Desperate for Democracy

Rony HamauiUniversità Cattolica of Milan

CEO Mediofactoring

Boston College

The anomaly of Arab autocracies

Until the mid-seventies most countries in the world weregoverned by authoritarian regimes

In years to follow, many countries faced an evolutiontowards democracy, including the collapse of the SovietEmpire, many dictatorships in Latin America, Asia andeven Africa.

This is what Samuel Huntington called the third wave ofdemocratization

The Middle East has not experienced a similar evolution

Source: , Center for Systemic Peace “Global Conflict Trends”, 2011

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Americhe Asia-pacifico Europa centro orientale MENA Africa sub-sahariana Europa occidentale

1973 2011

Source: Freedom House, 2011

Percentage of non-free countries by region

The anomaly involved all kinds of freedom

Political election pluralism government effectiveness

Civilian freedom of expression freedom of association principles of legality personal freedoms

Economics

World Western Europe Nord and e SudAmerica Eastern Europe Asia Pacific Sub-Saharan

Africa MENA

Election 7.7 11.8 10.4 7.6 7.4 5.6 3.0

Political pluralism 10.1 15.3 12.9 10.0 9.9 7.6 4.3

Government effectiveness 6.4 11.3 7.9 6.0 6.2 4.7 2.8

Freedom of expression 11.3 15.4 13.9 11.0 10.8 9.7 6.4

Freedom of expression 7.8 11.8 9.4 7.9 7.4 6.3 3.6

Principles of legality 8.4 14.6 9.7 8.3 8.3 6.2 4.0

personal freedoms 9.7 14.9 11.5 10.1 9.8 6.6 6.1

Freedom in different geographical areas

Source: Freedom House, 2011

1. What accounts for this anomaly?

2. Almost two years after the start of the riots, what is the situation in Arab countries?

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1. What explains this anomaly?

1. Socio-economic development i.e. the "modernizationtheory"?

2. Raw materials i.e. “rentier state”?3. Institutions i.e. the jokes of history and geography?4. Is Islam an obstacle to democracy?5. Ethnical and cultural fragmentation?

Individuals Muslims and Muslim-majority countries value democracy more (orat least in the same manner) than other people do: Rowley and Smith (2009)Maselmad van Hoorn (2011)

1. Being democratic: How rich should one be?

There is a vast amount of literature that shows the relationship between wealth/education and democracy: Aristotle, de Condorcet, Weber, Bryce, Lipset, Barro, Benhabib, Corvalan, Spiegel..

The richest countries are also more likely to become democratic when they are not and are less likely to become authoritarian.

More unclear is the evidence that democracy causes economic development: Barro, Tavares, J., and R. Wacziarg, Rodrick

Democracy and per capita income

Yemen 7,85

Marocco 8,16

Siria 8,23Iraq 8,39

Egitto 8,48

Giordania 8,51

Tunisia 8,74

Algeria 8,77

Iran 9,29

Libano 9,39

Libia 9,84

Arabia Saudita 10,08

Oman 10,09

Bahrain 10,15 Emirati Arabi 2,80

Kuwait 11,04

Qatar 2,80

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Reddito Pro Capite (in LOG)

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Almost all Arab countries seem to have reached thelevel of per capita income necessary to getdemocratic structures (3500-5000 US$)

This is particularly true for countries producing oiland gas

Of course income distribution and cultural level arealso relevant

2. The rentier: ‘Oil is the curse’

Many authors demonstrate how large natural resources (non-agricultural) hinder not only economic development (Dutch disease), but democracy as well (Mahdavy-Balawi, Huntington, Ross, Barro…)

Causes:1. low taxes: no taxation without representation2. high public expenditure: grants, subsidies3. heavy spending on defense and security4. large capital investment, lack of commitment to human

resources

Democracy level and oil income per capita in the Middle East countries (1960-2002)

Source: Ross, Michael. 2009. “Oil and Democracy Revisited.” UCLA.

