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Designer Notes: France ‘14
With the end to diplomacy in the summer of 1914, Germany marched into
Belgium in the first week of August to win a crushing victory with their finely tuned, but
heavily modified, Schlieffen Plan. Germany saw many initial successes in France and
Belgium in August and early September, and victory seemed like a foregone conclusion.
However, defying all odds, the weary French and British made an about face and counter
attacked along the Marne, crushing the Schlieffen Plan, and halting the German advance.
The 1914 conflict in France would be the opening act of a gruesome war that
would not end until 1918, a war which would forever remove many of the monarchs in
Europe, and consume the lives of over eighteen million people. This "Great War" would
mark the end of the Napoleonic old world order, and would be the catalyst for an even
greater struggle known as World War II.
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Table of Contents Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 5 Campaign background ..................................................................................................... 8 The Beligerants................................................................................................................ 11
The Belgian Army......................................................................................................... 11
Organization .......................................................................................................... 11 Miscellanea ........................................................................................................... 13
The French Army .......................................................................................................... 14 Organization .......................................................................................................... 14
Equipment and Training ....................................................................................... 17 Miscellanea ........................................................................................................... 23
The German Army ........................................................................................................ 24 Organization .......................................................................................................... 24
Equipment and Training ....................................................................................... 34 Miscellanea ........................................................................................................... 35
The British Army .......................................................................................................... 37
Organization .......................................................................................................... 37 Equipment and Training ....................................................................................... 38
General Notes .................................................................................................................. 42 Attachments .................................................................................................................. 42 Cavalry Units, cavalry tactics, and cavalry types ......................................................... 44
Replacements ................................................................................................................ 50
Infantry movement speed .............................................................................................. 51
Lack of "Go On Foot" command .................................................................................. 53 Unit frontages, attack formation (1914) ........................................................................ 53
Unit frontages, defense formation (1914) ..................................................................... 55 Forts .............................................................................................................................. 55 Trenches and Improved Positions ................................................................................. 58
Heavy Machine Gun Units............................................................................................ 59 Field Guns, direct versus indirect fire ........................................................................... 62 Machine Gun and Field Gun Unit setup ....................................................................... 63 Towed Gun Limitation (stacking) ................................................................................. 65 Brigade and regimental HQ units ................................................................................. 66
Off map HQ units with 0% arrival ................................................................................ 67
Commanders ................................................................................................................. 67 Engineer units, minefields, obstacle and rubble clearing ............................................. 70 Stacking limits .............................................................................................................. 73
Night operations ............................................................................................................ 75 Siege Gun Units ............................................................................................................ 77 Rail capacity.................................................................................................................. 78 Artillery setup parameter .............................................................................................. 80 Multiplayer .................................................................................................................... 80
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Listening Music ............................................................................................................ 82
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 84 Scenario Notes ................................................................................................................. 85
Getting Started: The Guns of August............................................................................ 85
1914_0804_01s: The Assault on Liège......................................................................... 87 1914_0812_01s: The Battle of the Silver Helmets ....................................................... 89 1914_0815_01s: A Crossing at Dinant ......................................................................... 90 1914_0818_01s: Driving the Wedge ............................................................................ 91 1914_0820_01s: Von Moltke's Indecisiveness ............................................................. 92
1914_0822_01s: Home Before the Leaves Fall ............................................................ 93 1914_0822_02s: Lanrezac, the Defiant ........................................................................ 97 1914_0822_03s: Offensive à Outrance! ..................................................................... 100 1914_0823_01s: The Contemptibles Make Their Stand ............................................ 102
1914_0823_02s: First Clash at Mons ......................................................................... 103 1914_0824_01s: Flank Guard at Elouges ................................................................... 104
1914_0825_01s: The Rage of Dreaming Sheep (1st Sortie) ...................................... 105 1914_0826_01s: Taking One for the Team ................................................................ 106
1914_0826_02s: Unwritten Valor............................................................................... 108 1914_0829_01s: French Morale Restored .................................................................. 109 1914_0901_01s: A Desperate Rear Guard ................................................................. 110
1914_0905_01s: Uncovering the Enemy's Hand ........................................................ 111 1914_0906_01s: Miracle at the Marne ....................................................................... 112
1914_0906_02s: The Juggernaut Exposed ................................................................. 117 1914_0906_03s: Foch Stands Firm ............................................................................ 119 1914_0906_04s: Opportunity Lost ............................................................................. 121
1914_0906_05s: Flirting With Disaster ...................................................................... 122
1914_0909_01s: The Belgian Diversion (2nd Sortie) ................................................ 123 1914_0913_01s: Everything at Stake! ........................................................................ 124 1914_0917_01s: The Race to the Sea ......................................................................... 126
1914_0919_01s: A Dagger to the Heart ..................................................................... 129 1914_1001_01s: Never Give Up! ............................................................................... 130
1914_1001_02s: Turning the Flank ............................................................................ 132 1914_1018_01s: Where Valor Sleeps ......................................................................... 133
1914_1018_02s: The Belgian Bulwark ...................................................................... 135 1914_1018_03s: The Graveyard of the Contemptibles .............................................. 137 1914_1018_04s: The Salient is Formed ..................................................................... 140 1914_1020_01s: The Unglamorous Struggle ............................................................. 141 1914_1020_02s: A Taste of Hell ................................................................................ 143
1914_1025_01s: The Salient Pushes Back ................................................................. 144 1914_1029_01s: Enter the Conqueror ........................................................................ 145
1914_1110_01s: Last Chance for Glory ..................................................................... 147 1914_1111_01s: The Prussian Guard's Grand Finale ................................................. 148
Grand Campaign Notes ................................................................................................ 150 Campaign Outcome (Campaign Victory Points - CVPs) ........................................... 150 Optional Prelude Scenarios (and CVPs for Prelude Scenarios) .................................. 151 Grand Campaign Scenario Progression Tree .............................................................. 153
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GRAND CAMPAIGN SCENARIOS ......................................................................... 155
1914: The Grand Campaign (scenario F14-A) ........................................................... 155 Prelude Scenarios ................................................................................................ 156 Strategies and Operations ................................................................................... 156
Scenario Results .................................................................................................. 163 1914: The Grand Campaign (scenario F14-B) ............................................................ 164
Prelude Scenarios ................................................................................................ 164 Strategies and Operations ................................................................................... 165 Scenario Results .................................................................................................. 165
1914: The Grand Campaign (scenario F14-C) ............................................................ 166 Prelude Scenarios ................................................................................................ 166 Strategies and Operations ................................................................................... 167 Scenario Results .................................................................................................. 167
Gameplay tips ................................................................................................................ 168 When to assault ........................................................................................................... 168
Breaking contact, retreating ........................................................................................ 169 The art of taking ground ............................................................................................. 170
Cyclist units, the use of ............................................................................................... 172 Rail lines, the use of .................................................................................................... 173 Playing as the French .................................................................................................. 174
Playing as the British .................................................................................................. 175 Playing as the Belgians ............................................................................................... 175
Playing as the Germans ............................................................................................... 176
Glossary of abbreviations used in the Order of Battle in the First World War
Campaigns Series .......................................................................................................... 177 French / Belgian .......................................................................................................... 177
German ........................................................................................................................ 178 Austro-Hungarian ....................................................................................................... 180
Content Changes ........................................................................................................... 181 Bibliography .................................................................................................................. 187 Special Thanks .............................................................................................................. 192
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Introduction
What now seems like a lifetime ago, I approached John Tiller with a proposal; a
new game series should be created covering the Great War.1 The Great War is a conflict
that is generally well known about, but is little understood, and any knowledge of it is
usually filled with stereotypes and generalizations. For many people, the first thing that
may come to mind is a conflict of nothing other than trench warfare, stagnation, and
attrition. While it is true that the Great War had an ample amount of these traits, in
actuality most of the campaigns were fluid, and it was only the periods of 1915-1916 on
the Western Front that characterizes what most people come to think of as the entire
conflict.
War gaming interest in the Great War has been nearly nonexistent in comparison
to gaming interest in World War II. One contributing factor is due to the almost total lack
of war games available about the former, in comparison to the complete saturation of
content about the latter.
In the proposal to Mr. Tiller, the first title in this bold new series would be based
upon the Western Front, and it would cover the entire year of 1914. To compound
matters, I decided to go a step further and attempt to represent the campaign using a
similar system to the popular Panzer Campaigns series, meaning that the conflict would
be represented at a scale of one kilometer per hex, at the battalion and company level. It
was a truly ambitious and equally insane undertaking, and, to my knowledge, the scale
and detail of which was something that has never been attempted before in the history of
1 In this document, “the Great War” may be referred to as “the First World War” or “World War I”
interchangeably.
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war gaming. The end result is what I hope will be the most accurate and detailed
representation of this great conflict, and a hope to spark greater interest in the study of
World War I in general for further research and understanding, which in turn helps form a
greater understanding of World War II and modern world problems and situations. An
example of this would be the outcome of the French campaign of 1940, and the
undeserved post World War II criticism placed upon the French Army by armchair
historians.2 If people learned through a war game, or through further reading inspired by
playing a war game, exactly how much the French people suffered during the Great War
by experiencing or reading about the campaigns themselves, then perhaps they would
exhibit a broader understanding of the "complete picture" and be less quick to criticize
French performance in 1940.3 This is just one example of how the Great War contributed
to the events, origin, and outcome of World War II but it certainly goes much further than
this. The Great War was the genesis of modern warfare, seeing the birth of many modern
weapon systems and tactics, all of which deserve their own study in order to better
understand modern warfare.
The sheer scope and depth of the data that needed to be gathered to create this
work is mind boggling to say the least and, to complicate things, almost every source
available covers a small piece of the puzzle, or conflicts with one another in some regard.
The most difficult task was wading through the data and sorting out facts from bias, and
2 There is an excellent Panzer Campaigns series title available, France ’40, if you would like to wargame
the 1940 German invasion of France. 3 France suffered roughly 25% of all casualties inflicted upon the Allied Powers during the Great War, with
over 5.6 million soldiers dead or wounded, second only to the Russian Empire, which suffered 30% of
Allied Power casualties at over 6.7 million soldiers dead or wounded. However, French military casualties
amounted to 14% of the total French population at the time (~40 million people), compared to Russian
military casualties which amounted to 4% of Russian national population at the time (~159 million people).
This percentage of national sacrifice is unparalled in history. War weariness in 1940, needless to say, was a
contributing factor to French performance, and rightly so.
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the avoidance of making too many speculations in areas which had little information
available. Cross referencing several sources was absolutely necessary so that an accurate
result, free of most bias from the period, could be obtained. Every effort was made to
make this as accurate a representation of the Great War as possible, given the limitation
of both human abilities and sanity. However, given these complications, realities and
over ambitions, there is no doubt that unintentional errors have been made in the creation
of this work. I alone am responsible for any such errors.
* * *
8
Campaign background
The following question must be addressed immediately: why was the decision
made to split the 1914 conflict on the Western Front into three separate campaigns, and
not represent it with one huge campaign? The answer is that 1914 was actually the scene
of three different stages of the battle as both sides switched to completely different
strategies throughout the year. These shifts in strategies were broken down into phases, of
which the three campaigns represent. You may notice that there is actually more than
three campaign scenarios present in this title, this is because the campaign in Flanders4
was broken up into smaller campaigns of Yser, Ypres, and La Bassée in order to provide
a smaller sector if the desire is not to play the entire Flanders Campaign.
The initial conflict from August to mid September was an attempt by the Germans
to win a quick victory over the allies by out flanking them and capturing Paris. This was
foiled by a series of events. The most notable of these events was the German 1st Army
turning south too early, the skillful BEF withdrawal and harassment, and the counter
attack by the French 5e Armee at Guise, all helping to force this early turn. However,
perhaps the biggest issue that foiled the plan was von Moltke’s revision of the original
Schlieffen Plan just prior to the war. Von Motke’s revision put more German corps along
the Franco-German frontier, and on the Eastern Front, rather than one massive wheeling
force towards Paris. Von Motlke felt that the original Schlieffen plan was too bold and he
could not accept a plan that would ultimately surrender German soil to the French.5 He
opted for a more conservative approach which, ultimately meant that the flanking
4 The Flanders campaign was during the period of mid October to mid November 1914.
5 The original Schlieffen plan was designed to weakly defend the Franco-German frontier and to give
ground to a French attack. By giving ground to the French, von Schlieffen calculated that the French army
would be walking into a trap, leaving Paris undefended, and allowing the French army to be flanked.
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German armies were too thinly spread in their wheeling movement to effectively swing
around and isolate Paris. To further complicate matters, a new decision by von Moltke,
just prior to the Battle of the Marne, to outflank and destroy the then weakened French
5th Army, had the effect of causing the German 1st Army to swing further southeast
which placed it in a situation where the German right wing was vulnerable to a massed
counter attack. This counter attack by the BEF and French 6th Army, resulted in a
decisive turn of events for the seemingly invincible German Army. What followed was
the German retreat, and the Battle of the Aisne, as the line was stabilized and then a new
phase of battle began. It is difficult to imagine, when all hope seemed lost, how the allied
armies managed to counter attack and completely turn the balance of power in the
conflict. Indeed it was a miracle.
From this point, a new phase of the campaign began and consisted of a race where
both the Central Powers and Allied Powers attempted to outflank each other. From the
Aisne to Switzerland, the battle line was continuous, but in the west the battlefield was
wide open all the way to the English Channel. Thus, the period known as "the Race to the
Sea" ensued in which both sides stretched the battlefield further and further northwest.
Neither side gave up hope that they could still force a quick victory before the end of
1914. The German strategy was both to outflank the allies and to seize as much territory
as possible, with the whole of Calais as the grand prize. The Allies desired to turn the
German flank, as they did at the Marne, and force a German withdrawal from Belgium
and France.
Once the Race to the Sea phase ended, and the battle line was now continuous
from the English Channel to Switzerland, a third phase began with the Germans trying
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desperately to break through the allied line in the vicinity of the BEF held salient at
Ypres. The reduction of the Ypres salient would shorten German lines, and eliminate a
bridgehead across the Yser that the allies could use for a future counter offensive. The
Germans were also aware of how thinly spread the BEF was becoming. All of this made
the Ypres salient a perfect opportunity for German breakthrough in an otherwise now
static front.
With all of this in mind, not only were the objectives in all three major phases
completely different, unit composition between the first and second phases were also
different and, more importantly, the French had dropped the “cult of the offensive”
mentality, so their infantry ratings had to change.6 Therefore, given France ’14’s scale, it
is impractical to effectively represent the whole entire 1914 conflict in one all
encompassing scenario. That is not to say that it is impossible, but any attempt to do so
would create an unmanageable experience and any semblance of a historical outcome is
doubtful.
The early campaign covers most of the front line area across France, but it does
not cover the relatively static areas in the German 7.Armee and French 1er Armée sector.
This area covered the region from Épinal to the Swiss border. Although the front
remained relatively static in this area during 1914-18 given the nature of the terrain, it is
important to remember the brutal fighting did occur here and that it too was part of the
"Western Front".
* * *
6 See the notes about the French Army for more information.
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The Beligerants
The Belgian Army
Organization
Obtaining correct order of battle information on the Belgian Army of 1914 is a
very difficult endeavor. The sources that are available are often conflicting or inaccurate.
However, through lengthy research, accurate and reliable sources were discovered. To
understand the events of the German invasion of Belgium, there must be a brief mention
of the Belgian Army's situation at the outbreak of the conflict.
At the start of 1914, the Belgian Army was in a state of total reorganization and
this reorganization was not scheduled to be complete until 1918. Indeed, at first glance
the Belgian order of battle will appear odd and even incorrect. Divisions are specified as
corps and brigades are specified as divisions. This is indeed intentional and historical.
During this period of reorganization, Belgium was looking to expand their army.
However, to avoid scaring parliament, who was afraid of all military expenses, it was
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decided that army corps would temporarily be called “divisions”; the divisions would be
called “mixed brigades”. Therefore, in essence, the brigades were an incomplete division
in the process of reorganization, and divisions were really the start of the formation of
army corps. This also explains why elements of the "divisions" were so scattered across
Belgium at the start of the conflict. Having this awkward organization in transition does
have its weaknesses as well as its strengths. "Brigades" have difficulty in cooperation
with other brigades, however brigades have the command radius of divisional HQs, and
divisions have the command radius of Corps HQs.
In time of peace, the Brigade Mixte was comprised of only one infantry regiment.
When the regiment was mobilized it would receive the eight youngest draft classes and
divide itself to form a second infantry regiment. This would then become the corner stone
of the Brigade Mixte. Then, seven of the oldest draft classes7 would form another
regiment; a Régiment de Forteresse. The split of the regiments was supposed to occur in
1915 during the middle of the reorganization period; however, it was decided to carry out
this split when the army was mobilized. The Belgian Army was already short of officers
and equipment, so the result of this split was an influx of inexperienced personnel and an
even greater shortage of cadre and equipment. This resulted in a much diluted army that
was in no way prepared to face the onslaught of the German war machine. However, no
one can deny the tenacity of "brave little Belgium" and even though their mobilization
system was flawed, a good part of the Belgian Army is rated as "C" quality with their
infantry regiments rated as "D" quality to represent this tenacity.
The Garde Civique deserves special mention. This unit was a governmental
institution that was charged with maintaining law and order and was not related to the
7 The “oldest draft classes” consisted of men over the age of 30.
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regular Belgian Army. The Garde Civique has been omitted from the order of battle for
several reasons. The first being that they were in fact only used in maintaining law and
order and the second being that they posed no real military threat to the German Army.
At the start of the war, the Belgian government decided to withdraw all Garde Civique
units to Bruxelles where they were ordered to dig trenches and prepare the city for
defense. However, the Germans did not recognize the Garde Civique as part of the
Belgian Army and so the Garde Civique decided to surrender their weapons so as not to
be classified as combatants.
Miscellanea
The HQ insignia for the Belgian Army are insignia based on traditional military
map symbols that denoted the size of unit and the colors are based on national colors.
* * *
14
The French Army
Organization
The French Army throughout 1914 was an organizational nightmare. Divisions
and Corps were uprooted and transplanted where needed, and it quickly became
disorganized. Creating the French Army in the order of battle was extremely difficult and
took over a year of researching different pieces of the puzzle, as well as countless late
night frustration. In the end, the primary source of information was, naturally, Les armées
françaises dans la Grande Guerre (AFGG), Thome X, Volumes 1 and 2.
Some might notice that a few corps formations which, at various times had a third
"attached" division, may not necessarily have that attachment in their "correct" places in
the order of battle.8 Or, in the case of the Groupe de Divisions de Réserve (GDR)
formations, some reserve divisions do not appear in their peace time "on paper"
organizations, rather they instead appear outside of the GDR. This was only done in cases
8 An example of this is the 3e CA's 38e DI and 10e CA's 37e DI, which was also attached to the 18e CA at
some point.
15
where units may have moved around in the organization between armies and various
corps which the game cannot otherwise allow. Instead, with these formations as lose
entities, it intentionally allows them to be attached to different armies to allow for this
historical level of flexibility. It is debatable whether or not these "attached" divisions
were actually assigned to a specific corps' organization in game play terms; rather, it is
more likely that these divisions were simply temporarily placed under the authority of the
corps commander, but not in the actual organization itself. One notable example is the 7e
CA. Historically, the 7e CA began the war with the 14e DI and 44e DI. However, around
the time of the Battle of the
Marne, the 7e CA was
transferred to the VIe Armée.
When it made this move, the 7e
CA's 44e DI remained with the
Ier Armée, and the 63e DI, which
was previously in the 1er GDR,
took its place. This type of
restructuring is what caused an immense amount of grief to the point where certain
adjustments had to be made, whilst keeping the historical events and possibilities in
mind. The end result is that a few units may appear out of place when, in reality, they are
located in such a manner to allow them to be attached to different armies, or to allow
them to be in historical "war time" organizations.
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The late 1914 order of battle9 was the most frustrating of the three orders of
battles to research and create. This period, as well as 1915, is what I refer to as the
"reorganization and improvisation period", where both sides were evolving to the nature
of the conflict and, in many cases, restructuring and rearming their forces as they went.
During the Race to the Sea, both sides reorganized themselves as needed to meet the
demands of the constantly lengthening front. For the Germans, this primarily meant that
corps were reassigned to different armies as the Germans generally kept their order of
battle extremely tidy. In contrast, the French made a host of restructuring and
reorganization changes which again test the capabilities of the game. The choice was
made that the starting organization for the late order of battle is setup to represent the
force structure at the start of October, when the late period was generally established
from the early 1914 structures. In the late September scenarios, these units are attached to
their parent army HQs, to which they originally resided. The intent is that late war
scenarios "play out" with some of the organizational changes already in effect in order to
help ensure that the battles flow more historically. The user still has the freedom to make
their reorganizations, but the historical guideline is in place. Also, any brigade or division
that may have been briefly and temporarily attached to a specific corps may not be
represented that way in the order of battle. It is rationalized that in these cases of brief
attachments, in game play terms it simply means that the units were independent at the
army HQ level, capable of working with other corps and divisions within the command.
This solution is not perfect, as no solution to this complex issue could be without
allowing a complete restructuring freedom of the order of battle from top to bottom, but it
does provide a common ground in a period were there was constant change. This could
9 The late order of battle coveres the “Race to the Sea” period, and the Battle of Ypres.
17
have been handled a multitude of other ways but unless there was a different order of
battle for every week of the war, this approach is as well as any other when attempting to
create a definitive order of battle structure at this level during a period when nothing was
definite.
Another late period order of battle issue was with the army level Artillerie
Lourde. In October, the French began to realize their shortcoming of indirect-fire-capable
artillery, and began to rectify it by bringing old guns out of retirement from forts and
stockpiles across the country. Obsolete guns like the 120mm de Bange 1877, and 155mm
de Bange 1877, began to see front line use until France could produce enough modern
guns to replace them. These guns are presented in the late order of battle, albeit the
Artillerie Lourde organization has shifted to a more abstract representation of groupings
of guns at the appropriate level that AFGG specifies. During this ad hoc period, the
French also had trouble replacing the early losses of 75mm M97 field guns and were also
experiencing trouble supplying them with enough ammunition. For this reason they
briefly brought two obsolete field guns out of retirement as a stop gap: the 95mm
Lahitolle 1875, and the 90mm de Bange 1877. These guns mostly acted as replacements
to the RAC field artillery units and, for the sake of practicality, these guns are not
represented in the order of battle. All of these guns were relatively quickly replaced as
75mm M97 field gun replacements became available, and as ammunition production
began to increase.
Equipment and Training
The French Army in any game, from the Napoleonic Era to the Second World
War, is a hot button issue. In France '14, there is no exception. The quality of the French
18
Army and its equipment is taken from several considerations, as is the quality of their
attack ratings. It is important to note that it seems to be rather popular to be labeled as
"anti French" when describing French weaponry, doctrine, or military capability of the
First World War. The following observations are not based upon any bias for or against
the French military, they are based solely on research from various sources, and from first
hand experience with the weapons they employed. Being a collector of firearms and
having over ten years of military experience, it is easy to come to the conclusion of what
the different unit ratings should be.
In 1914, the French infantry and machine gun soft attack ratings are the lowest
between German and British forces, with the Germans coming in second, and the British
being the best of the three. The French are the lowest rated because of their rather poor
quality weapons they fielded, and has nothing to do with the individual wielding it. The
machine gun used by the French in 1914 was primarily the air cooled 1907 St.Etienne
machine gun, which had serious defects. This weapon was highly susceptible to
misfeeding because it had an overly complex mechanism. Since the weapon was
extremely unreliable and prone to stoppages, French regulations stated that, unless in
cases of emergency, only one of the two machine guns in each section was allowed to fire
at any one given time. This was done in order to limit the possibility of both weapons
being down from a malfunction at the same time, while the crews performed immediate
or remedial action. The St.Etienne 1907 was quickly replaced by the Hotchkiss 1914
machine gun, however most sources indicate that the Hotchkiss 1914's adoption was
never really complete until early or middle 1915, while other sources indicate that it did
not occur until as late as 1916. Because of this, and the general uncertainty of what the
19
vast number of units were equipped with, machine gun ratings for the French are that of
the St.Etienne 1907. It is worth mentioning that another machine gun already in service,
the Hotchkiss 1900, was far better than the St.Etienne 1907 but at the time the Hotchkiss
1900 was too expensive given that the St.Etienne was a government made weapon at
government owned and operated factories. The Hotchkiss 1900 was produced by a
privately owned company and, because of this, the cost per unit was much higher than
that of the St.Etienne, so the St.Etienne received the nod.
The standard French Army rifle in 1914 was the Lebel Model 1886. The rifle was
extremely advanced when it was introduced in 1886, being the first to incorporate a small
caliber bullet and smokeless powder, but by 1914 it was obsolete and clumsy. The Lebel
M1886 was almost six feet long with bayonet attached and weighted nearly ten pounds
unloaded. It had an awkwardly designed eight round magazine, consisting of a
longitudinal tube underneath the barrel. The magazine was difficult and extremely time
consuming to load, taking over one minute to replenish under ideal circumstances. After
the eight round magazine was emptied, practicality forced the soldier to manually insert
single rounds into the breach to fire, since the amount of time to reload the magazine was
unfeasible when subjected to enemy fire. This greatly reduced the rate of fire of a French
infantryman to as much as one half the level of his rivals, the latter employing rifles
equipped with box magazines with quick loading stripper clips. As if this were not
enough, as the rifle's oddly designed longitudinal magazine was depleted, the center of
gravity of the weapon would shift dramatically. In modern rifles, it is now known that
having a perfectly balanced weapon with a constant center of gravity is critical to
maintaining accuracy. The shift in the Lebel's center of gravity as the magazine was
20
depleted would cause the weapon to become off balance and disrupt the firer's aim point.
All of these problems were not fully rectified until 1915 when the Lebel-Berthier
M1907/15 rifle was adopted, which featured a box magazine and a Mannlicher-type clip
for rapid reloading. However, the Lebel M1886 would still remain in service with second
line French units throughout The Great War, although these second line units began to
supplement it with other weapons later on. Taken by itself, the Lebel Model 1886 rifle
was bad enough on influencing a low soft attack rating for French infantry, however this
is not the only cause. The French infantry in 1914 frequently employed a tactic where
they would quickly pop up from cover and conduct rapid fire until their magazine was
depleted, then they would take cover and reload (rafale). This tactic resulted in a poor
distribution of fire, massive expense of ammunition, and extremely poor accuracy.
The French Army was almost totally lacking in true indirect artillery support
(howitzers) at the time of 1914. However, the French Army employed the best field gun
in the world: the 75mm Model 1897. This gun was a marvel of technology at the time;
21
the Mle 1897 utilized a French copy of a German designed10
long recoil hydraulic brake,
which allowed for a stable firing platform during rapid fire. This allowed the gun to be
fired rapidly and with great precision since the gun did not require frequent relaying. It is
certainly true that the German and British field guns featured similar characteristics;
however the real strength of the French 75mm Field Gun was in its rate of fire. The
German Field Kannone 96 fired approximately five rounds a minute, and the British 18
pounder fired nine rounds a minute. The French Mle 1897 field gun fired a remarkable
fifteen rounds a minute, and even up to thirty rounds a minute in emergencies and when
sufficient ammo was available.
The French infantry in the early order of battle11
are blessed with the highest
assault rating of all infantry, but are cursed with having the lowest defense rating. This is
formulated from several conditions, but the largest factors have to do with the "cult of the
offensive" doctrine of the early period of 1914. Following the French capitulation after in
the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, the officers at the École de Guerre came up with the
opinion that they had been defeated because they had surrendered tactical, moral, and
strategic initiative to the Germans before the battle even began. Their answer to this was
that in the next conflict the French would launch immediate attacks on all fronts,
theoretically causing the enemy to stretch their resources and force them to constantly be
on the defensive. A vocal French officer that supported this view, Colonel de
Grandmaison, has been quoted as saying, "In an attack only two things are necessary: to
know where the enemy is, and to decide what to do. What the enemy intends to do is of
no consequence." This type of mentality, combined with the doctrine of all out attack,
10
Konrad Haussner. 11
The pre “Race to the Sea” period.
22
nearly led to complete disaster. With indifference to the enemy's intentions, the French of
the early 1914 campaign approached tactical situations with the surgical precision of a
sledgehammer. Doctrinally, the French answer to most tactical dilemmas was to mass
into dense formation with bayonets fixed, and surge forward to deliver cold steel to the
enemy. It was thought that the massed attack delivered with unflinching determination
would prevail in any situation. To represent this severe vulnerability created by their “cult
of the offensive” doctrine, French infantry have the lowest defense rating out of the other
belligerents. In the late order of battle, the French had abandoned the flawed "cult of the
offensive" doctrine, and this is reflected in the game by French infantry assault and
defense values fluctuating back to a more standard level in comparison to the other
belligerents, thus making French infantry less effective in assaults but more effective in
the defense.
The French system of reserves was very different from that of the strict and highly
organized system used by the German Army. Upon completion of active service in the
French Army, soldiers passed into the Reserve for eleven years of additional service. At
mobilization, the first two reserve classes (soldiers who were on their first of second year
of being in the Reserve) where used to fill out the ranks of the Active Army formations to
bring them up to war strength, and were utilized as replacements from depots. The
remaining nine classes of reservists were used to form reserve units. This meant that the
actual reserve formations contained a mixture of personnel who were anywhere from
three to eleven years out of active service. To make matters worse, there were very few
experienced NCOs and officers in the reserve and exceptions for annual training for
reservists was granted liberally so that it is estimated that only 25% of those called back
23
for training actually appeared. This meant that the French reservist quickly became
"demilitarized" once he exited the Active Army. This "system" of reserves was the polar
opposite of the German system which was filled with high quality cadres and excellent
discipline.12
Miscellanea
With interest in keeping historical accuracy, you may notice that the Zouaves and
Tirailleurs Regiments and Battalions adopt a new naming system in the late 1914 order of
battle. In the early 1914 order of battle "RM" appeared before the regimental number13
where as in late 1914 the naming system changed to include "RM" in a full abbreviation
following the regimental number.14
The HQ insignia for the French Army are insignia based on traditional military
map symbols that denoted the size of unit and the colors are based on national colors.
For maximum chrome, the numbering system of French armies and corps are in
accordance with AFGG, the official French history of the war. This means that French
armies are numbered with roman numerals and French corps are numbered with Arabic
numerals, which is basically the opposite of other armies of the period. This keeps it
consistent with official French documents and adds a more historical flavor and
uniqueness to the order of battle.
* * *
12
Terence Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers: Ardennes 1914, 85. See the German Army section of the
notes for information on the German system of reserves. 13
ie. RM 2e Zouaves. 14
ie. 2e RMZ.
24
The German Army
Organization
German jäger battalions were an item of frustration. Some sources place jäger
battalions as a corps level asset, however, other sources and historical accounts place the
same jäger units in various German cavalry divisions. Thus, in 1914, it was decided to
place most of these active jäger battalions in the cavalry divisions since it is indisputable
that they were indeed attached to some of these divisions at some point. However, it may
be noticed that the jäger assignments are in no way uniform. Historically, some German
cavalry divisions had several jäger battalions and others had none at all, and this is
represented in the order of battle. German reserve jäger battalions also were a bit of a
headache. Conflicting sources placed the reserve jäger battalions in specific reserve
divisions, and some had them as Reservekorps level assets. Again, a decision was made
which placed these formations in specific reserve divisions. However, all jäger battalions
that are located in an infantry division are at division level, regardless of the fact that
25
some sources place them in specific infantry brigades within that division. This was done
because the jäger would be used where needed by the division commander and putting
them in a brigade restricts their use too severely.
Nothing was more frustrating than trying to
determine the organization and structure of the
1.Marine-Division. Every source consulted, in both
German and English, seems to have a different
answer to what structure this division had in 1914
and anyone who has ever had interest in researching
this has probably ran across the same issue. The two
aspects of the division that have the most
inconsistency are in regards to attached brigades,
artillery, and machine guns assigned to the unit.
Some sources place the Landwehr-Brigade.37 and
38 in the 1.Marine-Division, and later the Reserve-
Ersatz-Brigade.2.15
The same sources that list these brigades as part of the division also
place Landwehr artillery in the division itself along with Landwehr cavalry squadrons.
However, Die Schlachten und Gefechte des Grossen Krieges 1914-1918 (S und G)
specifically lists these two Landwehr and Ersatz Brigades separately when listing the
units which participated in the same battles that the 1.Marine-Division participated in. In
the end, a judgment call had to be made. The end decision is that both S und G and
Hermann Cron’s Geschichte des Deutschen Heers im Weltkriege 1914-1918 was used as
15
A mistake that has been perpetuated over time is that this brigade was called “Ersatz-Brigade.2”. There
was never an independent 1st or 2
nd Ersatz Brigade in existence in the German army; these two units were
both reserve ersatz brigades.
26
the final source for the division structure which basically represents the division in its
“bare bones” status. This means that the two Landwehr-Brigade.37 and 38 and
Res.Ersatz-Brigade.2 (later) are represented as separate independent entities that really
only acted in close support of the 1.Marine-Division. The two landwehr brigades were
mixed combined arms formations16
which contained their own artillery, cavalry and
pionier units and these are the same units that some sources list as being attached to the
1.Marine-Division. The S und G and Cron approach implies that the two mixed landwehr
brigades operated in close
support of the 1.Marine-Division
and, as such, lent its cavalry,
artillery and pionier services to
the division but were never
formally assigned to the division
itself. The actual amount of
organic artillery assigned to the
division only consisted of a
single battery of guns,17
which should not be confused with the naval artillery brigade
that was assigned to the division as infantry.18
The one naval artillery battery approach
seems to be consistent with how the 2.Marine-Division was established at the end of
November and provides a nice uniformity to the two division’s structure. So in the end,
16
These mixed landwehr brigades were referred to as “gemischt” landwehr brigades. 17
Hermann Cron, Imperial German Army 1914-18, 100. 18
The “naval artillery brigade” which was assigned to the division was used as infantry which made up the
two matrosen regiments and these troops were utilized as infantry, not as artilleryman.
27
the flexibility is left up to the user to choose whether to use the two mixed landwehr
brigades in a supporting role to the 1.Marine-Division or to send them elsewhere.
Pionier battalions within the pionier regiment might seem like they have the
incorrect number of companies at first glance. It is true that pionier battalions had four
companies before mobilization, however, after mobilization the 4th company of a pionier
battalion was split off and used as the foundation of a reserve pionier battalion. The first
three companies of a pionier battalion that did not form pionier regiment was divided up
amongst the regular infantry divisions, and the fourth company and first and second
reserve pionier companies were divided up amongst the reserve divisions. During
mobilization, ten pionier battalions were pre selected to form pionier regiments for the
purpose of siege warfare. These pionier battalions were the 18-20, 23-25, 29-31 and
Bavarian. When mobilization began, these select pionier battalions took on the
regimental number of their original battalion designation and the first three companies in
the battalion formed the I. Battalion of the regiment. The fourth company was combined
with the first and second reserve companies assigned to it and formed the II. Battalion,
thus making a regiment of two battalions, each of three companies and a siege train and
allotted minenwerfers. For simplicity, the II. Battalion of the regiment is a matching
quality of its fourth company so that the battalion can combine into one unit. It is
arguable that the fifth and sixth companies of this battalion should be of lesser quality
because they were in fact formed from the reserve component but this would cause
unnecessary clutter. Also, just as it can be argued that these two companies should be
lower quality, it could also be argued that the diluted battalion would take on the quality
of its senior company once the units are combined.
