Descriptive (Adaptation) Studies, Naming and Definitions ...filmjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/FJ4.6-P.-Cattrysse.pdfGideon Toury and his followers replaced the PS label with

CATTRYSSE FILMJOURNAL4(2017)

–1–

filmjournal.org [email protected]

Descriptive(Adaptation)Studies,NamingandDefinitions:EpistemologicalIssues*

PatrickCATTRYSSEUniversiteitAntwerpen

Introduction

Beforedeveloping themainargumentof thisessay, twopreliminary remarksare inorder.First,whatfollowsrepresentsaworkinghypothesisratherthanasetofestablishedtruths.Itdealswithquestions (asopposed toanswers),whichemergeon thebasisof anumberofassumptionsthatarediscussedwithinthefieldsofthephilosophyofscienceandlogics.Andsecondly, these questions fit into a wider on-going research project that concerns adescriptive studyof cultural adaptation. That iswhy this essay focuseson filmadaptationstudies.However,theepistemologicalissuesthatfollowmaywellapplytootherdisciplinesin thehumanities thataimat adescriptiveapproach. To illustrate thispoint,occasionally,examples are taken from translation studies and from genre studies. Hence, beforelaunchingthemainargument,thefollowingsectionexposesfirstthebasicfeaturesofwhathereafterisunderstoodtobea“descriptive”approach.Descriptiveadaptationstudies

Thedenomination“descriptiveadaptationstudies”(henceforthDAS)referstoasetof(at first mostly literary) translation studies that were initially called the “polysystem”(henceforthPS)studiesoftranslation.ThePSapproachwasoriginallydevelopedinthelate1960s by two Israeli scholars, Itamar Even-Zohar and Gideon Toury. However, in 1995,Gideon Toury and his followers replaced the PS labelwith the denomination “Descriptivetranslation studies” (henceforth DTS).1 In the early 1990s and afterwards, scholars havesuggestedproposalstoadaptthePSapproachtothestudyof(mostlyfilm)adaptations.2Inarecent study called Descriptive Adaptation Studies. Epistemological and MethodologicalIssues,IraisethequestionifandhowaparallelDASapproachwouldbepossibleanduseful.3

Forthepurposeofthisessay,itisimportanttounderstandthelabel“descriptive”as

* To cite this article: Patrick Cattrysse, “Descriptive (Adaptation) Studies, Naming and Definitions:Epistemological Issues”, in David Roche and Jean-François Baillon eds., “Terms that Matter: Naming andLabellinginEnglish-SpeakingCinema”,FilmJournal,4(2017).URL:http://filmjournal.org/fj4-cattrysse.1GideonToury,DescriptiveTranslationStudiesandBeyond,BenjaminsTranslationLibrary4(Amsterdam:JohnBenjamins Pub. Co., 1995); Alexandra A. Rosa, "Descriptive Translation Studies (DTS)," in Gambier and vanDoorslaer(2010:np),inHandbookofTranslationStudies(Amsterdam:JohnBenjaminsPublishing,2010),np.2 See for example Patrick Cattrysse, "L’Adaptation filmique de textes littéraires. Le film noir américain"(Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 1990), http://independent.academia.edu/CattryssePatrick/Books; PatrickCattrysse, Pour une théorie de l’adaptation filmique: Le film noir américain (Bern, New York: Peter LangInternational Academic Publishers, 1992); Aline Remael, "A Polysystem Approach to British NewWave FilmAdaptation,ScreenwritingandDialogue"(Ph.D.,KatholiekeUniversiteitLeuven,2000).3SeePatrickCattrysse,DescriptiveAdaptationStudies:EpistemologicalandMethodologicalIssues(Antwerpen:GarantPublishers,2014).


–2–


amulti-layeredconceptthatbothincludesandexcludesanumberoffeatures.Needlesstosay, the inclusionor exclusionof someof these features remains controversialwithin thephilosophy of science, and it requires attention that transcends the limits of this essay.Consequently,forpracticalpurposes,whatfollowsonlyscratchesthesurfaceofsomeverycomplexquestionsthatemergewithrespecttoa“descriptivestudies”debate.Firstofall,adescriptiveapproachattemptstostatefactsandtoeschewvaluejudgments.Thisraisesthequestion if andhowdescription canbedistinguished fromprescription.Onemay say thatstatements of fact trigger a true/falsemode of interpretation: they raise the question ofwhetherthecontentofthestatementistrueorfalse.Astatementoffactissaidtobetrueifits content matches the world as it is. Such claims fit into what philosophers call“correspondence theories of truth” because some kind of correspondence is assumed toexist between the content of a statement and the reality it refers to. If the content of astatement of fact does not fit reality, the proposition is said to be false. A statement ofvalue,ontheotherhand,canneitherbetruenorfalsebecauseitdoesnotrefertoaspecificproperty of a phenomenon, but rather to a predicate assigned by a subject to the saidproperty of a phenomenon. The expression of a value relies, therefore, rather on whatpragmaticians call “sincerity” or “felicity”.4 Addressers may be sincere or not whendescribing their (inter)personal values, and addressees may agree or disagree with theevaluation.Toillustratethedistinction,onemayconsiderthefollowingtwostatements:

(1)“ThisscreenplaywaswrittenbyBillyWilderandI.A.L.Diamond.”

(2)“Ilikethismovie.”

Accordingtothisview,statement(1)statesafact,thetruth-valueofwhichmaybecheckedthroughwhatresearcherscallmind-independentmeans.5Statement (2)expressesavalue.The question whether this statement is true or false does not apply. One may agree ordisagreethoughwiththisstatement. Furthermore,descriptionisunderstoodasobserver-dependent–amisunderstandingthatoccasionallypersistsamongcritics,asifdescriptioncouldbevalue-freeandobjective.Ifdescriptionisunderstoodasempiricalorobservationbased,thisimpliesthatitisinduction-basedratherthandeduction-based.6Fromthisfollowsthatdescriptiondependsoncorpus-based research. It begs the question whether the concept of “knowledge” should berestricted to sensoryperceptionornot.Finally,adescriptiveapproachmustdealwith thequestionifandhowonecandistinguishdescriptionfromexplanation,andhowdescription,if it is restricted to sensoryobservation, relates toprediction,which refers tophenomenathatcannotbeobservedbecausetheyhavenothappenedyet.

Itiswithinthiswiderepistemologicalframeworkthatthequestionemergesasto“if

4JohnL.Austin,HowToDoThingsWithWords(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1962);JohnR.Searle,SpeechActs.AnEssayinthePhilosophyofLanguage(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1969).5 See, for instance, Gregory Currie, Image and Mind. Film, Philosophy, and Cognitive Science (Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2008),45-46.6Eventhoughitisgenerallyacceptedthatinductionisimpossiblewithoutdeduction,thisdoesnotimplythatonecannotconsiderthelatterseparatelyfromtheformer.Fromacognitiveperspective,onecouldevenarguethat it isphysically impossibletothinkconsciouslyofbothinductionanddeductionatthesametime,evenifbothprocesseswouldoccursimultaneously.


