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Determining factors for a successful competence transfer: an analysis of the transfer of agriculture to the
Flemish Region during the fifth state reform1
Abstract
This paper analyzes the way the Flemish administration dealt with the competence transfer in the field of agriculture it experienced in 2001‐2002. The main research question goes as follows: “Which factors have an impact on a successful competence transfer in the context of a state reform?” This explorative research shows that the decision‐making process has a negative impact on that success because of the difficulties the administration experiences with the translation of the vague political compromises in the law. On the other hand, there is evidence that the change management willingness and capacity of the ‘receiving’ Flemish and ‘losing’ federal administration have a positive impact on that success.
1. Introduction Since 1970, the competence distribution between the central government and the regional governments in Belgium is shifting with the five state reforms as a result. Since the Belgian federal elections of June 2007, politicians are preparing for a possible sixth state reform2. Research on the Belgian state reforms is almost always conducted from a political and legal point of view with the decision‐making process and the interpretation of the legal documents as the study object. But a state reform does not stop once the decision is taken, on the contrary, it starts from there. It is the administrative translation of the political decision‐making and the implementation which, for a large part, determines the success of a state reform. This exploratory study attempts to respond to this deficiency and analyzes the factors through the process of a state reform required for a successful transfer of competence, with attention to the agenda‐setting, the policy formulation, the decision itself and the implementation of the decision and its impact on the Flemish administration.
1 This article is based on Vanhee & Hondeghem, 2009. For more info: http://www.steunpuntbov.be. 2 Voorstel van bijzondere wet houdende institutionele maatregelen, Parl. St. Senaat 2007‐2008, 4‐602/1; Wetsvoorstel houdende institutionele maatregelen, Parl. St. Senaat 2007‐2008, 4‐604/1.
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2. Research design
The general research question of this article goes as follows: ʺWhich factors determine a successful transfer of competence during a state reform?ʺ The way this research question is operationalized follows below. First of all, the dependent variable ʹsuccess competence transfer agricultureʹ is defined. Secondly, the way the transfer process will be analyzed in this article is clarified. In the third section we will focus on the theoretical framework that will be used to support the statements, and at the same time the research hypotheses will be formulated that will analyze which factors play a role in the success or failure of such transfer. Finally, in a fourth section, we will explain how the case will be constructed in terms of content. 2.1. Dependent variable ‘success competence transfer agriculture’
This article will examine the determining factors that lead to a successful transfer of competence during a state reform. But before these factors can be analyzed, one should define when and how one can speak about the success of such a transfer. In this paper, a distinction is made between the success of the process, the success of the implementation and the success of the post‐implementation.
‐ Process success: The way the execution was established. Within the transfer process, one can distinguish three partial successes:
● Speed: The speed of the entire process is analyzed, more in particular the preparation of the decision‐making and the implementation of the decision. Since the degree of complexity of the transfer plays an important role in the speed of implementation, an overall acceptable speed is not defined. In other words, the definition of an acceptable speed rate will follow out of the analysis of the case. ● Resources / output: The ratio resources to output of the transfer is examined and checked. Question is if this ratio is acceptable. The resources in this case are: people (own staff, external staff), budget and communication. Since the degree of complexity is different for each transfer, the number of resources will be different but are expected to be in proportion to the output. Again, an acceptable ratio will follow out of the analysis of the case. ● Policy continuity: This partial success consists of the fact that the policy continuity is not disrupted during the process of transfer. In other words, do the customers of the transferred policy domain encounter problems on the field during the transfer as a result of that transfer? This can be verified by detecting complaints concerning the disruption of the policy.
‐ Implementation success: The effective implementation of the transfer as outlined in the decision‐making phase. The formal decisions should be analyzed and be
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compared with the final result. Is everything implemented or are there parts that are still waiting for implementation? ‐ Post‐implementation success: New competence distribution after regionalization. The way that is dealt with the new distribution of competence between the different policy levels is examined. Within the distribution of competence, there are two partial successes:
● Competence demarcation: A clear demarcation of competences between the various policy levels. Is it, after execution of the transfer, clear which level is competent? ● Coordination: A good coordination between different policy levels. Is the coordination between the policy levels, in areas where needed due to the transfer, optimal?
By working with three main successes divided into six partial successes the image that will be obtained regarding the degree of success will be a lot closer to reality than when one should focus on only one or some of these partial successes. The six partial successes will together constitute a general indicator of success for the transfer of competences following out of a state reform. The case selection is undoubtedly important in the conduct of this type of research. As previously mentioned, we have opted in this paper for the competence transfer of agriculture following out of the fifth Belgian state reform in 2001. Several reasons underpin this choice. In the first place it is a transfer following out of the most recent state reform. In three areas this is important. In the first place, the study of the most recent state reform sees to it that the legacy of the four previous state reforms is taken into account and analyzed when necessary. In the second place, this choice sees to it that we will face the most recent rate of change management capacity and change management willingness of the administration. A third important consequence of this choice is of pragmatic nature: because the facts are not that old it is easier to get hold on the necessary documentation and to interview the former key players. Within the fifth state reform we chose the transfer of agriculture for two reasons. In the first place, it is interesting to see that it was not the first time the competence of agriculture was an object of transfer because pieces of this competence were already transferred in earlier state reforms. Secondly, it is important to emphasize that with this competence transfer a significant number of staff was transferred, i.e. 708 federal civil servants, which is the most recent major transfer to the Flemish level. 2.2. Process approach After defining a ‘successful competence transfer’ it is also important to structure the path to success or failure. The policy process approach of Howlett and Ramesh (1995) with the five phases of the policy cycle i.e. agenda‐setting, policy formulation, decision‐making, implementation and evaluation, is the ideal format to structure this
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complex story from the beginning X to the end Y. The agenda‐setting has, according to Howlett and Ramesh (1995), a major impact on the continuation of the process but does not necessarily lead to clear articulated goals. Certain events make sure that something is put on the political agenda. This is usually done through the efforts of one or more entrepreneurs. The policy formulation is a phase where proposals and options for the development of the changes are defined, considered, accepted or refused. During this phase the various options are formulated and reformulated over time. The phase of decision‐making is an important phase for the political actor with the necessary attention to the legislation which is usually accompanied with the reform. The implementation phase is not just an executive phase because negotiations on the effective implementation may still take place. The decision makers that did not achieve their goals have not disappeared and can still appear on stage to alter the policy to their ideal situation. Finally, the process ends with the evaluation phase where the policy steps which were discussed above are evaluated and the newly constructed competence demarcation and coordination is evaluated. In this paper we opt for a clear demarcation between the different phases with one phase each perfectly connecting with the one before. In reality, this is obviously much more complicated in the way that the different phases cross. Below, you will find this pragmatic demarcation for the case regionalization of agriculture with the length of the phase between brackets.
