derivative risk project

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Financial

Ins t i tu t ions

Center

Risks in Derivatives Markets

by

Ludger HentschelC l i f ford W. Smith, Jr .

96-24


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T HE WHARTON F INANCIAL INSTIT UT IONS CENT ER

T he Wharton Financial Institutions Center provides a multi-disciplinary research approach to

the problems and opportunities facing the financial services industry in its search for

competitive excellence. T he Center's research focuses on the issues related to managing risk

at the firm level as well as ways to improve productivity and performance.

T he Center fosters the development of a community of faculty, visiting scholars and Ph.D.candidates whose research interests complement and support the mission of the Center. T he

Center works closely with industry executives and practitioners to ensure that its research is

informed by the operating realities and competitive demands facing industry participants as

they pursue competitive excellence.

Copies of the working papers summarized here are available from the Center. If you would

like to learn more about the Center or become a member of our research community, please

let us know of your interest.

Anthony M. Santomero

Director

The Working Paper Series is made possible by a generous

grant from the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation


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Ludger Hentschel and Clifford W. Smith are at the William E. Simon School of Business Administration, University1

of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14627.

T he authors gratefully acknowledge financial support from the John M. Olin F oundation and the Bradley Policy Research

Cen ter, as well as helpful conversations with D.H. Che w, S.P. Kothari, R.J. Mackay, and C.W. Smithson. In addition, two

anonymous referees made many helpful suggestions. Parts of the analysis in this paper appeared in less technical form in

"Controlling Risks in Derivatives Markets,"Journal of Financial Engineering, (Vol. 4, No. 2, pp. 101-125).

Risks in Derivatives Markets 1

November 20, 1995

Abstract : T he debate over risks and regulation in derivatives markets has failed to provide

a clear analysis of what risks are and whether regulation is useful for their control. In this

paper we provide a parametric model to analyze default risk in derivative contracts. A firm

is less likely to default on an obligation on derivatives than on its corporate bonds because

bonds are always a liability, while derivatives can be assets. Using default rates for

corporate bonds, we provide an upper bound for the default risk of derivativesone

substantially lower than the popular debate seems to imply. Systemic risk is the

aggregation of default risks; since default risk has been exaggerated, so has systemic risk.

Finally, this debate seems to have ignored what we call "agency risk." Features of widely

used incentive contracts for derivatives traders can induce them to take very risky

positions, unless they are carefully monitored.

Keywords : Agency risk, default, derivatives, futures, forwards, hedging, options, risk

management , regulation, swaps.


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1 . I n t r o d u c t i on

The cont inuing discussion of risks and regulat ion in derivative mar kets illustra tes

that there is l i t t le agreement on what the r isks are or whether regulation is a

useful tool for their control.1One source of confusion is the sheer profusion of

names describing the risks arising from derivatives. Besides the price risk of

potential losses on derivatives from changes in interest rates, foreign exchange

ra tes, or comm odity prices, there is default risk (sometimes referred to as

counterparty risk ), liquidity (or funding) risk, legal risk, settlement risk

(or, a variat ion t hereof, Her sta tt risk), an d opera tions risk. Last , but n ot

least, is systemic riskthe notion of problems throughout the financial system

tha t seems t o be at th e heart of man y regulatory concerns.

In this paper, we analyze the risks associated with derivative transactions,

and the impact of regulation in limiting these risks. We provide a simple, para-

metric framework in which one can analyze price, default and systemic risk. In

section 2, we review price riskthat is, the potential for losses on derivative

positions stemming from changes in the prices of the underlying assets (for in-

stance, interest rates, exchange rates, and commodity prices). In section 3, we

examine default risk by either party to a derivatives contracta risk that we

believe has been largely misunderstood and exaggerated. The existence of price

risk h as been docum ented by several large, highly publicized derivatives losses.

There are, however, hardly any examples of default in derivative markets. We

argue th at this is a trend can be expected to continue.

In section 4, we ar gue th at systemic risk is simply the a ggregation of default

risks faced by individual firms in using derivatives. In brief, we argue that

the possibility of widespread default throughout the financial system caused by

derivatives has been exaggerated, principally due to the failure to appreciate the

low default risk associated with individual derivative contracts. Partly for this

reason, current regulatory proposals should be viewed with some skepticism.

In particular, none of the proposals recognize the fundamental dependence of

default risk on how derivatives are used.

1

We use th e term derivative to refer to financial contracts th at explicitly have the featuresof options, futures, forwards, or swaps.


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2 Risks in Derivatives Markets

In s ection 5, we suggest t ha t r ecent , highly publicized losses can be at -

tributed largely to improper compensation, control and supervision within firms.