3. The jokes of history…

Around 800 Europe is economically and politically weak.The Christian emperor offers Feudal lords greater politicalautonomy in exchange for an army. This mechanism ensurespolitical stability and limits the authoritarian power of thesovereign. The birth of a rural aristocracy will prove to becrucial for the emergence of democratic parliaments(Montesquieu, North e Weingast, Acemoglu..)

The Muslim sultans were richer and well organized. Thisallowed them to pay an army of slaves: the Mamalucchi.This mechanism favors the survival of authoritarian andcentralized structures (Blaydes and Chaney)

Autocracies of today depend on the institutions of yesterdayInstitutional persistence

…and geography

The Arabian Peninsula consists of arid lands that noempire has ever truly wanted to conquer.

They have never become colonies but protectorates.No one has ever wanted to export their own

institutions. In fact, the West often opposed theprocesses of democratization

Tribal structure where the main families sharepower.

Strong ideological and religious cohesion.Oil discoveries created another mechanism of social

control

4. Is Islam an obstacle to democracy and growth?

This question is important because:1. Few Muslim countries can be defined as democratic2. Many Arab constitutions make reference to Sharia3. Muslims are more pious and observant

Weber against Backer(obstacle to development ≠ religious contiguity )

Democratic and non-democratic Muslim countriesNON DEMOCRATIC DEMOCRATIC

% della pop musulmana % della pop musulmanaAfghanistan 99 Indonesia 87.21Djibouti 97.78 Comoros 99.31 Algeria 99.54 Senegal 91.99Egitto 89 Mali 89.99 Arbaiian 93.41 Mauritania 99.25Bahrain 81.16 Niger 88.69 Bangladesh 88.30 Turchia 99.76Gambia 94.89 Totale 7Guinea 85.01Iran 99.57

Iraq 97.03 No one in Mena Giordania 96.59Kuwait 75.25Libia 97.06 Arabia Saudita 96.68Maldive 100 Somalia 99.86Sudan 73Marocco 99.83 Siria 86.02Tajikistan 85.10Tunisia 99.48Pakistan 94.92 Turkrnenistan 86.91Emirati Arabi Uniti 96.02Qatar 95 Uzbekistan 88Yemen 99.89Totale 28

Percentage of people who: Germany France UK Italy US Turkey Egypt Morocco Iran Jordan Iraq-consider religion very important

11.2 13.0 21.0 34.4 47.4 74.7 95.4 90.6 78.5 94.5 96.1 -consider God very important in their life

9.8 11.2 23.3 33.8 57.8 76.2 97.0 87.5 79.7 97.1 91.8 -considers himself a religious person

42.9 46.9 48.7 88.0 72.1 82.6 92.5 91.8 83.7 92.2 54.7

-took part in a religious ceremony at least once a week 8.1 7.2 17.3 31.5 36.0 34.2 55.7 N.D 35.5 92.8 32.8

Indices of religiosity

Source: World Value Survey 2005

Is Islam an obstacle to democracy and growth?

From a theological-dogmatic perspective Islam stands for:1. Less prone to complex dogmatic formulations and more attentive

to legal behavioral provisions (orthodoxy → ortoprassia).2. Sharia law, has unlimited value to the sphere of the intimate

relationship between man and God, but is also the principles ofgood conduct in all areas of public life of the umma

3. The absolute centrality of the group defined as family, clan,ethnic group.

4. The constant reminder of equality and solidarity.5. The strong relationship with tradition in every field of human

existence; aptitude to perpetuate, rather than innovating theconstant reminder of the "golden age".

Is Islam an obstacle to democracy and growth?