Figure 1. Policy steps within the policy cycle applied to the case regionalization of agriculture following out of the fifth state reform
ABR: agriculture before regionalization; AS: agenda‐setting; PF: policy formulation; DM: decision‐making; IM: implementation; AAR: agriculture after regionalization.
The change process is of course influenced by the broader context of the fifth state reform which the competence transfer is a part of, and by the broader political, economical and social context, as figure 1 shows. It is clear in the description of these phases, that the three which come first, i.e. the agenda‐setting, policy formulation and decision‐making, will be analyzed from a political point of view, while the last two phases, i.e. the implementation and evaluation, will be analyzed from an administrative perspective. The process itself will be described by means of the narrative method (Abbot, 1992).
ABR AS
(95‐99) PF
(99‐00) DM (00‐01)
IM (01‐08) AAR
E V A L U A T I O NFifth State Reform
Process competence transfer agriculture
Political, economical and social context
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2.3. Theoretical framework
To overcome the shortcomings of the descriptive nature of the narrative method, the narrative explanation is codified: the story is told in the language of a theoretical framework (Ragin, 1987). The process will not be described and explained by a single theory, but by different theories, depending on the policy step within the process approach. Per policy step, one or more hypotheses will be formulated that should be explored and then be confirmed or invalidated through the research. Since this research is exploratory in nature and rather explores than evaluates, the value of these hypotheses can not be overstated but should rather be seen as a necessary starting point in the process. The starting point of the transfer ʹABRʹ or ʹagriculture before regionalization’, is the situation before the start of the agenda‐setting (see figure 1). In the context of this research, this represents the situation created by the earlier state reforms. Because the history is important to understand the facts that follow, the initial situation will be analyzed and explained through the theory of path dependency: events and decisions in the past have an influence on later policy decisions (Kiser, 1996). The expectation at this point goes as follows: The more areas of competence within the specific policy that have already been transferred in the past, the greater the chance of transfer success. One would expect that the experience gained in the past would contribute to the success of transfer. In line with this, the following expectation goes as follows: The more substantial the previous competence transfers were, the greater the chance of transfer success. One can expect that especially the earlier gained experience with substantial transfers will contribute to a successful transfer.
For the phase of agenda‐setting, this research uses the stream model of Kingdon (1995). Kingdon (1995) distinguishes between three streams: the policy stream, the problem stream and the political stream. The policy stream consists of policy alternatives and may gradually develop into policy proposals. The problem stream includes a multitude of factors that all could potentially be classified by decision makers as problems that have to be dealt with. The political stream consists of events such as changes in public opinion or changes in government majority. They have an influence on the fact that politicians focus on certain problems or certain policy alternatives. These flows normally move independently from each other, but can converge at crucial moments towards the opening of a ʹwindow of opportunityʹ which enables drastic changes in policy. This is done by the effort of one or more entrepreneurs (Pelgrims, 2008). The expectation within this policy step is: The extent to which the policy stream, the political stream and the problem stream regarding the regionalization of agriculture converge and is guided by a policy entrepreneur will have an impact on the success of the competence transfer. In this research, it is expected that when these three streams converge, when a platform for change is constructed and when an entrepreneur effectively does something about this, this will contribute to a smoother transfer. Within the phase of policy formulation, this research uses the theory of Barzelay (2001) which distinguishes between a fast and a slow treatment of the development
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of alternatives. This distinction is important because the speed at which alternatives are formulated can have an impact on the handling of the decision‐making and implementation. Often, the speed is related to the issue status. An issue that is put very high on the political agenda calls for a faster solution than an issue which is put low on the political agenda (Pelgrims, 2008). The expectation is: The issue status and the extent to which policy formulation foresees in involvement of all stakeholders will have an impact on the success of the competence transfer. It is assumed that the involvement of all stakeholders will allow to facilitate the execution of the policy steps. Or put otherwise: What is the value of a smooth policy formulation when this is one‐sided and the non‐actors disrupt the stage of decision making and implementation? The decision‐making phase is undoubtedly the most political of all phases. It is also at this stage that the ‘losers’ of the policy formulation come back to the front in trying to influence the decision (Howlett & Ramesh, 1995). In this research, the decision‐making theory specific to the Belgian state reform as described by authors as Dewachter (2001) and Deschouwer (2002) and derived from Lijphart (1968) and Huyse (1970) is used: the consociational democracy. Lijphart (1968) tries to explain why there is political stability in fragmented and divided societies. According to Lijphart (1968) it are the elites operating in cartel that ensure a relative stability. These elites must meet certain competence requirements to make this kind of politics work. In the first place, the elite has to realize that if peace is not maintained, this could mean the end of the political regime. Furthermore, the political elite has to follow the specific rules of the game: organization of top consultation for very threatening issues, confidentiality leading to an information gap between the top layer of politics and the rest, non‐political and business negotiations, tolerance between the elites, proportionality regarding the distribution of the benefits and finally the power of the government. In later work, he would also include the veto right of the minority. Dewachter (2001) adds three points which are specific to the Belgian type of consociational decision‐making. In the first place, one has to speak about the power of political parties, rather than the power of the government. In the second place, Belgium is influenced by incrementalism or policy in smaller pieces, as is the case with state reforms. Finally Belgium has a complex system of ‘checks and balances’ between the political elites which is an adjustment of the proportionality rule. In this context one can point out the double two thirds majority that must be met regarding decisions on the state reform. The expectation in this decision‐making phase is: The quality of decision‐making inherent to state reform will have an impact on the success of the competence transfer. With quality is meant: clarity for the civil servants that have to take care of the administrative translation. One can assume that the more detailed the political decision‐making is, the less chance there is for any kind of ambiguity, the less chance for administrative interpretation disputes, the more chance on a successful transfer. Furthermore, the implementation phase is framed within the theory of change management. In this research, we zoom in on the change process, rather than on the description of the contents or the context of change (Pettigrew, Ferlie & Mc‐Kee, 1992). The five pillars of the change management process, based on the work of Parys, Pelgrims and Hondeghem (2005), which will frame this phase, are: project
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organization (Duck, 2000; Kotter, 2000), acceptability by stakeholders (Kloosterboer, 1993), communication (Doppler & Lauterberg, 1996) resources and resistance (Stroh, North Craft & Neale, 2002). The expectation in this implementation phase goes as follows: The change willingness and change capacity regarding project organization, involvement, communication, resources and resistance within the ʹlosingʹ federal and ʹacceptingʹ Flemish administration will be a determining factor for a successful competence transfer. These conditions are assumed to be crucial for the success of the transfer and have everything to do with the will and capacity of the administrations to organize and change. Finally, the evaluation phase evaluates the process success, the implementation success and the post‐implementation success referred to in paragraph 2.1.. A transfer is considered to be successful if it meets the following conditions: the speed of the transfer is acceptable, resources are proportionate to the output, policy continuity is assured during the transfer, the decision is effectively implemented, the power distribution is clearly defined over the different policy levels and there is good coordination between the policy levels.