–3–


andhow”itispossibletodistinguishbetweendescriptiveandprescriptivedefinitions,ortoput it differently, if and how it is possible to select and define an object of study in adescriptiveratherthaninaprescriptiveway.Commonlanguageuse–commonproblems

A common way to ask for a definition in both everyday language and academicdiscourseconsists inusingthe“What is”-formedquestion:What isanadaptation?What istranslation?Whatisagenre?Whatisfilmnoir?Andanequallycommonwaytoanswersuchquestionsconsists inprovidingan“Xis”-formeddefinition.Ifwithinadescriptiveapproachdefinitionsaremeanttobedescriptive,“Xis”-formeddefinitionsshouldproducestatementsthataretrueorthatareatleasttruthevaluable.However,whenlookingatsomecommondefinitions,theassessmentoftheirtruth-valueturnsouttobeproblematic.Belowareafewexamples:

1. “Filmnoirisnotagenre”7vs.“filmnoirisagenre”8

2. “Boomerang(1947)isafilmnoir”9vs.“Boomerang(1947)isnotafilmnoir”10

3. “Weexperienceadaptation(asadaptations)aspalimpseststhroughourmemoryofotherworksthatresonatethroughrepetitionwithvariation”.11

4. Thevastmajorityofadaptationsarepresentedand/orperceivedasoriginals.12

If definitionsblatantly contradicteachother,how isone todeterminewhich statement istrue and which is false? The definitions show that confusion emerges when differentphenomena are labelled the same way and/or when similar phenomena are nameddifferently.Previoussuggestions

How then to clarify the definitional issues that various disciplines within thehumanitiesstrugglewith?Thefollowingdiscussionhingesontwoattemptsmadepreviouslyto amend some of these problems: one concerns genre studies, the other adaptationstudies.IbeginbyreferringtoTzvetanTodorov'sproposaltodistinguishbetweentheoreticalandhistoricalgenres,13andmyownproposaltodefine“adaptation”ina“functional”way.14

7See,e.g.,RaymondDurgnat,"PaintItBlack:TheFamilyTreeofFilmNoir",Cinema(UK)6/7(1970):49;PaulSchrader,"NotesonFilmNoir",FilmComment8,no.1(1972):8.8SeeRickAltman,Film/Genre(London:BFIPublishing,2000),27.9Durgnat,"PaintItBlack".10 Raymond Borde and Etienne Chaumeton, A Panorama of American Film Noir (1941-1953), (trans. PaulHammond,SanFrancisco:CityLightsBooks,2002;R.BordeetE.Chaumeton,PanoramaDuFilmNoirAméricain(1941-1953),Paris:EditionsdeMinuit,1955).11LindaHutcheon,ATheoryofAdaptation(London,NewYork:Routledge,Taylor&FrancisGroup,2006),8.12 Iaddthisdefinitionforthesakeofargument.Supportforthisdefinitioncanbefound inmanyadaptationstudies.Seeforexample,Cattrysse,"L’Adaptationfilmiquedetexteslittéraires".13 TzvetanTodorov,TheFantastic:A StructuralApproach toa LiteraryGenre (trans.RichardHoward; Ithaca:Cornell University Press, 1975; T. Todorov, Introduction à la littérature fantastique (Paris: Editions du Seuil,1970).14Cattrysse,"L’Adaptationfilmiquedetexteslittéraires".


–4–


I choose these two proposals among many others because they are firstly related tosuggestionsmadebyearliertheoriesofdefinition.Secondly,Todorov’sproposalandmyownmayfindfurtherimprovementsintheseearlierproposals.Ishallreturntobothissuesbelow.Todorov’stheoreticalandhistoricalgenres

In The Fantastic: A Structural Approach to a Literary Genre, Todorov proposes todistinguishbetweenwhathecalls“theoretical”genresand“historical”genres.Thelatterarethe resultofhistoricalobservation. They represent genre typesas foundandacceptedbythe culture and laymen. By contrast, theoretical genres are deduced from a theory (ofliterature). They represent genre types as created or defined by theoreticians. Todorov’sproposalshavebeencriticisedonmorethanoneaccount.IbrieflymentiontwoasexplainedinAltman’sFilm/Genre.Firstly,

this oppositionbegs thequestionof the critic’s positionwithin the culture: all historical genreswereoncetheoreticalgenres,definedbycriticsofaformercultureaccordingtoatheorythencurrent.15

Thus,theFantasticcouldhavebeenlabelleda“theoretical”genrewhenitemergedin1970,followingonFrenchstructuralist theories,but itmaybeseennow–almosthalfacenturylater–asahistoricalone.Altman’scriticismsuggeststhatmytheoreticalgenremaybeyourhistoricalgenre,andviceversa(seebelow). AsecondrecurringcriticismappliestoTodorov’snotionof“historical”genre.Joiningprevioussuggestionswithingenrestudies,16Todorov’sdefinitionof“historicalgenre”shiftsfocusfromthetexttowardstheinteractionbetweenatextanditsreceiver:

Thisemphasisonreadingpatternsrisksprovokinga“sorcerer'sapprentice”effect:oncethemagicword“reader”ispronounced,theremightbenocontrollingtheultimateeffect.Oncelabelledbywritersandcritics,genresmightwellfallintothehandsofuntutoredreadersorout-of-controlaudiences.17

However,Altmansomewhatironicallyurgeshisreadershiptorestassured:

Thus far this threathasnotmaterialized.Onthecontrary, themost importantEnglish-languagegenretheoryof the last twodecades,Alastair Fowler’sKindsof Literature:An Introduction to theTheoryofGenresandModes(1982),resolutelyreturnstoclassicalemphasisontextualstructurewithintraditionalgenresandcanonsoftexts,insteadofreleasingresponsibilityforgenrestoreadersandaudiences.'Thekinds,howeverelusive,exist,‘saysFowler(p.73),permanentlyclosingoffthedebate.18

Altman’s continued studyof genresproves that thedebate is far fromclosed.However, IquotethesereactionstoTodorov’ssuggestionsmoreextensivelybecausesimilarproposalsweremadewithinthefieldofPSadaptationstudies,andeventhoughadaptationscholarshave generally ignored these proposals, it is not hard to imagine that some adaptationscholarsmayhave resentedaPS functionaldefinitionof theobjectof study for the samereasons.ThePSfunctionaldefinitionoftranslation/adaptation 15Altman,Film/Genre,9.16See,e.g.,EricD.HirschJr.,ValidityinInterpretation(NewHaven:YaleUniversityPress,1967).17Altman,Film/Genre,11.18 Alastair Fowler, Kinds of Literature: An Introduction to the Theory of Genres andModes (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,1982),73.


