Department of Transportation of Transportation ... record keeping requirements; and the development and integration of new technologies. Following publication of the 1994

Wednesday,

January 17, 2001

Part III

Department ofTransportationFederal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232Brake System Safety Standards for Freightand Other Non-Passenger Trains andEquipment; End-of-Train Devices; FinalRule

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4104 Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 17, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION

Federal Railroad Administration

49 CFR Parts 229, 231, and 232

[FRA Docket No. PB–9; Notice No. 17]

RIN 2130–AB16

Brake System Safety Standards forFreight and Other Non-PassengerTrains and Equipment; End-of-TrainDevices

AGENCY: Federal RailroadAdministration (FRA), DOT.ACTION: Final Rule.

SUMMARY: FRA is issuing revisions tothe regulations governing the powerbraking systems and equipment used infreight and other non-passenger railroadtrain operations. The revisions aredesigned to achieve safety by betteradapting the regulations to the needs ofcontemporary railroad operations andfacilitating the use of advancedtechnologies. These revisions are beingissued in order to comply with Federallegislation, to respond to petitions forrulemaking, and to address areas ofconcern derived from experience in theapplication of existing standardsgoverning these operations.EFFECTIVE DATE: April 1, 2001. Theincorporation by reference of certainpublications listed in the rule isapproved by the Director of the FederalRegister as of April 1, 2001.ADDRESSES: Any petition forreconsideration should reference FRADocket No. PB–9, Notice 17, and besubmitted in triplicate to FRA DocketClerk, Office of Chief Counsel, RCC–10,1120 Vermont Avenue, Mail Stop 10,Washington, DC 20590.FOR FURTHER INFORMATION, CONTACT:Leon Smith, Deputy RegionalAdministrator—Region 3, FRA Office ofSafety, RRS–14, 1120 Vermont Avenue,Stop 25, Washington, DC 20590(telephone 404–562–3800), or ThomasHerrmann, Trial Attorney, Office of theChief Counsel, RCC–10, 1120 VermontAvenue, Stop 10, Washington, DC 20590(telephone 202–493–6053).SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. BackgroundIn 1992, Congress amended the

Federal rail safety laws by addingcertain statutory mandates related topower brake safety. See 49 U.S.C. 20141.These amendments specifically addressthe revision of the power brakeregulations by adding a new subsectionwhich states:

(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.—(1) TheSecretary shall conduct a review of the

Department of Transportation’s rules withrespect to railroad power brakes, and notlater than December 31, 1993, shall revisesuch rules based on such safety data as maybe presented during that review.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), theSecretary shall, where applicable, prescribestandards regarding dynamic brakeequipment. * * *Pub. L. 102–365, section 7; codified at 49U.S.C. 20141, superseding 45 U.S.C. 431(r).

In response to the statutory mandate,the various recommendations andpetitions for rulemaking, and due to itsown determination that the power brakeregulations were in need of revision,FRA published an Advance Notice ofProposed Rulemaking (ANPRM) onDecember 31, 1992 (57 FR 62546), andconducted a series of public workshopsin early 1993. The ANPRM providedbackground information and presentedquestions on various subjects includingthe following: the use and design ofend-of-train (EOT) telemetry devices;the air flow method of train braketesting; the additional testing of train airbrakes during extremely cold weather;the training of employees to performtrain brake tests and inspections;computer-assisted braking systems; theoperation of dynamic brakes onlocomotives; and other miscellaneoussubjects relating to conventional brakesystems as well as information regardinghigh speed passenger train brakes. Thequestions presented in the ANPRM onthe various topics were intended as fact-finding tools and were meant to elicitthe views of those persons outside FRAcharged with ensuring compliance withthe power brake regulations on a day-to-day basis.

Based on the comments andinformation received, FRA published aNotice of Proposed Rulemaking (1994NPRM) regarding revisions to the powerbrake regulation. See 59 FR 47676(September 16, 1994). In the 1994NPRM, FRA proposed a comprehensiverevision of the power brake regulationswhich attempted to preserve the usefulelements of the current regulatorysystem in the framework of an entirelynew document. FRA attempted todelineate the requirements forconventional freight braking systemsfrom the more diverse systems forvarious categories of passenger service.In developing the NPRM, FRA engagedin a systems approach to the powerbrake regulations. FRA considered allaspects of a railroad operation and theeffects that the entire operation had onthe train and locomotive power brakingsystems. Therefore, the proposedrequirements not only addressedspecific brake equipment and inspectionrequirements, but also attempted to

encompass other aspects of a railroad’soperation which directly affect thequality and performance of the brakingsystem, such as personnelqualifications; maintenancerequirements; written proceduresgoverning operation, maintenance, andinspection; record keepingrequirements; and the development andintegration of new technologies.

Following publication of the 1994NPRM in the Federal Register, FRAheld a series of public hearings in 1994to allow interested parties theopportunity to comment on specificissues addressed in the NPRM. Publichearings were held in Chicago, Illinoison November 1–2; in Newark, NewJersey on November 4; in Sacramento,California on November 9; and inWashington, DC on December 13–14,1994. These hearings were attended bynumerous railroads, organizationsrepresenting railroads, labororganizations, rail shippers, and Stategovernmental agencies. Due to thestrong objections raised by a largenumber of commenters at these publichearings, FRA announced by noticepublished on January 17, 1995 that itwould defer action on the NPRM andpermit the submission of additionalcomments prior to making adetermination as to how it wouldproceed in this matter. See 60 FR 3375.Although the comment period officiallyclosed April 1, 1995, FRA continued toreceive comments on the NPRM as wellas other suggested alternatives well intoOctober 1995.

Furthermore, beginning in mid-1995,FRA internally committed to the processof establishing the Railroad SafetyAdvisory Committee (RSAC). Thedetermination to develop the RSAC wasbased on FRA’s belief that the continueduse of ad hoc collaborative proceduresfor appropriate rulemakings was not themost effective means of accomplishingits goal of a more consensual regulatoryprogram. FRA believed that theestablishment of an advisory committeeto address railroad safety issues wouldprovide the best opportunity for creatinga consensual regulatory program tobenefit the Administrator in the conductof her statutory responsibilities. FRAenvisioned that the RSAC would allowrepresentatives from management, labor,FRA, and other interested parties tocooperatively address safety problemsby identifying the best solutions basedon agreed-upon facts, and, whereregulation appears necessary, byidentifying regulatory options toimplement these solutions. The processof establishing the RSAC was notcomplete until March 1, 1996, and onMarch 11, 1996, FRA published a notice


4105Federal Register / Vol. 66, No. 11 / Wednesday, January 17, 2001 / Rules and Regulations

in the Federal Register that theCommittee had been established. See 61FR 9740.

In the interim, based on theseconsiderations and after review of allthe comments submitted, FRApublished a notice in the FederalRegister on February 21, 1996, statingthat, in order to limit the number ofissues to be examined and developed inany one proceeding, FRA wouldproceed with the revision of the powerbrake regulations via three separateprocesses. See 61 FR 6611. In light ofthe testimony and comments receivedon the 1994 NPRM, emphasizing thedifferences between passenger andfreight operations and the brakeequipment utilized by the two, FRAdecided to separate passengerequipment power brake standards fromfreight equipment power brakestandards. As passenger equipmentpower brake standards are a logicalsubset of passenger equipment safetystandards, it was determined that thepassenger equipment safety standardsworking group would assist FRA indeveloping a second NPRM coveringpassenger equipment power brakestandards. See 49 U.S.C. 20133(c). Inaddition, in the interest of public safetyand due to statutory as well as internalcommitments, FRA determined that itwould separate the issues related totwo-way EOTs from both the passengerand freight issues, address them in apublic regulatory conference, and issuea final rule on the subject as soon aspracticable. A final rule on two-wayEOTs was issued on December 27, 1996.See 62 FR 278 (January 2, 1997).Furthermore, it was announced that asecond NPRM covering freightequipment power brake standardswould be developed with the assistanceof RSAC. At the Committee’s inauguralmeeting on April 1–2, 1996, the RSACofficially accepted the task of assistingFRA in development of revisions to theregulations governing power brakesystems for freight equipment. See 61FR 29164.

Members of RSAC nominatedindividuals to be members of the FreightPower Brake Working Group (WorkingGroup) tasked with makingrecommendations regarding revision ofthe power regulations applicable tofreight operations. The Working Groupwas comprised of thirty-one votingmembers as well as a number ofalternates and technical supportpersonnel. The following organizationswere represented by a voting memberand/or an alternate on the WorkingGroup:

Association of American Railroads(AAR)

The American Short Line RailroadAssociation (ASLRA)

Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers(BLE)

The Burlington Northern and Santa FeRailway Company (BNSF)

Canadian National Railroads (CN)Canadian Pacific Rail Systems (CP)Consolidated Rail Corporation (CR)CSX Transportation, Incorporated (CSX)Illinois Central Railroad Company (IC)International Association of Machinists

& Aerospace Workers (IAMAW)National Transportation Safety Board

(NTSB)(Advisor)National Association of Regulatory

Commissioners (NARUC)California Public Utilities Commission

(CAPUC)Norfolk Southern Corporation (NS)Railway Progress Institute (RPI)Sheet Metal Workers International

Association (SMWIA)Southern Pacific Lines (SP)Transportation Communications

International Union/Brotherhood ofRailway Carmen (TCU/BRC)

Transport Workers Union of America(TWU)

Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP)United Transportation Union (UTU)

The Working Group held seven multi-day sessions in which all members ofthe working group were invited. Thesesessions were held on the followingdates:

May 15–17, 1996 in Washington D.C.;June 11–13, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois;July 31, 1996 in Chicago, Illinois;August 21–23, 1996 in Annapolis,

Maryland;September 26–27, 1996 in

Washington D.C.;October 29–30, 1996 in Washington

D.C.; andDecember 4, 1996 in St. Louis,

Missouri.General minutes of each of these

meetings are contained in FRA DocketPB–9 and are available for publicinspection during the times and at thelocation noted previously. In addition tothese meetings, there were numerousmeetings conducted by smaller taskforce groups designated by the WorkingGroup to further develop various issues.All of these smaller task forces weremade up of various members of theWorking Group or their representatives,with each task force being representedby management, labor, FRA, and otherinterested parties. The Working Groupdesignated smaller task forces to addressthe following issues: Dry air; dynamicbrakes; periodic maintenance andtesting; electronically controlled

locomotive brakes; and inspection andtesting requirements. These task forceswere assigned the job of developing theissues related to the broad topics,presenting reports to the larger WorkingGroup, and if possible makingrecommendations to the Working Groupfor addressing the issues.

Although the Working Groupdiscussed, debated, and attempted toreach consensus on various issuesrelated to freight power brakes,consensus could not be reached.However, the working group inconjunction with the various task forcesdeveloped a wealth of information onvarious issues and further clarified theparties’ positions regarding how theissues could or should be addressed inany regulation. The major cluster ofissues, upon which resolution of manyof the other issues rested, were therequirements related to the inspectionand testing of brake equipment. Theinspection and testing task force met onnumerous occasions and gathered andreviewed data, and the labor and railmanagement representatives to the taskforce drafted various proposals andoptions related to the inspection andtesting of freight brake equipment. TheWorking Group discussed the proposalsand investigated many of the costs andbenefits related to the various proposalsas well as the safety implications;however, the Working Group could notreach any type of consensus position.Consequently, FRA declared that animpasse had been reached andannounced, at the December 4, 1996meeting of the Working Group, that FRAwould proceed unilaterally with thedrafting of the NPRM.

Subsequent to December 4, 1996,several members of the Working Group,including representatives from both railmanagement and labor, continuedinformal discussions of some of theissues related to the inspection andtesting of freight equipment. Theserepresentatives informed FRA that aconsensus proposal might be possible,provided that the Working Group werepermitted to continue deliberations.Consequently, FRA agreed to reconvenethe Working Group, and in April 1997three additional meetings wereconducted on the following dates:

April 2–3 in Kansas City, Missouri;April 10–11 in Phoenix, Arizona; andApril 23 in Jacksonville, Florida.Representatives of both rail

management and rail labor presentedthe Working Group with inspection andtesting proposals for consideration andreview both before and during thisperiod. Although the proposals werediscussed and deliberated, the WorkingGroup was once again unsuccessful in



reaching consensus on any of the freightpower brake inspection and testingissues. Consequently, by letter datedMay 29, 1997, FRA informed themembers of the Working Group thatFRA would be withdrawing the freightpower brake task from the WorkingGroup at the next full RSAC meeting onJune 24, 1997. FRA provided this noticeto avoid any misunderstandingregarding the process by which theproposed rule would be drafted. FRAalso informed the members of theWorking Group that it would not investfurther time in attempting to reachconsensus unless all other members ofthe Working Group jointly indicatedthat they have reached consensus on aproposal and wanted to discuss it withFRA. FRA noted that if that were tooccur prior to June 24, 1997, it wouldreconsider withdrawing the task fromRSAC. As no consensus proposal waspresented to FRA prior to June 24, 1997,FRA withdrew the task from theWorking Group and informed themembers of RSAC that FRA wouldproceed independently in the drafting ofa freight power brake NPRM.

FRA carefully considered theinformation, data, and proposalsdeveloped by the Freight Power BrakeWorking Group as well as all the oraland written comments offered byvarious parties regarding the 1994NPRM on power brakes whendeveloping a revised power brakeNPRM. On September 9, 1998, an NPRM(1998 NPRM) was published in theFederal Register proposing brakesystem safety standards for freight trainsand equipment. See 63 FR 48294(September 9, 1998).

As evidenced by the precedingdiscussion, FRA spent years developingthe 1998 proposed power brakeregulations. During that time, FRAinstituted rulemakings to addresspassenger and commuter operations andequipment and two-way end-of-traindevices, and developed a channel ofcommunication to address tourist andexcursion operational concerns.Consequently, the 1998 proposalfocused solely on freight and other non-passenger operations. FRA did not, forthe most part, attempt to includeprovisions related to the inspection andmaintenance of locomotive brakingsystems or to the performance of othermechanical inspections that arecurrently addressed by other parts of theregulations. FRA believed that althoughthose requirements are interrelated tothe inspection, testing, and maintenanceof freight power brakes, they areadequately addressed in otherregulations and would only add to thecomplexity of the proposal, causing

confusion and misunderstanding bymembers of the regulated community.

When developing the 1998 NPRM,FRA determined that the proposalwould closely track the existingrequirements related to the inspection,testing, and maintenance of the brakingsystems used in freight operations.Although FRA recognized that thecurrent regulatory scheme tended tocreate incentives to ‘‘overlook’’ defectsor fail to conduct vigorous inspections,FRA also believed that the currentregulatory scheme is an effective andproven method of ensuring safety andthat many of the ‘‘negative incentives’’could be greatly reduced by strict andaggressive enforcement coupled withmoderate revisions to address specificconcerns raised by interested parties.Furthermore, representatives of both raillabor and rail management indicatedthat if a consensus proposal could notbe developed then FRA should proceedon its own with developing a proposalwhich tracks the current requirements,and that FRA should strictly enforcethose requirements.

The 1998 NPRM proposed amoderate, although comprehensive,revision of the existing requirementsrelated to the inspection, testing, andmaintenance of brake equipment usedin freight operations. The proposalattempted to balance the concerns of raillabor and management and increase theeffectiveness of the regulation. In the1998 NPRM, FRA attempted toreorganize, update, and clarify theexisting regulations related to freightpower brakes and eliminate potentialloopholes created by the existingregulatory language. Furthermore,completely new requirements wereproposed to address the qualifications ofthose individuals conducting brakeinspections and tests. FRA alsoproposed requirements related to themovement of freight equipment withdefective or inoperative brakes whichwere consistent with existing statutoryrequirements and other federalregulations addressing the movement ofdefective freight equipment. The 1998NPRM also attempted to codify existingmaintenance requirements related to thebrake system and its components andprevent unilateral changes to thoseprovisions by the very party to whichthey apply. Moreover, the proposal alsocontained specific requirements relatedto dynamic brakes and requirementsaimed at increasing the quality of airintroduced into brake systems by yardair sources.

In addition to the above, the 1998proposal also contained variousincentives to the railroads to encouragethe performance of quality brake

inspections, particularly at locationswhere trains originate. These includedincentives to use qualified mechanicalforces to conduct brake system tests atmajor terminals where long-distancetrains originate in order to move thesetrains greater distances between brakeinspections than existing regulationspermitted. Consequently, the 1998proposal retained the basic inspectionintervals and requirements contained inthe existing regulations and preservedthe useful elements of the existingsystem, but also proposed additions,clarifications, and modifications thatFRA believed would increase the safety,effectiveness, and enforceability of theregulations.

Following publication of the 1998NPRM, FRA held two public hearingsand a public technical conference toallow interested parties the opportunityto comment on specific issues addressedin the NPRM. The public hearings wereheld in Kansas City, Missouri onOctober 26 and in Washington, DC onNovember 13, 1998. The publictechnical conference was conducted inWalnut Creek, California on November23 and 24, 1998. The hearings andtechnical conference were attended bynumerous railroads, organizationsrepresenting railroads, labororganizations, rail shippers, and Stategovernmental agencies. During thehearings and technical conference a vastamount of oral information waspresented, and a considerable number ofissues were raised and discussed indetail.

Subsequent to conducting thesepublic hearings and technicalconference, FRA issued a noticeextending the comment period on theNPRM from January 15, 1999 to March1, 1999. See 64 FR 3273. This extensionwas provided based on the requests ofseveral interested parties for more timein which to develop their responses. Atthe public hearings and technicalconference conducted in relation to theNPRM and in written commentssubmitted subsequent to the publichearings and technical conference,concerns were raised regarding the datadiscussed by FRA in the NPRM. Thecomments raised concerns regardingFRA’s collection of data related to FRA’sinspection activity and the number ofconditions not in compliance withFederal regulations found during thatinspection activity. The comments andcorrespondence received alleged thatthere were substantial problems withFRA’s database, that there had beensubstantial overreporting of the numberof units inspected, and that there hadbeen a systematic deflation of powerbrake defect ratios.



As the allegations and concerns raisedwere general in nature, FRA believed itprudent and necessary to allowinterested parties to fully explain anddiscuss their concerns. Therefore, FRAconducted a public meeting on May 27,1999 to permit the exchange ofinformation and concerns regardingFRA’s database and the informationdeveloped from that database. See 64 FR23816 (May 4, 1999). The purpose of themeeting was to allow FRA to provideinformation regarding its internalreview of the data and address some ofthe concerns raised as well as to allowinterested parties to further develop andarticulate the issues and concerns theyhad with regard to the data gathered andpresented by FRA in the NPRM.

FRA has carefully considered all theinformation, data, and proposalssubmitted in relation to FRA DocketPB–9 when developing this final rule.This includes: the information, data andproposals developed by the RSACFreight Power Brake Working Group; alloral and written comments submitted inrelation to the 1994 NPRM on powerbrakes; and all oral and writtencomments submitted regarding the 1998NPRM on freight power brakes. Inaddition to the preceding information,FRA’s knowledge and experience withenforcing the existing power brakeregulations were also relied upon whendeveloping this final rule.

II. Overview of Comments and GeneralFRA Conclusions

The following discussions aregrouped by major themes and issuesaddressed in the 1998 NPRM and theoral and written comments submitted inrelation to that document. In each of themajor issue areas, FRA has attempted tooutline the significant portions of theproposal, discuss the commentsreceived on the proposal and anyalternative approach recommended, andprovide a general idea of how FRA hasdecided to address the issues orapproaches.

A. Accident/Incident History andDefective Equipment

The 1998 NPRM contained a detaileddiscussion regarding the accident/incident data which FRA consideredwhen developing the proposal. In thatdiscussion, FRA noted that it considersa variety of factors in attempting todetermine the relative condition of theindustry as it relates to the safety oftrain power brake systems. Two of thefactors considered when making thisassessment are the number of recentbrake-related incidents and the amountof defective brake equipment recentlydiscovered operating over the railroad

system, both of which provide someindication as to the potential orlikelihood of future brake-relatedincidents. Due to concerns raised inboth written comments and at thepublic meeting conducted on May 27,1999, regarding the accident/incidentdata and power brake defect ratio datadiscussed above, FRA believes it isnecessary to further explain how thesedata were used in developing this finalrule.

1. Accident/Incident DataIn order to determine the potential

quantifiable safety benefits to be derivedfrom the provisions proposed in theNPRM and either retained or modifiedin this final rule, FRA conducted areview of all accidents/incidentsreported to FRA to determine whichincidents/accidents could potentiallyhave been prevented had the provisionsof the rule been in place. For purposesof the NPRM, FRA identified a brake-related incident as being an incidentreported to FRA as being caused by oneof the following: brake rigging down ordragging; air hose uncoupled or burst;broken brake pipe or connections; otherbrake components damaged, worn,broken or disconnected; brake valvemalfunction (undesired emergency);brake valve malfunction (stuck brake);hand brake broken or defective; handbrake linkage and/or connectionsbroken or defective. For purposes of theNPRM, FRA did not consider brake pipeobstruction-related incidents becauseFRA believed they had been fullyconsidered at the time that FRApromulgated the final rule relating tothe use of two-way end-of-train devices.

In written comments and at the publicmeeting held in conjunction with theNPRM, several labor representativesraised concerns regarding FRA’sreliance on accident/incidentinformation which is essentiallyreported to FRA by the railroads. Theserepresentatives contend that railroadshave an economic incentive to reportaccidents/incidents as being due tohuman factors rather than to mechanicalproblems or deficiencies. Thus, theycontend that the potential safetybenefits identified by FRA in the NPRMare inaccurate and underestimatedbecause the data used to determinethose benefits are developed by therailroads. FRA tends to agree with theconcerns raised by these commentersand raised this concern in its discussionof the accident/incident data in theNPRM.

In the NPRM, FRA acknowledged thatthe presented brake-related incidentsmost likely did not accurately reflect thetotal number of incidents that were

potentially linked, in some part, tobrake-related causes and did notprovide a complete picture of the costsassociated with the identified incidents.See 63 FR 48297. FRA recognized thatthe information on most incidents isprovided by the railroads whichgenerally identify the direct cause of anincident but may not sufficientlyidentify all of the contributory causes ina manner to permit FRA to concludethat the brake system played a part inthe incident. Thus, FRA acknowledgedthat there may be numerous incidentswhich occurred in the industry whichwere at least partially due to brake-related problems, but which wereultimately more closely linked tohuman error or other mechanicalproblems and thus, were reported toFRA under different cause codes.However, as it is extremely difficult toidentify those accidents/incidents thatmay have been in some part related toa brake problem, FRA elected to includeonly those accidents specificallyidentified as brake-related in itsquantified safety benefits and includedother potential incidents as qualitativesafety benefits in the NPRM. FRA alsorecognized that the damage costsprovided to FRA by the railroads for theincidents identified in the NPRM failedto consider all of the costs associatedwith an accident such as: loss of lading;wreck clearance; track delay;environmental clean-up; removal ofdamaged equipment; evacuations; or theimpact on local traffic patterns. See 63FR 48297. Thus, for purposes of theNPRM, the property damages reportedby the railroads were multiplied by afactor of 1.5625 in an effort to capturethese non-reported damages. See 63 FR48297.

In calculating the potentialquantifiable safety benefits to be derivedfrom this final rule, FRA has slightlyexpanded the criteria for determiningthe accidents/incidents which areaddressed by this final rule. Thus, forpurposes of this final rule the quantifiedsafety benefits include a percentage ofcertain types of accidents reported asbeing due to human error or other thana brake-related mechanical problem.The quantified safety benefits for thisfinal rule also include a percentage ofthose incidents which are consideredbrake pipe obstruction-related.Although these accidents wereconsidered in relation to the two-wayEOT final rule, FRA believes that thisfinal rule will prevent an additionalpercentage of those incidents that werenot captured by the two-way EOT finalrule.

Table 1 below contains a compilationof the relevant incidents that FRA



1 AAR surveyed its members and reported that,on average, these other costs constitute anadditional 56.25 percent of the reported damages.

considers to be preventable that havebeen reported to FRA from 1994 through1998. The incidents included in thistable contain incidents reported to FRAas being caused by one of the following:Brake rigging down or dragging; air hoseuncoupled or burst; broken brake pipeor connections; other brake componentsdamaged, worn, broken or disconnected;brake valve malfunction (undesiredemergency); brake valve malfunction(stuck brake); hand brake broken ordefective; hand brake linkage and/orconnections broken or defective. Table 1also contains incidents reported asbeing related to brake pipe obstructionsand certain brake-related human factorincidents which include: runaway cuts

of cars; train handling; and improperuse of brakes. FRA believes that variousprovisions of this final rule have thepotential of preventing a certainpercentage of the incidents reported asbeing due to these causes. However, indeveloping the cost/benefit analysis forthis final rule, FRA used a veryconservative effectiveness rate of .2 forincidents with these reported causes.The Regulatory Impact Analysisprepared in connection with this finalrule provides a detailed discussion ofhow certain human factor and brakepipe obstruction incidents were utilizedwhen evaluating this rule.

It should be noted that the damagecosts noted in Table 1 for the identified

incidents are based on the damage torailroad property or equipment. Thus,the damages presented fail to considerthe costs associated with the injuriesand fatalities involved. These costs arecalculated in detail in the RegulatoryImpact Analysis prepared in connectionwith this final rule. The costs presentedin Table 1 also do not consider suchthings as: loss of lading; wreckclearance; track delay; environmentalclean-up; removal of damagedequipment; evacuations; or the impacton local traffic patterns. Consequently,the railroad property damages have beenmultiplied by a factor of 1.5625 in aneffort to capture some of these non-reported damages.1

TABLE 1.—BRAKE-RELATED INCIDENTS

Year Number of ac-cidents Injuries Fatalities Damages *

1994 ................................................................................................................. 99 24 1 $11,414,3461995 ................................................................................................................. 121 65 0 9,431,5821996 ................................................................................................................. 112 44 3 20,637,9861997 ................................................................................................................. 98 8 0 9,651,5691998 ................................................................................................................. 121 3 0 10,791,626

Total ...................................................................................................... 551 140 4 61,927,107

* Increased by 56.25% to reflect unreported damages.

2. Use of Power Brake Defect Data

A second factor that is considered byFRA, to some extent, in determining therelative condition of the industry inregard to the safety of power brakeequipment is the percentage ofequipment found with defective brakesduring FRA inspections and specialprojects. As noted in the precedingdiscussions, the method for calculatingand determining the percentage ofequipment with defective brakes was acontentious subject within the RSACPower Brake Working Group prior to theissuance of the NPRM and at the publichearings and meetings conductedsubsequent to the issuance of theNPRM. In the NPRM, FRA provided alengthy discussion regarding the data ithad available regarding power brakedefect ratios and the limitationsregarding the use of such data. See 63FR 48298. In that discussion, FRAexplained that data on brake defects iscollected by FRA inspectors as they dorail equipment inspections and duringspecial projects conducted under theSafety Assurance and ComplianceProgram (SACP). The NPRM made clearthat the data collected during these

activities is not suitable for use in anystatistical analysis of brake defects.

In order to perform a statisticallyvalid analysis, either all cars andlocomotives must be inspected(prohibitively expensive), or astatistically valid sample must becollected. For the sample to be valid forthe purpose of statistical analysis, thesample must be randomly selected sothat it will represent the samecharacteristics as the universe of data.Random samples have several uniquecharacteristics. They are unbiased,meaning that each unit has the samechance of being selected. Randomsamples are independent, or theselection of one unit has no influenceon the selection of other units. Moststatistical methods depend onindependence and lack of bias. Withouta randomized sample design there canbe no dependable statistical analysis,and no way to measure sampling error,no matter how the data is modified.Random sampling ‘‘statisticallyguarantees’’ the accuracy of the results.

The sampling method used for regularFRA inspections is not random. It ismore of a combination between ajudgement sample and an opportunitysample. The opportunity sample

basically just takes the first samplepopulation that comes along, while thejudgement sample is based on ‘‘expert’’opinion. The sampling method used forSACP inspections is also a judgementsample, where FRA is focusing itsinspections on a specific safety concern.This method is extremely prone to bias,as FRA is typically investigating knownproblem areas. Furthermore, some SACPinspections are joint inspections withlabor. Consequently, it is unknownwhether the final reports reflect onlyFRA defects, as many of the jointinspections had both AAR and FRAdefects recorded.

Neither the regular FRA inspectionsnor the SACP inspections were designedfor random data collection. Althoughboth are very useful to FRA, they werenot designed for this purpose and thedata should be used carefully. FRAbelieves that data collected duringroutine inspections are the most likelydata to accurately reflect the conditionof the fleet. However, both FRAinspection data and SACP data lack anymeasuring device, a defect is a defectand no distinction is made between acritical defect versus a minor defect.Furthermore, the estimated correlationcoefficients between defects and



accidents were not found to bestatistically significant. This does notmean that defects cannot lead tocollisions or derailments as the lack ofcorrelation could easily be a result ofnon-random sampling. Therefore, thedata collected both during routine FRAinspections and under SACP cannot beused as a proxy for data collected bymeans of a random sample for thepurpose of statistical analysis. Thesample is not random, so no dependablestatistical analysis may be performed.Consequently, FRA did not and will notuse the data regarding power brakedefects for the purpose of conductingany type of statistical analysis.

In the NPRM, FRA provided brakedefect ratio’s for the years 1993 through1997 based upon the data contained inits database. See 63 FR 48298, Table 2.The average brake defect ratio for thisfive year period was 3.84 percent. TheNPRM also noted that the availableSACP data (which focuses on knownproblem areas) indicated brake defectratios as high as 35 percent at somelocations. FRA stated that the SACPdata in all likelihood indicates thatthere are localized areas of concern andthat some railroads have particularyards or operations with persistentproblems. The NPRM attempted to makeclear that FRA believes that brakedefects are in all likelihood higher thanthat indicated by FRA’s database andthat the reality of power brake defectslies somewhere between the 3.84percent represented in FRA’s databaseand the 35 percent found at certainlocations. FRA noted that actual powerbrake defect ratios are probably closer tothe percentage reflected in FRA’sdatabase because FRA examines almost1⁄2 million freight cars and locomotivesannually. Thus, contrary to theassertions of certain commenters, FRAdid not assert or contend that the powerbrake defect ratios represented by itsdatabase were an accurate or precisereflection as to the relative condition ofthe industry. In fact, as evidenced by thepreceding discussion, FRA attempted topoint out the limited usefulness of thedata contained in its database.Furthermore, review of the defect datasubmitted by the BRC at the technicalconference in Walnut Creek, California,as discussed below, appears to supportFRA’s conclusions regarding powerbrake defect ratios.

The NPRM made clear that the powerbrake defect ratios indicated in FRA’sdatabase were specifically relied ononly to calculate the cost of therequirement to conduct retests on carsfound with brakes that are not appliedduring the performance of the variousrequired brake tests. Power brake defect

ratios were not specifically relied onwhen developing any provisioncontained in the NPRM or in this finalrule. Although power brake defect ratioswere considered, they were not used asthe basis for any of the provisionsproposed in the NPRM or contained inthis final rule. They were generally usedto aid FRA in identifying problem areas,which in turn helped FRA identifybrake issues and practices that neededto be addressed. For example, theexistence of high power brake defectratios at a particular location or on aparticular railroad likely indicate theexistence of certain practices orprocedures that create or contribute tothe high defect levels. As is evidentfrom the discussions of the variousrequirements contained in both theNPRM and in this final rule, FRAconsidered a massive amount ofinformation when developing this rule.These included accident/incident data;information and data provided inrelation to the 1994 NPRM, the RSACPower Brake Working Group, and the1998 NPRM as well as FRA’s experiencein the enforcement of existingregulations and the expertise andknowledge of FRA’s field inspectors.

Although the data regarding defectratios contained in FRA’s database haslimited usefulness in the context ofdeveloping a regulation, the data is veryuseful to FRA in other ways. The datais useful in measuring a railroad’sgeneral compliance level and aids inidentifying problem areas or locations.This information aids FRA in allocatingits inspections forces and permits FRAto focus its enforcement on locations orissues which are in the greatest need ofsuch scrutiny. By focusing itsenforcement in this manner FRA is ableto make the best use of its limitedresources.

3. Discussion of Concerns RegardingFRA’s Collection of Power Brake DefectData

Although the NPRM and thepreceding discussion detail thelimitations of using the data collectedby FRA regarding power brake defectswhen developing a regulation, FRAbelieves that a more detailed discussionof FRA’s collection of power brakedefect data is needed in order to addressthe issues raised by various commenterssubsequent to the issuance of theNPRM. As noted above, FRA conducteda public meeting on May 27, 1999 inorder to address general concerns raisedby various parties regarding theaccuracy of the brake defect datapresented in the NPRM and to provideinterested parties the opportunity todevelop the issues they generally raised

in oral and written comments regardingthat data. At this public meeting,representatives of several labororganizations raised issues regarding theaccuracy and use of the power brakedefect data complied by FRA. Thesecommenters generally allege that themethod by which FRA collects defectdata results in the underreporting ofdefects which in turn results in asystematic deflation of power brakedefect ratios.

Specific issues raised at this publicmeeting and in subsequent writtencomments include: the overreporting ofunits inspected during FRA inspections;the calculation and deflation of thepower brake defect ratio; the inspectionprocedures used by FRA that tend toexclude certain categories of powerbrake defects; potential discrepancies inthe input data relative to the activitycodes from FRA field inspection reportsto FRA’s database; the performance ofpower brake inspections by FRAinspectors on cars that are not properlycharged or connected to a source ofcompressed air; FRA’s reliance on therailroads for the total number of carsinspected; and the wide variancebetween FRA inspectors and FRAregions in the number of unitsinspected, the number of defectsreported, and the resulting defect ratios.

In order to understand some of theissues raised, it is necessary tounderstand how inspection datadeveloped by an FRA inspector areentered into FRA’s database. FRAMotive Power & Equipment (MP&E)inspectors conduct inspections ofrailroad freight equipment pursuant tovarious parts of the Federal regulationscontained in chapter 49 of the Code ofFederal Regulations. Principally, theseinclude inspections under thefollowing: Part 215—Freight Car SafetyStandards; part 229—Locomotive SafetyStandards; part 231—Safety ApplianceStandards; and part 232—Power Brakesand Drawbars. When performing aninspection under each of these parts, anFRA inspector will fill out theappropriate inspection form whichindicates the number of units inspectedunder each part as well as the numberof defective conditions found on thoseunits. In the context of performingpower brake inspections under part 232,an inspection of a car means a unitcount of one. When this type ofinspection is conducted, inspectorsinspect various brake-related carcomponents such as: Foundation brakerigging, air hoses, angle cocks, brakeshoes, and, where possible, pistontravel. When an inspector performs aninspection of a brake test required underpart 232, the unit count for such a test



is the train consist, block of cars, or carbeing tested. For example, when aninspector observes the performance ofan initial terminal brake test, the entiretrain would constitute one unit count.

Certain labor representatives raisedvarious issues regarding FRA’scalculation of power brake defect ratios.Several of these concerns involve thepotential overreporting of the number ofunits inspected which then results inthe deflation of power brake defectratios. One concern addressed thepractice of counting a single car orlocomotive as a unit count under eachof the MP&E regulations that it isinspected under. For example, a freightcar could be considered a unit countunder part 215, part 231, and part 232if an FRA inspector were to inspect thatfreight car under each of thoseprovisions. Thus, one freight car could

be represented as three unit counts. It isclaimed that this practice inflates thenumber of units inspected and thus,deflates defect ratios. This concernwould be valid if FRA were to attemptto express a defect ratio for combinedparts of the CFR. For example, if FRAwere to attempt to express an MP&Edefect ratio (a combination of parts 215,229, 231, and 232) then the method bywhich FRA collects data would result inan inflation of the number of unitsinspected and the resulting defect ratiowould be skewed. For purposes ofanalysis, FRA’s database is constructedso that defect ratios are expressed onlyin terms of each separate part of theCFR. Therefore, the power brake defectratios discussed in the NPRM werecalculated based solely on the unitsinspected by FRA under the provisionscontained in part 232.

A second concern involves thepotential of duplicate inspection reportsbeing submitted by different FRAinspectors when engaged in teaminspections. Certain laborrepresentatives allege that FRAinspectors are significantly inflating thenumber of power brake units beinginspected by submitting duplicatereports for the same inspection activitywhen groups of FRA inspectors performinspections at the same location. In aneffort to investigate this concern, FRAdesigned a computer program to searchfor potentially duplicate inspectionreports submitted during the years of1995 through 1998. Table 2 displays thefigures regarding power brakeinspections conducted by FRA for theyears of 1995 through 1998 that iscontained in FRA’s database.

TABLE 2.—POWER BRAKE INSPECTIONS AND DEFECT RATIOS: 1995 THROUGH 1998*

Calendar year Power brakeunits

Power brakedefective units

All railroadspower brakedefect ratios

Class I RRspower brakedefect ratios

1995 ................................................................................................... 611,824 24,387 .03986 .03691996 ................................................................................................... 646,140 28,795 .04456 .04191997 ................................................................................................... 582,685 26,004 .04463 .0451998 ................................................................................................... 585,663 26,286 .04488 N/A

*Note: Class I Railroads Power Brake Defect Ratios column information comes from the Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) for the 1998 NPRMon freight power brakes. No defect ratio was used in the report for calendar year 1998 because the RIA was finalized in August of 1998.

In order to identify potential duplicate reports the computer program identified inspection reports in which twoor more FRA inspectors were in the same county, on the same day, on the same railroad, and in which at leastone unit-count code matched. Table 3 displays the results of this search, showing the number of potential duplicatereports that were submitted from 1995 through 1998 and showing the potential number of over reported units.

TABLE 3.—POTENTIAL DUPLICATE POWER BRAKE INSPECTIONS 1995 THROUGH 1998

Calendar year

Inspectionreports with more

than onematching unit

UnitsPotential

duplicate units(half of units)

1995 ................................................................................................................................. 39 1,965 9831996 ................................................................................................................................. 154 12,646 6,3231997 ................................................................................................................................. 342 19,482 9,7411998 ................................................................................................................................. 182 8,692 4,346

Table 4 and Table 5 display the impact of the potential duplicate reports on the calculation of power brake defectratios. FRA believes that the data contained in Tables 4 and Table 5 establish that the impact of potential duplicatereports on the defect ratios presented in the NPRM is insignificant when considered in the context of nationwidedata.

TABLE 4.—REVISED POWER BRAKE DATA CONSIDERING POTENTIAL DUPLICATE REPORTS 1995 THROUGH 1998

Calendar year Power brakeunits

Potentialduplicate units

Units minuspotential dupli-

cate unitsDefective units

Defect ratiosafter adjusting for

potential dupli-cate units

1995 ................................................................. 611,824 983 610,841 24,387 .039921996 ................................................................. 646,140 6,323 639,817 28,795 .045011997 ................................................................. 582,685 9,741 572,944 26,004 .045391998 ................................................................. 585,663 4,346 581,317 26,286 .04522



TABLE 5.—AFFECT OF POTENTIAL DUPLICATE REPORTS ON POWER BRAKE DEFECT RATIOS 1995 THROUGH 1998

Calendar yearDefect ratiosbefore adjust-

ment

Defect ratiosafter adjustment Difference

1995 ................................................................................................................................. .03986 .03992 .000061996 ................................................................................................................................. .04456 .04501 .000451997 ................................................................................................................................. .04463 .04539 .000761998 ................................................................................................................................. .04488 .04522 .00034

It should be noted that the numberspresented in Tables 3 through Table 5overstate the actual impact of potentialduplicate inspection reports. For theyear 1998, FRA conducted an in-depthanalysis of the potential duplicatereports found by the computer program.The computer program identified 393potential duplicate inspection reportsfor the year 1998. However, included inthis grouping were unique inboundinspection reports, outbound inspectionreports and split inspection reports. Inaddition, there were inspection reportsfrom inspectors who worked in thesame county, but at different locations.Each of these reports was removed fromthe 393 potentially duplicate inspectionreports identified by the computerprogram based on a report-by-reportanalysis of each of the reports by FRAMP&E specialists. This analysis left 182potential duplicate reports for 1998,which were used to calculate the figurespresented in Tables 3 through 5 for1998. Although these tables note 182potential duplicate inspection reportsinvolving 8,692 units (4,346 duplicates),a further analysis of the reports by FRAfound that only 54 of the inspectionreports were actually found to beduplicative. These 54 duplicateinspection reports involved the over-reporting of just 3,073 units rather thanthe 4,346 units identified in Table 4. Asan in-depth analysis was not performedon the potential duplicate inspectionreports identified by the computerprogram for the years of 1995 through1997, the figures provided for thoseyears in all likelihood greatly overstatethe actual number of duplicate claimssubmitted in each of those years. Thus,the actual impact of duplicateinspection reports is even less than thesmall percentages indicated in Table 5above.

Although the impact of duplicateinspection reports is insignificant, FRAbelieves that a brief discussion of howthese duplicate inspection reportshappened is necessary in order to assureinterested parties that such occurrencesare rare and that FRA has taken steps toavoid these inaccuracies. In 1994, FRAhad four inspection forms for theAgency’s five inspection disciplines.

The Operating Practices and HazardousMaterials disciplines shared the sameform. FRA also had a QualityImprovement Plan (QIP) daily activityreport form to help the Agency trackresource allocations, including theamount of time required to performcertain inspections. When ‘‘teaminspections’’ occurred, one inspectorcompleted the inspection report for theentire team. However, each inspector onthe team was also required to completea separate QIP report to receive creditfor the inspection. On January 1, 1995,a newly developed single inspectionform (FRA 6180.96) for all disciplinesbecame operational. Furthermore, inMay of 1995, FRA discontinued thecollection of QIP-time data based onFRA’s conclusion that it had adequateinformation from previous QIP reportsregarding the time it takes to conductvarious inspections. In addition, thenew inspection form incorporated manyof the previous QIP codes. In August1995, FRA converted to a data collectionsystem using personal computers.