28
Somewhat related to Pioniers, minenwerfers units deserve special mention. In
1915, the Germans began organizing minenwerfers into battalions of 30 mixed light and
medium minenwerfers. In September 1915, company sized formations of 12 mixed
heavy, medium, and light minenwerfers were established, and these company sized units
were attached to each division. These are the most commonly known minenwerfers. In
1914, the Germans did indeed have minenwerfers, but they did not have many. At the
start of the war, the minenwerfer was held in the greatest secrecy, similar to the 42cm
howitzers, and these secret minenwerfers were specifically designed to be used against
field works and light fortifications. The German Army was the only army that took to the
field with such a weapon on the western front, but in late 1914 the French soon followed
with antiquated but longer ranged 220mm de Bange 1880/91 mortar. In the early period,
the German minenwerfers were not organized into any official units and, because of their
level of secrecy; it is difficult to find concrete data about them in the early months.
However, German sources indicate that the minenwerfers they did have in 1914 were
organized with army level pionier units, specifically assigned to what they referred to as
the regiment's siege train. In that regard, the early minenwerfers have been grouped in a
siege train battery for each pionier regiment.
There is a common misconception on what an “ersatz” formation was composed
of in the German Army of 1914. Firstly, it is important to note that the "ersatz"
formations did not draw men from the Ersatz Reserve. The Ersatz Reserve was a pool of
men who could not make it into the army because of their physical condition. The ersatz
formations drew its soldiers from excess soldiers who were supernumerary to active army
units, after the initial reserve formations had been formed. In this regard they intended to
29
act as a replacement pool where the trained troops flowed in and awaited to be assigned
to other units so they are essentially rated the same as regular units. Ersatz divisions were
often used as a stopgap force to reinforce a sector and were even used in frontline
combat. Where they were at a disadvantage was in the fact that these Ersatz units lacked
a full cadre of officers and NCOs (leadership) and lacked much of the "logistical
necessities" needed for a field unit to operate effectively and supply itself effectively. For
this reason, Ersatz formation HQ units are rated very low in order to represent these
shortcomings and deficiencies which made them less effective as a front line force when
employed as a stopgap fighting formation.
When the German Army took to the field in 1914 they were lacking many of their
machine guns. The equipping of the German Army with machine guns was done just
prior to the start of the conflict and many reserve formations suffered from a shortage.
Some reserve infantry brigades and reserve jäger battalions went to war without their
machine gun companies. As the campaign progressed, these units would eventually
regain their missing companies, primarily from the machine gun sections that were
scattered amongst German fortress garrisons. Once the threat to the fortified areas was
removed, these units were pulled from their garrison and organized into companies to
bring the machine gun complement of the army up to full strength.19
Thus, after August,
there was a sharp influx of machine gun units. However, it is almost impossible to
determine exactly when each missing machine gun company was regained on a unit by
unit basis.20
It is important to mention that two assumptions were made in game design in
regards to German machine gun troops. First, it can be reasonably assumed that any
19
Eventually the machine gun compliment would surpass “full strength” in 1915 and 1916. 20
It is important to represent that this happened, rather than leave these units missing from the order of
battle during the period in which they were being replaced.
30
second draft reserve division or jäger battalion formed between October and December
were likely given their full complement of machine guns since reequipping was a
constant and ongoing process, and it is unlikely that a new unit would have been created
with the same shortage that was currently being addressed. Second, as for the original
units that were not at full complement at the start of the campaign, it is known that the
process of stripping the machine guns from the least threatened fortress garrisons began
at the end of August. It can be assumed that these units started forming and redeploying
shortly after this, therefore the "late" order of battle contains these missing machine gun
units. As a side note, under the reign of von Falkenhayn, and after the full complement of
machine gun units had been established, German machine gun troops began to drastically
expand during 1915. This expansion was Germany's long cherished plan of having one
machine gun company of six guns for each infantry battalion,21
and to equip every jäger
battalion with an addition company of machine guns. This was only possible after
stripping virtually all machinegun companies from their fortress garrisons. In addition to
the shortage of machine gun companies for reserve units, there was also a similar
shortage for cyclist companies for the reserve jäger battalions. While the reserve jäger
battalions gained their missing machinegun companies, they never would gain the
missing cyclist companies.
One unique aspect of the German Army in 1914 was its well thought out reserve
system. The German Army of the period without a doubt had the most extensive, well
organized and effective system of reserves out of all the armies in Europe. Unlike other
armies, the Germans strictly classified and kept track of their reserves by each year in
21
This is referring to all types of infantry battalions; regular, reserve, ersatz, landwehr and landsturm.
31
which they passed from the active army and into the reserves.22
This resulted in a
grouping of reservists into classes by year where each class was of similar composition in
readiness, physical condition and overall quality. This method allowed the German Army
to organize them in such as way as to maximize their effectiveness and dramatically swell
the armies ranks with highly trained reservists at mobilization time, while keeping the
older reservists separated. Service in the German Army was divided into two years in the
Active Army (three years for cavalry); five years in the Reserve (four years for cavalry);
eleven years in the Landwehr. The Landsturm included youths between the ages of 17
and 20, too young for Active Army service, and trained and untrained men between the
ages of 39 and 45, who were over ordinary military age.23
The reserves conducted strict
annual training in order to retain their level or readiness. At mobilization, reservists in the
first two year classes were utilized to fill out the ranks of Active Army units to bring
them up to full strength, used as replacements and, most importantly, used to form the
original Reservekorps and divisions. These initial reserve formations were comprised of
the newly made reservists who were still fresh in their training, albeit many were a little
out of shape physically, and who were supernumerary to the requirements of the Active
Army (in excess to the reservists used to fill out the Active Army's ranks). The remaining
reservists (third to fifth year classes) were then mobilized second and used to form the
"first wave" (also called "second draft") of Reservekorps which began entering the
German Order of Battle in October. In France '14, the "initial reserves", which are the
reserves that make up the initial Reservekorps and Reserve-Divisions, are for the most
22
As mention in the French Army section, , this was the direct opposite of the French system of reserves
which kept track of the first two years and then put all other reservists in a huge pool of troops which
diluted their effectiveness. 23
Edmonds, Sir James E. Military Operations: France and Belgium 1914, Vol. I., 21.
32
part all rated as equal quality (C) to active army units.24
The difference between active
army and reserve infantry battalions is that the reserve infantry battalion assault ratings
are slightly lower since there was indeed a real world qualitative difference between the
two entities.25
The "second draft" follow on reserve formations which began to show up
in the late "Race to the Sea" period had a slightly different divisional organization and
their quality ratings are less than the "initial reserve" formations. The shock to the world
in early 1914 was that the German "initial reserve" formations were almost equal in
effectiveness to that of the Active Army formations because of the German's strict
reservists classification system and annual training. In many cases the German initial
reserve formations were the tactical equals of the French Active Army divisions.26
The
initial German reserve formations could certainly handle any threat they were met with,
but despite all of their qualitative similarities to active army divisions, reserve divisions
were equipped with less artillery and the Reservekorps lacked heavy artillery and
supporting troops. This shortcoming is what often relegated the German Army to use
these reserve formations as follow on forces, or utilized in less critical areas (since the
active formations had more combat power).
The Landwehr formations in France '14 are rated as D quality units. These
formations were highly trained as they were veterans of anywhere from eight to eleven
years in the army. Quality wise this means that it would not be justifiable to rate them
lower or higher than D quality, but these formations were equipped with obsolete
24
An exception to this is with the divisional pionier units. The 1st and 2nd company of a reserve pionier
battalion was composed of reservists, and the 4th company was composed of active personnel. To represent
this difference, the division that contains the two reserve component pionier companies has those pionier
units rated as D quality, and the division that has the 4th company has this pionier company rated at C. 25
The lower assault rating for these units helps represent the fact that even reservists who had only been in
the Reserve for one or two years were still not as in shape as active army troops. 26
Zuber, The Battle of the Frontiers: Ardennes 1914, 85.
33
equipment and rifles (since all the up to date equipment had to be sent to the massive
reserve formations), and the Landsturm combat ratings reflect this.
In late 1914, the Germans raised a second draft of reserve divisions (also known
as "first wave") under the XXII to XXVII.Reservekorps and the 6.bayer.Reserve-
Division. Each reserve infantry battalion in these second draft formations received a
cadre company of an Ersatz battalion numbering 300 men. These men were trained
reservists and they were split up between the four companies in each of the four reserve
infantry regiments in the battalion.27
The remaining 75% of infantry came from a mixture
of untrained men which were over and under the military age, as well as landwehr and
landsturm infantry. The artillery in these divisions was also led by “officer substitutes”
but the artillerymen were of traditional reservist quality. In France ’14, the decision was
made to make the artillery units in these "second draft" divisions at D quality and the
reserve infantry battalions are also rated at D quality. This creates a big difference in
effectiveness between the second draft reserve formations and the initial reserve units.
Only one of the four "Big Bertha" batteries was actually "motorized". The other
three were rail transportable only. However, for game play concerns it was discovered
that a cunning allied player could destroy a few key rail junctions which would
completely stop the siege guns. Since there is no way to repair rail lines within the course
of the scenario, a compromise of sorts was required. The rail transported batteries are of
the horse class, with a speed of 1. This means that these batteries should primarily be
transported by rail but, if need be, they can also be off loaded and transported very slowly
in disassembled pieces to the next available rail line.
27
In other words, each company received 75 of the 300 men.
34
BAK28
units, which were designated as FLAK29
units in May 1916, are
not present in either the early or late period order of battle. When the war began,
Germany was still developing a true air defense organization. The Germans had a few
individual BAK guns which were mounted on motorized transport. These individual guns
were assigned to the I, VIII, XXI.Armeekorps and two BAK guns were assigned to the
XV.Armeekorps. These guns were virtually useless when it quickly became apparent that
the real threat was not from balloons, but from aero planes due to the growing
enterprising spirit of enemy airmen. It was not until the "reorganization period" of late
1914 when BAK units began to effectively form, and true BAK batteries of guns were
not used in a sizable force until the middle of 1915 to 1916. Therefore, in France '14, the
German order of battle does not contain any BAK units because they were not yet formed
into an effective force.30
Equipment and Training
Countless books have been written about the quality of the German Army in
World War One, so the subject will not be covered in any great detail here. It is
undeniable that the German Army was one of the best all around armies in Europe at the
time, second to the small professional British Army of course. The German Army was a
well trained, well equipped, and well oiled machine that could accomplish almost any
task assigned to it and it was operating on the pride and many past victories since
Frederick the Great. The individual soldier was not necessarily better than that of the
French Army, Russian Army or any other army in Europe, but it was a collection of
advantages like an abundance of high trajectory artillery and machine guns, an extremely
28
Ballonabwerkannone – balloon defense gun, or anti-balloon gun. 29
Fliegerabwehrkannone – airplane defense gun, or anti-aircraft gun. 30
One or two guns at each AOK adds useless and wasteful counters to the game.
35
efficient reserve system, and good quality equipment and training, that made the German
army a force to be feared and respected.
Special mention must be made of German jäger battalions and how they are
represented in France '14 (as pseudo motorized units). It may also be noticed that the
jäger battalions which are assigned to cavalry formations are motorized type units, but
they should not be referred to as "motorized". These troops were not truely "motorized"
in any modern sense of the word, they were simply crammed onto slow moving and
unreliable vehicles when they could so that the unit could keep up with the cavalry; true
motorized infantry did not come into existence until the 1930s. Before the outset of
World War One, the Germans experimented with using motorized transport to move their
cavalry divisional jäger battalions from point to point. Once the war started, these
experiments bore fruit, allowing the battalions to cover unprecedented amounts of
ground. Jäger battalions had a true motorized transport column, but they also
requisitioned wheeled vehicles (mostly wagons) as needed. These wheeled vehicles
usually carried lame soldiers or the equipment of the soldiers who were marching, but
nevertheless the wheeled vehicles did increase the mobility of the unit.31
Miscellanea
31
Zuber, The Mons Myth, 110-111. Zuber states that Jäger-Btl.7 was the only jäger battalion that received
its motorized truck column "during the campaign". Since his book is about Mons and also covers Le
Cateau, it is difficult to determine whether he refers to the "campaign" as the Battles of Mons and Le
Cateau together (his topics in his book), or if he refers to something more extensive like the early campaign
to the 1st Battle of the Marne. In this respect, it was decided that since it is known that all jäger infantry
were taught to be self reliant, that they had a motorized column in their organization, and that they did
acquire wheeled transport at every opportunity to increase their mobility, and that British historical
accounts repeatedly mention aerial reconnaissance seeing truck borne jäger units during the 1st Battle of
the Marne (in places which meant that it could not have only been Jäger-Btl.7), then it was decided that it
was best to represent all of these German cavalry divisional jäger battalions as what could be best referred
to as "pseudo motorized" units.
36
The HQ insignia for the German Army are insignia based on traditional military
map symbols that denoted the size of unit. The colors are based on traditional colors used
for the various Germanic states that made up the German Empire. The colors are mostly
for artistic purposes, but they are for identification purposes and historical flavor.
Color codes:
Kingdom of Prussia: grey and black with white numerals
Kingdom of Bavaria: blue and light blue with white numerals
Kingdom of Saxony: green and white with grey numerals
Kingdom of Württemburg: red and black with grey numerals
Kingdom of Hessen: red and white with white numerals (black border)
Kingdom of Baden: red and yellow with yellow numerals (black border)
German Empire (multi): black and white with red numerals (grey border)
Minor kingdoms: black and white with gold numerals (grey border)
* * *
37
The British Army
Organization
The British cavalry have been
classified as one makeup regardless of if they
are dragoons or lancers. This was done
because the differences between them were
not as great as the still specialized cavalry of
the German and French armies. Instead,
regardless of whether the British cavalry had
a lance or a saber, they were very effective in
assaults and were also highly trained
marksmen; they were also uniformly well skilled in dragoon type warfare from their Boer
War experiences. From this experience, the British began a total "modernization" of
cavalry where the principle weapon would now be the carbine and the pistol, instead of
the lance and saber. The result is that the British cavalry differ from the German and
French in that they are good all around troops, effective at reconnaissance,
marksmanship, and shock. Generally speaking, they are everything that the German and
French cavalry were, rolled into one package, but were not as effective at shock as some
specialized German and French cavalry were. At this point, the British cavalry was
mostly a homogeneous force with only their historical names remaining intact.
Overall BEF organization was a bit of a headache when creating the order of
battle for France '14, given several reorganizations they made throughout the conflict.
Because the scope of the campaign scenarios can span many months, and because the
38
forces on both sides had a tendency to change their organization throughout the war, an
approach was made to make BEF organization as simple as possible. For example, the
BEF's Cavalry Division was split up around September 1914 and was to become one of
the divisions in the new "Cavalry Corps". However, 3rd and 5th Cavalry Brigades
became "Gough's Command" from 6 September to 13 September where it was known as
the 2nd Cavalry Division. Somewhere between this point and 14 October, the Cavalry
Corps was formed. For the sake of simplicity, and to eliminate unnecessary confusion,
reformation will not take place during a scenario. Instead it will occur in following
scenarios. For example, the BEF underwent a few minor structure changes during the
period of the Battle of the Aisne. These changes to the BEF organization will be in place
in the scenarios following that battle, in the Race to the Sea phase. It is impractical in the
game to have units removed from the game then return under a different designation or
organization given that casualty level and fatigue levels would be lost and it would be
impossible to determine where to place the unit as reinforcement on the map.
Equipment and Training
The short barrel, magazine fed, Lee Enfield rifle (SMLE) was arguably one of the
better rifles in the world at the time. The SMLE had one of the smoothest actions when
compared to its contemporaries, could be reloaded quickly and easily, and was light due
to its compact design. The SMLE was not without its flaws, but most of its flaws can be
attributed to early war ammunition. Where the SMLE stood out was when it was in the
hands of a capable and highly trained British regular. In the pre-war years, the British
school of musketry sought to increase the number of machine guns assigned to each
infantry battalion from two to six but this was denied. When war broke out in 1914, the
39
British Army was severely lacking an effective and unified machine gun force since the
guns were divided up into two gun sections to support each infantry battalion.32
To
compensate for this lack of firepower, the school of musketry trained the soldiers in
special rapid fire marksmanship drills and the British Army offered pay incentives to
regular soldiers who demonstrated good marksmanship skill. Years of pre-war training
increased their proficiency with the SMLE, thus enabling the BEF regular soldier to
execute accurate and intense rapid rifle fire which would later compel many German
soldiers to believe that they were under machine gun fire. All of this combined to create
an almost mythical legend for the SMLE and the 1914 British professional soldier that
wielded it. In game play terms, something was needed beyond a simple quality level
increase in order to properly represent the doctrinal and proficiency differences with the
BEF professional force. It was decided that in addition to high troop quality levels, the
BEF professional infantry and cavalry would also have a higher soft attack rating, which
is attributed to a combination of the SMLE's advantages as well as the BEF regular
soldier's proficiency and specialized training in its use. The BEF regular infantry also
have a higher defense factor but this comes at the expense of a lower assault rating, since
they generally had a much greater reliance on firepower and marksmanship skill rather
than brute force cold steel, unlike the other infantry of Europe. These special traits
combine to create a realistic advantage for the small BEF which was an extremely
effective force, and this advantage is offset by the fact that the BEF generally had little to
no replacements and slowly dwindled away by the end of 1914. These "special traits" are
only present in the BEF "professional" regular infantry; guard infantry; and cavalry units
of 1914, and are not present in non regular infantry units, such as the British naval and
32
This two gun section per infantry battalion organization was similar to the French Army's approach.
40
marine infantry,33
Commonwealth infantry,34
territorial and yeoman units,35
nor any of
Kitchner's "New Army" units that followed in 1915.36
In other words, following the
demise of the core BEF professional force at the end of 1914 and the subsequent dilution
of replacements in 1915, British units became comparable to other European armies in
terms of combat factors.
Another issue involved the stop gap heavy artillery the British began to employ in
the latter months of 1914. Due to a lack of 60 pounder guns, in October the 7th
and 8th
Infantry Divisions arrived in Flanders fielding the awkward 4.7 inch naval guns which
were mounted on Percy Scott carriages. Initially these guns were an improvisation for the
Second Boer War. In that conflict, the British had no answer to the French made 155mm
Cruesot “Long Tom” field gun that the Boer’s employed. The solution was to dismount
the 4.7 inch naval gun from some ships and coastal batteries and mount it on a carriage
designed by Captain Percy Scott of the Royal Navy. The gun lacked any mechanism for
recoil and it had very limited elevation. The 60 pounder gun was created specifically to
address the stop gap and replace the 4.7 inch naval gun improvisation. In 1914, the 60
pounder was initially in very short supply, and this required the British to bring the 4.7
inch naval gun back into service. However, in France ’14, the ratings for these ground
based guns differ from the true naval mounted 4.7 inch guns for a couple of reasons. The
naval mounted 4.7 inch guns have a longer range and higher combat factor than the Percy
33
Naval infantry were ill equipped and composed of raw recruits, and marine infantry were composed of
reservists and recruits. 34
Commonwealth troops were mostly non professional in comparison to the “professional” sense of the
BEF regular, or they did not stress the same level marksmanship, or, in the case of the Indian units, were
only freshly equipped with SMLEs. 35
Yeoman and territorial formations were made up of citizen soldiers. 36
Kitchner’s “New Army” was comprised of hastily trained and poorly led troops and was an emergency
stop gap measure to get more troops to the front.
41
Scott carriage mounted guns because of the latter’s limited elevation capability and the
fact that the naval mounted gun could utilize more powerful charges.
* * *
42
General Notes
Attachments
Veterans of either the Panzer Campaigns or Modern Campaigns series may notice
that attachments are handled differently in France ‘14. In France ’14, attachments are
made an army level, therefore, corps can be attached to different armies, and independent
divisions and brigades can also be attached to different armies, but divisions cannot be
attached to different corps. The decision to go with this type of attachment scheme was
not an easy one to make. Evidence has shown that divisions were indeed transferred
between corps and corps transferred between armies, however there was overwhelming
evidence pointing to the fact that corps were reassigned amongst armies much more often
than divisions were reassigned amongst corps. The fact is, most division parings
remained the same amongst a corps, and when troops were needed elsewhere the entire
corps was reassigned to another sector of the front, under another army’s command.
During early alpha tests, it was also discovered that when division to corps attachments
were allowed it often influenced the reassignment of supporting units to create an a-
historical "breakthrough corps" of sorts, by combining all heavy artillery from several
different corps. Clearly this type of flexibility was not available during the early part of
World War I, so from a design point of view this was another reason for choosing an
army level attachment scheme in France ‘14. It was eventually decided that army level
attachments of corps was the best choice given both the grand scale of the game, the
potential abuse of divisional attachments thus producing unpredictable results, and, most
importantly, the evidence that it was the most likely and most frequent reorganization
43
method that occurred. While this approach is not perfect, it works well and allows
moderate flexibility and reorganization to occur, but not complete flexibility.
The exception to this intentional limited flexibility is that, in many cases, some
armies allowed cavalry divisions and reserve divisions to be reassigned amongst armies
and this has been modeled. In fact, special mention must be made of the French Army's
organization. The French Army in 1914 reorganized itself more than any other. Corps
were sent from the army formations in the east to army formation in the west as needed,
and reserve and territorial divisions were committed to different armies in crucial areas as
well. In the early part of 1914, there are a couple of unique aspects of the French
reserves. As a French player, you will have more flexibility to transfer units around but at
the same time you may end up with a completely disorganized force if it is not managed
properly. The second distinctive characteristic about the French Army and its attachment
capabilities are its reserve and territorial divisions. The GQG Reserve and Territorial
Reserve contain individual divisions allowing the French to attach these divisions as
needed, directly to various armies if necessary. Actually, any division that may have been
independently transferred between armies has been represented as a direct army level
attachment, as a kind of independent division. Some French infantry divisions fit this
description as well. Of special mention is the French 37th and 38th Infantry Divisions
which were sent from North Africa at the outbreak of the war. These two divisions
bounced around many different French corps during the conflict so it was decided to
allow these units to attach directly to armies as well, creating a capable fire brigade or
sorts.
44
Cavalry Units, cavalry tactics, and cavalry types
Cavalry units in First World War Campaigns of 1914 represent the twilight period
of cavalry in the traditional sense of the word. Most cavalry during this period still had its
roots in Napoleonic warfare and were still training in the tactics of arme blanch.37
While
cavalry met with some success on the more mobile eastern front, cavalry units on the
western front had little usefulness other than dismounted infantry after 1914. However,
during the fluid battles that were characteristic of 1914, cavalry were still used in their
traditional role until the point in which the west front developed into a static line, devoid
of any flanks.
Cavalry units in this series differ from anything available in the Panzer
Campaigns series in that when they are in Travel Mode they are not classified as being in
"travel mode" per se, rather they are just simply considered to be "mounted". From there
37
Arme blanche is a French term which essentially means cold steel. In this literal sense it refers to the use
of thrusting or cutting weapons in battle. In regards to cavalry, it describes their sole traditional role: to be
held back until the right moment as a decisive tactical striking force. In modern times this is often referred
to as “shock”.
45
it is assumed that when these units are "mounted" they would be able to move into charge
formation or column formation rather quickly, and they do not need to be micromanaged
on when to do this. While this might seem like a rather abstract approach, it works nicely
given the scale of the game. Cavalry can move rapidly and conduct charges while in their
mounted Travel Mode state, or they can dismount and perform as if they were infantry.
Some cavalry units have specializations while others do not. However, this is said
with reservation and depends on the nation in question, and the experiences they had at
the time, and not necessarily related to the armament of the individual cavalryman.
During the First and Second Boer War in South Africa, the British were matched
up against an opponent to which they were initially unprepared. The Boers, essentially
Dutch farmers in South Africa, utilized fast mobile hit and run cavalry tactics where they
relied exclusively on the carbine. Initially, Britain’s traditional cavalry were unable to
deal with this threat until they switched exclusively to dragoon type tactics to match their
foes. Following the war, several British military studies were conducted on lessons
learned and how cavalry should evolve. Some advocated for no change in cavalry from
its Napoleonic style because the Boers were hardly considered to be a similar threat that
another European army would be. Others argued that with the modernization of weapons,
the lance and saber needed to be discarded and that a single unified mounted infantryman
type cavalry force needed to be made.
One of the first British tacticians to argue for a complete change in cavalry tactics
and composition was Colonel F. R. Henderson. Colonel Henderson spent a considerable
time studying the American Civil War and came to the conclusion that the Americans had
"stuck the true balance between shock and dismounted tactics." Henderson pointed out
46
that by 1861 firepower had become the dominant factor in battle, and the Americans had
adopted alterations to traditional cavalry tactics that were necessary to both counter and
maximize firepower. Henderson believed that the true balance lay in the American's
choice of mixing both fire and shock. The result was that by 1907 the British began
modernizing their cavalry into a single homogenous force that was well rounded in
dismounted warfare, marksmanship and shock tactics.
General Francois de Négrier was a Frenchman who had been an observer in the
Russo-Japanese War. He believed that lessons learned in that struggle demonstrated the
need for a change in the methods of cavalry as well. Similar to Henderson, Négrier was
convinced from what he observed that cavalry needed to abolish the traditional
distinctions among lancers, dragoons, hussars and the like in favor of a single robust
cavalry force trained in both shock and fire tactics. However, he failed to reckon that the
French would be the most reluctant of all to change. Despite his studies, France went into
battle in 1914 with almost no change to the cavalry over their Napoleonic ancestors.
In Germany, one of the leading military writers of the pre-Great War period was
General Frederick von Bernhardi and he had much to say about cavalry tactics of the
future. Although he had strong faith in the value of dismounted action, he maintained that
cold steel remained the chief cavalry threat on the battlefield. However, Bernhardi
pointed out that modern cavalry should not rely exclusively on shock tactics, but instead
should consider various methods of fighting to create a single homogenous force capable
of both cold steel and dismounted accurate rifle fire. Like Négrier of France, he was to be
a voice in the darkness. Other nations, such as the United States and Britain, seemed to
pay more attention to their studies than their own armies did.
47
In the First World War Campaigns, specialized cavalry of the period were very
similar to, and in some cases exact, Napoleonic period formations and were trained, or
sometimes specifically equipped, for a certain style of combat. Lighter cavalry units such
as Uhlans and Chasseurs specialized in reconnaissance, and were somewhat weaker in
their shock capability than other types. Some cavalry of the period were classified as
"heavy" and consist of large men, sometimes wearing obsolete armor,38
and were
mounted on large powerful horses. These heavy cavalry units were the Napoleonic
equivalent of modern main battle tanks, and at the time of the First World War this was
expected to still be the case. All of this translates into the cavalry unit ratings in First
World War Campaigns; man cavalry units in the game have inherent advantages and
disadvantages which determine when they should and should not be used.
The primary advantages of all cavalry is their mobility and, due to their mobility,
their inherent strength in reconnaissance operations. Some cavalry have the ability to
conduct the recon spotting ability, which is a unit command menu order that instructs the
selected unit to expend movement points in an attempt to spot enemy units within their
line of sight. This is useful when cavalry units are moved forward into areas that were not
spotted at the beginning of the turn and helps you to avoid a blundering move into enemy
forces. In game play terms, cavalry that have this recon spotting ability are the light
cavalry units. These include, but are not limited to Uhlans, Lancers, Chasseurs, Cossacks,
and the “modern” classless British cavalry units. These light cavalry units should be
utilized in screening and reconnaissance, and should rarely be used in a full blown charge
38
The French Cuirassiers of 1914 went into battle wearing their armored breastplates for traditional
purposes and not for actual protection. The polished, shiny, breastplate was quickly covered with a brown
cloth, and the breastplate was completely discarded by French cuirassiers by the end of 1914. At the start of
the Great War, German and Russian cuirassier cavalry only wore their breastplates in full dress uniform for
ceremonial or parade purposes.
48
unless the situation is extremely beneficial to do so. Another advantage of cavalry units is
their ability to evade the enemy when mounted.39
When a mounted cavalry unit is
assaulted, it will retreat (if possible) and avoid high combat losses. However, this is only
true if all the defending units in a hex consist of mounted cavalry.40
These two
advantages, mobility and evasion, combine to make cavalry extremely useful in a role of
rear guard, covering a friendly infantry force’s retreat long enough to put a substantial
distance between it and its pursuers, and then repeating this process as necessary. Perhaps
the greatest advantage of mounted cavalry units is their ability to conduct a cavalry
charge. Unlike other units, mounted cavalry only require 1/3 of their movement to
conduct an assault, allowing them to make repeated assaults and to move almost to their
full extent before assaulting. When mounted cavalry units conduct a charge, their assault
rating is multiplied by four times its normal value, which, in the case of a charge en
masse or in the case of a heavy cavalry charge, can result in an absolutely overwhelming
result for the defender. As with every other assault, the end result is of course due to the
condition, size and type of the defending unit(s), and the terrain they are situated in.41
The greatest disadvantage of cavalry units is their vulnerability when mounted. As
with all other units in Travel Mode, mounted cavalry are more vulnerable to enemy fire
than a deployed unit. As mentioned, Travel Mode for cavalry units is not representing
that they are in column formation like standard units, instead it is an abstraction to
39
“Mounted cavalry” are cavalry units which are in Travel Mode. See the User Manual for more
information. 40
See the User Manual for more information. 41
For the class based cavalry of the early war, it is intentional that only the dragoon cavalry type has as
hard attack rating. This was done because the dragoon is essentially mounted infantry, which have
comparable ratings to standard infantry formations. This means that cavalry units of other classes in 1914
cannot assault fortresses, redoubts, bunkers nor armored cars. These cavalry units can push such enemies
out of a hex if they are disrupted, but they are intentionally not sufficiently powerful enough to cause any
other effect.
49
represent that they are mounted on horseback and, because of this, a larger, much more
vulnerable target. A poorly executed cavalry charge can have the opposite result that the
attacker intends, and can leave the cavalry unit vulnerable to retaliatory fire on the
enemy’s turn. Use cavalry charges with caution, the ability should only be used in a
situation of either desperation or extreme advantage, not as norm; cavalry units should be
husbanded and not wasted in futile cavalry charges. Part of the reason for this is their
next weakness. Cavalry was an expensive branch of service to equip, maintain, and train;
it took roughly three years to turn a man on a horse into an effective cavalry trooper.
Because of this, regular (non elite) cavalry units received very little replacements, and
elite cavalry units received even less. Strategically, cavalry of the period generally
regarded itself as a one shot weapon, something that would only be used en masse and in
force "when the time was right". The cavalry arm of all sides generally viewed itself as a
force that would battle enemy cavalry on the flanks in sweeping battles where they would
trade loss for loss, similar to trading knights in a game of chess, as they cover the flanks
of the armies. Cautiously utilized cavalry as a reconnaissance force would obviously be
around longer than a mass used as an offensive striking force, and this is partly why both
sides shied away from committing massed cavalry in one huge decisive action. When a
cavalry unit is decimated in the early period of First World War Campaigns, it will
essentially be gone forever if it is an elite unit, or it will take a very long time for it to
regain its strength if it is a regular unit.42
Also, the expense to equip and maintain the
42
This is due to the fact that in the "early" period all regular cavalry units have a 1% replacement rate, elite
cavalry units have a 0% replacement rate. In the "late" period (Race to the Sea and beyond), no cavalry
units receive replacements, however at that point all units (cavalry and otherwise) begin to receive
recovery. In the early period, the cavalry replacements represent the finite pool of troopers that were being
trained but who had not yet completed training, or those who were being processed from the ersatz units.
Recovery is set to 0% in this early period to represent the fact that both sides were on the move and had not
yet established permanent rear area facilities to process stragglers and the treated wounded. The pool of
50
these units, as well as the high cost of potentially losing both the mount and rider, means
that cavalry units are worth two times as many Victory Points as infantry formations. A
successful cavalry commander of the period must always keep in mind that a cavalry
charge which might cause a massive proportion of enemy infantry loss may carry with it
a substantial loss of irreplaceable cavalry in the charge, possibly making the charge itself
an exercise in futility. The infantry formation can usually, depending on the nationality
and supply situation, recover and replace its losses with ease where as the cavalry unit
cannot. In addition, the point value of friendly cavalry may actually turn out to be equal
to, or higher than the loss inflicted on the enemy. The higher victory point value for
cavalry loss makes the proposition of their use as stand in, dismounted infantry cannon
fodder an expensive proposition; this option should only be reserved when combating and
standing up against enemy cavalry formations that are employed in a similar manner,
such as the case in the First Battle of Ypres, 1914. All of these advantages and
disadvantages create a dilemma where knowing when and how to utilize cavalry
efficiently and effectively is a challenge, and a great deal of fun!
Replacements
Replacements are the strength recovery of a unit based on the individual unit's
replacement rate that is applied in the Order of Battle. Replacements are in addition to the
recovery rate (if any) which is specified in the parameters data. It is important to
familiarize yourself with the rule mechanics of the replacement feature, in order to get the
maximum amount of replacements to your units. The most critical aspect of gaining
treated wounded soldiers who could return to duty had also not accumulated yet. In the late period, the lack
of cavalry replacements represent the "drying up" of the pool of replacements, and the start of recovery
represents the fact that units began processing strength from losses at the start of the war (it represents a
transitional period). See the user manual for the different between replacements and recovery.
51
replacements is the Local Supply Level. First World War Campaigns titles are meant to
be played with the Virtual Supply Truck optional rule activated. By activating this rule,
your supply levels can vary across the map depending on the location of the hex in
relation to the nearest supply source that is providing supply to that hex. The replacement
rate of the unit is directly influenced by the supply level, therefore if your units are
located in an area with poor supply then you will receive a reduced rate of replacements.
When the local supply is greater than 50%, you will receive 100% of the assigned
replacement rate of that unit each turn, which is typically 3 or 4% strength for 1914. This
might seem like a lot, but the supply levels decline a great deal by the end of 1914 and
during the later periods of the campaign it is quite unrealistic to expect your units to have
a > 50% local supply value level at all times. As your units advance and as the campaign
progresses to the late period, the local supply level will drop and you will receive less
replacements based on the local supply level. If a unit has a replacement rate of 3% and is
drawing on a local supply of 40%, then that unit will receive only 2/3rds of its maximum
replacement rate (which would be 2%).43
The replacement rate is reduced even further
(halved) if the unit in question is out of range of its parent HQ (detached). With this in
mind, when resting units it is advisable to position them in range of its parent HQ and to
position the units in an area that is getting a "good" supply level that is greater than 50%
(this might require you to move the units out of a forested or swampy area and move
them closer to a road or rail network).
Infantry movement speed
43
See the user manual for more information on Replacements.
52
Early in the FWWC series, the regular infantry speed was set to 3 hexes per turn.