–5–


APSstudyofadaptationsproposeswhatitcallsafunctionaldefinitionoftheobjectof study. It redefines the common word “to function” as “to be presented and/or to beperceivedas[...]withinaspecifictime-spacecontext”.19Hence,afunctionaldefinitionofa“filmnoir,”a“western”oran“adaptation”is“anyphenomenonthatfunctionsassuch,”or“anyphenomenonthatispresentedand/orperceivedasafilmnoir,awestern,oranadapta-tionwithinaspecifictime-spacecontext.” APS“functional”definitionoftheobjectofstudypresentsanumberofadvantagesand disadvantages. Both remain under-investigated to this day. On the positive side, afunctionaldefinitionoftheobjectofstudyoffersaflexibleanddynamicmethodtodescribehow phenomena have been presented and perceived in one or more specific historicalcontexts. For example, the phenomena that functioned as “film noir” in France in thesummerof194620areverydifferentfromthosethatfunctionedas“filmnoir”inFrancetenyears later.21 In1946,French filmcriticNinoFrankdiscussed five“new,” recently-releasedAmericanmovies,whereasin1955,RaymondBordeandEtienneChaumeton'sAPanoramaofAmericanFilmNoirpresentedmorethanfourhundredAmericanmovies,someofwhichhadbeenreleasedmorethanadecadebefore.Differentphenomenamaythus“function”inthe sameway.A functional approachallows for thesedifferentphenomena tobe studiedtoo. However, a PS functional definition also holds limitations. If different phenomenamayfunction inthesameway,similarphenomenamayfunction indifferentways.SinceafunctionaldefinitionoftheobjectofstudylimitsitsfocustowhatXistakenfor,irrespectiveof what X actually is, these phenomena escape the scope of a functional definition. Forexample, phenomena that are similar to (functional) adaptations, but do not function assuch cannot be recognized as adaptations within an approach that limits its scope tophenomenathat“function”asadaptations.Forthesamereason,afunctionaldefinitionoftheobjectofstudycannotdealinaconsistentwaywithphenomenathathavebeencalled“pseudo-adaptation”or“pseudo-original”.22Ifonedefines“adaptation”asanyphenomenonthat functionsasanadaptation,aphenomenonthat functionsasanadaptationcannotbecalled a “pseudo-adaptation.” To call it a “pseudo-adaptation” is to use one name inreferencewithtwodifferent(typesof)phenomena:ontheonehand,therearephenomenathat“function”asadaptations,andontheotherhand,therearephenomenathataresaid“to be” adaptations (or pseudo-adaptations). While the former definition includes bothobject-immanentfeaturesandperceiverinteraction,thelatterfocusesonobject-immanentfeaturesonly.Theoriesofdefinition:afewconceptualtools

19 Gideon Toury, In Search of the Theory of Translation (Tel Aviv: Porter Institute, 1980), 83; Cattrysse,"L’Adaptationfilmiquedetexteslittéraires",110.20Seeforexample,NinoFrank,‘UnNouveauGenrePolicier:L’aventureCriminelle’,L’Ecranfrançais61(1946):8–9;14.21Seeforexample,BordeandChaumeton,APanoramaofAmericanFilmNoir.22 Pseudo-translations or pseudo-adaptations represent phenomena that are presented and/or perceived asthe translationoradaptationofXwhereafterwardsX is foundoutnot toexist. SeeCattrysse, ‘L’Adaptationfilmiquedetexteslittéraires.Lefilmnoiraméricain’;Cattrysse,Pourunethéoriedel’adaptationfilmique.


–6–


IhavediscussedtheproblemofaPSfunctionaldefinitionoftheobjectofstudyonpreviousoccasions,23but it isonlyrecentlythat IcameacrossthewritingsofphilosopherslikeRichardRobinson,NormanSwartz,andAnilGupta,andsodiscoveredtheexistenceofasub-disciplineofthephilosophyofsciencecalled"theoriesofdefinition".Eventhoughthesetheories go back to ancient Greek thinkers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle,24 scholarswithin translationandadaptation studies–andperhapsalso ingenre studies25– seem tohavebeenunawareofthiswork.ThefollowingsuggeststhataDASapproachcouldbenefitfromcertainanalytical conceptsdesignedby these theoriesofdefinition. To illustrate thispoint, I discuss two distinctions that are commonly known to theorists of definition: thedistinction between the real and the nominal aspect of definitions, and the distinctionbetweenstipulativeandlexicaldefinitions.Therealandnominalaspectofdefinitions

For the sake of simplicity, I suggest that theword “definition” be understood as apracticeorproduct thatdescribesand/orexplains themeaningofsomething.Whatneedsdefining, theorists call the definiendum, and what defines it the definiens. For example,Gérard Genette’s term “heterodiegetic narrator”26 could be a definiendum, and onedefinienscouldbe“anarrativeinstancethatisnotacharacterinthestory”.Todefinethings,people commonly use words, but theories of definition study also other types ofdefinitions,27 such as ostensive definitions for example, as when instead of explainingverballywhattheword“dog”means,Ipointtoadogwalkingacrossthestreet.Howeverinthis essaymyprimary concerngoes to verbaldefinitions,whichmay consistofone singleword, multiple words, or complete sentences. In the fields that concern us here,“translation”, “adaptation”, “filmnoir”or “filmgenre"” are suchwords, that isdefiniendathestudyofwhich,Iargue,couldbenefitfromthesaidtheoriesofdefinition. When usingwords, one can say that, on the one hand, they refer tomore or lessspecificphenomenaintheworld,whileontheother,wordsalsorefertothemselvesandtolanguage use. In common parlance, we distinguish between the sense of a word and itsreference. Following this, onemay study at least two different aspects of a definition: a“real”aspectanda“nominal”aspect.Tobehonest, I slightlyadapthereadistinctionthatwassuggestedalreadybyJohnLocke.28FollowingHilaryPutnam’sterminology,29Iconsiderthereal-nominaloppositionasadistinction,whichisunderstoodasperceptual,ratherthanas a dichotomy,which is understood asmetaphysical. That is why instead of speaking of

23 See Patrick Cattrysse, "Film (Adaptation) as Translation: Some Methodological Proposals", Target.InternationalJournalofTranslationStudies4,no.1(1992):65;Cattrysse,DescriptiveAdaptationStudies.24SeeRichardRobinson,Definition(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1950),149.25TheoriesofdefintionarenotmentionedbyeitherTodorovorAltman.26GérardGenette,FiguresIII(Paris:EditionsduSeuil,1972).27 See Robinson, Definition; Norman Swartz, "Definitions, Dictionaries and Meanings", 1997,http://www.sfu.ca/~swartz/definitions.htm;AnilGupta,"Definitions",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Spring2009Edition),2015,http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/definitions/.28SeeGupta,‘Definitions’,np.29 Hilary Putnam, The Collapse of the Fact/Value Dichotomy and Other Essays (London: Harvard UniversityPress,2004),9ff.


–7–


“real”and“nominal“definitions,Isuggestdistinguishingbetweentherealandthenominal“aspect“ofdefinitions.Whereasthe“real”aspectofadefinitionreferstothewhatnessofthedenotedthing–quidreisordere–the“nominal”aspectconcernsthewhatnessofthemeaning assigned to the words – quid nominis or de dicto. Put differently, a de reinterpretation of a definition looks at phenomena as they exist independently of theirnaming; a de dicto interpretation tries to gain a clearer view of the essential semanticfeatures of the word(s) that were used.30 When definitions consist of sentences,philosophersdebateasimilar,eventhoughcontroversialdistinctionbetweenthetruth-valueof “analytic” and “synthetic” propositions. “Analytic” propositions are said to be true byvirtueof theirmeaning,while “synthetic”propositionsaremeant tobe truebyhow theirmeaning relates to theworld.31 Sentence (1) offers an exampleof an analytic propositionwhilesentence(2)presentsanexampleofasyntheticproposition.