After conducting the analysisdiscussed above, it was determined that26 FRA MP&E inspectors inadvertentlyprepared all of the involved duplicateinspection reports. Furthermore, FRAwas not aware that the new computersystem did not filter out duplicateinspection reports. After becomingaware of these problems based onreports from its field personnel, FRAspecifically addressed the issue ofinspection reporting at FRA’s multi-regional conference conducted in 1998.At this conference, FRA’s Office ofSafety management provided specificguidance on preparing reports thatwould eliminate potential duplicatereporting. During this same period, FRAalso changed its computer software togive inspectors credit for inspectionswhile at the same time preventingpotential duplicate reporting.Furthermore, on March 5, 1999, FRA re-issued reporting procedures designed toprevent duplicate inspection reportswhen team inspections are conducted.These procedures were issued to allFederal and State inspection personneland to all FRA Regional Administratorsand Deputy Regional Administrators.

Subsequent to the public meetingconducted in May of 1999, FRA madetwo modifications to the summary dataproduced by its database in order toclarify the meaning of the data and toavoid misunderstanding by outsideparties. The first modification relates tosafety appliance inspections conductedunder 49 CFR part 231. The summarydata previously contained the heading‘‘SA & PB (cars and locomotives).’’ Thisheading may have caused someconfusion because the heading suggeststhat it applies to both safety applianceand power brake inspections when inreality the data captured under thisheading only concerns safety applianceinspections under part 231. Thisheading has been modified to read ‘‘SA(cars and locomotives)’’ to moreaccurately reflect the informationcontained under this heading. FRA hasalso modified the summary data byeliminating the calculation of an MP&Edefect ratio. As discussed above, FRAbelieves that the calculation of acomposite MP&E defect ratio isinappropriate based on the way FRAcollects the information contained in itsdatabase and would result in a deflationof MP&E defect ratios. Therefore, defectratios will only be presented for eachseparate MP&E CFR part.

In response to the issue raisedregarding FRA’s practice of conductingbrake inspections under part 232 whilecars are not connected to a source ofcompressed air or not completelycharged with air, FRA has developed aseparate reporting code for brakeinspections conducted in this manner.This reporting code will becomeeffective in mid-2000 and will indicatewhen brake inspections are conductedon cars or trains that are not chargedwith compressed air. Although FRAagrees that the most thorough brakeinspection is performed when a car ortrain is charged, a large majority of thebrake components on a car can beinspected for abnormalities without theactual application of the air brakes. Forexample, cut-out air brakes, brakeconnection pins missing, brake riggingdown or dragging, brake shoes worn tothe extent that the backing plate comesin contact with the tread of the wheel,



angle cocks missing or broken, retainervalves broken or missing, and air brakepiping bent or broken can all bediscovered regardless of whether a caror train is charged with air. When FRAinspectors conduct train air brake tests,they inspect all of the componentsnoted above as well as the operation ofthe train air brakes while under therequired air pressures. FRA hasconducted inspections of brakeequipment in this manner for decadesand will continue to conduct brakeinspections under part 232 onequipment that is both on and off asource of compressed air. FRA believesthat the addition of a code to identifythose inspections conducted whileequipment is not connected to a sourceof compressed air will provide a moreaccurate assessment of defective brakesystem components.

Two other issues raised by variousindividuals at the May 27, 1999, publicmeeting concerned FRA’s reliance onrailroads to determine the number ofcars inspected and the wide disparitybetween FRA inspectors and regionswith regard to the number of unitsinspected and defects reported. FRAacknowledges that FRA inspectorsfrequently rely on information providedby the railroad regarding car countswhen initially conducting aninspection, which is sometimes higherthan the actual number of cars beinginspected. However, in most instancesFRA inspectors request a copy of theconsist prior to finalizing theirinspection reports to ensure a properunit count. FRA has issued guidance toits inspectors to ensure that the unitcounts on all inspections are accurate.

Although FRA acknowledges that thenumber of brake inspections conductedvaries somewhat from inspector toinspector and from region to region,FRA contends that these variances arethe result of competing priorities andvarying workloads within each region.FRA makes every effort to standardize

its inspection activities by providingsubstantial training to each of itsinspectors. This training is comprised ofboth classroom and on-the-job training.Classroom training conducted at leastonce a year at the Regional or Multi-Regional conferences, and throughtraining provided by General Electric,General Motors-EMD, and WestinghouseAir Brake Company. Many regions alsoconduct discipline specific conferenceswith training on new regulations andissues provided by various subjectmatter experts. On-the-job training isprovided through Regional Specialistsand journeyman inspectors. Theseindividuals will work one-on-one withthe inspectors on the various types ofinspections that the inspector isrequired to conduct. FRA alsofrequently issues enforcement guidanceto its inspectors in the form of technicalbulletins in order to ensure consistentenforcement of the regulations.

4. Review of Defect Data Submitted bythe Brotherhood of Railway Carmen(BRC)

After issuance of the 1998 NPRM,FRA conducted a technical conferencein Walnut Creek, California, onNovember 23 and 24, 1998. At thistechnical conference individualsrepresenting the BRC submitted a vastamount of data collected either by itsmembers at various locations or throughjoint labor and FRA inspection activitiesconducted at various locations. The dataprovided by BRC representativesaddressed defective equipment found invarious trains at seven differentlocations across the country duringvarious time periods from October of1997 to November of 1998. The BRCsubmitted this data in order to establishthat the power brake defect ratiosdeveloped based on the informationcontained in FRA’s database wereinaccurate.

FRA conducted an in-depth review ofthe data submitted by BRCrepresentatives. Although the BRC

attempted to summarize the data formany of the locations addressed, FRA’sreview of the data discovered that theBRC’s summaries counted defects thatwere not power brake defects, failed tosummarize all the data for all the trainscovered by the supportingdocumentation, and double countedsome brake defects when calculating thenumber of defective cars. It should alsobe noted that approximately 80–90percent of the defective conditionsnoted on the supporting documentationmerely listed the defective condition asbeing ‘‘brake shoes.’’ This notation doesnot make clear whether the defectivebrake shoe was defective under thefederal regulations or defective underAAR industry standards. However, inorder to assess the data in a manner thatis most favorable to the party submittingthe data, FRA assumed that all defectsnoted as ‘‘brake shoes’’ were defectiveunder Federal requirements. Inconducting its analysis of the datasubmitted, FRA only considered powerbrake defects, whereas, BRC’s summarydata appear to consider othermechanical and safety appliance defectswhich are not the subject of thisproceeding.

Table 6 contains a summary of FRA’sin-depth analysis of the data submitted.FRA’s analysis determined that the datasubmitted by the BRC establish a powerbrake defect ratio of approximately 4.96percent, which is less than 1 percenthigher than the power brake defectratios developed based on theinformation contained in FRA’sdatabase for the years of 1996 and 1997,discussed in the 1998 NPRM. See 63 FR48298. The analysis of the datasubmitted by the BRC indicates thatsome locations and some trains havepower brake defect ratios in excess of 11and 12 percent, which is consistent withthe findings made and reported by FRAduring various SACP inspections asnoted in the preceding discussion andin the 1998 NPRM.

TABLE 6.—ANALYSIS OF DEFECT DATA SUBMITTED BY THE BRC

Location Total trains in-spected

Total cars in-spected

Cars with powerbrake defect

Power brake de-fect ratio (per-

cent)

North Platte, Nebraska .................................................................... 1,625 150,926 8,136 5.39Hinkle Yard, Oregon ........................................................................ 151 13,455 425 3.15Oak Island-Newark, New Jersey ..................................................... 13 618 72 11.65Kansas City, Missouri ...................................................................... 180 11,917 159 1.33Clovis, Alliance, Temple Yards—Texas .......................................... 16 1,419 41 2.88Sparks Yard—Sacramento, California ............................................. 8 781 30 3.84Various Locations, Mississippi ......................................................... 4 296 37 12.5

Totals .................................................................................... 1,997 179,412 8,900 4.96



B. Inspection and Testing Requirements

As noted in the preceding discussionsand in the 1998 NPRM, the issuesrelated to the inspection and testing ofthe brake equipment on freight trainsare some of the most complex andsensitive issues with which FRA dealson a daily basis. Consequently, therequirements related to the inspectionand testing of freight power brakes mustbe viewed as the foundation on whichthe rest of the requirement contained inthis final rule are based.

1. Brake Inspections—General

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA fullydiscussed the information and proposalssubmitted in response to the 1994NPRM, as well as the proposalsdeveloped as part of the RSAC process.See 63 FR 48298–304 (September 9,1998). Based on its review of thatinformation and those proposals andbased upon its experience in theenforcement of the current power brakeregulations, FRA provided a detaileddiscussion as to why those alternativeswere not viable models upon which arevision of the freight power brakerequirements could be based. See 63 FR48301–304. Rather than reiterate thosediscussions, FRA refers interestedparties to the discussions contained inthe 1998 NPRM noted above. Indeveloping the inspection requirementscontained in the NPRM, FRAdetermined that the proposedrequirements should closely track theexisting inspection requirements andintervals as they have proventhemselves effective in ensuring thesafety of railroad operations. FRAbelieved that moderate modifications tothe existing requirements werenecessary to ensure clarity, eliminatepotential loopholes, incorporate currentbest practices of the industry, andenhance enforcement while providingsome flexibility to the railroads toutilize new technologies and recognizecontemporary railroad operations.

The current regulations are primarilydesigned around the following fourdifferent types of brake systeminspections: Initial terminal; 1,000-mile;intermediate terminal; and brake pipecontinuity check. See 49 CFR 232.12and 232.13. These brake systeminspections differ in complexity anddetail based on the location of the trainor on some event that affects thecomposition of the train. Each of theinspection provisions details specificactions that are to be performed andidentifies the items that are to beobserved by the person performing theinspection.

The initial terminal inspectiondescribed in § 232.12(c)–(j) is intendedto be a comprehensive inspection of thebrake equipment and is primarilyrequired to be performed at the locationwhere a train is originally assembled.This inspection requires theperformance of a leakage test and an in-depth inspection of the brake equipmentto ensure that it is properly secure anddoes not bind or foul. Piston travel mustbe checked during these inspections andmust be adjusted to a specified length iffound not to be within a certain rangeof movement. The brakes must also beinspected to ensure that they apply andrelease in response to a specified brakepipe reduction and increase. FRArecently issued enforcement guidance toits field inspectors clarifying that bothsides of a car must be observedsometime during the inspection processin order to verify the condition of thebrake equipment as required whenperforming an initial terminalinspection.

The current regulations require anintermediate brake inspection at pointsnot more than 1,000 miles apart. Theseinspections are far more limited thanthe currently required initial terminalinspections in that the railroad isrequired only to determine that brakepipe leakage is not excessive, the brakesapply on each car, and the brake riggingis secure and does not bind or foul. See49 CFR 232.12(b). In the 1982 revisionsto the power brake rules, FRA extendedthe distance between these inspectionsfrom 500 miles to 1,000 miles.

The existing regulations also mandatethe performance of an intermediateterminal brake inspection on all carsadded to a train after it leaves its initialterminal, en route to its destination,unless they have been previously givenan initial terminal inspection. Thisinspection requires the performance of aleakage test and verification that thebrakes on each car added to the trainand the rear car of the train apply andrelease. See 49 CFR 232.13(d). Railroadsare permitted to use a gauge or deviceat the rear of the train to verify changesin brake pipe pressure in lieu ofperforming an application and releaseon the rear car. The current regulationsalso require that if cars that are given anintermediate terminal brake inspectionand have not previously been providedan initial terminal inspection and arethen added to a train, then the addedcars must be given an initial terminalinspection at the next location wherefacilities are available for performingsuch an inspection.

The current regulations also requirethe performance of a brake pipecontinuity test whenever minor changes

to a train consist occur. This inspectionrequires that a brake pipe reduction bemade and verification that the brakes onthe rear car apply and release. Railroadsare permitted to use a gauge or deviceat the rear of the train to verify changesin brake pipe pressure in lieu of visuallyverifying the rear car application andrelease. This inspection is to beperformed when a locomotive orcaboose is changed, when one or moreconsecutive cars are removed from thetrain, and when previously tested carsare added to a train.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA noted that inits opinion railroads have not conductedthe excellent initial terminal inspectionsthat were contemplated in 1982, whenFRA extended the 500-mile inspectioninterval to 1,000 miles. FRA alsocontended that many initial terminalbrake inspections are being performedby individuals who are not sufficientlyqualified or trained to perform the task.FRA recognized that since 1982 newtechnology and improved equipmenthave been developed that allow trains tooperate for longer distances with fewerdefects. However, the key to achievingthis improved capability is to ensure theproper operation and condition of theequipment at the location where thetrain is initially assembled.

Although FRA agreed that many ofthe initial terminal inspectionsconducted by train crews are not of thequality anticipated in 1982 when theinspection interval was increased from500 miles to 1,000 miles, FRA alsoconceded that properly trained andqualified train crew personnel canperform certain brake inspections andhave been performing such inspectionsfor many years. FRA stated that it didnot believe that a reversion to a 500-mile inspection interval restriction ontrains inspected by train crews, assought by some commenters, wouldadequately address the concernsregarding the safety of those trains andwould impose an economic burden onthe railroads that could not be justified.In FRA’s view, two of the major factorsin ensuring the quality of brakeinspections are the proper training ofthe persons performing the inspectionsand adequate enforcement of therequirements. Therefore, FRA proposedthat the current 1,000-mile inspectioninterval be retained but that generaltraining requirements for personsconducting brake inspections beestablished. The proposed trainingrequirements included generalprovisions requiring both classroom and‘‘hands-on’’ training, general testingrequirements, and annual refreshertraining provisions. FRA also proposedthat various training records be



maintained by the railroads in order forFRA to determine the basis for arailroad’s determination that aparticular person is qualified to performa brake inspection, test, or repair. FRAbelieved that the proposed generaltraining and recordkeepingrequirements would provide someassurances that qualified people wereconducting brake system inspectionsand tests. (See discussion below titled‘‘Training and Qualification ofPersonnel.’’)

In addition to proposing generaltraining requirements, FRA also notedits intent to enhance and increase itsenforcement activities with regard to theperformance of the brake inspectionsand tests eventually finalized in thisrule, particularly those performed bytrain crews. FRA made clear that itwould make a concerted effort to focuson the qualifications of train crewmembers and would strictly scrutinizethe method and length of time spent bythese individuals in the performance ofthe required inspections. FRA alsocommitted to focus its inspectionactivities to ensure that train crews areprovided the proper equipmentnecessary to perform many of therequired inspections.

In addition to focusing itsenforcement and to aid in that initiative,FRA proposed various clarifications,modernizations, and modifications ofthe current inspection requirements inorder to close what are perceived to beexisting loopholes and to incorporatewhat FRA believed to be the bestpractices existing in the industry whileupdating the requirements to recognizeexisting technology. FRA believed, andmany representatives of rail labor andmanagement agreed, that the currentinspection requirements are very goodfor the most part and are sufficient toensure a high level of safety, but thatthey need to be strictly enforced,clarified, and updated to recognizeexisting and new technology. Therefore,as noted above, FRA did not propose anextensive revision of the basic brakeinspection intervals or requirements.Rather, FRA proposed a moderaterevision of the requirements, with theintent of tightening, expanding, orclarifying those inspection or testingrequirements that have createdenforcement problems orinconsistencies in the past. FRArecognized some of the technologicalimprovements made in the industrysuch as the use of two-way EOTs duringthe brake tests and use of the air flowmethod of qualifying train air brakesystems. FRA also recognized that sometrains are capable of moving extendeddistances between inspections provided

that comprehensive inspections areperformed at the locations where thetrains are originated. (See discussionbelow titled ‘‘Extended Haul Trains.’’)

In order to clarify the requirementsregarding where and when variousbrake inspections and tests were to beperformed, FRA proposed modificationof the terminology related to the powerbrake inspection and testingrequirements contained in the currentregulations, which is generally based onthe locations where the inspections andtests must be performed (e.g., ‘‘initialterminal’’ and ‘‘intermediate terminal’’).Instead, FRA proposed various‘‘classes’’ of inspections based on theduties and type of inspection required,such as: Class I; Class IA; and Class II.This is similar to the approach taken byFRA in the 1994 NPRM and in the finalrule on passenger equipment safetystandards. See 64 FR 25682–83. FRAbelieved that this type of classificationsystem would avoid some of theconfusion that currently arises regardingwhen and where a certain brakeinspection must be performed.

Currently, the brake systeminspection and testing requirements areinterspersed within §§ 232.12 and232.13 and are not clearly delineated.Therefore, FRA proposed areorganization of the major types ofbrake inspections into separate anddistinct sections in order to provide theregulated community with a betterunderstanding as to when and whereeach inspection or test would berequired. Although FRA proposed achange in the terminology used todescribe the various power brakeinspections and tests, the requirementsof these inspections and tests mirroredthe current requirements and were notintended to change or modify any of thevoluminous case law that had beendeveloped over the years regarding theinspections. Consequently, FRAproposed four different types of brakeinspections that were to be performedby freight railroads some time duringthe operation of the equipment. FRAproposed the terms ‘‘Class I,’’ ‘‘ClassIA,’’ ‘‘Class II,’’ and ‘‘Class III’’ toidentify the four major types of brakeinspections required by this proposal.

The proposed Class I brake test,currently known as the ‘‘initialterminal’’ test, generally contained therequirements currently contained in§ 232.12(a) and (c)–(j). See 63 FR 48362–63. The requirements were reorganizedto clearly delineate when and how theinspection was to be performed basedon current interpretations andcomments received since the 1994NPRM. The requirements were alsomodified to require written notification

that the test was performed and that thenotification was to be retained in thetrain until it reached its destination. Theproposed revisions also acknowledgedthe use of the air flow method forqualifying train brake systems andpermitted the use of end-of-train devicesin the performance of the test. Theproposal also provided some latitude totrains received in interchange that hada pre-tested car or solid block of carsadded at the interchange point or thatwere to be moved less than 20 milesafter being received in interchange bypermitting these types of trains tocontinue without the performance of acomprehensive Class I brake test.

The proposed Class IA brake testclarified the requirements forperforming 1,000-mile brake inspectionscurrently contained in § 232.12(b). See63 FR 48363. The proposal made clearthat the most restrictive car or block ofcars in the train would determine whenthe inspection was to be performed onthe entire train. FRA also proposed thatrailroads designate the locations wherethese inspections would be conductedand did not permit a change in thosedesignations without 30-day notice toFRA or the occurrence of an emergencysituation. The proposed Class II andClass III brake tests essentially clarifiedthe intermediate terminal inspectionrequirements currently contained in§ 232.13(c) and (d) regarding theperformance of brake systeminspections when cars were added tothe train en route or when the trainconsist was slightly altered en route. See63 FR 48364.

In addition to the modifications andclarifications proposed with regard tothe four major types of brake systeminspections, FRA’s proposal alsoretained, with clarification andelaboration, the basic inspectionrequirements related to transfer trainscurrently contained at § 232.13(e) aswell as the requirements for performingbrake system inspections using yard airsources currently contained at§ 232.12(i). See 63 FR 48365. Theproposal also retained the requirementsrelated to the inspection and testing oflocomotives when used in doubleheading and helper service currentlycontained at § 232.15 and proposedadditional inspection requirements oflocomotives when used in helperservice or in distributed poweroperations to ensure the properfunctioning of the brakes on theselocomotives as these types ofinspections are not adequatelyaddressed in the existing regulation. See63 FR 48365. Furthermore, the proposalrecognized that trains, if properlyinspected, could safely travel greater



than 1,000 miles between brakeinspections. (See discussion belowtitled ‘‘Extended Haul Trains.’’)

FRA received numerous comments inresponse to the 1998 NPRM fromrepresentatives of rail labor and railmanagement, various private carowners, the NTSB, manufacturers of railequipment, and one state public utilitycommission relating to these proposedprovisions. These individuals andrepresentatives submitted commentsaddressing the qualifications ofindividuals conducting the proposedinspections, the methods by which theproposed inspections are to beconducted, the frequency with whichthe proposed inspections should berequired, and various other specificaspects of the language used in theproposed inspection requirements.

Several labor representatives objectedto the proposed change in the names ofthe specific required inspections. Thesecommenters believe that the proposednew terminology of Class I, Class IA,Class II, and Class III would result in anumber of problems includingconfusion among those individualsresponsible for performing theinspections as the existing terminologyhas been used for decades, imposition ofadditional training costs on the railroadsas workers will need to be reeducated,and the risk of upsetting years of caselaw dealing with the variousinspections.

Certain labor representatives alsoobjected to the language used inconnection to the proposed inspectionsthat would permit a qualified person toperform many of the requiredinspections. Various labor organizationsand their representatives reiterated theirconcerns that such an approach wouldcontinue to allow untrained andunqualified train crew personnel toperform the required inspections. Thesecommenters continued to assert thatFRA should mandate that carmen, orpersons similarly trained andexperienced, perform all of the requiredbrake inspections except for the cursorytrain line continuity inspectionscovered by the proposed Class III braketest. It is their belief that only carmenpossess the necessary training, skill, andexperience to properly perform theother brake inspections contained in theproposal. These commenters contendthat FRA is ignoring the commitmentmade by rail management in 1982, whenthe regulations were revised to permittrains to travel up to 1,000 milesbetween brake inspections, to conducthigh quality inspections at a train’sinitial terminal. They contend that the1982 revisions were intended to requirethat these brake inspections be

performed only by carmen. Severallabor representatives also contend thatsince the railroads have failed to live upto the commitment made in 1982, toconduct high quality initial terminalinspections, that FRA should reconsiderits proposals to permit trains to travel1,000 miles or more between brakeinspections. These commentersrecommended that FRA reduce theinspection interval to 500 miles.

Conversely, representatives of railmanagement and private car ownerssuggest that FRA failed to adequatelyconsider the industry’s safety record inproposing the inspection requirements.Several of these commentersrecommended that FRA reconsiderperformance standards similar to thoseprovided by the AAR in response to the1994 NPRM. See 63 FR 48300. Theseindividuals assert that based upon theindustry’s excellent safety record thereis no need for the command and controltype of regulations proposed in the 1998NPRM. Several railroad representativesalso commented that the proposedtraining requirements for designating anindividual as a qualified person areonerous and not justified in light of theindustry’s safety record. They contendthat the industry’s safety record isevidence of the sufficiency of thetraining currently provided to itsinspection forces. (See discussion belowregarding the ‘‘Training andQualification of Personnel.’’)

Many railroad and private car ownerrepresentatives also contend that thereis no justification for continuance of the1,000-mile inspection requirement.They contend that if a car is properlyinspected at its point of origin it can besafely moved to destination and thatvery few cars are found defective at1000-mile inspections. As support forthese contentions, they cite to variousstudies, which included: a 1994 studyconducted by the Illinois Institute ofTechnology Research Institute, whichconcluded that brake shoes could lastup to 4,000 miles; a 1993 studyconducted by BNSF at Havre, Montana,which found that less than 1⁄3 of 1percent of the cars inspected at 1,000miles had any kind of brake defect; anddata submitted in 1985 by the AARrelated to cars operating 3,000 milesbetween brake inspections. Thesecommenters also rely on the fact thatCanada eliminated its intermediatebrake inspection requirement in 1994.Consequently, these commenterscontend that the 1,000-mile inspectionserves no useful purpose from a safetystandpoint, creates unnecessary delays,and should be eliminated.

Commenters representing certainlabor organizations also recommended

that FRA establish step-by-stepprocedures for conducting the proposedinspections which specifically include arequirement that both sides of a train begiven a walking inspection during boththe set and the release of the brakes.These commenters contend that thelanguage proposed in the 1998 NPRMregarding the inspection of both sides ofa train is unclear and createsuncertainty as to how a properinspection is to be conducted. Theyfurther recommend that roll-byinspections of the brake release not bepermitted and that a walking inspectionof the release be required. They alsoobject to the proposed requirementpermitting the use of an end-of-traindevice in lieu of a visual inspection ofthe pressure at the rear car in the trainor in lieu of a set and release on suchcar as such a practice does not ensureactual application and release of thatrear car.

Representatives of railroads andprivate car owners also believe that FRAshould clarify the method by whichcertain inspections are to be performed.However, these commenters seek toclarify that both sides of the equipmentdo not have to be inspected duringeither the application or release of thebrakes when conducting a Class I braketest and that both sides of theequipment do not have to be inspectedwhen conducting Class IA brake tests.They contend that there is no reason toobserve both sides of the equipmentduring either the set or release as longas the brake rigging and equipment isinspected to ensure it is in propercondition prior to or at the same timethat the application or release of thebrakes is conducted. If the brakes areapplied or released on one side of theequipment then, due to the design of theequipment, the brakes on the other sideof the equipment will be similarlyapplied or released in virtually everyinstance. Therefore, it is contended thatthere is no justification to requireobservation of the set and release fromeach side of the equipment. Thesecommenters also contend that FRAneeds to clarify that both sides of theequipment do not need to be observedduring the performance of a Class IAinspection. They assert that such arequirement would be contrary to thecurrent 1,000-mile inspectionrequirements and would increase theburden on railroads when conductingthis inspection.

The CAPUC submitted comments onthe proposed inspection requirementsrecommending that each side of the carbe inspected during both the applicationand release of the brakes. Thiscommenter also recommend that FRA



require the proposed Class I brake teststo be performed by individualsdesignated as ‘‘qualified mechanicalinspectors’’ pursuant to the proposal.The CAPUC believes that only theseindividuals possess sufficientknowledge and ability to adequatelyperform the inspection. The NTSB alsosubmitted comments on the proposedinspection requirements suggesting thatFRA modify the requirements regardingthe pressure at which trains are testedto require that trains be tested at thepressure at which they will be operated.The NTSB believes that such arequirement would preclude attempts toqualify trains that have excessiveleakage by testing them at a pressurethat is lower than the train’s operatingpressure and thus, lower the amount ofleakage that exists on the train.

Some labor commenters againobjected to FRA’s inclusion of the airflow method as an alternative to theleakage test when qualifying a train’sbrake system. They contend that the airflow method disguises serious leaks andallows greater leakage in a train’s brakesystem than the currently requiredleakage test. The AAR and other railroadrepresentatives endorsed the allowanceof the air flow method as an alternativeto the leakage test for qualifying a train’sbrake system. They believe that the airflow method is superior to the leakagetest and is an appropriate alternative forall trains, regardless of length, providedthe 15 psi brake pipe gradient ismaintained.

Certain labor representativesexpressed concern over the proposedprovision permitting yard air tests to beconducted at a pressure that is lowerthan the operating pressure of the train.These commenters suggested that sucha practice could permit trains to departwith excess leakage since the requiredleakage test would be performed at thelower pressure and thus, mask thepotential leakage of the train. The AARand some of its member railroads alsoexpressed concern regarding theproposed requirements related to theperformance of brake tests using yardair. These commenters objected to therequirement that brake tests performedwith yard air be performed at 80 psi.They recommended that such test bepermitted to be performed at 60 psi ascurrently required because the proposalpermits yard and transfer trains tooperate at such pressure and that to testat higher pressure creates the potentialfor overcharge conditions. They alsoargue the practical difficulties of an 80psi requirement in that many older yardplants and rental compressors are notcapable of supplying 80 psi of airpressure. These commenters further

contend that FRA should permit yardair to be connected to other than thefront of the consist provided thatprocedures are taken to preventovercharge conditions. The commentersalso provided recommended language toclarify the calibration requirements fordevices and gauges used to conductyard air brake tests.

Several labor representatives alsocommented on the proposed writtennotification requirement related to theperformance of Class I brake tests. Thesecommenters supported the writtennotification requirement andrecommended that the informationremain with the train if the motivepower is changed. One labororganization also recommended that theproposed requirements related to thedesignation of 1,000-mile inspectionsare insufficient. This commenterrecommended that the designation befiled with FRA and that the designationsspecifically identify the trains that willbe inspected at each location.Representatives of rail managementobjected to the proposed requirementthat locomotive engineers be notified inwriting by a person performing the testas to the successful completion of aClass I brake test. These commenters didnot object to notifying the locomotiveengineer of the results of the test butbelieve that the notification could beprovided orally or electronically by aperson with knowledge of the test aslong as the locomotive engineer made arecord of the notification and necessaryinformation. These commenters alsosought clarification of the proposedrequirements regarding the designationof locations where 1,000-mileinspections would be conducted. Thesecommenters did not object to thedesignation requirement provided that itis not required on a train by train basis.They contend that to require thatspecific trains have 1,000-mileinspections performed at specificlocations would create substantialburdens and would eliminate flexibilityneeded to operate trains in a timely andefficient manner.

The AAR and other railroadcommenters also raised concern overthe requirement that trains in captiveservice be required to receive a Class Ibrake test every 3,000 miles. Theyrecommended that a train of this typethat travels in excess of 3,000 milesbetween cycles be permitted tocomplete its cycle prior to receiving aClass I brake test. They contend that torequire a Class I brake test on thesetypes of cycle trains on a 3,000 milebasis will require the reallocation ofmanpower and equipment to locations

not currently equipped to perform suchinspections.

Several railroad representatives alsoobjected to the definition of ‘‘solid blockof cars’’ contained in the proposal. Thisdefinition is important because FRAproposed that if more than a solid blockof cars is removed from or added or atrain, the entire train would have toreceive a Class I brake test. As theproposed definition limits a ‘‘solidblock of cars’’ to a group of cars that areremoved from only one other train andthat remain coupled together, thesecommenters contend that the definitionis much more restrictive than thecurrent interpretation of the languageand would significantly increase theneed to perform Class I brake tests.These commenters contend that thecurrent interpretation of the languagepermits a ‘‘solid block of cars’’ to bemade up of cars from several differenttrains provided the block of cars isadded to a train as one unit withouttriggering the requirement to perform anew initial terminal brake test on theentire train. These commenters alsonoted that a literal reading of theproposed provisions for when a Class Ibrake test would be required does notallow a railroad to remove defectiveequipment without triggering a Class Ibrake test on the entire train. Theycontend that this authority needs to berecognized and is currently permitted.

FRA Conclusions. After considerationof the comments submitted and basedupon its experience in the enforcementof the current power brake regulations,FRA continues to believe that thegeneral approach to brake inspectionscontained in the 1998 NPRM representsthe most effective method of ensuringthe continued safety and properoperation of brake systems currentlyused in the railroad industry withoutcreating an unnecessary burden to therailroads. Therefore, the final rule is amoderate revision of the currentinspection requirements, similar to thatproposed, with certain minor changesmade to address the comments andrecommendations submitted on theNPRM.

The final rule adopts the proposedclassifications identifying the varioustypes of brake inspections based on theduties and tasks that are required to beperformed. These include: Class I; ClassIA; Class II; and Class III brake tests.Contrary to the contentions of somecommenters, FRA does not believe thatthis classification of the brakeinspections in any way impactsprevious case law regarding the variousinspections. Although the final rulechanges the terminology used todescribe the various brake inspections,



the underlying inspection requirementshave remained generally consistent withthe existing requirements, and the finalrule is not intended to change or modifyany of the voluminous case law that hasdeveloped over the years regarding theinspections. Furthermore, the final ruleretains the monikers that havetraditionally been attached to thevarious inspections so as to limit anyconfusion that may exist. For example,the section containing the requirementsfor conducting Class I brake tests isentitled, ‘‘Class I brake test-initialterminal inspection.’’ FRA believes thatthe classifications proposed in theNPRM and retained in this final ruleclearly delineate what is required ateach inspection, better clarify wheneach inspection is to be performed, andavoid the potential confusion caused bythe terminology used in the presentregulations.

As discussed in detail in the 1998NPRM, FRA continues to believe thatthe performance standard recommendedby the AAR in response to the 1994NPRM and suggested again by somecommenters does not provide a viablemethod for establishing the frequency ofbrake inspections. See 63 FR 48301–02.The performance standard proposed bythe AAR is based upon the number ofmechanically-caused accidents permillion train miles. Therefore, thestandard is based upon the rate ofoccurrence of accidents—accidenthistory—rather than on a factor thatcould measure a railroad’s performanceprior to an accident occurring. Thesuggested performance standard wouldalso be very difficult to calculate on arailroad-by-railroad basis, and thestandard itself is a very subjective factoras many accidents are due to a varietyof causes only a part of which may bea mechanical or brake-related cause.Thus, the determination of whatconstitutes a mechanically-causedaccident would be difficult if notimpossible to make in somecircumstances and would be adetermination made by the railroad;thus, opening the potential for datamanipulation. FRA also notes that theAAR’s performance standard containscertain provisions that are contrary toexisting statutory requirementsregarding the movement of defectiveequipment.

The final rule retains the requirementto perform 1,000-mile brake inspectionsas proposed with a few minor revisionsdiscussed below and in the section-by-section analysis of that section.Although FRA agrees that many of theinitial terminal brake inspectionscurrently conducted by train crews andother personnel are not of the quality

anticipated in 1982, when theinspection interval was increased from500 miles to 1,000 miles, FRA continuesto believe that properly trained andqualified train crew personnel canperform most of the inspectionsrequired by this final rule and have beenperforming such inspections for manyyears. Furthermore, FRA continues tobelieve that a reversion to a 500-mileinspection interval on trains inspectedby train crews, as suggested by somecommenters, does not address theconcerns regarding the safety of thesetrains and would impose an economicburden on the railroads that cannot bejustified. Rather than simply increasingthe frequency at which inspections areperformed, FRA believes that the properapproach is to enhance the quality ofthe inspections being performed inorder to further improve safety. FRAbelieves that the training anddesignation requirements contained inthis final rule will increase the qualityof the brake inspections beingperformed by ensuring that thoseindividuals responsible for conductingthe inspections are provided adequateand continuing training to properlyperform the task. The final rule containsgeneral training provisions whichinclude: classroom and experiential‘‘hands-on’’ training; general testingrequirements; and periodic refreshertraining. The final rule also mandatesthat training records be maintained bythe railroads in order for FRA toascertain the basis for a railroad’sdetermination that a particular person isconsidered qualified to perform theinspection or test he or she is assigned.FRA believes these trainingrequirements will provide the necessaryassurances that the people conductingthe required inspections and tests arequalified.

FRA recognizes that since 1982 newtechnologies and improved equipmenthave been developed that allow trains tooperate longer distances with fewerdefects. The data submitted by AAR,noted above, appears to support thisassertion, and FRA does not dispute thepotential capability of certainequipment to travel distances in excessof 1,000 miles without becomingdefective. However, the capability of theequipment to travel extended distancesis contingent on the condition of theequipment when it begins operation andon the nature of the operation in whichit is to be engaged. FRA believes that inorder for brake equipment to travelextended distances between brakeinspections, the condition and plannedoperation of the equipment must bethoroughly assessed at the beginning of

a train’s journey through high qualityinspections. As noted above, FRAbelieves that railroads are notconducting high quality initial terminalinspections at many locations becausethe railroads are utilizing employeeswho are not sufficiently qualified ortrained to perform the inspections.Therefore, FRA believes that the 1,000-mile brake inspection interval continuesto be necessary and important to ensurethe safe operation of trains inspected byqualified personnel pursuant to thisfinal rule. Furthermore, no trainsoperated in the United States arecurrently permitted to travel greaterthan 1,000 miles between brakeinspections. Consequently, FRA is notwilling to permit trains to travel inexcess of 1,000 miles between brakeinspections, except in the limited,controlled situations where data on theequipment can be gathered. (Seediscussion below titled ‘‘Extended HaulTrains.’’) FRA notes that Canadaeliminated intermediate inspections in1994. However, Canada has differentinspection requirements than thosecontained in this final rule and vastlydifferent operating conditions andenvironments than those prevalent onmost American railroads, operatingconditions and environments that aremore conducive to the inspectionregimen imposed by that country.

The final rule also generally retainsthe proposed provisions detailing theitems that must be inspected during thevarious inspections and the minimumprocedures for performing theinspections. Contrary to the assertionsof some commenters, FRA believes thatthe proposed methods of inspectionsufficiently detailed how the variousinspections were to be performed whileproviding flexibility for railroads toconduct the inspections in a mannermost conducive to their operations. Themethods of inspection proposed in the1998 NPRM incorporated currentpractices and technical guidancepreviously issued by FRA. To requirethat all inspections be performed bywalking the train would impose a hugefinancial and operational burden on therailroads and would ignore the variousdifferent methods by which inspectionsare currently performed and have beenperformed for years. FRA does notintend to mandate specific methods forhow the various inspections are to beperformed. FRA believes that eachrailroad is in the best position todetermine the method of inspection thatbest suits its operations at differentlocations. FRA has never mandatedspecific step-by-step procedures forconducting brake inspections but



merely requires that, whichever methodis used, it must ensure that all of thecomponents required to be inspectedwill be so inspected.

The proposed rule made clear thatwhen performing a Class I brake test ofa train the inspector must take positionson each side of each car in the trainsometime during the inspection process.This provision is retained in the finalrule. This is intended to mean that at aminimum both sides of the equipmentmust be inspected. The provision doesnot require that both sides be observedduring the application or during therelease of the brakes. However, at aminimum at least one side of the carmust be inspected while the brakes onthe car are applied or if the brakes donot apply, while an effort is made toapply the brakes on the car. FRAcontinues to believe that if the variousbrake components are inspected toensure they are properly secure and inproper condition then, due to the designof the equipment, if an application orrelease is observed from one side it canbe assumed that in virtually every casethere is an application or release of thebrake occurring on the other side of theequipment. The final rule also retainsthe proposed requirement that thepiston travel on each piece of theequipment must be inspected while thebrakes are applied. Furthermore, thefinal rule retains the provision thatpermits a roll-by inspection of therelease of the brake but prohibits theroll-by inspection from beingconsidered an inspection of that side ofthe equipment.

FRA also finds the comments of AARand other railroad representativescontending that both sides of theequipment should not be required to beinspected at Class IA brake tests to belacking. The Class IA brake testbasically incorporates the current 1,000-mile brake inspection, which FRAbelieves requires an inspection of bothsides of the equipment during theinspection process. The current 1,000-mile inspection requires that brakerigging be inspected to ensure it isproperly secure and does not bind orfoul and that the brakes apply on eachcar in the train. See 49 CFR 232.12(b).In order to make these inspectionsproperly, FRA believes that both sidesof the equipment must be observedsometime during the inspection processand, to FRA’s knowledge, railroadscurrently conduct these inspections inthis manner. Thus, the NPRM and thefinal rule merely clarify what is requiredto be performed under the currentregulations to properly perform a 1,000-mile inspection. Therefore, contrary tothe contentions of certain commenters,

retention of this current requirementdoes not impose any additional burdenon the railroads.

The final rule retains the provisionsgranting railroads the ability to utilizethe air flow method (AFM) to qualify atrain’s brake system in lieu of thetraditional leakage test. FRA believesthat if a train contains a locomotiveequipped with 26L freight locomotivebrake equipment and the train isequipped with an EOT device, that trainshould be allowed to be qualified usingthe AFM. The AFM of qualifying trainair brake systems has been allowed inCanada as an alternative to the leakagetest since 1984. In addition, severalrailroads in the United States have beenusing the AFM since 1989 when FRAgranted the AAR’s petition for a waiverof compliance to permit the AFM as analternative to the leakage test. FRArecognizes the concerns of several labororganization commenters opposing theadoption of the AFM; however, FRAbelieves these commenters’apprehension is based on theirunfamiliarity with the method. As FRApointed out in the ANPRM, the 1994NPRM, and the 1998 NPRM, the AFMis a much more comprehensive test thanthe leakage test. See 57 FR 62551, 59 FR47682–47683, 63 FR 48305–06. TheAFM tests the entire brake system justas it is used, with the pressure-maintaining feature cut in. FRA believesthe AFM is an effective and reliablealternative method of qualifying trainbrakes. In the 1998 NPRM, FRAexpressed some concern regarding theuse of the AFM on short trains.However, based on consideration of thecomments received and FRA’sexperiences in observing the use of theAFM, FRA agrees that the AFM shouldbe permitted as an alternative on anytrain provided the 15 psi gradient ismaintained on the train.

The final rule changes some of theprovisions related to the conduct ofbrake tests utilizing yard air sources thatwere proposed in the NPRM. Ratherthan requiring yard air tests to beperformed at 80 psi as was proposed,the final rule reduces the requiredpressure to 60 psi at the end of theconsist as is currently required. FRArecognizes that many yard air sourcesand rental compressors are not capableof producing 80 psi of air pressure.However, to address the concerns raisedregarding the inadequacy of conductinga leakage or air flow test at this lowerpressure, the final rule includesprovisions to require those tests to beconducted at the operating pressure ofthe train. Thus, if the yard air is notcapable of producing the pressure thatthe final rule requires, then the leakage

or air flow test is to be conducted whenthe locomotives are attached. The finalrule also permits the yard air test deviceto be connected at other than the end ofthe consist nearest the controllinglocomotive, provided that the railroadadopts and complies with writtenprocedures to ensure that overchargeconditions do not occur. Many yardsacross the country currently conduct thetest in this manner, and FRA believes itis necessary to acknowledge theviability of these operations.

