as the U.S.sought to strengthen the non-proliferation regimeby de-emphasizing nuclear weapons in Americandefense policy, some hedging was required. WithSTART I just entering into force and START IInot ratified, Russian nuclear capabilities remainedthe focus of the NPR because they constituted theonly nuclear arsenal that can physically threatenthe survivability of U.S. nuclear forces.47

The 1993 NPR determined it was essential that theU.S. retain sufficient nuclear forces to deter apotentially hostile Russian government by holding

at risk a range of assets valued by that nations lead-ership. The force posture required to meet thatdeterrent mission was slightly smaller than theCold War triad, and included 450-500 Minuteman

IIIICBMs, each carrying a single warhead. In justi-fying the ICBM component, the NPR stressed the

importance of maintaining a triad of strategicforces to hedge against a failure in any one compo-nent, and noted that each leg of the nuclear triad

possessed unique characteristics and specific advan-tages.

The 2002 NPR offered a considerably differentcontext for U.S. nuclear force planning : an envi-ronment of uncertainty, military transformation,and capability-based planning.48 While the tradi-tional triad of nuclear offensive forces was main-tained, a New Triad presented in this NPR

included conventional forces for strategic missions,missile defenses, and the nuclear weapons infra-structure. With regard to sizing the nuclear force,the NPR declared the United States would end theCold War-era nuclear relationship with Russia,consider multiple potential nuclear opponents, anddeploy the lowest number of nuclear weaponsconsistent with the security requirements of theU.S.49 The uncertainties of the nuclear futureallowed this policy review to chart a path for war-head reductions in the near term, but it was unclearhow those forces would be structured to meet the

SORT goals of 1700-2200 operationally deployedwarheads by 2012. What was clear was the GeorgeW. Bush Administration intended to rely on thenuclear triad of old, had plans to fully fund lifeextension programs for each leg, and declared thatland and sea-based ICBMs and bombers would

play a vital role in the nations defense until at least2020.50

Thus, the direction for future U.S. nuclear forcesand policy has been framed by the arms controltreaties and policy reviews of the past, and the

authors of the next NPR have much to build on.However, the challenges confronting U.S. securityas we enter the second nuclear age are considerably

46 Nuclear Posture Review, http://www.dod.mil/execsec/adr95/npr_.html.47 Ibid.48 Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Re view, January 9, 2002, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/news/usa/2002/us.49 U.S. Department of Defense,Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review, January 9, 2002. The theoretical S oviet first strike, the Red Integrated Strategic Operations Plan

(RISOP), used to plan a U.S. second strike was formally cancelled in February 2005. See FAS says U.S. continues nuclear strike planning, Aerospace Daily, July 23, 2008, p. 2.50 Findings of the Nuclear Posture Review. By this time the U.S. had indicated its intent to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, thus allowing for development and deployment of

integrated ballistic missile defenses.


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51 See Keith B. Payne, Nuclear Deterrence for a New Century,Journal of International Security Affairs, Spring 2006, Number 10,http://www.securityaffairs.org/issues/2006/10/payne.php.

52 See Keith Paynes discussion of the valor of ignorance inDeterrence in the Second Nuclear Age. But Payne is not so much questioning the wisdom of maintaining forces andpolicies that deterred Cold War threats successfully. Rather, he is questioning the extension of those theories and practices to a new range of WMD-armed adversaries andexpecting similar successes.

more complex than whenthose documents weresigned. Importantly, as a

part of the 2006 QDR, theBush Administration out-lined a tailored deter-

rence strategy. Thisconcept is structured onthe understanding that,owing to the diverse actorsof the second nuclear age,Cold War deterrent theo-ries, strategies and forces

will have to be aug-mented.51 Tailoringnuclear deterrence for thefuture will require a carefulmix of the strategies andforces proven in the firstnuclear age coupled withnew capabilities to meetnew threats from newactors.

Tailored Deterrence for the SecondNuclear Age

How should nuclear deterrence be structured tomeet the requirements of the second nuclear age?There are good arguments for adhering to the

strategies and forces that have brought us stabledeterrence in the past against known nuclear rivals,

while investing in tailored measures and capabili-ties to cope with the uncertainties of the future.