From an economic prospect Islam stands for:1. Prohibition of interest payments: riba. Originally common

to all religions.2. Obstacle to the establishment of financial institutions and

corporate: temporary partnership was the typical form.3. Centrality of the group, clan, extended family.4. The very egalitarian inheritance system has prevented the

accumulation of capital (Kuran).5. Ban the printing of all books and journals: Firman of 1483

the caliph Beyazit II, revoked, with the exception of theKoran, in 1727 by Achemet III. The first printers only cameinto operation at the beginning of 1800

Is Islam an obstacle to democracy and growth?But …1. Today, these impediments are no longer in operation: there are large banks and

large corporations2. The Prophet Muhammad was a successful merchant who had more sympathy for

the rich than for Jesus3. Wealth is seen as a sign of good will4. Private property is protected5. Islam is seen as a social contract between the rich merchants and the poor

disenfranchised (Michalopoulos, Naghavi and Prarolo)6. For many centuries, Islamic countries were among the most advanced in the

world in terms of living standards, scientific and technological progress .... thenthe decay ... when Muslims became the majority (Chaney)

7. Also in political terms "the Caliph of the ancient becomes the Sultan; the primusinter pares becomes the state itself, embodying in itself the law, theadministration and the executive" (Backer)

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The empirical evidence on growthIslam is an obstacle to growth

Porta, Lopez, Shleifer e Vishny,(1997) Barro e McCleary (2003)Guiso, Sapienza e Zingale (2002)

Islam is not an obstacle to growth

Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer e Miller, (2004)

Noland (2003)

Gheeraert (2008)

Islam is neutral

Pryor (2007)

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The empirical evidence on democracyIslam is an obstacle to democracy

Barro e McCleary (1999)Porta, Lopez, Shleifer e Vishny,(1999) Fish (2002)Rowley, e Smith (2009) , Maseland e van Hoorn (2009)Potrafke (2012).

Islam is not an obstacle to democracy

Noland (2003) Noland (2008)

Islam is neutral

Pryor (2007)

Conclusions

Neither analysis of doctrine, nor historical and econometric analysis are able to give definitive answers.

It would seem, however, that Islamic countries present very different socio-economic situations that are dependent upon geographical location and their historical background.

Indonesia is a typical case that has managed to engage the wagon of the Asian Tigers, and that of Turkey, which maintains strong ties with Europe

5. The age-old divisions in the Islamic world

• Ethnic, linguistic and cultural fragmentation can be a majorobstacle to economic growth and creation of democraticinstitutions.– More difficult to sign a social contract– Obstacle to a more equitable distribution of income– Minor mutual trust

Easterly e Levine; La Porta, Lopez de Silanes, Shleifer e Vishny;

Barro; Alesina A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat e R.

Wacziarg

The age-old divisions in the Islamic world

• Apparent homogeneity of the Arab world:– a strong majority religion, Muslim– one Semitic language, Arabic, with Iran as the clear exception– a relatively homogeneous geography;– a population, the Arabs, of Semitic origin;– and above all a culture shaped over fourteen centuries by the

Muslim empire (with the Umayyads and Abbasids dynasties) andthen by the Ottoman Empire, which collapsed less than a centuryago.

Distribution of population by religious affiliation

The map of Islamic schools

Map of Arabic dialects

Ethnical Linguistic Religious Latin America 0.405 0.179 0.442 Sub-Saharan Africa 0.658 0.625 0.496 Eastern Europe 0.366 0.320 0.491 Western Europe 0.177 0.196 0.311 South Est Asia 0.306 0.353 0.457 Middle East 0.453 0.330 0.346

The fragmentation in different geographical areas

Source: A. Alesina, A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat and R. Wacziarg, Fractionalization, (2002), Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper Number 1959

Etnica Linguistica ReligiosaAlgeria 0.3394 0.4427 0.0091 Arabia Saudita 0.1800 0.0949 0.1270 Bahrein 0.5021 0.4344 0.5528Egitto 0.1836 0.0237 0.1979Iran 0.6684 0.7462 0.1152 Iraq 0.3689 0.3694 0.4844Giordania 0.5926 0.0396 0.0659Kuwait 0.6604 0.3444 0.6745 Libano 0.1314 0.1312 0.7886 Libia 0.7920 0.0758 0.0570 Marocco 0.4841 0.4683 0.0035 Omar 0.4373 0.3567 0.4322 Qatar 0.7456 0.4800 0.0950 Siria 0.5399 0.1817 0.4310 Tunisia 0.0394 0.0124 0.0104 UAE 0.6252 0.4874 0.3310 Yemen 0.0080 0.0023