The final rule also modifies thenotification requirement related to ClassI brake tests from that proposed in theNPRM. In the NPRM, FRA proposedthat the engineer be informed in writingof the successful completion of the ClassI brake test. The intent of thisrequirement was to ensure that thelocomotive engineer was adequatelyinformed of the results of theinspection; however, FRA recognizesthat a requirement to provide theinformation in writing ignorestechnological advances and operationalefficiencies. Consequently, the final rulewill permit the notification in whateverformat the railroad deems appropriate;provided that the notification containsthe proper information and a record ofthe notification and the requisiteinformation is maintained in the cab ofthe controlling locomotive. FRAbelieves these changes are consistentwith the intent and purpose of theproposed requirement for writtennotification and ensure necessaryinformation is relayed to the operator ofthe train.

FRA also realizes that the proposedrequirement for designating locationswhere Class IA inspections will beperformed was somewhat unclear andmay have caused confusion. The intentof the requirement was to ensure thatFRA was informed of those locationswhere a railroad intends to performClass IA brake inspections and that FRAhad the information with which to holdthe railroad responsible for conductingthe inspections at those locations. FRAwas not intending to require that arailroad separately identify a specificClass IA inspection location for eachtrain it operates. Consequently, the finalrule makes clear that the designationrequired is for locations where suchinspections will be performed andpermits deviance from those locationsonly in emergency situations.

The final rule retains the proposedrequirement that unit or cycle trainsreceive a Class I brake test every 3,000miles. FRA has added a definition of‘‘unit train’’ and ‘‘cycle train’’ to thefinal rule in order to clarify theapplicability of the requirement.



Historically, these trains operate forextended periods of time with only aseries of brake inspections similar toClass IA brake inspections. FRAbelieves that the proposed 3,000-milelimitation is appropriate as it representsthe approximate distance that a trainwould cover when traveling from coastto coast. In addition the 3,000 milerequirement is consistent with theinterval for performing Class IA braketests and would equate to every thirdinspection being a Class I brake testrather than a Class IA brake test.Furthermore, AAR does not seek amoderate extension of a couple hundredmiles so a few trains could completetheir cycle, but seeks to extend thedistance to more than 4,500 miles inmany instances. FRA is not willing tomodify the proposed requirement to thatextent and believes that the 3,000-mileinterval for these types of trainsprovides sufficient flexibility to therailroads to perform periodic Class Ibrake tests on these trains in a cost-efficient manner.

The definition of ‘‘solid block of cars’’has been modified from that proposedin the NPRM. Although FRA believesthe definition it proposed is consistentwith current interpretations andenforcement of the requirement, FRAagrees with some of the commentersthat the definition may have been toonarrow and does not directly addressFRA’s primary concern, the block ofcars itself. FRA’s primary concern is thecondition of the block of cars beingadded to the train especially when theblock of cars is made up of cars frommore than one train. Thus, the final rulewill permit a solid block of cars to beadded to a train without triggering arequirement to perform a Class I braketest on the entire train. However,depending on the make-up of that blockof cars, certain inspections will have tobe performed on that block of cars at thelocation where it is added to the train.

FRA believes that limits have to beplaced on the addition of blocks of carsbeing added to a train in order to ensurethat cars are being inspected in a timelymanner and in accordance with theintent of the regulations. Somecommenters suggest that a block of carsshould be permitted to be added to atrain with no inspection other than acontinuity test regardless of the numberof different trains the cars making upthe block came from provided all thecars received a Class I brake test at theirpoint of origin. Other commenterssuggest that any number of blocks ofcars should be permitted to be added toa train at a single location. FRA believesthat to accept either of these positionswould be tantamount to eliminating

initial terminal and intermediateinspections and would drasticallyreduce the safety of freight trains beingoperated across the country. In FRA’sview, both of the positions noted aboveare merely means to circumventinspections and are akin to a practiceknown as ‘‘block swapping’’ in themechanical inspection context, apractice that FRA does not permit. InFRA’s opinion, the ability to addmultiple blocks of cars to a train at onelocation or add a single block of cars toa train that is composed of cars fromnumerous different trains withoutinspecting the cars in those blocks,would essentially allow railroads toassemble new trains without performingany direct inspection of any of the carsin the train. Furthermore, if cars arepermitted to be moved in and out oftrains at will, the ability to track whenand where Class IA brake tests are to beperformed on trains will be impossible.

Based on a review of the commentssubmitted, two other minormodifications to the proposedinspection requirements have beenmade in this final rule. The final rulecontains an additional caveat that willpermit the removal of defectiveequipment at locations where other carsare added or removed without triggeringthe requirement to perform a Class Ibrake test on the entire train. FRAcurrently permits this practice, and it isconsistent with the requirements aimedat having defective equipment repairedas quickly as possible. The final rulealso modifies the language used in theproposed provisions related to the airpressure at which the brake tests are tobe conducted based on a commentsubmitted by the NTSB. The NTSBnoted that the language used by FRA inthe NPRM to describe the air pressuresettings for conducting the requiredbrake tests would permit some roadtrains to be tested at a lower pressurethan that at which the train would beoperated. The NTSB contends thatalthough most road freight trainsoperate at 90 psi, some road freighttrains are operated at 100 psi and theproposal would permit them to be testedat 90 psi. FRA agrees with NTSB’ssuggestion that a trains brake systemshould be tested at the pressure atwhich the train will operate and hasmodified the language of the final ruleaccordingly.

2. Extended Haul TrainsIn developing the provisions

regarding extended haul trains proposedin the 1998 NPRM, FRA relied onseveral basic beliefs developed from theinformation and comments submittedand upon its experience in enforcing the

current regulations. FRA believed that ifa train was properly and thoroughlyinspected, with as many defectiveconditions being eliminated as possible,then the train would be capable oftraveling much more than 1,000 milesbetween brake inspections. By this, FRAcontended that not only must the brakesystem be in quality condition but thatthe mechanical components of theequipment must be in equally primecondition. FRA believed that as thedistance a train is allowed to travelincreases, the mechanical condition ofthe equipment is a key factor inensuring the proper and safe operationof the train brake system throughout theentire trip. FRA also stated that the bestplace to ensure the proper conduct ofthese inspections and to ensure that thetrain’s brake system and mechanicalcomponents are in the best conditionpossible is at a train’s point of origin(initial terminal).

In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed aset of requirements that had to be metby a railroad in order to move a train upto 1,500 miles without performingadditional brake inspections. Therequirements included such features aslow defect ratios, maintenanceprograms, and the performance ofquality brake and mechanicalinspections at a train’s point of origin.See 59 FR 47735. In the 1998 NPRM,FRA agreed with several commentersthat some of the 1994 proposedrequirements were overly burdensomeand were partially predicated onpotentially subjective standards.However, FRA continued to believe thatmany of the inspection requirementsand movement restrictions proposed in1994 were valid conditions that shouldbe met in order to operate trains forextended distances between brakeinspections. These included: theperformance of a quality, in-depth brakeinspection by a highly qualifiedinspector; the performance of a qualitymechanical inspection by a personqualified under 49 CFR 215.11; and arestriction on the number of set-outsand pick-ups occurring en route. FRAalso believed that these extended haultrains had to be closely monitored toensure that both the brake system andmechanical components remain safelyintact throughout the train’s journey.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA proposed thatcertain designated trains be permitted tomove up to 1,500 miles between brakeand mechanical inspections providedthe railroad met various inspection andmonitoring requirements. See 63 FR48343, 48364–65. As no trains werecurrently permitted to travel in excess of1,000 miles between inspections, FRAwas not willing to propose more than



1,500 miles between such inspectionsuntil appropriate data is developed thatestablish that equipment moved underthe proposed criteria remains in propercondition throughout the train’s trip.FRA believed that the proposedprovision requiring the performance ofan inbound inspection at destination orat 1,500 miles and the requirement thatcarriers maintain records of all defectiveconditions discovered on these trainswould create the bases for developingsuch data.

In order to ensure the accuracy of thedata as well as ensure the proper andsafe operation of these extended haultrains, FRA also proposed that the trainshave 100 percent operative brakes andcontain no cars with mechanical defectsat their initial terminal point and at thetime of departure from the 1,500-milepoint, if moving an additional 1,500miles from that location between brakeinspections. FRA further proposed thatthese trains not conduct any pick-ups orset-outs en route, except for the removalof defective equipment, in order tominimize the disruptions made to theintegrity of the train’s brake system andreduce mechanical damage that mightoccur during switching operations. Inaddition, as there was no reliabletracking system currently available toFRA to ensure that cars added to thetrain en route have been inspected inaccordance with the proposedrequirements, FRA believed that thenumber of cars added to these trains hadto be limited.

As noted earlier in the discussion,FRA believed that in order for a train tobe permitted to travel 1,500 milesbetween inspections, the train mustreceive inspections that ensure theoptimum condition of both the brakesystem and the mechanical componentsat the location where the trainoriginates. In order to ensure thatquality inspections were performed,FRA proposed that they be performedby highly qualified and experiencedinspectors. As FRA intended that theproposed Class I brake test performedon these trains at their initial terminalbe as in-depth and comprehensive aspossible, FRA believed that theinspections should be performed byindividuals possessing the knowledgenot only to identify and detect adefective condition in all of the brakeequipment required to be inspected, butalso to possess the basic knowledge torecognize the interrelational workings ofthe equipment and the ability to trouble-shoot and repair the equipment.Therefore, FRA proposed the term‘‘qualified mechanical inspector’’ toidentify and describe those individualsit believed would possess the necessary

knowledge and experience to performthe proposed Class I brake tests on theseextended haul trains.

In the 1998 NPRM, a ‘‘qualifiedmechanical inspector’’ was defined as aperson with training or instruction inthe troubleshooting, inspection, testing,maintenance, or repair of the specifictrain brake systems the person isassigned responsibility and whoseprimary responsibilities include workgenerally consistent with thosefunctions. (See § 232.5 of the section-by-section analysis for a more detaileddiscussion of ‘‘qualified mechanicalinspector.’’) FRA also proposed thatthese same highly qualified inspectorsbe the type of individuals performingthe proposed inbound inspection onthese extended haul trains in order toensure that all defective conditions areidentified at the train’s destination or1,500-mile location. Similarly, FRAproposed that all of the mechanicalinspections required to be performed onthese trains be conducted by inspectorsdesignated pursuant to 49 CFR 215.11 inorder to ensure that all mechanicalcomponents are in proper conditionprior to the train’s departure.

The AAR and various private carowners submitted a number ofcomments objecting to the proposedrequirements regarding extended haultrains contained in the 1998 NPRM.These commenters believe that the1,500-mile limitation on the movementof these trains between brakeinspections is insufficient consideringthe restrictions placed on the trains.They recommend that these trains bepermitted to operate to its destination orat a minimum be permitted 2,000 milesbetween brake inspections. Theycontend that the 1,500-mile limitationresults in little or no benefit to therailroads because in order to takeadvantage of the flexibility provided,railroads would have to establish newfacilities and add more manpower at1,500-mile points to conduct the morestringent inspections required at thoselocations. They contend that alimitation at the 2,000-mile point wouldbe logically consistent with existinginspection requirements, based on1,000-mile increments, and would allowa greater number of trains to utilize theprovisions because railroads could useexisting facilities and manpower. Theyrecommend that FRA reconsider theestimates provided regarding thebenefits derived from the extended haultrain provisions, claiming that thebenefits estimated in the NPRM’sRegulatory Impact Analysis areoverstated. Several private car ownersalso suggested that even if FRA were notto extend the proposed distance for the

entire industry, it should allow certainprivate car owners greater distances dueto their superior safety record andmaintenance practices.

Many of these same commenters alsoobject to the proposed requirement thatextended haul trains not be permitted tomake any pick-ups or set-outs en route.These commenters contend that thisrestriction severely limits the actualflexibility of the proposal. They assertthat the prohibition on pick-ups and set-outs would eliminate nearly one-half ofthe trains that could potentially beoperated under the proposed provisions.Several commenters also objected to theproposed notification requirements forextended haul trains. These commentersstate that the proposed provisionrequiring advance notification to FRA ofthe trains to be operated under theextended haul provision wouldseriously limit the number of trainsutilizing the provisions as many trainsare unscheduled with unknown trainsymbols and would be excluded. Theyrecommend that the notificationrequirements be reduced in somemanner to allow unscheduled trains tobe identified as extended haul trains.One commenter also objects to theproposed requirement that extendedhaul trains not depart their initialterminals with any part 215 defectsentrained. This commenter asserts thatthere was no rationale for thisrestriction and that it merely creates anadditional burden for railroads.

Several rail labor representatives alsoobject to the proposed provisionspermitting trains to be operated asextended haul trains; however, thesecommenters oppose allowing any trainto operate more than 1,000 milesbetween brake inspections. Thesecommenters contend that when thedistance between intermediate brakeinspections was increased in 1982, therailroads made a commitment toconduct quality initial terminal brakeinspections in exchange for theincreased mileage, but that has notoccurred and FRA should not providethe railroads with an increase in mileagewhen the previous agreement has notbeen honored. They contend that theproposed extension would merely allowdefective equipment to be movedfurther distances without repair. Theyfurther contend that the proposedincrease in distance between brake testsis not justified from a safety standpointand, thus, violates 49 U.S.C.20302(d)(2), which permits a change inthe existing power brake regulations‘‘only for the purpose of achievingsafety.’’ These commenters oppose anyextension in the distance between brakeinspections unless stringent



requirements are placed on the trains,one such requirement being that carmenor similarly trained individuals performall the inspections and tests required tobe performed on the trains. They alsocontend that the proposed standard forrevoking a railroad’s ability to designateextended haul trains is too high.

FRA Conclusions. FRA continues tobelieve that if a train is properly andthoroughly inspected, with as manydefective conditions being eliminated aspossible, then the train is capable oftraveling much greater than 1,000 milesbetween brake inspections. Therefore,the final rule retains the provisionspermitting railroads to designate trainsas extended haul trains and allowingsuch trains to be operated up to 1,500miles between brake inspections.Although FRA recognizes that retentionof the 1,500-mile limitation may limitthe utility of the provision on somerailroads, FRA is not willing to increasethe proposed mileage restriction at thistime. Currently, no train is permitted totravel more than 1,000 miles withoutreceiving an intermediate brakeinspection. Therefore, FRA does notbelieve it would be prudent toimmediately double or triple thecurrently allowed distance withoutevaluating the safety and operationaleffects of an incremental increase in thedistance. Consequently, until sufficientinformation and data are collected ontrains operating under the provisionsproposed in the NPRM and retained inthis final rule, FRA is not willing topermit trains to travel the distancessuggested by some commenters withoutadditional brake inspections. FRAcontinues to believe that therequirement for performing inboundinspections and the requirement tomaintain records of all defectiveconditions discovered on these trainsprovides the basis for developing theinformation and data necessary todetermine the viability of allowinggreater distances between brakeinspections.

After consideration of the commentssubmitted, FRA agrees that the benefitsestimated in the NPRM in associationwith the extended haul provisions mayhave been overstated. FRA realizes thatthe retention of the 1,500-milelimitation may eliminate certain trainsfrom being operated pursuant to theextended haul provisions and reducethe benefits estimated at the NPRMstage of the proceeding. (See detaileddiscussion in the Regulatory ImpactAnalysis portion of the preamblebelow.) However, in order to increasethe viability of the extended haulprovisions, the final rule provides someflexibility for designating extended haul

trains and allows for the limited pick-up and set-out of equipment.

Several commenters noted that theproposed provisions regarding theadvance designation of extended haultrains would prohibit certainunscheduled trains from being operatedas extended haul trains. In an effort toprovide some flexibility in this area, thefinal rule has been modified to allowrailroads to designate certain locationsas locations where extended haul trainswill be initiated and requires railroadsto describe those trains that will be sooperated rather than requiring specificidentification of every train. FRAbelieves this modification will allowrailroads to capture some of theirunscheduled trains by identifying thetrains by the locations where they areinitiated.

The final rule will also permitextended haul trains to set out cars atone location or to pick up cars, or both,at the same or another location. Thismodification will provide railroads theflexibility to set-out a block of cars atone location and pick up a block of carsat another location. FRA believes thatthis limited ability provides therailroads with some flexibility to moveequipment efficiently while minimizingthe disruptions made to the train’s brakesystem and ensuring that cars added tosuch trains can be adequately trackedand inspected. The final rule makesclear that any cars added to extendedhaul trains must be inspected in thesame manner as the cars at the train’sinitial terminal. The final rule alsomakes clear that any car removed fromthe train must be inspected in the samemanner as a car at the train’s point ofdestination or 1,500-mile location.

Certain commenters have portrayedthe provisions related to extended haultrains as merely being an extension ofthe current intermediate inspectiondistances. FRA objects to such acharacterization. In FRA’s view, theextended haul provisions contained inthe NPRM and retained in this final ruleconstitute a completely new inspectionregimen. The provisions related to theoperation of extended haul trainscontain stringent inspectionrequirements, both brake andmechanical, by highly qualifiedinspectors and establish stringentrequirements whenever cars are addedto or removed from such trains. Theextended haul train requirements alsocontain a means to assess the safety ofsuch operations by requiring thatrecords be maintained of the defectiveconditions that develop on these trainswhile en route. Consequently, FRAbelieves that the requirements related toextended haul trains not only ensure the

safe operation of the trains operatedunder them, but actually increase thesafety of such operations over thatwhich is provided in the currentregulations.

3. Charging of Air Brake System

Present regulations for air braketesting basically require that cars thathave previously been tested inaccordance with the regulations either‘‘be kept charged until road motivepower is attached’’ or be retested. See 49CFR 232.12(i). The current regulationsalso require the performance of aninitial terminal brake test ‘‘where thetrain consist is changed other than byadding or removing a solid block of cars,and the train brake system remainscharged. * * *’’ See 49 CFR232.12(a)(ii). Based on longstandingadministrative interpretation andpractice, FRA currently presumes that abrake system is no longer adequatelycharged if disconnected from thecharging device (supply of pressurizedair) for more than two hours beforecoupling or recoupling of locomotives;otherwise, retesting is required.

In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed topermit trains to be removed from acontinuous source of compressed air forup to four hours without requiring there-performance of a comprehensivebrake inspection. FRA received very fewcomments that directly addressed thesafety implications of this proposal;thus, FRA proposed the four-hour timelimitation in the 1998 NPRM. In the1998 NPRM, FRA agreed that itslongstanding administrativeinterpretation, that requires the retestingof cars disconnected from a chargingdevice for longer than two hours, wasestablished prior to the development ofnew equipment that has greatly reducedleakage problems, such as welded brakepiping and fittings and ferrule-clampedair hoses. However, contrary to severalrailroads’ assertions, FRA did notbelieve that cars should be allowed to beoff air for extended periods of timewithout being retested. FRA believedthat the longer cars sit without airattached, the greater the chances werethat the integrity of the brake systemwould be compromised. Consequently,based on today’s equipment, operatingpractices, and overriding safetyconcerns, FRA proposed that carsshould not be disconnected from acontinuous supply of pressurized air forlonger than four hours without beingretested. FRA also proposed that thesource of compressed air must besufficient to maintain the integrity of thebrake system. Consequently, FRAproposed that the source of compressed



air be maintained at a minimum level of60 psi.

The AAR and several other partiescommented that there is no reason toassume that once a train is charged andtested and then left standing withoutbeing provided with a source ofcompressed air that the brake systemwould become defective. Thesecommenters assert that leavingequipment connected to a source ofcompressed air does nothing to ensureproper performance of the brake system,does not prevent vandalism, and doesnot prevent leakage due to adverseweather conditions. These partiessuggest that leakage on standing trainshas been greatly reduced through theuse of welded brake piping and fittingsand ferrule-clamped air hoses. Thesecommenters believe that FRA’s currentinterpretation of allowing trains to sitwithout air for only two hours is froman era when this new equipment wasnot used. They also contend that FRA’scurrent interpretation and the proposedfour-hour limitation costs the industrymoney, fuel, and time and createspollution because trains must either bereinspected or left with a locomotiveattached and idling in order to avoidperforming a full Class I brake test. Theyfurther contend that the proposed four-hour rule exposes employees to varioussafety hazards due to the employeesbeing required to perform inspections atlocations that are not designed orequipped for such activity.

The AAR recommends that theproposed four-hour limitation beeliminated for the reasons noted above.They also noted that the Canadian rulesdo not contain an off-air requirementand that in Canada if cars are off air forany length of time, only a set-and-release continuity test is required. As analternative to eliminating the off-airrequirement completely, the AARsuggests that FRA adopt requirementswhich would allow cars to be removedfrom a source of compressed air for upto 48 hours without a car-by-carreinspection. They recommend that carsonly be required to receive a continuitytest when they have been off a sourceof compressed air for more than fourshours but less than 48 hours and that noretesting occur if equipment is off air forless than four hours.

Representatives of rail labor objectedto the proposed increase in the amountof time that equipment could beremoved from a source of compressedair. These commenters believe that theexisting two-hour limitation isreasonable. Most of these commentersexpressed concern for the integrity ofthe brake system if a consist were leftstanding for longer than two hours.

These concerns were aimed at the effectthat climate might have on theequipment and the increased possibilityof vandalism to the equipment ifconsists or equipment were left off airfor longer periods.

FRA Conclusions. The final ruleretains the proposed requirement thatequipment removed from a source ofcompressed air for longer than fourhours be reinspected. FRA believes thatthis requirement is necessary to ensurenot only the integrity of the brakesystem on equipment but to ensure thatinspections are performed on equipmentin a timely and predictable manner.FRA tends to agree that the amount oftime equipment is left off a source ofcompressed air is not directly related tothe operation of the brake system onthat equipment. However, FRA doesbelieve that in certain circumstances thelength of time that equipment isremoved from a source of compressedair can impact the integrity andoperation of the brake system on avehicle or train. Particularly in coldweather situations where freeze-ups intrain brake systems can occur or in areaswhere the potential for vandalism ishigh due to the location whereequipment is left standing. Moreover,FRA believes that the four-hourlimitation is consistent with the intentof the existing regulations and isintended to ensure that equipment isregularly inspected.

The commenters objecting to the four-hour limitation proposed in the NPRMand retained in this final rule haveignored the intent and purpose of theexisting two-hour allowance permittedby longstanding administrativeinterpretation. As discussed above, theexisting power brake regulations,adopted by Congress in 1958, are basedon the premise that if a train orequipment does not remain charged theequipment is to be retested. There is noprovision in the existing regulations forallowing equipment to be removed froma source of compressed air for anylength of time, such allowance wasgranted only through administrativeinterpretation. The original intent of thecurrently existing two-hourinterpretation, which permitsequipment to remain off-air for up totwo-hours without being retested, wasto allow trains to pick up or remove carsfrom their consists while en routewithout requiring a retest of the entiretrain. The two-hour limit was based onthe amount of time it would take a trainto make a switching move while enroute. Thus, the current application ofthe two-hour rule to any and allequipment left off a source ofcompressed air is somewhat counter to

the original intent of the interpretationwhen it was provided.

Although FRA recognizes that it hasacquiesced and endorsed the expansionof the two-hour rule to all equipment,FRA believes that the underlying intentof the existing regulations must berecognized and maintained. Thedoubling of the existing two-hourinterpretation to four hours is based onthe fact that the average time needed formany trains to perform the switchingthey conduct while en route hasincreased. Thus, FRA’s intent whenproposing an expansion of the two-hourrule was not to alter the basic tenet thatequipment should be retested when it isremoved from a source of compressedair for any lengthy period of time. FRAbelieves that the four-hour allowanceprovided by this final rule gives therailroads flexibility to performswitching operations while trains are enroute and provides flexibility toefficiently move cars from one train toanother when necessary, yet retains theconcept that equipment be retestedwhen left disconnected from a source ofcompressed air for longer periods oftime.

FRA further believes that a limitationon the amount of time that equipmentmay be off air is necessary for ensuringthat equipment is inspected in a timelyand predictable manner. If no time limitwere imposed or if 48 hours werepermitted, as suggested by somecommenters, equipment could lawfullysit for days at various locations while enroute to its destination and be switchedin and out of numerous trains withoutever being reinspected. Such anapproach would drastically reduce thenumber of times that the brake systemson such equipment would ever be givena visual inspection from what iscurrently required and, in FRA’s view,would seriously degrade the safety ofthe trains operating with suchequipment in its consist. Furthermore, ifequipment were allowed to be off-air foran excessive amount of time, it wouldbe virtually impossible for FRA toensure that equipment is being properlyretested as it would be extremelydifficult for FRA to determine how longa particular piece of equipment wasdisconnected from a source ofcompressed air. In order to make sucha determination, FRA would have tomaintain observation of the equipmentfor days at a time. Consequently, thefinal rule retains the proposed four-hourlimit on the amount of time equipmentcan be disconnected from a source ofcompressed air as it maintains currentlevels of safety and provides anenforceable and verifiable time limitthat FRA believes provides the railroads



some additional benefit over what iscurrently required both in terms ofoperational efficiency and cost savings.

4. Retesting of BrakesIn the 1998 NPRM, FRA attempted to

clarify language contained in the currentregulation which requires that thebrakes ‘‘apply.’’ See 49 CFR 232.12(b),232.12(d), 232.13(d), and 232.13(e). Thecurrent language has beenmisinterpreted by some to mean that ifthe piston applies in response to acommand from a controlling locomotiveor yard test device, and releases beforethe release signal is given, the brakesystem on that car is in compliance withthe regulation because the brake simplyapplied. The intent of the regulation hasalways been that the brakes apply andremain applied until the release signalis initiated from the controllinglocomotive or yard test device.Therefore, clarifying language wasadded to the proposed inspectionrequirements to eliminate all doubt as towhat is required. In the 1998 NPRM,FRA made clear that the brakes on a carmust remain applied until theappropriate release signal is given. Theproposal required that cars with brakesthat fail to remain applied either beremoved from the train or repaired inthe train and retested, and the proposalprovided specific requirements forperforming a retest on such equipment.

FRA recognized that some defectivetrain air brake conditions found whenperforming a train air brake test, whichmay cause insufficient application ofthe brakes on a piece of equipment, areof such a nature that they can be quicklyrepaired in the train. For example, abrake connection pin might be missing,a slack adjuster might be disconnected,or some other minor part of the brakesystem might be defective. FRA realizedthat to mandate that equipment withthese types of obvious defectiveconditions be removed from the trainwould potentially impose a tremendousburden on the railroads. Therefore, FRAsought to provide some relief torailroads by permitting cars withobvious brake defects to be repaired andretested while remaining in the train.However, FRA also believed that someconsistency and guidance had to beprovided regarding the performance of aretest on a car’s brake system.Consequently, FRA proposed that theretesting of a car had to be conductedfrom the controlling locomotive or headend of the consist if a car is repaired ina train. Furthermore, FRA proposed thatif a retest is conducted the brakes on theretested car must remain applied for aminimum of five (5) minutes. Theproposed five-minute requirement was

based on the leakage parametersestablished for locomotives contained at§ 229.59(c).

The AAR and several othercommenters object to the parameterscontained in the proposed retestingprovisions. Specifically, thesecommenters object to three of therequirements contained in the proposedretest provision, these include: therequirement that only cars with anobvious defect be retested, therequirement that the brakes remainapplied for five minutes, and therequirement that the retest be conductedfrom the controlling locomotive or thehead of the consist. These commenterscontend that there is no reason to limitthe retest provision to cars with readilyidentifiable defects. They claim thatthere are a number of conditions whichmight cause a car’s brakes not to applythat are not readily identifiable thus, theretest may identify the problem andallow it to be repaired, or the reason fora no-set is unknown but the brakesoperate properly upon being retested.

These commenters also believe thatthe proposed requirement to have thebrakes remain applied for five minutesis impractical and unnecessary. Theyassert that it is only necessary to havethe brakes remain applied for the periodof time it takes an inspector to performan inspection of the brakes and that itis impractical to require an employee towatch each retested car for five minutes.They also contend that FRA’s relianceon the five-minute requirement relatedto the testing of locomotive brakecylinder leakage contained in § 229.59 ismisplaced. They assert that there is noparallel between determining the brakecylinder leakage on a locomotive andthe testing of the brakes on a freight car.One commenter suggests that a one-minute application is a sufficient periodto ensure the proper operation of a car’sbrakes.

These commenters also object to theproposed requirement that the retest beconducted from the controllinglocomotive or the head end of theconsist. They contend that there is nosafety hazard in performing the test witha test device positioned at one end ofthe car being retested. They assert thatsuch a procedure would replicate thenatural gradient of the train and, thus,avoid the possibility of overcharging thebrake system, and would better facilitateretesting.

Representatives of rail labor generallysupported the proposed retestprovisions. These commenters didassert that any retest should beconducted from the head end of theconsist or from the controllinglocomotive. They claim that to perform

the test from other than that locationwould provide no assurance that thebrakes would apply in response to abrake pipe reduction from thecontrolling locomotive.

FRA Conclusions. FRA agrees that theproposed provisions regarding theretesting of cars may have been overlyrestrictive and is modifying the finalrule based on FRA’s review of thecomments and recommendationssubmitted. The final rule has beenmodified to permit the retesting of anycar the brakes of which were found notto be applied during a requiredinspection. FRA agrees that there areseveral circumstances that could occurwhere the reason for the failure of thebrakes to apply is not readily apparent.FRA believes that permitting a retest onany car found not applying will notadversely affect safety since the car willbe required to pass the retest in order toremain in the train or be handled fornecessary repair.

The final rule also modifies theproposed provision that requires aretested car’s brakes to remain appliedfor five minutes. FRA agrees that itsreliance on the five-minute requirementapplicable to the testing of locomotivebrake cylinder leakage is notappropriate. However, rather than inserta subjective requirement for how longthe brakes should remain applied, assuggested by some commenters, FRAbelieves that a definite time periodshould be established to ensureconsistency in the performance of theseretests. Thus, the final rule requires thatthe brakes on a retested car remainapplied for at least three minutes. FRAbelieves that three minutes is consistentwith the amount of time that it wouldtake an individual to conduct acomplete inspection of the retested car’sbrakes. The three minutes is based onthe generally accepted period of one andone-half minutes it would take toperform a walking inspection on eachside of an average size freight car.Requiring the brakes to remain appliedfor a period of at least three minutesalso provides FRA with sufficientassurances that the brakes are operatingproperly and will remain applied for theduration of any brake applicationrequired during the train’s journey.

The final rule also modifies theproposed requirement that the retest beconducted from the controllinglocomotive or the head of the consist bypermitting the retest to be conductedwith a suitable test device positioned atone end of the car or cars being retested.FRA agrees that there is little or nosafety rationale for requiring the retestto be performed from the controllinglocomotive or head of the consist. Some



3 In 1994, Congress revised, recodified, andenacted without substantive change, the federalrailroad safety laws. Simultaneously, the thenexisting general and permanent federal railroadsafety laws were repealed. 45 U.S.C. 9 of the SafetyAppliance Acts is currently codified at 49 U.S.C.20301 and 20302. The reference to the AAR rules,standards, and instructions was removed during therecodification as executed. See Pub. L. 103–272(July 5, 1994) and H.R. Rep. No. 103–180, at 94(1993).

commenters argue that if the retest isnot conducted from the controllinglocomotive, then there are no assurancesthat the brakes will apply in response toa brake reduction from the controllinglocomotive. FRA finds that thisargument ignores the various methodsby which cars may be tested andassembled when air brake tests areconducted using yard air sources. FRAcurrently allows and this final rulecontinues to allow cars to be tested withyard test plants and allows such cars tobe added to trains without requiring thateach car be inspected to ensure itoperates in response to the controllinglocomotive.

One potential safety hazard withallowing cars to be retested with adevice at the car is the potential forinjury to the employees responsible forseparating the train line between thecharged cars. The train line between thecar being retested and the car it iscoupled to would have to be separatedto perform the retest with a device. Inmany cases this train line will be underpressure at the time of the separationand could cause injury to the personseparating the train line if caution is notused. The final rule recognizes thispotential safety concern and requiresthat the compressed air in a car to beretested must be depleted prior toseparating the air hoses and conductingthe retest.

C. Movement of Equipment WithDefective Brakes

The current regulations do notcontain requirements pertaining to themovement of equipment with defectivepower brakes. The movement ofequipment with these types of defects iscurrently controlled by a specificstatutory provision originally enacted in1910, and later amended which states:

(a) GENERAL.—A vehicle that is equippedin compliance with this chapter whoseequipment becomes defective or insecurenevertheless may be moved when necessaryto make repairs, without a penalty beingimposed under section 21302 of this title,from the place at which the defect orinsecurity was first discovered to the nearestavailable place at which the repairs can bemade—

(1) On the railroad line on which the defector insecurity was discovered; or

(2) At the option of a connecting railroadcarrier, on the railroad line of the connectingcarrier, if not farther than the place of repairdescribed in clause (1) of this subsection.49 U.S.C. 20303(a) (emphasis added).

Although there is no limit containedin 49 U.S.C. 20303 as to the number ofcars with defective equipment that maybe hauled in a train, FRA has alongstanding interpretation which

requires that, at a minimum, 85 percentof the cars in a train have operativebrakes. FRA bases this interpretation onanother statutory requirement whichpermits a railroad to use a train only if‘‘at least 50 percent of the vehicles inthe train are equipped with power ortrain brakes and the engineer is usingthe power or train brakes on thosevehicles and on all other vehiclesequipped with them that are associatedwith those vehicles in a train.’’ 49U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originallyenacted in 1903, section 20302 alsogranted the Interstate CommerceCommission (ICC) the authority toincrease this percentage, and in 1910the ICC issued an order increasing theminimum percentage to 85 percent. See49 CFR 232.1, which codified the ICCorder.

As virtually all freight cars arepresently equipped with power brakesand are operated on an associated trainline, the statutory requirement is inessence a requirement that 100 percentof the cars in a train have operativepower brakes, unless being hauled forrepairs pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 20303.Consequently, FRA currently requiresthat equipment with defective orinoperative air brakes makeup no morethan 15 percent of the train and that ifit is necessary to move the equipmentfrom where the railroad first discoveredit to be defective, the defectiveequipment be moved no farther than thenearest place on the railroad’s linewhere the necessary repairs can bemade or, at the option of the receivingcarrier, to a location that is no fartherthan the location where the repairscould have been performed on thedelivering line.

In addition to the generalrequirements relating to the movementof equipment with defective safetyappliances, FRA currently requires 100-percent operative brakes on a traindeparting its initial terminal. Therequirement for 100 percent at theinitial terminal has been a standard bywhich the railroad industry hasoperated for decades and one whichFRA and its predecessor agency, theInterstate Commerce Commission, haveendorsed since the adoption of thepower brake regulations. Therequirement is founded on Congress’mandate that the ICC incorporate intothe federal rail safety regulations theAAR’s rules, standards, and instructionsas of April 11, 1958, regarding theinstallation, inspection, maintenance,and repair of train brakes. In 1958,Congress amended a provision of theSafety Appliance Acts, then codified at45 U.S.C. 9, by incorporating theinspection requirements of the AAR into

the statute and permitting their changeonly for the purpose of achievingsafety.3 Based on a review of thelegislative history surrounding thatamendment, FRA believes it is clear thatCongress interpreted the AAR standardsas requiring 100 percent operativebrakes on all trains prior to departurefrom an initial terminal. As the currentregulations regarding the performance ofan initial terminal inspection containedat 49 CFR 232.12(c)-(j) were basically anadoption of the AAR inspection andtesting standards as they existed in1958, FRA believes that the currentregulations are intended and do require100 percent operative brakes at initialterminals.

In developing the 1998 NPRM, FRAconsidered the various proposalsdiscussed in the RSAC Working Groupand the numerous comments providedsubsequent to the issuance of the 1994NPRM. A discussion of those commentsand proposals was provided in the 1998NPRM and will not be reiterated here.See 63 FR 48308–310. It is clear fromthat discussion that many of theproposals received by FRA since theissuance of the 1994 NPRM were indirect conflict with various statutoryrequirements related to the movement ofequipment with defective brakes. As theRSAC Working Group was unable toreach a consensus on the inspection,testing, and maintenance requirementsfor freight train brake systems, FRA wasnot willing or able to propose provisionsregarding the movement of equipmentwith defective brakes that would becontrary to existing statutory mandates.The 1998 NPRM contained proposalsregarding the tagging of defectiveequipment, the placement of defectiveequipment in a train, and a method forconsistently calculating the percentageof operative brakes on a train. Therefore,in addition to being consistent with thestatutory requirements, the proposedrequirements ensured the safe andproper movement of defectiveequipment and clarified the dutiesimposed on a railroad when movingsuch equipment.

FRA proposed that all cars orlocomotives found with defective orinoperative brake equipment be taggedas bad ordered with a designation of thelocation where the necessary repairs



would be effectuated. FRA attempted toexpressly clarify the requirement thatequipment with defective brakes notdepart from, or be moved beyond, alocation where the necessary repairs tothe equipment could be performed. The1998 proposal made clear that if a caror locomotive is found with defectivebrakes during any of the proposed brakeinspections or while the piece ofequipment is en route and the locationwhere the defective equipment isdiscovered is a place where repairs ofthe type needed can be performed, thenthat car or locomotive may not bemoved from that location until thenecessary repairs are effectuated.However, if repairs to the defectivecondition cannot be performed at thelocation where the defect is discovered,or should have been discovered, theproposal made clear that the railroad ispermitted to move the equipment withthe defective condition only to thenearest location where the necessaryrepairs can be performed.

The preamble to the 1998 NPRMcontained a lengthy discussionregarding FRA’s views as to whatconstitutes the nearest location wherethe necessary repairs can be performed.See 63 FR 48309. In that discussion,FRA noted that its previous proposalsregarding the use of mobile repair trucksand when locations serviced by thosetrucks would be considered locationswhere necessary repairs could beeffectuated did not sufficiently addressthe issue and might lead to undesiredconsequences. Rather than attempt todevelop a standard applicable to allsituations, which FRA did not believecould be accomplished at the time, FRAintended to approach the issue of whatconstitutes the nearest location wherenecessary repairs could be made basedon a case-by-case analysis of eachsituation. FRA noted that in makingthese determinations both the railroadas well as FRA’s inspectors mustconduct a multi-factor analysis based onthe facts of each case. In the preamble,FRA provided a broad discussion, basedon existing case law, setting out generalguidelines and factors that should beconsidered when determining whether aparticular location is a location wherenecessary repairs can be made orwhether a location is the nearestlocation where the necessary repairs canbe effectuated. See 63 FR 48309.

FRA also proposed continuation ofthe requirement to have 100 percentoperative brakes on a train at its pointof origin (initial terminal). FRA notedthat this has been a requirement in therailroad industry for decades and that itwas not only wise from a safetystandpoint, as it ensures the proper

operation of a train’s brake system atleast once during its life, but it also setsthe proper tone for what FRA expects tobe accomplished at these locations.Furthermore, requiring 100 percentoperative brakes on a trains at itsinception provides the railroads with amargin for failure of some brakes whilethe train is in transit (up to 15 percent)and tends to ensure that defectiveequipment is being repaired in a timelyfashion. In addition, FRA stated that the100-percent requirement is consistentnot only with Congress’ understandingof the AAR inspection standards thatwere adopted in 1958, but also with theintent of FRA, rail management, and raillabor as to what was to occur at initialterminals when the inspection intervalwas increased from 500 miles to 1,000miles in 1982. At that time, carrierrepresentatives committed to theperformance of quality initial terminalinspections in exchange for anextension in the inspection interval, forwhich FRA intended to hold themaccountable. Moreover, FRA believedthat retention of the 100-percentrequirement is consistent with thestatutory requirements regarding themovement of defective equipmentbecause a majority of the locationswhere trains are initiated have thecapability of conducting virtually anybrake system repair, and thus, under 49U.S.C. 20303(a) the defective equipmentmay not be moved from those locationsanyway.

In the preamble to the 1998 NPRM,FRA recognized that the 100-percentrequirement at points of origin tends tobe somewhat burdensome for somerailroads at certain locations. See 63 FR48309–10. However, FRA noted that thenumber of locations where therequirement is quite burdensomeappears to be fairly low as FRA hadmade clear that railroads are free topetition for a waiver of this requirement,but as of the issuance of the NPRM norailroad had filed such a petition.Although FRA recognized that therequirement creates somewhat illogicalscenarios at some locations, FRA wasnot willing to propose provisionspermitting trains to depart locationswith less than 100 percent operativebrakes without fully considering thesafety hazards or potential abuses whichmay accompany such an approach.Therefore, FRA sought comment frominterested parties regarding the potentialfor permitting very limited flexibility inmoving defective equipment fromoutlying initial terminals which lack thecapability of effectuating brake systemrepairs. FRA also discussed variousalternative approaches, with attendant

restrictions, which might provide someflexibility at these outlying locationsand sought comment on thoseapproaches as well. See 63 FR 48310.

The AAR and several other railroadrepresentative submitted a number ofcomments on the proposedrequirements regarding the movement ofdefective equipment. The majority ofthe comments received from theseparties addressed the proposedrequirements regarding 100 percentoperative brakes at a train’s initialterminal, the identification of locationswhere brake repairs should be required,and the tagging of defective equipment.

These commenters recommend thatFRA permit trains to operate from anylocation with a minimum percentage ofits brakes inoperative. At a minimum,they recommend that this flexibility beprovided at locations where repairs cannot be performed. They suggestadoption of a 95-percent minimumoperative brake requirement from suchlocations. They contend that the 100-percent requirement at initial terminalsis outdated and does not take intoconsideration the numeroustechnological improvements made tobrake systems over the last severaldecades. They also contend that itmakes no sense to require 100-percentoperative brakes on trains originating ata location yet allow a train originatingat another location to pick-up defectiveequipment at the same location andhaul it to the same place that it couldhave been hauled by the originatingtrain. They further contend that the 100-percent requirement results in theunnecessary switching of cars andexposes employees to greater safetyrisks than if the equipment werepermitted to depart in originating trains.Several commenters note that Canadahas permitted trains to operate todestination with 95 percent operativebrakes since June of 1994 and hasexperienced no compromise in safety.The AAR commented that railroadscould live with a 95-percent operativebrake requirement out of initialterminals provided that there were nomileage restrictions placed on themovement of such defective equipmentas discussed in the NPRM. See 63 FR48310. The ASLRA sought clarificationas to the applicability of the 100-percentrequirement to transfer trains. Theycontend that the language used in theNPRM suggests that all transfer trainsmust have 100-percent operative brakesfrom their initial terminal which is notwhat is required under the currentregulations and would have a hugeimpact on small railroads.