In dealing with traditional nuclear competitors,deterrence in the second nuclear age and the forcesunderwriting it may not differ significantly fromthe first. Classic deterrence convinces would-beaggressors that the costs of pursuing hostile actionsfar outweigh any prospective benefits. However, inthe second nuclear age, there is a spectrum of

deterrence that can be tailored to specific actorsbased on their known capabilities and suspectedintentions, and on our ability to provide credibleattribution of their actions. Even at the highest levels

of Cold War confrontation,U.S. strategic nuclear policy

was based on tailoreddeterrence of a sort, eversince the 1970s whencountervailing strategies

and limited nuclearoptions added counter-force capabilities to makeretaliation more credible.

The second nuclear agedeparts significantly fromthe Cold War stalemate oftwo superpowers. The U.S.and its allies face a widearray of actors occupying

varied positions along a

spectrum of potentialthreats. Nevertheless, thesaliency of respondingcredibly to the existentialthreat to ones homelandand to extended deterrence

for allies requires a deterrent that maintains andsustains many of the properties that fostered peaceand stability during the first nuclear age.

Tailoring Deterrence for the SecondNuclear Age: Modern Nuclear States

Along the spectrum of deterrence that stretchesacross the challenges of the second nuclear age, first

priority must be granted to the most serious threat,the nuclear inventories of Russia and China. Whatdo the lessons of the Cold War teach us aboutnuclear deterrence at these most dangerous levels?

We must admit we dont know for sure, because weknow only that those policies and practices didntfail. We dont know that they worked, because theintentions of our adversaries are largely unknown.52

Yet prudence dictates that the United States main-

tain and sustain its deterrent capabilities for sometime until it can conclude that the nuclear arsenalsof Russia and China threaten no more harm to theU.S. mainland than do those of Great Britain and

There are good argumentsfor adhering to the

strategies and forces thathave brought us stabledeterrence in the past

against known nuclearrivals, while investing in

tailored measures and

capabilities to cope with theuncertainties of the future.

more complex than whenthose documents weresigned. Importantly, as a

part of the 2006 QDR , theBush Administration out-lined a tailored deter-

rence strategy. Thisconcept is structured onthe understanding that,owing to the diverse actorsof the second nuclearage, Cold War deterrenttheories, strategies andforces will have to beaugmented.51 Tailoringnuclear deterrence for thefuture will require a carefulmix of the strategies andforces proven in the firstnuclear age coupled withnew capabilities to meetnew threats from newactors.


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France. Therefore, the near-term objective of U.S.nuclear policy must be to rationalize the offensivearms reductions called for in the Moscow Treaty

with an adequate and affordable nuclear posture todeter the extant danger. From a variety of perspec-tives, as outlined below, continuing to field and

modernize a substantial force composed of all threelegs of the traditional triad appears to be a prudentcourse in underwriting this deterrent capability forthe future. Furthermore, because no explicit con-straints on the U.S. ICBM, SLBM or bomber forceremain in place, the United States retains consider-able freedom in structuring the size and compositionof nuclear forces to meet both legacy commitmentsand future challenges. A number of factorsstability, survivability, reliability, credibility, sover-eign basing, responsiveness, cost-effectiveness, andflexibilitywill shape and size that force.

Stability

In September 2002, the Congressional BudgetOffice (CBO) released a study examining the esti-mated costs savings of reaching nuclear arms reduc-tion goals through two approaches. The first ofthese alternatives presented was to maintain theexistence of all deployed delivery systems whilereducing the weapons load on each. The second

was to completely retire delivery systems from serv-ice and remove entire legs from the nuclear triad.53

Unsurprisingly, it was shown that the option toretire nuclear delivery platforms allows for a con-siderable cost savings by eliminating the operatingcosts of associated systems. However, the decline indeterrence and stability accompanying any reduc-tion in force structure by increasing the number of

warheads on the remaining missiles was deter-mined to be far more costly over the long termthan any short-term budget benefit. Therefore, theCBO recommended reducing the number ofdeployed warheads on each delivery vehicle, ratherthan decreasing the number of missiles. Over the

last fifteen years, reductions in the total number ofdeployed warheads have been partially achieved byretiring two components of the land-based ICBMforce, thePeacekeeper(MX) andMinuteman II

weapons systems. The remaining warheads have beenredistributed across the deployed force ofMinuteman