(1)Allbachelorsareunmarried.

(2)Allbachelorsareunhappy.

Whereasthetruth-valueofthefirstpropositioncanbeestablishedapriori, i.e.beforeanyexperience, on the basis of the tautological or overlapping semantics of the words“bachelor” and “unmarried”, one can only establish the truth-value of the secondproposition ex post facto, i.e. after the experience confirming or disconfirming thatbachelors are indeedunhappy. The relevanceof the latterobservationswill becomeclearbelow,asIapplytheseandfollowingdefinitionalconceptstothestudyof(film)adaptations,andthedefinitionoffilmnoirandfilmgenresmoreingeneral.

Stipulativeandlexicaldefinitions

Asstatedabove,theoristsdistinguishbetweendifferenttypesofdefinitions.HoweverIargue that two types of definitions in particular could be of use here: “stipulative” and“lexical”definitions.“Stipulative”definitionsdecreeorspecifyhowauser isgoingtouseatermX.Astipulativedefinitionmaydeviatefromorbeopposedtoamorecommonusageofthe term. “Lexical” definitions report on “the actualways inwhich some actualword hasbeen used by some actual persons.”32 That is why they are also called “reportive” or“reportative”definitions.33Hence,whereasastipulativedefinitionofXdescribesorshouldIsayprescribesapriorianumberoffeaturesaphenomenonshoulddisplayinorderforthatphenomenon to qualify as X, a lexical definition investigates the word use first in anempirical way in order to describe it a posteriori. Whereas a stipulative definition isstipulatedatthesubjectleveloftheanalyst,alexicaldefinitionisobservedandstudiedonthe level of the object of study. Finally, whereas stipulative definitions are necessarilysynchronicbecausetheymustbevalidforeachandeveryactualuser inoneactualadhoctime-spacecommunicationalcontext,lexicaldefinitionsmaybestudiedbothinasynchronic

30Gupta,‘Definitions’,np.31 Georges Rey, "The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2015Edition),http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/.32Robinson,Definition,35.33Swartz,‘Definitions,DictionariesandMeanings’,np.


–8–


andinadiachronicway.

Definitionalproblems

Howmaythesedefinitionaltoolsberelevanttofilmorculturaladaptationstudies?Thissectionpointsfirsttosomeproblems:adaptationcommentatorscommonlyuse“Xis”-formed definitions. Based on the above discussion, I argue that they are semanticallyconfusingandepistemologicallyinvalid.Semanticconfusion

“X is”-formed definitions are semantically confusing because they do not specifywhether theyshouldbe interpreteddereordedicto.Moreover,“X is”-formeddefinitionsmisleadingly suggest that the word is the thing and that it presents the thing in aperspective-lessway. The use of the ontological verb “to be” (or an equivalent)makes itimpossibleforadefinitiontobeusedaseitherastipulativeoralexicalone.Hence,amorecarefulanswertoquestionssuchas“Whatisadaptation?”or“Whatisfilmnoir?”maybetosay that they are words. This kind of answer makes it possible to apply the definitionaldistinctionsexplainedabove.Onemayconsiderthesemanticsofwordsontheonehand(dedicto),andreferencedpracticesandproductsontheother(dere).Bothwordsandworduseon theonehand, andpractices andproducts on theother,may changeover time and inspace;andsomaytheirsemanticandreferentialrelationships.Furthermore,ifconceptsareexplicitlypositedaswords, IcanspecifyhowIamgoingtousethatwordinoneparticulartime-spacecontext;for instance, inastipulativewayor ina lexicalway.Withinadaptationstudiescertaincommentatorshaveclaimedthatadaptationisimpossiblewhileothershaveargued that it is ubiquitous.34 As indicated above, within genre studies some critics haveassertedthatBoomerang (1947) isa filmnoir,whileothershaveclaimedtheopposite.Anexplicitationoftheaforesaiddefinitionalconceptsmayhelptoexplainthisparadox.Thesesemantic nuances involve epistemological consequences, which highlight their relevance.These epistemological consequences explain why “X is”-formed definitions may presentproblemsoflogicalvalidity.Logicalvalidity

Thedistinctionbetweenthenominalandtherealaspectsofwords,andtheonebetweenastipulative and a lexical definition, refer to the well-known epistemological distinctionbetweendescriptionandprescription.Fig.1summarizessomeofthebasicfeaturesthatareassociated with both approaches (see also above). To consider the real aspect of wordusage, i.e. its relation with the world, and to study a lexical definition is to focus ondescription rather than prescription. Conversely, to consider the nominal aspect of adefinition and toworkwith a stipulative definition is to focus onprescription rather thandescription.Whereastheformerpractice is induction-based,the latter isdeduction-based.

34 See Beja Morris, Film and Literature. An Introduction (London, New York: Longman, 1979), 79; SarahCardwell,AdaptationRevisited.TelevisionandtheClassicNovel(Manchester,NewYork:ManchesterUniversityPress,2002),51;KamillaElliott,RethinkingtheNovel/FilmDebate(Cambridge,NewYork:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003),133–34.


–9–


Induction requires words to fit the world, while deduction requires the world to fit thewords. It follows that the choice for a descriptive, i.e.more induction-based definition asopposed to a prescriptive, i.e.,more deduction-based definition, carries implicationswithrespecttotheneed,ornot,forresearchandgeneralizationstobebasedonhighqualitysetsofoccurrences.Realaspect–lexicaldefinition Nominalaspect–stipulativedefinition

Description PrescriptionInduction-based:describeswhatis Deduction-based:prescribeswhatshouldbeCorpusbasedresearchdependent NotcorpusbasedresearchdependentTruth-valuerelevant:wordsfittheworld Truth-valueirrelevant:worldfitsthewordsFig.1Considering the real aspect of word usage refers to the (features of the) phenomena itnames,andastudyofalexicaldefinitionconcernsthehistoricalwordusageofaspecificsetofusersinoneormoreparticulartime-spacecontexts.Inbothcases,wordsasusedbytheanalyst(=subjectlevel)mustfittheworld(=objectlevel),whichiswhytheyrequireapre-established corpus. Conversely, considering the nominal aspect of word usage or astipulativedefinitioncallsforphenomenatocomplywiththepre-definedfeatures.Ergo:nopre-established corpus is needed. Finally, from this follows that descriptive definitionsshouldbetrueortheirtruth-valueshouldbeverifiable,whereaswithrespecttoprescriptivedefinitions, thequestionabout their truth-value is irrelevant.Hence, to theextent that“Xis”-formeddefinitionsdonotspecifywhethertheyconcerntherealorthenominalaspectofthewordX,andtotheextentalsothattheuseoftheontologicalverb“tobe”(oranequiva-lent) prevents them from representing a stipulative or a lexical definition, “X is”-formeddefinitions arenot clear about theepistemological implications (asdistinguished in Fig. 1)they involve. “X is”-formeddefinitionsdonot showwhether theyaimatdescriptionoratprescription,whethertheydescribewhatthingsareorprescriberatherwhatthingsshouldbe. From this follows that “X is”-formed definitions are unclear about whether they arerather induction-based and thus corpus based research dependent or rather deduction-based,andthuscorpusbasedresearchindependent. If “X is”-formed definitions are meant to be descriptive, they need to fulfil therequirementsofthefeaturesmentionedintheleftcolumnofFig.1.Thismeansint.al.thatthey are corpus-based research dependent. However, the colloquial “What is”-formedquestionor“Xis”-formeddefinitiongenerallyclaimstoapplytoallpast,presentandfutureoccurrencesofacategory.Forexample,an“adaptationisX”-typeofdefinitionpretendstograsp the features of all past, present and future adaptations. Since that is impossible, itinevitably triggers the inductive fallacy of the faulty generalization. Karl Popper’swarningcomestomind:“Nomatterhowmanyinstancesofwhiteswanswehaveobserved,thisdoesnot justify the conclusion that all swans are white”.35 From this follows that non corpus

35KarlR.Popper,TheLogicofScientificDiscovery(London,NewYork:Routledge,1959),4.