A number of railroad representativesalso provided comments and



recommendations on how FRAaddressed the issue of what constitutesa location where brake repairs arerequired to be performed. Thesecommenters recommend that FRAclarify what constitutes the nearestlocation where repairs can be made.These parties do not believe that thisdetermination should be left to thediscretion of individual FRA inspectors.They claim that such an approachcreates inconsistent enforcement fromone region to another and makes it verydifficult for railroads to comply as FRAis continually second guessing theirgood faith determinations.

The AAR and other commenterscontend that Congress intended thatonly fixed repair facilities be consideredlocations where brake system repairsmust be conducted and that suchfacilities provide safer workingconditions than those encounteredwhen using a mobile repair truck. Theyfurther contend that it is not in thepublic interest to require repair trucks tomake repairs at every location wherethey can be moved. The AAR andseveral railroads recommend that FRApermit railroads to designate repairlocations to FRA and permitmodification of those designations eachquarter.

The AAR and its member railroadsalso objected to some to the proposedtagging requirements associated withthe movement of equipment withdefective brakes. They objected to therequirement that any automatedtracking system be approved by FRAprior to its implementation. Thesecommenters suggested that such reviewand approval process would be verytime consuming and that FRA wouldnot easily grant the use of such systems.They also objected to the proposedrequirement that the tag or card beretained for 90 days, contending that therequirement was merely to aid in FRA’senforcement and served no otherpurpose.

The AAR also recommended that FRAmodify the proposed requirementregarding the placement of equipmentwith defective brakes. The AARcontends that FRA should permit theuse of multi-unit articulated equipmentprovided that it has no more than twoconsecutive control valves cut out orinoperative rather than the proposedlimitation prohibiting the use of suchequipment with consecutive inoperativeor cut-out control valves. They contendthis is the current practice of manyrailroads in the United States and iscurrently allowed on trains operated inCanada.

A number of rail labor representativesalso provided comments on the

proposed provisions regarding themovement of equipment with defectivebrakes. These commenters as well as theCAPUC support the requirement thattrains have 100-percent operative brakesat their initial terminals. They believethat any flexibility granted to railroadsin this regard would reduce theincentive to conduct quality inspectionsand would result in railroadseliminating even more personnel atother outlying locations. Thesecommenters also suggest that anyinability of railroads to conduct repairsat outlying locations is due to their ownactions in eliminating repair equipmentand personnel from these locations.They also contend that properlyequipped mobile repair trucks have thecapability of conducting any repair thatwould be required at virtually any of theoutlying locations operated by arailroad.

Several labor representatives alsoobject to granting the railroads theability to designate locations wherebrake system repairs will be conducted.They contend that this is merely anattempt by the railroads to eliminateexisting locations where repairs can beconducted. They further object to theAAR’s contention that only fixed repairfacilities should be considered indetermining where brake system repairsmust be conducted. They claim thatsuch an approach would lead to theclosure of even more fixed repair shopsso that railroads could furthercircumvent the requirement to maketimely repairs at the nearest location.They assert that allowing railroads todesignate locations where repairs willbe made would violate 49 U.S.C.20303(a) which requires repairs to beconducted at the nearest location wherethe necessary repairs can be made.

Parties representing rail laborgenerally support the proposed taggingrequirements for moving defectiveequipment but noted their objection tothe use of an automated tracking system.These commenters believe that anautomated tracking system reduces theawareness of ground inspection forcesas to the presence of defectiveequipment and would not ensure properhandling of such equipment. Therequired tag provides carmen and yardcrews with the ability to visuallyidentify defective equipment and takeappropriate action. Furthermore, it iscontended that automated trackingsystems lack ready accessibility and donot provide sufficient accountability orsecurity to prevent potential abuse bythe railroads. Many of these commentersalso recommend that the tags beretained for a period of at least one yearrather than the proposed 90 days and

that they be made available to FRAimmediately rather than within theproposed 15 days. Allowing railroads 15days to produce the document wouldmerely frustrate FRA enforcementactivity due to information delay.

Several labor commenters as well asthe CAPUC also recommend that FRAmodify the proposed requirementsregarding the person responsible formaking the determinations regarding themovement of defective brakeequipment. They suggest that the rulerequire the person to be a carman or ata minimum a person meeting theproposed definition of a qualifiedmechanical inspector. They contendthat only these individuals have theexperience and knowledge toadequately assess the impact that adefective piece of equipment might haveon a train’s operation.

Several labor representatives alsoraised concerns regarding the proposedmethod for calculating the percentage ofoperative brakes. These commentersalong with the NTSB recommend thatthe proposed method for calculating thepercentage of operative brakes, based onthe number of cut-out control valves, bemodified because a control valve can becut in but the brakes which it controlscan be inoperative. Thus, the proposedmethod does not provide an accuratecount of the number of defective brakes.Some labor representatives suggest thatthe computation be based on car countas it provides a much more simple,reliable, and enforceable method thanthe proposed control-valve method.Certain labor representatives also objectto the proposed list of conditions thatwould not be considered an inoperativebrake for purposes of calculating thepercentage of operative brakes. Theycontend that cars containing any of thelisted conditions should be consideredto have inoperative brakes.

FRA Conclusions. The final rulegenerally retains the requirementsregarding the movement of defectiveequipment proposed in the 1998 NPRMwith minor modification in response tothe comments submitted. The final rulemodifies the language used in theproposed general provisions toaccurately reflect the languagecontained in the existing statutoryprovisions pertaining to the movementof equipment with defective brakes. Thefinal rule replaces the term ‘‘repairlocation’’ with the phrase ‘‘locationwhere necessary repairs can beperformed.’’ FRA agrees that theproposed language could have beeninterpreted as being somewhat contraryto the language used in the existingstatute, which was not FRA’s intent.



The final rule also clarifies that theperson required to make thedeterminations regarding the safemovement of defective equipment is tobe a ‘‘qualified person’’ as defined in thefinal rule. The intent of FRA whenissuing the NPRM was to require thedeterminations to be made by theseindividuals. FRA believes that thetraining requirements contained in thefinal rule for designating a personqualified to perform a specific task willensure that the individual possesses theappropriate knowledge and skills toperform the assigned task. Thedeterminations that are required to bemade in the final rule are currentlymade by individuals which FRAbelieves will be trained and designatedunder the final rule as qualified persons.

The final rule also modifies theproposed method for calculating thepercentage of operative brakes. The finalrule retains the general method ofcalculating the percentage based on acontrol-valve basis. FRA believes thatbasing the calculation on control valvesprovides a much more accuratemeasurement than using a car basisbecause many types of freightequipment in use today can have thebrakes cut out on a per-truck basis, andFRA expects this trend to continue asthe technology is applied to newequipment. Thus, the method retainedin this final rule more accurately reflectsthe true braking ability of a train as awhole and recognizes existingtechnology. However, FRA agrees withthe comments of the NTSB and certainlabor representatives that the methodproposed in the NPRM did not take intoconsideration the possibility of a controlvalve being cut in when the brakes itcontrols are inoperative. Consequently,the final rule clarifies that a controlvalve will not be considered cut in if thebrakes controlled by that valve areinoperative.

The final rule also retains theproposed list of conditions that are notto be considered inoperative powerbrakes for purposes of calculating thepercentage of operative brakes. Contraryto the assertions of some commenters,the conditions listed do not render thebrakes inoperative nor are the listedconditions ones that are outside thescope of the movement-for-repairprovisions. Furthermore, many of thelisted conditions are of such a naturethat if found, they would constitute aviolation under other provisionscontained in the final rule and separatepenalties are provided.

The final rule also modifies theproposed requirement regarding theplacement of multi-unit articulatedequipment with inoperative brakes. The

final rule requires that such equipmentshall not be placed in a train if it hasmore than two consecutive individualcontrol valves cut out or if the brakescontrolled by the valve are inoperative.FRA recognizes that the proposedrequirement prohibiting the placementof such equipment with consecutivecontrol valves cut out is more restrictivethan current practice on many railroads.When proposing the requirement in theNPRM, FRA believed that the currentpractice on most railroads was toprohibit the placement of suchequipment if it had consecutive controlvalves cut-out. Based on the commentsreceived, it appears that the standardpractice on most railroads prohibitsplacement of this equipment only ifmore than two consecutive controlvalves are cut-out. As it was FRA’sintent to incorporate the currentpractices of railroads with regard to theplacement of this equipment, the finalrule has been modified accordingly.

The final rule retains FRA’s positionon the use of automated trackingsystems in lieu of the required taggingof defective equipment. As an adequateautomated system for tracking defectiveequipment does not currently exist onmost railroads, FRA is not willing topermit the implementation of such asystem without its approval.Furthermore, FRA does not believe it isprudent, from a safety perspective, toallow implementation of a trackingsystem for which FRA would not havea prior opportunity to assess to ensurethe system’s accessibility, security, andaccuracy. Moreover, FRA agrees that thephysical tagging of defective equipmentprovides a railroad’s ground andoperational forces the ability to visuallylocate and identify defective equipmentat the time they see it rather thanreferring to an electronic database forsuch information. It should be notedthat FRA is not intending to discouragethe development of a viable automatedtracking system, but believes that FRAmust be provided the ability to reviewand approve any such system prior to itsimplementation. In fact, the final rulecontains some new language regardingFRA’s oversight of any automatedtracking system that is approved by FRAto ensure the agency’s ability to monitorsuch systems and potentially prohibitthe use of the system if it is founddeficient.

The final rule also retains theproposed requirement that a record orcopy of each tag removed from adefective piece of equipment be retainedfor 90 days and made available to FRAwithin 15 days of request. FRA does notbelieve that the proposed time framesneed to be expanded as suggested by

some commenters. The provisions areidentical to those contained in part 215regarding freight car defects, and theyhave proven to be sufficient to meet theneeds of FRA. FRA admits that therecord keeping requirements areintended to aid FRA in its enforcementof the regulations. However, as theagency is able to inspect and overseeonly a small portion of the railroadoperations taking place across thecountry at any one time, the need forrailroads to maintain records is essentialfor FRA carry out its mission ofensuring that all railroads are operatingin the safest possible manner andcomply with those regulatory provisionsdesigned to ensure that safety.

After consideration of the commentsprovided, FRA believes it is essential tofurther clarify to the regulatedcommunity its position for determiningwhether a location is a place wherebrake repairs can be made. FRA doesnot agree that railroads should bepermitted to unilaterally determine thelocations FRA will consider capable ofmaking brake system repairs. Historyshows that many railroads and FRAhave widely different views on whatshould be considered a location wherebrake repairs can and should beeffectuated. Furthermore, it is apparentto FRA that some railroads attempt tominimize or circumvent therequirements for conducting repairs forconvenience or efficiency. However,FRA also recognizes that the emergenceof mobile repair trucks creates an abilityto perform repairs that did not existwhen Congress enacted the statutoryrequirements related to the movement ofdefective equipment. FRAacknowledges that every location wherea mobile repair truck is capable ofmaking repairs should not beconsidered a location where repairsmust be conducted. However, FRA alsodisagrees with the contentions of somecommenters that Congress intended foronly fixed repair facilities to beconsidered when determining locationswhere brake repairs are to be performedand that mobile repair trucks should notbe considered. FRA is aware ofnumerous locations where mobile repairtrucks are being used in lieu of a fixedfacility or where a fixed facility waseliminated and the same repairs, thatwere being performed by the fixedfacility, are now being performed at thesame location by a fully equipped repairtruck. Thus, FRA believes that locationswhere repair trucks are used in the samemanner as a fixed facility should beconsidered when determining where thenecessary repairs can be made.

As noted in the NPRM, thedetermination as to what constitutes the



nearest location where necessary repairscan be performed is an issue that FRAhas grappled with for decades. FRAcontinues to believe that thedetermination must be made on a case-by-case basis after conducting a multi-factor analysis. However, in an effort tobetter detail the items that will beconsidered by FRA in making adetermination, the final rule containsgeneral guidelines that FRA willconsider when determining whether alocation is one where at least somebrake system repairs must be made. FRAwould expect railroads to consider theguidance contained in the final rulewhen making their decisions on whereequipment containing brake defects willbe repaired. The guidance contained inthe final rule is based upon thevoluminous case law that establishesthe guiding principles for determiningwhether a location constitutes thenearest location where the necessaryrepairs can be made, previousenforcement actions taken, andguidance provided by FRA regardingidentification of repair locations. Thefinal rule guidance incorporates theprinciples contained in the followingdiscussion previously set out in theNPRM.

In determining whether a particularlocation is a location where necessaryrepairs can be made or whether alocation is the nearest repair location,the accessibility of the location and theability to safely make the repairs at thatlocation are the two overriding factorsthat must be considered in any analysis.These two factors have a multitude ofsub-factors which must be considered,such as: the type of repair required; thesafety of employees responsible forconducting the repairs; the safety ofemployees responsible for getting theequipment to or from a particularlocation; the switching operationsnecessary to effectuate the move; therailroad’s recent history and currentpractice of making repairs (brake andnon-brake) at a particular location; andrelevant weather conditions. Althoughthe distance to a repair location is a keyfactor, distance alone is not thedetermining factor concerning whethera particular location is the nearestlocation for purposes of effectuatingrepairs and must be considered inconjunction with the factors notedabove. Existing case law states thatneither the congestion of work at aparticular location or convenience to therailroad are to be considered whenconducting this analysis.

Although FRA does not believe thatrailroads should be permitted tounilaterally designate locations wherebrake system repair will be conducted,

FRA does believe that safety could beserved and disputes avoided if arailroad in cooperation with itsemployees could develop a plan, subjectto FRA’s approval, which designateslocations where brake system repairswill be effectuated. FRA believes such aplan would have to be consistent withthe guidelines discussed above andcontained in this final rule and thatsuch plans would have to be approvedby FRA prior to being implemented.Such a plan could serve safety well bymaking clear to all where repairs are tobe made and by assuring in advance thatthe criteria set forth in the final rule areappropriately applied. Consequently,the final rule permits railroads andrepresentatives of their employees tosubmit a joint proposal containing aplan which designates locations wherebrake system repairs will be conducted.The final rule makes clear that suchproposals would have to be approved byFRA prior to being implemented.

The final rule also retains theproposed and current requirement thata train have 100-percent operativebrakes when departing from a locationwhere an initial terminal brake test isrequired to be performed on the train.This has been a requirement in therailroad industry for decades, and FRAis not willing to provide an exceptionon an industry-wide basis at this time.Contrary to the assertions made by somecommenters, FRA believes there isadequate justification for retaining the100-percent requirement. In the NPRMand in the preceding discussion, FRAprovided a number of reasons why itbelieves there is a need for the 100-percent requirement and will notreiterate them here. See 63 FR 48309.Some commenters suggested that FRAshould permit any and all trains thathave 95-percent operative brakes tooperate from their points of origin todestination and that Canada currentlyallows such operation. FRA believesthat such an approach would becompletely contrary to, and wouldviolate, the existing statutory mandateregarding the movement of equipmentwith defective brakes. The existingstatutory provisions regarding themovement of equipment require thatsuch equipment be repaired at thenearest location where the necessaryrepairs can be performed. See 49 U.S.C.20303(a). Consequently, trains thatoriginate at or that operate throughlocations where the necessary brakerepairs can be effectuated clearly arerequired by the statute to have 100-percent operative brakes prior todeparting those locations and may nothaul a car with inoperative brakes under

the statutory hauling-for-repairprovision.

Although FRA recognizes that the100-percent requirement may besomewhat burdensome for somerailroads at certain locations, FRAbelieves that the number of locationsinvolved is relatively low and should behandled on a case-by-case basis throughthe existing waiver process. FRA agreesthat many railroads have created theirown problems by eliminating repairfacilities and personnel at many of theoutlying locations where the railroadsnow claim they lack the ability to makeappropriate repairs. Furthermore, FRAbelieves that the best method ofassessing the safety implications ofpermitting a location to operate trainswith less than 100-percent operativebrakes is for the railroad to provideinformation on how the railroad willhandle the defective equipment basedon the specific needs and operatingcharacteristics of the railroad involved.

In the NPRM, FRA provided variousapproaches under which it wouldpotentially consider allowing a railroadto operate a train from their initialterminal with less than 100-percentoperative brakes. See 63 FR 48310. Themethods suggested by FRA wererejected as being overly burdensome byseveral commenters noted in thepreceding discussion. Therefore, FRAbelieves the burden falls on eachrailroad seeking relief from the 100-percent requirement at certain outlyinglocations to provide FRA with anoperating plan that will ensure the safeoperation of such trains and provide forthe timely and certain repair of anydefective equipment moved from thoselocations. Consequently, FRA believesthat there are a few existing locationsthat may be candidates for receiving awaiver from the 100-percentrequirement, and FRA is willing toconsider waivers for such locations,however; the railroads applying for suchwaivers must be able to establish a trueneed for the exemption and must bewilling to provide alternative operatingprocedures that ensure the safety of thetrains being operated from thoselocations.

The final rule also clarifies that the100-percent operative brake requirementis not intended to apply to transfertrains that originate at location wherethe necessary brake repairs cannot beeffectuated. FRA agrees that the 100-percent requirement does not currentlyapply to such trains, and it was notFRA’s intention when issuing the NPRMto extend its application to such trains.However, it should be noted that if atransfer train originates at a locationwhere repairs to the equipment



containing defective brakes can beeffectuated, then the train would berequired to have 100-percent operativebrakes prior to departing that location.

D. Dynamic BrakesThe issue of dynamic brakes, and the

extent to which FRA should imposeregulatory requirements governing theiruse, if at all, is one which has promptedlengthy and animated debate among allaffected parties since the issuance of theANPRM in December 1992. Coincidentwith the drafting of the ANPRM, theRail Safety Enforcement and Review Actamended section 202 of the FederalRailroad Safety Act of 1970 (recodifiedat 49 U.S.C. 20141), and mandated, inpart, that FRA, ‘‘where applicable,prescribe regulations that establishstandards on dynamic brakingequipment.’’ This specific mandate isderived largely from two NTSBrecommendations to FRA concerningdynamic brakes following the SouthernPacific Transportation Company (SP)accident at San Bernardino, Californiaon May 25, 1989.

In this accident, excessive tonnageand excessive speed cresting a 2.2-percent grade, complicated by the factthat the train crew had been providederroneous information regardingavailable and operative dynamic brakes,led to a train that was out of control andwas ultimately unable to stop beforederailing. While the NTSB determinedthe primary cause of the accident to bethe excessive weight of the train ascompared to that reported to the traincrew, a secondary cause was determinedto be the fact that the engineer had farless operable dynamic braking availablefor use than expected. The combinationof these two conditions likely led toflawed decision making by the traincrew in developing train handlingstrategies for negotiating the gradesafely. In its final report, the SafetyBoard issued the followingrecommendations to the FRA regardingdynamic brakes:

1. Study, in conjunction with theAAR, the feasibility of developing apositive method to indicate to theoperating engineer in the cab of thecontrolling locomotive unit thecondition of the dynamic brakes on allunits in the train.

2. Revise regulations to require that ifa locomotive unit is equipped withdynamic brakes that the dynamic brakesfunction. NTSB Recommendation R–90–24 (1990).

To reiterate the general explanation ofthe principles of dynamic braking, asprovided in the ANPRM (57 FR 62546),the 1994 NPRM (59 FR 47676), and the1998 NPRM (63 FR 48311), dynamic

brakes were developed as a ‘‘free’’ by-product of the diesel-electric drive train.By engaging the dynamic brake, thenormally powered traction motors oneach axle are changed to generators, andthe power generated is dissipatedthrough resistance grids. The effect issimilar to that of shifting an automobileto a lower gear when descending a steepgrade. The additional hardware neededto outfit a locomotive with dynamicbrakes includes the grids and thecontrols and switches.

The primary selling point of dynamicbrakes has been the ability to reducefreight car brake shoe wear. Thedynamic brake is also useful incontrolling train slack in lieu of usingthe locomotive independent brake.Furthermore, use of the dynamic brakein controlling train speed in lieu ofpower braking, where the train brake isapplied with the locomotive underpower, is a major factor in fuel savings.Due to these benefits, railroads currentlyemphasize and encourage the use ofdynamic brakes as evidenced throughexamination of numerous carriers’operating rules which dictate the use ofdynamic braking as the preferredmethod of slowing or controlling a train,or both, especially in heavy-gradeterritory. Historically, dynamic brakeshave been applied to locomotives at theindividual railroad’s option, primarilybased on economic considerations. It isimportant to note that, at present, thevast majority of new locomotivesprocured by the railroads are equippedwith dynamic brakes.

A wealth of information was gatheredregarding the operation, testing, andmaintenance of dynamic brakes prior tothe issuance of the 1998 NPRM. In the1998 NPRM, FRA provided an in-depthdiscussion of the various proposals andcomments related to the operation andmaintenance of dynamic brakes as wellas potential technologies for providinginformation to the locomotive engineerregarding the operational status of thedynamic brakes in a train consist. See63 FR 48310–313. After consideration ofall the information submitted anddeveloped, FRA proposed a set ofstandards for dynamic brakes that itbelieved were consistent with thestatutory mandate, took intoconsideration NTSB recommendations,promoted progressive improvements indynamic brake information systemsthrough the phased introduction oftechnology, while avoiding excessiveregulation that might discourage the useof dynamic brakes.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA noted thatRSAC Working Group and task forcedeliberations provided no rationale towarrant a reconsideration of FRA’s

stated position that dynamic brakes donot offer the technical capability toserve as a primary train braking systemsince: (i) They provide braking forceonly on powered locomotive axles andare incapable of controlling in-trainforces in the same manner as theautomatic braking system; (ii) they areeffective only within a narrow speedrange and have no capability to actuallystop a train; (iii) they can fail withoutprior warning; and (iv) their failuremode is characterized by loss of brakingforce (as opposed to the automaticbrake, which, properly employed,initiates an emergency brake applicationupon loss of system integrity andtherefore is failsafe). Similarly, however,FRA asserted that the RSAC WorkingGroup and task force deliberationsreinforced FRA’s belief that dynamicbrakes have become, de facto, a second-order safety system where employed.Although from the point of view oflogical priorities, dynamic brakes ‘‘backup’’ the automatic train brake system, insequence of operational procedures thepriority is reversed. Stated differently,either the proper functioning of thesesystems, or the provision of reliableinformation concerning degradedfunctioning of these systems, shouldprevent locomotive engineers fromoperating trains in a manner that mightmake recovery through use of theautomatic brake impossible.

In considering all of the informationavailable, FRA concluded that it wasimperative for the locomotive engineerto be informed in writing as to theoperational status of the dynamic brakeson all locomotives in the consist at theinitial terminal or point of origin for atrain or at other locations where alocomotive engineer first takes charge ofa train. Therefore, FRA proposed thatlocomotive engineers be provided thisinformation at these locations. Thisproposed provision directly addressedthe foremost concern articulated by theNTSB following the San Bernardinoaccident. FRA also proposed provisionsrequiring visible identification oflocomotive units with inoperativedynamic brakes. FRA also agreed thatwhen locomotives are equipped withdynamic brakes, they should be inproper operating condition and bemaintained on a regular basis.Therefore, FRA proposed that defectivedynamic brakes be repaired within 30days of being found defective or at thelocomotive’s next periodic inspection.FRA recognized that these maintenancerequirements might be overlyburdensome in some instances forrailroads (primarily short lines) that donot utilize dynamic brakes in their



respective operations, but yet own andoperate locomotives equipped withdynamic brakes. Consequently, FRAproposed provisions for deactivating alocomotive’s dynamic brakes withoutphysically removing the components.

In addition to the information andmaintenance requirements, FRA alsoproposed the development of operatingrules and training programs to ensurethe proper and safe use of dynamicbrakes. For example, FRA proposed thatrailroads operating trains with brakesystems that include dynamic brakes,develop and implement writtenoperating rules governing safe trainhandling procedures for using thesedynamic brakes under all operatingconditions that are tailored to thespecific equipment and territory of therailroad. The NPRM also proposed thatthe railroads provide training to theirlocomotive engineers on the prescribedoperating rules, that at a minimumincludes classroom, hands-on, andannual refresher training. Moreimportantly, FRA also proposed arequirement that a railroad’s operatingrules be based on the ability of frictionbrakes alone to safely stop the trainunder all operating conditions. FRAbelieved that the establishment of thesecomprehensive operating rules andtraining plans was the most effectivemeans by which to minimize thepossibility of future incidents caused byexcessive reliance on dynamic brakes bya train crew.

In the ANPRM (57 FR 62555), the1994 NPRM (59 FR 47687), and the 1998NPRM (63 FR 48314), FRA requestedcomments from the industry on possiblemethods of providing informationregarding the status of dynamic brakesto the engineer in the cab of thecontrolling locomotive. The 1998 NPRMalso contained a detailed discussion ofvarious technologies available forproviding information on the status ofthe dynamic brakes to the locomotiveengineer. See 63 FR 48312–13. AlthoughFRA recognized that the technology fordynamic brake displays with the abilityto provide the type of informationsought by FRA in the 1994 NPRM wasnot readily available at the time the1998 NPRM was issued, severalcommenters suggested that thetechnology was under development.Consequently, FRA was not ready orwilling to require the use of suchindicators at that time. However, FRAnoted that the benefit of such anindicator would be to alert engineersthat they have diminished or excessivedynamic braking capabilities, thuspermitting the engineers to control thebraking of their trains in the safestpossible manner. FRA indicated that it

would continue to monitor thedevelopment of the technology andconsider its application to locomotivesused in the industry.

The AAR and its members, the NTSB,the CAPUC, and several representativesof rail labor provided numerouscomments on the provisions related todynamic brakes proposed in the 1998NPRM. The AAR contends that theproposed requirement to providewritten notification of the operationalstatus of the dynamic brakes is overlyburdensome. They recommend that theinformation be permitted to betransmitted in any manner, provided arecord of the notification is maintainedin the cab of the controlling locomotive.They also suggest that the notificationonly be required on an exception basis,when the dynamic brakes areinoperative. Conversely, representativesof rail labor contend that no locomotivewith inoperative dynamic brakes shouldbe permitted to be dispatched from alocation with mechanical facilitiescapable of making the repairs. Theyfurther contend that if the locomotive’sdynamic brakes cannot be repaired atthe train’s point of origin it should beallowed to be operated only as a trailingunit. These commenters support therequirement that the locomotiveengineer be informed in writing as tothe operational status of the dynamicbrakes on all units in the consist andrecommend that the lead locomotive ofthe consist be tagged to notify theengineer of the presence of a defectiveunit.

The AAR also objects to the proposedrequirement that defective dynamicbrakes be repaired within 30 days ofbeing found defective. It claims that dueto the reliability of dynamic brakesystems they should be permitted tooperate until the next periodicinspection. AAR asserts that a shorterrepair cycle will reduce motive poweravailability and may result in shortagesof motive power on some railroads.AAR also requests clarification of theterm ‘‘ineffective’’ dynamic brake. Theorganization recommends that the termbe eliminated, that the term‘‘inoperative’’ dynamic brake beretained, and that a dynamic brake beconsidered ‘‘inoperative’’ when it is nolonger capable of providing its designedretarding force on the train, similar tothe proposed definition of ‘‘effective’’brake.

Representatives of rail labor contendthat locomotives with defectivedynamic brakes should be required to berepaired within 15 days of beingdiscovered. They contend that this is amore than sufficient time period forrailroads to arrange for alternative

power and get the locomotive to alocation where it can be repaired. Thesecommenters also recommend that arecord of the repairs made to alocomotives dynamic brakes be retainedfor a period of one year rather than the92 days proposed in the NPRM. Thesecommenters also recommend thatprovisions be added to ensure that alldynamic brakes operate as intended andthat the equipment not be altered or cutback in any manner.

The AAR also seeks clarification ofthe proposed training requirementscontending that they should not beincluded in this rule unless FRA iswilling to specify the knowledge, skills,and ability criteria needed pursuant topart 240. They also contend that theproposed requirement regarding thedevelopment of operating rules isunclear and should be eliminated if notclarified. The BLE asserted that theproblem is not in the training ofengineers on the use of dynamic brakesbut in the prohibition on the use of theautomatic brake in normal trainoperation, not just when the dynamicbrakes fail. They assert that locomotiveengineers should be permitted to use theautomatic brake to control the train ona periodic basis to become familiar withits operation.

The AAR also objects to therequirement to stencil locomotivesoperating with deactivated dynamicbrakes. The AAR asserts that defacingsuch locomotives is unnecessary andthat a less intrusive means ofidentification should be used. Theorganization recommends that alocomotive with a deactivated dynamicbrake should be treated no differentlythan a locomotive with an inoperativedynamic brake, in that the locomotiveengineer should be notified of itspresence. The AAR also recommendsthat railroads be permitted to useexisting tags to identify locomotiveswith inoperative dynamic brakes.

The AAR and several locomotivemanufacturers provided comments onthe availability and use of dynamicbrake indicators. These commentersmake clear that there is currently noeasy method of providing the availabledynamic brake retarding force to thelocomotive engineer. They also contendthat the technology does not exist toshow dynamic brake performance ondistributed power units and that theyshould, therefore, be excluded from anyindicator requirements. Thesecommenters indicated that technology isnot available to have most existinglocomotives retrofitted with an indicatorof some sort. They also assert that it isimpossible to develop a device that willtell an engineer whether the dynamic



brakes will operate prior to the engineeractually applying the brakes due to theunknown risk of failure. The AAR alsorecommends that if FRA adopts anindicator requirement then the proposedrequirements related to the notificationof the locomotive engineer of dynamicbrake status and for repairinginoperative dynamic brakes should notbe adopted since real-time informationwill be available to the locomotiveengineer.

Numerous labor representatives, theNTSB, and the CAPUC contend that thetechnology does exist, at least for newlocomotives, to provide locomotiveengineers with real-time indicators ofthe operating status of the dynamicbrakes on trailing units. Thesecommenters believe that the informationthese indicators provide to an engineeris extremely important and would allowengineers to control and operate theirtrains in the safest manner possible. Allof these commenters appear to supporta requirement to require these indicatorsin new locomotives, and somerecommend some sort of retrofitrequirement for existing equipment.

Several parties responded to FRA’srequest regarding technical reasons forprohibiting a locomotive withinoperative dynamic brakes fromfunctioning as the lead or controllinglocomotive in a locomotive consist. TheAAR responded that it found notechnical reason to prohibit such use,provided the locomotive has the abilityto control the dynamic brakes ontrailing locomotives. The AAR contendsthat railroads currently operate in thismanner and will use a non-equippedlocomotive when the other locomotivesin the consist are cabless. Several laborrepresentatives asserted that alocomotive with inoperative dynamicbrakes should not be permitted tooperate as the controlling locomotiveregardless of whether it can operate thedynamic brakes on trailing units. Thesecommenters contend that the engineer isbetter able to feel the dynamic brakesoperate if the controlling unit hasoperative dynamic brakes and that theengineer will at least know whether thatunit has operable dynamic brakes. TheCAPUC cites similar human factorreasons for contending that a locomotivewith inoperative dynamic brakes shouldnot be used as a controlling unit.Several labor representatives alsocontended that if a defective locomotivewere in the controlling position, thenthe speed of the train should be limitedto 30 mph and the train should not bepermitted to operate over grades of onepercent or greater until a locomotivewith operative dynamic brakes is placedin the lead position.

The NTSB and the CAPUCrecommend that FRA include a ‘‘mile-per-hour-overspeed-stop’’ rule into thefinal rule to ensure that the speed of atrain does not exceed its brakingcapacity. Such a rule would require atrain that exceeds an established speedlimit by a specified amount to be placedin emergency. The NTSB recommendsthat the overspeed limit be 5 mph orless over the designated speed limit.The CAPUC claims that California usesa 5 mph rule but that the limit may varyfor different operations and should beestablished through validatedsimulations that include brake fade andfield tests and must be related to a safebase speed. Both commenters contendthat although the overspeed rule issimple, it accomplishes a critical safetyfunction and reduces the chances of arunaway occurring as it removes anydiscretion from the operator. TheCAPUC also recommends that railroadsbe required to validate their operatingrules to ensure that friction brakes aloneare sufficient to stop a train on allgrades operated by the railroad. TheCAPUC recommends that this beaccomplished through validatedsimulations and field test that take intoaccount brake heat-fade.

FRA Conclusions. The intent of theproposed requirement to notify thelocomotive engineer in writing as to theoperational status of the dynamic brakeson the locomotives in a train’s consistwas to ensure that the engineer hadtimely information on the condition ofthe locomotives so he could operate thetrain in the safest possible manner basedupon that information. Thus, themanner in which the information isprovided to the engineer is not a majorconcern to FRA, provided theinformation is accurate and up-to-date.Therefore, the final rule will allowrailroads to provide locomotiveengineers with the required informationby any means they deem appropriate.However, the final rule will require thata written or electronic record of theinformation provided be maintained inthe cab of the controlling locomotive.This will ensure that on-comingengineers will have the informationprovided to the previous operator of thetrain. The final rule also clarifies thatthe information is to be provided to thelocomotive engineer at the train’s initialterminal and at other locations where anengineer ‘‘first begins operation’’ of thetrain rather than where the engineer‘‘takes charge of the train.’’ Thisclarification is in response to certainlabor commenters to prevent possiblemisinterpretation or abuse of therequirement.

The final rule retains the proposedrequirement to repair locomotives withinoperative dynamic brakes within 30days of being found inoperative or at thelocomotive’s next periodic inspection,whichever occurs first. Due to theindustry’s reliance on these brakingsystems, as noted in the discussionabove, FRA continues to believe theyshould be repaired as soon as possibleafter being found inoperative. FRAbelieves that a period of 30 daysprovides the railroads with sufficienttime to get a locomotive to a locationwhere the dynamic brakes can berepaired and allows for the reallocationof motive power when necessary so asto cause minimal disruption to arailroad’s operation. FRA is not willingdecrease the time period allowed tomake repairs, as recommended by somecommenters, because such a reductioncould jeopardize a railroad’s access toavailable motive power and could causedelay in the movement of freight whichmay create safety hazards themselves.

The final rule also eliminates the useof the term ‘‘ineffective’’ dynamicbrakes and uses the term ‘‘inoperative’’dynamic brake to include any dynamicbrake that no longer provides itsdesigned retarding force on the train, forwhatever reason. FRA agrees that theuse of only this term clarifies theapplicability of the requirements relatedto dynamic brakes and preventspotential misunderstandings. The finalrule also retains the proposedrequirements related to the tagging of alocomotive found with inoperativedynamic brakes. Contrary to thecomments of some parties, FRA doesnot believe that the tagging provisionsrequire the development of new tags.The rule would allow the use of anytype of tag, provided it is placed in aconspicuous location and contains therequired information. The final rule alsoeliminates the requirement to stencil theoutside of a locomotive declared to havedeactivated dynamic brakes. FRA agreesthat defacing the exterior of thelocomotive is unnecessary and woulddo little to inform the locomotiveengineer of the presence of thelocomotive. FRA believes that therequirements to notify the locomotiveengineer of the operational status of thelocomotives and to have the cab of thelocomotive clearly marked that thelocomotive’s dynamic brakes aredeactivated provide sufficient notice tothe locomotive engineer as to the statusof that locomotive.

The final rule contains a requirementthat an electronic or written record ofrepairs made to a locomotive’s dynamicbrakes be maintained and retained for aperiod of 92 days. Although this



requirement was not proposed in theNPRM, FRA believes these records fallwithin the scope of the notice and arenecessary to ensure that necessaryrepairs are conducted on a locomotive’sdynamic brakes in a timely fashion.FRA also believes that such a recordwill provide a railroad with informationregarding the operation of the dynamicbrakes and will potentially permitrailroads to identify a repeated problemwith a locomotive’s dynamic brakes toprevent future reoccurrences and, thus,increase the utilization of a locomotive’sdynamic brakes.

The final rule also contains specificrequirements related to the use of alocomotive with inoperative ordeactivated dynamic brakes as acontrolling locomotive. Theserequirements are based on FRA’s reviewof the comments submitted in responseto FRA’s request regarding thepositioning of such a locomotive madein the NPRM. See 63 FR 48314. FRAtends to agree that there are no technicalreasons why a locomotive withinoperative dynamic brakes cannotfunction as the controlling locomotiveprovided it can control the dynamicbrakes on trailing units in thelocomotive consist. However, FRA alsoagrees that a locomotive engineer losesthe physical sensation of the operationof the dynamic brakes when the unitwhere the engineer is riding losesdynamic brake capability, which, ifpresent, provides the engineer with atleast some assurance that the dynamicbrakes on some of the units in theconsist are operating. Thus, in additionto requiring that locomotives withinoperative or deactivated dynamicbrakes have the capability of controllingthe dynamic brakes on trailing unitswhen operating as the controllinglocomotive, the final rule also requiresthat such locomotives also have thecapability of displaying to thelocomotive engineer the decelerationrate of the train or the total traindynamic brake retarding force. Thisrequirement will ensure that locomotiveengineers have at least someinformation as to the operation of thedynamic brakes in the locomotiveconsist they are controlling. FRAintends that the information required bythis provision be provided either by adevice known as an ‘‘accelerometer’’ ora similar device or by a dynamic brakeindicator capable of providing total traindynamic brake retarding force to thelocomotive engineer.

The final rule also contains provisionsrequiring new and rebuilt locomotivesto be equipped with some sort ofdynamic brake indicator. Although FRAagrees that the technology does not

currently exist to equip existinglocomotives with dynamic brakeindicators economically, FRA doesbelieve that the technology exists or issufficiently developed to provide newlocomotives with the ability to test theelectrical integrity of the dynamicbrakes at rest and to display the totaltrain dynamic brake retarding force atvarious speed increments in the cab ofthe controlling locomotive. FRArecognizes that the industry will requirea little time to incorporate the existingtechnology into new locomotives.Therefore, the requirements related todynamic brake indicators will onlyapply to locomotives ordered one andone-half years after the issuance of thisfinal rule and to locomotives placed inservice for the first time three years afterthe effective date of the final rule. FRAalso recognizes that not all locomotivesbeing rebuilt are designed, or have thecapability of being redesigned, to havethe capability to display the total traindynamic brake retarding force in the cabof the controlling locomotive. Thus, thefinal rule allows rebuilt locomotives tobe designed to display the traindeceleration rate (i.e., equipped with anaccelerometer or similar device asdiscussed above) in lieu of beingequipped with the dynamic brakeindicator required on new locomotives.FRA believes that the informationprovided by these indicators isextremely useful to an engineer and willprovide locomotive engineers withready access to real-time information onthe operation of the dynamic brakes ina locomotive consist and permitengineers to control and operate trainsin the safest manner possible.

FRA also acknowledges that theinformation provided by dynamic brakeindicators would eliminate the need toprovide the locomotive engineers withinformation regarding the operationalstatus of the dynamic brakes when theengineer first begins operation of a train.As the indicators would provide real-time information to the engineer on theoperation of the dynamic brakes brakein the train consist, the informationreceived by the engine when beginningoperation would be unnecessary.Therefore, the final rule alleviates theneed to inform locomotive engineers ofthe status of the dynamic brakes whenall of the locomotives in the lead consistare equipped with dynamic brakeindicators required for new locomotives.FRA believes that this allowance makessense from a practical perspective butalso provides some incentive forrailroads to equip existing equipmentwith such indicators when thetechnology for doing so becomes

economically feasible. It should benoted that there is no requirement thatthe dynamic brake status of distributedpower units be provided in order toeliminate the need to provide dynamicbrake information to the engineer. FRAagrees that the technology fortransmitting that information to theengineer is not currently available in acost effective and reliable manner.

The final rule retains the proposedprovisions requiring railroads todevelop and implement writtenoperating rules governing the use ofdynamic brakes and to incorporatetraining on those operating rules intothe locomotive engineer certificationprogram pursuant to 49 CFR part 240.Contrary to the assertions of somecommenters, FRA does not believe theserequirements are unclear. FRA intendsfor each railroad to develop appropriateoperating rules regarding train handlingprocedures when utilizing dynamicbrakes that cover the equipment andterritory operated by the railroad. Manyrailroads already have these proceduresin place and already provide training totheir employees that adequately coverthe requirements. FRA continues tobelieve that training on proper trainhandling procedures is essential toensuring that locomotive engineers canproperly handle their trains with orwithout dynamic brakes and in theevent that these brake systems fail whilethe train is being operated. FRA alsodisagrees that the agency should specifythe knowledge, skill, and ability criteriathat a railroad must incorporate in itstraining program. FRA believes thateach railroad is in the best position todetermine what these criteria should be,given the railroad’s equipment, physicalcharacteristics and operating rules, andwhat training is necessary to providethat knowledge, skill, and ability to itsemployees.