Although this value was assigned in good intention, it was later realized that it was too
slow for early war period infantry which were relatively lightly equipped and had been
documented as moving faster tactically, and it hindered the historical progress of some
battles and campaigns. The original slower speed was certainly justified for the middle to
late period of World War I, when what was termed "heavy infantry" were developed, but
not for the early periods where mobility was stressed.
So, with that in mind, in the FWWC series the tactical speed of regular infantry in
the early battles of this series is set at a standard 4 hexes per turn, and light infantry unit
speeds are at 5 hexes per turn. This puts the non-light infantry speed in the early period at
the same speed as the Panzer Campaigns series and it is rationalized that the early war
infantry were as fast, and faster in the case of light infantry, as World War II infantry
units, but they were of course lighter equipped and had much less firepower. Gradually
these World War I infantry then became slower during the war (a speed value of 3 in
game terms) as they were burdened with heavier trench warfare type weapons, thereby
maximizing firepower but sacrificing mobility. Then, near the end of World War I, the
Germans revolutionized infantry with the advent of assault infantry (Stoßtruppen) which
balanced both speed and firepower with infiltration and small unit tactics. These assault
infantry essentially became World War II style infantry, returning their mobility back to
early World War I levels while still retaining the firepower of their mid-war predecessors.
In other words, for the FWWC series, the design approach that will be followed
is: in the early years of the war the infantry will be highly mobile, as was historically the
case, to better allow battles and campaigns to develop during the mobility period of the
53
war. Then in the middle of the war infantry speeds will become slower but infantry we
also become more powerful. By the end of the war the Germans will restore early war
speeds, combined with mid war firepower, and the ability to infiltrate and break down
into companies.
Lack of "Go On Foot" command
Veteran Panzer Campaigns and Modern Campaigns players might notice the lack
of the "Go On Foot" command in the Command menu. The reason for the lack of the Go
On Foot command is because it was not desired that cavalry units be able to go on foot
because, essentially, they could not abandon their horses in this way. They could
dismount and move away from the, but they could not just totally abandon them; some of
the personnel of that unit had to tend to them and keep them together, they could not just
completely ditch them at the brigade HQ so their mobility, even when dismounted, must
be restricted by where their horses can go. Cavalry units of the period were either foot
type units, or they had horses, but not a combination of both.
That said, of course this also means that "motorized" units cannot go on foot
either, but that too was desired because these units were not as flexible as true motorized
infantry of World War Two, so it was thought to be a better reflection of warfare of the
period to prevent them from going on foot. The short answer for why the Go On Foot
command was removed in FWWC is simply to limit flexibility at this period of warfare.
Unit frontages, attack formation (1914)
A successful attack comes from knowing where and how to concentrate your
forces. Typical German “by the book” attack formations of the period shed light on how
54
you should concentrate your forces.44
In the attack, a German infantry regiment’s
frontage was only 1 km wide, with the regiment deployed in depth. Depending on the
situation, usually only one battalion would be in the front and the other two battalions
would be in reserve, ready to relieve the front battalion, or ready to move forward to
administer an assault. The infantry regiment’s MG companies were usually in front with
the lead battalion, ready to deploy to provide a base of fire, as was the division’s field
guns. The “book” attack frontage for a brigade was therefore only 2 km wide, the
division was 4 km wide, and a corps was 8 km wide.45
It is easy to see how the Germans
intended to concentrate as much force on a small area to provide for a sustained attack.
The deployment in depth was a direct result of observation experience of the Japanese in
the Russo-Japanese War in Manchuria. On the attack, the deployment in depth ensures
that reserves can move forward to provide a fresh impetus to the momentum of the
advance. The Japanese deployed on too broad of a front on the attack and did not have
reserves in depth so their attacks frequently stalled. Of course, the situation did not
always allow the book to be followed, but it does give the attacker a guideline to follow;
attacking in depth should always be preferred to width in World War One. And if it can
be spared, a defense in depth is almost an immovable force.
On the attack, if you follow this strict frontage guideline where possible, then you
should be able to use the front battalion to absorb fire and whittle away the defenders to
get disruptions, then commit the reserve to assault and get a breakthrough. The key here
is knowing when to commit the reserve for the assault and when to simply relieve the
forward battalion to continue the attack by fire. The “book’s” decision point on when to
44
The “book” is referring to the 1909 Exerzier-Reglement für die Infanterie, the German infantry field
manual. 45
Zuber, 53.
55
commit the assault is in the cold calculated moment that the attack begins to suffer from
noticeably less retaliatory fire, when it is discovered that they are disrupted or low on
ammo or suffering from some other combat related stresses like high fatigue.
Unit frontages, defense formation (1914)
In the defense, the “book” prescribed that wider frontages could be the norm
given that a defending force could spread out and still effectively hold ground. The
frontages were essentially doubled in the defense, with a regiment usually holding a 2 km
front (two battalions on the line, one in reserve), a brigade holding a 4 km front, a
division holding an 8-9 km front and a corps holding a 16-18 km front. As mentioned, if
it can be spared, a defense in depth is obviously preferred over width. It is important,
much more so than is true in the Panzer Campaigns and Modern Campaigns series, to
keep track of enemy formation names on enemy units with Fog of War on. In other
words, you should keep a careful eye on enemy unit’s organizational names in order to
determine if the defender is spreading himself too thin. It cannot be stressed enough that
this can be a revealing sign on where to strike. The same is true if the roles are reversed,
if you can determine that an enemy division or other formation is spread out, then you
will know where you do not need to concentrate your reserves. During this period of
warfare, extensive records were kept on enemy formation locations to ascertain strength
and intentions; an effective commander in First World War Campaigns should do the
same.
Forts
Forts come in two types: strong and weak, or in game terms, vacated and non-
vacated. In the game rules, any vacated fortification is one half the normal defensive
56
bonus applied to the fortification. The actual size of a particular fort in no way translates
into the defense value of the fort, nor whether or not it is considered to be a “strong” or
“weak” fort at start. Several factors are considered when determining if a fort should
begin the game in a vacated status.
The primary factor beyond the actual study of each fortification was a research
chart that was constructed showing the number of days a fort held out against
bombardment of a particular caliber of siege gun. For example, seven of Liege's twelve
forts held out for only one day, most being bombarded by 210mm howitzers. The other
five held out from a period of two to four days again being bombarded by 210mm
howitzers. A few of the forts were hit by 305mm Mortars and 420mm "Big Bertha"
howitzers and these fell promptly afterwards. The same is true for Namur. The forts of
Antwerp held out from five to thirty days of bombardment from 420mm Howitzers. This
translates to Namur and Liege having weaker forts, however both were armed with a
rather large amount of cannon as they had a wide range of artillery ranging in caliber
from 57mm to 210mm guns that were, for the most part, obsolete.
So, what is the rationale behind the placing of fortification types? In most cases
fort strengths, whether they are vacated or not, are determined mainly by how long they
historically held out in bombardments, as mentioned above. In most cases the actual size
of the fort is ignored in terms of defensive ability, with the size only determining how
large the garrison and gun battery is. In some cases more capable forts will also have
higher quality defenders. However, as a general rule, the following guidelines are
applied:
57
FORT: The most capable of forts. These were modern constructions that usually
were equipped with gun turrets and modern guns but this is not always true. The most
capable forts were elaborate constructions that were quite impenetrable, before the world
witnessed the power of Big Bertha and other massive siege guns of course.
Fort: Lesser forts, either of stone construction or because they had less capable
defenses either through neglect, or obsolescence. Within the rules of the game, this also
represents destroyed or damaged capable forts (vacated).
REDOUBT: Redoubts, ouverages, small forts or any lesser fortification made of
concrete (above or below ground). This could be equipped with guns or gun turrets but
most often only contained a garrison of infantry.
Redoubt: Citadels and obsolete forts (ancient fortresses) or destroyed (vacated)
redoubts. These are usually scattered across the map and are no longer garrisoned or
equipped with guns.
BUNKER: Earthen bunkers and trenches.
Bunker: Primitive or damaged or destroyed (vacated) bunkers.
In cases where a supply source is present on a fortification hex and there is no
fortress gun unit (static), or fortress battalion unit present then a small, static, garrison
unit of less than 100 men will be present. The more capable fortified zones will also have
an HQ assigned to the garrison and the less capable zones will need to rely on the
currently assigned Army HQ radius for command. The sole purpose for these small
garrison units is to man the fortifications and keep an accidental move that would vacate
the fortification from occurring, from a user moving a unit into and out of a FORT or
REDOUBT hex, and to keep LOS to such fortification hexes and make them easy to find.
58
The SHIFT key can also be used to locate fortifications as the positions of all forts are
pinpointed with labels.46
It is important to note that fortresses in general are abstractions. Given the amount
of forts located in France, not every single fort has been placed on the map. Only the
most important ones are present and, in the case of obsolete forts, only the ones that were
temporarily used for refuge or were used for landmarks are present.
Trenches and Improved Positions
The trenches that were dug in 1914 were extremely primitive. These early field
works were simply nice straight and narrow ditches that were rarely continuous and
barely capable of covering a standing man. There were no traverses, were severely
overcrowded, and were extremely vulnerable to artillery fire. Many of these early
trenches were the graves of many soldiers as nearby exploding artillery fire collapsed the
walls and buried the men alive as they knelt for protection. For this reason, trenches in
France '14 do not have the high defensive ratings as they in no way represent the more
46
The exact locations of fortresses of the period were well known to both sides. It is intentional that the
enemy can note fortress locations that he does not have LOS to by using map labels.
59
elaborate trenches constructed out of experience in the later years of the war.47
Improved hexes represent the piling of debris, man made or natural, to create a
more defensible position. It also represents a hastily dug scrape in the ground or the
simple act of creating a concealed position. An alternate term for these positions might be
"breast works".
Given the low entrenching value, it is the designer's intent to mainly allow
improved positions to be built, with it taking a lengthy amount of time to construct a
primitive trench. Engineers will be vital in order to speed up the process and make it
more likely to successfully construct fighting positions. This decision is primarily due to
the lack of training, doctrine or entrenching equipment that resided in the line units of
1914. This would of course change drastically in the following years.
Heavy Machine Gun Units
Note: "Heavy machine gun" and "machine
gun" is referenced interchangeably elsewhere in
the notes document but all refer to the "heavy
machine gun" units that are described in this
section.
It was a tedious process to determine
exactly what kind of combat factors heavy
machine gun units of the period should have. But
before this is discussed, it is important to
47
The elaborate trenches that most people characterize as standard World War I trenches did not come into
existence until mid 1915 and early 1916, after both sides obtained substantial entrenching experience.
60
understand that the term "heavy machine gun" differs from the modern terminology. The
term today usually refers to a heavy barrel machine gun of 12.7mm48
or higher. However,
in the early 1900's, it referred to a machine gun which was on a heavy mount to stabilize
the weapon in which to provide it with a stable firing platform. Unlike World War II and
later periods, the ratings for these heavy machine gun units had to be completely different
and in a class of its own. The manner in which heavy machine guns were employed in an
artillery type role, combined with the limited infantry tactics of the day, results in a
period where the heavy machine gun reigned supreme and necessitates that they be
completely separate units, not factored into infantry battalion combat ratings. The result
is a unit with combat factors that greatly differ from anything in the Panzer Campaigns or
Modern Campaigns series.
The source of the formula that determined their combat ratings was based in
professional military studies of the period. These historical studies calculated that one
heavy machine gun was essentially worth the firepower of approximately 60-100 rifles,
with the more consensual figure being around 80 rifles. This estimate was a cold harsh
calculation of firepower versus the rigid early war infantry tactics and effectiveness of the
day. Maxim and Maxim copy heavy machine gun soft attack and assault strengths are
derived from calculations based on number of weapons per element in question,
compared to the soft attack strength of an average infantry battalion in the order of battle
by using a ratio of 80:1, which is determined at the maximum effective range to target.
Specifically, the rating at two hexes is (A * E * R) / M, where A = average infantry Bn
48
.50 caliber.
61
soft attack [2.5]49
, E = per rifle estimate [80], R = range value denominator [3], M =
number of men per heavy machine gun [15]. In other words, the heavy machine gun units
have a standard attack strength directly based upon their 1914 firepower effectiveness
estimate at 2,000m range. This base rating is then adjusted higher or lower to represent
various different types of heavy machine guns, with the Maxim and Maxim copy being
the median. The resulting high, almost artillery like, rating makes heavy machine gun
units particularly deadly during this period in the history of warfare, but a cumbersome
and slow to deploy unit that is only really useful in the defense.
Deciding on the number of men per weapon was a serious headache. The idea
initially was to convert these units into gun type units and avoid the issue altogether but it
was decided that is more accurate to have crew casualties than it would be to have losses
jump in increments of guns. This makes heavy machine gun units more effective and
increases their survivability.50
The strength in men of the heavy machine gun unit is
derived from an average so as to maintain a consistency regardless of any small variance
in crew strength between the different nationalities. The actual number of men assigned
to physically operate the weapon was usually six, regardless of nationality. However,
there were addition soldiers that were assigned to the crew that had nothing to do with its
direct operation but were still vital to the function of the heavy machine gun such as
range takers, ammunition carriers, gun captains, layers, loaders, assistant loaders, and so
forth. When all of these operators are taken into account, the number of men per weapon
rises to approximately 15, with an average of 30 men per heavy machine gun section.
49
The average infantry battalion soft attack rating is 2.5, which is an average of the Gewehr 98 [2] and
SMLE [3] equipped infantry soft attack ratings. 50
This increased survivability is especially true for the smaller two gun section sized units. See the User
Manual for more information on combat resolution.
62
This entire crew of men assigned to the heavy machine gun's direct and indirect operation
would have been utilized to maintain and operate the machine gun if attrition took its toll.
Therefore, in the order of battle, for every 15 men in a heavy machine gun unit there is
one heavy machine gun present, so the smallest unit consists of 30 men.51
Field Guns, direct versus indirect fire
Historically, field guns such as the French 75mm mle 1897, British 18 pounder,
and German 7.7cm field gun were in fact capable of utilizing low trajectory indirect fire
by first determining the bearing to the target, and then determining the elevation using a
"sight clinometer" to set the appropriate height. The round was then fired at such a
trajectory that it flew in a low arc to the target, allowing them to fire over the heads of
their own troops. This left a tough dilemma of sorts to be decided on whether these low
trajectory indirect fire capable guns should be allowed to fire true indirect fire over hills
and built up terrain or whether they should be restricted exclusively to direct fire only,
leaving indirect capability to howitzers. The reality is that neither approach would be
correct, leaving a situation where the lesser of two evils approach had to be taken. With
that in mind, it was felt that these guns should be limited to direct fire only, at least in the
early period of the war until the employment of the guns and the guns themselves
changed. Where the conflict was mobile in the early period of the war, it was felt that it
would be more correct to restrict these low trajectory guns to direct fire only in order to
allow their true destructive potential to be achieved when using line of sight firing, and to
allow them to be quick firing (three immediate direct fire shots versus one single
"barrage" that has to be plotted with a delayed delivery).
51
The smallest machine gun unit is a section, therefore 15 men per gun, two guns per section, 15*2 equals
30 men.
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Machine Gun and Field Gun Unit setup
In First World War Campaigns, a design approach was taken which requires
machine gun and field gun units to expend their full movement point to exit from Travel
Mode. These units only require 1/3 of their movement allowance to enter Travel Mode
though. This approach was taken because this requirement to exit from Travel Mode
represents the actual setting up of these units into firing positions. This setting up
involved setting up the guns themselves, stockpiling and preparing ammunition, and
communicating with their local HQ. All of these required a substantial amount of time to
do when taken as a whole, and this process left the unit vulnerable the enemy until it was
completed.
The primary reason for this approach is game play considerations on how these
units were historically used. By requiring a full turn to exit from Travel Mode, it puts the
advantage of these units squarely in the hands of the defense, which is where these units
excelled. These units can enter Travel Mode quickly and move away to another position,
but any attempt to use these units as a leading force in an attack will intentionally subject
them to enemy fire before they have a change to deploy (since one turn must be spent in
Travel Mode). This also means that these units are extremely vulnerable to counter
assault by the enemy and especially vulnerable to enemy cavalry in general. In other
words, if the attacker intends to move these gun units adjacent to the enemy as some sort
of driving force, they can certainly choose to do so but it will come with a consequence.
These units should always be accompanied by friendly infantry to protect them from
assault, and the guns should expect retaliatory fire on the enemy’s turn. It also means that
this vulnerability discourages these units from being able to race forward alone to a
64
strategic location (such as a crossroads) in order to quickly plant themselves as an
immovable force. This all contributes to “influencing” a more historical use for these
units.
In the offensive, care must be taken with their employment so as to not subject
them to too much enemy fire as they move forward. It also means that once these units
are setup and rooted to the ground, you should avoid moving them unless they are
completely out of range with the enemy. Ideally, the “safe” approach would be to move
these units forward to a stand off range of two hexes from the enemy, in order to safely
avoid the most harmful retaliatory fire, then deploy into this hex in order to lay down
disrupting fire before your infantry moves forward for the assault. If you, as the attacker,
intend to be bold and bring these units up as a killing force, then you must contend with
the draw back that you will ultimately lose valuable guns and men to enemy fire, and this
is especially true if you decide to mass multiple such units into the same hex. You will
also inherently accumulate a large amount of fatigue in the process and possibly get them
disrupted as well. The defender could then wisely choose to fall back once these units
have deployed, thus requiring you to move forward and repeat the same bloody process
again, trading the strength of these valuable units for ground.
On the defensive, when being perused by an enemy, you would want to use these
units to move rearward, picking out your key defensive points, and screened them by
friendly infantry to keep the enemy away from the machine guns and field guns until they
deploy. Once these machine gun and field gun units are deployed, the screening friendly
infantry should retire onto them to form the main line of resistance. As the main line
65
gives way to enemy assault, these field gun units and machine gun units should be the
first to fall back to their next position where the process repeats if necessary.
Towed Gun Limitation (stacking)
First World War Campaigns has a new feature where limitations are set on
exactly how many Towed Guns can be deployed in a single hex. Towed Guns consist of
all manner of artillery units, as well as machinegun units. The rationale behind this
limiting is that there was a practical limit on the number of guns that could be deployed
in any one given area. This practical limit was based on the fact that the guns needed
room to operate effectively, and the fact that it was very difficult to supply large
concentrations of guns with the amount of ammunition they whey would require to be
effective. The engine places a limit on the number of guns that could be effectively
employed in any given hex, requiring the excess to remain in Travel Mode. Naturally this
limit exists primarily to place guidelines on historical behavior and to prevent the
creation of "super stacks" of guns. It is important to note that Towed Gun type units in
Travel Mode do not have to abide by the Towed Gun stacking limit, these Travel Mode
units reference the Towed Gun stacking limit once they attempt to deploy from Travel
Mode. So, while the guns remain in travel mode, they are subject only to the normal
stacking limits.
It is advised that the user examines the Parameter values under the Help menu (or
by pressing the F4 key) and see what the Towed Gun stacking limit is, keeping in mind
that one gun is equal to 10 men.52
It is certainly possible to subject your Towed Guns to
unnecessary fire by moving a quantity of guns to one location, only to find out (after the
52
For example, a Towed Gun stacking limit of 450 men means that 45 guns can deploy in a single hex, or
any combination of guns and machine gun units that will equal that amount.
66
enemy conducts their next turn of retaliation) that the number of guns you moved to that
hex is in violation of the Towed Gun stacking limit. In this case you will only be able to
deploy a portion of the guns and should move the rest away to another position. The
current Towed Gun limit is quite generous and historically accurate, so it is not very
likely that you will violate this limit unless your field gun units are stacked extremely
dense.
Brigade and regimental HQ units
Unlike in the Panzer Campaign's series where regimental and brigade HQ units
usually provide more flexibility to a division, in the First World War Campaigns series it
has a different effect. Given the rather strict command system in this series where units
that are out of command suffer a one step loss in morale, brigade and regimental HQ
units, with their small command radius, intentionally restrict a division's effective “foot
print”. This is necessary to properly represent the rigid command structures present
during the First World War and to keep a division from being too intermixed which
would allow a player to put battalions and MG units anywhere they are needed. A user
can still choose to do this, but there are consequences if the units being "shoved into the
breach" are outside of their parent brigade's range (they will not perform as effectively as
they normally would). The relatively small command ranges of brigade and regimental
HQs can prove to be an Achilles heel to the entire structure. If one such HQ unit is
eliminated or disrupted then the entire chain is affected and attacks and defenses could
falter. If, for example, you cut off the head of a division then all brigade HQs will most
likely fail their command checks, which could affect their command radius or
replacement and recovery levels. The command structures during this period were not at
67
the level of capability where small units were able to operate on their own initiatives. In
later war scenarios this will gradually begin to change with brigade and regimental HQ
units getting a larger command radius, or possibly being removed altogether to allow
greater flexibility.
When moving brigade and regimental HQs you should keep them as close to their
subordinate units as possible but also out of danger as much as possible. You do not want
to risk losing the HQ unit in a fight, but it is a balance between risk versus maintaining an
effective link with your units on the battlefield. Front lines can be penetrated and HQ
units overrun to great effect, possibly routing or disrupting a larger force when they are
further pressed.
Off map HQ units with 0% arrival
In some scenarios there are supreme HQ units, such as OHL; GQG; and GHQ;
which have a 0% chance of arrival. Any scenario where an HQ unit is scheduled for a 0%
arrival chance is an intentional representation that the higher HQ is out of range and
remains out of range of the units that are depicted in the scenario. These out of range HQ
units usually show up as arriving in one of the corner map hexes and are labeled as “out
of range” to serve as a reminder of this fact. Given how the engine works, if a higher HQ
is not present on the map nor scheduled as reinforcement then it is assumed that the
higher HQ is off map but within range of the units on the map. By placing the HQ as
reinforcement with 0% chance of arrival, it effectively breaks the link between the units
on the map and the scheduled HQ unit, which represents the fact that this HQ units was
very far away from the battle area.
Commanders
68
With the exception of the BEF, in France ’14 you will find that only the GHQ,
Army HQs, and Corps HQs, have commander names. This was done because the game
covers several months, and given the scale of the order of battle, it is impractical to
properly name commanders at division level and below because of how often they
changed during this period. There are a few exceptions to this of course, and these
exceptions are usually made for only the most famous or most capable commanders. The
effect of naming every division commander within the time frame represented by the
game would be a complex changing of HQs and almost twice the amount of HQ portraits
for the various commanders. On the west front, the corps level and above is really where
the commanders stood out from their peers. For the most part, a division commander
during this period of warfare was about as special as a brigade commander; the corps was
the basic unit of action in most cases.
Historically, many commanders were relieved and replaced throughout the 1914
campaign. However, it is quite unreasonable to expect that every commander is properly
represented and replaced when it historically occurred, so several design decisions had to
be made. Firstly, only the most important commander changes are represented when it
actually occurred, such as the replacement of the French IIIe and Ve Armée commanders,
as well as the promotion of Foch to command the new IXe Armée. In these cases, it is
important to represent the change of command when it happened because of the change
in HQ rating, or the formation of a new army. Of course, many brigade and division
commands changed as well but it is not practical to represent this except in cases where
an exceptional commander appeared. When Army HQs are changed, it is handled with
Strategy and Operations selections so that you can choose the best location for the change
69
of command to occur in relation to the current location of the army. Corps commanders
that were replaced or promoted with a comparable replacement appear with a hyphenated
name depicting the {first}-{second} commanders.
The primary disadvantages to replacing HQ units when a change of command
occurred are that the user might choose a location that has been overrun by the enemy,
and for that, it is completely up to the user to pay attention to where they are deploying
the replacement HQ. Also, the user may have moved the army in such a way that the HQ
locations are very distant. This has hopefully been negated by providing many different
locations in which the HQ can be deployed, and from there the user can move the HQ by
rail or road to where it is needed. Of course the HQ locations are in the general historical
location of where the change of command occurred, but there are a few choices provided
that should allow flexibility. The actual location of the change of command does not
necessarily represent where the former commander was replaced, as they could have been
"summoned" to any given location and relieved of their command. Corps HQs that
appear hyphenated also have a disadvantage because the quality of the first leader may
not represent the quality of the one who took his place. Foch is a clear example where,
upon his promotion to commander of the new IXe Armée, his post at XXe CA
commander was taken over by Balfourier. However, since Balfourier and Foch shared the
same corps level HQ unit, they both have the same quality.53
This is a necessary evil
given that it is impossible to predict the location of specific corps at the time in which the
HQ unit should get replaced.
In all cases, everything is correct by the time of the second phase race to the sea
period, which is the “late” order of battle. In some cases several changes in command do
53
Balfourier carries Foch’s B quality.
70
not occur at their historical time if it occurred near the transition period between the early
and late order of battle. As already mentioned, every change in command may not be
represented; only the most important cases that have the most impact on play actually
occur.
Engineer units, minefields, obstacle and rubble clearing
During the early part of World War I, neither participant utilized mines or
constructed minefields to a large degree. To a large extent mines were something that
was known about, as Imperial Germany created the first modern fused land mine in 1912,
however they were not widely used at this point on the battlefield. It was not until around
1917 that minefields began to see widespread use, particularly during the battle of
Passchendale of that year. From this point onward it is still not accurate to allow engineer
units of this period to lay minefields or obstacles within the scope of a scenario; they
were instead something that was only put into place over a long period of fortifying. The
same is true of clearing obstacles and mines. Obstacles tended to be extremely thorough
forms of barbed wire, which were arrayed in hellish and elaborate concentric belts.
During the duration of a scenario, it was only possible to cut through them for a passage
lane. These wire constructions were so elaborate that it would be impossible to
completely clear the area within the scope of a several hour turn.54
Also, accurate and
thorough mine clearing, also known as demining techniques, were not adopted until
World War II, particularly with the invention of the electronic mine detector in 1941.
With the exception of some units, "mine clearing" during The Great War was almost
54
The obstacle counters in the First World War Campaigns series represents the most elaborate wire
obstacle contructions of the period, and not the often erected single strand obstacle. Unlike the Panzer
Campaigns or Modern Campaigns series where obstacles usually represent a hasty abatis or several strands
of rolled wire, the most elaborate wire obstacles of the Great War were elaborate and complicated
constructions that could not be easily cleared and removed.
71
strictly limited to engineers clearing and maintaining passage lanes. In game play terms,
this means that engineer units in France '14 do not have the capability to lay mines nor
clear obstacles or minefields. It is decided that these traits are largely absent from
engineer units until the battles covered in the Panzer Campaigns series.
Engineer type units are also the only units that can destroy rail lines and ferries,
which is different from both Panzer Campaigns and Modern Campaigns. This was done
because the line units of the period did not yet carry the demolition equipment required to
conduct these tasks. It was also a desired change so that every unit in the order of battle
was not capable of destroying these features, which would result in an a-historical wide
spread destruction of rail lines, and it also places greater value on engineer units.
There are documented cases where some engineer units in The Great War
constructed boats or rafts and ferries friendly troops across the river. However, it is
undesirable for engineer units to be as flexible as they are in the Panzer Campaigns,
where engineers in that series can ferry infantry across rivers. The ferry ability for
infantry in First World War Campaigns was removed because it was felt that, in the cases
where infantry were ferried across the river, this is adequately represented by having a
bridging engineer unit construct a bridge, and these rafts and boats were usually
constructed by the engineers that had bridging capability. In most of the documented
cases of engineers constructing rafts or boats, it took these engineer units a lengthy
amount of time to construct such devices which would be represented by many turns.
However, if engineers retained the Panzer Campaigns ability to ferry troops then they
would become too effective since they would be able to move to and send infantry and
cavalry across a river in the span two turns at most. The rapid engineer troop ferrying
72
capability is more of a characteristic of blitzkriegesque modern warfare, not a
characteristic of warfare of the early 1900s.
Engineers of this period also do not have the rubble clearing capability that they
have in Panzer Campaigns and Modern Campaigns. The rationale is that these units
during this period did not have the heavy equipment that "modern" engineer units had
and were therefore unable to clear rubble during the course of a single scenario or
campaign. This is especially true given the massive mounds of rubble that were formed
from entire towns being flattened in the artillery barrages of war.
It was decided early on that only engineer units that were company sized or larger
should be included in the order of battle. This means that the detachment and platoon
sized engineer units of the German and French cavalry divisions,55
are intentionally
omitted from the order of battle. This was done primarily to cut down on counter density
and the amount of units that the user must manage in relation to their actual usefulness.
These small units would, historically, provide menial tasks to the division such as
providing at least some sort of minimal fortifying asset. On the other hand, division level
bridging detachments are included in the order of battle, but given that they were so
small, they are not represented by an explicit unit. Instead, these divisional bridging
detachments, if present, are represented by giving the division level engineer unit the
bridging capability, resulting in a hybrid bridging / pioneer type unit.56
These units are
capable of deploying a bridge, but the corps level bridging train units are better at this
task since they can construct it quicker (the division level bridging units are small units).
This approach works well since it makes the actual bridge / pontoon bridging units better
55
German and French engineer platoons (in the cavalry divisions) consisted of 90 and 36 men respectively. 56
Historically the bridging detachments were indeed attached to the division level engineer units and did
not operate on their own.
73
at constructing bridges, while still maintaining a minimal bridging capability at bridging
level. It must be noted that the Germans had exceptional bridging capability with every
division formation containing its own bridging detachment. One the other hand, the
French had very little bridging capability, relying almost entirely on the corps level
bridging assets.57
Stacking limits
In France '14 it may be noticed that there are extremely high stacking limits. A
balance is struck between maximum physical space and maximum practical space. Also,
the area stacking and road stacking limits are intentionally not a straight 3:1 ratio in
relation to each other.
Area stacking: Assuming that, for the sake of simplicity, a soldier with ruck sack
takes up approximately a 1 square meter area. Within a 1,000 square meter, there could
physically exist about ~10,000 soldiers. This would obviously be quite outrageous. In
1914 unit formations, the appearance tended to resembled that of a Napoleonic unit so a
large amount of men must be allowed to stack in one hex: much more than previous
games allowed. Tactically, and with some exceptions, soldiers certainly did not march
arm in arm in dense formations of infantry as their Napoleonic ancestors did, quite the
contrary, they operated loose skirmisher formations. However, small unit tactics that
characterize modern infantry tactics did not yet exist, and tactical command and control
was still as crude as it was during the Napoleonic Wars. For this reason, despite the fact
that individual infantry had about two meter intervals between them, in skirmish
57
Prior to the outbreak of the war, France had planned to create division level bridging detachments but
this organization not formed in time. This meant that the only real division level bridging detachments were
that of the few independent regular divisions. General Staff, War Office. Hand Book of the French Army
1914., 294-295.
74
formations infantry still had to remain relatively close together, in long ranks with
subsequent ranks following one after the other, rather than small groupings of squads
which characterize modern warfare and the “assault” infantry of late World War One.
With this in mind, it was decided that the stacking limit should be less than one half of
this "physically possible" approach, with the maximum area stacking at ~4,200 men per
hex. This still might seem like a lot of men, and certainly is, but this is the extreme case
and you will likely pay for high stacking with horrendous losses due to stack density.
Road stacking: Road stacking is a rather unique situation in this series. The
battlefields of World War I did not have the same level of threats to rear areas like that of
World War II or modern times, so units tended to move in what could be called "parade
ground" columns. Around the period of World War II, infantry began to move in tactical
columns along the sides of the road with substantial intervals to avoid air interdiction.
However, in early World War I this threat did not exist and units would move along the
road in massed, dense columns. Where it might be completely outrageous to take the
maximum physically possible approach to area stacking, it is not so outrageous when it
comes to road stacking since these units tried to keep the column as short as possible. In
the above example of a soldier taking up a one meter square area, this means that you
could fit approximately 1,000 men in a file across a 1,000 meter long road. Units tended
to march in three to four files so this would mean that you could fit 3,000-4,000 men
along a 1,000 meter stretch of road. For the sake of generosity and the fact that
companies often marched with a slight interval between them, this has been lowered to a
road stacking limit of ~2,600 men.
75
In both cases, care should be taken so as not to provide too dense of a target to the
enemy. Only stack more than one infantry battalion in a hex if there is a low threat level
to that hex, or only if it is absolutely necessary to do so.58
In most cases it is advisable to
have one infantry battalion deployed adjacent to the enemy to disrupt them and two
behind it in order to execute an assault if need be.
Night operations
Wireless radios of the Great War were known as "wireless telegraphs" or
"radiotelegraphs", and were large, primitive, fixed stations where the transmission tower
either had to be constructed or already in place.59
Wireless telegraphs provided brief text
based communication and were usually employed at army, corps, division and brigade
headquarters. Text messaging on a modern cell phone could be considered a form of
radiotelegraphy so, needless to say, even though the radiotelegraph was a technological
advancement for the day, strategic level orders were slow to transmit, receive, and
disseminate.
During the Great War, units lacked tactical man portable wireless radios,
henceforth referred to as “modern wireless radios”. This lack of modern wireless radios
meant that company and platoon level units could not effectively communicate “on
demand” with their sister companies or battalion HQ. This meant that tactical level
command and control was extremely difficult at best and completely non existent at
58
It may be beneficial to stack several infantry battalions or cavalry regiments in a single hex when
conducting an assault, but overstacking will cause high losses to opportunity fire or on the enemy’s next
turn. 59
Wireless telegraphs of the period were utlitized at the strategic level of almost every army in Europe at
the time. The Russian army of 1914 extensively used wireless telegraphs during the 1914 campaign in East
Prussia. The Germans intercepted these strategic transmissions which, to the German’s delight, were
broadcasted in the clear, and were able to anticipate Russian movements and determine unit locations.
76
worst.60
Anyone with military experience knows that tactical level command and control
is absolutely necessary during night operations, and even with the aid of modern light
amplification equipment, night operations can be a difficult and clumsy affair. In a period
where effective command and control at the tactical level was nonexistent, “efficient”
night movement and night combat operations was practically impossible. Night
operations had not yet matured, and effective night movement was limited to following
roads and rail lines in column formation.61
This translates into game play that, unless you
are moving strategically in Rail Mode or in Travel Mode along roads, your units will
become disrupted any time they move during a night turn.62
Several realistic situations and tendencies occur because of this rule. The first is to
make it more obvious that, unless you absolutely need to move your units, you should be
resting them during night turns. Doing so is not only a good decision to prevent
disruptions from tactical movement, but it also keeps units from gaining more fatigue
during night turns. If you do need to move your units then you should only be moving
them strategically to break contact, put more distance between you and a pursuer, or to
move units up to the front line from rear areas. You can also choose to drive the advance
forward along roads, but doing so is quite a risky proposition. The second tendency that
occurs is that, during night operations, it is often wise to cover road junctions to protect
against a forced night advance by the enemy. If you are conducting a rearward night
march, then it can be more effective to temporarily leave some units along major roads to
60
It was not until World War II that modern wireless radios were introduced, thereby rectifying the tactical
level command and control difficulties. 61
During darkness, it is much easier to follow in a file, one behind the other, in a column formation, along
a known road, that it would be to move tactically or in a column across open terrain. 62
In other words, if you are not utilizing the road movement rate of the unit then the unit will disrupt when
it moves during night turns. See the User Manual for more information about movement and night
operations.