We define derivative risks stemming from these sources as agency risks, a ref-erence to the principalagent conflicts from which they arise. For instance, we

believe th at s ome standa rd evaluat ion an d compensat ion systems can be ill-

suited for employees granted decision rights over derivatives transactions. Firms

that pay large bonuses based on short-term performance can encourage excessive

risk-taking by employees. Despite limited public discussion, it appea rs t hat firms

are a ware of these issues a nd a re working to control the problems. In section 6,

we offer a few concluding remarks.

2 . P r i c e R i s k

The modern analysis of financial derivatives is unified by the successful applica-

tion of absence of arbitrage pricing arguments. In their seminal work, Black and

Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973) first showed how to price optionsthe last

class of derivatives to elude this analysisvia absence of arbitrage.

The ability to use arbitrage pricing in valuing derivatives has at least one

profound implication for the current public debate on derivatives. Redundant

securities logically cannot introduce any new, fundamentally different risks into

the f inancial system. To the extent tha t derivatives ar e redunda nt, th ey cann ot

increase the aggregate level of risk in the economy. Derivatives can, however,

isolate and concentrate existing risks, thereby facilitating their efficient transfer.

Indeed, it is precisely this ability to isolate quite specific risks at low transactions

costs that makes derivatives such useful risk-management tools.

For derivatives, the composition of the replicating portfolios can vary con-

siderably over time and maintaining these portfolios can involve extensive and

costly tr ading.2Even if such t rad ing costs introduce a degree of imprecision into

derivative pricing models, virtually all derivatives can be valued using arbitrage

models. (In fact, to the extent that transaction costs introduce a degree of im-

2Note that the trading required to replicate the payoffs depends critically on the other

outstanding positions managed by the firm. Required trading costs for a market maker with anextensive derivatives position book are generally dramatically less than the sum of the tradesto replicate the individual contracts.


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Sec. 2] Price Risk 3

precision into derivative pricing models, derivatives are likely to provide more

efficient hedges than synthetic derivatives used to hedge the same risks. )

The standard use of derivatives is in managing price risks through hedg-ing. Firms with a core bus iness exposur e to under lying factors su ch as com-

modity prices, exchange or interest rates, can reduce their net exposures to

these factors by assuming offsetting exposures through derivatives. Rational,

value-maximizing motivations for such corporate hedging activities are provided

by Mayers and Smith (1982, 1987); Stulz (1984); Smith and Stulz (1985); and

Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein (1993) among others.

Although risk aversion can provide powerful incentives t o hedge for indi-

viduals, this u sua lly is n ot th e motive for large public companies wh ose owners

can adjust their risk exposures by adjusting the composition of their portfolios.

Rather, current theory suggests that incentives to hedge stem from progressive

taxes, contracting costs, or underinvestment problems. All of these issues are

internal to the firm and cannot be solved by external investors.

2 .1 . Exposure

For simplicity, we assu me th at t he value of th e firm is inher ently qua dra tic in a

assume that the firm is operating with fixed production technology and scale

case, the firm has an incentive to reduce its exposure to the underlying factors

in order to reduce the quadratic cost term.

This formulation can be interpreted as a local approximation to firm value

for any of the aforementioned hedging motives. For example, if taxes motivate

hedging, after-tax income is a concave function of income a nd t he qua dra tic

specification can be viewed as an appr oximat ion t o after-tax income. Similarly,

3While this gives rise to negative firm values, adding back a constant mean does not

produce additional insights.


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if bankruptcy or underinvestment costs rise as firm value falls, then the above

formulation can approximate this behavior.4

2.2. Hedging

Next, assume th at there is a set of financial instrum ents with m ean zero (net)

be applied to any financial contract in efficient markets. For derivative contracts

such as forwards, futures, or swaps, whose payoffs are linear in the underlying

For derivatives like forwards and options, the single payment date is an

accurate representation of the actual contract. For derivatives like futures and

swaps with multiple payment dates, this characterization ignores the sequential

nat ure of payments. For t hese contra cts, the single payment date can be inter-

preted as t he ma tur ity date of the contr act, with all payments cumulated to

maturity.

If the firm can t ran sact in th is financial ma rket without costs, then firm

value is given by

(2)

The char acterization of th e firm an d its der ivatives positions in eq. (2) ab-

stracts from most dynamic intertemporal features. The single-period framework,

however, permits us to better focus on the relation between derivatives positions

and default than alternative dynamic approaches. Johnson and Stulz (1987),

for example, assume th at the n et worth of an option writer a nd th e underlying

price have a constant correlation that is exogenous to their model. Conditional

on this a ssum ption, they can exactly price options with default risk. Cooper

and Mello (1991), Sorensen and Bollier (1994), Jarrow and Turnbull (1995), and

4Although we dont view this a s th e typical hedging motivation, our par amet erization of

firm value also can be interpreted as a quadratic approximation to the concave utility functionof a r isk averse owner.

5

Referring t o these cases, we will not always m ake a careful distinction between underlying

prices and payoffs. For contracts such as options, whose payoffs are nonlinear in the underlyingprice, this distinction is important, however.