The final rule also requires that theoperating rules developed by railroadsinclude a ‘‘miles-per-hour-overspeed-stop’’ requirement that requires a trainto be immediately stopped if it exceedsthe maximum authorized speed by morethan 5 mph when descending a grade ofone percent or greater. FRA agrees withboth the NTSB and the CAPUC that thisrequirement accomplishes a criticalsafety function and reduces thepotential for a runaway train as itestablishes a clear rule for stopping atrain and removes any discretion fromthe operator to continue operation of atrain. FRA believes that the five-mphlimitation is a good base limitation thatshould be reduced if so indicated byvalidated research and should beincreased only with FRA approval.Moreover, the operating rules of most



Class I railroads already include a five-mph-overspeed-stop provision; thus,FRA’s inclusion of the requirement inthis final rule should impose little or noburden on the operations of mostrailroads.

E. Training and Qualifications ofPersonnel

Currently, the regulations contain nospecific training requirements orstandards for personnel who conductbrake system inspections. Theregulations merely require that a‘‘qualified person’’ perform certaininspections or tasks. See 49 CFR232.12(a). Furthermore, the currentregulations do not require that a railroadmaintain any type of records orinformation regarding the training orinstruction it provides to its employeesto ensure that they are capable ofperforming the brake inspections ortests for which they are assignedresponsibility. In several cases, FRA hasfound that a railroad’s list of ‘‘qualifiedpersons’’ is merely a roster of all of itsoperating and mechanical forces.

In the 1994 NPRM, FRA proposed aseries of broad qualification standardsaddressing various types of personnelengaged in the inspection, testing, andmaintenance of brake equipment. See 59FR 47731–47732. These broadqualifications were separated intodistinct subgroups that identifiedvarious types of personnel based on thetype of work those individuals would berequired to perform under the proposal.These included supervisors, train crewmembers, mechanical inspectors, andelectronic inspectors. Although notproposed in the rule text of the 1994NPRM, the preamble contained variousguidelines regarding specific hours ofclassroom and ‘‘hands-on’’ training aswell as guidelines regard the level ofexperience each of these types ofemployees would be required to possessor be provided. See 59 FR 47702–47703.The proposal also contained variousrequirements regarding the developmentand retention of records andinformation used by a railroad indetermining the qualifications of suchemployees. See 59 FR 47732.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRAacknowledged that many railroadscontinue to improve the training theyprovide to individuals charged withperforming brake system inspections,tests, and maintenance; however, FRAalso acknowledged that it continued tobelieve that this training could begreatly improved and enhanced. Theagency noted that although there hadbeen a decline in the number of trainincidents, derailments, fatalities, andinjuries over the previous ten years,

FRA believed that the number of theseincidents could be further reduced ifmaintenance, inspections, and tests ofthe brake system were performed byindividuals who have received propertraining specifically targeting theactivities for which the individual isassigned responsibility. FRA believedthat one of the major factors in ensuringthe quality of brake inspections and theproper operation of that equipment isthe adequate training of those personsresponsible for inspecting andmaintaining that equipment.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA proposedbroad performance-based training andqualification requirements that wouldpermit a railroad to develop programsspecifically tailored to the type ofequipment it operates and theemployees designated by the railroad toperform the inspection, testing, andmaintenance duties required in thisproposal. FRA agreed that there is noreason for an individual who solelyperforms pre-departure air brake testsand inspections to be as highly trainedas a carman since a carman performsmany other duties which involve themaintenance and repair of equipment inaddition to brake inspections. Therefore,FRA proposed training and qualificationrequirements which permit a railroad totailor its training programs to ensure thecapability of its employees to performthe tasks to which they are assigned.FRA also made clear that the proposedtraining and qualification requirementsapplied not only to railroad personnelbut also to the personnel of railroadcontractors and personnel in plants thatbuild cars and locomotives that areresponsible for brake systeminspections, maintenance, or testscovered by this part.

Contrary to the 1994 NPRM, FRA didnot issue specific guidelines onexperience, classroom training, or‘‘hands-on’’ training. FRA agreed thatmany of the guidelines contained in thepreamble to that proposal were overlyrestrictive and might have impeded theimplementation of certain trainingprotocols capable of achieving similarresults with less emphasis on solely thetime spent in the training process.Furthermore, the 1994 proposedguidelines failed to consider thepotentially narrow scope of training thatmight be required for some employees,particularly some train crew personnel,that perform very limited inspectionfunctions on very limited types ofequipment. Consequently, although thetraining and qualification requirementsproposed in the 1998 NPRM continuedto require that any training providedinclude classroom and ‘‘hands-on’’training as well as verbal or written

examinations and ‘‘hands-on’’proficiency, they did not mandate aspecific number of hours that thetraining must encompass as FRArealized that the time period shouldvary depending on the employee oremployees involved. The 1998 proposalalso contained provisions forconducting periodic refresher trainingand supervisor oversight of anemployee’s performance once training isprovided.

FRA believed that the recordkeepingand notification requirements containedin the 1998 proposal were thecornerstone of the training andqualification provisions. As FRA wasnot proposing specific training curriculaor specific experience thresholds, FRAbelieved that the recordkeepingprovisions were vital to ensuring thatproper training was being provided torailroad personnel. FRA intended therecord keeping requirements to providethe means by which FRA would judgethe effectiveness and appropriateness ofa railroad’s training and qualificationprogram. The proposed recordkeepingprovisions also provided FRA with theability to independently assess whetherthe training provided to a specificindividual adequately addresses thetasks that the individual is deemedcapable of performing. Finally theproposed training mandates seemedmost likely to prevent railroads fromusing insufficiently trained individualsto perform the necessary inspections,tests, and maintenance required by theproposal.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA proposed torequire that railroads maintain specificpersonnel qualification records for allpersonnel (including their contractors’personnel) responsible for theinspection, testing, and maintenance oftrain brake systems. FRA proposed thatthe records contain detailed informationregarding the training provided as wellas detailed information on the types ofequipment the individual is qualified toinspect, test, or maintain and the dutiesthe individual is qualified to perform.As an additional means of ensuring thatonly properly qualified individuals areperforming only those tasks for whichthey are qualified, FRA proposed thatrailroads be required to promptly notifypersonnel of changes in theirqualification status and specificallyidentify the date that the employee’squalification ends unless refreshertraining is provided.

FRA recognized that some railroadswould be forced to place a greateremphasis on training and qualificationsthan they had in the past, and as a resultwould incur additional costs. However,FRA believed that the proposed rule



allowed railroads the flexibility toprovide only the training that anemployee needs in order to perform aspecific job. The 1998 proposed rule didnot require an employee who performsonly brake inspections while the train isen route (i.e., Class II brake tests) toreceive the intensive training needed foran employee who performs Class I braketests or one who is charged with themaintenance or repair of the equipment.The training might be tailored to thespecific needs of the railroad. Across theindustry as a whole, the 1998 proposalwould not have required extensivechanges in the way most railroadscurrently operate, but it would haverequired some railroads to invest moretime in the training of their personnel.

FRA recognized that the costs of theproposed training requirements werefairly substantial; however, FRAbelieved that most Class I railroads hadalready invested in training, routinelyscheduled training for their employees,and offered training to other interestedparties. On the other hand, FRA notedthat most railroads did not engage in the‘‘hands-on’’ training and testingcontained in the proposal nor did mostrailroads maintain the records requiredin the proposal. FRA noted that manyClass I railroads have participated ininitiatives under the Safety Assuranceand Compliance Program (SACP) withFRA and labor and that many of theproposed training requirements wouldalready be met by those railroads thathave completed the training requiredunder the SACP.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA recognizedthat the proposed training requirementswould likely cause some impact tosmaller railroads but believed that theimpact of the requirements on thesesmaller operations would be somewhatreduced due to the training alreadyprovided by the railroads and due to thenature of the operations themselves.FRA noted that many smaller railroads,particularly Class II railroads, send theiremployees to other railroads fortraining, participate in ASLRA and FRAtraining, and have some form of on-thejob training. Furthermore, Class IIIrailroad employees are not likely torequire extensive training on differenttypes of brake equipment since most ofthe equipment used by Class IIIrailroads have only one type of brakevalve. Furthermore, the employees ofthese small railroads would likely notbe required to receive any training inthe areas of EPIC brakes, dynamicbrakes, two-way EOT devices, or onsome of the brake tests and maintenancemandated in the proposal due to thelimited distances traveled by thesetrains, the low tonnages hauled, and

because many of the maintenancefunctions are contracted out to largerrailroads.

The AAR and its members, theASLRA, and various private car ownerssubmitted numerous commentsregarding the proposed trainingrequirements. Generally, thesecommenters believe that the significantcosts being imposed by the proposedtraining requirements are not justifiedbased on the industry’s safety recordover the last two decades. They contendthat the industry’s safety record isevidence that the current trainingprovided by the railroads is sufficient.At a minimum, these commentersrecommend that railroads be providedthree years to implement any trainingrequirements imposed. Such anapproach would be consistent with theproposed three-year refresher trainingrequirements and would preventmanpower shortages and ease thefinancial impact.

Several railroad representativesrecommend that railroads not beresponsible for the training of thecontract personnel they employ as wasproposed. They contend that railroadsdo not maintain records of the trainingor experience of these individuals andthat the contractor should bear theburden of training its own employees.These commenters admit that railroadswould work with contractors to helpthem train their employees but that thecontractor should be held responsiblefor providing the necessary training.They assert that the contractor is in thebest position to determine the trainingneeds of its employees and that theproposed approach potentially intrudesand alters the employment relationshipof contractors and railroads.

Representatives of various railroadsalso object to some of the administrativeburdens imposed by the proposedtraining requirements. They contendthat the requirement to identify all tasksrelated to the inspection, testing, andmaintenance of brake systems anddevelop procedures for performing eachtask, is overly burdensome andunnecessary. They also object to theproposed requirement that the railroad’sChief Mechanical or Chief OperatingOfficer sign a statement for eachemployee attesting that the employeemeets the minimum requirements. Theycontend that the requirement wouldinhibit the use of electronic records andthat there is no benefit obtained byrequiring such a signature. Thesecommenters further object to therequirement that railroads implementformal internal audit programs,contending that these programs wouldwaste scarce resources and that the

effectiveness of a training program canbe assessed through efficiency tests,supervisory spot checks, and other lessburdensome methods.

The AAR also objects to the potentialrequirement that all existing employeesbe completely retrained. The AARrecommends that existing employeesnot be required to receive any newtraining because it is unnecessary andthere has been no showing that currenttraining is inadequate. They also suggestthat there is no need for refreshertraining of these employees unless anew brake system is introduced. At aminimum, they recommend that the‘‘hands-on’’ refresher training beeliminated as virtually every railroadconducts periodic efficiency testing oraudits of its employees to ensure‘‘hands-on’’ proficiency of personnel.They also contend that refreshertraining should only be required forthose employees that repeatedlydemonstrate a failure to properlyperform their required duties.

Several railroad representatives alsoobject to the proposed requirement thatemployees receive training and testingon each task they will be required toperform and that they be trained andtested on each type of equipmentoperated by the railroad. Thesecommenters contend that theseproposed requirements would be cost-prohibitive and time-consuming. Theyclaim that it is impossible for a railroadto have every type of vehicle it operatesavailable to train all of its employees.They recommend that the training belimited to the different brake systemsoperated by the railroad and that thetraining be required to impart thenecessary skills and abilities to performthe required tasks.

The AAR and the ASLRA also objectto the proposed record keepingprovisions, claiming they are overlydetailed and unnecessary. Thesecommenters recommend that the recordkeeping burdens be reduced and thatFRA should only require a list ofqualified employees, the trainingcourses completed by an employee, andthe date that training was completed.They contend that each railroad is in thebest position to determine the level ofdetail that their records should containand that the level of detail proposed byFRA will have a significant cost burdenon railroads.

Representatives of rail labor reiteratethat the need for any training provisionscould be greatly reduced if FRA wouldsimply require many of the proposedinspections and tests to be conducted byqualified carmen. At a minimum, thesecommenters contend that any trainingprovisions must include a requirement



for FRA approval. They assert that anytraining program developed by arailroad should be approved by FRA.Several labor representatives alsocontend that the proposed trainingrequirements fail to adequately addresssupervisors charged with oversight andtraining instructors. They believe thatspecific qualifications of bothsupervisors and instructors should beincluded in any final rule developed.They further contend that the proposedrequirements do not include a disputeresolution procedure which they believeis necessary to avoid potential abuses byrailroads when designating qualifiedemployees. Certain labor representativesrecommend that the proposed languageregarding the training on newequipment needs to be clarified toensure that the training is providedbefore the new equipment is placed inservice.

FRA Conclusions. FRA recognizesthat there has been a significant declinein the number of brake-relatedderailments and other train accidentsand incidents, and resulting propertydamage, fatalities, and injuries over thelast ten years; however, FRA continuesto believe these numbers can be evenfurther reduced if the inspections andtests of brake systems are performed byindividuals who have received trainingthat specifically targets the activitieswhich the individual is assignedresponsibility to perform. FRA’sexperience in enforcing the existingpower brake regulations supports theconclusion that the better trained aperson is on how to perform a brakeinspection the better that person canperform the inspection when required todo so. Many FRA field inspectors havediscovered equipment with brakeconditions having the potential ofcausing a derailment or accident that arenot identified by railroad personnelbecause those persons responsible forfinding the conditions are notsufficiently trained or equipped toconduct the inspections they arerequired to perform. FRA’s field forcesconsistently find that the mostcomprehensive brake inspections areperformed by those individuals whohave received detailed trainingspecifically related to the inspectionbeing performed and who conduct suchinspections on a consistent basis. Basedon this experience, FRA believes thatthe training required in this final rulewill enhance the quality of brakeinspections, which will increase thediscovery of brake conditions that havethe potential of causing a derailment orother accident. Because an increasednumber of brake conditions having the

potential of causing a derailment orother accident will be discovered priorto being used in a train, FRA expectsthat the training required by this rulewill reduce the number of incidentscaused by brake-related problems.

Furthermore, as discussed in the 1998NPRM, railroads continue to consolidatemechanical work to fewer and fewerlocations on their systems. This trendplaces an increasing premium on theability of mechanical and operatingforces to conduct meaningfulinspections and tests of the power brakesystem. Increases in train speeds andincreased pressure on operatingpersonnel due to growing traffic densitywill continue to make it critical foroperating and mechanical forces todischarge their duties with respect tothe power brake system both diligentlyand effectively even under the mostoptimistic of scenarios. Technologicalchange presents an additional reason forplacing a strong emphasis on thetraining and qualifications of inspectionpersonnel. Both operating andmechanical personnel are confrontedwith an increasing variety of powerbrake arrangements and features.Consequently, these trends and changesmake the training required in this finalrule a necessity in order to ensure andenhance the quality of brakeinspections.

In addition to the safety benefits, bothquantified and non-quantified, there arecertain operational benefits derivedfrom the training required by this finalrule. This final rule allows an increasein the distance some trains may travelbetween brake inspections. Theseincreases are premised on the conditionthat all of the inspection functionsperformed on these trains are conductedby highly trained and qualifiedpersonnel. The latitude provided tothese trains will result in fewerinspections per miles traveled and willreduce the number of opportunities thatexist for a serious defect to be foundbefore it could result in a train incident.It is imperative, therefore, that eachinspection performed on these trains beof uniformly high quality. FRA believesthat the training required by this finalrule is a key factor for ensuring suchhigh quality inspections. FRA alsobelieves that certain non-quantifiableoperational benefits will be derivedfrom the training required by this finalrule, particularly in the areas ofequipment utilization, reduced traindelays, and repair costs.

FRA agrees that railroads have madesignificant improvements in the qualityof training provided to their employeesbut believes that this training can befurther improved. Furthermore, FRA

believes that a number of railroadsparticipating in the SACP process havealready developed, or are in the processof developing, comprehensive trainingprograms that meet many of therequirements proposed in the NPRM.Therefore, the final rule retains the basicstructure and concepts that wereproposed in the NPRM regarding thetraining of individuals responsible forconducting the inspections and testsrequired by the final rule. The proposedtraining requirements have been slightlyrevised in this final rule in order toclarify FRA’s intent, to recognizeexisting training, and to reduce anyunnecessary burden that may have beeninadvertently created by the proposedrequirements.

The final rule modifies the proposedprovision that required a railroad toprovide training to the personnel of acontractor to the railroad whom therailroad uses to perform the varioustasks required by the rule. The final rulemakes clear that the contractor isresponsible for providing appropriatetraining to its employees. FRA agreesthat railroads should not bear theburden of training the employees of acontractor. However, FRA notes thatthis change does not relieve the railroadfrom potential civil penalties for, e.g.,failure to perform a proper Class I braketest, if the employees of a contractorwere found not to be qualified toperform the task for which they areassigned responsibility. As acontractor’s employees are acting as anagent for the railroad when performinga task required by this regulation, boththe railroad and the contractor wouldremain liable for potential civilpenalties if the employees used toperform a particular task were nottrained and qualified in accordancewith the training requirementscontained in this final rule.

The final rule retains the proposedrequirement that railroads andcontractors identify the tasks related tothe inspection, testing, and maintenanceof the brake system required to beperformed by the railroad or contractorand identify the skills and knowledgenecessary to perform each task. FRAbelieves that it is essential to developinga comprehensive training program for arailroad or contractor to go through theprocess of identifying the tasks they willbe required to perform and determiningthe skills and knowledge that must beprovided to perform those tasks. FRAbelieves that most railroads havealready engaged in this activity andwould merely need to revise existingdata with changes made to existingrequirements by this final rule. The finalrule eliminates the requirement to



develop written procedures forperforming each task identified.Although FRA believes that eachrailroad or contractor should and willdevelop such procedures, FRA does notbelieve it is necessary to require theirdevelopment as FRA believes they willeither be developed in the requiredtraining curricula or are sufficientlydetailed in the regulation itself.

The final rule also clarifies that therequired training is intended to provideemployees with the skills andknowledge necessary to perform thetasks required by this final rule. FRAdoes not believe it is necessary to trainan employee on every different type ofequipment that a railroad operates or oneach and every task an employee will berequired to perform. FRA’s intent whenissuing the NPRM was to ensure that thetraining received by an employeeprovided that individual with theknowledge and skills needed to performthe tasks he or she was assigned on thevarious types of equipment the railroadoperated. Therefore, the final ruleclarifies this intent by specificallystating that the training curriculum, theexaminations, and the ‘‘hands-on’’capability should address the skills andknowledge needed to perform thevarious required tasks rather thanfocusing strictly on the tasks themselvesor on the specific types of equipmentoperated by the railroad. The final rulealso clarifies that the training that anemployee is required to receive needonly address the specific skills andknowledge related to the tasks that theperson will be required to performunder this part. Thus, a railroad orcontractor may tailor its trainingprograms to the needs of each of itsemployees based on the tasks that eachof its employee will be required toperform. FRA tends to agree withseveral commenters that there is noreason for an individual who performsstrictly brake inspections and tests to beas highly trained as a carman sincecarmen perform many other dutiesrelated to the maintenance and repair ofequipment in addition to brakeinspections.

The final rule also clarifies thatprevious training and testing receivedby an employee may be considered bythe railroad. FRA did not intend torequire the complete retraining of everyemployee performing a task required inthis final rule. When proposing thetraining requirements, FRA intended forrailroads to incorporate existing trainingregimens and curricula into theproposed training programs. Therefore,in order to clarify this intent, the finalrule contains a specific provision whichpermits railroads to consider previous

training and testing received by anemployee when determining whether anemployee is qualified to perform aparticular task. However, the final rulealso makes clear that any previoustraining or testing considered by arailroad or contractor must bedocumented as required in the finalrule. Thus, previous training or testingwhich has not been properlydocumented cannot be considered. Thefinal rule also makes clear thatemployees must be trained on thespecific regulatory requirementscontained in this final rule related to thetasks that the employee will be requiredto perform. Therefore, all employeesperforming tasks covered by this partwill require at least some training whichcovers the specific requirementsdetailed in this final rule.

The final rule retains the proposedrequirement regarding the performanceof periodic refresher training andtesting. The final rule retains therequirement that refresher training beprovided at least once every three yearsand that it include both classroom andexperiential ‘‘hands-on’’ training andtesting. FRA continues to believe thatperiodic refresher training is essential toensuring the continued ability of anemployee to perform a particular task.FRA does not intend for such trainingto be as lengthy or as formal as theinitial training originally provided, butbelieves that the training shouldreemphasize key elements of varioustasks and focus on items or tasks thathave been identified as beingproblematic or of poor quality by therailroad, contractor, or its employeesthrough the periodic assessment of thetraining program. The final rule alsomakes clear that a railroad or contractormay use efficiency testing to meet thehands-on portion of the requiredrefresher training provided such testingis properly documented. FRA agreesthat such testing provides the necessaryassurances that the individual continuesto have the knowledge and skillsnecessary to perform the task for whichthe employee is being tested.

The final rule also modifies theproposed requirement that railroadsdevelop an internal audit process toevaluate the effectiveness of theirtraining. Although FRA agrees that aformal audit process may not benecessary, FRA continues to believe thatrailroads and contractors shouldperiodically assess the effectiveness oftheir training programs. However, ratherthan require a formal internal audit,FRA believes that periodic assessmentsmay be conducted through a number ofdifferent means and each railroad orcontractor may have a need to conduct

the assessment in a different manner.The final rule requires that a railroad orcontractor develop a plan toperiodically assess its training programand, as suggested by some commenters,permits the use of efficiency tests orperiodic review of employeeperformance as methods for conductingsuch review. FRA agrees that manyrailroads, due to their small size, arecapable of assessing the quality of thetraining their employees receive byconducting periodic supervisory spotchecks or efficiency tests of theiremployees’ performance.

The final rule also retains the recordkeeping requirements proposed in theNPRM with slight modification forconsistency with the changes notedabove regarding the application of theskills and knowledge necessary toperform a particular task. FRAcontinues to believe that the recordkeeping and designation requirementscontained in this final rule are thecornerstone of the trainingrequirements. Contrary to the views ofsome commenters, FRA believes thatsomething more than mere lists ofqualified employees is needed. Becausethe rule allows each railroad andcontractor the flexibility to develop atraining program that best fits itsoperation and does not impose specificcurriculum or experience requirements,FRA continues to believe it is vital forrailroads and contractors to maintaindetailed records on the training they doprovide. Such documentation will allowFRA to judge the effectiveness of thetraining provided and will provide FRAwith the ability to independently assesswhether the training provided to aspecific individual adequately addressesthe skills and knowledge required toperform the tasks that the person isdeemed qualified to perform. Moreover,requiring these records will preventrailroads and contractors fromcircumventing the training requirementsand prevent them from attempting toutilize insufficiently trained personnelto perform the inspections and testsrequired by this rule.

The final rule makes clear that therequired records may be maintainedeither electronically or in writing. Manyrailroads currently maintain theirtraining records in an electronic format,and FRA sees no reason not to permitsuch a practice if as the information canbe provided to FRA in a timely mannerupon request. The proposed provisionrequiring the railroad’s chief mechanicalor chief operating officer to sign astatement regarding each employee’squalifications has been modified in thefinal rule to merely requireidentification of the person or persons



making the determination that theemployee has completed the necessarytraining. This modification will permitthe information to be maintainedelectronically and will still provide theaccountability which FRA intended bythe provision in the NPRM. FRAbelieves it is absolutely essential thatthose individuals making thedeterminations regarding an employee’squalification be identified in order toensure the integrity of the trainingprograms developed and preventpotential abuses by a railroad orcontractor.

FRA also objects to the portrayal bysome commenters that the recordsrequired to be maintained are overlyburdensome. Virtually all of the itemsrequired to be recorded are currentlymaintained by most railroads in somefashion or another. Contrary to theconcerns raised by some commenters,the rule does not require that thecontents of each training program bemaintained in each employee’s file.Railroads are free to develop whatevertype of cross-referencing system theydesire, provided the contents of thetraining program are maintained insome fashion and can be readilyretrieved. Furthermore, railroadscurrently maintain lists of individualsthey deem to be qualified persons andinform those individuals as to theirstatus to perform particular tasks. FRAbelieves this is a good practice and isnecessary to ensure that individualemployees do not attempt to perform, orare not asked to perform, tasks forwhich they have not been trained.

The final rule contains two provisionsthat were not specifically included inthe NPRM but which were intended byFRA to be covered by the establishedtraining programs. The final rulerequires that new brake systems beadded to training programs prior to theirintroduction into revenue service. FRAbelieves this requirement is only logicaland makes sense. FRA believes thatprior to the introduction of any newbrake system the employees responsiblefor inspecting and maintaining theequipment need to be specificallytrained on the systems in order toadequately perform their required tasks.The final rule also requires railroadsthat operate trains under conditions thatrequire their employees to set retainingvalves to develop training programswhich specifically address the use ofretainers and provide such training tothose employees responsible for usingor setting retainers. This provision hasbeen added in response to an NTSBrecommendation which FRA supports.See NTSB Recommendation R–98–7.

FRA has not included provisionsrequiring FRA approval of the trainingprograms developed by railroads orcontractors as suggested by somecommenters. FRA does not have theresources to implement such anapproval process and does not believesuch approval is necessary, given therecords that will be required to bemaintained. Furthermore, FRA believesthat such a process would slow theimplementation of training programsand, thus, slow the implementation ofthis final rule. An approval processwould also seriously impede the abilityof a railroad or contractor to makenecessary and timely changes to itstraining program, which is necessary toensure its currency. The final rule alsodoes not contain a dispute-resolutionprovision regarding such programs. FRAbelieves that such matters are within theprovince of employee-employerrelationships and are better addressedby established processes. The final rulealso does not specifically address thetraining that must be provided tosupervisors. Although somecommenters recommended specificrequirements, FRA believes thatsupervisors are sufficiently covered bythe final rule requirements. FRAbelieves that in order for a supervisor toproperly exercise oversight of anemployee’s work, the supervisor mustbe qualified to perform the tasks forwhich they have oversightresponsibilities.

FRA realizes that many railroads willneed time to bring their existing trainingprograms up to the level required bythis final rule. FRA also recognizes thatthe cost of the proposed trainingrequirements is somewhat substantialand may prevent railroads fromcompleting the necessary training in ashort period of time. Moreover, FRArecognizes that railroads need time toprovide the necessary training to theiremployees without causing manpowershortages in their operations. Therefore,the final rule allows railroads threeyears in which to develop and completethe required training. This period isconsistent with the time requested bythe AAR and other railroad commenters.It is also consistent with therequirement to provide refreshertraining at least every three years andwill allow a railroad to have one-thirdof its inspection forces receive thenecessary refresher training each yearafter the initial training is complete.

F. Air Source RequirementsIn the 1998 NPRM, FRA again

proposed a ban on the use of anti-freezechemicals in train air brake systems,reiterating the position stated in the

1994 NPRM, in order to preventuntimely damage and wear to brakesystem components. See 59 FR 47728.At that time, FRA had not received anyadverse comments on this issue inresponse to the 1994 NPRM, in whicha similar requirement was proposed.Furthermore, statements anddiscussions provided at various RSACWorking Group meetings appeared toestablish that both rail labor and railmanagement representatives believedthat such a provision would beacceptable.

Based on information gatheredthroughout the RSAC process, previouscomments by industry parties, andagency experience, FRA firmly believesthat the presence of moisture in thetrain air brake system poses potentialsafety, operational, and maintenanceissues that require attention in thisrulemaking. After completion ofdetailed, instrumented testing on bothlocomotives and yard test plantsperformed as part of the task forceactivities, FRA determined thatlocomotives rarely contribute tomoisture in the trainline. Consequently,FRA did not propose that air dryers beinstalled on new locomotives, as wasproposed in the 1994 NPRM (59 FR47729). A detailed discussion of thetesting conducted by the RSAC WorkingGroup members and recommendationsregarding air dryers appears in thepreamble of the 1998 NPRM. See 63 FR48317–19.

In contrast, the results of the sametesting clearly indicated to FRA thatyard air plants often provideunacceptably high levels of moisturewhile charging the train air brakesystem due to the age of the system,improper design, inadequatemaintenance, or a combination thereof.Working Group task force efforts alsoestimated that upwards of 80 percent oftrain air brake systems are charged usingyard/ground air plants. However, FRAdid not believe that simply requiringyard air sources to be equipped with airdryers would solve or address theproblem. In order for air dryers to beeffective on yard air sources, the airdryers must be properly placed tosufficiently condition the air source.FRA determined that many yard airsources are configured such that a singleair compressor services several branchlines used to charge train air brakesystems; therefore, multiple air dryerswould be required to eliminate theintroduction of moisture into the brakesystem. Consequently, FRA determinedthat requiring yard air sources to beequipped with air dryers would imposea significant and unnecessary costburden on the railroads.



Based on its determination that airdryers would not provide a costeffective or suitable solution, FRAconsidered other viable alternatives. Inthe 1998 NPRM, FRA proposed thateach railroad develop and implement asystem by which it would monitor allyard air sources to ensure that the airsources operate as intended and do notintroduce contaminates into the brakesystem. FRA believed that the proposedmonitoring program provided a methodby which the industry might maximizethe benefits to be realized through airdryer technology, which all partiesacknowledge has been proven to reducethe level of moisture introduced into thetrainline, at a cost that wascommensurate with the potentialbenefits. The proposed monitoringprogram required railroads to takeremedial action with respect to any yardair sources that were found notoperating as intended, and established aretention requirement for records of thedeficient units to facilitate the trackingand resolution of continuing problemareas. FRA also proposed that yard airreservoirs either be equipped with anoperative automatic drain system or bemanually drained at least once each daythat the devices were used or whenmoisture was detected in the system.FRA believed that these proposedprovisions, in concert with assurancesthat condensation is blown from thepipe or hose from which compressed airis taken prior to connecting the yard airline or motive power to the train, ascurrently prescribed in § 232.11(d),would significantly minimize thepossibility of moisture being introducedinto the train air brake system.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA noted therecent issuance of a final rule mandatingthe incorporation of two-way end-of-train telemetry devices (two-way EOTs)on a variety of freight trains, specificallythose operating at speeds of 30 mph orgreater or in heavy grade territories. See62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs providelocomotive engineers with thecapability of initiating an emergencybrake application that commences at therear of the train in the event of ablockage or separation in the train’sbrake pipe that would prevent thepneumatic transmission of theemergency brake application throughoutthe entire train. FRA noted that theissuance of a final rule mandating theuse of these devices was significantparticularly in the context of air sourcerequirements and air dryers. In theunlikely event that the proposedrequirements regarding air sources failto sufficiently eliminate moisture fromthe trainline, and a restriction or

obstruction in the form of ice forms asthe result of the freezing of this moistureduring cold weather operations, thetwo-way EOT device becomes a firstorder safety device and will initiate anemergency application of the brakesfrom the rear of train. Therefore, manyof the concerns associated withmoisture in the trainline freezing in coldweather operations have been alleviatedthrough the incorporation of thistechnology in most freight operations,thus reducing the need or desire tospecifically require air dryers on airsources.

The AAR and its member railroadssubmitted various comments related tothe proposed air source requirements.Although various railroads hadpreviously indicated support for arequirement banning the use of alcoholin train brake system and stated thattheir railroad no longer used alcohol inits operation, they now object to theproposed requirement prohibiting theuse of the such chemicals. Thesecommenters now assert that there areinstances in the industry where alcoholis used to unfreeze frozen trainlines.They contend that railroads should bepermitted to continue this practice inorder to move trains in certaincircumstances and that the need to usealcohol would be rare but necessary.The AAR contends that the use of theterm ‘‘chemical’’ is inappropriate, and,unless there is an alternative, therequirement should be deleted. Theycontend that frozen trainlines are areality and railroads must be providedsome method to deal with suchoccurrences other than waiting for warmweather which could take months.

These commenters also discussed theproposed requirements related thedevelopment and implementation ofmonitoring plans for yard air sources.The AAR contends that the railroadswould need at least five years to complywith the proposed requirements andwould incur costs of $41 million. Thesecommenters object to the requirementfor remedial action when a yard airsource is found to have the ‘‘potential’’of introducing contaminants into theequipment it services. They contendthat such remedial action should berequired only if the yard air sourceactually introduces such contaminants.These commenters also object to therequirement for a detailed assessment ofthe remedial actions taken asunnecessary and believe that therecordkeeping requirements merelyincrease a railroad’s administrativeburden and are merely included asenforcement traps.

Several representatives of rail laborand the NTSB support the proposed

prohibition on the use of alcohol andobject to any allowance of its use. Somelabor representatives suggested that, ifFRA were to allow the use of alcohol,then it needed to reinstate therequirements to perform periodic clean,oil, test, and stencilling (COT&S). Thesecommenters recommend that theprohibition be extended to any deviceproviding air to a train’s brake system.The BRC again asserts that FRA shouldrequire that locomotives and air sourcesbe equipped with air dryers, contendingthat they are the only way to ensure thatmoisture is not introduced into a train’sbrake system. Labor representatives alsoobject to the proposed yard airmonitoring plan requirements,contending that the proposedrequirements fail to specify thefrequency with which yard air sourcesare to be inspected. They recommendthat such inspections should be morefrequent at locations in cold climates.They also suggest that the monitoringplans should be subject to FRA approvalprior to implementation.

FRA Conclusions. The final ruleretains the basic requirements regardingyard air sources and cold weatheroperations that were proposed in the1998 NPRM. The final rule generallyretains the proposed requirementprohibiting the use of chemicals in atrain air brake system. However, FRAagrees that the proposed prohibition ofall chemicals may have been somewhatoverbroad and contrary to FRA’s actualintent. In proposing the prohibition,FRA intended to eliminate the use ofchemicals, such as alcohol, which areknown to degrade the rubber of a train’sbrake system. FRA agrees that there arechemicals that are currently available orthat are in the process of beingdeveloped that do not cause theproblems associated with the use ofalcohol. In fact, FRA believes there areproducts currently available that do notdegrade a brake system’s rubbercomponents like alcohol does. FRAbelieves that several railroads arecurrently testing or using these chemicalalternatives. Consequently, the final ruleslightly modifies the prohibition on theuse of chemicals by imposing theprohibition on chemicals that areknown to degrade or harm brake systemcomponents, such as alcohol.

The final rule also modifies some ofthe requirements related to the proposedyard air source monitoring plans. FRAagrees that the proposed requirementsdid not establish a frequency withwhich inspections of yard air sourcesshould be conducted. In proposing therequirement, FRA hoped that variouscommenters would recommendfrequencies for conducting these



inspections. This did not occur. FRAagrees that a set frequency needs to beestablished that will ensure that yard airsources are inspected in a timelymanner during various climaticconditions. Therefore, the final rulerequires the that yard air sources beinspected at least twice each calendaryear and that two of the inspections beno less than five months apart. FRAintends for this requirement to result inyard air sources being inspected eachyear during two different seasonalperiods.

The final rule also clarifies thatremedial action under the monitoringplans is required only on those yard airsources that are not operating asintended or that are found introducingcontaminants into brake systems. Thus,the final rule removes the word‘‘potential’’ as FRA agrees that theproposed language was unclear and mayhave been over-inclusive. The final rulealso eliminates the requirement forrailroads to conduct a detailedassessment of the remedial actionstaken. FRA agrees that this requirementis unnecessary because railroads will beconducting regular inspections of theyard air sources on which they haveconducted repairs or taken otherremedial action and will be able todetermine if the repairs were effectivethrough those inspections. The finalrule retains the other proposed recordkeeping requirements related to yard airmonitoring plans but clarifies that therecords may be maintained eitherelectronically or in writing. FRAcontinues to believe that these recordsare necessary to ensure that railroads areproperly conducting the requiredinspections and are taking timely andappropriate remedial action when aproblem air source is detected.

The final rule does not containprovisions requiring FRA approval ofthe yard air source monitoring plansprior to their implementation assuggested by some commenters. FRAdoes not have the manpower orresources to review and approve theplan of each railroad and does notbelieve such approval is necessary giventhe specific requirements contained inthe final rule and the records that arerequired to be maintained. The finalrule also does not contain requirementsregarding the use of air dryers on eitherlocomotives or yard air sources. For thereasons noted in the discussion aboveand in the NPRM, FRA believes thatrequiring the use of air dryers on eitherlocomotives or yard air sources wouldimpose a significant cost burden onrailroads and would not necessarilyaddress the problem sought to beresolved. See 63 FR 48317–19. It should

be noted that FRA advocates the use ofair dryers when possible and agrees thatthey have proven effective in reducingthe level of moisture introduced into thebrake system; however, FRA believesthat the railroad is in the best positionto determine where these devices willprovide the greatest benefit based on therailroad’s operation.

FRA is somewhat skeptical of theAAR’s contentions regarding both thetime and the cost necessary toimplement the required yard air sourcemonitoring plans. FRA sees no reasonwhy a railroad would need five years toimplement a plan to inspect each of itsyard air sources twice a year. Thesedevices are used on a fairly regular, ifnot daily, basis and should not be thatdifficult to inspect. Therefore, FRAbelieves that railroads should easily beable to implement these monitoringplans within the three years allowedunder the applicable date provided inthis final rule.

G. Maintenance RequirementsBased on comments received in

response to the 1994 NPRM,deliberations of the RSAC WorkingGroup and task force, and fieldexperience, FRA proposed acomprehensive set of maintenancerequirements which were intended to bea codification of current best practicesoccurring within the industry. Thepreamble to the 1998 NPRM contains adetailed discussion of the issues raised,discussed, and considered prior to theissuance of the NPRM. See 63 FR48320–22.

After consideration of all theinformation and comments submittedprior to the issuance of the 1998 NPRM,FRA remained confident that the ‘‘new’’repair track test and single car test,which have been used industry-widesince January of 1992, are a much betterand more comprehensive method ofdetecting and eliminating defectivebrake equipment and components thanthe old, time-based COT&Srequirements. FRA continued to believethat performance of the repair track andsingle car test significantly reduces thenumber of defective components anddramatically increases the reliability ofbrake equipment. Accordingly, FRAproposed the incorporation of AARInterchange Rule 3 and Chart A into the1998 NPRM, thus codifying the repairtrack air test requirements per Chart A,such that a railroad would be requiredto perform a repair track brake test onfreight cars in any of the following sixcircumstances: (i) When a freight car isremoved from a train due to an air brakerelated defect; (ii) when a freight car hasits brakes cut out when removed from

a train or when placed on a shop orrepair track; (iii) when a freight car is ona repair or shop track for any reason andhas not received a repair track brake testwithin the previous 12 month period;(iv) when a freight car is found withmissing or incomplete repair track braketest information; (v) when the brakereservoir(s), the control valve mountinggasket, and the pipe bracket stud areremoved, repaired, or replaced; or (vi)when a freight car is found with a wheelwith a built-up tread, a slid flat, or athermal crack. FRA also proposed thateach freight car receive a repair track airtest no less frequently than every 5years, and not less than 8 years from thedate the car was built or rebuilt.Similarly, it was proposed that thesingle car test requirements of Chart Abe codified, such that a railroad wouldperform a single car test on a freight carwhen the service portion, the emergencyportion, or the pipe bracket or acombination of such components isremoved, repaired, or replaced.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA recognizedthat circumstances arise where theproposed repair track brake tests orsingle car tests could not always beperformed at the point where repairscan be made that necessitateperformance of the test. To addressthese circumstances, FRA proposed thata car would be allowed to be moved tothe next forward location where the testcould be performed after the necessaryrepairs were conducted. FRA attemptedto make clear that the inability toperform a repair track brake test or asingle car test did not constitute aninability to effectuate the necessaryrepairs. At the same time, however, FRArecognized rail labor’s contention thatsome carriers often attempt tocircumvent the requirements for singlecar and repair track testing through theelimination of repair tracks, by movingcars to ‘‘expediter’’ tracks for repair, orsimply by making the repairs in thefield. As a means to curtail thesepractices, FRA decided to imposeextensive tagging requirements onfreight cars that, due to the nature of thedefective condition(s) detected, requirea repair track brake test or single car testbut that are moved from the locationwhere repairs are performed prior toreceiving the required test. As analternative to the tagging requirements,FRA proposed that railroads bepermitted to utilize an automatedtracking system to monitor these carsand ensure they receive the requisitetests provided the automated system hasbeen approved by FRA. FRA alsoproposed to require stencilling of carswith the location and date of the last



repair track or single car test.Alternatively, FRA proposed thatrailroads could utilize an electronicrecord keeping system to accomplishthis stencilling requirement, providedthe system has been approved by FRA.FRA believed that the proposed taggingand stencilling requirements werenecessary to ensure the timelyperformance of the tests. Without suchinformation, there would be virtually noway for FRA to verify a railroad’scompliance with the proposed repairtrack and single car test requirements.

FRA also proposed variousrequirements related to the testing of thedevices used to perform the single cartests. Similar to the 1994 NPRM, the1998 NPRM again proposed that singlecar testing devices be tested at leastonce a day and receive routinemaintenance at least every 92 days. FRAalso proposed that the mechanical andelectronic test devices be regularlycalibrated.

In the 1998 NPRM, FRA determinedthat any changes to the AAR standardsincorporated into regulation should bereviewed and approved by all affectedparties, including FRA and rail labor.Consequently, FRA proposed a specialapproval process, whereby the AARwould be required to submit anyproposed changes to the FRA. FRAwould review the proposed change todetermine whether the change is‘‘safety-critical.’’ Such proposedchanges include, but are not limited tothe following: (i) Any changes to ChartA, (ii) changes to establishedmaintenance intervals, and (iii) changesto UMLER reporting requirements. If theproposed change was deemed by FRA tobe ‘‘non safety-critical,’’ FRA wouldpermit the change to be implementedimmediately. If the proposed changewas deemed ‘‘safety-critical,’’ FRAwould be required to publish a FederalRegister notice, conduct a publichearing if necessary, and act based onthe information developed andsubmitted in regard to theseproceedings.