77
act as a rear guard to stop any night pursuits. Cavalry work particularly well in this regard
role, and you can recall any units used as rear guards on the morning turn.
Siege Gun Units
Some artillery of the period, such as the massive German 42cm howitzer "Big
Bertha" and the Austro-Hungarian 30.5cm howitzer “Schlanke Emma”, was designed
with the sole intent of penetrating and destroying fortresses. These units are designated as
Siege Guns in the order of battle and are primarily effective against fortresses, redoubts,
and pillboxes. The more capable the fort or redoubt is, the more resistant it is against the
siege artillery. The smallest pillboxes, such as citadels and obsolete forts, were veritable
graves to these guns.
In the First World War Campaigns series, there are a number of other heavy
artillery units that are not considered Siege Guns in the same sense as the heaviest ones
were, but these non Siege Gun units were still intended to be used against smaller forts
and bunkers, such as the German 21cm howitzer and the German 28cm mortar. In game
play terms, obviously neither of these non Siege Gun units are as effective at reducing
78
fortresses as the “true” Siege Guns are, but these non Siege Guns are more effective at
targeting bunkers and enemy units located in non fortified areas.63
Rail capacity
Getting the rail capacity level correct was a tricky issue.64
Both sides largely
transported their supplies and heavy artillery by rail when the situation permitted, but
neither side had the capability to transport massive amounts of troops on a whim: it
required careful planning of rolling stock movements and time tables. With that in mind,
the rail capacity level was determined by first determining the largest sized corps unit on
both sides; this was then determined to be the optimal rail capacity amount. The optimal
rail capacity level was then reduced by three quarters to provide the final, less than
optimal level. This approach was taken for several reasons.
Firstly, the rolling stock of both sides were gainfully employed transporting
various units, supplies, and replacements between different sectors and were not available
to draw upon at will. It was not as if hundreds of locomotives and train cars were just
standing by to be summoned to a certain area on a moments notice. French corps from
the Alsace region did arrive in the early campaign by rail, as well as various German
units, and these transports are considered to be of the carefully planned and coordinated
variety, where the rolling stock was gathered for the effort and then dispersed to continue
its other tasks. If a full corps or division were allowed to be rail headed on demand, then
it would create an a-historical rail transport capability since arriving reinforcement corps
and supplies would exceed the practical capacity; this would allow far too much mobility.
63
Siege Gun units are not effective against bunkers or lesser fortified hexes, they do not receive their Siege
Gun benefit in these cases. See the User Manual for more information about Siege Gun units. 64
“Rail capacity” refers to the amount of units that both sides can transport, on demand, with rail
movement.
79
In other words, a corps or two could arrive by scheduled reinforcement on rail, before
which the user embarked a corps of choice by rail, thus ending up with far too much rail
heading capacity than was historically available.
The second reason for the reduction is to prevent rapid “on demand” rail transit. If
a corps must be broken in small pieces to rail head to an area then it would encourage
short movements and quick debarkations in order to move the other half of the corps,
essentially discouraging wholesale troop readjustments, thus minimizing “gamey” levels
of mobility.
Thirdly, as more supply units and reinforcements arrive by rail, and as the
Germans move their siege artillery by rail, the capacity will be intentionally exhausted
and it will prevent any further rail movement until existing units are debarked.65
This
means that when a reinforcement does arrive by rail it should encourage the user to
quickly move and unload the troops where needed, rather than leaving them on the rail as
a rapid deployment force of sorts. The user should also make sure that they unload the
reinforcements exactly where they are needed because chances are they will not have the
rail capacity to embark the entire force again, since the trains are considered to be
sticking to their planned schedules and have moved on to other tasks. If a reinforcement
corps is unloaded in a location that is deemed incorrect, then the user will have to march
from there, or transport the corps piece meal by rail to a new area. From a game design
point of view, it is better to have less rail capacity than is fully needed in order to create a
dilemma for the user, rather than having an abundance of rail heading capacity which
does not encourage careful management and planning.
65
Supply units are only available when the Explicit Supply rule is selected in the Optional Rules Dialog at
the start of a new scenario. See the User Manual for more information about Explicit Supply.
80
It is worth noting that the “late” campaign, the period known as the “Race to the
Sea” and beyond, rail capacity is at minimal levels. This is done because the rolling stock
of both sides was exceptionally busy during this period, transferring many corps around
France and Belgium and this left little “on demand” rail head capability to either side.
Artillery setup parameter
In First World War Campaigns, especially in the early years of the war, the
artillery setup parameter is set to an intentionally low parameter.66
This was done because
setting up guns for indirect fire, getting the ammo in place and establishing
communication with their HQ could become an extremely time consuming process in a
period before portable radios. The position of the guns had to be determined by terrain
association and map reading, and this position had to be relayed to the HQ and, in many
cases, wire had to be run between the artillery unit and the HQ for the use of field phones
if the situation permitted. If field phones were not used, such as in the case of a period of
high mobility, then someone had to physically travel from the higher HQ’s position to the
artillery unit’s position (or vice versa) in order to establish a communication link, and
thus had to travel between the two to relay messages. It was not the most effective system
to say the least, and the only way to model this is to have varying degrees of probability
for setting up indirect fire artillery. It may take only several turns to setup an artillery unit
or it may take many turns, so you should the location that you want your artillery to setup
very carefully.
Multiplayer
66
See the User Manual for more information about the artillery setup rule.
81
As with every other game in existence, France '14 is definitely more enjoyable
when played against a human opponent. In World War I, and especially during the early
period of 1914, army commanders seldom cooperated with each other in the optimal
sense, and often had conflicts of interest, rivalries, or competing ambitions (think of von
Kluck’s and von Bülow’s relationship during the German invasion of France in early
1914, or Rennenkampf’s and Samsonov’s relationship in the Russian invasion of East
Prussia in 1914). This facet more than once influenced how the two sides advanced and,
at various points of the campaign, directly influenced the front line situation. With
enough users available, France '14 becomes more historical when there are multiple
players per side, particularly for the allies. While this can be accomplished either through
PBEM or through TCP/IP, I will concentrate on PBEM here because this method is
usually the most practical.67
The most enjoyable situation is a balance of having the most players involved,
without detracting from the length of the turn from the time it takes to email it to the
participants in the chain. This problem does not exist in TCP/IP games since the general
rule is that the more players involved, the faster the turn will be. In PBEM team games,
having one player per available army produces the most exciting results, provided that the
turns could be passed along the chain of players quickly enough. At the very least, France
'14 is most enjoyable with four human players assigned to the following positions: the
BEF commander, the Belgian Army commander, the French Army commander and the
German Army commander. If only three players are available then the BEF and Belgian
Army should be combined under the same player. The BEF and French should never fall
67
PBEM team based play is accomplished by forming a chain of players that mail the turn to each other,
with the last player on that side ending the turn and emailing it to the other side where the process is then
repeated.
82
under the same player if possible. Any inclusion of further players should be used to
divide up the German armies.
During the early half of the campaign, before the Race to the Sea period,
emphasis should be placed on isolating the German 1, 4, and 6.Armee into one player,
with the other player having the 2, 3, and 5.Armee as well as overall command. Division
of German forces should primarily stress separation of the 1.Armee and 2.Armee into
separate users, since the historical coordination between these two armies was lacking,
with the overall command not falling under the player that has control of the 1.Armee.
Three German players should see the forces divided up further, into one player having the
1.Armee, the second player having the 2 and 3.Armee, and the third player having the 4,
5, and 6.Armee and so on. The result of this is to better simulate the often general lack of
cohesion and stress the amount of communication that was required to coordinate actions,
which often resulted in failure.
While splitting the campaigns into multiple players creates the most excitement,
smaller scenarios are also very enjoyable with multiple users per side as well.
As mentioned, TCP/IP team play of France '14 is particularly entertaining with
the same force divisions already described and are usually faster with the more people
that participate, thus making it practical to have one user per army or an even greater
division of forces if enough users are available.
Listening Music
I found that my gaming experience was greatly enhanced when I listened to
Napoleonic period music using Windows Media Player, with the Media Player's volume
at 20% so I could still clearly hear the game. The early period of the Great War was both
83
struggling to find its own identity as well as seemingly mimicking the tactics, élan, and
appearance that characterized the Napoleonic period or, at the very least, the Franco-
Prussian War period. As a result, I think that this type of music fits the early years of The
Great War quite well. Some affordable and excellent CDs you might want to consider
picking up and adding to your media player play list are:
Bagpipe Marches and Music of Scotland, Legacy International.
French Military Marches, Legacy International.
Famous German and Austrian Marches, Premium Music Collection.
German Military Marches, Legacy International.
Highland Pipes and Drums, Legacy International.
Regimental Marches of the British Army Vol. 1, Chandos Collect.
Regimental Marches of the British Army Vol. 2, Chandos Collect.
Tchaikovsky: 1812 Overture - Marche Slave, Deutsche Grammophon.
Obviously, these CDs also provide great listening music for HPS' Napoleonic Campaigns
series.
84
Conclusion
I hope you enjoy playing this game as much as I have enjoyed creating it. I can
only hope that the years of toil spent will help inspire further reading and study, and
revitalize interest in the history of The Great War. This work is my feeble attempt to
contribute to the memory of The Great War, and to honor the millions that gave their
lives during this conflict. Perhaps it is not until you play First World War Campaigns that
you realize the full awe inspiring scope of the conflict, and the tragic loss of humanity.
The four years spent creating this work is dedicated to all brave soldiers of the
world both past and present, who have fought and died in battle. Most of all, I want to
dedicate this to a personal friend, SSG Christopher L. Everett. May his memory, and
others like him, never be forgotten.
Courage Conquers!
31 March 2010
Edward L. Williams
* * *
85
Scenario Notes
Getting Started: The Guns of August
This scenario is meant to demonstrate the awesome firepower of the German siege guns
against forts.
Many Belgian fortress garrisons surrendered from the siege gun bombardment. Instead of
having Belgian units automatically withdrawn from the map, the surrendering procedure
works perfectly when you disrupt *all* of the defenders of the fort with the siege guns,
then surround and follow up with infantry assaults. When executed correctly, this
procedure will yield large quantities of captured Belgian garrison troops.
Historically, the key forts that were blocking the roads into and out of Liège were
“cleared” first so that the 1.Armee could advance unhindered. The last of the Liège forts
would not fall until August 16th.
As war broke out on the western front, Germany raced to mobilize its forces to execute
the Schlieffen Plan as soon as possible. During this "mobilization" period, it was
recognized that the Belgian Fortress city of Liège needed to be taken in order to clear the
route for the 1.Armee. A mixed force was comprised of various infantry brigades that
were located along the frontier. These infantry brigades were from five separate divisions
and were allotted cavalry, artillery and pioneers to comprise a combined arms force.
When the German attack commenced, the Belgian 3e Division recognized the futility of
the situation and made a run for the northwest, braving the swarming German cavalry
patrolling the area. It was a risky strategy to be sure, but the Belgians succeeded in
escaping the closing net. On the night of the 5th, the German infantry were in position to
begin their assault. The infantry attacks were initially unsuccessful except for
Infanterie.Bde.14 led by General Ludendorff. Ludendorff had taken command of the
86
brigade as the attack had faltered and led them through the defenses. By the next day
Ludendorff's brigade had captured Liège itself.
87
1914_0804_01s: The Assault on Liège
This scenario covers the initial attack on Liège up to the point where the city itself was
captured and the Belgian 3e Division escaped to the northwest. At this point it became a
stalemate until the siege artillery arrived on August 12th.
Since the Germans attacked Liège while the rest of the troops mobilized, the infantry
brigades involved in the attack were all at peace time levels, at approximately 75%
strength.
On August 5th, Infanterie.Bde.14 will lose its HQ unit temporarily. Later in the day
another HQ will arrive from Verviers which represents Erich Ludendorff. Ludendorff
was a staff officer to von Emmich's Maas.Armee at the time and he seized command of
the Infanterie.Bde.14 at the point in which the attack began to falter. Ludendorff
personally led the brigade through the defenses around Fort de Fléron and captured the
city of Liège. This action was to be the preliminary catalyst of his rise to power.
As the Maas.Armee approached Liège, General Leman, the Belgian commander at Liège,
recognized the fact that expending the 3e Division in the defense of Liège would be a
terrible error. On the morning of the 6th
, Leman ordered the division to breakout and
make a run for the west, braving the swarming German cavalry patrolling the area and
link up with the Belgian Division de Cavalerie at Hallogne. The Belgians can indeed
choose not to extricate the 3e Division, but this would pass up a large amount of VPs
from the exit hexes to the west. The Belgian player is encouraged to exit this division as
was historically the case, however, defending the fortress or a combination there of might
also yield success. The worst case scenario would be the Belgians not being able to
extricate themselves, and losing Liège as well.
Are the German cavalry divisions preventing the escape of the Belgian 3e Division? Try
moving the division northwest to Ft Latin and deploying it. Once the division is deployed
properly, no cavalry division will be able to stand in its way, but you most likely will
88
have to fight for the exit. If the German cavalry divisions attempt to block you then, with
superior countering, you can inflict enough high VP point casualties to drive them off.
89
1914_0812_01s: The Battle of the Silver Helmets
Uhlan.Regt.9 is withdrawn from the scenario on the second turn to represent its recon and
screening action to the northwest to hinder any possible Belgian attempt to flank the
HKK.2 from that direction.
90
1914_0815_01s: A Crossing at Dinant
Keep in mind that the German are extremely limited in their river crossing options here.
All German units, other than the bicycle jäger units, must cross at the heavy bridge at
Dinant (the light bridges do not support horse or motorized units). The bicycle jäger
companies, which begin the scenario combined into a battalion, should be reserved as a
force to assault across the light bridges near either Yvior or Houx. They can also be sent
south to Anseremme, or split into companies if needed. Utilize the other units available to
soften up the crossing for this unit, and attempt to take the main crossing at Dinant by
force.
A young French Lieutenant named Charles de Gaulle, of the 33e RI, was wounded in the
clash at Dinant.
The commander of the German HKK.2 was the father of Manfred von Richtofen (aka. the
Red Baron).
91
1914_0818_01s: Driving the Wedge
Historically, the Belgians withdrew to the River Dyle in the afternoon and early evening
of the 18th, shortly after Haelen and Diest was taken by storm and their flank was
exposed, with the 1er Division d’Armée being the primary force engaged. HRH Leopold
II recognized that the Germans were trying to drive a wedge between his army and
Antwerp and, shortly after the line along the Dyle was established, ordered a withdrawal.
On the 19th of August his army conducted a skillful withdrawal to Antwerp, arriving
there by the 20th and thus avoiding the trap.
This scenario ends at the point where the Belgians began falling back to Antwerp.
The main objective for the Belgians is to keep as many German units from exiting the
map to the west, and, where possible, hold the objectives to prevent a total rout of the
Belgian Army.
The Germans can choose to drive off the Belgian's left flank around Haelen by taking the
objectives concentrated in that area; it is assumed that a successful wedge is driven
between the Belgians and Antwerp if the Germans can take all of those objectives. The
Germans can also choose to bypass the Belgian line and gain points by exiting units on
the western map which is the route to Bruxelles. By doing this it should balance out any
failure on the Germans to drive the Belgians away from Antwerp, but it will probably not
gain them a major victory.
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1914_0820_01s: Von Moltke's Indecisiveness
From turn the third turn on, two German and two French Corps will arrive along the
length of the east edge of the map. Pay close attention to the protected hexes under the
View > Shade menus. The French units will arrive first and then the pursuing German
units will arrive the turn following. These arriving units represent the eastern tip of the
French salient that was pushed back from about the vicinity of Diueze (10-20km off the
east edge of the map).
Even though the French were badly beaten in the frontier battles of Lorraine, the German
counter offensive would force the French armies to retract to the west and it would be a
big factor in Joffre's abandonment of Plan XVII. Rupprecht's counter offensive would
place the French on the defense south of Metz. This shift in French posture allowed Joffre
to transfer units west, thus creating another German strategic failure.
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1914_0822_01s: Home Before the Leaves Fall
This campaign begins on the August 19th at a
point where both sides were committed to their
specific plans. Choosing any point earlier would
results in an outcome that would never be close
to the historical one (as the French player would
certainly not commit to Plan XVII). Therefore,
this scenario begins just after the long period of
German marching on the wing and right at the
moment that the French began to abandon Plan
XVII. The battles in the period prior to this
moment are all represented in separate scenarios
(mentioned on previous pages).
This campaign ends when the Germans
historically went on the defensive following
their defeat at the Marne, covering the first day
of what was historically the German withdrawal
to the Aisne on the 10th of September (the
campaign ends on the evening the 10th). This
essentially grants the campaign one additional day beyond the Battle of the Marne where
the Allies can push the Germans back, or the Germans can make up lost time, rather than
just cutting it off at the moment in which the Germans began to fall back. Another reason
why this campaign ends on September 10th is because a combination of things occurred
to help draw this phase of the 1914 campaign to an end. Besides the successful Allied
counter offensive at the Marne, the weather began to deteriorate heavily on the 11th and
both sides saw a large drop in supply as they exhausted the stockpiles that they had
gathered for the short war, a war that was predicted to last only until the end of August.
So, rather than have the "main event" (early phase) go out with a whimper with supply
dropping, storms, and deteriorating ground conditions, it seeks to go out with a high
intensity finale.
Historically, after the Battle of the Marne was decided on the 9th, the 10th-12th of
September was the period in which the Germans retreated to the Aisne. The Battle of the
Aisne historically began immediately following this point on the 13th, and it is covered in
a separate scenario (#1914_0913_01s_Aisne). The Battle of the Aisne marked the
“intermission” between the early campaign and the second phase of the war known as
"the race to the sea". The race to the sea is beyond the scope of this campaign and there is
a separate campaign covering this period as well (#1914_0917_01s_Campaign_Race).
Once the race to the sea began, it was essentially a new phase in the conflict as both
sides, having exhausted themselves, adopted a completely new strategy of turning the
other's flank as the rest of the front solidified.
94
Historically this campaign can be said to have ended in a draw with neither side
victorious over the other; a victory to such a degree that would have forced an end to the
conflict did not occur.
As the default Optional Rules suggest, this scenario (and all others) should be
played with the Virtual Supply Trucks (VST) optional rule turned on. This rule
creates a realistic situation where supply levels vary depending the location of the
area in relation to friendly supply sources, where distance and the road and rail
network play a factor. While this is not much of an issue in smaller scenarios with
smaller maps, if this VST optional rule is turned off in this large campaign, then
both sides will get their full supply no matter what the location of their units, which
will cause unintended results. The outcome will be at a much higher intensity
instead of the supply lines being realistically stretched with the advance.
The BEF begins fixed in the positions they historically were in at the battle of the Mons
which occurred the next day. For the most part this is correct for the starting deployment
but in the case of a few components, such as the 19th Infantry Bde who was just arriving
to Valenciennes by train, the 22nd was spent arriving into those locations and creating
hasty fortifications.
In order to ensure that the German attack and advance through Belgium proceeded
according to the Schlieffen Plan, von Bülow (2.Armee) was given control over 1.Armee
and 3.Armee on August 9th, an arrangement that had to be abandoned eight days later
following disagreements between von Bülow, who was cautious by nature, and the
aggressive commander of 1.Armee, von Kluck. However, even though the arrangement
was abandoned, the HKK.2 (on the German extreme flank) would remain reassigned to
2.Armee. This resulted in poor cooperation with the cavalry and 1.Armee. The HKK.2
was reassigned to the 1.Armee shortly after the Battle of Mons.
The German GHQ, General von Moltke, begins the campaign off the map and arrives
later on the August 30th. This is due to the fact that prior to August 17th
, von Moltke’s
HQ was in Berlin, and from the 17th to the 30th he relocated to Coblenz. Coblenz, the
closer of the two points, is roughly 60km east of the map edge – a huge distance to say
the least. Thus, during the crucial period of the campaign, von Moltke was over 200km
from the critical areas where the fate of the campaign hung in the balance. This certainly
contributed to the outcome of the campaign as it historically caused problems in the
German chain of command. In the early stages of the campaign, all German armies are
intentionally detached from OHL since OHL was well out of range. On October 30th
,
OHL arrives in the city of Luxembourg (at the little red school house) where it remains as
a static unit for the remainder of the campaign.
The Royal Ordinance Survey created a map in 1920 that placed the German HKK.1 in the
vicinity of Binche on August 23rd. In 1924 the Royal Ordinance Survey revised this map
and placed the HKK.1 northwest of Namur, in reserve positions recovering from their
previous actions. Germans sources also place them in this reserve location, so this is
95
where they begin the scenario. This is only mentioned because of the confusion created
by early British maps.
The "non priority" areas of the front line in the southwest (around Nancy) have lower
level supply sources which represent the fact that both sides were concentrating their
main efforts in other places.
The Belgian field army HQ is fixed for the duration of this campaign within the fortified
area of Antwerp. The reason for this is to discourage the Belgians from going on an all
out offensive. By fixing the field army HQ, as well as the overall Belgian HQ, any a-
historical all out offensive will come with a disadvantage of risking the loss of valuable
objectives within Antwerp (if the region is vacated), objectives which historically all
remained under Belgian control for the duration of this campaign, and it ensures that
subordinate formations will be out of command if they stray too far from Antwerp. The
position of the fixed superior HQs should still allow (and encourage) periodic limited
attacks and demonstrations out of Antwerp.
See the notes on the #1914_0822_02s_Charleroi and #1914_0822_03s_Ardennes
scenarios (below) for information on the details concerning the Charleroi and Ardennes
sectors.
This campaign works well as a TCP/IP team based game of eight (Allied) versus seven
(German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [Overall commander (Joffre) & 9e
Armée (formed later) & GQG Réserve & Les défenses mobiles du nord-est & Réserve
Régional & Réserve Territoriale], #2 [Belgian Army], #3 [BEF], #4 [IIe Armée], #5 [IIIe
Armée], #6 [IVe Armée], #7 [Ve Armée], #8 [VIe Armée & Armée de Lorraine & Gouv.
militaire de Paris]. The most inexperienced player should be commander #3 [BEF], and
he should sit as far away from commander #7 [Ve Armée] as possible. The German
players should consist of #1 [Overall commander (von Moltke) & OHL Reserve], #2
[1.Armee], #3 [2.Armee], #4 [3.Armee], #5 [4.Armee], #6 [5.Armee], #7 [6.Armee]. The
two best German players should be commander #2 [1.Armee]and #3 [2.Armee], and both
of these player's should sit as far apart as possible. A PBEM team based game could
consist of three (Allied) versus two (German), with Allied players consisting of 1#
[Belgian Army], #2 [BEF], #3 [French Army (with additional players splitting up the
French forces)], and the German team should consist of #1 [1.Armee & 5.Armee &
6.Armee], #2 [2.Armee & 3.Armee & 4.Armee], with additional players splitting up the
forces from there but, for the sake of historical accuracy, 1.Armee and 2.Armee should
not be controlled by the same player in a team based game and overall command should
not fall under the player that controls 1.Armee.
Changes:
1.01) Congestion markers are used in northern Belgium (to the east and west of
Antwerp). These markers represent civilians fleeing the war to the Netherlands, and their
associated debris. This congestion affects both sides and cannot be removed and is
96
present on most of the major road intersections where at least four roads meet in one
place.
1.01) Better represented the fortified area of Metz and Diedenhofen (Thionville) with
additional research of material.
1.01) The French 18e CA was moved up to its historic location, a correction over its
previous representation which had them arriving as reinforcements in the south due to a
mistranslated French source. Its current location has the 36e DI in the process of
deploying in and east of Thurin (it arrived in that location in the evening of the 21st), and
the 35e DI was historically spread out from Beaumont to the southwest and did not see
any action on the 22nd because it was assembling. The 35e DI is fixed at start in
Beaumont to represent it forming, where it then has a varied release in the early afternoon
so that it can start moving up to the Sambre where it historically took up the position west
of the 36e DI by 1900 hours, minus one brigade (69e) which was sent to Nalinnes to
support the 3e CA.68
1.01) Placed the French 4e GDR in its proper location. It was moved up near the Sambre
before to cover an empty gap and prevent "gamey" behavior by way of triggered release
to allow this formation to move up and cover the canal. Since the 18e CA is in its correct
place, this is no longer necessary.
1.02) Corrected the missing release for two German FAR battalions.
1.02) Corrected the arrival date and location of the French 21e CA to be more historical.
1.03) Quartered the objective values and VP levels so as to make casualties play a more
realistic and historical role in the outcome of the campaign.
1.04) Further altered and streamlined VP objective locations so that there are much fewer
objective locations. This was done in order to further stress that the Allied Powers should
fall back (or be allowed to fall back) early in the campaign without suffering any ill effect
from that historical decision, because the vast majority of the terrain no longer has value.
Objectives are now placed in key areas such as in the Ardennes to encourage a historical
early French offensive (see below), vital fortified areas, and along the Marne where the
final battle of the early campaign was fought.
1.04) Added the early termination rule to the campaign scenario in order to encourage the
French side to at least try to maintain their historical offensive at the start of the campaign
just to see if they can possibly achieve a sudden and quick victory. This creates a
68
Hanotaux, Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914, 236-304. In this book, German and British
dispositions on the "Bataille de la Sambre" (272) map are, for the most part, completely incorrect (the
books were published in 1915, before any official reference sources from those two nations were available).
An example is that the BEF in that map is shown southwest of Maubeuge, which coincides with Lanrezac's
erroneous report to GHQ that the BEF was "in echelon behind his left" when in fact they were actually far
forward of his position along the Sambre on the 22nd. The German positions are a little more accurate.
Despite these errors, the books in this series are useful for French related information.
97
dilemma for the Allied Powers side on deciding when they should call off the attack, and
when to continue pressing the offensive.
1914_0822_02s: Lanrezac, the Defiant
The scenario begins just after the bloody French assault towards the Sambre was halted.
Historically the French surged forward to destroy the German bridge heads on the south
side of the river and they expected to drive the Germans back at the point of the bayonet.
The assault failed and the ensuing German counter attack nearly caused the rout of the
entire Ve Armée. It was only the timely arrival of the 18e Corps d'Armee that ultimately
prevented it.
On the evening of the 22nd, the 1er Corps d'Armee was given orders to move to and
strengthen the crumbling line to its northwest. Hours later this order was cancelled
ordering them back to their positions on the Meuse. Some historians say this was a huge
mistake on Lanrezac's part, and this allowed von Hausen's troops to cross the Meuse at
Dinant. However, at the time, the Prussian Guard was threatening to destroy Lanrezac's
centre and he was unsure if the 18e Corps d'Armee would arrive in time. When playing
against an AI allied opponent, the AI will issue these historically countermanding orders.
However, with a human player as the Allies, you can decide to leave the Ier Corps on the
Meuse, to commit it to the assistance of 10e Corps d'Armee, or even decide to send a
portion to assist the Belgians in Namur. Any approach you take though will no doubt
center on what to do with the 1er Corps d'Armee since, no matter how you look at it, the
situation will grow increasingly desperate with each passing turn.
Historically, Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie was falling back from Gambloux, in hot pursuit
by the Germans. Sordet's troopers rode almost completely around Belgium since the war
began, and because of this they were exhausted at the time of this battle. Sordet's troopers
were to move into an area south of Thurin to thwart any German breakthrough in that
area and to rest and reorganize briefly before high tailing it off again. Their rest would
last approximately two days before taking flight again on a twelve day exhausting ride
from Thurin to Paris that almost drove Sordet’s mounts and troopers into the ground
(Sordet was later sacked and replaced by General Bridoux on September 8th).
The 4e GDR is located in reserve and took no part in the heavy fighting (although it did
see some minor action on the 23rd). On the 23rd the 4e GDR moved north to the Sambre
(north of where it starts) and took up position to oppose the approaching German
formations, where the 4e GDR essentially acted as a deterrence to any major German
activity in that area. In this scenario, half of the 4e GDR (69e DR) is on map and fixed
near Solre-le-Château (the 53e DR was located off map at Avesnes to the southwest). The
53e DR does not come into play since it historically moved up to briefly take up the
position between Maubeuge and the 69e DR, which is mostly off the map to the west (the
units that would be on the map are represented with an impassible area on the south side
of the Sambre). The entire 4e GDR is withdrawn on the 24th, which is the day when the
98
formation disengaged and began moving south to Maubeuge. (No longer applicable since
1.02, see below)
The Belgian 4e Division d’Armée is withdrawn on the night of the 23rd, as it historically
withdrew south across France and embarked by ship for Antwerp. This division would
not make it to Antwerp until after the Battle of the Marne.
On the night of the 22nd, the German 13.Infanterie-Division becomes fixed in place. This
was done because historically it moved into the Binche area and remained there to cover
the flank of the 2.Armee against the BEF (see the Mons scenario which takes place on the
following day). This division then assisted in the attack against the BEF there on the
23rd. Two approaches were considered here. The first option was obvious, to simply have
the 13.Infanterie-Division withdraw on the night of the 22nd. The only problem is that
even though this division did not play any role in the fighting in this scenario after this
point, removing it from the map would leave a huge gap in the German right flank, which
could allow some "gamey" movement on the part of the French or, at the very least, it
would leave Binche open and require more German units to move there to secure it. This
of course would not make sense given that the 13.Infanterie-Division remained in the
area. It is rationalized that if the French try to do something bold on the 23rd to the
degree that they move along the map edge toward Binche, then the 13.Infanterie-Division
would get released again by line of sight and would use its full force to counter that
movement, rather than conducting their historic attack on the BEF right. (No longer
applicable since 1.02, see below)
Changes:
1.01) The French 18e CA was moved up to its historic location, a correction over its
previous representation which had them arriving as reinforcements in the south due to a
mistranslated French source. Its current location has the 36e DI in the process of
deploying in and east of Thurin (it arrived in that location in the evening of the 21st), and
the 35e DI was historically spread out from Beaumont to the southwest and did not see
any action on the 22nd because it was assembling. The 35e DI is fixed at start in
Beaumont to represent it forming, where it then has a varied release in the early afternoon
so that it can start moving up to the Sambre where it historically took up the position west
of the 36e DI by 1900 hours, minus one brigade (69e) which was sent to Nalinnes to
support the 3e CA.69
1.01) Placed the French 4e GDR in its proper location (partially off map). It was moved
up near the Sambre before to cover an empty gap and prevent "gamey" behavior by way
of triggered release to allow this formation to move up and cover the canal. Since the 18e
69
Hanotaux, Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914, 236-304. In this book, German and British
dispositions on the "Bataille de la Sambre" (272) map are, for the most part, completely incorrect (the
books were published in 1915, before any official reference sources from those two nations were available).
An example is that the BEF in that map is shown southwest of Maubeuge, which coincides with Lanrezac's
erroneous report to GHQ that the BEF was "in echelon behind his left" when in fact they were actually far
forward of his position along the Sambre on the 22nd. The German positions are a little more accurate.
Despite these errors, the books in this series are useful for French related information.
99
CA is in its correct place, this is no longer necessary. (No longer applicable since 1.02,
see below)
1.01) Subtracted 750 points from each VP level due to the fact that the west side of the
map is not longer "up in the air" because of the correction to the 18e CA's disposition.
Historically the French held this area and it is now rationalized that any loss of the
forward three 250 point objectives in this area along the Sambre is unfavorable towards
the possibility of a French victory.
1.02) A triggered 0% release has been added to the 13.Infanterie-Division. This is
scheduled for 0600 on the 23rd, and it exists to keep the Allies from doing something
gamey like attacking or pushing forward north of the Sambre in this area. The Allies are
advised to fall back to the Sambre and to attempt no funny business in this area or else
the 13.Infanterie-Division will be fully released from its blocking position as it is
understood that it would have reacted to the threat accordingly.
1.02) Updated the Allied global supply level and map edge supply levels for both sides to
be more consistent with the #1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario (Allied global
supply level was supposed to be 70% not 80%).
1.02) Corrected the missing release for two German FAR battalions.
1.02) Corrected an issue with the German 1.Garde-Division's deployment; changed this
division so that it starts out released so that it can move south and assist the 2.Garde-
Division in its attack towards Fossé on the first day (as was historically the case), or so
that it can be used in any other manner seen fit by the user. It was previously fixed for the
whole of the 22nd, which caused the Germans to be unable to make historical gains
towards Fossé on the first day. Historically the 14.Reserve-Division moved south to take
1.Garde-Division's place covering the west side of Namur.
100
1914_0822_03s: Offensive à Outrance!
The Battle of the Ardennes officially began on the 21st when Joffre first issued the order
to the IVe Armée to attack into the Ardennes. However, the entire day was spent
marching north. This scenario begins just as the Germans and French were making
contact on the morning of the second day.
The French advance has been likened to a "flight of steps" with each corps offset in a
descending “stair” pattern from west to east. The intent was that each corps would be able
to turn and face any threat from the east if needed, and for any two corps to theoretically
be able to come to the aid of the other. In reality, it was to become a fatal flaw in that if
one corps in the pattern of steps was routed, then the rest would come down like a house
of cards. Historically, three French corps (the Colonial Corps, XVIIe Corps and Ve
Corps) were to be dealt a crushing blow which would in turn cause gaping holes to
develop in the French line.
In almost every place, the deployment of the front line formations are about two or
three turns ahead of where they historically began on the morning of 22nd of
August. On average, the front line deployment is what it would have been on the
1200 turn. This was intentionally done so as to "force" both sides into the historical
situation they found themselves in after first contact was made. Because of hindsight and
game play considerations, if this approach was not taken then the fighting in the
Ardennes would in no way represent even a vaguely historical outcome; the French
would likely pull back immediately without suffering a single loss. The obvious
disadvantage of this approach is that it allows three more turns of fighting in the
Ardennes than was historically the case. However, this disadvantage is offset by the fact
that it forces at least three turns of "hindsight free" combat before the French can break
off and start acting more intelligently than was historically the case (since the French
player is fully aware of the German strength). In this case, an accelerated a-historical
setup is more important in order to create a historical flow of the battle.
Near Rossignol (35,37), the French 3e Division d'Infanterie Colonial (DIC) was in a bad
position. Specifically, the division was split as one of the brigades was ahead of the other
and advancing on Neufchateau. To make matters worse, the division's elite cavalry
regiment was behind the infantry advanced guard and was not used for reconnaissance.
This was mostly because the 3e DIC was convinced that its right flank was secured by the
4e Division d'Infanterie, which had falsely reported its location that morning.
Historically, the separated brigade was hit in the flank as it advanced and promptly fell
back towards Rossignol, but it was too late; the brigade was cut off from the remainder of
its division at the Semois River by the German Infanterie-Brigade.22. Prior to the battle,
General Lefevre, the Colonial Corps commander, was ordered to keep his 2e DIC in
reserve at Jamoigne, despite repeated pleas to IVe Armée HQ for its release. The blame
can certainly be equally placed on the army, corps, and division level commanders, but
the fact is that most of the 2e DIC sat in reserve the entire day while the 3e DIC was
systematically destroyed. By nightfall the 3e DIC, an elite fighting force, had ceased to
exist and an entire brigade was completely overrun in a climactic battle at Rossignol. It
101
was a tragedy of the highest order, one in which over 11,000 veteran colonial French
soldiers would be lost. The event of the day would cause the name "Rossignol" to evoke
French memories similar to American memories of the Alamo, or the Little Big Horn, but
on a much grander scale.