IIImissiles. Maintaining a distributed alert force of450 land-based ICBMs helps convince an adver-sary not to attempt a disarming counter-forcestrike. However, reductions below this level begin

to introduce stability concerns in that a nuclearpower such as Russia , in times of crisis, might con-sider a first-strike against a diminished target setrather than suffer a first nuclear blow against itsown vulnerable forcesparticularly if strategicdefenses are included in the exchange calculations.Further weighing against a preemptive strike is adistributed and deployed force of submarine-basedmissiles, regarded as inherently survivable andtherefore stabilizing, and a bomber force that canbe generated and dispersed for survivability.

Survivability, Reliability, and CredibilityThe December 2006Report of the Defense Science

Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilitiesconcluded that the overriding priority for the U.S.nuclear weapons enterprise is to provide and sus-tain a reliable, safe, secure, and credible set ofnuclear weapons needed to maintain the nucleardeterrent.54 It is precisely those qualities of relia-bility, safety, surety, and credibility that continue to

point to the need for an ICBM/SLBM/bomberforce to provide a complementary combination of

these attributes. Regarding the sea-based deterrent,the first of the Ohio-class ballistic missile sub-marines will retire in 2029with SSBNs back-fitted for the D-5 missile remaining in service untilat least 2042. Nevertheless, a retirement starting intwo decades suggests that the Navy must begindesigning a replacement submarinetheSSBN(X)no later than 2012. SSBN optionsinclude a variant of the Virginia-class attack subma-rine, a new design, or a variant of the Trident.Other factors to be considered are the continuedmodification of SSBNs to SSGN configuration

(with conventional cruise missiles) or reconfiguringthe Trident to meet the initial Prompt GlobalStrike system requirement.55 In any event, owing toits flexibility and inherent survivability, the SSBN

53 Congressional Budget Office,Estimated Costs and Savings from Implementing the Moscow Treaty, Washington, D.C., September 2002.54 Final Report of the DSB Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities, Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics,

December 2006.55 The DoD request, unsupported by Congress, was to modify two Trident II D-5 missiles on each of the 12 deployed strategic ballistic missile submarines and replace their

nuclear warheads with conventional re-entry vehicles. See the Statement of Brian R. Green, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Strategic Capabilities, to the SenateArmed Services Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing, March 28, 2007.


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fleet will continue to form an important compo-nent of the nations nuclear deterrent force in thesecond nuclear age.

Sovereign Basing

A deterrent force based on American soil signifiesthat the U.S. maintains maximum control over itsnuclear arsenal and guarantees an appropriateresponse when a vital interest is threatened. Theland-based ICBM and bomber force coupled witha deployed SSBN fleet also reassures U.S. allies thatthey are protected by an American nuclear umbrella.The extension of the U.S. nuclear deterrent to alliednations has strengthened a presumption against

proliferation when those countries face a nuclearthreat. For example, Japan and South Korea, bothof which rely on the U.S. for nuclear deterrence and

stability, each might have pursued an independentnuclear deterrent following North Koreas provoca-tive nuclear activities.56 Given the prospects forfurther proliferation among rogue states andnuclear aspirants such as Iran, it is conceivable thatU.S. nuclear umbrella will be extended to coverfriends and allies in the Middle East and elsewherein Europe. Amid the uncertainties of the secondnuclear age, both allies and would-be nuclearadversaries are aware of the deterrent valuecapa-bility and credibilityof the U.S. nuclear triad.

ResponsivenessA 2003 National Institute for Public Policy papernoted the traditional arguments for a triad ofnuclear forces in the second nuclear age, but specif-ically championed the ICBMs promptness, shorttime of flight and accuracy.57 Until the UnitedStates pursues and successfully fields a conventional

prompt global strike capability, the ICBM is theprincipal weapon to hold at risk a strategic targetthat could be hardened or deeply buriedthreat-ening the American or an allys mainland with a

nuclear strike.58

The land-based ICBM maintainsexceptionally high rates of alert using continuous,secure communications, ensuring a timely response.