–10–


basedresearchsupportedgeneralizationsaboutwhat“adaptation-in-general”isordoes,orwhat adaptation theory does or does not do – especially if the concept is used in thesingular, as if there existed one universal and homogeneous set of thoughts aboutadaptation – or what “we” adaptation scholars all over the world do or do not do, arepremature to say the least. Yet, this type of statements is common practice within filmadaptationstudies,ifnotelsewhere.Hereareafewexamples:- What adaptation is: see, for instance, Linda Hutcheon who realizes that a definition is

difficult,butstillspendsawholechaptertryingtodeterminewhat“is”anadaptation.36Nocoherentcorpusismentioned.Asimilarproblememergeswhencriticsproposeonce-and-for-all classifications of types of adaptations. See, for instance, GeoffreyWagner’sfidelity-based distinction between what he calls “transposition,” “commentary” and“analogue.”37

-What adaptationdoes: see, for instance, adaptation critic Robert Stam,who claims that“often[sic]wefindakindofcondensationofcharacters”,38orJulieSanders,whosignalsthat “adaptation is frequently [sic] involved inoffering commentaryona sourcetext.”39Neithercriticcarestospecifywhatparticularadaptationstheyarereferringtoexactly.

- What adaptation theory is: see for example, James Naremore, who notices that “mostwriting on adaptation as translation [...] betrays…,” or Thomas Leitch,who claims that“muchof the literatureonadaptationhas concentratedon…,”40 or “adaptation theorytendstoassume…”41etc.Hisreadershipisassumedtoimagineacommonlyunderstoodnotion of “most writing,” “adaptation theory,” etc. No corpus-based research ismentioned.

-What“we”adaptationscholarsdo:Thepracticereferredtohereconsistsinaddressingthereaderof anessayor amonographwith the firstpersonplural “we.”Again, insteadofperforming long and tedious audience research, this “we” quickly assumes one globaladdresseewho is assumed tohold the samepersonal valuesas theaddresser. See, forexample,adaptationscholarSarahCardwell,whopondersanimaginarydocumentaryonthe lifeofElizabeth I:“Wouldwe[sic]considerthisdocumentaryanadaptation?Surelytheanswerisno.”42SeealsoHutcheon,whotalksabout“whenmostofusconsiderthemove…,”43 or Robert Stam stating that “we in no way abandon our rights orresponsibilitiestomakejudgmentsaboutthevalueofspecificfilmadaptations.”44Whoisthis“we”?Theglobalcommunityofadaptationscholarsorsome“mutualcitationclubof

36Hutcheon,ATheoryofAdaptation,33ff.37 GeoffreyWagner, The Novel and the Cinema (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1975),219ff.38RobertStam,"BeyondFidelity:TheDialogicsofAdaptation",inJamesNaremoreed.,FilmAdaptation(NewJersey,NewBrunswick:RutgersUniversityPress,2000),54-76,esp.71.39JulieSanders,AdaptationandAppropriation(London:Routledge,2006),18–19.40Naremore,FilmAdaptation;ThomasLeitch,FilmAdaptationandItsDiscontents.FromGonewiththeWindtoThePassionoftheChrist(Baltimore:JohnHopkinsUniversityPress,2007),71.41Ibid.,120.42Cardwell,AdaptationRevisited,16.43Hutcheon,ATheoryofAdaptation,39.44Stam,"BeyondFidelity",75.


–11–


like-knows-like”? Interestingly, media scholar Robert C. Allen asks the same questionwhen discussing “the purposive collapsing of addresser, characterized addressee andimpliedviewer”intelevisionnewsprograms,TVshows,gamesshowsandtalkshows.45Ofallpossiblecommentators,Allenquotesnoneotherthan. . . .RobertStam,whoseemsveryfamiliarwiththisrhetoricaldeviceandlabelsit“theregimeofthefictiveWe”:

Televisionnews[...]claimstospeakforus,andoftendoes,butjustasoftenitdeprivesusoftherighttospeakbydeludingusintothinkingthatitsdiscourseisourown.46

Similarly, sweeping generalizations about unspecified adaptation theories, adaptationtheorists and “we’s” try to delude actual readers into thinking that the discourse is theirown,andthatitsclaimsaretrue.Theabovesuggeststhatonlystatementsreferringtowell-definedcorporaoftheories,theoristsand“we’s”canclaimtruthevaluability. Problemsgetworseifonetriestocoverthetrans-historicalessenceoftoomany,toodisparateandtoovariablephenomenaintoonesingle,synchronic,once-and-for-alltypeofdefinitionorname.AstheFrenchsay,“Quitropembrasse,malétreint.”47Suchadefinitionisbound to becomeunworkable. A commonly knownexample of this practice concerns theuseof“umbrellawords.”Theterm“umbrellaword”referstowordsthatarecommonlyusedto refer to very different things. They explain the contradictory statements mentionedabove.Wordslike“translation”or“adaptation”representsuchumbrellaterms.Withinthefield of descriptive translation studies, scholars have fairly soon discovered that theword“translation”referstotoomany,differentphenomenatobeuseful.Tryingtocomeupwithonce-and-for-all typesofdefinitionsencompassingallpast,presentandfuturetranslationsandprocessesoftranslatingshowedthatsuchdefinitionshadtobesoinclusiveastobenolongerexclusive.PStranslationscholarsTouryandLambertultimatelyconcludethat:

Translatedtextsaswellas[…]translationprocessesvaryintermsofculture,language,historicalperiod,source-andtarget-texttypesandfunctions,modeoftransfer,communicationchannelandmanyotherfactors. There is hardly any single feature which is sine qua non for rendering products, and/or theprocesseswhichyieldthem,astranslationalentities.48

ThatisalsowhyinhisupdatedDescriptiveTranslationStudies,Touryrepeatsthat:

Any a priori definition, especially if couched in essentialist terms, allegedly specifying what is“inherently” translational, would involve an untenable pretense of fixing once-and-for-all theboundariesofanobjectwhichischaracterizedbyitsveryvariability.49

Now, many years later, adaptation critics have also come to realize that the word“adaptation” refers tomanydifferentphenomena, and that to label all thesephenomenawithonenameisproblematic.50