For lack of a better term, think of this scenario as a Pearl Harbor type situation for the
French. The French were basically surprised with the meeting engagement and the
German commander's main intent should be to capitalize on this as much as possible in
the first few turns. The Germans must cause maximum havoc and damage before the
French can recover, reorganize, fall back or press forward. There are great expectations
placed on the Germans in this scenario to eliminate a large quantity of French forces as
was historically the case, as well as the expectation that they will both take and hold the
same objectives that they historically held and captured (the historical result is assumed
to be a German victory). The French commander must not have a weak stomach: he will
take heavy losses as was historically the case but if the French can save some of the units
that were historically destroyed, as well as capture some German objectives and prevent
the Germans from taking several French ones, then you will stand a good chance of
winning.
This was to be Erwin Rommel’s first battle. At the time of this battle, the twenty-two year
old lieutenant commanded the 1st infantry platoon in the 7.kompagnie, II.Battalion,
Infanterie-Regiment.124. He and his unit fought in a famous action in and around the
town of Bleid.
This was also to be Freiherr Manfred von Richthofen's first battle (the future Red Baron).
Von Richthofen was a young lieutenant in Ulanen-Regt.1 which was part of the
9.Infanterie-Division. On 21 August, von Richthofen was part of a 15 man cavalry patrol
which was sent out to locate the French. Upon seeing a French patrol of Dragoons, von
Richthofen's patrol charged and came across French infantry. Von Richthofen and four
other men were the only ones able to escape on horseback, the others returned later on
foot or were killed. It was an obscure and nearly fatal beginning for the man that would
become the greatest ace and one of the most well known people of the Great War!
102
1914_0823_01s: The Contemptibles Make Their Stand
This scenario covers the entire clash at Mons, including the second day when von Kluck
attempted to turn the British left flank and push the BEF towards Maubeuge.
The entire British I Corps will be withdrawn on the morning of the 24th to simulate their
withdrawal to the southwest (see the map label and impassible area east of Maubeuge
which shows their fallback position). It is recommended that the Germans should
advance quickly in that area as soon as it happens in order to compromise the British
position along the Canal du Centre, which is represented by the capturing of the
rearward objectives. This withdrawal is done because the I Corps historically started
withdrawing south before the II Corps received orders to do so, which left the latter
exposed on the right flank. The scenario design rationale here is that if the I Corps in not
withdrawn from the scenario, then the British player has no reason to do so themselves
since historical issues do not have to be taken into consideration (such as the French
withdrawing on the BEF’s right at Charleroi, and the German cavalry moving around the
BEF’s left flank). With the I Corps' forced withdrawal, then the II Corps must begin
falling back to avoid being flanked, and other units may have to be sent to cover its flank.
Historically, part of the British 4/Royal Fusiliers was deployed in the town of Nimy, but
this was actually only a small portion of the regiment. The other 4/5ths of the regiment
was deployed facing west on a north-south line from Nimy to Mons along the Canal du
Centre. Since the majority of the regiment was not located in Nimy, and since the
regiment cannot break down into companies, it would make perfect sense to deploy the
regiment in the average position of all of its companies (which would be one hex south of
Nimy). However, this would be impractical in regards to the historical context that the
regiment fiercely opposed the bridge crossing in the town of Nimy, and would allow the
Germans to walk across the canal relatively effortlessly. Therefore, to make the scenario
more historical, the 4/ Royal Fusiliers must be placed entirely in Nimy in order to hold
the bridges in a historical manner.
103
1914_0823_02s: First Clash at Mons
This scenario covers the first clash between the BEF and the Germans between Jemappes,
Nimy, Obourg and la Bois Haute.
Historically, part of the British 4/Royal Fusiliers was deployed in the town of Nimy, but
this was actually only a small portion of the regiment. The other 4/5ths of the regiment
was deployed facing west on a north-south line from Nimy to Mons along the Canal du
Centre. Since the majority of the regiment was not located in Nimy, and since the
regiment cannot break down into companies, it would make perfect sense to deploy the
regiment in the average position of all of its companies (which would be one hex south of
Nimy). However, this would be impractical in regards to the historical context that the
regiment fiercely opposed the bridge crossing in the town of Nimy, and would allow the
Germans to walk across the canal relatively effortlessly. Therefore, to make the scenario
more historical, the 4/ Royal Fusiliers must be placed entirely in Nimy in order to hold
the bridges in a historical manner.
104
1914_0824_01s: Flank Guard at Elouges
The battle begins just after the failed cavalry charge on the Sugar Factory (which would
have been around hex 8,7) by the British 9th Lancers and 4th Dragoon Guards. Following
that, the British cavalry retired east to Elouges where they were subjected to more
German fire.
The Cheshire would fight stubbornly and almost hold to the last man. The Cheshires, who
at the start of the battle mustered over one thousand soldiers, would suffer severely. At
role call the next morning only two officers and two hundred men would answer to their
name.
105
1914_0825_01s: The Rage of Dreaming Sheep (1st Sortie)
The Belgian's first sortie made good progress but it was abandoned with the Belgian
retirement back to Antwerp on the 26th
of August. Arguably the Belgians could have
broken out of Antwerp during this battle but they historically called off the sortie when it
was learned that the BEF and French were falling back after the Battles of Mons and
Charleroi. Another reason for the decision to withdraw was because the Belgians were
informed that Joffre was suspending allied counter offensive operations until a later date.
This meant that any breakout of Antwerp would essentially not accomplish much since
the Belgian Army would be completely on its own.
At the time of this scenario, the 4e Division d’Armée was still extricating itself from
Namur, so it was not present during this battle.
106
1914_0826_01s: Taking One for the Team
The British 1/Duke of Cornwall's and 1/East Surrey were historically formed up on the
road southeast of Le Cateau (34,18) when the action began. At 0600 hours, just as the
order came for these two units to move south, these two units began to take fire from
Germans who had managed to move into town and around their flank. The British
suffered around 200 casualties before falling back to the southwest of town, along the
valley to the main British line. For several hours a desperate battle echoed through the
narrow valley, unseen by anyone else along the entire British battle line.
Since the historical battle saw the British fall back from their initial positions by the end
of the 26th (to the Haucourt-Ligny-Bertry-Honnechy line), and since there is no way to
encourage the British user to actually do so in such a short scenario where there are no
strategic aspects to take under consideration, this scenario effectively ends after nightfall.
This is the point when the British historically began to fall back from the line because of
strategic considerations (they needed to disengage so that they could continue the retreat).
This makes this scenario very busy, yet short and sweet. The German user should be
mindful of this and should do everything he can to "soften up" the British positions at the
objectives for an assault on the final two turns. Be careful not to spend your force early
on.
On the British left flank of the battlefield the 1/Royal Lancaster was caught alone in the
open and, as the morning fog lifted, they were cut to ribbons by fire from 21 German
machine guns and over 36 field guns. The battalion was driven back by heavy fire and
assault and the British 1st Warwicks rushed forward to cover them. Among the soldiers
of the 1/Warwicks was a young junior officer named Bernard Montgomery.
Most of the British 4th Infantry Division starts the battle as disrupted. Although it was
fresh, it had marched into position during the night and at least one of the brigades (the
11th) got disoriented and lost their way, and the remainder of the division could be said
to be in a state of disruption.
Historically, Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie was located in the vicinity of Lesdain but, as
soon as day broke, it galloped off to the west through Banteux. It then supported the 84e
Division d'Infanterie Territoriale near Cambrai until the evening. In this scenario, it is
understood that Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie has already left and his exhausted troopers
will return in the evening near the end of the battle.
As the Germans, avoid sending the 22.Reserve-Division into the line. It was historically
used to cover the German right flank around Cambrai, to protect the forces fighting in
this sector for the arriving French cavalry (see the map label for where they arrive). Also,
be sure to turn on the Protected Hex shading to see both where the French cavalry arrive
and which areas to avoid. If you have units located in this protected area when the French
cavalry arrive, then your units will be broken. This prevents "gamey" behavior of the
Germans being able to sit in their arrival area as a method to block the French from
107
arriving. If the French cavalry are blocked properly then they will play little effect on the
battle, but if they are not blocked properly then they may be able to wreak havoc on the
flank.
It is interesting to note that Smith-Dorrien's decision the night before to stand and fight
triggered Sir John French, in his pessimistic and depressive state of mind, to write the II
Corps off "as good as lost" to the enemy.
For the sake of honoring the memory, it must be mentioned that if you look to the
northwest of the map you will see Cambrai. The events the #1914_0826_02s_Cambrai
scenario are occurring at precisely the same moment as this scenario is unfolding. If you
play both scenarios it is easy to see how the bravery of the men of the French 84e DIT, a
territorial unit made up of reservists, and the Corps de Cavalerie helped save the British II
Corps. It is not difficult to speculate that had the 84e DIT not fought off the elite German
II.Armeekorps in that area, then the II.Armeekorps would have been able to flank around
the rear of the British II Corps, making it impossible for them to extricate themselves. It
is tragic how little has been written about the action at Cambrai, and how it has been
completely overshadowed by the battle at Le Cateau.
Changes:
1.01) Made adjustments to the German 2.Kavallerie-Division composition and starting
disposition based on information that was not available at the time of the scenario was
first created.70
70
Zuber, The Mons Myth, 217-226.
108
1914_0826_02s: Unwritten Valor
The Germans will receive bonus points for exiting units at the south of the map. This
represents the intended long flanking movement being a success, which would have
placed the German II.Armeekorps deep behind the BEF line at Le Cateau (the
#1914_0826_01s_Le_Cateau scenario occurs just off the east of this map).
The French Corps de Cavalerie will arrive during the course of the scenario but it has a
possibility of being withdrawn again. Pay close attention to the withdrawal
announcements in the Command Report so that you are not caught off guard when the
cavalry units are withdrawn. It is a good idea to fall back with the 167e Brigade of the
84e DIT immediately, so it can be in a position to cover the areas that are left vacant
when the Corps de Cavalerie is withdrawn. The French 5e Division de Cavalerie has a
very low change of being withdrawn, so that it becomes likely that it will remain for the
duration of the scenario. This is done so that this division can be used to hold off the
Germans moving towards the exit hex. However, it is still possible that this division too
will be withdrawn so the French player should have a contingency plan if this happens.
Historically, the Corps de Cavalerie withdrew to move east to assist the BEF at Le
Cateau. See that scenario for when this occurred. The quick arrival and departure of the
Corps de Cavalerie should give some insight on just how frantic General Sordet was
moving his corps from place to place, never really staying around long enough in once
place to make his presence truly effective.
Changes:
1.01) Made small adjustments to the German 2.Kavallerie-Division composition based on
information that was not available at the time of the scenario was first created.
109
1914_0829_01s: French Morale Restored
The remainder of the German VII.Korps (specifically the 14.Infanterie-Division) was
located off to the west of the map along with the HKK.1. These units were positioned to
cover the flank of von Kluck's 1.Armee and were in screening positions in front of the
BEF, who was positioned in the vicinity of La Fère.
The battered BEF to his west, being in no condition to support the French attack, would
use the entire day of the 29th for some much needed rest. It is arguable that the French
Ve Armée was in just as bad of shape as the BEF, yet Sir John French's paranoia and
pessimism kept him out of the battle.
Although the battle that ensued was a tactical French defeat, it would be regarded as a
strategic victory because it would briefly check von Bülow's 2.Armee, and allow the
allies to resume a more orderly withdrawal and gain some much needed rest from the
German brief operational pause while the 2.Armee recovered.
110
1914_0901_01s: A Desperate Rear Guard
In the historical battle, the British 6th Brigade turned back north to cover for the 4th
Guards Brigade as it began to become overwhelmed. The 6th Brigade was positioned
slightly south of Villers-Cotterets, just barely off the map edge, and does not take part in
this scenario.
111
1914_0905_01s: Uncovering the Enemy's Hand
According to the impression left by orders issued from GQG, the French were not
expecting any contact to occur west of the Ourcq. At the start of this battle, the French
were marching east towards the Ourcq and were just stopping to rest and prepare for
lunch.
With the exception of the Battle of Le Cateau, the IV.Reservekorps saw little action since
the start of the conflict, being tasked out for various details, lines of communication
security, and the occasional siege. As a matter of fact, a brigade of the 22.Reserve-
Division was returning from being tasked out to security of Bruxelles. Von Gronau's
troops were itching to prove themselves and were in good condition.
Von Gronau's spoiling attack disrupted the French advance and eliminated the element of
surprise, thus allowing von Kluck to start taking immediate action on the night of the
5th/6th to counter it. The result of the Battle of the Marne could have been far worse for
the Germans had von Gronau not made this vital decision. Von Gronau's decision to
attack has often been compared to von Alvensleben at the Battle of Vionville in the
Franco-Prussian War of 1870.
112
1914_0906_01s: Miracle at the Marne
This scenario represents what is historically known as The First Battle of the Marne, and,
rather than only covering the famous Paris sector, it covers the entire battle from Paris to
Verdun. After careful consideration it has been determined that the Nancy sector would
not be covered in this scenario. While it is true that the battle raged around Nancy during
the battle of the Marne, the Nancy sector was largely stagnant in comparison to the
mobile action to the west. Also, it was felt that by expanding the battle to the relatively
stagnant Nancy area, the scenario would bog down and be too large to be enjoyable. This
is especially true since this was the point in which both sides began drawing away forces
from the Nancy sector which means that as the battle progresses it would become less
eventful.
The scenario begins at what is largely recognized as the start of the battle, when the
French counterattack from Paris began to seriously develop. It is important to understand
that the battle actually began the day before near Iverny which is represented in another
scenario. During that battle, the French had stumbled into the force which von Kluck
assigned to screen his flank from any minor patrols or raids from Paris. In reality, the
clash around Iverny served to warn von Kluck of a major French attack and, by the time
this scenario begins, he was already sending the II.Armeekorps north to aid his screening
force.
The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine
(evening of September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this
point then the Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans
probably would have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at
some other point between Melun and Verdun.
113
It is uncertain what precise role Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie played in the fighting on the
6th of September as it does not appear to be mentioned in any French sources. It is
practically certain that it was still south of the Seine (southwest off the map) refitting
from its exhausting one month ride through France and Belgium. It is recorded that an ad
hoc cavalry brigade (brigade de cavalerie Gillet) was located between the French and
BEF. Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie did arrive later to help secure VIe Armée's left flank. It
is almost impossible to determine the exact composition of the brigade de cavalerie
Gillet, but some educated assumptions have been made. What is known is that it was an
ad hoc unit comprised of a mix of eight cavalry squadrons which were hastily thrown
together.
The German 4.Kavalerie-Division on von Kluck's flank was a shell of its former self. It
suffered severely in a clash with BEF cavalry (primarily the 1st Cavalry Brigade) at Néry
on the morning of September 1st.
As a result of the Battle of Iverny, the German II.Armeekorps has begun to march north
to relieve the IV.Reservekorps, now withdrawn to Trocy.
The French 63e DR of Groupe Ebner remained in Paris for most of the duration of this
scenario. The 63e DR, Bde de Fusiliers Marins and the RMCIC (Spahis cavalry brigade)
all began moving on the afternoon of the September 8th to a line Dalmartin - Montge.
They were sent to form a second line of defense in that area. These units have been left
out of the scenario since they were tasked with defending the rear area of the VIe Armée,
because they would arrive so late in the scenario (they would have arrived in the area on
the morning of the 9th with five turns remaining). From a design point of view it is better
to leave these units out rather than allowing the possibility of an allied player sending
them into a final rush.
The French 7e DI is the unit that historically arrived by taxis from Paris. In the annuls of
history this event has been exaggerated to mythological proportions. Historically the
infantry component of this division was sent by Paris Taxi while the rest of the division
was sent by rail. Since the sudden Paris Taxi movement cannot be represented in the
game (other than having them magically appear at their destination). The Taxi transport is
abstractly represented by giving the infantry brigades a head start over the other elements
in the division, therefore the infantry arrives several turns prior to the rest of the division.
The BEF cavalry brigade locations have been pinpointed using war diaries and, as such,
they do not agree with official GHQ situation maps of the day. This disagreement is
exists because on the night of the 5th, the majority of the brigades were located behind
the BEF (since they were formerly in front of the BEF's direction of travel to the south) --
which is more or less where the GHQ situation maps has them. However, during the late
evening of the 5th, the cavalry brigades were ordered to move north and to the east flank.
At some point during the issuance of orders and the actual movement is where the
contradiction occurs. With that in mind, it is more accurate to go with war diary locations
than the situation maps.
114
The BEF is in terrible condition regarding its fatigue. This was done because at this point
it had been marching for thirteen straight days with only one day of rest over a distance
of one hundred and thirty-six miles. Although the French Ve Armée was suffering from a
similar situation, its retirement was better managed. To put it bluntly, the BEF was near a
state of total exhaustion from the retreat and the constant harassment from the German
1.Armee. One British officer summed it up at the time, "I would never have believed that
men could be so tired and so hungry and yet live." At various points Sir John French
made the BEF's withdrawal seem more like a hopeless rout with (mentally) the only good
destination being the nearest channel port. Historically the BEF moved very slowly on
the first and second days of the Battle of the Marne. This is justifiable and easily
represented if we consider that their fatigue was almost at maximum level from such a
long and relentless retreat. In other words, it is better to not push the BEF forward too
hard during the first couple of days of the battle so as to allow them to recuperate and
have some semblance of effectiveness.
Von Hausen's (3.Armee) memoirs paint him as a guileless straight forward commander
that was more interested in the quality of the quarters that he slept in each night rather
than the outcome of the campaign. As accurate or inaccurate of a judgment this might be,
throughout the invasion of France he constantly provided neighborly aid and co-operation
that was unique among German army commanders. However, this aid always came at an
expense of initiative of his 3.Armee. In a sense, he was a sort of mobile reserve for the 2
and 4.Armee; always providing assistance but never leading and rarely getting any
assistance in return. At the start of the Battle of the Marne, von Hausen had divided his
army in half to simultaneously aid the 2.Armee and 4.Armee. This created a gap in his
sector but there also existed an identical gap between the French IXe and IVe Armée
directly opposite of him.
Von Hausen had rested his 3.Armee the entire day of the 5th. Because of this, his army
had lost contact with the French but his troops were well rested.
Foch's 42e DI, Division Morocaine and 9e CA (-) were all given offensive orders for the
day of the September 6th. However, just after dawn, the Germans would attack first
across the marshes of St Gond. The 42e DI, Division Morocaine and 9e CA (-) was in the
process of moving north to accomplish this task when a meeting engagement developed
north of the marshes. To simulate this attack, the 17e DI begins the scenario fixed for one
turn, as this is supposed to represent their move into their current positions, since the
human player has not real incentive to do so, and by turn 2 they are free to fall back as
was historically the case.
The German 3.Armee's 32.Infanterie-Division and 23.Reserve-Division were extremely
difficult to place in their starting locations. Several maps show these divisions to be west
and northwest of Chalons-sur-Marne, however it seems that both of these divisions
actually continued moving to their currently represented spots during the day and night of
the 5th. Fighting at Normée, Lenharrée, and first contact at Sommesous is recorded as
having occurred on the 6th (the fighting at Normée having occurred in the morning), and
there is no other way for this to have happened unless they were in their currently
115
represented locations. Apparently the commander of the 32.Infanterie-Division attacked
towards Normée on his own accord and the 23.Reserve-Division covered its flank, and
these movements do not seem to be well documented.
HKK.4, near Revigny, is fixed with no release for the duration of the scenario. This is
because this formation essentially held the pivot point between the German 4. and
5.Armee. Should this formation start released or be released at some point, then someone
would naturally, with the wonderful gift of hindsight, send them to some other sector for
a breakthrough.
The French 17e CA starts deployed as Fixed where they were by the morning of the 7th.
This is done to prevent the French commander from, due to hindsight, charging the corps
forwards to gain some strategic ground, while at the same time taking into account the
historical redeployements that were taking place in that area during the 6th.
Between Revigny and Verdun there are a large quantity of objectives that begin under
German control even though they are forward of the German positions. This was done
primarily to influence the Allied player to move forward as was historically the case. The
idea is that the French must advance forward as was historically the case, otherwise the
French will probably permanently surrender these objectives to the Germans in this
scenario.
There are a great number of victory points located immediately south of Verdun. This
was done to influence the French player to resist and maintain contact with the fortified
area of Verdun, as was historically the case (and even though this was a dangerous and
reckless decision by Sarrail), rather than influencing the French to move south and form a
more advantageous, but completely a-historical, defensive position.
This scenario works well as a TCP/IP team based game of six (Allied) versus five
(German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [VIe Armée], #2 [Ve Armée], #3
[BEF], #4 [IXe Armée], #5 [IVe Armée], #6 [IIIe Armée]. The German players should
consist of #1 [1.Armee], #2 [2.Armee], #3 [3.Armee], #4 [4.Armee], #5 [5.Armee]. A
PBEM team based game could consist of two versus two, with Allied players consisting of
#1 [VIe Armée & Ve Armée & IVe Armée] and #2 [BEF & IXe Armée & IIIe Armée]. The
German team should consist of the #1 [1.Armee & 5.Armee] and #2 [2.Armee & 3.Armee
& 4.Armee].
Changes:
1.02) Adjusted VP levels for better balance.
1.02) Corrected some starting deployments of French units.
1.02) Placed the GQG unit on the south edge of the map (fixed status) since it was
historically just off the map area.
116
1.02) The French 23e DI is now more historically deployed.
1.03) Made several significant changes to German deployments in the St. Gond sector
based on Gabriel Hanotaux's descriptions of how the battle unfolded on the French side
on the 6th.
1.03) Updated the release time and date of the French 11e CA and 52e DR to allow for
more historical play as it prevents, from hindsight, the French from rushing forward
immediately to create a buffer of space between the objectives and the Germans (11e CA
was holding fast on 6th and 52e DR was kept in reserve until the evening of the 7th).
1.03) The French 60e DR begins in its historic locations which are a mixture of where it
was moving to, and where it was residing in on the 6th. The division's cavalry squadrons
had been sent east to be a liason with IVe Armée, and two of the division's infantry
battalions were sent to Fere-Champenoise. One brigade was located at Semoine, and the
"remainder of the division" was located at Villers-Herbisse.71
Given the gift of hindsight,
it was decided that this division would begin in those locations and would get released
during the 6th, which allows it to rush to help defend Sommesous, rather than having the
division move to Sommesous immediately on the first turn.
71
Gabriel Hanotaux, Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914, Thome I, 210.
117
1914_0906_02s: The Juggernaut Exposed
The scenario begins at what is largely recognized as the start of the battle, when the
French counterattack from Paris began to seriously develop. It is important to understand
that the battle actually began the day before near Iverny which is represented in another
scenario. During that battle, the French had stumbled into the force which von Kluck
assigned to screen his flank from any minor patrols or raids from Paris. In reality, the
clash around Iverny served to warn von Kluck of a major French attack and, by the time
this scenario begins, he was already sending the II.Armeekorps north to aid his screening
force.
The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine
(September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the
Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would
have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point
between Melun and Verdun.
It is uncertain what precise role Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie played in the fighting on the
6th of September as it does not appear to be mentioned in any French sources. It is
practically certain that it was still south of the Seine (southwest off the map) refitting
from its exhausting one month ride through France and Belgium. It is recorded that an ad
hoc cavalry brigade (brigade de cavalerie Gillet) was located between the French and
BEF. Sordet's Corps de Cavalerie did arrive later to help secure VIe Armée's left flank. It
is almost impossible to determine the exact composition of the brigade de cavalerie
Gillet, but some educated assumptions have been made. What is known is that it was an
ad hoc unit comprised of a mix of eight cavalry squadrons which were hastily thrown
together.
The German 4.Kavalerie-Division on von Kluck's flank was a shell of its former self. It
suffered severely in a clash with BEF cavalry (primarily the 1st Cavalry Brigade) at Néry
on the morning of September 1st.
As a result of the Battle of Iverny, the German II.Armeekorps has begun to march north
to relieve the IV.Reservekorps, now withdrawn to Trocy.
The French 63e DR of Groupe Ebner remained in Paris for most of the duration of this
scenario. The 63e DR, Bde de Fusiliers Marins and the RMCIC (Spahis cavalry brigade)
all began moving on the afternoon of the September 8th to a line Dalmartin - Montge.
They were sent to form a second line of defense in that area. These units have been left
out of the scenario since they were tasked with defending the rear area of the VIe Armée,
because they would arrive so late in the scenario (they would have arrived in the area on
the morning of the 9th with five turns remaining). From a design point of view it is better
to leave these units out rather than allowing the possibility of an allied player sending
them into a final rush.
118
The French 7e DI is the unit that historically arrived by taxis from Paris. This event has
been exaggerated to mythological proportions. Historically the infantry component of this
division was sent by Paris Taxi while the rest of the division was sent by rail. Since the
sudden Paris Taxi movement cannot be represented in the game (other than having them
magically appear at their destination). The Taxi transport is abstractly represented by
giving the infantry brigades a head start over the other elements in the division, therefore
the infantry arrives several turns prior to the rest of the division.
The BEF cavalry brigade locations have been pinpointed using war diaries and, as such,
they do not agree with official GHQ situation maps of the day. This disagreement is
exists because on the night of the 5th, the majority of the brigades were located behind
the BEF (since they were formerly in front of the BEF's direction of travel to the south) --
which is more or less where the GHQ situation maps has them. However, during the late
evening of the 5th, the cavalry brigades were ordered to move north and to the east flank.
At some point during the issuance of orders and the actual movement is where the
contradiction occurs. With that in mind, it is more accurate to go with war diary locations
than the situation maps.
The BEF is in terrible condition regarding its fatigue. This was done because at this point
it had been marching for thirteen straight days with only one day of rest over a distance
of one hundred and thirty-six miles. Although the French Ve Armée was suffering from a
similar situation, its retirement was better managed. To put it bluntly, the BEF was near a
state of total exhaustion from the retreat and the constant harassment from the German
1.Armee. One British officer summed it up at the time, "I would never have believed that
men could be so tired and so hungry and yet live." At various points Sir John French
made the BEF's withdrawal seem more like a hopeless rout with (mentally) the only good
destination being the nearest channel port. Historically the BEF moved very slowly on
the first and second days of the Battle of the Marne. This is justifiable and easily
represented if we consider that their fatigue was almost at maximum level from such a
long and relentless retreat. In other words, it is better to not push the BEF forward too
hard during the first couple of days of the battle so as to allow them to recuperate and
have some semblance of effectiveness.
Changes:
1.02) Adding a withdrawal for the German 14.Infanterie-Div. which historically was sent
to the St-Gond sector during the course of this scenario.
119
1914_0906_03s: Foch Stands Firm
The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine
(September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the
Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would
have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point
between Melun and Verdun.
Von Hausen's (3.Armee) memoirs paint him as a guileless straight forward commander
that was more interested in the quality of the quarters that he slept in each night rather
than in the outcome of the campaign. As accurate or inaccurate of a judgment this might
be, throughout the invasion of France he constantly provided neighborly aid and co-
operation that was unique among German army commanders. However, this aid always
came at an expense of initiative of his 3.Armee. In a sense, he was a sort of mobile
reserve for the 2 and 4.Armee; always providing assistance but never leading and rarely
getting any assistance in return. At the start of the Battle of the Marne, von Hausen had
divided his army in half to simultaneously aid the 2.Armee and 4.Armee. This created a
gap in his sector but there also existed an identical gap between the French IXe and IVe
Armée directly opposite of him.
Von Hausen had rested his 3.Armee the entire day of the 5th. Because of this, his army
had lost contact with the French but his troops were well rested.
Foch's 42e DI, Division Morocaine and 9e CA (-) were all given offensive orders for the
day of the September 6th. However, just after dawn, the Germans would attack first
across the marshes of St Gond. The 42e DI, Division Morocaine and 9e CA (-) was in the
process of moving north to accomplish this task when a meeting engagement developed
north of the marshes. To simulate this attack, the 17e DI begins the scenario fixed for one
turn, as this is supposed to represent their move into their current positions, since the
human player has not real incentive to do so, and by turn 2 they are free to fall back as
was historically the case.
The German 3.Armee's 32.Infanterie-Division and 23.Reserve-Division were extremely
difficult to place in their starting locations. Several maps show these divisions to be west
and northwest of Chalons-sur-Marne, however it seems that both of these divisions
actually continued moving to their currently represented spots during the day and night of
the 5th. Fighting at Normée, Lenharrée, and first contact at Sommesous is recorded as
having occurred on the 6th (the fighting at Normée having occurred in the morning), and
there is no other way for this to have happened unless they were in their currently
represented locations. Apparently the commander of the 32.Infanterie-Division attacked
towards Normée on his own accord and the 23.Reserve-Division covered its flank, and
these movements do not seem to be well documented.
Changes:
120
1.02) Added the previously missing German division (14.Inf.Div.), historically this
division arrived from off the west edge of the map as reinforcement on the 8th.
1.02) Removed the French 9e DC from the east edge of the map (the area east of
Sommesous) and replaced it with an impassible area. This was done because additional
German 3.Armee divisions (23. 24. and 40.Infanterie-Division) were advancing south
from Chalons-su-Marne along the east edge of the map. Historically the 9e DC did
nothing else in the battle except cover the gap between the IVe Armée and IXe Armée,
and it fell back to the south as the battle proceeded in order to keep the gap covered.
However, in this scenario the user has no incentive to keep the 9e DC in covering
positions because of the non-existent threat, and is more inclined to a-historically use the
9e DC as a harassing force along the east side of the map, or to send it somewhere else in
this area to hold the line. By removing the division from the scenario, it prevents it from
being a-historically used as anything other than a covering force, and by making the area
impassible it prevents the Germans from advancing through the area that the 9e DC
would be covering.
1.02) Adjusted VP levels for better balance.
1.02) Corrected some starting deployments of French units.
1.03) Further adjusted the starting fatigue of French units in the Morius-le-Petit to
Sommesous sector to be more historically fragile.
1.03) Made several significant changes to German deployments in the St. Gond sector
based on Gabriel Hanotaux's descriptions of how the battle unfolded on the French side
on the 6th.
1.03) Updated the release time and date of the French 11e CA and 52e DR to allow for
more historical play as it prevents, from hindsight, the French from rushing forward
immediately to create a buffer of space between the objectives and the Germans (11e CA
was holding fast on 6th and 52e DR was kept in reserve until the evening of the 7th).
1.03) The French 60e DR begins in its historic locations which are a mixture of where it
was moving to, and where it was residing in on the 6th. The division's cavalry squadrons
had been sent east to be a liason with IVe Armée, and two of the division's infantry
battalions were sent to Fere-Champenoise. One brigade was located at Semoine, and the
"remainder of the division" was located at Villers-Herbisse.72
Given the gift of hindsight,
it was decided that this division would begin in those locations and would get released
during the 6th, which allows it to rush to help defend Sommesous, rather than having the
division move to Sommesous immediately on the first turn.
72
Gabriel Hanotaux, Histoire illustrée de la guerre de 1914, Thome I, 210.
121
1914_0906_04s: Opportunity Lost
The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine
(September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the
Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would
have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point
between Melun and Verdun.
HKK.4, near Revigny, is fixed with no release for the duration of the scenario. This is
because this formation essentially held the pivot point between the German 4. and
5.Armee. Should this formation start released or be released at some point, then someone
would naturally, with the wonderful gift of hindsight, send them to some other sector for
a breakthrough.
The French 17e CA starts deployed as Fixed where they were by the morning of the 7th.
This is done to prevent the French commander from, due to hindsight, charging the corps
forwards to gain some strategic ground, while at the same time taking into account the
historical redeployements that were taking place in that area during the 6th.
Changes:
1.02) Corrected an error where both sides had too much air support.
1.02) Corrected the arrival of the French 21e CA to be more historical (a fixed release at
the appropriate time, rather than arriving by rail).
1.02) With the use of new and previously unavailable information, corrected the starting
deployment of French units between the St-Lumier and Sermaize-les-Bains area to be
more historical.
1.02) The French 23e DI is not more historically deployed.
1.02) Repositioned some objectives on the west side of the battlefield to place greater
historical emphasis on that area.
122
1914_0906_05s: Flirting With Disaster
The scenario ends at the point in which the Germans began to withdraw to the Asine
(September 9th). It is rationalized that if the Allies can get a victory by this point then the
Germans would historically retreat to the Aisne. If not, then the Germans probably would
have redirected the 1.Armee towards Paris or gotten a breakthrough at some other point
between Melun and Verdun.
Between Revigny and Verdun there are a large quantity of objectives that begin under
German control even though they are forward of the German positions. This was done
primarily to influence the Allied player to move forward as was historically the case. The
idea is that the French must advance forward as was historically the case, otherwise the
French will probably permanently surrender these objectives to the Germans in this
scenario.
There are a great number of victory points located immediately south of Verdun. This
was done to influence the French player to resist and maintain contact with the fortified
area of Verdun, as was historically the case (and even though this was a dangerous and
reckless decision by Sarrail), rather than influencing the French to move south and form a
more advantageous, but completely a-historical, defensive position.
Changes:
1.02) Corrected an error where both sides had too much air support.
123
1914_0909_01s: The Belgian Diversion (2nd Sortie)
The 4e Division d’Armée had just recently arrived from Namur. Historically it was
evacuated across France from Namur and embarked on ships and sent to Antwerp. It
remains in this scenario in a fixed status as it was being reconsolidated.
Historically, the Germans reacted quickly to the second Belgian sortie from Antwerp.
They brought the 6.Reserve-Division back to the area permanently; halted the march of
the IX.Reservecorps (which was on its way to France, off the map to the south and does
not appear in the scenario); and they diverted the lead division of von Herringen's
7.Armee, which was on its way from Alsace to the extreme right flank of the German
armies along the Aisne.
One objective of the second Belgian sortie was to turn the German's east flank and sweep
around and disrupt German lines of communication. However, due to the German
reaction, the Belgians had to abandon the sortie after heavy fighting that inflicted over
8,000 Belgian casualties. Even though the Belgians called off the attack, they succeeded
in attracting German attention with their sortie, and greatly disrupted German movement
and planning.
The German 5.Reserve-Division intentionally has a 0% triggered release by subunit. In
other words, this division will not be released unless it is in contact with the enemy. Once
the division makes contact, it will release parts of the division depending on which
brigade made contact. The intent is that, historically, this division remained in place to
cover the left of the line. In order to prevent the German player from sending this division
on the offensive or sending it around to the east, it must be fixed in its historic place.
However, if the Belgian player becomes aggressive in the 5.Reserve-Division's area then
it will become active and can be used accordingly. The Division and Corps HQs will not
be released unless they have direct line of sight with an enemy unit, therefore, the intent
is that the brigades in this division should not go very far from the immediate vicinity of
the rest of the division.