Cost-Effectiveness

Defense planners will be faced with a number ofbudgetary trades forced by rising operations andmaintenance (O&M) costs, expensive conventional

weapons programs, the continuing war on terror-

ism, and contesting discretionary expenditures.With a future ICBM replacement beyond the hori-zon and current plans calling for extending the lifeof theMinuteman IIIto 2040, the appropriateinvestments to maintain that course and capabilityappear modest in comparison to the return. Whilethe other legs of the nuclear triad will continue todisplay complementary capabilities in the secondnuclear age,Minuteman IIIcontinues to be themost cost-effective weapon system for underwrit-ing tailored deterrence at the highest end of thespectrum of plausible nuclear conflict.

Flexibility

In a paper analyzing the 2002 NPR, LexingtonInstitutes Dan Goure noted that the new triad ofthe NPR was wise in preserving the capability andsynergy of the old triad of nuclear forces that retainthe characteristics of being robust, flexible andresponsive.59 He also argued that the ICBM leg ofthe triad was emerging as the most relevant of thethree in the second nuclear age:

High accuracy, counterforce potential, speed andresponsiveness were all characteristics of ICBMsthat gave rise to problems in the context of the oldEast-West confrontation. Now, those same opera-tional characteristics must be considered as positivebenefits in the context of the new security environ-ment The operational characteristics of theICBM, prompt responsiveness, speed, precision andthe ability to deliver unique payloads, are highlydesirable when considering the range of strategicscenarios the United States could confront.60

If we now revisit the previously noted spectrum,this time from a deterrence standpoint as illus-

trated in Figure 2, we see that triad forces carryincreasing significance as priority is granted to thethreats posed by modern nuclear states.

1 6



56 Details of U.S. security obligations to Japan, for example, may be found in U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future, Security ConsultativeCommittee Document, October 29, 2005, available at The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/scc/doc0510.html.

57 Strategic Offensive Forces a nd the Nuclear Posture Reviews New Triad, Fairfax, VA: National Institute for Public Policy, March 2003, p. 24.58 A Prompt Global Strike capability has been called for by the Congress, but they have rejected plans to convert SLBMs, ICBMs or a space-plane-like concept to fill this

requirement.59 Daniel Goure, Strategic Nuclear Forces in U.S. National Security in the 21st Century, Arlington, VA: October 2002, p. 18.60 Ibid.


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Tailoring Deterrence for the SecondNuclear Age: Rogue States, NuclearAspirants, and Non-State Actors

To this point, this paper has argued that from anumber of policy perspectives, the traditional triadof nuclear forces remains essential to the formula-tion and execution of U.S. deterrence policy in thesecond nuclear age. Indeed, at the end of the spec-trum that remains less likely but potentially farmore devastating, the triad must meet the require-

ments generated by the existential threat as the U.S.

builds down its nuclear force under the terms of theMoscow Treaty. If we extend deterrence to themore uncertain ends of the spectrum, however, the

problems of policy and force structure becomemore complex and choices less clear. The two new

groups of actors posing nuclear threats wheredeterrence becomes problematic are rogue states

with nascent nuclear capabilities and non-stateactors that might gain rudimentary nuclear

weapons and delivery systems.

Can rogue states be deterred? The United Stateshas acknowledged that the contemporary andemerging missile threat from hostile statesrequires a different approach to deterrence:61

Deterring these threats will be difficult. There areno mutual understandings or reliable lines of com-munication with these states. Our new adversariesseek to keep us out of their region, leaving themfree to support terrorism and to pursue aggressionagainst their neighbors. By their own calculations,these leaders may believe they can do this by hold-

ing a few of our cities hostage. Our adversaries seekenough destructive capability to blackmail us fromcoming to the assistance of our friends who wouldthen become the victims of aggression.62