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Sec. 2] Price Risk 5

Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) also provide pricing models for financial contracts

in the presence of default risk. They make the same tradeoff as Johnson and

Stulz (1987) and take the source of the default risk as exogenous to their model.In contrast, we structure our model specifically to illustrate that the correlation

between firm value and derivative obligations is a crucial ingredient in default

risk, and furt herm ore that this correlat ion depends on th e firms derivatives po-

sition.

2.3. Imp act of Hed ging

The optimal position in the fina ncial contra cts is found by optimizing th e value

(3)

(4)

is the ma trix of

(5)

To be an effective hedge, the financial contract must be highly correlated

is small in order to limit the introduction of additional uncertainty through

of derivatives is tha t t hey individua lly ta rget t he potentia lly large sources of

variation, such as interest rates, exchange rates, or commodity prices, without

introducing additional sources of variation.


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F IGURE 1: Firm value, exposures, and hedging.

that the firms exposure to x is negative.6 To display the payoff from the finan-

by the dashed line. Finally, the dashed and dotted curve labeled VH shows the

net exposure of firm value including the derivatives contracts.

The figure shows that hedging operates through two channels. First, the

hedge reduces the n et exposur e to the u nderlying risk factor, which reduces

variation in firm value. This is evident from the reduced slope of VH compared

The exposure shown in figure 1 might be appropriate for a chemical pro-

an oil producer is likely to have a positive exposure to the price of crude oil. In

our framework, the oil producers firm value would be that of the oil consumer

producer, but it would be upwar d sloping. In t his case, hedging would a gain

reduce both the slope and the concavity of this value function.

as exposure in the context of exchange and interest rates, respectively.


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Sec. 3] Default risk 7

3 . De fau l t r i sk

Default risk is the risk that losses will be incurred due to default by the counter-party. As noted above, part of the confusion in the current debate about deriva-

tives stems from t he pr ofusion of nam es associated with defau lt risk. Term s such

as credit r isk and count erpar ty risk are essent ially synonyms for default risk.

Legal risk refers to the enforceability of the contract. Terms such as settle-

ment risk and Herstatt risk refer to defaults that occur at a specific point in

th e life of th e cont ra ct: th e dat e of sett lement . These term s do not repr esent

independent risks; they just describe different occasions or causes of default.

In most derivatives contracts, either party may default during the life of

the contr act.7 In a swap, for exam ple, eith er side could default on a ny of th e

settlement dates during the life of the swap. In practice, a firm may be able to

accelerate default. For example, once it becomes clear that a firm will ultimately

be unable to meet all of its obligations, the firm may elect to enter bankruptcy

proceedings now, even t hough curr ent obligat ions do not force th is step. The

firm would only chose this pa th if it is in t he firms best int erest, an d hen ce there

may be an optimal default policy. While such timing issues may be important,

especially for firms near bankruptcy, we abstract from these complications and

continue to focus on the default risk posed by one side of the contract at a singlepayment dates.

8

Defau lt r isk ha s two component s: the expected exposur e, (th e expected

replacement cost of the contract minus the expected recovery from the counter-

party) and the probability that default will occur.

3 .1 . Expected exposure

The expected exposure measures how much capital is likely to be at risk should

7

Options form the notable exception to this rule. An option buyer cannot default afterthe purchase of the option since he does not have any further obligations to pay under theoption contra ct. Hence, in option mar kets only th e option writ er poses default r isk.

8

One reason we believe that this is a r easonable tradeoff is that it is unlikely tha t payment s

obligated under derivatives trigger default. The more likely it is that default is triggered byobligated payments to other claim holders, the less important it is to focus on the intertemporaldetails of the cashflows un der der ivatives contra cts without m odeling th ese details of bond,employee, and lease contracts.


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th e counter par ty defau lt. The notional principal amount s of derivatives like

forwards and swaps grossly overstate actual default exposure. For example, in

interest rat e swaps only net interest pa yments ar e exchan ged. These paymentsare a small fraction of the notional principal of the swap. In fact, the US General

Account ing Office (GAO) estimat es t ha t t he n et credit exposur e on swaps is

approximately l% of notional principal.

In a ddition t o the expected value of the derivative at th e time of default , ex-

pected exposure also depends on expected recovery rates after default. (Current

capital standards implicitly assume that the recovery rate is zero, which leads

to a material overstatement of the expected loss.) Most swaps are unsecured

claims in bankruptcy proceedings. For unsecured (senior) claims, recovery rates

average about 50% (Franks and Torous, 1994for collateralized claims recovery

rat es ar e closer t o 80%. )

Finally, the expected exposure depends on whether the contract includes

imbedded options. Specifically, if the swap stipulates a floor rate, the buyers

obligations and the magnitude of the losses it could cause in a default are con-

tractually limited.