The Belgian Division de Cavalerie is fixed in place during the first night (from 1800 on
the 9th, to 0600 on the 10th). This was done because the division was supposed to screen
the left flank while the Belgian infantry moved forward. Since the Belgian user has the
gift of knowing that there is no threat to the east and southeast, this division is forced to
screen the flank on the first night, thus limiting the advance of it to a more historical rate.
The three historical Belgian covering positions (objectives) southwest of Malines have
intentionally high VP levels. This was done so as to provide historical objectives to the
flank, which is what the 1er and 5e Division occupied and held throughout the battle
(securing the Belgian right flank). These objectives were occupied just prior to when this
scenario begins, in the day spent moving forward from the attack positions.
124
1914_0913_01s: Everything at Stake!
This scenario covers the mobile portion of the battle which was historically known as the
First Battle of the Aisne.
The historical battle continued off and on until the end of the month, but deadlock was
achieved by the end of the third day (September 15th) and trench warfare, in the sense of
what most people come to think about when they think of the Great War, began in this
sector. This start of stagnation is when this scenario ends.
The bridges located at Chavonne (76,40) and south of Vailly (71,40) were indeed
destroyed at the start of this battle. At Chavonne the Germans, in their haste to get across
the river, had left a temporary trestle construction over a broken span. At Vailly the
destroyed section was small enough that British infantry were able to bridge it with a
single plank of wood. In game play terms this means that neither bridge is destroyed
especially since both of them were historically in a crossable condition.
The German 5.Kavallerie.Div does not appear in this scenario since it was moving east to
reinforce 3.Armee. Historically, at the start of this scenario, the division was located
roughly behind the 2.Armee so they played no part in the battle in this sector.
The German XVIII.Armeekorps was sent from 4.Armee to 2.Armee during the battle but
it was held in a strategic reserve on the 15th so it does not appear in the scenario.
The French XIIIe Corps d'Armée was en route from the VIe Armée from the Ier Armée
and began arriving near the end of this scenario. It was not until 17th September that this
corps actually came into the battle line at the (at that time) extreme left flank to the west
of IVe Corps d'Armée. This is the point in which the "Race to the Sea" began.
The French Corps de Cavalerie (formerly under the command of Sordet, but now under
the command of Bridoux) was positioned on the far left of the Allied front line. Two of
the cavalry divisions (1er and 5e DC) were just off the map to the left of the 3e Division
de Cavalerie. These two cavalry divisions pushed north throughout the battle nearly
reaching the Somme near Bray (around 25km north-northwest of Roye). These two
cavalry divisions pushed stragglers before them and never turned inward behind the
German 1.Armee so they are not included in this scenario.
South of the town of Bourg (83,42), there is a British artillery unit that may seem out of
place. The XXXII Bde RFA was temporarily loaned to The Cavalry Division (from the
4th Division).
The German 13.Infanterie-Division (HQ at 107,40) was retreating northeast and not
advancing (in case anyone there is some confused as to which direction they should be
heading by their starting disposition). The division was conducting rear guard actions
125
with the gem.Landwehr-Brigade.25 (HQ at 83,41), and both organizations suffered
heavily from it.
In desperation, the Germans employed their 15cm and 21cm howitzers in the direct fire
role around Vregny and along the Chemin des Dames. This tactic allows the Germans to
bring in immediate heavy fire but it comes with the inherent cost the guns must be
vulnerable in order to be used in this way (they are naturally spotted and can be fired on,
and they can be overrun in an assault). The Allies should try to put effective fire on these
guns.
This scenario works well as a TCP/IP based team based game of three versus three. The
Allied players should consist of #1 [Ve Armée], #2 [VIe Armée], #3 [BEF] and the
German players should consist of #1 [1.Armee], #2 [2.Armee], #3 [7.Armee]. A PBEM
team based game could consist of two versus two, with Allied players consisting of #1
[French Army], #2 [BEF] and the German players consisting of #1 [1.Armee], #2
[2.Armee & 7.Armee].
Changes:
1.01) Made small corrections to Belgian unit dispositions and release conditions.
126
1914_0917_01s: The Race to the Sea
This campaign ends after Antwerp was evacuated, the Belgians reached their positions
behind the Yser, and just before #1914_1018_01s_Campaign_Flanders begins (October
17th, evening). At this point, both sides essentially reached the channel coast and the
great flanking maneuvers had ended and a new phase began.
As the default Optional Rules suggest, this scenario (and all others) should be
played with the Virtual Supply Trucks (VST) optional rule turned on. This rule
creates a realistic situation where supply levels vary depending the location of the
area in relation to friendly supply sources, where distance and the road and rail
network play a factor. While this is not much of an issue in smaller scenarios with
smaller maps, if this VST optional rule is turned off in this large campaign, then
both sides will get their full supply no matter what the location of their units, which
will cause unintended results. The outcome will be at a much higher intensity
instead of the supply lines being realistically stretched with the advance.
The Royal Marine Brigade was not intended to be a front line force. Where as the British
Naval units were an improvisation, the Royal Marine Brigade was not. On the outbreak
of war, the brigade was planned to be formed from recruits and used to secure and guard
any temporary port that might be necessary. In September 1914, this brigade was
intended to guard Dunkerque and secure a line of communication and supply to the
channel port as the BEF was shifting its base of operations from the Aisne to Flanders.
However, the events unfolding in Antwerp forced this brigade to be sent forward as a
token reserve force to try to aid the Belgians in any way possible. British sources state
that when the Royal Marine Brigade was moved from Dunkerque to Cassel on the 30th of
September, it left behind its "untrained recruits" which was about half of its strength (the
brigade numbered 2085 men when it moved out, which is approximately 52% strength).
There is no effective way to represent this in game play other than having the brigade
arrive at this reduced strength. This reduced strength has been carried over to each
127
scenario in which the Royal Marine Brigade is involved in during the period of August
through October.
This scenario does not include withdrawals for the British 1st Royal Naval Bde, the user
can instead choose to move them north to the border with the Netherlands (either the
northern map edge or the impassible hexes in the north) and exit the units from map.
Historically the 1st Royal Naval Bde fled into the Netherlands, a neutral country, and was
disarmed at 2200 hours on October 9th.
Historically, the reason the British 1st Royal Naval Bde had to flee into the Netherlands
was because the order for the brigade to withdraw on the night of 8/9 October was
mistakenly delivered to the brigade’s Drake Bn. The Drake Bn withdrew on its own and
the mistake was not noticed until the early morning hours of the 9th. This historical
blunder is simulated by fixing the brigade (less the Drake Bn) on the night of the 8th and
creating a variable percentage that the brigade will be released by morning.
Congestion markers are used to represent the massive flow of panicked civilians that
were fleeing Antwerp as the city’s final hour approached. Unlike the
#1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario, this congestion only affects the Allied
Powers since, in this case, the fleeing civilians were leaving Antwerp well in advance of
the German attack.
Actual French rail transit time tables were used to determine exact departure and arrival
times of the reinforcements. The reinforcements arrive on the map edges at the point in
which they are able to move to, and disembark at, their historical points at the historical
time. Some random variation in unit arrival probability (for both sides) is added, in order
to provide a degree of variation each time this campaign is played.
The British I Corps does not appear in this scenario. Historically it was arriving near St.
Pol on the 19th, which is two days after this scenario ends.
Some reinforcements will arrive away from the map edge. These units will arrive in
Travel Mode and, when they arrive, they may be placed along roads or rail lines. The
reason for this is that these units were historically disembarked in these locations near the
map edge, where they then marched from that point to the front line. The initial units that
arrived were historically dropped in these out of the way locations because commanders
did not know where the exact position of the enemy. Having the advantage of perfect
hindsight, if these units arrived on the map end in Rail Mode, then the user would
obviously move them to a better location across the map.
Avoid the temptation of sending a column of Rail Mode units into enemy territory as
some sort of rapid moving vanguard. The enemy could ambush the train to devastating
effect either by assault or by attack by fire.
As the Belgian Army withdraws from Antwerp (if it does), Belgian and British engineer
units should consider destroying rail lines between Antwerp and the Yser, or else you
128
may find German corps arriving quickly by train in these areas near the end of the
campaign.
Avoid the temptation of using allied units at Dunkirk as some sort of force to move into
German rear areas and cause mischief. The British Oxfordshire Hussars, British
Eastchurch Squadron, French Brigade de Fusiliers Marins, and the British Royal Marine
Brigade are better utilized in assisting the extrication of the Belgians from Antwerp, and
in screening allied objectives in Calais. Do not complain if you send these units into
German areas only to have the German cavalry capture the allied objectives across Calais
and cause equal mischief behind the Allied front lines.
This scenario works well as a TCP/IP based team based game of four (Allied) versus
three (German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [VIe Armée & IIe Armée], #2
[Xe Armée & GAN (Foch)], #3 [BEF], #4 [Belgian Army] and the German players
should consist of #1 [1.Armee & 2.Armee], #2 [6.Armee], #3 [AG.Beseler]. A PBEM
team based game could consist of three (Allied) versus two (German), with Allied players
consisting of #1 [French Army], #2 [BEF], #3 [Belgian Army] and the German players
consisting of #1 [1.Armee & 2.Armee & 6.Armee], #2 [AG.Beseler].
Changes:
1.03) Halved the objective values and VP levels so as to make excessive casualties play
some role in the outcome of the campaign.
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1914_0919_01s: A Dagger to the Heart
The Crown Prince's attack (off the northwest map edge) would gain little ground, but
Armee-Abt.Strantz's attack was a great success, forming the Saint Mihiel salient and
capturing the Fort du Camp des Romains. However, he was unable to advance beyond
Saint Mihiel.
The bayer.Ersatz-Division historically arrived in sector at the end of September to
reinforce the III.bAK and has been left out of the scenario. German sources state that the
division arrived late in September to reinforce the III.bAK after the salient had formed,
which is essentially when this scenario ends.
The German Inf.Bde.17 HQ and the 9.Infanterie-Div HQ are fixed on the north edge of
the map, along with the division's howitzers. This was done because historically that area
marked the beginning of the relatively static front line, and half of Inf.Bde.17 was off the
north edge of the map holding the flank of what would form the St-Mihiel salient. The
Germans are encouraged to anchor their line in the north off this area as was historical the
case, but they can of course choose to advance the 9.Infanterie-Div. and half of
Inf.Bde.17 but they will intentionally suffer from moving out of range of their fixed HQ
units.
This scenario ends on the evening of September 26th, when Fort du Camp des Romains
historically fell and the front began to solidify.
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1914_1001_01s: Never Give Up!
This scenario is unconventional in that it is a tug of war of sorts, similar to
#1914_0804_01s_Liege and #1914_0818_01s_Gette situations. The German objective is
simple; take as many objectives as possible and to block allied unit withdrawals to the
west if possible. The allied objective is to hold the objectives as long as possible while at
the same time exiting forces to the west, thereby weakening their capability to hold those
objectives. The proper balance is for the allies to hold as long as possible with the least
amount of forces as possible, and exit forces to the west to cancel out German gains. A
successful allied player must strike a balance between both options with the most
successful being able to hold off the German advance and prevent the capture of Antwerp
by the end of the scenario while at the same time extricating at least 85% of their forces.
Historically, all of the Belgian divisions (with the exception of about half of the 2nd
Division) retreated west between October 6th and 7th while the other half of the 2nd
Division, fortress troops, and most of the British Royal Naval Division retreated on the
8th. The city fell around October 9th (formally surrendered on October 10th), and this
result is considered to be a draw since the bulk of the Belgians escaped but the Germans
took the city.
The scenario ends on the evening of October 10th which was after Antwerp historically
(and formally) surrendered, and after the bulk of the Belgian Army retreated to the west
and the remaining Belgian defenders surrendered.
The Royal Marine Brigade was not intended to be a front line force. Where as the British
Naval units were an improvisation, the Royal Marine Brigade was not. On the outbreak
of war, the brigade was planned to be formed from recruits and used to secure and guard
any temporary port that might be necessary. In September 1914, this brigade was
intended to guard Dunkerque and secure a line of communication and supply to the
channel port as the BEF was shifting its base of operations from the Aisne to Flanders.
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However, the events unfolding in Antwerp forced this brigade to be sent forward as a
token reserve force to try to aid the Belgians in any way possible. British sources state
that when the Royal Marine Brigade was moved from Dunkerque to Cassel on the 30th of
September, it left behind its "untrained recruits" which was about half of its strength (the
brigade numbered 2085 men when it moved out, which is approximately 52% strength).
There is no effective way to represent this in game play other than having the brigade
arrive at this reduced strength.
This scenario does not include withdrawals for the British 1st Royal Naval Bde, the user
can instead choose to move them north to the border with the Netherlands (either the
northern map edge or the impassible hexes in the north) and exit the units from map.
Historically the 1st Royal Naval Bde fled into the Netherlands, a neutral country, and was
disarmed at 2200 hours on October 9th.
Historically, the reason the British 1st Royal Naval Bde had to flee into the Netherlands
was because the order for the brigade to withdraw on the night of 8/9 October was
mistakenly delivered to the brigade’s Drake Bn. The Drake Bn withdrew on its own and
the mistake was not noticed until the early morning hours of the 9th. This historical
blunder is simulated by fixing the brigade (less the Drake Bn) on the night of the 8th and
creating a variable percentage that the brigade will be released by morning.
Congestion markers are used to represent the massive flow of panicked civilians that
were fleeing Antwerp as the city’s final hour approached. Unlike the
#1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario, this congestion only affects the Allied
Powers since, in this case, the fleeing civilians were leaving Antwerp well in advance of
the German attack.
Changes:
1.02) Improved VP levels for better balance.
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1914_1001_02s: Turning the Flank
This scenario represents what is historically known as the First Battle of Arras.
This battle historically began to subside at the end of the 4th of October, which is when
this scenario ends. On the 5th, the situation was mostly stabilized in this sector and the
fighting shifted north.
The French 21e Corps d'Armée is not present because it was not until the 7th of October
when this force arrived from the north (specifically from the Lille-Armentières area). At
that point the battle to turn the flank was carried further north.
The key to this battle lies in the north. Historically the Germans moved their
reinforcement infantry corps to the center of their line, which freed their cavalry in the
center to move north (to the "new" flank). Doing this efficiently while resting the cavalry
in preparation of advancing in the north, is the key to success. The center and south
should be put under great pressure of course, but the pressure the Germans can put on the
north flank by repositioning their forces accordingly will decide the fate of many
objectives.
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1914_1018_01s: Where Valor Sleeps
The British Official History of the War series (and any books or maps based on it) imply
that the Belgians had formed a second cavalry division near Veurne after the Belgian
Army took up permanent residence along the Yser in mid October of 1914. However,
Belgian records consistently state that there was still only one cavalry division in
existence at this time and that the second cavalry division was not established until late
1916 to early 1917 (from various divisional cavalry regiments that were previously
assigned to Belgian infantry divisions), and then changed back to one cavalry division in
1918. It is possible that a number of cavalry regiments which would eventually make up
the Belgian 2e Division de Cavalerie were located in reserve near Veurne and it is also
possible that British sources incorrectly assume that a second division was had been
established when this occurred. In France ’14, the decision was made to follow Belgian
sources and represent only one cavalry division for the Belgian Army throughout 1914.
In this scenario, some of the various cavalry units which would eventually make up the
2e Division de Cavalerie are placed in reserve in the vicinity of Vuerne, since it is
obvious that there was a concentration of cavalry in this area.
The Dover Patrol Flotilla arrived in time to help breakup the German attack from the
4.Ersatz-Divison along the coast. Historically the fire was accurate along the coast which
stopped the German advance and eventually caused the 4.Ersatz-Division to withdraw
back to Oostende. The flotilla also directed their guns inland on areas where they
suspected the German heavy artillery to be firing from, but the flotilla’s fire was mostly
ineffective and scattered because of lack of accurate spotting.
The marsh area along the Yser was flooded near the end of this scenario. Given that the
map is static and is based on the master map, this area must begin in its flooded state.
Since marsh terrain has a positive combat modifier (it penalizes the defender), the
Belgians should either dig in this area to negate the penalty, or pull back beyond the
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marsh as soon as these units are released (the historical choice). It can be rationalized that
the moment the Germans reached the Yser (either sooner or later than was historically the
case), the Belgians would have released the sluices at that moment.
When the scenario begins, the German III.Reservekorps (in the Yser sector) was just now
drawing off to the north, away from the French cavalry advancing towards Roulers. The
III.Reservekorps was screening for the arrival of the new reservekorps of the 4.Armee, of
which it was remarkably successful.
Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses
of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion
in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary
delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the
Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this type of congestion would be driven off
by any German advance into the area.
This scenario works well as a TCP/IP based team based game of three (Allied) versus
three (German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [French Army], #2 [BEF], #3
[Belgian Army] and the German players should consist of #1 [4.Armee], #2 [6.Armee],
#3 [AG.Beseler & AG.Fabeck & AG.Linsingen]. A PBEM team based game could consist
of two (Allied) versus two (German), with Allied players consisting of #1 [French Army],
#2 [BEF & Belgian Army] and the German players consisting of #1 [4.Armee &
AG.Beseler], #2 [6.Armee & AG.Fabeck & AG.Linsingen].
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1914_1018_02s: The Belgian Bulwark
The British Official History of the War series (and any books or maps based on it) imply
that the Belgians had formed a second cavalry division near Veurne after the Belgian
Army took up permanent residence along the Yser in mid October of 1914. However,
Belgian records consistently state that there was still only one cavalry division in
existence at this time and that the second cavalry division was not established until late
1916 to early 1917 (from various divisional cavalry regiments that were previously
assigned to Belgian infantry divisions), and then changed back to one cavalry division in
1918. It is possible that a number of cavalry regiments which would eventually make up
the Belgian 2e Division de Cavalerie were located in reserve near Veurne and it is also
possible that British sources incorrectly assume that a second division was had been
established when this occurred. In France ’14, the decision was made to follow Belgian
sources and represent only one cavalry division for the Belgian Army throughout 1914.
In this scenario, some of the various cavalry units which would eventually make up the
2e Division de Cavalerie are placed in reserve in the vicinity of Vuerne, since it is
obvious that there was a concentration of cavalry in this area.
The Dover Patrol Flotilla arrived in time to help breakup the German attack from the
4.Ersatz-Divison along the coast. Historically the fire was accurate along the coast which
stopped the German advance and eventually caused the 4.Ersatz-Division to withdraw
back to Oostende. The flotilla also directed their guns inland on areas where they
suspected the German heavy artillery to be firing from, but the flotilla’s fire was mostly
ineffective and scattered because of lack of accurate spotting.
The marsh area along the Yser was flooded near the end of this scenario. Given that the
map is static and is based on the master map, this area must begin in its flooded state.
Since marsh terrain has a positive combat modifier (it penalizes the defender), the
Belgians should either dig in this area to negate the penalty, or pull back beyond the
marsh as soon as these units are released (the historical choice). It can be rationalized that
136
the moment the Germans reached the Yser (either sooner or later than was historically the
case), the Belgians would have released the sluices at that moment.
When the scenario begins, the German III.Reservekorps was just now drawing off to the
north, away from the French cavalry advancing towards Roulers. The III.Reservekorps
was screening for the arrival of the new reservekorps of the 4.Armee, of which it was
remarkably successful.
Both sides will have units gradually drawn off during the course of this scenario as the
battle shifted south towards the Ypres salient (into the impassible areas on the south edge
of the map). Most notably, the German XXVI and most of the XXIII.Reservekorps will
be drawn away as they diverted their axis of advance to the south. Historically these two
corps would still have been located on the map, but with the absence of any physical
threat to them in the south, they would a-historically be used to the attack to the allies in
this sector. It is advisable for the remaining elements of the XXIII.Reservekorps to go on
the defensive in the south at the time in which these German units began to get
withdrawn.
137
1914_1018_03s: The Graveyard of the Contemptibles
This scenario covers what is historically known as the First Battle of Ypres.
Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses
of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion
in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary
delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the
Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this type of congestion would be driven off
by any German advance into the area.
The German XIII.Armeekorps moved south on the 19th to assist in the battle in that area
(you can find it near Loos in the #1914_1020_02s_Armentieres-La_Bassee scenario).
Historically, on the 23rd and 24th, the French and British launched a counter offensive
aimed at taking back Passchendaele. This is a viable option once the French 9e Corps
d’Armée arrives.
The French 2e Corps de Cavalerie and 9e Division de Cavalerie being the scenario in the
positions that they reached at the end of the day. In other words, the French cavalry in the
north of the map begin the scenario in the positions that the historically moved to by the
end of the first day in this scenario, and they start the scenario as fixed. This was done to
force the scenario to play out historically in the north, because otherwise a user would
probably send these cavalry formations all over the map at the start, since there is no
threat from the off map German units in the Yser area.
Keep a close eye on the protected hex shading feature to know what hexes you should
stay away from. Given the abundance of German troops approaching this area, in the
north, east, and south of the map the Germans intentionally arrive in long columns with
138
each stack having a large protected range of hexes. This was done to prevent any gamey
attempt by the allies of moving into this area where the Germans arrive in force. The
same is true for the Allies in the western map edge.
The British 1st Division was in the process of being relieved by the French and was
falling back to the vicinity of Ypres to rest. This division had been single handedly
holding back the German XXIII.Reservekorps for four days and had been bombarded all
throughout the night on the 24th when it was supposed to be extricated. As a result, the
division was in poor shape and the it had only begun to pull out of the line in the early
morning hours of the 25th, and it was not until 0800 that the division was fully clear of
the line.
Historically, the massive German offensive by Heersgruppe.Fabeck was to commence on
the 30th of October. The 29th was to have an attack to take Gheluvet by the
XXVII.Reservekorps, supported by the newly formed 6.bayer.Reserve-Div. The German
cavalry of HKK.1, 2 and 4 were also to advance and pin the enemy in place. All of these
attacks were primarily intended to cover the buildup of Heersguppe.Fabeck and the attack
of it on the 30th
was made in complete surprise.
After the German infantry divisions began to take over the front line from the cavalry
divisions along the Lys Canal on the evening of the 30th of October, most of the German
cavalry divisions were pulled back into reserve north of Lille (in this map area). This
reserve of cavalry was intended to be called up to exploit a breakthrough or to fill in and
cover the flanks of the spearhead that would be formed by Armeegruppe Fabeck.
The French 32e Division d’Infanterie, which arrived on the 30th of October, was split up
piece meal and sent to each place in the line where the Germans were threatening to
breakthrough. Of primary importance was an entire brigade of infantry and some artillery
that were rushed to the British Cavalry Corps sector near Wyschaete.
The BEF 7th Division, battered and exhausted, began to move into reserve on the 5th
of
November. On the 6th of November, the 20th Infantry Brigade from this division was
moved west off the map to Meteren and the Northumberland Hussars and various
division assets followed the next day. These units have a chance of withdrawal at the start
of their respective dates, so the Allied player needs to adjust accordingly.
During the 10th of November, the battered 22nd Infantry Brigade of the BEF 7th
Division moved west to Merris into reserve, southwest of Bailleul, off map and out of
sector. This unit joined the other elements of the division out of sector, minus the 21st
Infantry Brigade which was in the line at Ploegsteert. These off map units remained for
the duration of the Ypres battle. Thus, the 22nd Infantry Brigade has a chance of
withdrawal their respective day.
This scenario intentionally has duplicate units in it. If you open it in the scenario editor
you will be presented with messages of duplicate units. Historically, many units were
withdrawn from the sector and then returned later on so the duplicate units are necessary
139
to represent this, but no two of the same units should even be on the map at the same time
since they are always withdrawn before returning.
This scenario works well as a TCP/IP and PBEM team based game of two (Allied) versus
two (German). The Allied players should consist of #1 [Dét d'Armée de Belgique], #2
[BEF & Belgian Army] and the German players should consist of #1 [4.Armee &
AG.Linsingen], #2 [6.Armee & AG.Fabeck]. For TCP/IP, any further players could
break down each side by corps.
140
1914_1018_04s: The Salient is Formed
The German XIII.Armeekorps moved south on the 19th to assist in the battle in that area
(you can find it near Loos in the #1914_1020_02s_Armentieres-La_Bassee scenario).
This scenario ends at the end of the 24th of October where the #1914_1025_01s_Ypres
scenario resumes the battle.
Historically, on the 23rd and 24th, the French and British launched a counter offensive
aimed at taking back Passchendaele. This is a viable option once the French 9e Corps
d’Armée arrives.
The French 2e Corps de Cavalerie and 9e Division de Cavalerie being the scenario in the
positions that they reached at the end of the day. In other words, the French cavalry in the
north of the map begin the scenario in the positions that the historically moved to by the
end of the first day in this scenario, and they start the scenario as fixed. This was done to
force the scenario to play out historically in the north, because otherwise a user would
probably send these cavalry formations all over the map at the start, since there is no
threat from the off map German units in the Yser area.
Keep a close eye on the protected hex shading feature to know what hexes you should
stay away from. Given the abundance of German troops approaching this area, in the
north, east, and south of the map the Germans intentionally arrive in long columns with
each stack having a large protected range of hexes. This was done to prevent any gamey
attempt by the allies of moving into this area where the Germans arrive in force. The
same is true for the Allies in the western map edge.
Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses
of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion
in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary
delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the
Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this type of congestion would be driven off
by any German advance into the area.
141
1914_1020_01s: The Unglamorous Struggle
To the south of the well known Ypres sector lies
a forgotten front: the La-Bassee sector which
held the southern flank of the Ypres salient. So
far as valor and determination of the troops that
fought here are concerned, the fighting was
equally ferocious and desperate as the fighting
that occurred immediately around Ypres, but the
La Bassee sector never had the same strategic or
sentimental importance. The La Bassee sector
was originally supposed to be the area that the
BEF would outflank the Germans in early
October as they advanced towards Lille, but the
advance quickly ran into resistance and attention
shifted to the north. In the middle of October, as
the Ypres salient was only beginning to be
formed, the German 6.Armee launched a
powerful offensive with the attempt of smashing
through the Allied line, which would thereby put
the allied forces to the north in untenable
positions.
This scenario obviously covers the Armentieres
and La Bassee sector but is named “La Bassee” since the majority of the hard fighting
occurred to the north and west of this town around Neuve Chappelle. It is also named “La
Bassee” because, quite simply, “La_Bassee-Armentieres” does not fit in the File
Selection Dialog box.
This scenario covers the full German 6.Armee offensive from 20th October to 2nd
November when the area largely became stagnant following the capture of Neuve
Chappelle. The “first phase” from the 20th to the 23rd was an all out offensive to
accomplish a breakthrough, and when this failed a “conclusion” phase began which saw
the objectives change from breakthrough to simply pinning the enemy and preventing
them from assisting the fight around Ypres. Because of this shift in strategy, there are exit
hexes in friendly territory along the north edges of the map (both French and British units
may use the British exit hex at 9,0). These exit hexes provide victory points under the
rationale that forces sent north to assist the fighting around Ypres could play a decisive
role on the outcome of the battle there. However, if either side sends forces north to the
Ypres sector then they will significantly weaken their own ability to hold or take
objectives in the La Bassee sector. In other words, if one side or the other exits units to
the north then it will upset the historical balance of forces in the area. If such an occasion
occurs, then the opposing side can either exit forces of their own or push their attack on
enemy objectives. This will undoubtedly produce wildly varying results depending on
what happens in the campaign. Users may want to consider conducting aerial recon
missions around enemy exit hexes near the end of the scenario and are encouraged to
142
keep a close eye on the victory levels so that you are not caught off guard by a sudden
exit of forces to Ypres. The Germans should provide constant pressure on the Allied line
to prevent them from disengaging a sizable force, and the Allies should counter attack if
the Germans feel that they have the luxury to exit units. Since the user is free to exit units
for points, units that were historically withdrawn (ie. East Lancashire, Somerset LI,
Hampshire – the entire 6.bayer.Res.Div etc) do not have a withdrawal in this scenario.
The user can instead decide to use them in the area or withdraw them as was historically
the case. Keep in mind that units that were historically withdrawn have already been
factored into the victory point total (so as to force their withdrawal). For historical unit
withdrawals, see #1914_1020_02s_La_Bassee withdrawal dialog. For obvious reasons,
HKK.1 is not included in the scenario since it is rationalized that this unit was already
committed to the north (historically it was located at Lille and moved north as soon as
this scenario begins).
The official British history includes this area in the overall battle for Ypres, where it is
basically considered the southern shoulder of the Ypres salient. In the practical sense the
Armentieres area was indeed a separate sector from the main event around Ypres in the
same sense that the Yser sector (north of Ypres) was also separate. Despite what the
official British history states, it divides Ypres and Armentieres into separate maps and the
official German history considers it a separate conflict from Ypres. It is important to state
these facts because careful consideration has been made on whether or not to include this
area in the Ypres sub scenarios. While it is true that the entire Flanders front fought for
the same purpose, the final decision was that the individual Yser, Ypres, and La Bassee-
Armentieres areas had conflicts and concerns of their own and are more practically
represented as separate scenarios. Those who want the “full effect” have the option to
play the entire massive Flanders front campaign in scenario
#1914_1018_01s_Campaign_Flanders.
This battle was to be the scene for the death of the British 2/Royal Irish. On October
19th, the regiment had launched a gallant attack, in which it lost over 200 men, and
seized the town of Le Pilly. The French cavalry, from the Ier Corps de Cavalerie, were
supposed to cover the unit's flank as it simultaneously attacked towards the town of
Fournes. However, the French had difficulty meeting their objectives and the Irish were
left to stand alone and fought bravely to the bitter end after the Germans surrounded and
annihilated them.
143
1914_1020_02s: A Taste of Hell
This scenario obviously covers the Armentieres and La Bassee sector but is named “La
Bassee” since the majority of the hard fighting occurred to the north and west of this
town around Neuve Chappelle. It is also named “La Bassee” because, quite simply,
“La_Bassee-Armentieres” does not fit in the File Selection Dialog box.
This is the short version of the battle which ends on the 23rd of October, essentially at the
end of the first onslaught. Given the objectives of the first phase, there are no exit hexes
to the north of the map nor is there an objective in Estaires (see
#1914_1020_01s_Campaign_La_Bassee).
This battle was to be the scene for the death of the British 2/Royal Irish. On October
19th, the regiment had launched a gallant attack, in which it lost over 200 men, and
seized the town of Le Pilly. The French cavalry, from the Ier Corps de Cavalerie, were
supposed to cover the unit's flank as it simultaneously attacked towards the town of
Fournes. However, the French had difficulty meeting their objectives and the Irish were
left to stand alone and fought bravely to the bitter end after the Germans surrounded and
annihilated them.
144
1914_1025_01s: The Salient Pushes Back
This scenario ends on the 28th of October where the #1914_1029_01s_Ypres scenario
resumes the battle.
The British 1st Division was in the process of being relieved by the French and was
falling back to the vicinity of Ypres to rest. This division had been single handedly
holding back the German XXIII.Reservekorps for four days and had been bombarded all
throughout the night on the 24th when it was supposed to be extricated. As a result, the
division was in poor shape and it had only begun to pull out of the line in the early
morning hours of the 25th, and it was not until 0800 that the division was fully clear of
the line.
Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses
of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion
in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary
delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the
Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this type of congestion would be driven off
by any German advance into the area.
145
1914_1029_01s: Enter the Conqueror
This scenario ends at the end of the 10th of November where the #1914_1110_01s_Ypres
scenario resumes the battle.
Historically, the massive German offensive by Heersgruppe.Fabeck was to commence on
the 30th of October. On the 29th, a German attack commenced to take Gheluvet by the
XXVII.Reservekorps, supported by the newly formed 6.bayer.Reserve-Div. The German
cavalry of HKK.1, 2 and 4 were also to advance and pin the enemy in place. All of these
attacks were primarily intended to cover the buildup of Armeegruppe Fabeck and the
attack of it on the 30th was made in complete surprise.
After the German infantry divisions began to take over the front line from the cavalry
divisions along the Lys Canal on the evening of the 30th of October, most of the German
cavalry divisions were pulled back into reserve north of Lille (in this map area). This
reserve of cavalry was intended to be called up to exploit a breakthrough or to fill in and
cover the flanks of the spearhead that would be formed by Armeegruppe Fabeck.
The French 32e Division d’Infanterie, which arrived on the 30th of October, was split up
piece meal and sent to each place in the line where the Germans were threatening to
breakthrough. Of primary importance was an entire brigade of infantry and some artillery
that were rushed to the British Cavalry Corps sector near Wyschaete.
The BEF 7th Division, battered and exhausted, began to move into reserve on the 5th of
November. On the 6th, the 20th Infantry Brigade from this division was moved west off
the map to Meteren and the Northumberland Hussars and various division assets followed
the next day. These units have a chance of withdrawal at the start of their respective
dates, so the Allied player needs to adjust accordingly.
146
Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses
of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion
in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary
delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the
Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this type of congestion would be driven off
by any German advance into the area.
147
1914_1110_01s: Last Chance for Glory
During the 10th of November, the battered 22nd Infantry Brigade of the BEF 7th
Division moved west to Merris into reserve, southwest of Bailleul, off map and out of
sector. This unit joined the other elements of the division out of sector, minus the 21st
Infantry Brigade which was in the line at Ploegsteert. These off map units remained for
the duration of the Ypres battle. Thus, the 22nd Infantry Brigade has a chance of
withdrawal their respective day.
Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses
of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion
in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary
delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the
Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this type of congestion would be driven off
by any German advance into the area.
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1914_1111_01s: The Prussian Guard's Grand Finale
This scenario begins after the fierce two hour (stockpiled) German heavy artillery
bombardment of the allied line in this sector, thus most of the German artillery is low on
ammo/unavailable.
The scenario occurs near the end of 1914 where both sides were running low on supplies.
Firing in this scenario will most likely cause the unit to go low on ammo and thus, reduce
its assault rating. This is something the German user should keep in mind, since you will
want to maximize your assault power. Fire with disrupted units that cannot assault, or
with MG, field guns, and artillery and use the other good order units only for assaults.
Technically, the Prussian Guard did not have special assignment to issue the “knock out
blow” or “main attack” on the Ypres salient, but given that the Guard division and the
4.Infanterie-Division were both fresh and elite troops, and given their placement in the
center of the line, high expectations were naturally placed upon them to help deliver the
decisive result.
Tragically, and wastefully, the Prussian Guard was shot down en masse by accurate rifle
and machine gun fire and was, in all practicality, utterly destroyed. When the battle
subsided and the remnants of the Prussian Guard withdrew, they were unaware that they
had come perilously close to smashing through the final British defenses, the only thing
lying between them and the Channel coast were a handful of weakened units. The Guard
would go on to fight in the remainder of the war, but the organization would always be
just a shadow of its former glory.
While there are many reasons for the failure of the Prussian Guard attack, one of the
primary reasons for their failure was from the fact that the Guard had divergent attack
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orders to the north and west, rather than convergent orders to overrun any one part of the
British line. The German player can of course attack however they like, and possibly
achieve success, but the British player may also reinforce his line in his own way to
counter it (thus a convergent attack may not always work either, either case depends on
how the enemy reacts).
Congestion markers are used around Ypres to represent the congestion caused by masses
of rear area personnel and support units moving in and out of the small area. Congestion
in this area is specifically mentioned in official British historical accounts as the primary
delaying factor to the units moving in and out of the salient. Congestion only affects the
Allied Powers side since it is rationalized that this type of congestion would be driven off
by any German advance into the area.