45 Robert C. Allen, ed.,Channels of Discourse, Reassembled. Television and Contemporary Criticism (London:Routledge,1992),122.46Quotedinibid.47He/shewhograspsattoomuchlosesall.48GideonTouryandJoséLambert,‘OnTarget’sTarget’,Target.InternationalJournalofTranslationStudies1,no.1(1989):3–4.49Toury,DescriptiveTranslationStudies,31.Boldinoriginal.50 See for example, Cardwell, Adaptation Revisited, 9; Hutcheon, A Theory of Adaptation, 15; Sanders,Adaptation and Appropriation, 19; Mike Ingham, "The Mind’s Ear: Imagination, Emotions and Ideas in the


–12–


In conclusion, to theextent that “X is”-formeddefinitionsarenot supportedbyanexplicit and representative corpus of occurrences, their truth-value cannot be verified orfalsified.Totheextentthattheyaresupportedonlybyarandomsetofoccurrencesorbyone thatwas compiled ratheradhoc andexpost facto, forexampleon thebasisof theirrepresentativenesstoillustrateapreviouslymadeclaim,over-generalisationswillbeeasytodisconfirmsimplybyassemblingadifferentsetofoccurrences.Forexample,foreachoftheabovementionedstatementsaboutwhatadaptationsareordo,orwhatadaptationtheorydoes,etc.,astatementclaimingtheoppositecanbemade,basedsimplyontheassemblyofadifferentsetofoccurrences.Finally,“Xis”-formeddefinitionsarealsoproblematicalwhenunderstoodtobeprescriptive.Theuseoftheontologicalverb“tobe”ismisleadingbecauseitsuggestsstatementsoffactthetruth-valueofwhichwouldberelevant.Suggestingsolutions?

In a backwardsway, thepreceding suggests that the above-mentioneddefinitionaltools could improvediscourseonadaptations, translations–andperhapsotherobjectsofstudy–intermsofbothsemanticprecisionandlogicalvalidity.Thissectionexaminessomepossibilities.

Therealaspectofadefinition:corpus-basedresearch

Fig.2

ItwassuggestedinFig.1thatadoptingadescriptiveapproachimplies lookingatthereal aspect of the definition. If it is impossible to study all past, present and futureadaptationsbeforedefininganddescribingthem,thereisasimplealternative:tostudyonly IntersemioticTranspositionofHousman’sPoetrytoSong", inLaurenceRawed.,Translation,Adaptation,andTransformation(NewYork:Continuum,2012),189.


–13–


a few of them first. In other words, a solution to the aforementioned inductive problemconsistsinestablishingawelldefined,precisecorpusofoccurrencesfirstandtoclarifythatconclusionspertaintotheinvestigatedcorpusandtothatcorpusalone.Criticsmayagreeordisagreewith theway sets of occurrenceswere assembled, but they can verify or falsifyevery claim that was made with respect to the explicitated corpora. In other words,explicitatingacorpusdoesnotguarantee that statementsare true,but itassuresscholarsthat statements are truth evaluable. Further researchmay investigate other corpora andconfirmordisconfirmthe findings thatweremade.Corpus-basedresearchdoesnot implyobjectivity. On the contrary, it acknowledges the relevance of perspective. Sceptics whoclaimthattheexplicitationofanycorpusalwayscoloursresearchresultsstatetheobvious.This isonlyaproblemtowhoeverbelieves it ispossible todefineanobjectof study fromoutsideanypointofview.Explicitatingtheperspectiveofastudyinsteadofhidingit,as“Xis”-formeddefinitionstendtodo,makesitpossibletocheckforexamplewhetherdivergentobservations can be ascribed to the different analytical perspective thatwas adopted, orwhether thedivergence shouldbeattributed toamistake. In the first case, thedivergentobservationsmayrevealdifferentbutaccurateandcomplementaryaspectsofreality;inthesecondcase,theobservationsareconflictinginsteadofcomplementary,andatleastoneofthe observations must be false. This distinction can easily be explained with the help ofcartoonistW.E.Hill’swell-known1915drawingof“MyWifeandMyMother-in-Law”51[Fig.2]. If person A sees a young girl in the drawing, and person B sees an old woman, theoppositeviewsmaybeattributedtoadifferentperspective.IfpersonChoweverseesapinkelephant, thisviewwillgenerallybeacceptedtobeerroneousandpersonCwillkindlybeaskedtogoseeadoctor. PStranslationstudieshasinsistedsinceitsbeginningsontheimportanceofcorpus-basedresearch.Yet,itisonlysincethemid-1990sthatthetopichasreceivedseriousmeta-theoreticalattentionindescriptivetranslationstudies.52Tomyknowledge,meta-theoreticalreflection on how (film) adaptation studies could benefit from systematic corpus-basedresearchhasyettostart. However,iftheestablishmentofalimitedcorpusofoccurrencessavesDASfromtheinductivedeadlock,thatofneverbeingabletostudyallpast,presentandfutureobjectsofstudyfirst,theveryestablishmentofsuchacorpusimmediatelythrowsupanother:ifIwantto study a film noir, or a translation, or an adaptation without an a priori description ordefinitionoftheobjectofstudy,howamItorecognizeaphenomenonsuchasafilmnoir,a

51MenakhemPerry,‘LiteraryDynamics:HowtheOrderofaTextCreatesItsMeanings’,PoeticsToday1,no.1–2(1979):51.52Seeint.al.SylvianeGranger,"TheCorpusApproach:ACommonWayForwardforContrastiveLinguisticsandTranslationStudies?’, inSylvianeGrangeretal.eds.,Corpus-BasedApproaches toContrastiveLinguisticsandTranslationStudies(Amsterdam,Atlanta:Rodopi,2003),17;AnnaMauranenandPekkaKujamäki,TranslationUniversals: Do They Exist? (John Benjamins Publishing, 2004), 1; Maeve Olohan, Introducing Corpora inTranslationStudies (London:Routledge,2004),1.SeealsotheCorpora inContrastiveandTranslationStudies(UCCTS),abiennialinternationalconferenceserieslaunchedtoprovideaforumforexploringthecreationanduseofcorporaincontrastiveandtranslationstudies:http://www.edgehill.ac.uk/events/2010/07/27/conference-using-corpora-in-contrastive-and-translation-studies-uccts-2010.


–14–


translation or an adaptationwhen I see one? This question turns the focus from the realaspectofadefinitiontoitsnominalaspect.

Thenominalaspectofadefinition:Howtorecognizetheobjectofstudy?

Popper’s observation about the white swans signals thus another limitation ofinductivelogic.IfIwanttoverifywhetherallswansarewhite,howamItorecognizeaswanasaswanbeforedefininganddescribingone inthefirstplace?RickAltmantranslatesthequestiontohistopic,whichisgenrestudies.53TranslationscholarGideonTouryontheotherhandcarefullyavoidstheproblemwhenhespeaksofthe“representativenessofmoresyste-maticallyobservedtranslationalcharacteristics.”54IfIamlookingfortranslationalcharacte-ristics,howdoIrecognizecharacteristicsas“being”translational?Similarly,whenstudyingadaptations,howdoIrecognizeathingasanadaptation?IneedtodefinefirstwhatIwillbelookingfor,i.e.,anadaptation,beforebeingabletoperceiveit,assembleit,describeit,andexplainit.Consequently,inductionmustbetriggeredbydeduction,eventhoughdeductionmay in its turnbe induction-based.This reflectionshifts the focus fromthe leftcolumnofFig. 1 to the right column, looking int. al. at the nominal aspect of definitions. Perhapsstipulative and lexical definitions may help descriptive studies to escape from thisdefinitionalimpasse.