3 .2 . Probab i l i ty o f defau l t

Default on any financial contract, including derivatives, occurs when two condi-

t ions a re met simu ltaneously: a pa rty to the contra ct owes a payment under t he

contract, and t he count erparty cann ot obtain t imely payment.9Under U.S. law,

this mea ns t hat the defaulting party either ha s insufficient assets to cover the

required payments, or has successfully filed for protection under the bankruptcy

code.

The fact that default only occurs when two conditions hold simultaneously

implies that it is a bivariate phenomenon. To capture the nature of default risk,

we therefore have to consider the bivariate distribution of the counterpartys

obligation under the derivative contract as well as its ability to pay. For simplic-

9In our discussion of default, we generally ignore technical default since it h as n o direct

cash flow consequences. However, many derivative contracts have cross-default clauses whichcan place a party into technical default. Should the counterparty try to unwind the contractunder the default terms but fail, then default occurs. On the other hand, if the contract canbe unwound at market value, then technical default has no valuation consequences.


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S ec. 3] Defau lt risk 9

F IGURE 2: Insolvency and default on derivatives.

Conversely, we assume that the firms obligation under the derivative contract

is illustrated in figure 2. Although the firm is insolvent in the shaded areasof quadrants II and III, it only owes payments on the derivative in the shaded

areas of quadrants III and IV. Hence, default on the derivative is confined to the

cross-hatched area in quadrant III .

The pr obability of defau lt is given by the joint probability t ha t th e firm

which is given by the cumulative density function

(6)


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F IGURE 3: Firm value and asset prices. The case of zero correlation.

Moreover, if we are willing to make specific distributional assumptions

and Wishart densities.) In principle, one could also directly estimate the joint

As we will argue la ter, h owever, defau lt is a r elatively rar e phenomen on, which

implies that the default probability depends strongly on the tail behavior of the

density. This makes precise empirical estimates difficult.

3.2.1 Complete hedging

in default, respectively. In figure 3, the inside contour contains the combinations


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F IGURE 4: Default and the correlation between firm and derivative value.

will be outside the next largest contour drops to 1%; and the probability that

the joint density in figure 3, the likelihood of default in eq. (8) is less than %,

the volume above the shaded default area in quadrant III and underneath the

probability density function.

lated. While this may be the case, generally the two could have either positive

or negative correlat ion. Figure 4 illust rat es how th e correlat ion a ffects th e like-

lihood of defau lt. In both pan els of figure 4, t he dist ribut ion s hows a st rong

correlation between the value of the firm and the payoff from the derivative.

(9)


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3.2.2 Partial hedging

Panel A of figure 4 illustrates the negative correlation between firm value and

arise when the firm in figure 1 is holding fewer than the variance-minimizing

the contract is lower than if firm and derivative value are uncorrelated.10

Th e

l% confidence region barely touches the shaded area of quadrant III. Compared

to figure 3, a considerable amount of the probability mass has been shifted from

quadrant III to quadrant IIaway from the default area.11

3.2.3 Overhedging

th e firms as sets. This situ at ion can ar ise if a firm with negat ive core exposur es

firm, the likelihood of distress-induced default on the derivatives is higher. Now

the l% confidence region reaches well into the shaded area of quadrant III and

probability mass has been shifted to the default area. Alternatively, the positive

long position in the derivative.

Figure 4 shows tha t the likelihood of distress-induced default on derivatives

increases with the correlation between the value of the firm and the value of the

derivative.

10This is true in the typical case when there is considerable residual variation. If a perfect

insolvent or default.11The panel assumes t hat the negat ive net exposure does not s tem from a large short

default area would be the area of insolvency in quadrant II.


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F IGURE 5: Derivatives positions and the probability of default

3 .3 . Decompos ing the p robab i l i ty o f defau l t

One can decompose the probability of default, P(D), into the probability of in-

Figure 5 pr esent s th is decomposition graphically for a ra nge of hedge ra tios,

The probability of insolvency and the probability of default conditional on

insolvency both depend on th e corr elation between t he value of th e firm an d

the value of the derivative. This correlation changes as the firm varies its hedge

ra tio. With in complete h edging, as t he firm increa ses t he size of its h edging

position minimizes variations in firm value and the risk of insolvency. As the

firm increases its hedge ratio beyond this point, the firm overhedges and reverses

its net exposure. Eventually, firm volatility is dominated by the variations in

the derivatives position.


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When t he h edge rat io is below zero, th e firm is using derivatives to increase

its exposures rather than to reduce them. Nonetheless, as long as firm value has

to fall below its expectation to induce insolvency, the probability of insolvencyis less than . This is indicated by the fact that, regardless of correlation, only

ha lf of th e probability ma ss is below the h orizontal a xis in figure 4.