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Grand Campaign Notes The "Grand Campaign" is a series of scenarios that are intended to be played in sequence,
with the result of each deciding which scenario to play next and, eventually, collectively
deciding the outcome of the war. All Grand Campaign scenarios are intended to be
played as head-to-head with another player (or as a team game with a group of players).
The goal of the Grand Campaign is to provide a fun way to explore the history of the war
by providing influential outcomes, continuity and, occasionally through the use of the
Strategy and Operations feature, some historically based decision making. The intent is
that the players feel as if they are working towards an overall objective rather than just
playing a series of otherwise unrelated scenarios, and to allow some a-historical "what-if"
situations to be explored where certain decisions can carry far reaching consequences.
Note that Grand Campaign scenarios sometimes feature MASSIVE amounts of
reinforcements from Strategy and Operations selections. It is recommended that you
utilize the "Place All" button in the Reinforcement Dialog when placing large amounts of
reinforcements.
Campaign Outcome (Campaign Victory Points - CVPs)
The Grand Campaign is intended to be played across all available games in the First
World War Campaigns series, and is designed around the accumulation of "campaign
victory points". The sum total of Campaign Victory Points (CVPs) is what decides the
outcome of the campaign.
Note that some minimal and simple bookkeeping is required for the campaign to keep
track of the CVP total and progress and, if the "CVPs for prelude scenarios" optional rule
is used, the number of prelude scenario major victories per side (see Optional Rule: CVPs
for Prelude Scenarios. ).
At the start of the campaign, there are 0 CVPs; the CVP scale (above) starts in the center
at zero. After each campaign scenario is played, CVPs may be obtained from the result
and the Campaign Victory Point level is updated: when one side obtains points the scale
moves in that direction and when the other side obtains points then the scale moves back
in the opposite direction, and so on. For example, if the first campaign scenario result was
+2 CVPs for Central Powers, and the second campaign scenario result is -2 CVPs for
Allied Powers, then the new running total is now 0 CVPs (+2 then -2 = 0).
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Once the Central Powers reach a total of +FOUR Victory Points or when the Allied
Powers reach -FOUR Victory Points then the Grand Campaign is over: that side
has won the war (the opposing side has capitulated)! If this has not occurred then
the Grand Campaign is so far inconclusive and continues on (the CVP total carries
on through the entire campaign and never "resets").
Note that all campaign scenarios do not provide the same amount of CVPs to the winner,
and this represents the fact that some campaigns had greater importance on the outcome
of the war. Also, some campaign scenarios may provide asymmetrical amounts of CVPs
to the winner and loser and may provide no CVPs for minor victories. This asymmetrical
CVP awarding is by design and represents the occasional asymmetrical level of
importance of certain battles.
Some scenarios have Strategy and Operations selections that must match between several
campaigns scenarios (it specifically mentions this on the strategy and in the scenario's
notes in this document). The side that has these choices is bound by honor to make
selections that are consistent between the scenarios. If it is determined that those
selections were not consistent, then that side has forfeited both scenarios and the other
side is given a Major Victory result. However, if a the Grand Campaign ends in a forfeit
loss, the winning side can choose to have the campaign continue for one additional battle
to see if the opposing side can push the CVP scale back and remain in the fight.
Optional Prelude Scenarios (and CVPs for Prelude Scenarios)
Prelude scenarios are scenarios that occur in the time period before and between the
various campaign scenarios, and these are specifically mentioned in the "Prelude
Scenarios" notes section for each individual Grand Campaign scenario. Prelude scenarios
can either be skipped or played for fun (for the sake of getting the "whole picture" of the
war). Alternatively, if both sides prefer that the prelude scenario results should influence
the outcome of the campaign, then the "CVPs for Prelude Scenarios" optional rule can be
used (see below).
Optional Rule: CVPs for Prelude Scenarios. If both sides agree, the results of the optional
prelude scenarios can provide some minor influence the outcome of the campaign by
introducing the possibility that CVPs may be rewarded for achieving a string of decisive
victories. The process is as follows:
Keep track of each Major Victory obtained by both sides in the prelude scenarios
in a running total. These are called Campaign Prelude Points (CPP).
Each CPP gained cancels out one CPP from the other side's total (but their CPP
total can never drop below 0).
The moment a side has obtained FIVE total CPPs, that side gets one Campaign
Victory Point (CVP) in their favor (i.e. Central Powers: +1 CVP or Allied
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Powers: -1 CVP) and then that side's CPP total count is reset back to 0 (the
enemy's CPP count is NOT reset to 0 when this happens however).
Carry the total CPP count over throughout the Grand Campaign (from the France
'14 prelude scenarios to the East Prussia '14 prelude scenarios, and so on).
Example 1:
The Central Powers win three major victories in prelude scenarios before the Allied
Powers win any major victories. Central Powers have 3 CPP. If the Central Powers can
obtain two more major victories then they will gain a CVP and their CPP count returns
back to 0 and the process begins again.
Example 2:
Continuing on the above example where the Central Powers have a total of 3 CPP, if the
Allied Powers can win a major victory before the Central Powers could win those other
two, then the Allied Powers would have 1 CPP, and Central Powers would have 2 CPP
(3-1 = 2).
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Grand Campaign Scenario Progression Tree version: 21 May 2014
(supersedes all previous versions)
It is important to note that although the Grand Campaign Scenario Progression Tree defines which
scenarios to play in what order and which scenario to start from, the campaign is NOT intended to be rigid.
Both sides can agree to start the campaign at any point in the tree, can skip scenarios if they want, or can
agree on a result for a specific scenario and move forward. For a shorter campaign, both sides can agree to
end the campaign after a certain scenario and then whoever is in the lead on the CVP scale can be declared
as the winner.
F14-A EP14-A F14-A is the START scenario.
Normally EP-14A is played after F14-A, but it can be played simultaneously (recommended).
Do not proceed further until both are resolved!
F14-B* Skipped if either side obtained a Major Victory in F14-A.
F14-C EP14-B Normally EP-14B is played after F14-C, but it can be played simultaneously (recommended).
Do not proceed further until both are resolved!
EP14-C
stalemate If neither side has achieved enough CVPs to win, then the campaign is so far inconclusive (a draw).
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Legend:
BLUE = Western Front
GREEN = Eastern Front
* = sometimes skipped
grouped on same line = can be played simultaneously, otherwise play in sequence from
left to right and top to bottom (be sure to check the notes for each scenario for any
prelude scenarios in between)
Notes:
1. The Grand Campaign may be expanded in future titles, at which point players can
go back and play any scenarios that were newly added to the tree. In the case
where additional scenarios might be added to the end of the tree, players can
decide to resume their Grand Campaign and continue on playing the new
scenarios with their CVP total.
2. The ideal situation is to play the Grand Campaign with a group of players and,
even better, several teams of players with each team specific to a certain front.
The next ideal situation would to have the same players play all fronts but at least
have a different player act as the overall commander in each front. The least
preferred situation would be for two people to play the entire Grand Campaign
one scenario at a time (this would not be impossible, but it would take a lot of
effort and time).
3. The campaign tree only exists as a graphical representation to show the flow of
the campaign, in order to view the long term path of the campaign. Each Grand
Campaign scenario's notes section specifies which scenario Grand Campaign
scenario to play next so that you are not required to study the tree after each
result.
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GRAND CAMPAIGN SCENARIOS
1914: The Grand Campaign (scenario F14-A)
This scenario is part of the Grand Campaign series, designed to cover all campaigns in
the First World War series with the outcome of the war being decided by scenario results.
This particular scenario is based on the #1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario,
most of the notes regarding that scenario still apply and should be referenced before
playing.
Although both sides can agree to start the Grand Campaign at any scenario, this scenario
is intended to be played FIRST. However, this scenario can be played simultaneously
with the East Prussia '14 scenario #1914_Grand_Campaign_EP14-A (Ideally it should be
played as a team effort with one team playing this scenario, and another team
simultaneously playing the other.)
Other than the different scenario description text, the following differences between this
scenario and #1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early are:
This scenario begins seven days earlier on the 15th, in the period where some of
the armies were still concentrating and when the German armies just began to
advance into Belgium and France.
Numerous Strategy and Operations selections are added based on the various
historical war plan options, strategic force movements between fronts, and army
concentration options.
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The German exit hex has been removed from 412,329 (Epinal), and in its place a
1500 point objective has been added at Neufchateau (346,321) and at Joinville
(298,312). This was done because in the standard campaign the Nancy area is
well fortified and heavily occupied, so there isn't much hope to push through
south of Toul, so the incentive for the Germans to push hard in that area is to
invest Epinal to the south, which would help push back the French forces off the
map to the southeast. In this campaign, the Germans actually could push through
south of Toul due to the different war plans that can be chosen, and now there is
an incentive to consider it as these two added objectives are essentially "bread
crumbs" leading into the VP rich area towards Paris.
The objectives and VP levels and values are based on "version 3" of the
#1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario.
Be sure to check for corps attachments on the midnight turn of first day, as many reserve
units are assigned to GHQ/OHL reserves and need to be assigned to the army formation
of your choice.
Prelude Scenarios
The following is a list of optional "prelude" scenarios that can be played before this
particular Grand Campaign scenario is played. The results of these prelude scenarios are
just for fun and have no effect on the outcome of the Grand Campaign, unless the "VPs
for prelude scenarios" optional rule is used (see Optional Rule: CVPs for Prelude
Scenarios. ). As many or as few of these scenarios can be played as desired:
(France '14)
#1914_0804_01s_Liege
#1914_0812_01s_Haelen
#1914_0815_01s_Dinant
Strategies and Operations
This section covers a description of the various Strategy and Operations selections
available during this Grand Campaign scenario. Careful thought and consideration has
gone into determining the grand strategic and operational selections in the campaign.
Please read these notes about the different choices and choose your selections carefully.
Central Powers ---Plan of Attack---
!(selection must match in #1914_Grand_Campaign_EP14-A or forfeit both)!
Plan 1905 (Massive wing, neglect Russia)
Massive attacking right (north) wing
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Minimal forces in East Prussia, the Germans will rely primarily on Landwehr
formations drawn from the surrounding region to conduct a purely defensive
campaign (II.LK is utilized, and Hauptreserve Posen arrives sooner), Germans are
initially deployed in a more defensive stance in East Prussia
Less defense on the German left (south) wing in France, and no historical counter
offensive into Lorraine on AUG 20th, therefore no additional reinforcements will
arrive
Allows a moderate amount of additional French reinforcements from the Ière
Armée to arrive later in the campaign from the Vosges sector after the French
would have adjusted to the situation
HKK.3 attached to the 3.Armee
Ersatz divisions deployed behind the attacking right wing in France
16 Landwehr brigades deployed behind the attacking right wing in France
Two corps from East Prussia deployed with the attacking right wing in France
(XVII.AK & XX.AK)
Violation of Dutch neutrality: 1.Armee is accelerated in their approach march by
a day, but one corps lost as a Dutch observation force (IX.RK)
Aggressively tries to win in France, while all but giving up East Prussia, but can
also be vulnerable to Allied war plans that place the bulk of their forces in
Belgium
Plan 1912 (Strong wing, partially neglect Russia)
Strong attacking right (north) wing
Light defense in East Prussia, the Germans will rely more on Landwehr
formations drawn from the surrounding region to conduct a mostly defensive
campaign (II.LK is utilized), Germans are initially deployed in a more defensive
stance in East Prussia
Moderate defensive left (south) wing in France, capable of launching a secondary
Cannae type offensive; historical offensive into Lorraine occurs on August 20th,
bringing additional forces to the area from just off the east side of the map
Allows some minor additional French reinforcements from the Ière Armée to
arrive later in the campaign from the Vosges sector after the French would have
adjusted to the situation
Ersatz divisions deployed behind the attacking right wing in France
16 Landwehr brigades deployed behind the attacking right wing in France
One corps from East Prussia deployed with left wing in France for a possible
Cannae type two pronged offensive (XX.AK)
Violation of Dutch neutrality: 1.Armee is accelerated in their approach march by
a day, but one corps lost as a Dutch observation force (IX.RK)
Possibly vulnerable to certain types of Allied war plans, but still concentrates on a
higher chance of victory in France above all else
Plan 1914 (Moderate wing, do not neglect Russia) (historical)
Moderate attacking right (north) wing
Moderate defense in East Prussia, able to conduct counter offensive operations
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Strong defensive left (south) wing in France, extremely capable of launching a
secondary Cannae type offensive which could be quite successful against a
cautious French plan of defense (XVI), or a successful diversion to the attacking
wing; historical offensive into Lorraine occurs on August 20th, bringing
additional forces to the area from just off the east side of the map
No additional French reinforcements from Ière Armée, due to the fact that the
Germans are so strong in the Alsace-Lorraine sector
Ersatz divisions deployed behind the mostly defensive left wing in France
8 Landwehr brigades deployed behind the attacking right wing in France
Conservatively organizes strength to counter all possible Allied war plans, while
sacrificing a higher chance of victory in France
Notes:
1. The Allies should look for the appearance of either the XVII.Armeekorps or the XX.Armeekorps
in both F14-A and EP14-A. If either of these corps appears in both, then the S|O selections do not
match, and the Central Powers have forfeited both scenarios.
2. Plan 1912 is an estimate and it represents the fact that von Schlieffen revised his plans every year
after his retirement in 1906, until his death in 1912. It is rationalized that his final revision would
have been something of a mix between the more aggressive Plan 1906, and the more conservative
Plan 1914. Essentially the 1912 plan recognizes the fact that Russian mobilization speeds were far
exceeding the original 1906 plan, which was of grave concern to the Germans.
3. No matter what, the historical reinforcements will be sent to East Prussia on the 26th of August.
However, the Germans can decide to bring those reinforcements back to France with the
"Reinforcements from Western Front" strategy (see below).
4. Players may be surprised to discover that although Plan 1912 and 1906 are more aggressive than
Plan 1914, neither is not completely better than Plan 1914, just different. Plan 1914 has its own
inherent strength: it plays a safe hand. What Plan 1914 has going for it is that it tries to be safe in
all places, which has an effect of minimizing risk and avoiding the possibility of a quick
campaign-terminating series of defeats. Of course being safe everywhere also means that Plan
1914 is not likely to result in a quick campaign-terminating series of Central Powers victories
either, but Plan 1914 is likely to give the Central Powers longer legs because it decreases the
possibility of losing in all places. When choosing the more aggressive Plan 1906 and 1912, East
Prussia is almost a guaranteed loss (or at least victory is unlikely), and if a major victory cannot
also be obtained in France then the result may be a disaster (because the possibility would then
exist that the Allied Powers could obtain a total of -4 CVPs at worst). Alternatively, with Plan
1914, the possibility of victory in East Prussia is much more likely, and a minor victory is still
possible in France. Another possibility is that with the aggressive Plan 1906 and 1912, the
Germans could achieve a major victory in France (+2 CVPs) but suffer a major defeat in East
Prussia (-2 CVPs), with no ground gained. With Plan 1914's greater strength in East Prussia, a
major win there (+1 CVP) with a minor victory in France (+1 CVP), or a draw in France (+0 CVP)
would still see the Central Powers in the lead.
5. The ideal Central Powers counter to Plan Michel would be to attack heavily in the Verdun-Toul-
Nancy sectors, either via a plan of attack that does this, or by recognizing the French war plan and
redeploying forces to the south. Doing this will open up the south and allow the valuable swath of
objectives to be captures in a sweeping movement similar to the Franco-Prussian War campaign.
Central Powers ---Reinforcements from Western Front---
!(selection must match in #Grand_Campaign_EP14-A or forfeit both)!
Continue on to East Prussia (historical)
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The Gardereservekorps, XI.Armeekorps and 8.Kavallerie-Division continue on to
East Prussia and, with the matching selection in #1914_Grand_Campaign_EP14-
A, these forces will arrive there to assist in the battle
Reinforcements redirected back to France
The Gardereservekorps, XI.Armeekorps and 8.Kavallerie-Division are redirect
back to France and, with the matching selection in
#1914_Grand_Campaign_EP14-A, these forces will not arrive in East Prussia.
Although these units will return to France, they will be delayed by one day after
they would have historically arrived in East; this delay represents the disruption
that the change of decision would have caused to the rail network (rail scheduling
was difficult to change and often it was easier to go all the way to the planned
destination THEN turn around and go back)
Because of the delay and the fact that these units were moving through Germany,
these units arrive back in France rested and at full strength; this represents them
using the one day delay to take on reinforcements, plus the natural reinforcements
they would have taken on during their normal redeployment
The air units from these two corps are not returned back to France, as it is
rationalized that these units would not have had time to setup operations again
before the end of the campaign
This selection represents a hypothetical situation where OHL changed its mind,
and halted, then returned the reinforcements back to France; Essentially it allows
the Central Powers overall commander to decide where these forces are most
needed -- either arrive in East Prussia on time, or return to France in hope to use
them in the closing moments of the battle there
Notes:
1. After the 1st of September, the Allies should look for the appearance of either the
Gardereservekrops, XI.Armeekorps, or 8.Kavallerie-Division in both F14-A and EP14-A. If
any of these units appear in both scenarios after that date, then the S|O selections do not
match, and the Central Powers have forfeited both scenarios. (These units start the campaign
in F14-A and are withdrawn in late August, then may either return back to F14-A or be
transferred to EP-14A at the beginning of September - they may not appear in both campaigns
in September!).
Allied Powers ---Plan of Defense--- Plan Michel: defensive, reinforce Belgium and hold Lorraine
Ière & IIe Armées will NOT attack into Alsace (off map), therefore units that
would have participated in the attack will instead start the campaign on map,
uncommitted, and will not arrive as exhausted reinforcements from the east of
Nancy
IIe Armée begins in a defensive arrangement between Verdun to Nancy
IIIe, IVe, Ve Armées deployed between Lille and Rethel, ready to immediately
advance into Belgium and assist in the defense and counterattack, if possible
Ier Corps d' Armée and 8e Brigade deployed with the rest of Ve Armée
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37e and 38e Division d' Infanterie deployed as a GQG reserve, staged to embark
on rail transport if need be
Corps de Cavalerie (Sordet) deployed as a reconnaissance force on the left flank,
ready to advance into Belgium and fully rested
All reserve divisions are evenly distributed between the armies and deployed
behind active forces ready to act as an integrated tactical reserve
Affords the French commander two main options: advance into Belgium to
counter the German advance, or deploy on the French border and fortify before
the Germans arrive
Cautious plan placing the bulk of French forces on the Franco-Belgian border
between Lille and Rethel, ready to move northeast to assist the Belgians in the
defense, and the remainder of French forces are placed on the defense along the
Franco-German border (in the Verdun and Nancy sectors), giving up all
possibility of winning a sudden victory from an attack into the Ardennes and
around Metz but focused on stopping a German sweeping movement through
Belgium; above all this plan seeks to avoid or minimize the possibility of being
enveloped by a German attack through Belgium, so it is best used against a very
aggressive German plan of attack (1905), but the disadvantage of this plan is that
it is vulnerable to a cautious German plan of attack (1914) that pushes heavily in
Lorraine (which is something Michel believed would not be probable)
Plan XVII: offensive, IVe Armée in reserve
Ière & IIe Armées will attack in Alsace-Lorraine region (off map), therefore units
which are committed to the historical offensive off map will arrive east of Nancy
on the 20th as exhausted reinforcements (be sure to check the reinforcement
dialog for their arrival and make sure to secure their area, or risk additional
losses)
French armies begin in a mobile offensive arrangement, approaching the frontier
with the IVe Armée deployed in reserve behind the other armies, but it is ready to
move immediately
IIIe and Ve Armées are temporarily fixed to allow for the other armies to
advance, otherwise the gift of hindsight would make things unfair to the German
armies which begin the campaign as fixed and waiting for the wing armies to
make progress
Ier Corps d' Armée deployed with the rest of Ve Armée and is released early so
that they can either move to aid the Belgians at Namur and block the Meuse River
crossings, or advance into the Ardennes to act as an advance guard to the rest of
the Ve Armée
37e and 38e Division d' Infanterie deployed in mobile positions in reserve with
the IVe Armée and ready to move via rail
Corps de Cavalerie (Sordet) and 8e Brigade deployed to reconnoiter the front and
left flank of the advancing French armies and partially fatigued from conducting
conservative reconnaissance across the Belgian border
Conservative plan of attack allowing flexibility to adjust as the situation requires
with the uncommitted centrally located strategic reserve IVe Armée which can be
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used to the bolster the attack in the Ardennes or in Lorraine (Nancy sector), or
materialize an attack on Metz, or move to the left flank as a covering force
Plan XVII Amended: full offensive, all armies forward (historical)
Ière & IIe Armées will attack in Alsace-Lorraine region (off map), therefore units
which are committed to the historical offensive off map will arrive east of Nancy
on the 20th as exhausted reinforcements (be sure to check the reinforcement
dialog for their arrival and make sure to secure their area, or risk additional
losses)
French armies begin in a mobile offensive arrangement, approaching the frontier
with the Ve Armée deployed on the left (western) flank poised to march into
lower Belgium, and the IVe Armée on the front line in between the IIIe and Ve
Armées preparing to attack into the Ardennes.
IIIe and IVe Armées are temporarily fixed to allow for the other armies to
advance, otherwise the gift of hindsight would make things unfair to the German
armies which begin the campaign as fixed and waiting for the wing armies to
make progress
Ier Corps d' Armée and 8e Brigade deployed to lower Belgium, south of Namur
along the Meuse
37e and 38e Division d' Infanterie deployed south of Charleroi in support/reserve
of Ier Corps d' Armée
Corps de Cavalerie (Sordet) arrives south of Charleroi and exhausted and greatly
disorganized from conducting aggressive but uneventful reconnaissance towards
the Belgian-German frontier
Aggressive plan of attack, committing all armies to the front line making them
vulnerable to certain German war plans, but also bringing the total weight of
French strength to the battle quickly and across the widest frontage
Notes:
1. Plan Michel is essentially General Victor Michel's proposed version of the plan that would have
replaced the antiquated Plan XVI, and would have become Plan XVII. Since this plan was never
officially approved, some of it is an educated guess based on second hand description. General
Michel was the Chief of the General's Staff until being relieved by the War Minister, Adolphe
Messimy, in 1911. Michael proposed a plan which stated that the most probable German axis of
attack would be through "the whole of Belgium", given that the Franco-German border was
heavily fortified, and the fact that the Germans were unlikely to repeat their Franco-Prussian War
plan as it would be too predictable. With that in mind, the Michel Plan called for a defensive force
along the Franco-German border in Lorraine with no offensive into Germany, defensive forces
between Verdun and Toul, and the bulk of the army along the Franco-Belgian border from Rethel
to Lille. When war broke out, the force between Rethel to Lille would advance northeast into
Belgium in order to assist the Belgians in defense and to oppose the German main push, and
advance like a large wheel pivoting on Verdun. The hope was that the French Army would
advance until contact was made with the Germans, then assist the Belgians in the defense thus
forming a continuous line Antwerp-Namur-Verdun-Toul-Epinal, and if the situation turned sour
then the French armies would begin to fall back in a counter clockwise pivot on Verdun. Also,
since much of the war would be waged on Belgian soil, it was thought that it would leave more
room for French forces to withdraw under pressure before the Germans could reach Paris. In any
case, when Michael proposed his plan it was looked at as insanity because of the fact that it was
mostly defensive in nature in the sense that it did not take the war directly to German soil, and
popular sentiment in the French Army at the time was clearly oriented towards establishing and
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maintaining the offensive into enemy territory, mostly due to the disastrous Franco-Prussian War
of 1870 where the French Army was almost always on the defensive and never holding the
initiative. It was a twist of fate that Michel's plan did not become Plan XVII, and that Michel was
relieved of command. This operational selection rationalizes that the opposite happened:
cautiousness prevailed and Michel's plan was adopted, however it is assumed that Joffre still
assumed command prior to 1914 to carry out Plan Michel.
2. It is important to note that Plan Michel was not completely defensive in nature. Popular history
has painted Michel as a level headed defensive minded general with sage like clairvoyance to see
into the future and predict the perfect passive counter to the so called Schlieffen Plan. However,
Michel's Plan still took the fight to the Germans in an early offensive, only that the initial
offensive was moved from Alsace-Lorraine to Belgium. This carries its own set of advantages and
disadvantages depending on the German plan of attack, and it is unclear if Michel's Plan would
have meant much difference in the outcome of the campaign. It is provided here in this Grand
Campaign scenario as a historical "what-if" in order to test the thesis that it would have been
better (or worse) than the historical Plan XVII.
3. One of Plan Michel's provisions was a complete reorganization of the reserves, in that they would
be better integrated into the active army ranks upon mobilization, thereby doubling the size of
each active division. This too was frowned upon by high ranking officials in the French Army
because the reserves were looked at with contempt, and it was thought that any integration would
dull the offensive capability of the active French Army. Many believed that the reserve force was
only capable at defensive operations and this mentality transferred into neglect, which was sort of
a self fulfilling prophecy and is in stark contrast to the integrated and extremely effective reserve
system in the German Army. That said, Plan Michel does not completely reorganize the French
Army in this scenario, but rather, the reserve infantry divisions are more evenly spread between
the armies as a tactical reserve.
4. The ideal Central Powers counter to Plan Michel would be to attack heavily in the Verdun-Toul-
Nancy sectors, either via a plan of attack that supports this, or by recognizing the French war plan
and redeploying forces to the south. Doing this will open up the south and allow the valuable
swath of objectives to be captured in a sweeping movement similar to the Franco-Prussian War
campaign. The French would then have to counter by rail moving reinforcements to the area.
Allied Powers ---BEF Concentration--- Deploy in western Belgium (landed at Oostende)
Cautiously deploys to provide immediate assistance to the Belgians on the 17th,
which allows the BEF to come into action sooner and allowing for a possible joint
Anglo-Belgian counter attack or flanking distraction, but also carries the risk that
the BEF may be trapped in Antwerp or against the English Channel and made
irrelevant or even destroyed
In reserve at Amiens
Cautiously deploys to the rear at Amiens on the 19th, giving up terrain but
matching any cautious French war plan which seeks to develop the situation
before committing to any decisive action
Deploy at Mons (historical)
Aggressively deployed to cover the left flank of the French armies at Mons on the
22nd, with the intent of establishing a continuous front in the event of an
aggressive French war plan
Notes:
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1. There are intentionally no supply sources located in Oostende. This is because there were no
large harbors in the area to support heavy resupply, so it should be taken into account when
this deployment is selected. Essentially the BEF must draw on supply from other sources, so
they have to take special care not to end up in a situation where they are cut off from both
Antwerp and the map edges sources to the west and south.
Scenario Results
The German invasion of France and Belgium is deemed as a battle of equally vital
importance for both sides. Achieving a major victory during this campaign would have
greatly altered the outcome of the war and because of that, the CVP values are substantial
and symmetrical. The historical outcome of this battle is considered to be a Draw.
If EP14-A is NOT being played simultaneously:
Central Powers Major Victory: +2 Campaign Victory Points to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-A
Central Powers Minor Victory: +1 Campaign Victory Point to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-A
Draw: no Campaign Victory Points to either side
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-A
Allied Powers Minor Victory: -1 Campaign Victory Point to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-A
Allied Powers Major Victory or Central Powers forfeit: -2 Campaign Victory
Points to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-A
If EP14-A is being played simultaneously:
Central Powers Major Victory: +2 Campaign Victory Points to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-C (skip F14-B)
Central Powers Minor Victory: +1 Campaign Victory Point to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-B
Draw: no Campaign Victory Points to either side
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-B
Allied Powers Minor Victory: -1 Campaign Victory Point to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-B
Allied Powers Major Victory or Central Powers forfeit: -2 Campaign Victory
Points to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-C (skip F14-B)
164
1914: The Grand Campaign (scenario F14-B)
This scenario is part of the Grand Campaign series, designed to cover all campaigns in
the First World War series with the outcome of the war being decided by scenario results.
This particular scenario is based on the #1914_0917_01s_Campaign_Race scenario, most
of the notes regarding that scenario still apply and should be referenced before playing.
Although both sides can agree to start the Grand Campaign at any scenario, this scenario
is intended to be played after both the #1914_Grand_Campaign_F14-A and the East
Prussia '14 scenario #1914_Grand_Campaign_EP14-A and the results of both might
cause this scenario to be skipped (see those two scenarios for more information).
Prelude Scenarios
The following is a list of optional "prelude" scenarios that can be played before this
particular Grand Campaign scenario is played. The results of these prelude scenarios are
just for fun and have no effect on the outcome of the Grand Campaign, unless the "VPs
for prelude scenarios" optional rule is used (see Optional Rule: CVPs for Prelude
Scenarios. ). As many or as few of these scenarios can be played as desired:
(France '14)
#1914_0909_01s_Antwerp
#1914_0913_01s_Aisne
165
Strategies and Operations
None.
Scenario Results
The "Race to the Sea" is deemed as a battle of equal, but not vital, importance for both
sides. Achieving a victory during this campaign would have altered the outcome of the
campaign in France, but probably not the outcome of the entire war at this point. The
CVP values are minor and symmetrical. The historical outcome of this battle is
considered to be a Draw.
Central Powers Major Victory: +1 Campaign Victory Points to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-C (EP14-B can be played simultaneously)
Central Powers Minor Victory: +1 Campaign Victory Point to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-C (EP14-B can be played simultaneously)
Draw: no Campaign Victory Points to either side
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-C (EP14-B can be played simultaneously)
Allied Powers Minor Victory: -1 Campaign Victory Point to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-C (EP14-B can be played simultaneously)
Allied Powers Major Victory: -1 Campaign Victory Points to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_F14-C (EP14-B can be played simultaneously)
166
1914: The Grand Campaign (scenario F14-C)
This scenario is part of the Grand Campaign series, designed to cover all campaigns in
the First World War series with the outcome of the war being decided by scenario results.
This particular scenario is based on the #1914_1018_01s_Campaign_Flanders scenario,
most of the notes regarding that scenario still apply and should be referenced before
playing.
Although both sides can agree to start the Grand Campaign at any scenario, this scenario
is intended to be played after #1914_Grand_Campaign_F14-B. However, this scenario
can be played simultaneously with the East Prussia '14 scenario
#1914_Grand_Campaign_EP14-B (Ideally it should be played as a team effort with one
team playing this scenario, and another team simultaneously playing the other.)
Prelude Scenarios
The following is a list of optional "prelude" scenarios that can be played before this
particular Grand Campaign scenario is played. The results of these prelude scenarios are
just for fun and have no effect on the outcome of the Grand Campaign, unless the "VPs
for prelude scenarios" optional rule is used (see Optional Rule: CVPs for Prelude
Scenarios. ). As many or as few of these scenarios can be played as desired:
167
(France '14)
#1914_0919_01s_St_Mihiel
#1914_1001_01s_Antwerp
Strategies and Operations
None.
Scenario Results
The Battle of Flanders is deemed as a battle of equal, but not vital, importance for both
sides. Achieving a victory during this campaign would have altered the outcome of the
campaign in France, but probably not the outcome of the entire war at this point. The
CVP values are minor and symmetrical. The historical outcome of this battle is
considered to be a Draw.
If EP14-B is NOT being played simultaneously:
Central Powers Major Victory: +1 Campaign Victory Points to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-B
Central Powers Minor Victory: +1 Campaign Victory Point to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-B
Draw: no Campaign Victory Points to either side
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-B
Allied Powers Minor Victory: -1 Campaign Victory Point to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-B
Allied Powers Major Victory: -1 Campaign Victory Points to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-B
If EP14-B is being played simultaneously:
Central Powers Major Victory: +1 Campaign Victory Points to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-C
Central Powers Minor Victory: +1 Campaign Victory Point to Central Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-C
Draw: no Campaign Victory Points to either side
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-C
Allied Powers Minor Victory: -1 Campaign Victory Point to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-C
Allied Powers Major Victory: -1 Campaign Victory Points to Allied Powers
go to #Grand_Campaign_EP14-C
168
Gameplay tips
When to assault
The most important thing to know in First World War Campaigns, is when to
press home an assault and when not to assault. Generally speaking, you should of course
get accustomed to the particular strengths and weaknesses of the units in general. For
example, an infantry unit can almost always assault a mounted (Travel Mode) cavalry
unit, bicycle unit, or engineer unit with success without having to disrupt them before
hand. "Success" in this case is defined as taking the ground. You should also always to
have at least a 2:1 numerical advantage when making an assault, try to avoid numerical
1:1 assaults as much as possible.
In the case of enemy cavalry, you can usually tell whether it is a pesky cavalry
squadron or a full cavalry regiment by seeing what the effect is of their return fire. If the
enemy is deemed to be nothing more than a cavalry squadron, then you can press home
the assault to great effect, again without waiting for the enemy to be disrupted. This is
also true for engineer units which might also be broken down into companies. If you have
a pesky engineer unit barring the way somewhere, then simply overrun it with a massed
infantry assault and you can probably rest assure that the enemy is throwing "the kitchen
sink" in the line at this point if they are wasting engineer units in this manner.
And finally and most importantly, you should NEVER wait for field gun or
machine gun units to be disrupted before carrying out an assault. If said units are
disrupted then that is great, otherwise always try to disrupt the enemy infantry battalions
at the very least. In almost every case, all you need to do is disrupt the enemy infantry
169
battalions, then press forward with an assault of two or more infantry battalions of your
own. Such an assault will force the non disrupted field gun and machine gun units to bear
the brunt of the attack and will cause them to take significant losses. This can then be
followed by more assaults if possible to drive the enemy out of the hex. Either way, if
you are not able to take the hex then you have likely caused a great loss to the core
defense of the hex, thus making it easier to take in future turns or forcing the enemy to
withdraw on his own turn altogether.
Breaking contact, retreating
When attempting to fall back or retreat in the face of an overwhelming attack or
an unfavorable disposition, you have to first break contact with the enemy. Breaking
contact with a superior force can be tricky in a period of warfare where everything moves
at roughly the same speed, and is even trickier if your force is lower quality than the
enemy's force. When attempting to break contact, use any method necessary that puts the
most distance between your forces and the enemy. Use of a rear guard is vital in most
cases and cavalry and field artillery (field gun) units work particularly well at this task.
Cavalry and field artillery units can delay an enemy advance long enough to put some
distance between the advancing enemy infantry and friendly forces, then mount / limber
up and fall back to their next delay position which should be just behind the last friendly
infantry unit in the retreating force, thus repeating the process.
When your force contains inferior quality troops then you must take into account
that you will move slower than your pursuing enemy. This is also true if your force
contains a large number of disrupted or broken units. In either of these cases, you must
plan your retreat in advance, using good order units to act as a rear guard in order to give
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these slower units time to get a head start on the movement. You must also take care not
to stick around too long in any one place, lest you end up in a situation where it is
impossible for you to retreat back fast enough. In all of these cases, you should try to stay
close to primary roads as they are critical in your ability to fall back. Not taking these
things in consideration will result in the devastating loss of many an infantry battalion.