Stipulativedefinitions Totheextentthatastipulativedefinitionprescribesfirstthefeaturesaphenomenonshould present, in order for that phenomenon to be considered, a stipulative definitioncannot be corpus-dependent. In that sense, stipulative definitions solve the problem ofexhaustive corpora of occurrences. Stipulative definitions solve at the same time thechicken-and-eggproblemmentionedabovebecausetheydeductivelydecreefirstwhatoneis going to look for and study. Stipulative definitionsmay be narrow or wide. Both haveadvantages and disadvantages. A good example of a narrow stipulative definition of"adaptation"canbefoundinIrmelaSchneider’s1981DerVerwandelteText:WegezueinerTheoriederLiteraturverfilmung (TransformingtheText:TowardsAnotherTheoryofScreenAdaptation).Init,theauthordefineshowsheunderstandsthisconcept:

[Film adaptation] is about the processing of a literary model in filmic images, wherebyintentional analogies with the literary text can be observed, which precludes one fromconsidering the literarymodel as amere content provider. The process of film adaptationitselfisunderstoodasanaestheticpractice.55

Schneider’s definition is temptingly final and concrete.Onemayassume, indeed, that themoreconcreteastipulativedefinitionofX,theeasier itwillbetodecideifaphenomenon

53Altman,Film/Genre,6.54Toury,DescriptiveTranslationStudies,1.55 My translation. Irmela Schneider, Der Verwandelte Text: Wege zu einer Theorie der Literaturverfilmung(Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1981), 119. Original text: “Es geht um die Umsetzung einer literarischenVorlage in filmische Bilder, bei der intentionale Analogien zum literarischen Text feststellbar sind, die esverbieten,die literarischeVorlagealspurenStofflieferantenzubestimmen.DerProzeßderVerfilmungselbstwirdalseineästhetischeArbeitverstanden.”


–15–


qualifiesasXornot.However,Schneider’sdefinitionisveryrestrictive.Theauthorexplicitlyreducesthephenomenonof filmadaptationtothatof theLiterary filmwithcapitalL.Sheeven narrows the concept down to those adaptations which add aesthetic value to theliterarysource.Whoisthejudgeofthoseaestheticvaluesremainstobeseen.Schneider’sdefinitionshowsthatthemorerestrictiveastipulativedefinition,themoreexclusiveitis.Itmaythusdiscardphenomenawhich,forvariousreasons,onecouldconsidertoberelevanttoastudyofadaptations.56Forexample:Whataboutadaptationswhichdonot“intend”tobefaithful,ordonotadd“aestheticvalue”?Andwhataboutadaptationsthatarebasedonliterary texts which are not judged to be canonical? Clearly, these questions do notrepresent a problem for Schneider because in her mind, these phenomena “are” notadaptations–Schneiderlabelsthem“Bebilderungen”or“illustrations”57–butotherscholarshavecalledandstudiedsuchphenomenaasadaptations.58Hence, similaritiesonboth thereallevelofpropertiesandonthenominallevelofpredicatesmayargueforaninclusionofthesephenomenaintothefieldofadaptationstudies. If stipulative definitions are too exclusive, there is a simple way to correct thatproblem: to stipulate a wider definition of “translation” or “adaptation.” This is whatLambertandRobynsseemtosuggestwithrespecttotranslationstudies:

Wemay [...] define translation in the largest sense asmigration-through-transformation ofdiscursive elements (signs), a process duringwhich they are interpreted (re-contextualized)accordingtodifferentnorms,codes,andmodels.59

Widestipulativedefinitions suchas thisonehavehelpedPSstudiesopenup thescopeofresearch and study phenomena thatwere excluded from both traditional translation andadaptation studies.60 However, as thewider stipulative definition of Lambert and Robynsalreadysuggests,suchdefinitionsruntheriskofbecomingtooinclusive.UsingLambertandRobyns’definition,everythingmaybeseenasatranslation.Intheend,restrictiveaswellaswidestipulativedefinitionsrecallWittgenstein’sexperiencewithdefinitions:

Itisnotpossibletospelloutnecessaryandsufficientconditionsforanactivitytobeagame[read: adaptation, translation, ...]. (...) One invariably finds an activity that one’s definitionincludesbut thatonewouldnotwant tocountasagame,oranactivity that thedefinitionexcludesbutthatonewouldwanttocountasagame.61

Stipulativedefinitionsdohavetheadvantageover“Xis”-formeddefinitionsthattheyallowtoexplicitatethejudgingsubject(seeabove).However,ratherthandescribingwhataphenomenonactuallyis,stipulativedefinitionsdecreeaprioriwhatfeaturesaphenomenonshoulddisplayinorderforthatphenomenontoqualifyas,say,anadaptation.Thisraisesthe

56Thenotionof“relevance”remainsamatterofcontention.Itispartofawiderdebateaboutthedescriptivevs.normativeselectionoftheobjectofstudy.SeeCattrysse,DescriptiveAdaptationStudies,334–35.57Schneider,DerVerwandelteText,293.58Forreferences,seeforexample,Cattrysse,‘L’Adaptationfilmiquedetexteslittéraires",3ff.59 Quoted in Patrick Cattrysse, "Audiovisual Translation and New Media", in Robert Hodgson and Paul A.Soukupeds.,FromOneMediumtoAnother.Basic Issues forCommunicating theBible inNewMedia (KansasCity:Sheed&WardandAmericanBibleSociety,1997),77.60Seeforexample,Cattrysse,"L’Adaptationfilmiquedetexteslittéraires",20;Cattrysse,"Film(Adaptation)asTranslation:SomeMethodologicalProposals",60.61QuotedinAlanF.Chalmers,WhatIsThisThingCalledScience?(Berkshire:OpenUniversityPress,1999),111.


–16–


questionhowprescriptivedefinitions fit intoadescriptiveapproach.Perhaps the studyoflexicaldefinitionsallowsforamoredescriptiveapproach.

Lexicaldefinitions

To study the lexical definition of aword is to empirically observe and describe itsusage in one or more particular contexts. Consequently, unlike the use of stipulativedefinitions, thestudyof lexicaldefinitions requires,again, thepreviousestablishmentofaqualitycorpus. Inotherwords, insteadofpretendingtohavestudiedallpast,presentandfuture uses of the word “adaptation,” one establishes first a limited but precise set ofdefinitionsanduses.Theresearcherdescribeshowusers1,2and3haveusedthewordXandwhatithasmeantincontextsA,BandC.Suchanapproachisparticularlyusefulwhendealing with words that are very common, such as “film noir” or “western,” or umbrellawords such as “translation” or “adaptation”; words which are not only used by aprofessionalin-crowdbutby“ordinary”people.