The middle panel of figure 5 shows how the probability of default condi-

tional on insolvency depends on the hedge ra tio. As the firm increases its hedge

rat io above zero, it also increases t he correlation between t he va lue of th e firm

and the value of the derivatives. This consequently increases the probability of

default conditional on insolvency since more of the probability mass is shifted

into the default region. At a hedge ratio of 1, firm and derivative value are un-

correlated (as in figure 3) and the probability of default given insolvency is for

symmetric unexpected changes. But, if the hedge ratio is negative, default risk

jumps immediately. In panel A of figure 4, this would have the effect of switch-

ing the default area into quadrant II ; hence the discontinuous increase in the

default probability.12

In the extremes, if the firm acquires very large derivatives

positions, the firm is sure to default on these positions in the event of insolvency.

Alternatively, the probability of default conditional on insolvency can be

interpreted as the probability of default on derivatives relative to the probability

clearly that the probability of default on derivatives is always less than the

probability of default on debt . Fur th erm ore, for der ivatives used to hedge (0

on debt. Not only is the default risk of derivatives significant ly lower th an tha t of

the firms debt, but hedging with derivat ives helps r educe the default risk of debt

by offsetting th e firms core business exposur es. Without doubt, th e pr obability

of default on derivatives that are used to hedge is low by the standards of default

on corporate debt.

Finally, the bottom panel of figure 5 explicitly shows the probability of de-

fault on the derivativethe product of the probabilities in the two panels above.

The probability of default is always less than , and much lower than that for

12l f (unhedged) firm value and the derivative ar e un correlated, th en t he pr obabil it ies are

symme tric about zero derivatives positions and do not have a discontinuit y at gamma = 0.


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typical derivative positions with hedge ratios between zero and one. Nonethe-

less, as the size of the derivatives position becomes very large, net firm value

(including the derivatives) and the derivatives become more highly correlated.

For extreme positions, the firms payoffs are almost entirely derivatives related.

If the derivat ive payoffs are symm etr ically distribut ed about zero, there is a

50% chance that the derivative finishes out of the money, that the firm becomes

insolvent, and defaults on the derivatives contracts.

To the extent t ha t corporat ions use der ivatives to hedge, we can use genera l

corporate default rates to assess the default risk of derivatives. Altman (1989)

reports that 0.93% of all A-rated corporate bonds default during the first ten

years after being issued. This evidence suggests a n average ann ual default ra te

of 0.1%. For the special case of a firm negotiating an at-market swap that com-

pletely hedges the firms interest rate exposure, the default rate on the swap will

be half the default rat e on th e debt. (For a n at -market swap, future interest

ra tes a re a s likely to be above as below the swa p ra te; if th e firm completely

hedges its exposure t o interest rates, f irm value and interest ra tes ar e un corre-

lated.) Consequently, a conservative estimate of the average annual default rate

on swaps used to hedge the exposures of an A-rated firm is1/20 of one percent

(see Figure 5).

3 .4 . Defau l t exposure

In the special case of independence between the derivatives payoffs and firm

value, the default exposure is simply the product of the expected exposure and

th e probability of defau lt. We ha ve alread y estima ted ea ch of these two compo-

nents. Our conservative estimate of the default probability is 0.0005. We have

also argued t ha t t he expected loss on an u nsecured s wap is 0.5% of notiona l

principal. Therefore, a conservative estimate of the annual expected default cost

is 0.00025% of notional principal. This means that on a $10 million interest rate

swap, the expected annual cost of default is no more than $25.

3 .5 . C o r p o r a t e u s e o f d e r i v a t i v e s

At th is point , the evidence on corporat e derivative use is st ill somewhat prelim-

inary. Yet, the existing evidence supports the hypothesis that firms use deriva-


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tives to hedge.

Dolde (1993) reports t he r esults of a sur vey of the risk-ma na gement pra c-

tices of 244 Fortune 500 firms. The overwhelming majority responded that their

policy is to hedge with hedge ratios between zero and one. Although many

firms adjust this hedge ratio on the basis of their market view, only 2 of the 244

firms responded that they sometimes choose hedge ratios outside the 0-1 range.

Furthermore, a considerable body of theory (see Mayers and Smith 1982, 1987;

Stulz 1984; Smith and Stulz 1985; and Froot, Scharfstein and Stein 1993) pre-

dicts a set of firm characteristics that should be associated with higher demand

for hedging and hence larger derivatives positions. Nance, Smith and Smith-

son (1993); Booth, Smith and Stolz (1984); Block and Gallagher (1986); Hous-

ton a nd Mu eller (1988); Wall and P ringle (1989); Hents chel and Kothar i (1994);

and Mian (1994) generally report empirical support for these predictions. Yet, if

firms were using derivatives simply to speculate, one would not expect to observe

this association between firm characteristics and derivatives use.