2.4. Sources
Two types of sources are used for the reconstruction of this case. First, we use different scientific, political, journalistic and official documents: scientific books and journals, legislation, parliamentary questions, committee reports, government statements, internal memos and reports from various administrative consultation structures, newspaper articles, ... . Secondly, this information is, as much as possible, tested by interviewing the former political, administrative and social key actors3.
3 The names of the interviewed: Camiel Adriaens, Magda Aelvoet, Werner Bosmans, Xavier De Cuyper, Noël Devisch, Vera Dua, Jaak Gabriëls, Jan Rammeloo, Erik Van Bockstaele, Pascal Vanderbecq, Noël Van Ginderachter, Patrik Vankrunkelsven, Jules Van Liefferinge and Piet Vanthemsche.
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3. Process analysis of the competence transfer of agriculture during the fifth state reform 3.1. Agriculture before regionalization following out of the fifth state reform Before starting with the phase of agenda‐setting, it is important to give a historical overview of the state reform in the field of agriculture before the fifth state reform and of the agricultural administration on the Flemish and federal level4. The competence of the regions in the field of agriculture is established by the Special Law of August 8, 1980 (Belgisch Staatsblad August 13, 1980), amended in 1988 and 1993 by the third and fourth state reform. Before the fifth state reform, the regions are already responsible for the application, in the framework of the agricultural fund, of the European measures on the agricultural structure policy on the specific support for agriculture in problem areas and rural development, the agricultural investment fund, the additional aid to agricultural companies, the promotion policy; the application of the European measures in the framework of the common agricultural policy which relate to the environment and on land, forestry and nature conservation. Furthermore, coordination mechanisms between the federal government and the regions on agricultural policy are already in place. Before the fifth state reform, the federal government however is still controlling the residual competences. Specifically, its competence contains the regulations, management and control of animals, plants, of agricultural raw materials and agricultural and food products, the health policy on plants and animals concerning animal and vegetable products. This residual competence for the federal government is reflected in the size of the administration. While the Flemish administration of agriculture, just before the fifth state reform, has around 100 civil servants and is included in the department Economy, Employment, Home Affairs and Agriculture, the federal administration of agriculture counts around 2800 civil servants. Below you will find, in figure 2, the organizational chart of the Ministry of Small Businesses and Agriculture. The federal department of Small Businesses and Agriculture consists of 7 Directorates‐General next to the Secretariat‐General and the general services. The Secretariat‐General and the general services department are horizontal services and their main task is to support the operational services. Directorate‐General (or DG) 1 and 7 relate to competences regarding small businesses, DG2 to DG6 are the DG’s who would later be directly affected by the regionalization.
4 For a full overview of the first four state reforms we recommend the books of Clement, D’Hondt,Van Crombrugge & Vanderveeren (1993) and Alen & Suetens (1993).
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Figure 2. Organizational chart Ministry of Small Businesses and Agriculture before fifth state reform
DG2 ‐ Agricultural policy is responsible for the conception and management of agricultural and marine fishery policy. This policy is mainly originated at the European level, and for agriculture, particularly in the common agricultural policy. DG2ʹs main role is to prepare and manage European policy. DG2 also manages the agricultural fund and agricultural investment fund. Inside DG2 there are two departments: the department of internal agricultural policy and the department of international agricultural and fishery policy. DG2 is also responsible for the monitoring of policy in other multilateral organizations such as the WHO. DG2 has 158 employees.
DG3 ‐ Agricultural production management is the payment agency of the ministry and is responsible for the payment of direct aid to the producers. DG3 implements the European policy that it partially determined by DG2 and has 286 employees.
DG4 ‐ Quality raw materials and vegetable products is responsible for control and quality in the vegetable sector. The DG is split up into 2 inspection services: inspection of raw materials and processed products and inspection plants and vegetable products. DG4 has 434 employees. DG5 ‐ Animal health and quality of animal products is responsible for control and quality in the animal sector. It is split up into 2 inspection services: veterinary services which is responsible for animal health, animal medicine, animal welfare and traffic of animals and the inspection service quality of animal products which is responsible for quality management in the animal sector. Together these two services account for 292 employees.