FRA proposed the special approvalprocess in response to comments fromseveral railroads and manufacturers thatFRA needed to devise some sort ofquick approval process in order topermit the industry to makemodifications to existing standards orequipment based on the development ofnew technology. Thus, FRA attemptedto propose an approval process itbelieved would speed the process fortaking advantage of new technologiesover that which is currently availableunder the waiver process. However, inorder to provide an opportunity for allinterested parties to provide input for

use by FRA in its decision-makingprocess as required by theAdministrative Procedure Act, FRAdetermined that any special approvalprovision must, at a minimum, provideproper notice to the public of anysignificant change or action beingconsidered by the agency with regard toexisting regulations.

The AAR, its members, and variousprivate car owners and brakemanufacturers submitted numerouscomments regarding the maintenancerequirements proposed in the NPRM.The commenters object to the proposedincorporation of AAR’s Rule 3, Chart A,and the incorporation of specific AARstandards for performing single car andrepair track air brake tests. Theycontend that such incorporation wouldinhibit the ability of the industry todevelop and implement new rules andprocedures that would improve safetyand hinder the ability of the industry toimplement changes that improve brakeperformance. They contend that thecurrent reference to AAR rules issufficient and that oversight by FRA isnot necessary. The AAR notes that therehave been over 25 changes to the AARmaintenance requirements and testprocedures over the last ten years andthat many of these may not have beenaccomplished under the provisionsproposed in the NPRM. The AAR alsonotes that the single car and repair trackstandards cited in the NPRM werechanged in July of 1998 and were beingrevised again in 1999. Thesecommenters recommend that anyprovisions requiring FRA approval ofAAR standards should be eliminated.Alternatively, they recommend thatAAR be permitted to implementchanges subject to FRA revocation basedon a finding that the change does notpromote safety.

In addition to their general objectionsto any incorporation of AARmaintenance standards, thesecommenters provide severalrecommendations in the event that FRAshould decide to retain the proposedrequirements. They recommend thatFRA eliminate the requirement tostencil equipment with the date of thelast single car or repair track air braketest and allow the industry to use theUMLER tracking system to record andmonitor such information. They believethat the industry should be permitted toimplement an automated or electronictracking system without prior FRAapproval. They contend that theindustry has been using the UMLERsystem to track this information foryears and it has proven effective. Theycontend that the automated systemcurrently used is no less secure or

capable of manipulation than a manualstenciling requirement. They contendthat there has been no evidence offalsification on the part of railroadsusing the UMLER system and that itshould be permitted without FRAapproval.

Several railroad representatives alsoobject to the proposed requirement forperforming a repair track air brake testwhenever a car is removed from a trainfor a brake-related defect. They contendthat the way the provision is proposedit would require repair track air braketests whenever minor brake defectsoccur that have no relation to the actualoperation of the brakes. Theyrecommend that the requirement be tiedto cars removed from trains forinoperative brakes as this is the intentof AAR’s Rule 3, Chart A. Thesecommenters also object to the proposedrequirement to perform a set and releaseof the brakes and to check piston travelwhen a car is on a shop or repair track.They contend that AAR no longerrequires this to be performed and assertthat the brake tests required in theproposal are sufficient to determinepiston travel and proper operation of thebrakes. These commenters also contendthat there is no need to retain the badorder tags required for movingequipment for testing because a recordof the repair is maintained for a yearpursuant to AAR rules. They alsorecommend that FRA should not requirebrake repairs at locations where singlecar or repair track tests cannot beperformed. They contend that the test isnecessary to determine the sufficiencyof the repair. They believe that theinability to conduct these test should beconsidered an inability to conduct brakerepairs.

The AAR and certain manufacturersof brake equipment also raise concernsover the proposed requirements relatedto the testing and calibration of devicesused to perform single car and repairtrack air tests. These commentersgenerally object to the inclusion of theserequirements in the proposal as theyhave always been part of AAR standardS–486 and feel they do not belong infederal regulations. These parties alsocontend that the proposed requirementsregarding the testing and calibration ofsingle car test devices are morerestrictive than are currently required.The current existing industryrequirements for testing single car testdevices are based on the date on whichthe device is placed in service. Thus,the time for conducting the 92-day testdoes not begin to run until the deviceis placed in service. They contend thatthe ‘‘in service’’ date allows railroadsflexibility in having spare devices when



a primary device is being serviced assuch a device is generally sent to aspecial location for calibration andcleaning. At a minimum, theyrecommend that the rule permit testingand calibration of single car test devicesbased on the in-service date of thedevice rather than a strict 92-dayrequirement.

Representatives of rail labor supportthe incorporation of AAR standards andcontend that AAR should not beallowed unilateral discretion to changethe incorporated standards. Thesecommenters assert that railroads do notcurrently follow existing AAR standardsand will not do so unless they are madepart of a federal regulation. Thesecommenters recommend that FRAdevelop specific, detailed maintenancerequirements rather than reference AARstandards. They further contend that allmaintenance should be required to beperformed by a carman or at least by aQMI as defined in the NPRM. Thesecommenters object to any type ofautomated tracking system as it issusceptible to abuse and manipulationby railroads.

Certain labor representatives providedspecific comments on the proposedrequirements related to conductingsingle car and repair track air braketests. They recommend that FRAidentify locations where single car andrepair track air brake tests can beperformed to prevent manipulation andcircumvention of the requirements byrailroads. These commenters contendthat only a carman or a QMI should bepermitted to perform a single car orrepair track air brake test. They alsocontend that, since periodic COT&S hasbeen eliminated, the need to conductfrequent repair track and single car testsis much greater in order to ensure theproper operation of the brakeequipment. They assert that theintervals for conducting these tests needto be increased over those proposed andrecommend that each car receive arepair track air brake every year and asingle car test every four years.

FRA Conclusions. Although the finalrule retains many of the proposedmaintenance requirements, severalmodifications have been made in thisfinal rule in response to commentsreceived and based upon the currentbest practices occurring within theindustry. FRA agrees that the proposedincorporation of AAR Rule 3, Chart A,is unnecessary as it would remove thedetermination of when certainmaintenance is performed from thediscretion of the railroads, and wouldmake it difficult for railroads to changethe requirements related to theperformance of that maintenance. FRA

believes that a railroad is in the bestposition to determine when and whereit will perform various maintenance onits equipment and should not have itshands tied in this area by overlyprescriptive federal requirements.Furthermore, FRA’s primary intentwhen proposing incorporation of AARRule 3, Chart A, was to codify theexisting requirements for performingsingle car and repair track air brake testsand eliminate the right of the industryto unilaterally change the frequency andmethod of performing these tests. As thefinal rule retains the requirements forwhen and how these tests are to becompleted and retains certaininspections that are to be performedwhen equipment is on a shop or repairtrack, FRA believes that it isunnecessary to incorporate everymaintenance procedure covered inAAR’s Rule 3, Chart A. Consequently,the final rule does not incorporateAAR’s Rule 3, Chart A, and continues toallow railroads some flexibility indetermining appropriate maintenancepractices.

Contrary to the assertions of somecommenters, FRA continues to believethat certain maintenance procedures arecritical to ensuring the safe and properoperation of the brake equipment on thenation’s fleet of freight cars. FRA doesnot believe that the determination ofwhat maintenance should be performedshould be left solely to the discretion ofthe railroads operating the equipment inall circumstances. As periodic COT&Smaintenance has been eliminated andreplaced with the performance of singlecar and repair track tests, which FRAagrees is a better and morecomprehensive method of detectingdefective brake equipment andcomponents, FRA believes that specificand determinable limits must be placedon the manner and frequency in whichthese tests are performed. Therefore, thefinal rule retains the proposedrequirements regarding the performanceof single car and repair track tests.

FRA recognizes that the proceduresfor performing single car and repairtrack tests proposed in the NPRM havebeen modified by the AAR since theissuance of the proposal. As it is FRA’sintent to incorporate the most recentversion of the single car and repair trackair brake test procedures, the final ruleincorporates the test procedures thatwere issued by the AAR in April of1999. FRA recognizes that the industrymay find it necessary to modify the testprocedures from time to time in order toaddress new equipment or utilize newtechnology. Thus, the final rule permitsrailroads to seek approval of alternativeprocedures through the special approval

process contained in the final rule. Thespecial approval process is intended tospeed FRA’s consideration of a party’srequest to utilize an alternativeprocedure from the one identified in therule itself. FRA believes that it isessential for FRA to approve any changemade in the procedures for conductingthese safety-critical tests in order toprevent unilateral changes and to ensureconsistency in the method in which thetests are performed.

It should be noted that theincorporated procedures for performingsingle car and repair track air brake testsare the minimum requirements forperforming such tests. The specialapproval process is required to be usedonly if the incorporated procedures areto be changed in some manner. Forinstance, if the industry were to elect toadd a new test protocol to theincorporated procedures, there wouldbe no need to seek approval of such anaddition as long as the procedurescontained in the incorporated standardare still maintained. This final rule isnot intended to prevent railroads fromvoluntarily adopting additional or morestringent maintenance standardsprovided they are consistent with thestandards incorporated.

The final rule also modifies one of theproposed conditions for when a repairtrack air brake test would be required tobe performed. FRA agrees that theproposed requirement to perform arepair track air brake test on any carremoved from a train for a brake-relateddefect is overly restrictive andinconsistent with the requirements ofAAR’s Rule 3, Chart A. FRA agrees thatthe proposed requirement would requirethe performance of the test when minorbrake system repairs are conducted,which is not the intent of the AAR’srule. Therefore, the final rule modifiesthe proposed condition to require theperformance of a repair track test oncars that have inoperative or cut-out airbrakes when removed from a train.

The final rule also modifies theproposed requirements regarding theuse of an automated tracking system inlieu of stenciling equipment with thedate and location of the last single caror repair track test received. Since 1992,the industry has utilized the AAR’sUMLER reporting system toelectronically track the performance ofsingle car and repair track air brake testas well as other repair information.Based on the performance and use ofthis system over the last seven years,FRA believes that the AAR’s UMLERsystem has proven itself effective fortracking the information required in thisfinal rule and ensuring the timelyperformance of single car and repair



track air brake tests. Furthermore, FRAcontinues to believe that theinformation required to be tracked withregard to these tests is easily maintainedthrough an electronic medium.Moreover, FRA has found nosubstantiated instances of railroadsfalsifying or altering the informationmonitored and tracked by AAR’sUMLER system. Thus, the final rulepermits railroad to utilize an electronicrecord keeping system to track single carand repair track air brake tests withoutobtaining prior FRA approval of thesystem. The final rule makes clear thatFRA will monitor the performance ofsuch systems and retains the right torevoke a railroad’s authority to utilizethe system if FRA finds that it is notproperly secure, inaccessible to FRA ora railroad’s employees, or fails toproperly or adequately track andmonitor the equipment.

The final rule does not increase theproposed frequency at which the singlecar or repair track air brake tests are tobe performed as recommended by somecommenters. As noted above, theprimary intent of the proposedprovisions was to codify the existingrequirements regarding the performanceof single car and repair track air braketests and prevent any unilateral changesto those requirements. FRA believes thatthe frequency at which these tests arecurrently required to be performedunder industry standards has proven tobe sufficient and a substantial economicburden would be imposed if thefrequency were increased. The final rulealso retains the requirement that thesetests be conducted by a qualifiedperson. FRA believes that the personperforming these tests must bespecifically trained and tested on howthe test is to be performed and be ableto determine the appropriate actionsthat must be taken based on the resultsof the test. FRA does not believe that themere fact that a person is a carman ora QMI is sufficient to consider thatperson qualified to perform single car orrepair track air brake tests. FRA believesthat the training requirements containedin this final rule ensure that a persondeemed qualified to perform these testshas been specifically trained and testedon the performance of the tests prior tobeing considered qualified.

The final rule also retains theproposed provisions permitting cars tobe moved from a location wherenecessary repairs are made to a locationwhere a single car or repair track airbrake test can be performed if it cannotbe performed at the same location wherethe repairs are conducted. FRAdisagrees with the assertion that airbrake repairs should not be required at

locations that lack the ability to performsingle car or repair track air brake tests.FRA believes that position is not onlycontrary to the statutory mandatesregarding the movement of equipmentwith defective brakes but would openthe door to potential abuse by railroads.Furthermore, the operation of a car’sbrake system can generally be testedafter a repair without performing acomplete repair track air brake test. Forthe most part, single car and repair trackair brake tests are intended to bemaintenance requirements that attachbased on a condition in which a car isfound or on a repair that is required tobe performed. If the condition of a caris such that a repair track air brake testis necessary to determine the defect,then the final rule would permitmovement of the car to the nearestlocation where a repair track air braketest can be performed. However, FRAbelieves that most defective conditionscan be easily determined withoutperforming a repair track air brake test.Moreover, for years FRA has requiredthe performance of repairs where theycan be performed and has allowed suchequipment to be moved to the nextforward location for performance of asingle car or repair track air brake testand has not found that such a practicehas created any potential safety hazard.

The final rule retains the proposedrequirements for tagging equipmentwhich is being hauled for theperformance of a single car or repairtrack air brake test after the appropriaterepairs have been conducted. FRAbelieves that the tags are necessary notonly to provide notice to a railroad’sground forces as to the presence of thecar but to ensure that railroads areproperly performing the tests atappropriate locations. Furthermore,many railroads currently moveequipment in this fashion, and there hasbeen no indication that safety has beencompromised. The final rule also retainsthe requirement that a copy or record ofthe tag be retained for 90 days and madeavailable to FRA upon request. Contraryto the objections of some commenters,FRA continues to believe that the recordkeeping requirements are necessary sothat there is accountability on the partof the railroads to conduct these tests atthe proper locations and that equipmentis not moved for extended periodswithout receiving its requiredmaintenance. It should be noted that thefinal rule clarifies that the record orcopy of the tag may be maintainedeither electronically or in writingprovided all the required information isrecorded. The final rule does not defineor require identification of locations that

can or will perform single car or repairtrack air brake tests as suggested bysome commenters. FRA does not believethat such a requirement is necessary asthe rule specifically establishes whenthe tests are to be performed and it isin the railroad’s best interests to performthe tests in a timely manner.

The final rule retains the proposedprovisions requiring certain tests andinspections to be performed whenever acar is on a shop or repair track.Although the AAR asserts that it didaway with the requirements to performa set and release of the brakes and adjustpiston travel on all cars on repair orshop tracks, the requirements arecurrently contained in power brakeregulations separate and apart from anyAAR requirements. See 49 CFR232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv). FRA believes thatrepair and shop tracks provide an idealsetting for railroads to conduct anindividualized inspection on a car’sbrake system to ensure its properoperation and that such an inspection isnecessary to reduce the potential of carswith excessive piston travel beingoverlooked when employees areperforming the ordinary brakeinspections required by this final rule.If any problems are detected at thatlocation, the personnel needed to makeany necessary corrections are alreadypresent. Furthermore, performing theseinspections at this time ensures properoperation of the cars’ brakes andeliminates the potential of having to cutcars out of an assembled train and, thus,should reduce inspection times andmake for more efficient operations.

The final rule adds two items to theinspections that are to be conductedwhen a car is on a shop or repair track.They are an inspection of a car’s handbrake and an inspection of the accuracyand operation of any brake indicators oncars so equipped. The final rule doesnot provide for the specific inspectionof these items during any of the otherrequired brake tests. Consequently, FRAbelieves this is an ideal time for therailroad to inspect these items whileimposing the least burden on therailroad’s inspection and repair forces.

As the final rule requires that certaininspections and tests be performedwhen a car is on a shop or repair trackand because a repair track air brake testis required to be performed when a caris on a repair track and such a test hasnot been performed within the lasttwelve months, FRA believes it isnecessary to clarify what constitutes ashop or repair track. This issue hasbecome more prevalent over the last fewyears due to the growing use of mobilerepair trucks and due to therequirements for conducting repair track



air brake tests. For years, many railroadshave conducted minor repairs on trackscalled ‘‘expedite tracks.’’ Generally, thetypes of repairs that were performed onthese tracks were minor repairs thatcould be made quickly with a limitedamount of equipment, and neither therailroads or FRA considered the tracksto be repair tracks. However, recentlyrailroads have started performingvirtually every type of repair on theseexpedite tracks. These tracks are nolonger limited to minor repairs but arebeing used to perform heavy, complexrepairs that require the jacking of entirecars or the disassembly and replacementof major portions of a car’s truck orbrake system. At many locations theseexpedite tracks are positioned next tooperative repair shops. Furthermore,several railroads have closed previouslyexisting repair shop facilities and arenow using fully equipped mobile repairtrucks to perform the same type ofrepairs that were previously performedin the shop or on established repairtracks and are attempting to call thetracks serviced by these mobile repairtrucks ‘‘expedite tracks.’’ Thus, the linebetween what constitutes a repair orshop track and what constitutes an‘‘expedite track’’ has become unclear, ifnot, nonexistent.

FRA believes that the operationalchanges, noted above, are partly anattempt by the railroads to circumventthe requirements that currently applywhen a car is on a shop or repair track.Currently, if a car is on a shop or repairtrack, it must have its brakes inspected,under 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv), andthe car is to receive a repair track airbrake test if it has not received one inthe last twelve months under AAR Rule3, Chart A. Some railroads contend thatan expedite track is not a repair or shoptrack; therefore, the requirements of§ 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv) do not apply. FRAfinds this interpretation to beunacceptable and believes that railroadsare abusing the concept of expeditetracks to avoid performing requiredmaintenance. Therefore, the industry’sown actions have caused the need forFRA to clarify what constitutes a shopor repair track. Consequently, the finalrule includes a definition of what FRAwill consider to be repair or shop tracksrequiring the performance of certaintests and inspections.

The final rule makes clear that FRAwill consider certain tracks to be repairor shop tracks based on the types ofrepairs that are made on the tracks, notnecessarily the designation given by arailroad. The definition in the final rulealso makes clear that it is the nature ofthe repairs being conducted on a certaintrack that is the determining factor not

whether a mobile repair truck is beingused to make the repairs. Due to theability of mobile repair trucks to makevirtually any type of repair necessaryand due to their growing use, FRA doesnot believe that tracks regularly andcontinually serviced by these types ofvehicles should be excepted from thedefinition of a repair track. FRA believesthat if a track is designated by therailroad as an ‘‘expedite’’ track (i.e., onewhere minor repairs will be conducted)then the railroad should ensure thatonly cars needing minor repairs bedirected to that track for repair. Thefinal rule does not eliminate the conceptof expedite tracks but limits the use ofsuch tracks to those types of repairs thatare truly minor in nature and thatrequire a limited amount of equipmentto perform. At locations where arailroad conducts repairs of all types,either with fixed facilities or withmobile repair trucks, FRA would expectthe railroad to designate certain trackageat the location as repair tracks andcertain trackage as ‘‘expedite tracks’’where only minor repairs would beconducted. In such circumstances, FRAwould expect railroads to direct cars inneed of heavier repairs, the kind thathave been traditionally performed on ashop or repair track, to be directed totrackage designated at the location as arepair track.

The final rule places the burden onthe railroad to designate those tracks itwill consider repair tracks at locationswhere it performs both minor and heavyrepairs, and makes the railroadresponsible for directing the equipmentin need of repair to the appropriatetrackage. If the railroad determines thatrepairs of a heavy nature will beperformed on certain trackage, then thetrack should be treated as a repair track,and any car repaired on that trackageshould be provided the attentionrequired by this final rule for cars on ashop or repair track. Further, if arailroad determines that minor repairswill be performed on certain trackage,then the railroad bears the burden ofensuring that only cars needing minorrepairs are directed to that trackage. Ifthe railroad fails to adequatelydistinguish the tracks performing minorrepairs from those tracks performingheavy repairs or improperly performsheavy repairs on a track designated asan ‘‘expedite track,’’ then the railroadwill be required to treat all cars on thetrackage at the time that the heavyrepairs are being conducted as thoughthey are on a repair or shop track.

It should be noted that the issue ofwhat constitutes a repair or shop trackfor the purposes of 49 CFR232.17(a)(2)(ii) and (iv) is completely

separate and distinct from the issue ofwhether a location is a location wherenecessary repairs can be performed forpurposes of 49 U.S.C. 20303. Althoughan outlying location might beconsidered a location where certainbrake repairs can be conducted, thatdoes not mean the track where thoserepairs are performed should beconsidered a repair track. FRA does notintend for trackage located at outlyinglocations or sidings which areoccasionally or even regularly servicedby mobile repair trucks to be consideredrepair tracks. FRA believes that repair orshop tracks should exist at locationsthat have fixed repair facilities and atlocations where repairs of all types areperformed on a regular and consistentbasis regardless of whether the repairsare performed in fixed facilities or bymobile repair vehicles.

The final rule also modifies some ofthe proposed provisions regarding thetesting and calibration of single car testdevices and other mechanical devicesused to perform single car and repairtrack air brake tests. FRA’s intent whenproposing the requirements was tocodify the current best practices of theindustry. Thus, FRA did not intend topropose testing and calibrationrequirements that were more stringentthat those currently imposed by AARstandards. Therefore, FRA agrees thatthe testing and calibration requirementsfor single car test devices should not beimposed until the devices are actuallyplaced in service, which is consistentwith current AAR requirements. FRArecognizes that the proposed calibrationand testing requirements may haveresulted the unnecessary acquisition ofsingle car testing devices. Consequently,the final rule makes clear that the 92-day and the 365-day requirementsrelated to single car test devices are tobe calculated from the day on which thedevice is first placed in service.

III. Section-by-Section Analysis

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 229

The amendments to part 229contained in this final rule concern thetesting of electronic gauges commonlyused in electronically controlledlocomotive brake systems. Currently,there are two electronically controlledlocomotive brake systems in use on thenation’s railroads, the Electro-Pneumatic Integrated Control (EPIC)system supplied by Westinghouse AirBrake Company and the ComputerControlled Brake (CCB) systemdeveloped by New York Air BrakeCompany. At this time, there arethousands of locomotives in service that



are equipped with either the CCBsystem or the EPIC system.

The final rule retains the proposedrequirements extending the testingcycles for the electronic gauges used inthese types of locomotive brake systems.The final rule retains the proposedincrease of the testing interval for theseelectronic gauges from 92 days to oneyear. Although certain laborrepresentatives objected to the proposedincrease in the testing interval,contending that the interval should bereduced due to problems encounteredby numerous locomotive engineers, FRAcontinues to believe that technologyincorporated into the electronic gaugesused in these locomotive brake systemshas significantly increased theirreliability over standard mechanicalgauges. Furthermore, the objectionsraised were not based on the properoperation or performance of theelectronic gauges.

The lengthening of the testing intervalfor these gauges is based onrecommendations made by a committeeformed to address issues related to theoperation of electronically controlledlocomotive brake systems as well as thetraining of those individuals using thisnew technology. In May of 1996, theRSAC Working Group decided to forma task force to consider issues related toelectronically controlled locomotivebrake systems. Rather than create anentirely new task force, the WorkingGroup assigned the task to a group ofindividuals who were members of thepreviously established ‘‘NewTechnology Joint InformationCommittee.’’ This task force, comprisedof representatives from the railroadindustry, rail labor, air brakemanufacturers, and locomotivemanufacturers, addressed several issuesrelated to these braking systemsincluding: design; training; inspectionand testing; and maintenance. The taskforce concluded that additionalregulation of these types of locomotivebraking systems was unnecessary sincethe current regulations or waiverssufficiently address the training,inspection, and maintenance of thesesystems and any additional designrequirement would most likely notenhance safety and would probablyrestrict the advancement of newtechnology. The task forcerecommended that part 229 be revisedto increase the testing interval for theseelectronic gauges from 92 days to anannual cycle. The task force based thisrecommendation on its finding that theelectronic gauges used in these brakesystem are much more reliable thanstandard mechanical gauges due to thefollowing: the electronic components

have longer life cycles than those inmechanical gauges; the accuracy anddurability of the transducer have beenextended; and internal computerdiagnostics detect inaccuracies beforegauges becoming defective under federalregulations. FRA continues to agreewith these findings and has retained theproposed extension in this final rule.

The final rule does not include theproposed requirement that locomotivecompressors be tested for capacity byorifice test during the annual testrequired by § 229.27. FRA agrees thatthe requirement for orifice testing oflocomotive air compressors waseliminated from part 229 in 1980. See45 FR 21097. At that time, FRA foundthat such a test was not useful indetecting a bad compressor and, thus,found no reason to retain therequirement. Although the requirementto perform orifice testing remained in§ 232.10(c), FRA’s elimination of therequirement from part 229 rendered theprovision in part 232 meaningless. Asno railroad has performed orifice testingsince 1980 and because FRA is notaware of any safety hazard being createddue to the elimination of such testing,FRA agrees that there is no justificationfor reinstating the requirement toperform such testing.

Amendments to 49 CFR Part 231The final rule retains the proposed

clarifying changes in the applicabilitysection of this part. FRA received nocomments objecting to the proposedmodifications. The changes are intendedto make the regulatory exceptionsconsistent with the exceptionscontained in the statute. The addedexceptions are taken directly from 49U.S.C. 20301 (previously codified at 45U.S.C. 6). It is noted that the words‘‘freight and other non-passenger’’ havebeen added to the exceptions in order toremain consistent with Congress’ intentwhen the statutory exceptions werecreated. At the time that Congressprovided an exception from therequirements of the Safety ApplianceActs, Congress did not and could notenvision that the equipment used inthese operations would be modified forthe purposes of hauling passengers,which FRA has discovered with regardto four-wheel coal cars. Consequently,the final rule makes clear that FRA willexcept only freight operations or othernon-passenger operations that employthe types of equipment contained inthese amendments.

The final rule also retains theproposed movement of the provisionsrelated to drawbars from part 232,where they are currently contained, tothis part. FRA believes that part 231 is

a more logical place for the drawbarprovisions to be located as they are nota brake system component but a genericsafety appliance. Although the final ruleadopts the drawbar provisions asproposed, the changes made to thelanguage of those provisions whenproposed in the NPRM were for clarityand readability and were not intendedto change any of the basic drawbarrequirements contained in part 232.

49 CFR Part 232

Subpart A—General

Section 232.1 Purpose and ScopeParagraph (a) contains a formal

statement of the final rule’s purpose andscope. FRA intends the final rule tocover all brake systems and brakecomponents used in all freight trainoperations and all other non-passengertrain operations.

Paragraph (b) contains the dates uponwhich railroads covered by this partwill be required to comply with therequirements contained in this finalrule. FRA recognizes theinterrelationship between the propertraining of railroad personnel andimplementation of many of theinspection, testing, and maintenancerequirements contained in the final rule.FRA realizes that in order for railroadsto comply with many of therequirements related to the inspection,testing, and maintenance of equipmentand the requirements regarding themovement of defective equipment, therailroad and its contractors must first beprovided sufficient time to assess itscurrent training program and developand implement a training programconsistent with the requirements of thispart. The railroad or contractor thenneeds time to provide the necessarytraining to its employees withoutcausing manpower shortages in itsoperations. FRA also recognizes that thecosts of the training requirements aresomewhat substantial and may preventa railroad or contractor from completingthe necessary training in a short periodof time. Therefore, this final ruleprovides railroads and contractors withthree years to develop and implementthe required training. This period isconsistent with the time requested bythe AAR and other railroads. It is alsoconsistent with the requirement toprovide refresher training at least everythree years and will allow a railroad orcontractor to have one-third of itsinspection forces receive the necessaryrefresher training each year after theinitial training period is complete.Consequently, FRA will requirecompliance with all the requirementscontained in § 232.15, subpart B,



subpart C, and subpart F of this finalrule at the conclusion of the three-yearperiod provided for conducting therequired training.

This paragraph makes clear that themaintenance requirements contained insubpart D will become applicable to allrailroads to which this part appliesapproximately six months after theissuance of this final rule. Virtually allof the requirements contained in thissubpart are existing regulatoryrequirements or prevailing industrypractice, and FRA sees no reason tosignificantly delay theirimplementation. FRA notes that thissubpart requires certain tasks to beperformed by a ‘‘qualified person’;however, FRA will not subject railroadsto the qualification and trainingrequirements contained in this final rulefor individuals performing these tasksuntil the conclusion of the three-yearperiod provided for conducting therequired training.

This paragraph also clarifies that thegeneral provisions contained in subpartA of this final rule regardingapplicability, definitions, waivers,responsibility for compliance, penalties,preemptive effect, special approvalprocedures, availability of records, andinformation collection will becomeapplicable approximately sixty daysafter the issuance of this final rule. Dueto the enforcement implicationsconnected with these provisions, it isboth necessary and desirable to have theprovisions become applicable as quicklyas possible.

This paragraph also makes clear thatthe requirements related to end-of-traindevices contained in subpart E becomeapplicable to all trains operating ontrack which is part of the general systemof transportation approximately sixtydays after issuance of the final rule. Asthe requirements related to thesedevices have existed for a number ofyears and because this final rulemodifies those requirement to a verylimited extent, FRA believes thatrailroads should have no problemcomplying with the requirements in thissubpart in the period of time provided.Furthermore, the requirementscontained in this subpart apply to bothfreight and passenger trains that operateon the general system of transportationand are not contingent on theperformance of additional training.

FRA also recognizes that there arecertain aspects of this final rule thatprovide operational flexibility to therailroads. Due to this flexibility, FRAbelieves that some railroads will desirethe authority to comply with the finalrule as soon as their employees havebeen properly trained. Therefore,

paragraph (c) contains a provisionwhich allows a railroad to notify FRA inwriting that it is willing to begincompliance with the requirements of thefinal rule sometime earlier than thethree years provided. However, FRAwishes to make clear that it does notintend for railroads to take advantage ofthe flexibility provided under some ofthe provisions of the final rule unlessthe railroad is willing to comply with allthe requirements contained in the finalrule.

Paragraph (d) of this section clarifiesthat any railroad that operates on thegeneral railroad system of transportationthat is not operating pursuant to therequirements contained in this final ruleor the requirements contained in thePassenger Equipment Safety Standardsat 49 CFR part 238, shall continue tocomply with the requirementscontained in part 232 as it existed priorto the issuance of this final rule, whichhave been moved to Appendix B of thenew part 232. Thus, a railroad willcontinue to be subject to the existinginspection, testing, and maintenanceprovisions contained in part 232 untilthe railroad is required to operate underthe provisions of this final rule (i.e.three years for most requirements) oruntil the railroad voluntarily commits tooperate under the provisions of thisfinal rule, whichever comes first. FRAalso intends for operations and trainswhich currently operate under theexisting part 232 to continue to operatepursuant to those provisions if theoperation is not addressed by either thisfinal rule or part 238. It should be notedthat FRA does not intend to extend thecoverage of part 232 beyond the types ofoperations that are currently subject tothe requirements of part 232. Thus, FRAhas explicitly excluded railroads thatoperate only on track inside aninstallation that is not part of thegeneral railroad system oftransportation, rapid transit operationsthat are not connected with the generalsystem, and operations specificallyexcluded by statute.

Section 232.3 ApplicabilityAs a general matter, paragraph (a) of

this section establishes that this finalrule applies to all railroads that operatefreight or other non-passenger trainservice on standard gage track which ispart of the general railroad system oftransportation. In paragraph (b) of thissection, FRA makes clear that subpart Eof this final rule applies to all trains thatoperate on the general system regardlessof whether the train is a freight orpassenger train, unless it is specificallyexcepted by the provisions contained insubpart E. Subpart E contains the

requirements regarding the use of two-way end-of-train devices which wereissued on January 2, 1997 and becameeffective on July 1, 1997. Although thefinal rule contains some minor changesto these requirements, principally forclarification, the provisions containedin Subpart E are very similar to theexisting requirements.

Paragraph (c) of this section containsa listing of those operations andequipment to which FRA does notintend this final rule to apply. Theseinclude: rapid transit operations notconnected to the general system;commuter, intercity, and other short-haul passenger operations; and tourist,scenic, historic, or excursion operations.In 1994, FRA issued a power brakeNPRM in which FRA attempted to drafta proposal covering all railroadoperations. FRA received a multitude ofcomments suggesting that similartreatment of passenger and freightoperations was not a viable approachdue to the significant differences in theoperating environment and equipmentused in these operations. Based on thesecomments, FRA decided to separatepassenger and freight operations andFRA recently addressed the power brakeissues related to passenger andcommuter operations in a separate finalrule specifically tailored to those typesof operations. See 64 FR 25540.Similarly, the Federal Railroad SafetyAuthorization Act of 1994 directs FRAto examine the unique circumstances oftourist and historic railroads whenestablishing safety regulations. The Act,which amended 49 U.S.C. 20103, statesthat:

In prescribing regulations that pertain torailroad safety that affect tourist, historic,scenic, or excursion railroad carriers, theSecretary of Transportation shall take intoconsideration any financial, operational, orother factors that may be unique to suchrailroad carriers. The Secretary shall submita report to Congress not later than September30, 1995, on actions taken under thissubsection.

Pub. L. 103–440, § 217, 108 Stat. 4619,4624, November 2, 1994.

In response to this mandate, FRAsubmitted a report to Congress on June11, 1996, outlining FRA’s efforts totailor its rail safety requirements totourist, historic, scenic, and excursionrailroads. Notably, FRA has establisheda Tourist and Historic RailroadsWorking Group formed under RSAC tospecifically address the applicability ofFRA’s regulations to these unique typesof operations. Consequently, anyrequirements issued by FRA for thesetypes of operations will be part of aseparate rulemaking proceeding.However, this final rule makes clear that



the provisions of part 232 as theyexisted prior to this issuance of this rulewill continue to apply to suchoperations that are currently required tocomply with the requirements in orderto avoid regulatory gaps while powerbrake provisions for such service arefinalized. Part 232 as it existed prior tothe issuance of this final rule iscontained as appendix B to this newpart 232.

Similar to the amendments made topart 231, paragraphs (c)(6)–(c)(8) of thissection also contain the expressexceptions currently contained in thestatute for certain coal cars and loggingcars. These provisions are intended tomake the regulatory exceptionsconsistent with the exceptionscontained in the statute. The exceptionsare taken directly from 49 U.S.C. 20301(previously codified at 45 U.S.C. 6). Aswas done in these amendments to part231, the words ‘‘freight and other non-passenger trains’’ have been added tothe exceptions in order to remainconsistent with Congress’ intent whenthe statutory exceptions were created.At the time that Congress created anexception from the requirements of theSafety Appliance Acts, Congress did notand could not envision that theequipment used in these operationswould be modified for the purposes ofhauling passengers, which FRA hasdiscovered with regard to four-wheelcoal cars. Consequently, FRA will onlyexcept freight and other non-passengeroperations which employ the types ofequipment contained in theseamendments.

Paragraph (d) of this section revokesthe Interstate Commerce CommissionOrder 13528, of May 30, 1945, asamended (codified in existing § 232.3and appendix B to part 232), andcodifies some of the relevant provisionsof that Order. Thus, paragraph (d) of thissection contains a list of pieces ofequipment that were excepted from theOrder’s specifications and requirementsfor operating power-brake systems forfreight service. FRA believes that theOrder is no longer completely relevantor necessary and believes that therelevant provisions should beincorporated into this section. Inaddition, FRA references currentindustry standards containingperformance specifications for freightpower brakes in other portions of thisfinal rule which mirror the provisionscontained in the Order. FRA notes thatlocomotives were removed from thelisting as this final rule contains variousrequirements which addresslocomotives.

It should be noted that paragraph (a)of this section contains a specific

reference to private cars and circustrains. As private cars are designed tocarry passengers and are generallyhauled in both freight and passengertrains, FRA intends that these types ofcars be covered by both the recentlyissued Passenger Equipment SafetyStandards and this final rule. Forexample, these types of cars will besubject to the maintenance andequipment standards applicable topassenger equipment but will becovered by the inspection requirementscontained in this final rule when hauledin a freight train. With regard to circustrains, FRA intends for these operationsto be covered by this final rule due tothe unique nature of this equipment andoperations. Although a circus traincarries some employees, the majority ofthe train is composed of freight-typeequipment and is operated in a mannersimilar to a freight train. Thus, forconsistency purposes, FRA intends thatthis final rule apply to circus trainoperations.

Section 232.5 DefinitionsThis section contains an extensive set

of definitions. FRA intends thesedefinitions to clarify the meaning ofimportant terms as they are used in thetext of the final rule. The definitions arecarefully worded in an attempt tominimize the potential formisinterpretation of the rule. The finalrule retains most of the definitionsproposed in the NPRM; however, basedon the comments received a few newdefinitions have been added and otherdefinitions previously included in theNPRM have been slightly modified forclarity. Several of the definitionsintroduce new concepts or newterminologies which require furtherdiscussion. The following discussion isarranged in the order in which thedefinitions appear in the rule text.

‘‘Brake indicator’’ means a device,actuated by brake cylinder pressure,which indicates whether brakes areapplied or released on a car. The use ofbrake indicators in the performance ofbrake tests is a controversial subject.Rail labor organizations correctlymaintain that brake indicators are notfully reliable indicators of brakeapplication and release on each car inthe train. Further, railroads correctlymaintain that reliance on brakeindicators is necessary becauseinspectors cannot always safely observebrake application and release. FRAbelieves that brake indicators can servean important role in the performance ofbrake tests, particularly in thoseinstances where the design of theequipment requires inspectors to placethemselves in potentially dangerous

position in order to observe the brakeactuation or release.

The definition of ‘‘effective brake’’ hasbeen slightly modified from thedefinition proposed in the NPRM. Themodification clarifies that a car’s airbrake will not be considered effective ifits piston travel exceeds the specifiedlimits or if it is not capable of producingits designed retarding force. FRAbelieves this clarifying language isnecessary to address the concerns raisedby certain commenters regarding thedefinitions of ‘‘bind’’ and ‘‘foul’’contained in this final rule. Thedefinitions of ‘‘bind’’ and ‘‘foul’’ havebeen retained as proposed in the NPRM.Contrary to the assertions made by somecommenters, FRA believes that thedefinitions are sufficiently clear. Certaincommenters contend that the definitionsof these terms fail to address everypossible condition that could affect theproper operation of a brake system. FRAbelieves that the conditions noted byseveral commenters as not beingcovered by these definitions aresufficiently covered by the clarifieddefinition of ‘‘effective brake’’ containedin this final rule. Thus, even though acondition may not cause a brake to‘‘bind’’ or ‘‘foul’’ the condition wouldcause the brake not to be an ‘‘effectivebrake’’ as defined in the final rule.Furthermore, FRA does not believe thatthe definitions of ‘‘bind’’ or ‘‘foul’’ areoverly broad, as suggested by somecommenters, since the restrictionsaddressed are ones which affect theintended movement of a component.Therefore, if the restriction is one thatdoes not restrict the component’sintended movement, then it should notbe considered to ‘‘bind’’ or ‘‘foul.’’

The final rule also includes adefinition of ‘‘inoperative dynamicbrake’’ which was not specificallycontained in the NPRM. This definitionhas been added in response tocomments that the term ‘‘ineffectivedynamic brake’’ contained in the NPRMwas unclear and could lead to potentialmisunderstandings. These commenterscontended that the rule should use theterm ‘‘inoperative dynamic brake’’ andthat its definition should be consistentwith the definition of ‘‘inoperativebrake.’’ FRA agrees with thesecomments and thus, the final rulereplaces the term ‘‘ineffective dynamicbrakes’’ with the term ‘‘inoperativedynamic brake.’’ The term ‘‘inoperativedynamic brake’’ means any dynamicbrake that no longer provides itsdesigned retarding force on the train, forwhatever reason. FRA agrees that theuse of only this term clarifies theapplicability of the requirements related



to dynamic brakes and preventspotential misunderstandings.

The final rule also defines the term‘‘initial terminal’’ to mean the locationwhere a train is originally assembled.This definition is consistent with thedefinition contained in the existingpower brake regulations. Furthermore,the final rule eliminates the term ‘‘pointof origin’’ proposed in the NPRM. FRAagrees that the proposed definition ofthis term was duplicative of the term‘‘initial terminal’’ and merely createdpotential misunderstandings. Moreover,FRA agrees that the problems attemptedto be addressed by the use of this termare sufficiently addressed by the variousinspections required in this final rulewhen adding cars to a train.

The concept of ‘‘ordered date’’ or‘‘date ordered’’ is vital to the correctapplication of this final rule. The termsmean the date on which notice toproceed is given by a procuring railroadto a contractor or supplier for newequipment. Some of the provisions ofthe final rule apply only to newlyconstructed equipment. When FRAapplies a requirement only toequipment ordered on or after aspecified date or placed in service forthe first time on or after a specified date,FRA intends to exempt from therequirement, or ‘‘grandfather’’ any pieceof equipment that is both ordered andplaced in service for the first time beforethat date. FRA believes this approachwill allow railroads to minimize, oravoid altogether, any costs associatedwith changing existing purchase ordersand yet limit the delay in realizing thesafety benefits of the requirementscontained in this final rule.

The definitions of ‘‘qualified person’’and ‘‘qualified mechanical inspector’’are vital to understanding theinspection, testing, and maintenanceprovisions contained in this final rule.In order to ensure a properunderstanding of these terms, the finalrule clarifies FRA’s intent regarding thenecessary training these individuals areto receive and further clarifies thedesignation of such individuals.Although FRA disagrees with theassertions of some commenters that a‘‘qualified person’’ should only be ableto perform a limited number of tasksrequired by this final rule, FRA doesagree that the definition of ‘‘qualifiedperson’’ contained in the NPRM wasoverly vague and was susceptible toabuse and misunderstanding. Therefore,this final rule modifies the definition ofa ‘‘qualified person’’ in order to morefully develop what is required by arailroad when designating a person asqualified to perform a particular task.