While the general evidence suggests that firms typically use derivatives

to hedge, derivatives dealers have particularly strong incentives to ensure that

customers with low credit ratings use the derivatives to hedge. In particular, the

relatively high default risk makes it unlikely that a dealer would sell derivatives

to a poorly ra ted credit if the firm is u sing th e derivat ives to double up an

4 . Sys t e mic r i sk f rom de r iva t ive s

As noted above, one of the prominent concerns of regulators is systemic risk

arising from derivatives. Although this risk is rarely defined and almost never

quantified, the systemic risk associated with derivatives is often envisioned as

a potential domino effect in which default in one derivative contract spreads to

other contra cts and markets , ultimat ely threatening the entire financial system.

4 .1 . Def in ing sys t em ic r i sk

For th e pur poses of th is paper, we define th e systemic risk of derivatives as

widespread default in any set of financial contracts associated with default in


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Sec. 4] S ystem ic risk from derivatives 17

derivatives. If derivative contracts are to cause widespread default in other

markets, there first must be large defaults in derivative markets. In other words,

significan t derivative defaults ar e a necessary (but n ot sufficient) condition for

systemic problems. While this interpretation of systemic risk is consistent with

most others, we believe that focusing on default is useful because it has definite

cash flow consequen ces and is more operat iona l.13

Even if systemic risk is simply the aggregation of the underlying risks, be-

cause the underlying risks are correlated, one cannot simply sum them to find the

total . Some a rgue th at widespread corporate r isk m ana gement with derivatives

increases the correlation of default among financial contracts. What this argu-

men t fails to recognize, is tha t t he a dverse effects of shocks on individual firm s

should be smaller precisely because the same shocks are spread more widely.

More important, to the extent firms use derivatives to hedge their existing expo-

sures, much of the impact of shocks is being transferred from corporations and

investors less able to bear them to counterparties better able to absorb them.

It is conceivable that financial markets could be hit by a very large distur-

bance. The effects of such a disturbance on derivative markets and participants

in these ma rkets depend, in particular , on the du ration of the disturban ces an d

whether firms suffer common or independent shocks.

If the disturbance were large but temporary many outstanding derivativeswould be essentially unaffected because they specify only relatively infrequent

payments.14 Therefore, a temporary disturbance would primarily affect contracts

with required settlements during this period.

If the shock were permanent, it would affect derivatives in much the same

manner that it affects other instruments. If the underlying price increases, long

positions gain while short positions lose. Since derivative contracts are in zero

net supply, the gains exactly equal the losses.

A critical question in evaluating systemic risk concerns the extent to which

defaults across derivatives markets, and financial markets in general, are likely

13The Bank for International Settlements (1992), for example, defines systemic risk to

include widespread difficulties. Although t his definition agr ees with ours in s pirit, it is lessobservable.

14The payments under path-dependent derivatives, like Asian options for example, can be

affected by temporary disturbances long after the disturbance has subsided.


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18 Risks in DerivativesMarke ts

to be correlated. There are reasons to expect that defaults on derivatives con-

tracts are approximately independent across dealers and over time. Dealers have

powerful incentives to assess the default risks of their customers. In practice, astrong credit rating is required of derivatives customers. Second, as we have dis-

cussed in deta il, firms u sing derivatives to hedge their exposures, ar e most likely

to become insolvent precisely when t heir der ivatives ar e in th e money. Price

shocks in the underlying derivative do not cause these firms to default on the

derivative.

In this sense, derivative defaults are significantly more idiosyncratic than

defaults on loans. For example, a large increase in interest rates is much more

likely to produce defaults on floating-rate bank loans than on interest rate swaps.

For partially hedged firms, the correlation among loan defaults is likely to be

higher than the correlation among derivative defaults. Hence, diversification is

a more effective tool for managing the credit risk of derivatives than loans. This

is why derivatives dealers carefully monitor and ultimately limit their exposures

to individual counterparties, industries and geographical areas.

Finally, dealers with a carefully balanced book and substantial capital re-

serves can absorb individual defaults by their counterparties without defaulting

on their other outstanding contracts.

4 .2 . S y s t em i c r i s k , t h e p ay m en t s y s t em , an d b a n k i n g r eg u l a t i o n

Banks are among the most active participants in derivatives markets. They par-

ticipat e in two prima ry capacities. Many ban ks ar e active end users of derivatives

in order to manage their own portfolio risks. Furthermore, many banks are active

market makers in derivatives. These banks either act as market makers directly

or through increasingly common, separately capitalized derivatives subsidiaries.

Banks are also among the most heavily regulated financial institutions.

One justification for t his regulat ory burden on ban ks is to limit externa lities their

insolvencies might impose. In particular, bank failures can impose externalities

on t he f inan cial system as a whole by disrupting th e payment system.

While these concerns are valid, our previous analysis suggests that deriva-

tives are unlikely to be a major cause for bank failures. In neither their end


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Sec. 5] Agency Risk 19

user n or th eir mark et ma ker capacities do banks face unusua lly large r isks in

derivatives markets.