There is a range of views on whether nuclearweapons can deter rogue states like North Koreathat may possess limited nuclear capability. Thebelief that such states cannot be deterred has con-tributed to a doctrine calling for preventive mili-tary action against such states before they couldthreaten to launch or transfer nuclear weapons.Indeed, that was one of the principal, if ultimately

mistaken, factors in prompting the U.S. invasion ofIraq in 2003. But Jeffrey Record has argued thatbecause rogue states have critical assets that can beheld hostage to the threat of devastating retaliationnuclear deterrence will likely remain credible.63

1 7



Effective Deterrence

Likelihood of Attack

ModernNuclear States

FracturedNuclear States

Rogue States

NuclearAspirants

Non-stateActors

HIGHERLOWER

IntensityofAttack

H

IGHER

LOWER

Figure 2. Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age.

61 National Policy on Ballistic Missile Defense Fact Sheet, Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 20, 2003, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases2003.62 Ibid.63 Jeffrey Record, Nuclear Deterrence, Preventive War, and Counterproliferation,Policy Analysis, No. 519, July 8, 2004, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa519.pdf.

Can rogue statesbe deterred?


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Record supports his analysis by pointing out thatno rogue state has ever used WMD against anenemy capable of such retaliation, and concludesthat strengthening deterrence against these emerg-ing threats is far more promising for internationalstability than resorting to preventive war.64

Because game theory provided considerable insightinto the behavior of nuclear adversaries during theCold War, it may also be useful to apply such adeterrent framework to the interaction of theUnited States and rogue states in the secondnuclear age.65 Game theory is based on an assump-tion that the players are rational but, as RogerMyerson has recently observed, although ouradversarys interests may vary widely from our own,it is also likely that we share common interests,such as avoiding the costs of destructive conflict.66

Adopting a game theory perspective, Myersonargues against regarding any adversary as irrational,lest such a declared position evolve into a self-fulfilling prophesy during times of crisis.67

Others agree that deterrence must continue to berelied on in the face of these new nuclear threats.Baker Spring and Kathy Gudgel, in acknowledgingthe threats of regional powers armed with WMD

wrote, The Cold War arsenal must be adjusted, innumbers and types of weapons, to provide deter-rence in a new and dynamic situation.68 Writing

earlier, Keith Payne similarly noted that it is notpossible to establish a generic formula for predictablydeterring a rogue challenger.69 Because differentopponents (such as North Korea and Iran) willhave different motivations in acquiring nuclear

weapons, Payne argued that the U.S. nuclear deter-rent threat must be sufficiently flexible to speak toall of these particular opponents and incentives.Paynes prescription was therefore for substantial

and wide-ranging intelligence that identifies andweighs the factors influencing the rogues decision-making, and a flexible and certain nuclear force

with global reach to underwrite regional deterrencepolicies. A recent RAND study concluded thatclassical Cold War deterrent strategy may not be

applicable against nuclear-armed regional adver-saries because those actors may conclude they willnot be any worse off for having used nuclear

weapons than if they were to forego their use.70

Deterrence is much less likely to be effective indealing with terrorist groups threatening the use ofnuclear weapons. As David Holloway has argued,such groups should be deterrable in principle,because something they value can be put at risk.71

However, Holloway adds that they are likely to beshadowy groups with no return address, that they

miscalculate the consequences of their actions (9/11comes to mind), or that they actually seek to provokea massive response to fit their apocalyptic vision andcult of martyrdom. Acknowledging these factors,the U.S. 2002National Security Strategy statesclearly that traditional concepts of deterrence willnot work against a terrorist enemy whose avowedtactics are wanton destruction and the targeting ofinnocents; whose so-called soldiers seek martyr-dom in death and whose most potent protection isstatelessness.72 The June 2008National DefenseStrategy reinforces this statement: Deterrence may

be impossible in cases where the value is not in thedestruction of a target, but the attack and the verymeans of the attack, as in terrorism.73

Those who believe that deterrence strategies willhave little success with transnational terroristgroups such asAl Qaeda tend to urge policies ofdefense, preemption or prevention rather thanthreats of punishment. Sophisticated defenses have