Cabinet Minister
Small Businesses
and Agriculture
Secr.-Gen. General services
RSVZ High Council for small business
DG1
DG2 Agricultural
Policy
DG3 Agricultural Production
Management
DG4 Quality raw
materials and vegetable products
DG5 Animal health
and quality animal
products
DG6 Research &
Development
DG7
BIRB
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DG 6 ‐ Research and development is responsible for scientific research in the agricultural sector and is responsible for the distribution and application of the results and consists of 99 employees. There are 5 scientific institutes associated with the department: the center for agricultural economics with 134 staff members, the national botanical garden with 157 staff members, the center for research in veterinary medicine and agro‐chemistry with 232 staff members, the center for agricultural research in Melle with 466 staff members and the center for agricultural research in Gembloux with 448 staff members. In addition to funding from the budget of the department DG6, each of these institutions has a legal personality in which own revenue is generated (Pvtconsult, 2001). 3.2. Agenda‐setting (21/05/1995 ‐ 13/06/1999)
The agenda‐setting on the transfer of agriculture runs from the elections of May 21, 1995 to the elections of June 13, 1999. The federal government declaration of June 28, 1995 provides for the establishment of a commission composed of representatives of the federal parliament and the community parliaments to evaluate the competence distribution and coherence of the competence domains with the objective to achieve a greater homogeneity. The Bureau of the Senate decides not to establish a separate committee but to use the existing Commission for Institutional Affairs for this task. After its activities, this committee publishes its rapport on March 30, 1999 but the conclusions are in most cases nothing more than a starting point for more thorough research. Regarding agriculture, the different parts of agriculture are highlighted and a possible regionalization is discussed5. The Flemish Government is also active in this field and wants to take the next step after the fourth state reform and therefore it lays down its guidelines for a further state reform in a discussion paper6. This paper, together with the results of a series of hearings, constitutes the basis of the work of the Commission for State Reform of the Flemish Parliament, which leads to different resolutions within the Flemish Parliament on the state reform adopted on March 3, 1999. In one of these resolutions the complete transfer of agricultural competences is explicitly demanded: A complete transfer of the agricultural, horticultural and fishery competences towards the regions should be executed. This implies the full execution of European policy, including quota management, scientific research, product control and sanitary and phytosanitary competences7. In response to the resolutions of the Flemish Parliament, the Parliament of the Walloon Region and the French Community adopt, in turn, a resolution in which the negative views of the French‐speaking parties are set out8. The activities within the Senate, within the Flemish Parliament and Flemish Government can be categorized within the above mentioned policy stream. It is especially the Flemish political elite who is not satisfied with the fourth state reform as a final step. The demand for a full regionalization of agriculture is a part of that dissatisfaction.
5 Evaluatie van de werking van de federale structuren: verslag namens de commissie voor de institutionele aangelegenheden, Parl. St. Senaat 1998‐99, 1‐1333/1. 6 Discussienota voor een verdere staatshervorming, Parl. St. Vlaams Parlement 1995‐1996, 253/8, 23‐41. 7 Voorstel van resolutie betreffende het tot stand brengen van meer coherente bevoegdheidspakketten in de volgende staatshervorming, Parl. St. Vlaams Parlement, 1998‐1999, 1342. 8 Parl. St. Fr. Gem. R. 1998‐1999, 328/1.
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In May of 1999 Belgium experiences the so‐called dioxin crisis. At that time it is clear that the toxic substance dioxin has affected the food chain. Large quantities of chicken and dairy products are, out of precaution, taken out of the shelves and the supply of chicken, pork and beef is stopped. This crisis also has an important political consequence because the opposition claims that the responsible ministers tried to hide the scale of the problem described in the note Destickere, a note which had come to light by the head of the opposition Guy Verhofstadt. The position of Minister of Health Colla and Agriculture Pinxten is untenable and on June 1, 1999 both of them resign as minister9. Because of this crisis a problem stream arises around agriculture, more in particular that the federal agricultural department would not have worked properly. This dioxin crisis dominates the month before the elections and the elections itself of June 13, 1999, which entails the political stream of this story. The combination of the three streams ‐ the policy stream, the problem stream and the political stream ‐ with the elections of June 13, 1999 as a peak and at the same time the end of the agenda‐setting, ensure that agriculture is put in the middle of the storm and a ʹwindow of opportunityʹ for reform arises. Guy Verhofstadt, during this crisis, plays the role as entrepreneur who would, after the elections, carry out the necessary reforms. If one takes a look at the other stakeholders10 we can conclude that they don’t seem to influence the agenda‐setting. Firstly, we can take a look at the pressure groups, the most important being the Boerenbond (BB) and the Algemeen Boerensyndicaat (ABS). The BB is not in favor of a regionalization, on the contrary, it is against. The ABS however is in favor of a regionalization because they are more Flemish oriented than BB but they do not have a real impact on agenda‐setting. The administrative actors are not involved in the agenda‐setting. The administrations of agriculture, on both Flemish and federal level, do not interfere with this political phase of agenda‐setting. The federal administration is following the work in the Flemish Parliament and the Senate but does not pay much attention to it. This changes somewhat with the outbreak of the dioxin crisis because it is quickly felt within the federal administration that this crisis could have major consequences for them. The federal department of agriculture is partly given the blame for the error. The federal cabinet of agriculture is more involved than the above mentioned administrations of agriculture since the agenda‐setting is entirely political. Within the federal cabinet, an increased vigilance regarding a possible regionalization of agriculture is the case with the outbreak of the dioxin crisis. The Flemish cabinet of agriculture at this stage is rather watching things from the sideline and follows the events from a distance.
3.3. Policy formulation (13/06/1999 ‐ 05/04/2000)
The policy formulation starts after the elections of June 13, 1999 and runs until April 5, 2000, the day on which the Hermes agreement which seals the regionalization of agriculture is concluded. The election results of June 13, 1999 are extremely affected
9 For an overview of the political year 1999 we refer to the article of Deweerdt (2000). 10 Since the case concerns the transfer towards the Flemish administration we have opted not to include the Walloon stakeholders in this research.