The definition of ‘‘qualified person’’contained in this final rule makes clearthat the person is to receive trainingpursuant to the training, qualification,and designation program required under§ 232.203. The definition also makesclear that although a person may bedeemed a ‘‘qualified person’’ for theperformance of one task, that sameperson may or may not be considered a‘‘qualified person’’ for the performanceof another task. The rule requires thatvarious tasks be performed by a‘‘qualified person.’’ For example, thesetasks include the performance of brakeinspections, the handling of defectiveequipment, and the performance ofsingle car tests. FRA would expectemployees performing these varioustasks to have different levels of training.For example, a person receivingappropriate training to be deemed a‘‘qualified person’’ for the purpose ofperforming Class II brake tests shouldnot be deemed a ‘‘qualified person’’ forthe purpose of moving defectiveequipment or performing single car orrepair track air brake tests, unlessspecific training is provided thatindividual which specifically coversthose tasks. The final rule stresses thatthe individual must have receivedappropriate training to perform the taskfor which the railroad is assigning theperson responsibility.

Contrary to the assertions of certaincommenters, FRA does not intend forterm ‘‘qualified person’’ to besynonymous with the term train crewmember. Although the NPRM discussedthe fact that a train crew member couldbe considered a ‘‘qualified person’’ forperforming many of the brakeinspections required by the rule, FRAdoes not intend for a train crew memberto be deemed a ‘‘qualified person’’ forperforming every task covered by thisfinal rule which is to be performed bya ‘‘qualified person.’’ There are varioustasks covered by this final rule (i.e.,single car and repair track air brake test)that must be performed by a ‘‘qualifiedperson’’ which would require anindividual to receive more specializedand in-depth training than that receivedby a person strictly performing brakeinspections. For some tasks a ‘‘qualifiedperson’’ may have to be an individual inthe railroad’s repair or mechanicaldepartment. The final rule makes clearthat the railroad is responsible fordetermining that the person has theknowledge and skills necessary toperform the required function for whichthe person is assigned responsibilityand for maintaining sufficient recordsdocumenting this knowledge and skill.

The final rule also retains theproposed definition of ‘‘qualified

mechanical inspector’’ (QMI) with slightmodification to ensure clarity and avoidpotential misunderstanding. The finalrule defines a QMI as a ‘‘qualifiedperson’’ who as a part of the training,qualification, and designation programrequired under § 232.203 has receivedinstruction and training that includes‘‘hands-on’’ experience (underappropriate supervision orapprenticeship) in one or more of thefollowing functions: trouble-shooting,inspection, testing, maintenance, orrepair of the specific train brakecomponents and systems for which theinspector is assigned responsibility.This person shall also possess a currentunderstanding of what is required toproperly repair and maintain the safety-critical brake components for which theperson is assigned responsibility.Further, a QMI shall be a person whoseprimary responsibility includes workgenerally consistent with the above-referenced functions.

The definition contained in this finalrule clarifies the intent of the NPRM byspecifically stating that a QMI must beproperly trained and have a primaryresponsibility in the function of trouble-shooting, inspection, testing,maintenance, or repair of the specifictrain brake systems for which theinspector is assigned responsibility. Thedefinition also clarifies that a QMI mustpossess a current understanding of whatis required to properly repair andmaintain the safety-critical brake ormechanical components for which theperson is assigned responsibility. Theconcept of QMI is premised on the ideathat railroads will be permitted to movetrains extended distances between brakeinspections if the trains are inspected byhighly qualified individuals. As notrains are currently permitted to movethe distances between brake inspectionspermitted by this rule, FRA believes thatthe inspections these trains receive mustbe of very high quality and must beperformed by individuals who can notonly identify a particular defectivecondition but who have the knowledgeand experience to know how theparticular defective condition affectsother parts of the brake system ormechanical components and who havean understanding of what might havecaused a particular defective condition.FRA also believes that in order for aperson to become highly proficient inthe performance of a particular task thatperson must perform the task on arepeated and consistent basis. As it isalmost impossible to develop andimpose specific experiencerequirements, FRA believes that arequirement that the person’s primary



responsibility be in one or more of thespecifically identified work areas andthat the person have a basicunderstanding of what is required toproperly repair and maintain safety-critical brake components is necessaryto ensure the high quality inspectionsenvisioned by the rule.

In order to clarify the meaning of‘‘primary responsibility’’ as used in thedefinition of QMI, the final rulecontains a definition of the term. As arule of thumb FRA will consider aperson’s ‘‘primary responsibility’’ to bethe task that the person performs at least50 percent of the time. Therefore, aperson who spends at least 50 percentof the time engaged in the duty of eitherinspecting, testing, maintaining,troubleshooting, or repairing trainbrakes systems may be designated as aQMI; provided, the person is properlytrained to perform the tasks assignedand possesses a current understandingof what is required to properly repairand maintain the safety-critical brakecomponents for which he or she isassigned responsibility. However, FRAwill consider the totality of thecircumstances surrounding anemployee’s duties in determining aperson’s ‘‘primary responsibility.’’ Forexample, a person may not spend 50percent of their day engaged in any onereadily identifiable type of activity; inthose situations FRA will have to lookat the circumstances involved on a case-by-case basis.

The definition of QMI largely rulesout the possibility of train crewmembers being designated as thesehighly qualified inspectors since theprimary responsibility, as definedabove, of virtually all current train crewpersonnel is the operation of trains andfor the most part train crew personneldo not possess a current understandingof what is required to properly repairand maintain the safety-critical brakecomponents that are inspected duringthe various required brake tests. FRAprovides a clear definition of qualifiedmechanical inspector so that adifferentiation can be made between thecomprehensive knowledge and trainingpossessed by a professional mechanicalemployee, and the more specializedtraining and general knowledgepossessed by train crews. FRA intendsthe definition to allow the members ofthe trades associated with the testingand maintenance of equipment such ascarmen, machinists, and electricians tobecome qualified mechanicalinspectors. However, membership inlabor organizations or completion ofapprenticeship programs associatedwith these crafts is not required to be aqualified mechanical inspector. The two

primary qualifications are possession ofthe knowledge required to do the joband a primary work assignmentinspecting, testing, maintaining,troubleshooting, or repairing theequipment.

The definition of ‘‘solid block of cars’’has been modified from that proposedin the NPRM. Although FRA believesthe definition it proposed is consistentwith current interpretations andenforcement of the existing requirement,FRA agrees with some of thecommenters that the definition mayhave been too narrow and did notdirectly address FRA’s primary concern,the block of cars itself. Rather thanattempt to limit the addition of certainblocks of cars to a train by requiring thatthe entire train be reinspected if theblock of cars is not composed of carsfrom only one other train, the final rulespecifically addresses the inspection ofa ‘‘solid block of cars’’ in the variousinspection provisions based on thecomposition of the block. Thus, the finalrule defines a ‘‘solid block of cars’’ astwo or more freight cars consecutivelycoupled together and added to a train asa single unit. As FRA’s primary concernis the condition of the block of carsbeing added to the train especially whenthe block of cars is made up of cars frommore than one train, the final rule willpermit a solid block of cars to be addedto a train without triggering arequirement to perform a Class I braketest on the entire train. However,depending on the make-up of that blockof cars, certain inspections will have tobe performed on that block of cars at thelocation where it is added to the train.Therefore, the final rule places theemphasis on the inspection of the carsbeing added to the train rather thanrequiring a complete reinspection of theentire train.

The final rule also adds a definitionof ‘‘unit train’’ and ‘‘cycle train’’ inorder to clarify the requirementregarding the performance of a Class Ibrake test on such a train every 3,000miles. Although the preamble to theNPRM made clear that this requirementwas intended to apply to trains that areoperated in captive service, theproposed rule text failed to specificallyidentify which trains were required toreceive such attention. Thus, in order toremain consistent with FRA’s intent, thefinal rule text has been modified toinclude the term ‘‘unit or cycle train.’’‘‘Unit train’’ or ‘‘cycle train’’ means atrain that, except for the changing oflocomotive power and the removal orreplacement of defective equipment,remains coupled as a consist andcontinuously operates from location Ato location B and back to location A.

These trains are also referred to ascaptive service trains as they basicallyoperate in one continuous loop.Currently, trains which operate in thisfashion can operate almost indefinitelyon one initial terminal inspection andthen a continuing series of 1,000-mileinspections. FRA believes that it isnecessary for these trains to receivecomprehensive brake inspections on aperiodic basis in order to ensure theirsafe and proper operation.

The definitions of ‘‘transfer train’’ and‘‘switching service’’ are somewhatinterrelated since the determination asto whether, at a minimum, a transfertrain brake test is required is based onwhether the movement is a switchingmovement or a train movement. It isnoted that the definition of ‘‘yard train’’contained in the NPRM has beeneliminated from this final rule. As theterm was not used in the NPRM and hasnot been used in this final rule, FRAfinds no need to retain the definition.Furthermore, the determination as towhether or not a yard train is requiredto be inspected and tested as a transfertrain is based on whether the train isengaged in a train movement.

The final rule slightly modifies theproposed definition of ‘‘transfer train’’to clarify that such a train may pick upand deliver freight equipment while enroute to its destination. Such activity iscurrently conducted by these trains, andit was not FRA’s intent when issuing theNPRM to prohibit these trains frombeing used in this fashion. The final rulealso retains the definition of ‘‘switchingservice,’’ which is defined as theclassification of cars according tocommodity or destination; assemblingof cars for train movements; changingthe position of cars for purposes ofloading, unloading, or weighing; placingof locomotives or cars for repair orstorage; or moving of rail equipment inconnection with work service that doesnot constitute a train movement. Thus,a train engaged in switching servicecarries the potential of becoming atransfer train, subject to a transfer train’stesting requirements, if the movement itwill be engaged in is considered a ‘‘trainmovement’’ rather than a ‘‘switchingmovement.’’ FRA’s determination ofwhether the movement of cars is a‘‘train movement,’’ subject to therequirements of this section, or a‘‘switching movement’’ is and will bebased on the voluminous case lawdeveloped by various courts of theUnited States.

FRA’s general rule of thumb as towhether a trip constitutes a ‘‘trainmovement’’ requires five or more carscoupled together that are hauled adistance of at least one mile without a



stop to set off or pick up a car and notmoving for the purpose of assembling ordisassembling a train. However, FRAmay consider movements of less thanone mile ‘‘train movements’’ if variouscircumstances exist. In determiningwhether a particular movementconstitutes a ‘‘train movement,’’ FRAconducts a multi-factor analysis basedupon the discussions contained invarious court decisions on the subject.See e.g. United States v. Seaboard AirLine R. R. Co., 361 U.S. 78 (1959);Louisville & Jeffersonville Bridge Co. v.United States, 249 U.S. 543 (1919). Thefollowing factors are taken intoconsideration by FRA: The purpose ofthe movement; the distance traveledwithout a stop to set out or pick up cars;the number of cars hauled; and thehazards associated with the particularroute traveled (e.g., the existence ofpublic or private crossings with orwithout crossing protection, thesteepness of the grade, the existence ofcurves, any other conditions thatminimize the locomotive engineer’ssight distance, and any other conditionsthat may create a greater need for powerbrakes during the movement). Theexistence of any of these hazards wouldtend to weigh towards the finding of a‘‘train movement,’’ since these are thetypes of hazards against which thepower brake provisions of the Federalrail safety laws were designed to giveprotection.

Section 232.7 WaiversThis section sets forth the procedures

for seeking waivers of compliance withthe requirements of this rule. Requestsfor such waivers may be filed by anyinterested party. In reviewing suchrequests, FRA conducts investigations todetermine if a deviation from thegeneral criteria can be made withoutcompromising or diminishing railsafety.

Section 232.9 Responsibility forCompliance

General compliance requirements arecontained in this section. In accordancewith the ‘‘use’’ or ‘‘haul’’ languagepreviously contained in the SafetyAppliance Acts (49 U.S.C. chapter 203),and with FRA’s general rulemakingauthority under the Federal railroadsafety laws, the final rule retains theproposed requirement that any train,railroad car, or locomotive covered bythis part will be considered ‘‘in use’’prior to departure but after it receives orshould have received the necessary testsand inspections required for movement.FRA will no longer necessarily wait fora piece of equipment with a powerbrake defect to be hauled before issuing

a violation report and recommending acivil penalty, a practice frequentlycriticized by the railroads. FRA believesthat this approach will increase FRA’sability to prevent the movement ofdefective equipment that creates apotential safety hazard to both thepublic and railroad employees. FRAdoes not feel that this approachincreases the railroads’ burden sinceequipment should not be operated if itis found in defective condition in thepre-departure tests and inspections,unless permitted by the regulations. Infact, this modification of FRA’sperspectives as to when a piece ofequipment will be considered ‘‘in use’’was fully discussed by members of theWorking Group and representatives ofboth rail labor and rail managementsupported this approach, agreeing thatthe current practice of waiting for adefective piece of equipment to departfrom a location does very little topromote or ensure the safety of trains.FRA received no comments objecting tothis approach in response to the NPRM.

FRA currently interprets the ‘‘use’’ or‘‘haul’’ language previously containedin the Safety Appliance Acts narrowlyto require that a train or car not incompliance with the power brakeregulations actually engage in a trainmovement before a violation under thepower brake regulations could beassessed against a railroad. Althoughthis interpretation is in accordance withexisting case law, FRA believes that abroader interpretation is possible basedupon the case law interpreting the ‘‘use’’language contained in the SafetyAppliance Acts and based upon FRA’sgeneral rulemaking authority under theFederal railroad safety laws. Based uponboth these authorities, FRA finds that itis not necessary to require that a trainor car engaged in a train movementprior to FRA assessing a violation underthe power brake regulations. The factthat the train or car is being used by arailroad, has been or should have beeninspected by the railroad, and will beengaged in a train movement while innon-compliance with the requirementscontained in this part is sufficient toallow a violation to be assessed.

This section also clarifies FRA’sposition that the requirementscontained in these rules are applicableto any ‘‘person,’’ as broadly defined in§ 232.11, that performs any functionrequired by the proposed rules.Although various sections of the finalrule address the duties of a railroad,FRA intends that any person whoperforms any action on behalf of arailroad or any person who performsany action covered by the final rule isrequired to perform that action in the

same manner as required of a railroad orbe subject to FRA enforcement action.For example, private car owners andcontract shippers that perform dutiescovered by these regulations would berequired to perform those duties in thesame manner as required of a railroad.

Paragraph (c) states that any ‘‘person’’as broadly defined in § 232.11, thatperforms any function or task requiredby this part will be deemed to haveconsented to FRA inspection of theperson’s operation to the extentnecessary to ensure that the function ortask is being performed in accordancewith the requirements of this part. Thisprovision was contained in the NPRM,and FRA received no commentsopposing the position. This provision isintended to put railroads, contractors,and manufacturers that elect to performtasks required by this part on notice thatthey are consenting to FRA’s inspectionfor rail safety purposes of that portionof their operation that is performing thefunction or task required by this part. Inmost cases, this function or taskinvolves a contractor’s performance ofcertain required brake inspections or theperformance of specified maintenanceon cars, such as conducting single car orrepair track tests on behalf of a railroad.FRA believes that if a person is going toperform a task required by this part,FRA must have the ability to view theperformance of such a task to ensurethat it is conducted in compliance withfederal regulations. Without suchoversight, FRA believes that therequirements contained in this theregulation would become illusory andcould be easily circumvented by somerailroads. FRA believes that it has thestatutory authority pursuant to 49 U.S.C.20107 to inspect any facility oroperation that performs functions ortasks required under this part, and thisprovision is merely intended to makethat authority clear to all personsperforming such tasks or functions.

Section 232.11 PenaltiesThis section identifies the penalties

that may be imposed upon a person,including a railroad or an independentcontractor providing goods or servicesto a railroad, that violates anyrequirement of this part. These penaltiesare authorized by 49 U.S.C. 21301,21302, and 21304. The penaltyprovision parallels penalty provisionsincluded in numerous other safetyregulations issued by FRA. Essentially,any person who violates anyrequirement of this part or causes theviolation of any such requirement willbe subject to a civil penalty of at least$500 and not more than $11,000 perviolation. Civil penalties may be



assessed against individuals only forwillful violations, and where a grosslynegligent violation or a pattern ofrepeated violations creates an imminenthazard of death or injury to persons, orcauses death or injury, a penalty not toexceed $22,000 per violation may beassessed. In addition, each day aviolation continues will constitute aseparate offense. It should be noted that,the Federal Civil Penalties InflationAdjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. 101–410 Stat. 890, 28 U.S.C. 2461 note, asamended by the Debt CollectionImprovement Act of 1996 Pub. L. 104–134, April 26, 1996 required agencies toadjust for inflation the maximum civilmonetary penalties within the agenciesjurisdiction. See 63 FR 11623. Theresulting $11,000 and $22,000maximum penalties noted in thissection were determined by applyingthe criteria set forth in sections 4 and 5of the statute to the maximum penaltiesotherwise provided for in the Federalrailroad safety laws. Finally, paragraph(b) makes clear that a person may besubject to criminal penalties under 49U.S.C. 21311 for knowingly andwillfully falsifying reports required bythese regulations. FRA believes that theinclusion of penalty provisions forfailure to comply with the regulations isimportant in ensuring that complianceis achieved.

The final rule includes a schedule ofcivil penalties in appendix A to thispart. Because such penalty schedulesare statements of policy, notice andcomment were not required prior to itsissuance. See 5 U.S.C. 553(b)(3)(A).

Section 232.13 Preemptive EffectThis section informs the public as to

FRA’s intention regarding thepreemptive effect of the final rule.While the presence or absence of sucha section does not conclusively establishthe preemptive effect of a final rule, itinforms the public concerning thestatutory provisions which govern thepreemptive effect of the rule and FRA’sintentions concerning preemption.Paragraph (a) points out the preemptiveprovision contained in 49 U.S.C. 20106,which provides that all regulationsprescribed by the Secretary relating torailroad safety preempt any State law,regulation, or order covering the samesubject matter, except a provisionnecessary to eliminate or reduce anessentially local safety hazard that is notincompatible with a Federal law,regulation, or order and that does notunreasonably burden interstatecommerce. With the exception of aprovision directed at an essentially localsafety hazard that is not inconsistentwith Federal law, regulation, or order

and that does not unreasonably burdeninterstate commerce, 49 U.S.C. 20106will preempt any State regulatoryagency rule covering the same subjectmatter as the regulations contained inthis final rule.

Paragraph (b) of this section alsoinforms the public of the potential forpreemption under various otherstatutory and constitutional provisions.These include: the LocomotiveInspection Act (now codified at 49U.S.C. 20701–20703), the SafetyAppliance Acts (now codified at 49U.S.C. 20301–20304), and theCommerce Clause. FRA is notexpressing positions as to whether or towhat extent preemption exists withregard to any of the provisions notedabove because doing so requires alengthy analysis for each componentwhich, in the aggregate, would be solong as to impair the usefulness of thisdocument for most readers. As FRAlacks the authority to make bindingpreemption determinations, FRA’spurpose in identifying these provisionsis merely to inform the public of theexistence of these provisions and thatvoluminous case law exists regardingpreemption under each of theprovisions.

Paragraph (c) further informs thepublic that FRA does not intend topreempt provisions of State criminallaw that impose sanctions for recklessconduct that leads to actual loss of life,injury, or damage to property, whethersuch provisions apply specifically torailroad employees or generally to thepublic at large.

Section 232.15 Movement of DefectiveEquipment

This section contains the provisionsregarding the movement of equipmentwith defective brakes without civilpenalty liability. Except as noted in thediscussion below, the provisionscontained in this section are almostidentical to the provisions proposed inthe 1998 NPRM and incorporate thestringent conditions currently containedin 49 U.S.C. 20302, 20303, 21302, and21304 (previously codified at 45 U.S.C.13). The language used in some of theprovisions has been slightly modified toensure consistency with existingstatutory requirements. As pointed outin the previous discussion, most of thealternative proposals received by FRAin response to the 1994 NPRM, thesubsequent RSAC Working Groupmeetings, and the 1998 NPRM allcontained provisions regarding themovement of equipment with defectivebrakes which are in direct conflict withthe statutory requirements. See‘‘Overview of Comments and General

FRA Conclusions’’ portion of thepreamble under the heading ‘‘Movementof Equipment with Defective Brakes.’’FRA continues to believe that therequirements related to the movement ofequipment with defective brakesretained in this final rule are not onlyconsistent with the statutoryrequirements, but also ensure the safeand proper movement of defectiveequipment and clarify the dutiesimposed on a railroad when movingsuch equipment.

Paragraph (a) of this section containsvarious parameters which must exist inorder for a railroad to be deemed to behauling a piece of equipment withdefective brakes for repairs without civilpenalty liability. The final rule modifiesthe language used in some of theproposed general provisions containedin this paragraph to accurately reflectthe language contained in the existingstatutory provisions pertaining to themovement of equipment with defectivebrakes. The final rule replaces the term‘‘repair location’’ with the phrase‘‘location where necessary repairs canbe performed.’’ FRA agrees with thecomments of certain laborrepresentatives that the proposedlanguage could have been interpreted asbeing somewhat contrary to thelanguage used in the existing statute,which was not FRA’s intent.

The vast majority of the requirementscontained in this paragraph should poseabsolutely no additional burden torailroads as they are merely acodification of existing statutoryrequirements. The only requirementbeing retained from the 1998 NPRM inthis paragraph that is not currentlymandated is the requirement that allcars or locomotives found withdefective or inoperative brakingequipment be tagged as bad orderedwith a designation of the location wherethe necessary repairs can and will beeffectuated and that a qualified persondetermine the safety parameters formoving a piece of defective equipment.Although these are new requirements,most railroads already tag defectivebrake equipment upon discovery of thedefect. It should be noted that the finalrule clarifies that the person required tomake the determinations regarding thesafe movement of defective equipmentis to be a ‘‘qualified person’’ as definedin the final rule. The intent of FRAwhen issuing the NPRM was to requirethe determinations to be made by theseindividuals. FRA believes that thetraining requirements contained in thefinal rule for designating a personqualified to perform a specific task willensure that the individual possesses theappropriate knowledge and skills to



perform the assigned task. Furthermore,the determinations that are required tobe made in the final rule are currentlymade by individuals who FRA believeswill be trained and designated under thefinal rule as qualified persons.

In paragraph (a), FRA retains theexisting and proposed requirement thatequipment with defective brakes shallnot depart from or be moved beyond alocation where the necessary repairs tothe equipment can be performed.Therefore, if a car or locomotive isfound with defective brakes during anyof the proposed brake inspections orwhile the piece of equipment is en routeand the location where the defectiveequipment is discovered is a placewhere repairs of the type needed can beperformed, that car or locomotive shallnot be moved from that location untilthe necessary repairs are effectuated.However, if repairs to the defectivecondition cannot be performed at thelocation where the defect is discovered,or should have been discovered, thefinal rule makes clear that the railroadis permitted to move the equipmentwith the defective condition only to thenearest location where the necessaryrepairs can be performed.

Paragraph (a) also retains theproposed codification and clarificationof the statutory restrictions on themovement of equipment with defectivebrakes onto the line of a connectingrailroad. Hence, the delivery ofdefective equipment in interchange iscovered by these restrictions. Inaddition to fulfilling the otherrequirements set out in this section, arailroad seeking relief from civil penaltyliability must show that the connectingrailroad has elected to accept the non-complying equipment and that the pointof repair on the connecting railroad’sline, where the equipment will berepaired, is no further than the pointwhere the repairs could have been madeon the line where the equipment wasfirst found to be defective.

Paragraph (b) of this section containsthe specific requirements regarding thetagging of equipment found withdefective brake components. Therequirements contained in thisparagraph are very similar to the taggingrequirements proposed in the NPRMand those currently contained in part215, regarding the movement ofequipment not in compliance with theFreight Car Safety Standards, and aregenerally consistent with how mostrailroads currently tag equipment foundwith defective brakes. The final ruleretains the proposed requirement that arecord or copy of each tag removed froma defective piece of equipment beretained for 90 days and made available

to FRA within 15 days of request. FRAdoes not believe that the proposed timeframes need to be expanded assuggested by some commenters. Theprovisions are identical to thosecontained in part 215, regarding freightcar defects and they have proven to besufficient to meet the needs of FRA. Therecord keeping requirements areintended to aid FRA in its enforcementof the regulations. As the agency is ableto inspect and oversee only a smallportion of the railroad operations takingplace across the country at any onetime, the need for railroads to maintainrecords of such operations is essentialfor FRA to carry out its mission ofensuring that all railroads are operatingin the safest possible manner and thatthey comply with those minimumFederal standards designed to ensurethat safety.

Paragraph (b) also recognizes that theindustry may attempt to develop sometype of automated tracking systemcapable of retaining the informationrequired by this section and trackingdefective equipment electronically.Thus, this paragraph permits the use ofan automated tracking system in lieu ofdirectly tagging the equipment if theautomated system is approved for useby FRA. Contrary to therecommendations of some commenters,FRA is not willing to permit theimplementation of an automatedtracking system without its approval. Asan adequate automated system fortracking defective equipment does notcurrently exist on most railroads, FRAdoes not believe it is prudent, from asafety perspective, to allowimplementation of a tracking system forwhich FRA would not have a prioropportunity to assess to ensure thesystem’s accessibility, security, andaccuracy. Furthermore, FRA tends toagree with the assertion of various laborrepresentatives that the physical taggingof defective equipment provides arailroad’s ground and operational forcesthe ability to visually locate and identifydefective equipment at the time they seeit rather than referring to an electronicdatabase for such information.

This paragraph also contains languagenot previously included in the NPRMregarding FRA’s oversight of anautomated tracking system that isapproved by FRA. FRA believes theseprovisions as necessary to ensure theagency’s ability to monitor such systemsand potentially prohibit the use of thesystem if it is found deficient. Theprovisions make clear that an automatedtracking system approved for use byFRA be capable of being reviewed andmonitored by FRA at any time. Thisparagraph also notifies the railroads that

FRA reserves the right to prohibit theuse of a previously approved automatedtracking system if FRA subsequentlyfinds it to be insecure, inaccessible, orinadequate. Such a determinationwould have to be in writing and includethe basis for taking such action.

Paragraph (c) retains the proposedprovision restricting the movement of avehicle with defective brakes for thepurpose of unloading or purging only ifit is necessary for the safe repair of thecar. This restriction is fully consistentwith the statutory provisions regardingthe movement of equipment withdefective safety appliances.

Paragraph (d) retains with slightmodification the method of calculatingthe percentage of operative powerbrakes (operative primary brakes) in atrain that was proposed in the NPRM.This paragraph retains the generalmethod of calculating the percentage ona control valve basis. However, FRAagrees with the comments of the NTSBand certain labor representatives thatthe method proposed in the NPRM didnot take into consideration thepossibility of a control valve being cutin when the brakes it controls areinoperative. Therefore, this final ruleclarifies that a control valve will not beconsidered cut-in if the brakescontrolled by that valve are inoperative.Although the statute discusses thepercentage of operative brakes in termsof a percentage of vehicles, the statutewas written nearly a century ago, and atthat time the only way to cut out thebrakes on a car or locomotive was to cutout the entire unit. See 49 U.S.C.20302(a)(5)(B). Today, many types offreight equipment can have their brakescut out on a per-truck basis, and FRAexpects this trend to increase as thetechnology is applied to newly acquiredequipment. This final rule merelyadopts a method of calculating thepercentage of operative brakes in a trainbased on the design of equipment usedtoday and, thus, a means to moreaccurately reflect the true braking abilityof the train as a whole. FRA believesthat this method of calculation isconsistent with the intent of Congresswhen it drafted the statutoryrequirement and simply recognizes thetechnological advancements made inbraking systems over the last century.

Paragraph (d) also retains theproposed list of conditions that are notto be considered inoperative powerbrakes for purposes of calculating thepercentage of operative brakes. Certaincommenters recommended that FRAeliminate the proposed listing ofconditions that would not be consideredas rendering the brakes inoperative,contending that the listed conditions



should not be excluded fromconsideration. FRA disagrees with thesecommenters. The purpose of thecalculation is to determine thepercentage of operative brakes, and theconditions listed in the proposal andretained in this final rule do not renderthe power brakes inoperative. Many ofthe listed conditions constitute aviolation under other provisionscontained in the final rule or anotherregulatory provision for which separatepenalties are provided.

A cut-out or ineffective power brakeis an inoperative power brake, but thefailure or cutting out of a secondarybrake system does not result ininoperative power brakes; for example,failure of the dynamic brake does notrender the power brake inoperative.Furthermore, inoperative handbrakes orpower brakes overdue for maintenanceor stenciling do not render the powerbrakes inoperative on the car andshould not be deemed inoperativepower brakes for purposes of thecalculation. The final rule and otherregulations contain separate penaltiesfor operating a car that has aninoperative handbrake, is overdue formaintenance, or lacks the properstenciling or marking if not beingproperly hauled for repairs. In addition,although a car may be found with pistontravel that exceeds the Class I brake testlimits, such excess travel does notrender the brakes inoperative until thepiston travel exceeds the outside limitsestablished for that particular type ofpiston design. However, piston travelthat exceeds the applicable Class I braketest limits would be considered adefective condition if the piston travelwere not adjusted at the time that aClass I brake test were performed, andthe final rule contains an appropriatepenalty for such a condition.

Paragraph (e) contains therequirements regarding the placement ofcars in a train that have inoperativebrakes. The requirements contained inthis final rule are virtually identical tothe requirements proposed in theNPRM. The restrictions contained inthis paragraph are consistent withcurrent industry practice and are part ofalmost every major railroad’s operatingrules. This paragraph prohibits theplacing of a vehicle with inoperativebrakes at the rear of the train. Inaddition, this paragraph retains theprohibition on the consecutive placingof more than two vehicles withinoperative brakes, as test trackdemonstrations have indicated thatwhen three consecutive cars have theirbrakes cut-out it is not always possibleto obtain an emergency brakeapplication on trailing cars. However, as

it was FRA’s intent to incorporatecurrent industry practice whenproposing the requirements, the finalrule slightly modifies the requirementregarding the placement of multi-unitarticulated equipment. When proposingthe restrictions regarding multi-unitarticulated equipment, FRAextrapolated the restriction based on therequirements regarding the consecutiveplacing of defective cars. Based on itsconsideration of the comments, FRA hasdetermined that the proposedrequirement prohibiting the placementof such equipment with consecutivecontrol valves cut out is more restrictivethan current practice on many railroads,which was not FRA’s intent whendrafting the proposal. Consequently, inorder to remain consistent with existingindustry practice, the final rule requiresthat such equipment shall not be placedin a train if it has more than twoconsecutive individual control valvescut out or if the brakes controlled by thevalve are inoperative.

Paragraph (f) contains guidelines thatFRA will consider when determiningwhether a location is one wherenecessary brake repairs can beperformed and whether a location is thenearest location where such repairs canbe effectuated. The preamble to theNPRM contained an extensivediscussion regarding what factorsshould be considered when determiningwhether a particular location is onewhere brake system repairs should beperformed and discussed the difficultiesand pitfalls associated developing astandard applicable to all situations. See63 FR 48309. In the NPRM, FRA statedthat the determinations as to whatconstitutes a location where necessaryrepairs can be performed had to beconducted on a case-by-case basisutilizing the criteria established inexisting case law. A number of railroadrepresentatives commented on this issueand recommended that FRA furtherclarify what constitutes a location wherebrake repairs must be conducted. Thesecommenters claimed that leaving thedetermination solely to individual FRAinspectors creates inconsistentenforcement and makes it virtuallyimpossible for railroads to comply. AARand its members recommended thatFRA allow railroads to designatelocations where brake system repairswould be conducted. Conversely,representatives of rail labor objected toany approach that would permitrailroads to designate repair locations,claiming that such an allowance wouldviolate the statutory conditionsregarding the movement of defectiveequipment.

After consideration of thesecomments, FRA believes it is essentialto further clarify to the regulatedcommunity what the agency’s positionwill be for determining whether alocation is a place where brake repairsare to be conducted. FRA does not agreethat a railroad should be permitted toindependently determine the locationsit will consider capable of making brakesystem repairs. History shows that manyrailroads and FRA have widely differentviews on what should be considered alocation where brake repairs can andshould be effectuated. Furthermore, it isapparent to FRA that some railroadsattempt to minimize or circumvent therequirements for conducting repairs inthe name of convenience or efficiency.However, FRA also recognizes that theemergence of mobile repair truckscreates an ability to perform repairs thatdid not exist when Congress originallyenacted the statutory requirementsrelated to the movement of defectiveequipment. FRA acknowledges thatevery location where a mobile repairtruck is capable of making repairsshould not be considered a locationwhere repairs must be conducted.However, FRA also disagrees with thecontentions of some commenters thatCongress only intended for fixed repairfacilities to be considered whendetermining locations where brakerepairs are to be performed and thatmobile repair trucks should not beconsidered. FRA is aware of numerouslocations where mobile repair trucks arebeing used in lieu of a fixed facility orwhere a fixed facility was eliminatedand the repairs that were beingperformed by the fixed facility are nowbeing performed at the same locationwith a fully equipped repair truck.Thus, FRA believes that locations whererepair trucks are used in virtually thesame manner as a fixed facility shouldbe considered when determiningwhether the location is capable ofmaking the necessary repairs.

As noted in the NPRM, thedetermination as to what constitutes alocation where necessary repairs can beperformed is an issue that FRA hasgrappled with for decades. FRAcontinues to believe that thedetermination must be made on a case-by-case basis after conducting a multi-factor analysis. However, in an effort tobetter detail the items that will beconsidered by FRA in making adetermination, paragraph (f) containsgeneral guidelines that FRA willconsider when determining whether alocation is one which should beconsidered a location where at leastsome brake system repairs must be



made. FRA would expect a railroad toconsider the guidance contained in thisparagraph when making its decisions onwhere equipment containing brakedefects will be repaired. The guidancecontained in this paragraph is basedupon, and consistent with, thevoluminous case law which exists thatestablishes the guiding principles fordetermining whether a locationconstitutes a location where thenecessary repairs can be made as wellas previous enforcement actions takenand guidance provided by FRAregarding such locations. The final ruleguidance incorporates the principlesdiscussed in the ‘‘Overview ofComments and General FRAConclusions’’ portion of the preambleunder the heading ‘‘Movement ofEquipment with Defective Brakes.’’

Paragraph (g) provides a method bywhich a railroad may designatelocations where various brake systemrepairs will be conducted. AlthoughFRA does not believe that railroadsshould be permitted to unilaterallydesignate locations where brake systemrepair will be conducted, FRA doesbelieve that a railroad in cooperationwith its employees could potentiallydevelop a plan that designates locationswhere brake system repairs will beeffectuated. This paragraph makes clearthat such a plan would have to beconsistent with the guidelines containedin paragraph (f) and that such planswould have to be approved by FRAprior to being implemented. Thisparagraph also makes clear that for FRAto entertain a proposal containing a planwhich designates locations where brakesystem repairs will be conducted arailroad and representatives of itsemployees must submit the proposaljointly . FRA does not intend toconsider proposals nominally submittedpursuant to this provision that are notsupported by a railroad’s employees andtheir representatives.

Section 223.17 Special ApprovalProcess

This section contains the proceduresto be followed when seeking to obtainFRA approval of a pre-revenue serviceacceptance plan under § 232.505 forcompletely new brake systemtechnologies or major upgrades toexisting systems or when seekingapproval of an alternative to the teststandard incorporated in §§ 232.305 or232.307. Several railroads andmanufacturers contended, both inresponse to the 1994 NPRM and at theRSAC Working Group meetings, thatFRA needed to devise some sort ofquick approval process in order topermit the industry to make

modifications to incorporated standardsor existing equipment based on theemergence of new technology. Thus,FRA proposed an approval process itbelieved should speed the process fortaking advantage of new technologiesover that which is currently availableunder the waiver process. However, inorder to provide an opportunity for allinterested parties to provide input foruse by FRA in its decision makingprocess, as required by theAdministrative Procedure Act, FRAbelieves that any special approvalprovision must, at a minimum, provideproper notice to the public of anysignificant change or action beingconsidered by the agency with regard toexisting regulations.

This section essentially retains theproposed special approval process. Oneprivate car owner commented that theprocedures should require FRA topublish any petition received within 30days of receipt and to rule on thepetition within 30 days of receipt of thelast comment. Certain representatives ofrail labor asserted that the specialapproval procedures should betightened to be consistent with therequirements for granting a waiver andthat the comment period should beextended and expanded to provideadequate time for parties to prepare. Asthe special approval process onlyapplies to pre-revenue testing plans andthe procedures for conducting single carand repair track air brake tests andbecause the purpose of the process is tospeed the decision making process, FRAdoes not believe it is necessary tofurther lengthen the comment periodsproposed in the NPRM, and FRA thinksthat the procedures provide an adequateopportunity for interested parties tocomment. Furthermore, if theprocedures for these special approvalsare made overly burdensome then thespeed intended to be gained through theprocess would be lost. However, FRAalso does not believe that the proposedtime frames provided for FRA’sconsideration of a petition should bereduced. FRA believes that the timeframes included in the proposal for FRAconsideration are necessary for FRA tofully consider all comments andinformation received.

Section 232.19 Availability of RecordsThis section makes clear that unless

otherwise provided by this part, therecords and plans required to bedeveloped and maintained by this partshall be made available torepresentatives of FRA and Statesparticipating under part 212 of thischapter for inspection and copyingupon request. FRA has added this

section to the final rule in order tospecifically clarify the availability ofsuch records while increasing thereadability of the rule and reducing theunnecessary repetition of therequirement throughout the text of therule.

Section 232.21 Information Collection

This section indicates the provisionsof this part that have been approved bythe Office of Management and Budgetfor compliance with the PaperworkReduction Act of 1995. See 44 U.S.C.3501 et seq. A more detailed discussionof the information collectionrequirements contained in this part isprovided in the ‘‘Regulatory Impact’’portion of this preamble.

Subpart B—General Requirements

Section 232.101 Scope

This section contains a formalstatement of the scope of this specificsubpart of the final rule. This subpart isintended to establish general operating,performance, and design standards forrailroads that operate freight or othernon-passenger trains and furthercontains specific requirements forequipment used in these types ofoperations.

Section 232.103 General Requirementsfor All Train Brake Systems

This section contains generalrequirements that are applicable to allfreight and non-passenger train brakesystems. This section specificallyincludes certain basic train brake systempractices and procedures that form thefoundation for the safe operation of alltypes of trains. Some of these basicprinciples are so obvious that they havenot been specifically included in pastrules. For example, paragraphs (a)-(c)state the most basic safety requirementsfor all train brake systems, whichinclude having the ability to stop a trainwithin the existing signal spacing,maintaining and monitoring theintegrity of the train brakecommunication line, and having thetrain brake system respond as intendedto signals from the brakecommunication line. These basicrequirements were proposed in theNPRM and have been retained in thisfinal rule without change.

Paragraph (d) contains the provisionrequiring trains to have 100 percentoperative and effective power brakesprior to use at, or departure, fromcertain locations and prohibiting thehauling of a car with inoperative orineffective power brakes from certainunder 49 U.S.C. 20303. Paragraph (d)has been slightly modified from that



proposed in the NPRM in order toclarify that the requirement applies onlyto trains that are required to receive aClass I brake test at the location. Thismodification was made in order tospecifically clarify that the 100 percentoperative brake requirement is notintended to apply to transfer trains thatoriginate at a location where thenecessary brake repairs cannot beeffectuated. FRA agrees with theconcerns raised by various commentersthat the proposed language could havebeen interpreted as applying to transfertrains. FRA agrees that the 100 percentrequirement does not currently apply tosuch trains, and it was not FRA’sintention when issuing the NPRM toextend its application to such trains.However, it should be noted that if atransfer train originates at a locationwhere repairs to the equipmentcontaining defective brakes can beeffectuated, then the train would berequired to have 100 percent operativebrakes prior to being used or departingthat location.

Contrary to the contentions of certaincommenters, FRA continues to believethat there is adequate justification forretaining the 100 percent requirement.The requirement to have 100 percentoperative brakes prior to departing alocation where an initial terminal braketest is required to be performed hasexisted in the railroad industry fordecades. FRA believes it is not onlywise from a safety standpoint, as itensures the proper operation of a train’sbrake system at least once during itsexistence, but the requirement sets theproper tone for what FRA expects to beaccomplished at these locations. FRAbelieves that requiring 100 percentoperative brakes on trains at their originprovides the railroads with a margin forfailure of some brakes while the train isin transit (up to 15 percent) and tendsto ensure that defective equipment isbeing repaired in a timely fashion. Inaddition, FRA believes that the 100percent requirement is consistent notonly with Congress’ understanding ofthe AAR inspection standards that wereadopted in 1958, but also with theintent of FRA, rail management, and raillabor as to what was to occur at initialterminals when the inspection intervalwas increased from 500 miles to 1,000miles in 1982. At that time, carrierrepresentatives committed to theperformance of quality initial terminalinspections in exchange for anextension in the inspection interval, forwhich FRA intends to hold themaccountable.

Some commenters recommended thatFRA permit any and all trains that have95 percent operative brakes to operate

from their point of origin to destinationand noted that Canada currently allowssuch operation. FRA believes that suchan approach would be completelycontrary to the existing statutorymandate regarding the movement ofequipment with defective brakes. Theexisting statutory provision regardingthe movement of equipment withdefective brakes requires that suchequipment be repaired at the nearestlocation where the necessary repairs canbe performed. See 49 U.S.C. 20303.Consequently, trains that originate at orthat operate through locations where thenecessary brake repairs can beeffectuated are clearly required by thestatute to have 100 percent operativebrakes prior to departing thoselocations.