Understanding how night movement works in this series is also the key to
breaking contact. The best result is to prepare your units for movement and get them into
position to move strategically along the roads during the night turn. Cavalry and field gun
units can be placed at key road junctions to block any enemy units that try to pursue
along the roads during the night. Night retreats come at the expense of a large amount of
extra fatigue, but occasionally this is necessary in order to safely extricate forces. Unless
it is in an emergency, avoid the temptation of holding a rear guard to the "last man" with
cavalry and field gun units. Doing so will definitely buy more time but will also reward
the enemy with a large number of victory points. If you are not careful, the victory points
the enemy gains from the careless loss of valuable cavalry and artillery guns can easily
make up for lost time and objectives.
The art of taking ground
Where possible, avoid direct assaults when trying to take ground from the enemy.
The best way to take ground is by simply making it untenable. On the attack, you make
ground untenable by pushing around the flanks of the strong point. By doing this you
leave the defender with two options: either displace and save the units or allow them to
be bypassed, isolated, and eventually destroyed. The act of making ground untenable can
be done at both the tactical level (divisions, brigades and battalions), but more
171
importantly it can be done at the strategic level with corps and armies. Always look at
"the big picture" to see where you can flank an entire enemy corps or army, thereby
forcing the defender to give up ground wholesale or by causing the destruction of an
entire army (which was the holy grail of objectives in the 1914 "early" campaign; in
game play terms, the destruction of an army could yield around 10,000 Victory Points!).
Getting tactical level "tunnel vision" and not recognizing strategic opportunities is the
most common cause of failure in a campaign.
Secondly, when on the offensive you should avoid concentrating your attack at
one point for a long period of time since this allows the enemy to reinforce that point
with units from nearby non-threatened areas. If possible you should consider limited
attacks around the central point of emphasis, and these limited attacks would have the
goal of simply tying the enemy in place where they cannot move to reinforce the main
attack. Another technique that works is demonstrations. Often you can demonstrate an
attack in area and tie down enemy forces in that area because they are forced to defend
against the looming attack that may or may not be carried out. For example, in the St-
Gond scenario, the German 1.Garde-Divsion intends to attack across the eastern edge of
Les Marais de St-Gond. However, doing so will allow the French in the immediate area
to the west to move to any threatened area and reinforce or relieve the defenders.
However, the 20.Infanterie-Division to the west can move south towards the enemy and
demonstrate that they are about to attack across the marsh, even if they do not intend on
doing so. The French are then forced to hold units in this area for an attack that may
proceed, thereby giving an easier time to the 1.Garde-Division to its east. If the French
ignore the demonstration then the 20.Infantrie-Division would be in a prime position to
172
continue its attack. This attack can proceed forward to the point that the French begins to
pay attention to the threat and shifts forces that way, whereby the Germans can pull back
the attack, and continue pushing with the 1.Garde-Division, or vice-versa. Think of these
types of maneuvers as a pin or skewer in chess.
Cyclist units, the use of
Use cyclist units for their high mobility on primary roads as a probing or
screening force. When the cyclist’s host unit is traveling in column, use the cyclists to
“orbit” the unit as it moves to get eyes on the enemy. This can be done by seeking out
good vantage points along the parent unit’s axis of advance. These cyclist units can also
move forward to secure key road junctions or bridges that the host unit needs to
accomplish its mission. Beware though, these cyclist units are not intended to hold
ground for too long; they should only be used to delay or probe if they are needed for
combat. Using cyclist units as some sort of rapid force to sweep behind the enemy for
isolation is a waste; cyclist units used in this manner will likely be easily overrun by an
assault from cavalry or any line infantry battalion. Also, be sure not to advance cyclist
units too far in Travel Mode, it is better to move them just far enough that they can
quickly retire or that they can deploy at the end of the turn. A Travel Mode cyclist unit
that ends its turn in contact with the enemy is a dead cyclist unit. It is intentional that
cyclist units are not “recon” units that are capable of Recon Spotting; cyclist units are
intended to be supplemental and to work in conjunction with reconnaissance capable
cavalry.
Another important use of cyclist units is to have these units be the ones who
conduct "Patrolling". These units can be useful to move quickly to an area, hide in a
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forest or get behind a hill, then patrol to see if there are any enemy units within two
hexes. Obviously this works best when there is a terrain type or elevation in front of the
cyclist unit to where it does not have a line of sight to the second hex. Cyclist units are
also great units to devote to "Patrolling" during night turns. This can be done in places
where they are stacked with a rear guard force, or in places where they are stacked with
line units on the front line. In this way, you can have a sort of early warning on enemy
movements that are two hexes distant during night turns. It is important to remember that
other units can patrol as well, it is not a unique ability for cyclist units. Cavalry should be
used to patrol to good effect, and line infantry units can certainly patrol, but it is
suggested that cyclist units be used to patrol so that other units, such as infantry and
cavalry units, can be freed up to do other important tasks, and so that they are not left in a
weakened state such as what occurs when "patrolling". A stacked cyclist unit that is
patrolling is secured by the stacked infantry or cavalry unit, while the infantry or cavalry
unit rests, digs in, or engages the enemy.
Rail lines, the use of
Do not underestimate the importance of rail roads. Rail lines were particularly
vital during this period of warfare for the rapid movement of troops and materials. Care
should be taken to protect rail lines with detachments of lines of communication troops to
ensure that the rail lines are not obstructed or cut. Rail lines are primarily used for
transporting complete corps from one sector of the front to another, but are also important
for the mobility of some siege guns. When explicit supply is used, rail lines should be
utilized to the fullest to transport supply units quickly to front. These supply units will
arrive on map at major roads and should be moved to the nearest railhead and sent
174
forward. Originally it was planned to make separate rail type supply units but this was
abandoned because these types of units would be totally restricted to rail lines. Instead,
the user has the freedom to move the explicit supply units by rail (as long as the rail
capacity for that side is not exceeded) and unload and continue to move them when
necessary. If an army loses access to a rail line then it can quickly become detached from
the overall strategic situation and runs the risk of being defeated by an opposing army
that has access to a rail line.
Playing as the French
Playing the French in 1914 is not for the faint-hearted. The French in “early”
battles of France'14 are best utilized in massed bayonet assaults on the enemy, supported
by or preceded by bombardments from their rapid firing field guns. French infantry unit
ratings are directly representative of their doctrine, and their somewhat flawed
equipment. Direct fire with their infantry should only be done in order to disrupt the
enemy, or when in good defensive positions. The French should rely almost exclusively
on their excellent 76mm field guns to cause casualties and disrupt attacking enemy
infantry. The MG sections can also be useful to strengthen its parent infantry battalions
footing in the defense.
When you are on the offensive and you find yourself facing murderous defensive
fire, sometimes it is better for French infantry to give the bayonet and carry out the
assault before the enemy is completely disrupted (as long as you outnumber the defenders
at least by 3:1). Knowing when to do this and when to back down is crucial. Such is the
dilemma when learning to deal with the advantages and disadvantages inherent with the
"cult of the offensive”. Try to avoid stacking more than two infantry battalions in a single
175
hex if it can be avoided so that you limit your losses from retaliatory fire. In most cases it
is better to keep infantry battalions in reserve to push forward and assault en masse at the
right moment, rather than having them massed adjacent to the enemy at all times.
Keep in mind that as you retreat your supply lines retract and improve. This
means that the closer you pull back a unit then the better their replacement rate might be
(depending on how low your supply level is at the extremities of your front). Once you
reach the historical battle of the Marne location you should be gaining much needed
replacements and supplies which were historically the case as fresh troops were arriving
from the close depots. It is also better to completely pull a unit out of the battle line if
possible, in order to replenish its losses and recover fatigue rather than continue to leave
it on the firing line.
Playing as the British
The BEF's main strength is in the quality of the British professional soldier and
their awesome direct fire with the SMLE rifle. You should rely on delaying actions and
inflict as many casualties as possible with your superior marksmanship before you fall
back. In the campaign, try to avoid prolonged exposure to German massed infantry
assaults because the Germans can replace their losses with ease, whilst the BEF cannot.
The BEF will die off, there is no avoiding this. The trick is to make the tiny BEF last as
long as possible and to maximize their effectiveness throughout 1914.
Another strength of the BEF is that they have a fairly decent amount of indirect
fire howitzers at their disposal, unlike the French who have almost none at all in 1914.
Playing as the Belgians
176
The strength of the Belgians lies in the fact that their army, while not being strong
in any one area, does not have any serious weaknesses other than their almost total lack
of indirect fire capable artillery (the do have one siege gun regiment of antiquated guns
from the 1800s), and their low troop quality which is attributed to their flawed
mobilization program. The Belgians should rely on harassing and slowing the German
advance and causing as much trouble from Antwerp as possible.
Playing as the Germans
The German’s strength lies in their numbers, their good quality infantry, and their
massive amount of howitzers and in their employment of machine gun units. German
infantry formations on the advance are almost an unstoppable steam roller. When the
infantry is backed up by howitzers there is almost no defensive barrier that cannot be
breached. When the Germans are forced on the defensive, their MG kompagnien can be
used to solidify the line along with supporting fire from howitzers and field guns. In 1914
the biggest problem the Germans have is that they seem to be always racing against the
clock and spreading themselves thin. You will need to make split decisions on when to
charge home and push the enemy back at the expense of more casualties so that you can
keep your forward momentum, or engage the enemy in direct and indirect fire attacks at
the expense of forward movement.
Knowing when to rest your attacking forces is also the key to victory. Rest them
too often and you will lose the initiative. If you do not rest them often enough then your
attack will falter and your lines will begin to break.
* * *
177
Glossary of abbreviations used in the Order of Battle in the First World War Campaigns Series
French / Belgian
ACMs Auto-Canons-Mitrailleuses - Armored Machingun Cars
BA Bataillons “Alphabétiques" - Formation of Zouaves, most likely temporary
battalions
BCA Bataillon de Chasseurs Alpins - Alpine Chasseurs Battalion
BCI Bataillon de Chasseurs Indigènes - Indigenous (Moroccan) Infantry
Battalion, light infantry unit
BCP Bataillon de Chasseurs à Pieds - Chasseurs Infantry Battalion, light
infantry unit
Bie Batterie - Battery
Btn Battalion
CA Corps d'Armée - Army Corps
CAC Corps d'Colonial - Colonial Corps
CC Corps d'Cavalerie - Cavalry Corps
Chas. Chasseurs - literal: "hunters"
Cie Compagnie - Company
Dét Détachement – Detachment
DAB Détachement d’Armée de Belgique – French army detachment for the
Belgian area (Flanders)
DIC Division d'Infanterie Colonial - Colonial Infantry Division
DC Division d'Cavalerie - Cavalry Division
DIT Division d’Infanterie Territoriale - Territorial Division
DM Division Marocaine - Moroccan Infantry Division
DR Division d'Réserve - Reserve Division
GAN Groupe d'Armées du Nord - Group of Armies of the North (Flanders
sector)
GDR Groupe de Division de Reserve - Group of Reserve Divisions
GQG Grand Quartier Général - Supreme Headquarters
GR Groupe d'Réserve - Reserve Group
Mit Mitrailleuse - Machine Gun
RAC Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne - Campaign Artillery Regiment
RACC Régiment d'Artillerie de Campagne Colonial - Colonial Campaign
Artillery Regiment
RAL Régiment d'Artillerie Lourde - Heavy Artillery Regiment
RAM Régiment d'Artillerie Montagne - Mountain Artillery Regiment
REI Régiment Etranger d'Infanterie - Foreign Legion Infantry Regiment
RFM Régtiment d'Fusiliers Marin - Marine Fusiliers Regiment
RI Régiment d'Infanterie - Infantry Regiment
RIC Régiment d'Infanterie Colonial - Colonial Infantry Regiment (European,
not native troops)
RIT Régiment d'Infanterie Territoriale - Territorial Infantry Regiment
178
RM Régiment de Marche - ad hoc Regiment; used seperately in early 1914
designations
RMCIC Régiment de Marche de Chasseurs Indigènes à Cheval - ad hoc Spahis
Regiment, RMSM in 1915
RMT Régiment de Marche Tirailleurs - ad hoc "rifleman" Regiment
RMZ Régiment de Marche Zouaves - Zouaves ad hoc Regiment
RMZT Régiment Mixte de Zouaves et Tirailleurs - Mixed Zouaves and Tirailleurs
ad hoc Regiment
RTM Régiment de Tirailleurs Marocains - Moroccan Tirailleurs
Sec Section - Section
Tir. Tirailleurs - literal: "sharpshooters" These were African troops serving in
the French colonial army
German
A.Abt Armee-Abteilung - Army Detachment
Abt Arbeitlung - Battalion Detachment
AOK Armee Oberkommando - Army Command, as in the Army headquarters
AR Artillerie Regiment - Artillery Regiment
Art Artillerie - Artillery
b Bayerische - Bavarian
bayer Bayerische - Bavarian (long abbreviation)
baden Badisches - Grand Duchy of Baden
Bde Brigade
Bel Belagerungstrain - (preceded by "Pionier" or abbreviation "Pio") Pioneer
Siege Train
Battr Battarie - Battery
Btl Battalion
CR Carabinier Regiment - Essentially these were dragoons
det. Detachement - Detachment
Div Divisione - Division, a combined arms force of various types of
components
DR Dragoner Regiment - Dragoon Regiment, cavalry used for dismounting
and fighting on foot
ErsR Ersatz Regiment - Depot or replacement Regiment
Esk Eskadron - Cavalry Squadron
FAR Feldartillerie Regiment - Field Artillery Regiment, lighter more mobile
artillery intended to support armies in the field
FußAR Fußartillerie Regiment - Foot Artillery Regiment, the traditional Prussian
designation for heavy artillery
FüsR Füsilier Regiment - Fusilier Regiment
GAR Garde Artillerie Regiment - Guard Artillery Regiment
GC Garde du Corps - Life Guard Cavalry Regiment, Heavy cavalry, the
German cavalry elite
Gd Garde - Guard
GDR Garde Dragoner Regiment - Guard Dragoon Regiment
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gem Gemischt - Mixed, combined arms
GErsR Garde Ersatz Regiment - Guard Depot or Replacement Regiment
GFAR Garde Fußartillerie Regiment - Guard Heavy Artillery Regiment
GFüsR Garde Füsilier Regiment - Guard Fusilier Regiment
GGR Garde Grenadier Regiment - Guard Grenadier Regiment
GHQ Großen Hauptquatier - Supreme Headquarters
GKR Garde Kürassier Regiment - Guard Armored Cavalry Regiment
GR Grenadier Regiment
GResR Garde Reserve Regiment - Guard Reserve Infantry
GResDR Garde Reserve Dragoner Regiment - Guard Reserve Dragoon Regiment
GRzFß Garde Regiment zu Fuß - Guard Infantry Regiment, literal: "Guard
Regiment of Foot"
GRzP Grenadier Regiment zu Pfrede - Horse Grenadiers, light cavalry used for
skirmishing
GUR Garde Uhlan Regiment - Guard Lancer Cavalry Regiment
hesse Hessisches - Grand Duchy of Hesse
HKK Höhere Kavallerie-Kommandeur - Senior Cavalry Commander; essentially
this is a cavalry corps although it worked a bit differently than a regular
army corps: the HKK commander was essentially a senior cavalry
commander that was only a command authority concerning tactics and
strategy of the employment of the cavalry divisions and support assets
within the grouping
HR Husaren Regiment - Hussar Regiment, medium cavalry
ILR Infanterie Leib Regiment - Body Infantry Regiment, literal: "body guard"
IR Infanterie Regiment - Infantry Regiment
Kp Kompagnie - Company (German spelling changed to "kompanie" in 1929)
KR Kürassier Regiment - Armored Cavalry Regiment, heavy cavalry used for
shock
kz Kürze - short
Ldw Landwehr - Militia
LdwIR Landwehr Infanterie Regiment - Militia Infantry Regiment
LGR Leib Grenadier Regiment - Life Grenadier Regiment
LgR Leibgarde Regiment - Life Guard Regiment, literal: "life guard" (Hessian)
LHR Leib Husaren Regiment - Life Guard Hussar Regiment
LIR Lehr Infantry Regiment - Infantry Instruction Regiment, as in the
"instructors"
LKR Leib Kürassier Regiment - Life Guard Armored Cavalry Regiment
Lst Landstrum - Reservists / Territorial Troops
MFüsR Marine Füsilier Regiment - Marine Regiment
MG Maschinengewehr - Machine Gun
MGK Maschinengewehr Kompagnie - Machine Gun Company
MGSfK Maschinengewehr Schärfschützen Kompagnie - Machine Gun
Sharpshooter Company
MörR Mörser Regiment - Mortar Regiment
MR Matrosen Regiment - Sailor Regiment
Mwf Minenwerfer - Trench mortar
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Nr Nummer - Number
OHL Oberste Heeresleitung - Supreme Army Command
Pio Pionier - Pioneers, engineers
Regt Regiment - comprised of several battalions; could also appear as "Rgt" to
prevent text overflow
Res Reserve
RR Reiter Regiment - cavalry, literal: “rider regiment", usually preceded with
an “s”, designating a heavy cavalry regiment.
Rtnd Reitende - riding
s schwere - heavy
sächs Sächisches - Kingdom of Saxony
UR Ulanen Regiment - Lancer Cavalry Regiment, light cavalry at this time
used for reconnaissance
württ Württembergisches - Kingdom of Wurttemberg
Austro-Hungarian
FsAB. Festungsartilleriebataillon - Fortress Artillery Battalion
k.u.k. Kaiserlich und Königlich - "Imperial and Royal"; the regular army of the
Austrian-Hungarian Empire
* * *
181
Content Changes
v1.01
- Corrected the #1914_0822_02s_Charleroi and #1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early
scenarios to put the French 18e CA in more historical starting locations.
- Corrected missing releases in the #1914_1018_01s_Campaign_Flanders scenario.
- Corrected some missing units in the 2nd wave of reserve divisions (in the late OOB)
and added those missing units to the scenarios that the parent formations participate in.
- Corrected German starting positions in the #1914_0826_01s_Le_Cateau (in the west)
and #1914_0826_02s_Cambrai scenarios.
- Updated the #1914_0823_02s_Mons scenario to be a little better balanced.
- Fully modeled the fortified area of Metz and Diedenhofen (Thionville) in the
#1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early and #1914_0822_03s_Ardennes scenarios.
- Added unit artwork for the Metz fortress area.
- Updated the notes.pdf document with more information and some clarifications.
v1.02
- Corrected a problem where v1.01 inadvertently changed von Moltke's on map HQ
command radius to 0 in the early campaign OOB.
- Corrected an issue with a High Wall hexside and the full hex bridge at Antwerp (the
wall was blocking movement across the bridge).
- Corrected two unreleased German FAR battalions in the #1914_0822_02s_Charleroi
and #1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenarios.
- Corrected a duplicate unit name in the "late" OOB (Res.Jager-Btl.25 x2, one should
have been #25 and the other is #26).
- Corrected the erroneous release messages in the Marne sub scenarios.
- Added 60 man Ersatz MG detachments to the German Ersatz brigades in the "late"
OOBs and scenarios. It seems that there was a mistake in translation during initial
research in that it was thought that each of these brigades had one MG, and as such, it
was not worth adding to the OOB, but the correct translation was that each BATTALION
in the brigade had one MG, which was formed into a brigade level detachment, similar to
an MGK. Needless to say, this change should give a subtantial amount of firepower to
Ersatz brigades. After careful deliberation, it was decided that these MG.dets would be
given to the Ersatz brigades in the "late", but not the "early" OOB, due to the historical
MG shortage in this early period. (A big thanks to those that pointed out the issue).
- Updated the notes.pdf document with more information and some clarifications.
- Removed all VII battalion infantry units from the French reserve infantry regiments.
These battalions were depot units of cadre, and were responsible for the training of
French recruits, the these battalions were not located in the front line units, but were
instead in rear areas where the recruits were being trained. However, the VII battalion
units are still located in the OOB, its just that the units themselves are not present in the
scenarios. (A big thanks to the French community for pointing out this issue).
- Corrected an abbreviation in the OOB (and in the notes). Previously, German field
artillery were "AR" as in "artillerie-regiment", but this was incorrect. The proper name is
182
"feldartillerie-regiment", "FAR". However, to complicate things, the heavy artillery
regiments, or "fußartillerie-regiment", were all labeled "FAR", so these too are now more
correctly abbreviated as "FußAR" to differentiate the two.
-Improved VP levels in the #1914_1001_01s_Antwerp scenario.
- Corrected German sFH 13 howitzer soft attack rating from 17 to 18.
- Raised the quality of the German IR.124, the regiment Rommel was in, because it was
known to be well versed in its own brand of small unit tactics. German units were
decentralized in their training, and many units adopted their own methods of training.
The B quality represents IR.124's somewhat unique training.
- In the "late" OOB, changed British 1-pdr Pom-Pom anti-aircraft guns to type Heavy
Anti-Aircraft. This is done only in the early years of the war because recon aircraft did
not fly very high in 1914 and 1915.
- Corrected Horse movement in Village, Town, City, Industrial from 10 10 15 25 to 15 15
20 30.
- Corrected an error in the #1914_0906_04s_Vitry and #1914_0906_05s_Revigny
scenarios where both sides had too much air support.
- Corrected error with BEF infantry where some infantry were had a 7 defense (Guards)
and some had an 8 defense (Regulars). All non-territorial BEF infantry should now have
a defense of 7.
- Corrected an error with the German guards infantry defense and assault ratings. Their
defense was previously 6, when it should have been 5. Their assault rating was 9 and is
now 10 (this retains their current assault capability). The reason for this change is
because the German guards were historically known to exclusively employ massed/dense
formations in the attack. The guard infantry were used as an assault force, where they
were rooted in the "old way" of combat which made them highly effective in assaults but
prone to high losses. Essentially it is tradeoff between higher assault capability than
ordinary infantry but at the cost of being a little more vulnerable to enemy fire. This
intentionally makes them similar to early war French infantry, although by comparison
the German Guard is more effective in direct fire but less effective in the assault.
- Corrected #1914_0906_03s_St_Gond scenario by adding the previously missing
German division (14.Inf.Div.) that historically arrived as reinforcement.
- Corrected #1914_0906_02s_Ourcq-Morins scenario by adding a withdrawal for the
German 14.Infanterie-Div. which historically was sent to the St-Gond sector.
- Adjusted the VP levels in the #1914_0906_03s_St_Gond scenario for better play
balance.
- Corrected some starting deployments of French units in the #1914_0906_03s_St_Gond
scenario.
- Updated the Allied global supply level and map edge supply levels for both sides in the
#1914_0822_02s_Charleroi scenario to be more consistent with the
#1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario (Allied global supply level was supposed to
be 70% not 80%).
- Corrected a problem in the #1914_0906_01s_Marne and #1914_0906_04s_Vitry
scenarios where some German cavalry squadrons were unintentionally releasing a large
number of French units (from LOS) on turn 1.
- Corrected a mistake with the Belgian Minerva armored car's speed value, it is now 8
instead of 12.
183
- Added the missing 2./s.Küstenmörser siege battery to the
#1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario, historically this battery assisted with the
two day bombardment of the French Fort de Manonviller. Also, the withdrawal % of both
siege gun batteries have been changed from 100% to 20% to allow the possibility of them
staying around a few turns longer.
- Adjusted the VP levels in the #1914_0822_02s_Charleroi scenario for better play
balance.
- Edited #1914_0822_02s_Charleroi by removing the entire west edge of the map
(including the 13.Infanterie-Division and most of the 35e Division d'Infanterie from the
play area (the map is now impassible on those places). This was done as the only solution
to remove the gamey behavior on the map edge, in an area that historically was static
during the battle. This also was done to place greater emphasis on the areas where the
heavy fighting actually occurred.
- Corrected Landwehr-Div.2 name to Höhere Ldw.Kommand.2 (the divisions were
renamed as Landwehr Divisions later).
- Corrected the speed and assault ratings of all regular German Kuerassier units in the
"early" OOB. Speed is now 4 instead of 5, and assault is now 9 instead of 10 (these
values were already correct in the "late" and "mobilization" OOBs).
- Corrected German reserve dragoon squadrons to be of type dragoon instead of type
hussar.
v1.03
- Drastically improved the VP levels and objective values in the
#1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario. Based on feedback from campaign results,
the old VP levels and objective values have been quartered. The change is minimal, but it
has a drastic impact on the game play since greater historical emphasis is now placed on
casualties than before (for example, von Moltke's historical decision to turn away from
Paris was based largely on the desire of destroying the French Army by inflicting heavy
losses on it in a double envelopment). It is rationalized that any losses sustained on a
level that is massively out of proportion to the enemy's (on a difference of a half of a field
army of men or more) would have influenced the outcome of the war, as the political will
to fight a prolonged conflict would have likely been broken immediately. In regards to
the changes to the campaign the following points must be mentioned...
a) Neither side can no longer afford to lose over a hundred thousand men and
thousands of guns more than their enemy, doing so will alter the outcome.
b) If one side manages the elusive "holy grail" result of isolating and destroying
an entire enemy field army then the campaign will likely be won easily. This was not
possible before.
c) It has now been calculated that the Allies can afford to fall back from the start
to the Marne, and still keep the game close in the draw result region. Losses above or
beyond this, or taking back or losing objectives along the final line should tip the result
one way or the other.
d) A forward Allied defense that disregards all losses should reliably result for
them than a draw now, depending on how many losses were inflicted and which
objectives were held of course. However, such an Allied tactic is risky because,
184
combined with high losses, and just "a few more objectives" taken by the Germans will
likely result in a Central Powers victory, rarely resulting in an Allied victory unless
something miraculous occurs (such as like loss ratios are kept close).
e) Because of the changes above, the odds are stacked a little more fairly. A
successful Allied tactic now is to bloody the Germans at the start, then break contact and
fall back and repeat. Continue to fall back, periodically holding or counter attacking
(delaying) in some areas as you, overall, continue the strategic withdrawal. The point in
which the Allies should withdraw is once the Germans begin inflicting heavier casualties
than the the Allies themselves are inflicting, taking into consideration also the time spent
delaying the German advance. In other words, a series of delaying actions, with each
disengaging at the point when the Germans begin to get the upper hand is advised. Near
the end of the campaign, perhaps in the final week or so, the Allies should be looking to
hold fast and counter attack where possible. Do this too early and the Germans may
decimate the Allies and win from objectives and casualties inflicted. Do this at the right
time and the Allies can push the Germans back and possibly administer heavier losses on
the enemy (think of the historical out flanking at the Marne for example, and the near
destruction of the German 1.Armee).
- Adjusted the VP levels and objective values in the #1914_0917_01s_Campaign_Race
campaign scenario. Similar to the change made to the early campaign but not as drastic,
the VP levels and objective values in the Race to the Sea campaign are now halved to
allow for casualties to play some role in the result, but not as much of a role as they do in
the early campaign. The rationale here is that although casualties should play a role in the
Race to the Sea campaign, by this time both sides were desperately attempting to win the
war before the end of 1914, regardless of cost. To do this, the Germans wanted to break
through to Calais to outflank the Allies and shorten the line, and the Allies were doing
their own counter attacking to push the Germans back (thus the formation of the Ypres
salient). Because of that, it is factored in that losses are a little less important here, they
are still secondary to the terrain objectives but are not totally irrelevant either.
- Duplicated the "early" and "late" PDT files and created new ones with the "-no rail"
suffix on the filename. The difference with these is only that the normal PDT files have
rail capacity, while the "no rail" PDT files are for smaller scenarios which now have a rail
capacity of 0 for both sides. This was done to allow a rail capacity in the largest
campaign scenarios, while preventing gamey "rail blitzes" in the smaller scenarios.
- Edited the "mobilization" and "early" OOB by removing all replacements from artillery
type units. After additional research and consideration, it is determined that in the early
stages of the campaign, neither side should receive artillery replacements since, during
this period of mobilization, no surplus existed. Essentially, the guns available were all
there were. The effect on game play is that devoting time and effort to counter battery fire
in the early campaign actually becomes useful because each gun lost will never return.
Also, this change penalizes those who choose to deplete their field gun units in hold-to-
almost-the-last-man situations, because they can no longer withdraw and rebuild them
during the campaign.
- Major changes to the #1914_0906_03s_St_Gond and #1914_0906_01s_Marne
scenarios for more historical play in the Morius-le-Petit to Sommesous sector.
- Corrected German "pseudo-motorized" Jaeger unit speed from a mix of 5 through 7 to
the correct value of 7.
185
- In the #00_Started scenario, corrected the starting location of HQ Position de Liege
(Leman) to now be in the historical location of Fort de Loncin.
- Changed the starting strength of the German Gardekorps units to be a more historical
level in the #1914_0913_01s_Aisne scenario.
- In the #1914_0822_02s_Charleroi scenario, removed the German 13.Infanterie-Division
units that arrived as reinforcements in the impassible area. These forces were not
supposed to be included in the scenario as per the change made in v1.02 and their arrival
was overlooked.
- Edited German starting dispositions on the north map edge in
#1914_0919_01s_St_Mihiel scenario to be more historical.
- In the #1914_1001_02s_Arras scenario, changed the arrival time of 45e DI to be 0600
instead of 0800 on 4 OCT, but the probability was lowered from 80% to 60%. This was
done to allow the possibility of the division arriving earlier but at a less likelihood of
doing so.
- Corrected an error in the "early" OOB where a German unit III./ResDR.2 was
incorrectly specified as a pioneer unit instead of a dragoon unit.
- Corrected the name of the 1/Royal Irish to 1/Royal Irish Fusiliers in the early and late
OOBs.
- Added the missing 1/Royal Irish Fusiliers and 2/Seaforth Highlanders in the
#1914_0826_01s_Le_Cateau scenario (they were in reserve positions south of Haucourt.
- Corrected some issue in the OOB and with missing portraits for the French foreign
legion units.
- In the "late" OOB, corrected the German IR.240 to be a reserve formation instead.
- Improved the VP levels in the #1914_0919_01s_St_Mihiel scenario.
- Changed the title of #1914_1111_01s_Ypres scenario so that it matches the scenario's
filename.
v1.04
- Complete overhaul of artwork by Jan Johansson (Jison), bringing the artwork up to the
East Prussia '14 standard.
- Edited #1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early scenario so that it uses the new early
termination feature. It is now possible for the French to carry through with their historical
Plan XVII attacks in order to get an immediate victory. It is assumed that if the French
can capture the objectives on the map, then the attack would inevitably continue eastward
(off the map) resulting in a French victory. The disadvantage to this approach is that the
French must know when or whether to abandon the attack and pull back, otherwise they
will become too committed to a losing situation.
- Added new "Grand Campaign" scenarios (#Grand_Campaign_F14-A,
#Grand_Campaign_F14-B, #Grand_Campaign_F14-C). These are designed to play with
the associated East Prussia '14 Grand Campaign scenarios, for those who want to try to
add a sense of a wider campaign where game results will decide the outcome of the war.
See the notes document for more information.
- Doubled the probability of air unit availability, because it was felt that air units were not
becoming available after use fast enough. Now it should take about a day before they are
ready for a new mission (rather than two days on average).
186
- Increased the setup % of indirect artillery units from 40 to 60 because artillery units
were taking a little too long to setup.
- Corrected British Royal Marine infantry battalion assault ratings in the "early" and
"late" OOB (it was too low).
- Corrected German reserve infantry battalion assault ratings in the "early" OOB (it was
slightly too high).
- Corrected German Landwehr infantry battalion soft attack rating in "early" OOB to be
consistent with the "late" OOB.
- Corrected all cavalry unit speeds in the "early" OOB, they were using early values and
were too fast, now lowered to their correct value by -1 speed to almost all cavalry units.
- Corrected German Jaeger MG unit assault ratings in all OOBs.
- Corrected the name of the unit Res.Jäger-Btl.8 and Res.Jäger-Btl.9 (there were
previously duplicate Res.Jäger-Btl.9 units) in the "early" and "late" OOBs.
- Added the missing MGKs for Res.Jäger-Btl.8 and Res.Jäger-Btl.14 in the "late" OOB,
and added those missing units to the #1914_0917_01s_Campaign_Race scenario.
- Added the missing Deal RMLI (MG) unit to the #1914_0822_01s_Campaign_Early
scenario.
- Moved the Res.Jäger-Btl.9 to its correct division in the "early" and "late" OOBs.
- Swapped the map label and, in appropriate scenarios, the unit locations for the Belgian
Fort de Loncin and Fort de Lantin. It turned out that these two forts were accidentally
swapped when designing the original scenarios.
- Corrected the Horse movement cost in clear terrain in all PDT files.
187
Bibliography
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Nicot, Jean. Inventaire Sommaire des Archives de la Guerre, Répertoire Numérique des
Journaux des Marches et Operations. Troyes: La Renaissance, 1968.
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1914”. Military Affairs, Vol. 28, No. 4 (Winter, 1964-1965), pp. 173-183. Society for
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Westlake, Ray. The Territorial Force, 1914. Ray Westlake Military Books, 1988.
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Websites (in no particular order):
*Links are functional as of 30 JAN 2009*
Volcano Mods.com http://www.volcanomods.com
(website site for games modifications and forums for this and other Tiller games)
191
The Blitz.org http://www.theblitz.org
(excellent site for ladder wargaming to setup play-by-email matches with others, and
forums for discussing this and other Tiller games)
First World War.com http://www.firstworldwar.com
(excellent site for general facts and topics about WWI)
Belgian Fronts http://users.skynet.be/fonck/
(good information on the Belgian Army of WWI)
Tulip Academy http://www.tulipacademy.org/gew/index.htm
Historique de Régiments http://www.chtimiste.com/
(excellent source for WWI French regimental history)
Mark Conrad's homepage http://marksrussianmilitaryhistory.info/
(excellent source for Allied 1914 order of battles)
Axis History Forum http://forum.axishistory.com/
Der erster Weltkrieg http://www.1914-18.info/
World War One Image Archive http://www.gwpda.org/photos/greatwar.htm
(excellent site for World War One photos; some of the images in this notes document
came from this website)
Other sources:
Belgian Ministry of War's army budget summary for the year 1914, presented to the
Belgian parliament on March 10, 1914. (In Flemish; used for order of battle information
of the Belgian Army.)
Great Britain. War Office. Army Orders, 1914. (Published 1 January 1915. Contains very
detailed organizational charts of all types of units.)
Great Britain. War Office. Monthly Army List - July, 1914.
192
Special Thanks
Although I conducted my own research, it was helpful to brainstorm ideas and come to a
consensus on how to best represent historical situations with the abstractions inherent in a
war game. I want to thank Dr. Robert Bruce for his time, patience, and ideas. However,
Dr. Bruce’s most significant contribution is one that he is probably not aware of: the
instilment of a desire to create the most detailed wargame series about the Great War that
has yet been created. It speaks volumes about the effectiveness of a teacher that can
inspire creativity and the desire for further learning.
Also, I want to thank the testers. Great testers are a valuable resource and are quite hard
to find. Over the year that France '14 was tested, the testers did an outstanding job on a
project that probably seemed to them like it was never going to end. Despite this, they
continued to test for over a year and did as best as anyone could humanly hope for.
Without their help, France '14 would not be a reality.
193
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