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by the dioxin crisis which dominated the weeks that precede. The Green party obtains a good score and also Guy Verhofstadt as opposition leader is strengthened by these elections. It soon becomes clear that the Christian Democrats choose for the opposition and they leave the initiative to the electoral winners. At the federal level, a purple‐green government is formed. The same government is formed on the Flemish level plus VU&ID.
The agreement of the federal government of July 7, 199911 is a compromise between the refusal of the French‐speaking politicians for further negotiations and the Flemish politicians who showed in their earlier initiatives precisely the opposite position. The compromise consists in referring the negotiations to an inter‐governmental and inter‐parliamentary conference for institutional innovation, with representatives of federal and regional parliaments and governments. This conference would be called ʺCOSTAʺ (COnference STAte reform) in the press. Illustrative for the Flemish desire for a further step in the state reform is the agreement of the Flemish Government of July 8, 1999 that makes a distinction between reforms that could be implemented rapidly and necessary reforms for which a more detailed consultation is necessary. Agriculture, horticulture and fishery can be found in the second category with the demand for the transfer of full responsibilities12. The Costa is installed on October 20, 1999 and is chaired by Patrik Vankrunkelsven (VU&ID) and Philippe Moureaux (PS). It soon becomes clear that it would be difficult to reach a consensus, as evidenced by the composition of the Costa: 31 party representatives from the six parties of the majority plus from VU&ID, CVP and PSC. Two working groups are established, one on the competence distribution that would begin with the domain of agriculture and foreign trade, and one on the financing of the communities and regions. Important in this early period is that the work is crossed by negotiations on the special Finance law. On December 1, 1999 the agreement of Sint Eloois is concluded which states that the distribution of the federal education dotation between the Flemish and French Community would be made on the basis of the number of school pupils between 6 and 18 years.
For their work, members of the Costa use the previously discussed Senate committee report. Working Group I concludes a principal agreement on December 22, 1999 on a maximal regionalization of agricultural policy. But a few months later, this agreement no longer stands and on March 22, 2000 Vankrunkelsven from VU&ID puts Prime Minister Verhofstadt under pressure to open negotiations on all outstanding issues on government level. These negotiations take into account the matters already discussed in the Costa but because the number of negotiators and policy makers are now smaller, this way of working seems much more efficient than the Costa. After preliminary discussions and discrete and nightly meetings of the core cabinet and the two co‐chairmen of the Costa, six parties of the federal government finally agree, on 5 April, 2000, with the regionalization of agricultural and export policy: the Hermes Agreement (Deweerdt, 2002b ).
11 Federaal Regeerakkoord: de Brug naar de eenentwintigste eeuw, Parl. St. Kamer BZ 1999, 20/1. 12 Vlaams Regeerakkoord: een nieuw project voor Vlaanderen, Parl. St. Vlaams Parlement BZ 1999, 31/1.
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In the policy formulation phase there is, due to the dioxin crisis, a policy formulation that crosses the regionalization of agriculture. This other policy formulation deals with a new federal agency for the safety of the food chain, in which the inspection services of health and agriculture would be integrated under the responsibility of the Ministry of Health. Given the pressure that was created after the dioxin crisis, the policy formulation on this agency goes extremely fast. Beginning of July 1999, Verhofstadt announces the idea, at the end of July 1999 an agreement is concluded within the government, to lead to the formal establishment of the new agency (FAVV) on February 4, 2000. The FAVV would be a public institution with legal personality, whose objective is to check the safety of the food chain and the quality of food in order to protect the health of the consumers (Deweerdt, 2000). The two policy formulation phases described above i.e. the regionalization of agriculture and the establishment of the FAVV clearly have a different issue status. The reforms deemed necessary following the dioxin crisis have a high issue status and because of this, a very short and effective policy formulation. The regionalization of agriculture has a lower issue status and is in fact a ‘victim’ of the new FAVV.
After the elections of June 13, 1999 the Boerenbond loses its direct line with the federal Minister of Agriculture since the minister is no longer of christen‐democratic signature but of liberal signature, namely Jaak Gabriëls. The Boerenbond is therefore no longer, as it was in the past, the preferred partner of the minister and is practically ignored. The loss of this direct connection has as a consequence that the BB is unable to influence policy formulation. The ABS, which earlier agreed on the agenda‐setting does not need to influence the policy formulation. As in the stage of agenda‐setting, the federal and Flemish administration of agriculture have a ‘wait and see’ attitude in this policy formulation phase. Indeed, policy formulation is a political phase where top politicians and their cabinet play a greater role. Both the cabinet of Flemish minister Dua and the cabinet of federal minister Gabriëls have in this period contact with the Costa. But this contribution is limited to a few notes which do not push policy formulation in another direction.
3.4. Decision‐making (05/04/2000 ‐ 13/07/2001)
On April 5, 2000, as previously mentioned, nocturnal negotiations within the government lead to a breakthrough and the six parties of the federal government agree on the regionalization of agricultural policy. According to this agreement, called the Hermes agreement, the regions are responsible for agricultural policy and sea fishery, with the exception of anything related to public health, the replacing income measures for early retirement of farmers, the Belgian Intervention and Restitution Office (BIRB), and the price and income policy. With regard to the European decision‐making on agriculture a federal member of government would remain the spokesman, but this minister would represent the position of the regions. Finally, the botanical garden in Meise would be transferred to the Flemish Community (Deweerdt, 2002b).
On July 5, 2000, three months after the Hermes agreement, the agreement is slightly modified. Is added to the text: The agreement of the regional governments is required for
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the actions of the federal government on animal welfare affecting agricultural policy. The following explanation is given: The conservation at federal level of regulation and control of animal welfare must be accompanied by guarantees for the regions. A compulsory procedure is installed which makes sure that the relevant measures affecting agricultural policy are subject to the agreement of the regions13. The added paragraph is remarkable: the federal government will need the agreement of the regions for action on animal welfare if this has an effect on the regional economic interests. The adjustment came at the request of the PS, who feared for restrictive measures for the sector of foie gras (Eeckhout, 2000). On July 5, there is still no consensus on the financial aspects of the regionalization, therefore the proposal is not introduced in parliament.