Furthermore, a study of the lexical definition of say “film noir,” “translation” or“adaptation”avoidsthecatch22problemmentionedaboveofhowtorecognizetheobjectof study. When studying the lexical definition of “film noir,” or “translation,” or“adaptation,” the words simply appear as such in language use. Interestingly, lexicaldefinitionsmaybestudiedinasynchronicandadiachronicway.Forexample,inapreviousstudy, I examined the lexical definition of film noir as provided in eleven “relevant”filmographies published between 1940 and 1990.62 Filmographies were considered to be“relevant”iftheypresentedonehundredormorefilmnoirtitles.Inthisway,acorpusof604movietitleswascompiled.Asindicatedabove,adiachronicstudyofthelexicaldefinitionoffilmnoirmaystartwithNinoFrank’suseofthetermin1946,referringtofivespecifictitles,andmoveon fromthere to thehistoricaluseof thewords"filmnoir" inother time-spacecontexts.

Doesthismeanthatthestudyof lexicaldefinitionsofferstheperfectsolutiontoallproblems?Unfortunatelynot.Thereaderwillhavesurelynoticedthesimilaritybetweenthelexical definition on the one hand, and Todorov’s historical definition (as opposed to atheoretical definition) and my own 1990 PS functional definition of "adaptation" on theother.Thelexical,historicalorPSfunctionaldefinitionoftheobjectofstudyfocusesonhowsubjects within a specific historical context present and perceive phenomena, and namethem. Hence, they all run into the problems mentioned above: the fact that similarphenomenamayalsofunctionorbelabelledindifferentways.Anyapproachthatlimitsitsscopetoonenameoronelabelnecessarilymissesthosesimilarphenomenathatgounderadifferentname.Furthermore,asindicatedabove,Altmanexplainsthatinthefieldofliterarystudies, academics were not happy to see the initiative of defining their object of studybeing taken away and left "into the hands of untutored readers or out-of-controlaudiences”.63 It is not hard to imaginenormative adaptation critics feeling the sameway.Thismayexplainwhyafunctionalstudyofadaptationremainsunder-investigateduntilthisday.

62Cattrysse,"L’Adaptationfilmiquedetexteslittéraires";Cattrysse,Pourunethéoriedel’adaptationfilmique.63Altman,Film/Genre,11.


–17–


Conclusions

It would seem that a more explicit distinction between the real and the nominalaspectofadefinition,andthemoreexplicituseofeitherlexicalorstipulativedefinitions–insteadof“Xis”-formeddefinitions–couldimprovedescriptiveadaptationstudiesintermsofsemanticprecisionandlogicalvalidity. To distinguish between the real and the nominal aspect of a definition is easy.Already in his 1946 essay,An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation, philosopher ClarenceLewis suggested the use of quotation marks.64 Following this convention, a word usedwithout quotationmarks indicates its reference to the named thing and its properties. Itinvolvestheexplicitationofawell-definedcorpus.Conversely,thementionofawordwithquotationmarksreferstothewordasalistofpredicatesandhintsatanumberofnominaloptions.Applying this convention ina consistentwaycould removesomeof the semanticconfusionthatwasmentionedabove. Withrespect to thedistinctionbetweenstipulativeand lexicaldefinitions, it shouldbe clear that a descriptive approach does not plead for the eradication of the former infavour of the latter. Rather, it argues for a clearer distinction between both types ofdefinitions. Lexical definitions refer, in effect, to objects of study that are empiricallyinvestigated, described and if possible explained.65 However, in order to do just that,researchers need analytical tools and methods that meet the epistemic standards ofdescriptive research. Stipulative definitions constitute exactly the analytical tools that arenecessary in a researchprogram.Theymustbedecreedandagreedupon in a synchronicwaybyagroupofresearchersassembledinonehicetnunccommunicationalsituation.Itiswith the help of these stipulative definitions that researchers investigate objects of studyand communicate the results of those investigations to each other. To maintain a cleardistinctionbetweenastipulativeandalexicaldefinitionisalsoeasy.Itonlyrequiresacertaindiscipline in languageuse. Inordertoshowthatadefinition ismeantasastipulativeone,onecouldwrite:“IdefineX(say"adaptation"oranyotherword)asY.”Inordertoexplainthat a definition is studied as a lexical one, one could write: “A, B and C define X (say"adaptation" or any otherword) as Y.” In this case, A, B andC represent the limited andexplicitatedcorpusofdefinitionusersonthebasisofwhichthestudyoflexicaldefinitionsismade.Atalltimes,onewouldthenavoidthecolloquialwriting:“X(say“adaptation”oranyotherword)isY.” Thestipulative-lexicaldistinctionalsohelpstoamendTodorov’sdistinctionbetweena theoretical and a historical definition, and the aforesaid PS functional definition of theobjectofstudy.Asstatedabove,Todorov’stheoreticaldefinitionresemblesthestipulativedefinition if it isunderstoodas createdby theanalystbeforeusing it. Todorov’shistoricaldefinitioncorresponds to the lexicaldefinition, theoneananalyst findsasusedbyotherswithinaspecifictime-spacecontext.Confusionstartswhentheanalystfindsdefinitionsthatwerecreatedbyso-calledtheoreticians.Inthisrespect,thestipulative-lexicaldistinctionmay

64QuotedinSwartz,"Definitions,DictionariesandMeanings",np.65 That is why perhaps philosophers also call them "descriptive definitions". See for example, Gupta,‘Definitions’,np.


–18–


helpout:anyonecaneitherdefineawordapriori, i.e.,createone’sowndefinitionbeforeusingit,ordecidetoadoptthedefinitionasfoundintheusagebyothers.Fromthisfollowsthat definitions are not per se theoretical or historical, stipulative or lexical. The labeldependsonthepointofviewthatistaken:whetherthedefinitioniscreatedorstipulatedatthe subject levelof theanalyst,orwhether it is foundat theobject levelof theobjectofstudy.Inthatsense,yourtheoreticalorstipulativedefinitionmayindeedbemyhistoricalorlexicaldefinition,andviceversa.Inotherwords,thereferentoftheseconceptsisdeictic.66 Finally, the stipulative/lexical distinction helps to complement the blind spotmentionedwith respect to the PS functional definition of the object of study.Whereas afunctional definition seems to correspond to a lexical definition, the additional use of astipulativedefinitionhelpstodistinguishbetweenwhatXisandwhatXistakenfor.Hence,acommunityof adaptation scholarsmayapriori decidewhat theyare going to consider asadaptationsandadaptationalrelationships(asopposedtoothertypesofrelationships),andthenmoveon to studywhat phenomenahavebeenpresented and/or perceived as such.Thecombinedusageofstipulativeand lexicaldefinitionsallowsthemtodescribehowandexplainwhydifferentphenomenahavefunctionedinsimilarways,whilesimilarphenomenahavefunctionedindifferentways.

66Theword“deictic”comesfromlinguisticsandreferstowordslike“here,”“now,”orpersonalpronounslike“I”or“you.”Theirreferentdependsonwhospeakswhereandwhen.

Documents

Descriptive (Adaptation) Studies, Naming and Definitions ...filmjournal.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/FJ4.6-P.-Cattrysse.pdfGideon Toury and his followers replaced the PS label with