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64 However, demonstrating a willingness and ability to resort to preventive military action in certain cases may act to dissuade others from similar provocative behavior, includ-ing the acquisition or transfer of WMD. See Andrew Krepinevich and Robert Martinage, Dissuasion Strategy, Washington, D.C: Center for Strategic and Budgetary

Assessments, www.CSBAonline.org.65 The seminal classic is T.C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960.66 Roger B. Myerson, Force and Restraint in Strategic Deterrence: A Game-Theorists Perspective, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, November 2007.67 Myerson goes as far to assert that, It is generally much safer to assume that our adversaries will respond appropriately to a firm deterrent strategy when our resolve and

restraint are both made clear to them.Ibid. p. 22. But that may not be true for all the potential players in the second nuclear age.68 The Role of Nuclear Weapons in the 21st Century, Heritage Foundation, April 13, 2005, www.heritage.org/Reserach/NationalSecurity/wm721.cfm.69 Payne,Deterrence in the Second Nuclear Age, op. cit., p. 127.70 David Ochmanek and Lowell Schwartz, The Challenge of Nuclear-Armed Regional Adversaries, Santa Monica: RAND, 2008. The monograph goes on to advocate preventa-

tive measures to be taken before any missile launch, and active defenses to be employed after a launch.71 Deterrence, Preventive War, and Preemption, in George Bunn and Christopher Chyba (eds.) U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy, Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 2006, p. 57.72 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, September 2002, www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002.73 National Defense Strategy, June 2008, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, p. 12.


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important roles in the second nuclear age, and theyare discussed below. But there are those who arguethat, because terrorists seeking to use nuclear

weapons are highly dependent on other actors intheir quest for nuclear capability, deterrence also

will play a role.74

While threats of retaliation will not have muchutility if terrorists are bent on blowing up them-selves along with their victims, deterrence tacticscan be employed against their organizations andterritorial bases in a targeted manner.75 Nuclearterrorism is likely to be the result of theft or trans-fer from a nuclear-capable state, from indigenous

production or the purchase of nuclear weapons ormaterial. But these proliferations of nuclear capa-bility cannot occur without some state support.76

The deterrent prescription, according to Paul K.

Davis and Brian Jenkins, is stark: the United Statesmust credibly announce that any state or non-stateorganization that even tolerates the acquisition of

WMD by terrorists within its borders will be sub-ject to the full wrath of the United States.77 Thisstatement, with tones reminiscent of U.S. policyduring the Cuban-missile crisis, is followed up bythe authors with the assertion that the UnitedStates might lower standards of evidence in ascrib-ing guilt and may violate sovereignty in its pre-emptive attack to remove guilty regimes by force.

Although the United States has not moved to thislevel of declaratory policy, it has shifted in thatdirection. The 2006National Security Strategydescribes a new deterrent calculus declaring thatstates harboring terrorists assume their guilt, and

will be held to account. This policy, referred toby some as expanded deterrence relies heavily onthe ability of the U.S. to define the nature andsource of a terrorist-employed WMD to enablethe rapid response efforts that may be critical indisrupting follow-on attacks.78 This process ofnuclear attribution, developing appropriate forensic

techniques and integrating them to levels of highconfidence, is still in its early stages, and faces bothtechnical and organizational challenges. AsTalmadge concludes, deterrence will depend onconvincing other states that the United Statesactually has the capability to identify the origins of

a nuclear weapon detonated on its soil.79 If theU.S. develops a demonstrated nuclear attributioncapability, and backs it up with credible threats ofretaliation, the odds of nuclear deterrence againstterrorists and other non-state actors in the secondnuclear age will be strengthened.