Meanwhile, the financial problems of the French Community are more and more visible. Slowly, the French‐speaking politicians indicate that they are prepared to talk about fiscal autonomy, something they had refused to do up to then. Discrete preliminary talks are conducted before and during the parliamentary recess in 2000. The real negotiations start on October 11 and are conducted between the top ministers of the federal government and the regional and community governments, and the Costa co‐presidents. On October 16, 2000, the Lambermont agreement is concluded and the regionalization of agricultural is reconfirmed (Deweerdt, 2002b).
The Verhofstadt government substantiates these agreements into two draft special laws of January 23, 2001. One regulates the financial side of the story: the refinancing of the communities and fiscal autonomy. A second includes the transfer of competences: agriculture, foreign trade, local and provincial law and, on a longer term, development cooperation. In this draft the financial impact of the regionalization becomes more clear. The regionalization of agricultural policy is accompanied by an amount of 1.8 billion BEF. Flanders gets, after deduction of 370 million BEF for the Brussels Region, 61.96%, or 874 million BEF. Furthermore, three scientific institutions are transferred to Flanders and Wallonia: the center for agricultural economy, the center for agricultural research in Melle and Gembloux, and the subsidies for scientific research. For the distribution, the localization principle is used so that Flanders receives 864 million BEF, compared to 777 million BEF for Wallonia (Deweerdt, 2001). Even before the parliamentary debate starts, the consultation committee approves on March 22, 2001 the two draft special laws as well as the cooperation agreement on the botanical garden in Meise and the cooperation agreement on the representation of Belgium in the European Council of Ministers14.
What follows is a difficult parliamentary discussion and vote (Deweerdt, 2002b) of the special law of July 13, 2001 on the transfer of various competences to the regions and communities with a central place for the quest of Verhofstadt for a two thirds majority in parliament. The partial cancellation of support from VU&ID means Verhofstadt has to seek support of the opposition party PSC, which is under pressure 13 Costa, Voorstel van bijzondere wet tot wijziging van de bijzondere wet van 8 augustus 1980 tot hervorming der instellingen: verklarende nota, 05.07.2000, Archief P. Vanderbecq. 14 Ontwerp van bijzondere wet houdende overdracht van diverse bevoegdheden aan de gewesten en de gemeenschappen, Parl. St. Senaat 2000‐2001, 2‐709/1.
15
from the christian trade unions of education to approve the special laws. Eventually, the PSC supports both drafts after the completion of some necessary requirements. The first is participation in the way the Lambermont money would be spent. This is fulfilled with the St. Boniface Agreement. A second is the signing by Belgium of the Framework Convention of the Council of Europe on the protection of national minorities. Eventually both laws are voted and the fifth state reform is born15. The result on the agricultural aspect is that DG4 and DG5 remain almost entirely federal and are transferred to the new FAVV, which has a huge impact on the size of the regionalization of agriculture.
The Boerenbond again does not succeed in influencing decision‐making and is very critical concerning the decision on the Belgian representative on the European agricultural councils and the way in which agricultural resources are distributed. The Boerenbond feels that the regionalization is a pure political decision motivated by the fact that the VU&ID had to be calmed down and then agriculture was offered as a gift (X, 2000). The ABS sees fewer problems in the decision. The federal and Flemish administration of agriculture are surprised by the speed and the way the Hermes agreement is established. The administrations are informed through the media. The Flemish and especially the federal cabinet of agriculture are surprised by the way the decision‐making takes place. Illustrative is the fact that the leader of the cabinet of Jaak Gabriëls on April 5, 2000 is in his car when he hears, on the radio news, that agriculture is regionalized. He immediately contacts the cabinet of Verhofstadt in order to urge him to immediately call Jaak Gabriëls apparently at that time on a formal trip to the Netherlands with the king. In other words, the federal cabinet of agriculture is barely involved in the decision‐making regarding the abolishment of its own ministry of agriculture, which is remarkable. After the political agreement, the federal cabinet of agriculture can’t do nothing else than respect the decision.
The decision‐making preparing the fifth state reform in general and the regionalization of agriculture in particular, fits perfectly into the type of decision‐making described earlier on in this paper: consociational decision‐making. Firstly, there are built up tensions. On Flemish side, one wants go further with the state reform in the field of competence transfers and fiscal autonomy for the regions. In the French speaking part of Belgium, there is a need for a refinancing of its education. The political elites realize that they must come to an agreement. What follows is a consultation with the top of politics in which a concession on the one side, leads to a concession on the other side. During the decision‐making phase all other stakeholders are not involved. The result of this secret summit is an information gap between the top‐class negotiators and the rest of the political and other stakeholders. In this type of decision‐making one strives to proportionality between the populations but this is weakened by the veto right of the minority in favor of that minority, for example the disproportionate allocation keys used in the
15 Bijzondere Wet van 13 juli 2001 houdende overdracht van diverse bevoegdheden aan de gewesten en de gemeenschappen, B.S. 3 augustus 2001. For books regarding the fifth state reform we refer to Alen, Craenen e.a. (2002) en Ingelaere, Clemer e.a. (2001).
16
transfer of agriculture. This type of decision‐making results in sophisticated, balanced, highly complex and difficult to understand written texts that have to be submitted to the party, and this every time a substantial change is made. During the decision‐making phase, there are several moments where the texts by the political elite must be defended within the party: when the political agreement is concluded, when the agreement is transposed into legislation and finally when the texts are treated in parliament and are voted, as was the case with the fifth state reform.
3.5. Implementation (13/07/2001 – end 2008)
3.5.1. Preparation and transition phase
Once the decision is final, the focus moves in July of 2001 from politics to the administration and the administrative translation of the special laws. The federal department of agriculture takes the lead and foresees in many consultation structures with the regions. During this consultation, it is clear quite quickly that the federal departments which are to be transferred to the regions can not be transferred physically as from 1 January, 2002, the date of the application of the special laws. Therefore, in December of 2001, a cooperation protocol16 is established in which the way the federal and regional administrations of agriculture would work and the way the ministers would take up their responsibilities between January 1 of 2002 to 15 October 2002 is put. This protocol is the result of intense discussions and cooperation between federal and regional governments and contains a number of general provisions on logistics, personnel, language and competence distribution. While the focus during this phase shifts to the administration, it is striking how much still must be decided politically. All administrative translations must be submitted to the central political group which oversees the administrative groups.