The fragmentation in different countries

Source: A. Alesina, A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat and R. Wacziarg, Fractionalization, (2002), Harvard Institute of Economic Research, Discussion Paper Number 1959

Looking to the future

The riots have taken on different characteristics Civil war with thousands dead in Libya, Syria and Yemen Bloody demonstrations in Egypt, Tunisia, Bahrain Almost bloodless demonstrations in Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan,

Kuwait(for a Political Economics Model that considers fragmentation and oilrevenue see Roland 2012)

The Arab uprisings are nothing new Every year over the past 60 years, there has been at least a "change or

attempt to change the government" in an Arab country (Menaldo 2011) In some of those years there were as many as five insurrections, with

three remaining the yearly average

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Number of uprisings in countries MENA:1950 - 2006

Soure: Victor Menaldo, 2011“The Middle East and North Africa’s Resilient Monarchs”,University of Washington working34

The monarchies are more stable The monarchies have registered a % of revolutions significantly

lower than that seen in republican countries. In fact the monarchies manage to:

create a better political culture that promotes consensus and reassures theelite

better coordinate the interests of the major families, ethnic groups. create more effective mechanisms for the distribution of income (oil) provide mutual aid (GCC) use religion as an element of legitimacy the kings of Morocco and Jordan claim to be the descendants of the

Prophet (Sharifs) those of Saudi Arabia bearing the title of custodians of their sacred

mosques

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MONARCHIE NON MONARCHIE Bahrain Algeria Giordania Egitto (dal 1952) Kuwait Iran (dal 1979) Marocco Iraq (dal 1958) Oman Libano Qatar Libia (dal1969) Arabia Saudita Tunisia Emirati Arabi Uniti Yemen (dal 1962)

Constitutional regime in MENA countriesfrom 1950 or from the date of their independence

Source: Wright (2008), Goemans et al. (2009).

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The oil monarchies are even more reluctant towards democratic development

This does not mean that the Gulf states are not affected by the uprisings in the Arab world. They were: In 1952, when Nasser overthrew King Faruq and proclaimed a Egyptian

Republic : Saudi Arabia was the biggest opponent to those movements In 1979, the outbreak of the Iranian Revolution which led the Saudi

monarchs to support the Salafists more strongly and invigorate the opposition between Sunnis and Shiites ("Arab Cold War")

Today, they have: given money to their citizens and increased public spending: $130 billion in SA violently suppressed the riots financially assisted ($5 billion) Jordan and Morocco’s proposal to enter the GCC (Gulf

Cooperation Council) Intervened militarily in Bahrain under the banner of GCC

Nothing has happened in terms of greater freedom

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The use of violence

The civil wars rarely end quickly, lasting 6 years on average, in some caseslasting up to 20 years

The probability that a democratic regime emerges from a civil hoversbetween 35% and 70%.

The probability of these countries becoming democratic is higher most are rich fewer are exporters of raw materials, oil in particular fewer are fragmented more wars are inspired by political factors fewer wars are waged for ethnic, cultural or religious reasons

Democracies emerging from civil wars are on average less respectful ofcivil and political rights (Cervellati, Fortunato and Sunde (2011))

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Civil liberties around periods of transition to democracy

Source: Matteo Cervellati, Piergiuseppe Fortunato e Uwe Sunde, 2011, “Democratization and Civil Liberties: The Role of ViolenceDuring the Transition” IZA DP No. 5555

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The Arab revolutions after almost two years

– The area as a whole has not made much progress– Significant improvements are observed in Tunisia (now

partly free), Libya and Egypt. Less marked in Morocco and Jordan

– The situation appears to be stable in Iraq and Oman– Deterioration occuring in all other countries. Particularly

marked in Bahrain, Yemen and Syria– Sharia has become the legal basis for many countries

(Kuran Lusting 2012)

In terms of freedom, the Arab countries are still an anomaly in the international view

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