What are the force planning implications for deter-ring these new actors in the second nuclear age?U.S. deterrent policies and forces must be preparedto address a wide range of nuclear threats, somestill requiring a clearly disproportional retaliatory

response. In other cases such punitive deterrentthreats may be ill-suited to deter an actor who doesnot highly prize the civilian population or anyinfrastructure that might be placed at risk.80

Maintaining and modernizing the traditional triadto deter the capabilities of modern nuclear states isessential as the United States builds down its strate-gic arsenal. But what additional capabilities mightbe required to deter actors emerging along thespectrum of plausible nuclear conflict? A 2003RAND study on future roles for U.S. nuclear forces

argued that the forces and operational practicesunderwriting a contemporary theory of nucleardeterrence are likely to look very different fromthe current U.S. approach.81 Specifically, theRAND authors posited three situations (counter-force, special targets and critical situations) in

which the U.S. might threaten the use of nuclearweapons against such actors:

COUNTERFORCE

Counterforce is defined as the targeting of enemynuclear forces to limit damage to the United States

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74 See Caitlin Talmadge, Deterring a Nuclear 9/11,The Washington Quarterly, Spring 2007, pp. 21-34.75 Klaus-Dieter Schwarz, The Future of Deterrence, SWP Research Paper S13, Berlin: German Institute for International and Security Affairs, June 2005, p. 13.76 See Nuke blueprints found on computers kept by smugglers,Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, June 19, 2008, p. 4.77 Paul K. Davis and Brian Michael Jenkins, Deterrence and Influence in Counterterrorism, Santa Monica : RAND NDRI, p. xv. See also Jenkins,Will Terrorists Go Nuclear?

New York: Prometheus, 2008, in which the author advocates steps for securing and decreasing nuclear arsenals, and strengthening both international institutions andterrorist-related intelligence.

78 National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006, www.whitehouse.gov.nsc/nss/2006.79 Talmadge, op. cit.p. 30.80 See Kenneth Watman and Dean Wilkening, U.S. Regional Deterrence Strategies, Santa Monica : RAND, 1995.81 Glenn Buchan, David M. Matonick, Calvin Shipbaugh, and Richard Mesic, Future Roles of U.S. Nuclear Forces, Santa Monica : RAND, 2003, p. xix.


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in a nuclear exchange. The RAND authorsspeculate that fledgling nuclear powers are unlikelyto deploy hardened or survivable nuclear forces, andthat even a modest U.S. capability would representconsiderable inherent counterforce capabilityagainst emerging nuclear powers.

SPECIAL TARGETS

If an adversary does take steps to harden or deeplybury nuclear assets such as command centers, man-ufacturing plants or storage sites, nuclear weaponsmay be required to destroy such sites. The RANDstudy notes that maintaining a capability to success-fully attack these targets is the most fundamentaltenet of deterrence holding at risk whatever theenemy values.

CRITICAL MILITARY SITUATIONS

Crises might arise in which nuclear use surfaces as

an option because other alternatives (e.g., conven-tional force, missile defense) appear inadequate.Such a situation may require flexible nuclear-capableforces that can be put in place to convey a deterrentthreat and that will be perceived as credible by theadversary.

In all of these cases, the RAND analysts concludedthat if the United States is to adopt a nuclear posturecapable of deterring emerging threats in the secondnuclear age, it will require the targeting flexibilityand the intelligence, surveillance and reconnais-sance support comparable to that needed for con-

ventional weapons.82 In addition to preservingand modernizing the triad, then, three additionalforce planning initiatives to underwrite deterrencein the second nuclear age appear promising.

Next Generation Bomber

Within the traditional triad, the long-rangebomber force is critical to maintaining U.S. long-range nuclear capability, flexible targeting, andman-in-the-loop command and control (whetherthe aircraft is manned or not). The Air Force plans

to leverage near-term technologies to field a nextgeneration long-range strike system (NGLRS, alsocalled next-generation bomber, or NGB) to replacethe oldest B-52s by 2018, and continue the divesti-ture of legacy bombers. The NGLRS system isexpected to be manned and nuclear-capable.83

Persistent Awareness

The RAND argument calling for ISR supportcomparable to that for conventional weaponsdemands an integrated, layered system of sensors,

platforms and decision support aids. ISR operationsin the second nuclear age may include overflightsin relatively benign air defense environments.Because of this, nonstealthy unmanned vehicles, suchas the Global Hawk andPredator, and manned sys-tems such asJoint STARSwith improved moving-

target indicator radars may be included as part ofthe ISR tools utilized

Documents

Deterrence and Defense in Second Nuclear Age