Just like other firms, banks that use derivatives to hedge their exposureshave lower default risk on their derivatives than they have on their other fixed

obligations. In the case of banks, these obligations include debt and deposits.

Moreover, this risk management with derivatives makes the bank less likely to

default on a ny of its obligations.

Although market making is likely to expose banks to some additional de-

fault risk, this risk is likely to be smaller than the risks associated with more

traditional banking activities like lending. As we have already noted, because

default on derivatives is more idiosyncratic than default on loans, diversification

is a more effective tool in managing default risk in derivatives than in loans.

Furthermore, to the extent that banks derivatives subsidiaries can shield their

parents from losses at the subsidiaries, the current movement toward conducting

most market making in derivatives through such subsidiaries reduces the banks

default risk.

The most prominent recent ban k failure, the failure of Barin gs Bank, was an

isolated failure and did not result in problems that can be described as systemic.

Nor did the failure result in material difficulties for the payment system. The

bank was simply wound down in an orderly fashion. Instead, the case of BaringsBank demonstr ates another, far less t alked about type of risk in derivatives

markets: agency risk.

5. Agency R isk

The derivatives losses incurred by firms like Procter & Gamble, Gibson Greet-

ings, and Barings Bank gained notoriety because of their sizenot because there

was serious concern that the companies would default on the contracts. Never-

theless, these losses share a disturbing pattern of inappropriate incentives and

ineffective controls within the firms. In many instances, the magnitudes of the

derivative losses and hence the underlying derivative positions came as surprises

to senior management and shareholders. This suggests that employees with the

authority to take such derivatives positions were acting outside their authorized

scope an d were n ot acting in th e best int erests of the firm s owners .


23/29


This misalignment between owners objectives and employees actions

makes this a typical agency problem. Employees in the derivatives area (the

agents) are not working toward the general corporate objectives set by senior

management and shareholders (the principals). Given the nature of the problem,

we will refer t o the a ssociated r isks a s agency risks.

In our simple setting, such agency problems exist whenever the agent in

deviate from the position that maximizes the value of the firm. For concreteness,

hedging costs.

Pr oblems of th is type are n ot special to derivatives; th ey arise in ma ny

different settings where principals and agents have divergent interests. Since the

agents incentives are affected by the structure of the organization, the design

of the organization can either exacerbate or control these incentive problems.

There are three critical facets of organizational structure: evaluation and control

systems, compensation and reward systems, and assignments of decision rights

(see Brickley, Smith, and Zimmerman, 1996). Although no single organizational

structure is appropriate for all firms, there are several general features that

should help control agency risk in derivatives.

5 .1 . E v a l u a t i o n an d co n t r o l

Recent regulatory proposals to increase the required disclosure of firms

able and hence reduce monitoring costs.

Our framework suggests that current and proposed disclosure standards do

not a chieve perfect observability. For one, firms are only required to report th e

size of their derivative positions, they do not have to provide information about

the exposures (deltas in options parlance) of these positions. In addition, the

exposures are only reported on the balance sheet dates, yet exposures can change

over time even if the positions remain fixed. Moreover, for outsiders the core


24/29

Sec. 5] Agency Risk 21

exposures of the firm can be difficult to measure, making it hard to ascertain

whether the firm is engaged in an optimal hedging program.

Only absent information costs does our simple model suggest that future

disclosure standards should include more detailed information about derivatives

and firm exposures. If it is costly to gather and maintain this information,

or if the information has private value, full disclosure is generally suboptimal.

Nonetheless, net, core, and derivatives exposures are surely among the most

important pieces of summary information in evaluating the performance of a

firms derivatives activity.

The recent derivatives scandals also point out, however, that monitoring

even within the firm can be difficult. Managers at firms like Barings Bank and

Procter & Gamble claim they were not aware of the full extent of the derivatives

activities of their subordinates. This is an internal control problem that financial

accounting standards simply cannot solve. Our analysis summarized in figure 5

provides some solace in this regard. The figure shows that the actual hedge posi-

tion has to deviate strongly from the variance-minimizing position to materially

increase the risk of insolvency or default on the derivatives. Nonetheless, even

in the absence of default, such deviations have costs that are determined by the

curvature of firm value.

Careful contr ol and s upervision is critically importan t for derivatives. Al-

though leverage is one of the features that makes derivatives attractive hedging

instruments, it also makes it harder to monitor derivatives activity by reducing

the cash flows at initiation of the contracts. The problem can be compounded

by the steady increase in available maturities, which extend the time required to

determine the ultimate net gain or loss from the contracts.

5 .2 . C o m p en s a t i o n an d i n cen t i v e s

compen sat ion to the objective, one can induce employees in t he der ivatives area

to adhere to the hedging program if the firms core exposures are observable.


25/29


hedging activities by employees.