As from January 1, 2002, the regional Ministers of Agriculture are responsible for the transferred agricultural competences. The federal administration continues to work, but reports to the competent regional ministers17. In practice this means that from January 1, 2002 regional ministers of agriculture get federal files on their desk (Belga, 2002). The difficulties still to be solved politically are dealt with in the inter‐ministerial conference of agriculture. Just before the end of the transition period, a dissolution committee is established to accompany the final phase of the regionalization in the field of staff, logistics, budget and information technology. This committee is, once again, a body where many political decisions must be taken regarding the distribution of the above.
16 Protocol van 13 maart 2002 tussen de federale staat, het Vlaamse Gewest, het Waalse Gewest en het Brussels Hoofdstedelijke Gewest met betrekking tot de overgangsmaatregelen voor de uitoefening van de geregionaliseerde bevoegdheden op het vlak van Landbouw en Visserij, Archief P. Vanderbecq. 17 Gedachtewisseling over de implicaties van de verdere regionalisering van het landbouwbeleid, Verslag namens de Commissie Economie, Landbouw, Werkgelegenheid en Toerisme, Parl. St. Vlaams Parlement 2001‐2002, 1097/1.
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3.5.2. Implementation and integration phase within Flemish administration
In October of 2002, the number of staff that is transferred is published in the Belgisch Staatsblad. 708 civil servants move to the Flemish Region and 605 go to the Walloon counterpart. The DG’s dealing with food quality and safety, which represents 709 civil servants, go to the FAVV. The other civil servants are transferred to four federal services. The Federal Ministry of Health receives 227 employees and 12 employees involved in the European Agriculture Council move to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition, 218 civil servants move to the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and 154 civil servants go to the Federal Ministry of Social Affairs. The transferred civil servants towards social affairs are only and to economic affairs are largely civil servants of the ministry of Small Businesses18. This is interesting because the dissolution is finally clear in terms of personnel.
In figure 3 below one can se that 49.87% of the staff of the Ministry of Small Businesses and Agriculture are transferred to the regions.
Figure 3. Heirs of the staff of the Ministry of Small Businesses and Agriculture
Slightly more than one quarter of the total staff will be transferred to Flanders, slightly less than one quarter goes to Wallonia. 50.13% of the staff remains federal. It is noteworthy that the FAVV with 26.93% is the biggest heir and is even greater than the Flemish region with 26.89%. Publishing the personnel transfer in the Staatsblad is one thing, the integration into a new entity is another. Based on the Special Law of 1980 which says that ʺthe transfer of staff is conducted with the conservation of their degree or an equivalent degree and in their capacityʺ a necessary coordination with the Flemish rules are in order. The federal statute is therefore compared with the Flemish statute. The transferred employees retain under the same special law “at least the same salary that they had or would have obtained if they were kept in service within their initial service office”. As a result, the transferred staff never receives a lower salary in their new degree than they had within the federal government at the time of their transfer, in
18 K.B. tot overdracht van personeelsleden van het Ministerie van Middenstand en Landbouw naar de Vlaamse regering van 29 september en K.B. tot overdracht van personeelsleden van het Ministerie van Middenstand en Landbouw naar de voorlopige cellen van het Federaal Agentschap voor de Veiligheid van de Voedselketen van 29 september, Belgisch Staatsblad 01.10.2002. Also see Deweerdt, 2002c.
FAVV 26,93%
Public Health 8,62%
Economical Affairs
8,28%
Foreign Affairs
0,46%
Walloon Region
22,98%
Flemish Region 26,89%
Social Affairs
5,85%
18
particular 1 October, 2002. These civil servants can not, in their grading, be blocked in their salary; their evolution in salary by the Flemish government should at least be as good as the federal government19. Finally, Article 4, Section 3 of the KB of July 25, 1989 is also important and says ʺthe staff which is transferred keep their allowances, fees or premiums and other benefits which they could claim in their traditional ministry in accordance with the regulations that applied to them20.ʺ They keep the advantages associated with a function only insofar as the conditions for granting is also applicable in the service of the receiving government. The integration of these 708 employees within the Flemish administration takes until long after the official transfer of October 15, 2002. It takes a long time before all personnel files are in order, and the difficult grading exercise within the Flemish Staff Statute is finally executed. In 2004, one could say the biggest problems were resolved regarding staff. This exercise had a positive outcome for almost all civil servants because the transfer was accompanied by an average wage increase of 6%. The organization in which the 708 ʹLambermont civil servants’ are put is not optimal. A small Flemish administration of approximately 100 employees suddenly receives a multitude of federal staff members and is not ready for this challenge. The officials are dropped in an interim structure where there is no integration until the ʺBeter Bestuurlijk Beleid” ‐ structure is definitively applied in 2006. In line with the organization, there is also the problem of housing. The services that are transferred are not immediately transferred physically to the existing Flemish services and this takes several years before the two populations are integrated. It is obvious that these problems have a negative impact on the speed with which the former federal civil servants mix among the Flemish civil servants. Therefore a common Flemish agricultural administrative culture is not possible during the first years after the transfer. In terms of budget, logistics and ICT, the implementation and integration goes a lot smoother.