Indeed, because th e objective is t o stabilize firm value or t axable income,

incentive compensation for treasury employees might be cheaper to implement

than for many other employees, all else equal. The typical cost of incentive com-

pensa tion is th e increased income risk for the employee. Risk a verse employees

demand higher average compensation to bear this risk. Yet, employees charged

with reducing risk face less risk when they are successful.

For derivatives employees in trading or market-making functions, the sit-

uation is somewhat different. Here, the objective is not to stabilize firm value

but to generate profits. For any high-leverage financial contract, strong incen-

tive compensation based on the payoff to the contract can have undesirable sideeffects.

The primary problem in linking pay to derivative profits is the limited li-

ability of employees. Although employees can participate in the upside, they

usually have insufficient resources to share large negative outcomes. This asym-

metry induces option-like features in compensation plans based on trading prof-

its. Compen sat ing employees on th e basis of long-ter m per form an ce reduces

these option-like features that would otherwise encourage traders to take riskier

positions th an is optimal from th e owners perspective.

One way to rewar d t rader s for good performa nce without forgiving a ll losses

is to base m ore of th e compensa tion on long-term per forma nce. For exam ple, in a

good year, a trader might have part of a bonus paid into a deferred compensation

accoun t. If subsequen t p erforma nce is also good, the a ccount cont inues to grow.

On the other hand, if the trader is simply taking large bets, half of which lose,

then the bonus account is reduced during years with poor performance. In this

way, derivatives traders share responsibility for their losses as well as gains.

5 .3 . Decis ion r igh ts

For most corporations, derivatives activity is not entirely static, the way we have

characterized it in our model, but it moves relatively slowly. Most firms hedging

deman ds do not chan ge much on a da ily basis. In such cases, it is not critical tha t

individual employees have decision rights over derivatives positions. Allocating


26/29

S ec. 6] Conclusion 23

th e decision r ights t o a team of trea sur y employees is likely to impr ove intern al

controls at low cost.

In contrast, derivatives traders and dealers typically haveand shouldhavesubstantial decision rights over the positions they assume in derivatives.

Moreover, typical employment in the derivatives area also suggests that an opti-

mal compensation package should have strong incentive components (see Holm-

strom 1979). In particular, improved performance can generate very large ad-

ditional profits, and, normal trading activities are readily observable. There is

also no reason to believe that employees in the derivatives area are more risk

averse or less responsive to incentives than other employees.

Setting position limits for tra ders conta ins th e size of the positions t hat they

could assume. Separating trading and settlement responsibilities (something that

apparently was not done in the case of Barings Bank) allows firms to monitor

derivatives activity. This separation is also necessary to ensure compliance with

position limits.

Many firms are changing the ways in which they manage their derivatives

operations to account for t hese a gency issues. As we gather more experience with

these compensation and control systems, control of these problems is likely to

improve. Nevertheless, the recent losses demonstrate that agency risk is currently

a material problem for many firms.

6. Conc lus ion

We provide a parametric model of hedging which captures the major hedging

th eories. With t he aid of th is model, we show that firm s th at use derivat ives

have lower default probabilities on these derivatives than they do on their debt.

Based on this insight and empirical evidence on bond default rates, we compute

a conservative default probability for derivatives. We estimate that the expected

an nua l loss due t o default on a $10 million int erest r at e swap is un likely to exceed

$25.

Given these small default rates, we argue that systemic r isk, the proba-

bility of widespread default, is even smaller. To the extent that derivatives are

being used primarily to hedge rather than to speculate, the default probability


27/29


associated with derivatives is less th an half the default probability on debt issued

by the same firms. Furthermore, derivatives markets act to reduce systemic risk

by spreading the impact of underlying economic shocks among a larger set ofinvestors in a better position to absorb them.

Est ablishing effective public policy toward derivatives requires accura te a s-

sessment of both th e risks a ssociated with derivatives and the benefits offered by

the instr umen ts. Of course, the misuse of derivat ives can be costly. Neverth eless,

a growing body of academic evidence suggests that these tools are typically used

by firms to hedge their exposures.

Although we conclude that default and systemic risks are not major prob-

lems in derivatives markets, we argue that many firms are exposed to agency

risk. This risk arises when employees have decision rights over derivatives and

misaligned incentives relative to the firm but are not properly monitored. The

proper balan cing of decision r ights, incentives and contr ol is a major firm-int erna l

concern for firms with derivatives activity.

We are concerned about this misidentification of the nature of the risk that

regulation might address. Although many regulatory proposals focus on default

and systemic risk, the problem cases appear to involve agency risk. The internal

nature of this problem is apparently not recognized in many regulatory propos-

als, nor is regulation likely to be a particularly effective tool in overcoming this

problem. Nonetheless, recent disclosure proposals which would allow firms to use

private valuation models for their derivatives positions form a noticeable excep-

t ion. Such stan dards encoura ge monitoring at least a s mu ch a s th ey encoura ge

transparent disclosure.

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