When the case agriculture is tested on the elements of change management previously cited at the beginning of this paper one obtains following findings. Firstly one can see that the change willingness of the ‘losing’ federal and the ʹreceivingʹ Flemish administration is very different. In the first case, this willingness is initially very low because they see themselves as a victim of a political decision as a result of a mediatized dioxin crisis. However, the loyalty of the administration towards the political decision grows after a while and takes the upper hand on this initially low level of change willingness. The willingness to change within the Flemish administration of agriculture is already present from the beginning and is driven from the Flemish administration credo ʹwhat we do, we do better’. It is obvious that it is more motivating for an organization to take over an administration, than it is to dissolve itself as is the case at the federal level. Secondly, after the change willingness, one should pay attention to the change capacity of the two 19 Hand. Commissie voor institutionele en bestuurlijke hervorming en ambtenarenzaken van het Vlaams Parlement, 2 juli 2002, 4‐20. 20 K.B. van 25 juli 1989 tot vaststelling van de wijze waarop personeelsleden van de federale ministeries overgaan naar de Gemeenschaps‐ en Gewestregeringen en naar het Verenigd College van de Gemeenschappelijke Gemeenschapscommissie, B.S. 31 juli 1989.
19
administrations. Firstly, one can see that the transfer is professionally prepared and coordinated from the federal level with the aim to split up the ministry, and is taken over professionally by the Flemish level with the aim to implement and integrate the competence and the staff within its own ranks. Both levels establish the necessary consultation structures and use the necessary resources. They are assisted, in greater or lesser extent, by external consultants, for the federal level this is KPMG and for the Flemish level this is PVT consult with Piet Vanthemsche as contract holder. Later on there is a Flemish change manager who accompanies the transfer of agriculture but also leads the BBB exercise. Secondly, one can not speak of genuine involvement of stakeholders during the implementation phase. The reform is implemented top down which is not so surprising if one takes a look at the (political) origin of the administrative reform. There is no ʹburning platformʹ, not during the agenda‐setting, nor during policy formulation, nor during decision‐making but also not during the implementation phase. A third finding is that, despite the low involvement of stakeholders, the federal administration and later the Flemish administration do everything to adequately inform and communicate the progress regarding the transfer to the civil servants of agriculture. Finally, the resistance towards change regarding the transfer is still manageable, despite the top‐down implementation. The consultations with the trade unions and the connections the top tries to have with the staff undoubtedly plays a role in managing resistance.
3.6. Evaluation
Can we talk about a successful transfer? Despite the complex decision‐making one can say that it is almost completely implemented21, which is a partial success. The process success is both positive and negative. In the first place, we find that the speed of the transfer was too low. Between the political agreement concerning the transfer and the official transfer of staff lies more than 2.5 years, not to mention the integration that took much more time. The resources to execute the transfer were, given the complexity of the exercise, in proportion. Also positive regarding the transfer was that the policy continuity during the complex transfer was not disrupted. The post‐implementation success is nuanced. The new distribution of competences between the different policy levels has not become clearer thanks to regionalization and even more than before coordination between different policy levels is necessary. Yet it seems that the more vague demarcation and the great need for coordination on the field is workable to this day.
Which factors are decisive for the degree of success of this transfer and which are not? With caution one can state that the agricultural competences that were already on the regional level before the fifth state reform indirectly contributed to its success. Indirectly because it has fed the change willingness and change capacity of the administrations in the past. At the same time, this factor is mitigated because the agriculture transfers in the past were not of substantial nature, and this is the reason why this factor does not appear in the figure 4 below. With this indirect related factor, we immediately come to the main determinants of success which is the
21 To this days, the official transfer of the botanical garden in Meise has not yet been executed.
20
change willingness and change capacity of both administrations. But this limited exploratory research also found a factor which triggers failure, namely the decision‐making specific to the state reform, i.e. the consociational decision‐making. Finally, other earlier stated factors apparently play no role in the success or failure of a transfer. From this limited study one can cautiously state that the support nor the involvement of all stakeholders is indispensable for the success of such a transfer. The main interest group was not in favor of the regionalization and the farmers themselves and the administration were not involved, and yet they executed the reform.
In figure 4, the relationships that have come up during the research regarding the transfer of agriculture to the Flemish Region following the fifth state reform are shown schematically. The complex decision‐making regarding the state reform produced by a political agenda‐setting and policy formulation, seems to have a negative influence on the partial success effective transfer, on the partial success speed, and on the partial successes competence demarcation and coordination after regionalization. The change willingness and change capacity of both governments however seem to have a positive impact on all partial successes. These relationships should be further examined to determine the weight of the various relationships.
Figure 4. Determining factors for the rate for success of the transfer of agriculture
Change willingness and change capacity of the ‘receiving’ Flemish administration
Change willingness and change capacity of the ‘losing’ federal
administration
Consociational decision‐making
Has a negative impact on
S1: Effective transfer
S2: Speed
S3: Resources/output
S4: Policy continuity
S6: Coordination
S5: Compentence demarcation
Has a positive impact on
21
4. Conclusion
Competence transfers following out of state reforms are often analyzed from a political point of view in which the political decision‐making gets a central place. Most of the time the administrative translation, implementation and integration within the receiving government do not get the attention they deserve. This research aims to give a stimulus to look at state reforms in a more general manner and more in particular to study competence transfers in a global way.
From the limited research that has been conducted so far it can be said that competence transfers, as those of agriculture following out of the fifth state reform, show in many cases a similar pattern. First, the state reform is put on the agenda by different political stakeholders who will later formulate specific policies. The decision‐making specific for state reforms, i.e. the consociational decision‐making, is complex and difficult: first, a political agreement is concluded, then the conversion to special laws follows, with ultimately the parliamentary treatment and vote. But then the real work begins as the reform that is on paper has to be implemented. From this stage, the administration takes the lead although many political decisions are yet to be taken. After the implementation one needs to integrate and consolidate the competence.
The transfer of agriculture following the fifth state reform may be regarded as a partial success. The success is that the decision is effectively carried out with resources that are in proportion to the output and that the policy continuity was not disrupted. It is only a partial success since the transfer speed was low and the competence distribution and coordination mechanisms have not become easier in practice. The factors, according to this limited explorative research, that have facilitated a successful transfer of competence in the field of agriculture have been the change readiness and capacity of the concerned administrations. The factor that complicated a successful transfer is the decision‐making typical for a state reform.
In order to get a better view on the typical characteristics, one needs further research on the success criteria and success factors of such a competence transfer which counters the limitations of this explorative research.
22
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