FRA realizes that the 100 percentrequirement creates a somewhatillogical situation at some locations byrequiring certain trains to have 100percent operative brakes prior todeparting the location and yet allowingother trains to pick up defectiveequipment at the same location.However, FRA believes that varioussafety benefits are created by retainingthe 100 percent requirement. The publicis assured that a train’s brake system isin near perfect condition at thebeginning of its journey, train crews aremore cognizant of the presence ofdefective cars in the train when they arepicked up en route, railroads are morelikely to perform repairs at a locationwhere trains are initiated in order toavoid breaking up trains to set outdefective cars once the trains areassembled, and FRA retains a clear andconsistent enforcement standard thatcan be easily understood by itsinspectors and railroad industryemployees.

Although FRA recognizes that the 100percent requirement may be somewhatburdensome for some railroads atcertain locations, FRA believes that thenumber of locations involved isrelatively low and should be handled ona case-by-case basis through the existingwaiver process. FRA believes that manyrailroads have created their ownproblems by eliminating repair facilitiesand personnel at many of the outlyinglocations that the railroads now claimthey lack the ability to make appropriaterepairs. Furthermore, FRA believes thatthe best method of assessing the safetyimplications of permitting a location tooperate trains with less than 100 percentoperative brakes is for the railroad toprovide information on how the railroadwill handle the defective equipmentbased on the specific needs andoperating characteristics of the railroadinvolved.

In the NPRM, FRA provided variousapproaches under which it wouldpotentially consider allowing a railroadto operate trains from their initialterminals with less than 100 percentoperative brakes. See 63 FR 48310. Themethods suggested by FRA wererejected as being overly burdensome byseveral commenters. Therefore, FRAbelieves the burden falls on eachrailroad seeking relief from the 100percent requirement at certain outlyinglocations to provide FRA with anoperating plan that will ensure the safeoperation of such trains and provide forthe timely and certain repair of anydefective equipment moved from thoselocations. Consequently, FRA believesthat there are a few existing locationsthat may be candidates for receiving awaiver from the 100 percentrequirement, and FRA is willing toconsider waivers for such locations;however the railroads applying for suchwaivers must be able to establish a trueneed for the exception and must bewilling to provide alternative operatingprocedures that ensure the safety of thetrains being operated from thoselocations.

Paragraph (e) contains a clear andabsolute prohibition on train movementif more than 15 percent of the cars in atrain have their brakes cut out or haveotherwise inoperative brakes. Althoughthere is no explicit limit contained inthe statute regarding the number of carswith inoperative brake equipment thatmay be hauled in a train, the 15-percentlimitation is a longstanding industryand agency interpretation of thehauling-for-repair provision currentlycodified at 49 U.S.C. 20303, and haswithstood the test of time. Thisinterpretation is extrapolated fromanother statutory requirement whichpermits a railroad to use a train only if‘‘at least 50 percent of the vehicles inthe train are equipped with power ortrain brakes and the engineer is usingthe power or train brakes on thosevehicles and on all other vehiclesequipped with them that are associatedwith those vehicles in a train.’’ 49U.S.C. 20302(a)(5)(B). As originallyenacted in 1903, section 20302 alsogranted the Interstate CommerceCommission (ICC) the authority toincrease this percentage, and in 1910the ICC issued an order increasing theminimum percentage to 85 percent. See49 CFR 232.1, which codified the ICCorder. One labor representativerecommended that this requirement beeliminated as it creates confusionregarding the movement of defectiveequipment. FRA believes that if the ruleis read in its entirety there should be no



confusion as to the movement ofdefective equipment, and that thisprovision merely sets an outside limiton the percentage of cars that may behauled in any train with inoperativebrakes. Consequently, FRA believes theexpress prohibition is necessary andwill continue to require that equipmentwith inoperative air brakes make up nomore than 15 percent of any train.

As virtually all freight cars arepresently equipped with power brakesand are operated on an associatedtrainline, the statutory requirementcited above is in essence a requirementthat 100 percent of the cars in a trainhave operative power brakes, unlessbeing hauled for repairs pursuant to 49U.S.C. 20303. Therefore, paragraph (f)makes clear that a train’s air brakes shallbe in effective and operable conditionunless a car is being hauled for repairspursuant to the conditions contained in§ 232.15. This section retains theproposed standard for determiningwhen a freight car’s air brakes are notin effective operating condition basedon piston travel. The piston travel limitsfor standard 12-inch stroke brakecylinders are the same as currentlyrequired under § 232.11(c). Certain laborrepresentatives asserted that thepermissible piston travel for these brakecylinders should be reduced to 10inches rather than the currently allowed101⁄2 inches. These commentersprovided no technical data to supportsuch a change, and FRA is not aware ofany problems or unsafe conditionsresulting from the current 101⁄2 inchpiston travel allowance on such brakecylinders. Consequently, the final ruleretains the existing piston travel limitsfor standard 12-inch stroke brakecylinders.

Due to the proliferation of equipmentwith other than standard 12-inch strokebrake cylinders, FRA has found thatmechanical forces and train crewmembers performing brake systeminspections often do not know theacceptable range of brake piston travelfor this non-standard equipment. In anattempt to improve this situation and toensure the proper operation of a car’sbrakes after being inspected, FRAproposed that vehicles equipped withother than standard 12-inch stroke brakecylinders have either the badge plate forthe vehicle or a stencil, sticker, ormarker indicate the acceptable range ofpiston travel for the brake equipment onthat vehicle. FRA also proposed that theinformation on the badge plate, sticker,stencil, or marker include both thepermissible brake cylinder piston travelrange for the vehicle at Class I braketests and the lengths at which the pistontravel renders the brake ineffective.

Paragraph (g) generally retains theseproposed requirements. FRA continuesto believe that this information isessential in order for a person toproperly perform the brake inspectionscontained in this final due to thegrowing number of cars with other thanstandard brake designs. Therequirement has been slightly modifiedfrom that proposed to require that theoutside piston travel limit need only beprovided if it is different from the ClassI brake test limit. FRA agrees with thecontentions of certain commenters thatsuch information would beunnecessarily redundant if the limits arethe same. Thus, if there is no outsidelimit indicated on the badge plate,stencil, sticker, or marker the pistontravel limits indicated for the Class I/initial terminal brake test for the vehiclewill be considered the outside pistontravel limits for that vehicle.

The AAR recommends that, inaddition to vehicles equipped withstandard 12-inch stroke brake cylinders,FRA should also except vehiclesequipped with WABCOPAC orNYCOPAC truck-mounted brakecylinders from the markingrequirements contained in paragraph(g). The AAR contends that thestenciling or marking of the pistontravel limits on these vehicles isunnecessary because the piston travellimits for these brake systems are well-known and nearly 30 percent of the fleetis equipped with them. FRA disagreeswith this contention. Based on FRA’sexperience in monitoring theperformance of various brake tests, FRAbelieves that many employees are notaware of the piston travel limits for thebrake systems noted above.Furthermore, there are numerous truck-mounted brake cylinders currently inuse that have piston travel limits whichare different from those of theWABCOPAC and NYCOPAC truck-mounted systems. Thus, FRA believesall vehicles equipped with these brakesystems need to be marked in order toavoid confusion by individualsinspecting the equipment and thusensure the proper operation of thebrakes on such cars. Moreover, FRA isaware that many vehicles equipped withthe type of truck-mounted brake systemssought to be excepted by AAR,particularly privately owned vehicles,already have decals, stickers, or stencilscontaining the information required bythis paragraph.

The AAR also recommends thatrailroads be provided eight years inwhich to implement the markingrequirements contained in thisparagraph in order to perform the workduring the required periodic single car

or repair track air brake tests. FRAbelieves such an allowance of time isunnecessary and excessive. The reasonFRA is permitting the information to bemarked on the car with either a decal,stencil, or sticker is to provide therailroads with relatively simple andeasy methods for bring cars intocompliance without requiring them tobe placed in a maintenance facility oron a repair track to have the informationaffixed. FRA believes that the three-yearapplicability period provided by thisfinal rule provides railroads withsufficient time to mark cars as required.Furthermore, many cars are alreadyproperly marked with the necessaryinformation as noted in the previousdiscussion.

Paragraph (h) requires that allequipment ordered or placed in servicefor the first time on or after the specifieddates, be designed not to require aninspector to place himself or herself on,under, or between components of theequipment to observe brake actuation orrelease. This paragraph allows railroadsthe flexibility of using a reliableindicator in place of requiring directobservation of the brake application orpiston travel because the designs ofsome freight car brake systems makedirect observation extremely difficultunless the inspector places himself orherself underneath the equipment.Indicators of brake system piston travelor piston cylinder pressure have beenused with satisfactory results for manyyears. Although indicators do notprovide 100 percent certainty that thebrakes are effective, FRA believes thatthey have proven themselves effectiveenough to be preferable to requiring aninspector to assume a dangerousposition. Some commentersrecommended that the indicatoralternative be eliminated and thatrailroads should not be allowed to relyon indicators. FRA believes that thesecommenters fail to recognize the need toprovide some alternative to directobservation of the piston travel oncertain equipment and fail toacknowledge the existence of newtechnologies available to the industry.Further, although the rule permits theuse of an indicator for purposes ofdetermining piston travel, theindividual inspecting such equipmentwould be required to inspect allcomponents of the brake system forproper operation.

This requirement stems primarilyfrom the brake system design of double-stack equipment currently used byseveral larger freight operations. Severalcommenters have indicated that thefunctioning of the brakes on this type ofequipment cannot be observed without



inspectors placing themselves inpotentially dangerous positions. Inaddition, a complete inspection of thebrake equipment and systems used ondouble-stack equipment is timeconsuming. Consequently, inspectorsare reluctant to conduct a completebrake inspection test on departing trainsthat contain this type of equipment.FRA thinks that double-stack equipmentis becoming a mainstay of the freightrailroad industry and that this designdeficiency must be corrected. Thus,FRA has attempted to make this aperformance requirement by simplyspecifying how the equipment mustfunction and allowing the industry todetermine the method of compliance.

Paragraph (i) retains the proposedrequirement that an emergency brakeapplication feature be available at anytime and that it produce an irretrievablestop. This section merely codifiescurrent industry practice and ensuresthat all equipment will continue to bedesigned with an emergency brakeapplication feature. In the 1994 NPRMon power brakes, FRA proposed arequirement that all trains be equippedwith an emergency application featurecapable of increasing the train’sdeceleration rate a minimum of 15percent. See 59 FR 47729. Thisproposed requirement merely restatedthe emergency specification currentlycontained in Appendix B to part 232.Comments received in response to thatproposal indicated that some brakeequipment currently in use or beingdeveloped could provide a decelerationrate with a full service application thatis close to the emergency brake rate andthat the proposed requirement wouldrequire the lowering of full service brakerates, thereby compromising safety andlowering train speeds. Consequently,the requirement proposed in the 1998and retained in this final rule removesthe 15-percent differential.

Paragraphs (j) and (k), which wereproposed as paragraphs (k) and (l),impose on the railroads theresponsibility for determiningmaximum air brake system workingpressure and maximum brake pipepressure. These provisions werecontained in both the 1994 and 1998NPRM, and FRA received no commentsobjecting to their inclusion. See 59 FR47743. Thus, FRA intends to continue toallow individual railroads the widelatitude currently permitted indetermining these pressures.

Paragraph (l), previously proposed asparagraph (m), provides that except asprovided by other provisions of thispart, all equipment used in freight orother non-passenger trains shall, at aminimum, meet the performance

specification for freight brakes in AARstandard S–469–47. The AAR standardincorporated by reference in thisparagraph contains all the provisionscurrently referenced in § 232.3 andcontained in existing Appendix B topart 232. In the NPRM, FRA soughtcomments from interested parties as tothe necessity of referencing thesestandards as well as any information onany updated standards related to theperformance of freight equipment that iscurrently being used throughout theindustry. Although one commentergenerally asserted that the standardsshould merely be included as areference and that their inclusion wouldrequire retroactive validation of provendesigns, FRA finds little merit in thiscontention since any existing equipmentshould already be designed to thespecifications as they are currently partof the existing regulations. Except asnoted below, FRA received nocomments seeking specific changes tothe referenced specifications or otherobjections to their inclusion.

It should be noted that the provisionpreviously proposed in paragraph (j) ofthis section requiring that the air brakecomponents that control brakeapplication and release be adequatelysealed to prevent contamination byforeign material (63 FR 48359) has beenremoved due to its incorporation inanother provision contained in this finalrule. As the proposed requirement iscontained in AAR standard S–469–47 asone of the general specificationrequirements, there is no reason toretain the specific requirement in thisfinal rule. Thus, although therequirement has been specificallyremoved from the rule text, it is retainedby its inclusion in the referenced AARstandard. Furthermore, FRA findsAAR’s objection to this requirementsomewhat hard to understand. FRA isnot imposing a new requirement butmerely sets forth an existingrequirement contained in an AARstandard. Contrary to the concernsraised by AAR, FRA does not intend tochange the existing standard ofcompliance for this requirement.

Paragraph (m), previously proposed asparagraph (n), retains the proposedrequirement that if an en route trainqualified by the Air Flow Methodexperiences a brake pipe air flow ofgreater than 60 CFM or brake pipegradient of greater than 15 psi and themovable pointer does not return to thoselimits within a reasonable time the trainmust be stopped at the next availablelocation and inspected for leaks in thebrake system. This requirement one ofthe conditions of the general waivergranted to the AAR allowing the use of

the air flow method to qualify train airbrakes. FRA believes that thisrequirement is necessary to preventtrains with excessive leakage fromcontinuing to operate. If a train hasexcessive leakage, the engineer may lackthe ability to stop the train using the airbrake system. Other than the generalcontention raised by certain laborrepresentatives that the Air FlowMethod not be allowed, FRA receivedno specific comments on therequirements contained in thisparagraph.

Paragraph (n), previously proposed asparagraph (o), contains requirementsregarding the setting and releasing ofhand brakes on equipment that is leftunattended. The requirementscontained in this paragraph differ fromthose previously proposed in the NPRM.In the NPRM, FRA proposed variousrequirements for securing standingequipment. The requirements proposedin the NPRM were basically a reiterationof the guidance issued by FRA in SafetyAdvisory 97–2 on September 15, 1997.See 62 FR 49046. The securementguidance contained in Safety Advisory97–2 was based upon FRA’s review ofan incident that occurred on August 20,1997 near Fort Worth, Texas, and itsawareness of other incidents involvingthe improper securement of rollingequipment. The Safety Advisory wasissued in order to provide the industrywith some assistance and guidanceregarding securement procedures and toprovide information on currentpractices of the industry related to thesecurement of rolling stock. Id.

The requirements proposed in theNPRM where also intended to addressthe practice known as ‘‘bottling the air’’in a standing cut of cars, an issue relatedto improperly secured rail equipment.The practice of ‘‘bottling the air’’ occurswhen a train crew sets out cars from atrain with the air brakes applied and theangle cocks on both ends of the trainclosed, thus trapping the existingcompressed air and conserving thebrake pipe pressure in the cut of carsthey intend to leave behind. Thispractice has the potential of causing,first, an unintentional release of thebrakes on these cars and, ultimately, arunaway. Many railroad operating rulesrequire that a 20-pound reduction inbrake pipe pressure be made whenstopping a train to remove a cut of carsfrom the train. Thus, if the trainmancloses the angle cock where the cut isto be made before pressure equalizes inthe trainline, an air wave action mayform that can be of sufficient amplitudeto initiate an unintentional release ofthe brakes.



Brake pipe gradient is another factorthat makes bottling the air dangerous.‘‘Normal gradient’’ is a term used toexpress the difference between thehigher pressure on the front end of thetrain and the lower pressure on the rearend of the train, which is dependentupon brake pipe leakage and trainlength. Each train establishes its ownnormal gradient value. ‘‘Inversegradients’’ and ‘‘False gradients’’ aretemporary gradients that are a result ofbrake operations. Inverse gradientsoccur when a brake pipe reduction ismade, temporarily making the brakepipe pressure higher on the rear of thetrain. The false gradient is createdanytime the train brakes are set andreleased, thus temporarily resulting in ahigher than normal pressure differentialbetween the front and rear end of thetrain as the brake pipe charges.Therefore, if the engineer sets andreleases a train’s brakes a sufficientnumber of times prior to stopping toremove a cut of cars, a false gradientcould be established. Even if theengineer made a 20-pound brake pipereduction and listened for the air to stopexhausting at the automatic brake valvebefore giving the signal to the trainmanto cut off the cars, the potential existsfor an unintentional release of air brakesif the air on the cars is bottled. The falsegradient could be of such magnitudethat, as the trainline attempts toequalize, the higher pressure on thefront end flowing to the rear will exceedthe 11⁄2 pound differential across theservice piston and cause a release of airbrakes. An inverse gradient can alsocreate an unintentional release ofbrakes. As brake pipe pressure isreduced at the front of the train, the rearend temporarily has a higher pressure.As the trainline attempts to equalize, thepressure on the front end will rise. Insome circumstances, this rise could beenough to initiate a release of air brakes.

On June 5, 1998, the NTSB issued thefollowing recommendation to FRA:

Issue a regulation that requires the brakepipe pressure to be depleted to zero and anangle cock to remain open on standingrailroad equipment that is detached from alocomotive controlling the brake pipepressure.

(R–98–17). This recommendation wasthe result of NTSB’s investigation of anincident that occurred on January 27,1997, on the Apache Railway nearHolbrook, Arizona. The incidentinvolved the runaway of 77 cars downa 1.7 percent grade for 14 milesresulting in the eventual derailment of46 cars and the release of hazardousmaterials. Although there were nofatalities, 150 people were evacuated

from nearby residential areas. The NTSBdetermined that the 77 cars rolled awayunattended because the conductor of thetrain had trapped the air in the brakesystem, i.e., ‘‘bottled the air,’’ whichresulted in an undesired release of thebrakes on the standing cars. In itsrecommendation the NTSB correctlynoted that FRA statistics show that tenaccidents occurred between 1994 and1995 which were attributable to thepractice of ‘‘bottling the air.’’

FRA received numerous commentsfrom the AAR and various otherrepresentatives of the railroads objectingto the proposed provisions regarding thesecurement of standing equipment.Although these commenters generallyagreed with the intended purpose of theproposed requirements, they believedthat the proposed provisions wereoverbroad, increased certain safetyhazards, and exposed railroademployees to higher risk of injury.These commenters contend that thegoals of FRA could be accomplished ina less burdensome fashion whileincreasing safety and reducing thepotential for employee injuries. Afterreviewing the comments submitted bythese parties, FRA agrees with most ofthe recommendations provided.Consequently, the provisions containedin this paragraph have been modified toreflect those recommendations.

FRA agrees with the recommendationthat the requirements contained in thisparagraph should be applied only tounattended equipment rather than tostanding equipment generally. FRAagrees that, if the train is attended, thesetting of handbrakes serves no usefulpurpose and would result in anenormous cost to the industry.Therefore, paragraph (n) contains adefinition of ‘‘unattended equipment’’to clarify the applicability of therequirements contained in thisparagraph. The term covers equipmentleft standing and unmanned in such amanner that the brake system of theequipment cannot be readily controlledby a qualified person.

FRA also agrees that the proposedrequirement that railroads develop amatrix to determine the number of handbrakes that are to be applied may not bethe best approach to ensure that asufficient number of hand brakes havebeen applied to a specific cut ofunattended equipment. FRA agrees thatthe number of hand brakes required tobe applied depends on a wide variety offactors not easily captured in a matrixformat and that a matrix approach mightresult in either too few or too manyhand brakes being applied. Thus,paragraph (n)(1) eliminates therequirement for developing a matrix and

is modified to include a performance-based requirement that a sufficientnumber of hand brakes be applied tohold the equipment and a requirementthat railroads develop and implement aprocess or procedure to verify that theapplied hand brakes will sufficientlyhold the equipment when the air brakesare released. This requirement willpermit a railroad to develop appropriateoperating rules to verify the sufficiencyof the handbrakes applied which can betailored to the specific territory andequipment operated by the railroad. Onsome railroads and at some locations,these operating rules may include theuse of a matrix or some other type of setcalculation.

Paragraph (n)(2) addresses the issue of‘‘bottling air’’ on unattended equipment.This paragraph requires that anemergency brake application beinitiated on all equipment prior to itsbeing left unattended. This paragraphno longer requires that the locomotivebe detached to effectuate the emergencyapplication as was proposed. FRAagrees with the concerns raised bycertain parties that the proposedrequirement to detach locomotives toallow an emergency application of thebrakes is not appropriate or desirable inmany circumstances. FRA agrees that itis not necessary to detach locomotivesto initiate an emergency application,that it is safer to leave the locomotivesattached due to redundant securementfeatures on a locomotive, that anemergency application should not bemade until it is known that the numberof hand brakes set is sufficient, and thatit would be very burdensome to detachlocomotives every time a train is leftunattended.

Paragraphs (n)(3) and (n)(4) containthe requirements for securingunattended locomotives. FRA agreeswith the recommendations made byvarious commenters that the proposedrequirements regarding locomotivesecurement were over broad by failingto distinguish among (i) locomotives inthe lead consist of a train, (ii)distributed power locomotives, and (iii)locomotives within yard limits. FRAagrees that these securementrequirements contained in this final ruleshould not apply to distributed powerlocomotives. Consequently, theseparagraphs establish specificsecurement requirements that applyonly to locomotives in the lead consistof a train and are based on the locationof the locomotive or locomotive consistwhen it is being left unattended.

Paragraph (n)(5) retains the proposedand existing requirement that any handbrakes applied to secure unattendedequipment not be released until it is



known that the air brake system isproperly charged.

It should be noted that paragraph (n)reflects FRA’s agreement with thevarious concerns raised regarding theproposed requirements to use derails tosecure unattended equipment and tochock and chain locomotives when leftunattended on certain grades. FRAagrees that the use of derails, asproposed in the NPRM, couldpotentially create safety hazards if notproperly removed and might exposeemployees to a greater potential forinjury by increasing the handling andmovement of derails. FRA also agreesthat if handbrakes are properly appliedon unattended locomotives there is littleneed to chock and chain locomotivewheels in most instances and such arequirement merely creates the potentialof exposing railroad employees tounnecessary risks. Furthermore, FRAbelieves that the alternative approachsubmitted by the CAPUC regardingwhen and where derails should beapplied is too complicated, requiresfurther research, and might requireunnecessary securement in manyinstances. Thus, the approach taken inthis final rule is to provide requirementsfor the setting of hand brakes andrequire railroads to ensure the capabilityof those hand brakes to hold theequipment. If the applied hand brakesdo not adequately hold the equipment,FRA would expect the railroad to utilizeother methods of securement such asderails, skates, chains, and chocks.

Paragraph (o), previously proposed asparagraph (p), requires that air pressureregulating devices be adjusted inaccordance with the air pressurescontained in the chart contained in thisparagraph. The chart is very similar tothat proposed in the NPRM, but hasbeen slightly modified in response tothe comments received. The referencesto equipment used in passengeroperations has been eliminated, and thepressure of the self-lapping portion forindependent air brake has beenmodified to read ‘‘30 psi or less’’ ratherthan the proposed ‘‘30–72 psi.’’

Paragraph (p) contains the proposedprovision regarding the jointresponsibility of supervisors andinspectors to ensure the propercondition and functioning of train brakesystems. The provision contained in thisparagraph has been slightly modified inorder to remain consistent with theexisting requirement regarding suchjoint responsibility contained at§ 232.11(a). These modifications clarifythat joint responsibility exists to theextent that it is possible to detectdefective equipment by the inspectionsand tests required by this part.

Section 232.105 General Requirementsfor Locomotives

For the most part, this sectioncontains general provisions related tolocomotives that are either currentlycontained in § 232.10 or that werepreviously proposed in the NPRM. Asdiscussed in detail in the NPRM, FRAdoes not intend to include provisions inthis final rule related to the inspectionand maintenance of locomotive brakingsystems. FRA believes that theserequirements are adequately addressedin part 229 and would only add to thecomplexity of this rule and potentiallycause confusion or misunderstanding bymembers of the regulated community.Therefore, while many of therequirements currently contained in§ 232.10 are no longer necessary as theyare adequately addressed in part 229,paragraphs (a) and (c) are provisionscurrently contained in § 232.10 whichFRA believes need to be retained. See 49CFR 232.10(b) and (f)(2).

Paragraph (c) retains the proposedrequirement that the hand or parkingbrake on a locomotive be inspected andrepaired, if necessary, at least every 368days. It should be noted that paragraph(c) has been slightly modified from thatproposed in order to allow the date ofthe last inspection of the hand brake tobe entered on Form FRA F 6180–49A inlieu of stenciling such information onthe car. As the current regulationpermits either the stenciling or taggingof a locomotive with this informationand because many railroads currentlyrecord the information on the formnoted above, FRA believes it isappropriate to continue to allow such apractice. FRA continues to believe thatthis inspection requirement will havelittle or no impact on railroads as thisinspection is intended to coincide withthe annual locomotive inspectionrequired under § 229.27 and manyrailroads currently inspect these devicesat this annual inspection. FRA alsocontinues to believe that a thoroughinspection of these devices on an annualbasis is sufficient to ensure the properand safe functioning of the devices.

Paragraph (b) retains the proposedrequirement that locomotives ordered orplaced in service for the first time afterthe specified dates be equipped with ahand or parking brake. Although thefinal rule retains the requirements thatthe hand or parking brake be capable ofbeing set and released manually, thefinal rule modifies the requirementregarding the holding capability of suchbrakes. Rather than requiring that thebrake be capable of holding theequipment on the maximum gradeanticipated by the operating railroad,

the final rule requires that the brake becapable of holding the equipment on athree-percent grade. Based oninformation provided by severallocomotive manufacturers, FRA agreesthat current locomotive hand andparking brakes are designed to achievea three-percent holding capacity andthat current operating practices arebased on this capacity. Severalmanufacturers assert that if the holdingcapacity of these brakes had to beincreased, then the cost of a locomotivewould increase significantly as such anincrease would require redesign of thefoundation brake rigging. As the currentdesigns have provided adequate safetyand the enhanced design would be veryexpensive relative to the improvementin safety, this paragraph has beenamended to require that the hand orparking brake be capable of holding theunit on a three percent grade.

A hand or parking brake is animportant safety feature that preventsthe rolling or runaway of parkedlocomotives. The requirementscontained in this paragraph representcurrent industry practice. In the 1994NPRM on power brakes, FRA proposedrequiring that a hand brake be equippedon locomotives. See 59 FR 47729. FRAreceived several comments to thatproposal suggesting that the term‘‘parking brake’’ be added to therequirement since that is what is usedon many newly built locomotives. Aparking brake generally can be appliedother than by hand, such as by springpressure, by air pressure when the brakepipe air is depleted, or by an electricalmotor. Parking brakes usuallyincorporate some type of manualapplication or release feature, althoughthese features are generally moredifficult to operate. FRA believes thatparking brakes are the functionalequivalent of a traditional hand brakeand are capable of providing a similarlevel of security to stationaryequipment. Consequently, FRA addedthe term ‘‘parking brake’’ to the 1998NPRM and has retained the term in thisfinal rule.

In paragraph (d), FRA requires thatthe leakage of air from equalizingreservoirs on locomotives and relatedpiping be zero. The equalizing reservoircontains the controlling volume of airpressure, which is set to a desiredpressure by the locomotive engineer bysetting the regulating valve (also knownas the ‘‘feed valve’’) on the automatic airbrake system. When the automatic brakevalve handle is moved to the releaseposition, air supplied from thelocomotive air compressor and the mainair reservoirs is supplied to theequalizing reservoir through the



regulating valve. The brake pipepressure will then be charged to thelevel of the air pressure contained in theequalizing reservoir. When anapplication of the train brakes isdesired, the engineer moves theautomatic brake valve handle into theapplication zone. The movement of thebrake valve handle into the applicationzone shuts off the supply of air from theregulating valve to the equalizingreservoir, leaving the volume of aircontained in the equalizing reservoirtrapped in the equalizing reservoir. Thepressure of the trapped air can then bereduced to a desired amount bymovement of the automatic brake valvehandle. This will result in the brakepipe pressure responding and beingreduced to a pressure equal to thepressure contained in the equalizingreservoir. Furthermore, the air pressurein the brake pipe on most freightequipment will be maintained at thepressure in the equalizing reservoir dueto the maintaining features of the brakesystem. Consequently, any leakage fromthe equalizing reservoir will affect themaintaining feature of the automatic airbrake, causing the engineer to lose theability to effectively maintain control ofthe brake pipe pressure and, thus,affecting the ability of the engineer tosafely control the train in somecircumstances.

One manufacturer of locomotivescommented on the requirementcontained in this paragraph, contendingthat the requirement should not beapplied to locomotives utilizingelectronic braking systems because suchleakage is not detectable by thelocomotive engineer. This commentercontends that on these types of brakingsystems a continuous demand is madeon the compressor to offset any leakageand if the compressor cannot offset theleakage the engineer is notified and thetrain is automatically stopped ifnecessary. Thus, the systems aredesigned to be fail-safe in the event ofexcessive leakage. This commenterbelieves that FRA should recognizethese types of designs and except themfrom the requirement contained in thisparagraph.

FRA agrees that the electronic brakesystems currently in use on somelocomotives are designed to maintainequalizing reservoir pressure at a setlimit. Because these systems aredesigned to offset equalizing reservoirleakage, the locomotive engineer wouldnot experience any problem with theoperation of the train’s brakes if a minorleak occurs. However, if the leakageexceeds the ability of the system tomaintain the pressure, a fault messagewould be displayed to the locomotive

engineer and the train’s brakes would beautomatically applied, if necessary.Therefore, this section has been slightlymodified from that proposed in theNPRM to allow locomotives that areequipped with these types ofmaintaining features to continue tooperate with some leakage in theequalizing reservoir. However, thissection makes clear that when suchsystems identify an equalizing reservoirleak, the railroad is to perform therepairs necessary to eliminate theleakage at the nearest forward locationwhere such repairs can be made.Generally a leakage on these electronicbraking systems will be discoveredwhen maintenance personnel review thefault screen during routine inspectionsand tests. Therefore, if a locomotive isequipped with a braking system that hasthe ability to maintain equalizingreservoir pressure, with the automaticbrake valve set in the freight position ordirect release, an equalizing reservoirleak will generally not be required to berepaired until it is either identified bythe inspection forces or until thelocomotive engineer identifies thecondition during the normal operationof the train.

In paragraph (e), FRA retains theproposed prohibition on the use of‘‘feed or regulating valve braking,’’ inwhich reductions and increases in thebrake pipe pressure are effected bymanually adjusting the feed valve.‘‘Feed valve braking’’ has beenrecognized by both the railroad industryand FRA as an unsafe practice. Mostrailroads already have some type ofoperating rule prohibiting this type ofbraking. No comments were receivedobjecting to the inclusion of thisprohibition in response to the NPRM.

In paragraph (f), FRA also retains theproposed prohibition on the use of the‘‘passenger’’ position on the locomotivebrake control stand on conventionalfreight trains when the trailingequipment is not designed for graduatedbrake release. The ‘‘passenger’’ positionwas intended only for use withequipment designed for graduated brakerelease. Therefore, use of the‘‘passenger’’ position with otherequipment can lead to potentiallydangerous situations where undesiredrelease of the brakes can easily occurdue to the slightest movement of theautomatic brake valve. In FRA’s view,the only situation when the use of thepassenger position might becomenecessary to safely control a train iswhen equalizing reservoir leakageoccurs en route. If such a situationarises, this paragraph makes clear thatthe train may move only to the nearestforward location where the equalizing

reservoir leakage can be corrected. Noobjections were received by FRA inresponse to the NPRM with regard tothese requirements.

Paragraph (g) contains an existingrequirement which was inadvertentlyexcluded from the NPRM. Thisparagraph makes clear that engineersmust know that the brakes onlocomotives of which they are takingcharge are in operative condition. Thisrequirement is currently contained at§ 232.10(l). Thus, FRA is not imposinga new burden by incorporating thisrequirement into the final rule.Furthermore, FRA does not intend tocreate a new inspection requirement byincluding this provision, but intends forit to be applied and enforced in thesame manner as the existingrequirement. If a locomotive engineerrelieves another engineer, the conditionof the brakes could be determined,based on a conversation or report fromthe engineer being relieved. The railroadmay also elect to have mechanical forcesinspect the locomotive for properoperation of the brakes and have thelocomotive engineer accept thelocomotives based on the mechanicaldepartment’s inspection. However, alocomotive engineer may have toconduct a cursory inspection andperform a running test of the brakesystem to satisfy this requirement, if aprior inspection has not beenperformed.

Section 232.107 Air SourceRequirements

This section contains requirementsdirected at ensuring that freight brakesystems are devoid, to the maximumextent practical, of water and othercontaminates which could conceivablydeteriorate components of the brakesystem and, thus, negatively impact theability of the brake system to functionas intended. The general preamblesection of this rule provides a detaileddiscussion as to why FRA proposedmany of the items contained in thisparagraph. See discussion contained in‘‘Overview of Comments and GeneralFRA Conclusions’’ portion of thepreamble under the heading ‘‘AirSource Requirements.’’ Based on thework performed by and informationgathered by the RSAC Working Groupand based on FRA field experience, FRAcontinues to believe that requiringlocomotives to be equipped with airdryers would provide minimal safetybenefits and would impose an enormousand unwarranted cost burden on therailroads. Further, FRA continues tobelieve that simply requiring that yardair sources be equipped with air dryersmay not necessarily effectuate the



desired results unless the air dryers areappropriately placed to sufficientlycondition the air source. Many yard airsources are configured such that a singleair compressor services several branchlines used to charge train air brakesystems and, therefore, multiple airdryers may be required to eliminate theintroduction of wet air into the brakesystem. FRA believes that, as withlocomotives, requiring yard air sourcesto be equipped with air dryers wouldlikely impose a significant andunnecessary cost burden on therailroads.

This section retains the basicrequirements regarding yard air sourcesand cold weather operations that wereproposed in the NPRM with minormodification based on the commentssubmitted in response to the proposal.Paragraph (a) retains the provisionsrequiring railroads to adopt and complywith a plan to monitor all yard airsources to ensure that the yard airsources operate as intended, are inproper condition, and do not introducecontaminants into the brake system offreight equipment. FRA intends to makeclear that the inspections requiredunder this paragraph are to be thoroughinspections of the entire yard air source.This inspection would include allcompressors, piping, hoses, valves, andany other component or part of the yardair source to ensure it is in propercondition and operates as intended.

Paragraph (a) modifies some of theproposed requirements related to theyard air source monitoring plans. FRAagrees with the comments provided byseveral labor representatives that theproposed requirements did not establisha frequency with which inspections ofyard air sources should be conducted. Inproposing the requirement, FRA hopedthat various commenters wouldrecommend frequencies for conductingthese inspections. This did not occur.FRA agrees that a set frequency needs tobe established which will ensure thatyard air sources are inspected in atimely manner during various climaticconditions. Therefore, paragraph(a)(2)(i) requires that the monitoringplan developed by a railroad ensure thateach yard air source be inspected atleast twice each calendar year and thattwo of the inspections be no less thanfive months apart. FRA intends for thisrequirement to result in yard air sourcesbeing inspected each year during twodifferent seasonal periods.

Paragraph (a)(2)(ii) clarifies thatremedial action under the monitoringplans is required only on those yard airsources that are not operating asintended or that are found introducingcontaminants into brake systems. Thus,

the final rule removes the word‘‘potential’’ from the proposed languageas FRA agrees that the proposedlanguage was unclear and may havebeen over-inclusive. The final rule alsoeliminates the proposed requirement forrailroads to conduct a detailedassessment of the remedial actionstaken. FRA agrees with the assertions ofAAR that this proposed requirement isunnecessary because railroads will beconducting regular inspections of theyard air sources on which they haveconducted repairs or taken otherremedial action and will be able todetermine if the repair were effectivethrough those inspections. Paragraph(a)(3) retains the other proposed recordkeeping requirements related to yard airmonitoring plans but clarifies that therecords can be maintained eitherelectronically or in writing. FRAcontinues to believe that these recordsare necessary to ensure that railroads areproperly conducting the requiredinspections and are taking timely andappropriate remedial action when aproblem air source is detected.

The final rule does not containprovisions requiring FRA approval ofthe yard air source monitoring plansprior to their implementation assuggested by some commenters. FRAdoes not have the personnel orresources to review and approve theplan of each railroad and does notbelieve such approval is necessary giventhe specific requirements contained inthe final rule and the records that arerequired to be maintained. Although thefinal rule does not contain requirementsregarding the use of air dryers on eitherlocomotives or yard air sources, FRAadvocates the use of air dryers whenpossible and agrees that they haveproven effective in reducing the level ofmoisture introduced into the brakesystem. However, FRA believes that arailroad is in the best position todetermine where these devices willprovide the greatest benefit based on therailroad’s operation. FRA notes itsdisagreement with AAR’s contentionsregarding both the time and the costnecessary to implement the requiredyard air source monitoring plans. FRAsees no reason why a railroad wouldneed five years to implement a plan toinspect each of its yard air sources twicea year. These devices are used on afairly regular, if not daily, basis andshould not be that difficult to inspect.Consequently, FRA believes thatrailroads should easily be able toimplement these monitoring plans bythe three-year effective date provided inthis final rule.

Paragraphs (b) and (d) containadditional measures to minimize the

possibility of moisture being introducedinto the trainline. Paragraph (b) of thissection reiterates the proposed andcurrent requirement contained at§ 232.11(d), which requires thatcondensation be blown from the pipe orhose from which compressed air istaken prior to connecting the yard airline or motive power to the train. As anadditional precaution, paragraph (d) ofthis section retains the proposedrequirement that yard air reservoirs beequipped with an operable automaticdrain system, or be manually drained atleast once each day that the devices areused or more often when moisture isdetected in the system.

Paragraph (c) generally retains theproposed ban on the use of chemicals ina train air brake system. However, FRAagrees with the position asserted byseveral commenters that the proposedprohibition of all chemicals may havebeen somewhat overbroad and contraryto FRA’s actual intent. In proposing theprohibition FRA intended to eliminatethe use of chemicals, such as alcohol,which are known to degrade the rubberof a train’s brake system. FRA agreesthat there may be chemicals which arecurrently available or which are in theprocess of being developed which donot cause the problems associated withthe use of alcohol. In fact, FRA believesthere are products currently availablewhich do not degrade a brake system’srubber components. FRA believes thatseveral railroads are currently testing orusing these chemical alternatives.Therefore, FRA believes that there arealternatives to using alcohol whichcurrently exist or can be developedwhich would provide railroads theability to address the rare instanceswhere trainlines become frozen.Consequently, this paragraph slightlymodifies the prohibition on the use ofchemicals by imposing the prohibitionon chemicals that are known to degradeor harm brake system components, suchas alcohol.

It should be noted that FRA recentlypublished a final rule mandating theincorporation of two-way EOTs on avariety of freight trains, specificallythose operating at speeds of 30 mph orgreater or in heavy grade territories. See62 FR 278. Two-way EOTs providelocomotive engineers with thecapability of initiating an emergencybrake application that commences at therear of the train in the event of ablockage or separation in the train’sbrake pipe that would prevent thepneumatic transmission of theemergency brake application from thefront of the train through the rest of thetrain. These devices consist of a frontunit, located in the cab of the



controlling locomotive, and a rear unit,located in the rear of the train andattached to the brake pipe. Radiocommunication between the front andrear units is continually monitored andconfirmed at regular intervals, and therear unit is only activated whencontinuity of these radio transmissionsis not maintained over a specified timeinterval. This discussion of two-wayEOTs is particularly appropriate withinthe context of the air sourcerequirements. In the unlikely event thatcompliance with the requirementscontained in this section regarding dryair fails to sufficiently eliminatemoisture from the trainline, and arestriction or obstruction in the form ofice develops as the result of freezing ofthis moisture during cold weatheroperations, the two-way EOT devicebecomes a first-order safety device andwill initiate an emergency application ofthe brakes from the rear of train. Assuch, the vast majority of concernsassociated with moisture in the trainlinefreezing during cold weather operationshave been alleviated through theincorporation of this technology in mostfreight operations.

Paragraph (e) retains the proposedrequirement that a railroad adopt andcomply with detailed written operatingprocedures tailored to the equipmentand territory of the railroad to promotesafe train operations during coldweather situations. In 1990, the NTSB,in response to an accident whichoccurred in Helena, Montana,recommended that FRA amend thepower brake regulations to requireadditional testing of air brake systemswhen operating in extreme cold,especially when operated in mountaingrade territory. See NTSBRecommendation R–89–081 (February12, 1990). In response to thisrecommendation and to variouspetitions for rulemaking requestingsimilar action, FRA in the 1994 NPRMproposed various requirementsregarding cold weather operations,which included: use of two-way EOTs;prohibition on the use of alcohol intrainlines; air dryers on locomotives;and requirements for railroads todevelop procedures for operating duringcold weather and in mountain gradeterritories. As noted previously, a finalrule regarding the use of two-way EOTshas been issued and is in effect. Thisfinal rule also prohibits the use ofcertain anti-freeze chemicals, containsother requirements to ensure that dry airis being added to brake systems, andretains the previously proposedrequirement that railroads adopt andcomply with operating requirements for

cold weather and heavy-gradeoperations.

FRA recognizes that in the past therehas been little support for mandatingadditional brake system testing duringcold weather. FRA agrees that thedevelopment and use of welded pipefittings, wide-lip hose couplings, andferrule clamps have greatly reduced theeffects of cold weather on the air brakesystem. However, FRA continues tobelieve that cold weather situations doinvolve added safety risks and need tobe further addressed. FRA believes thatrequiring the development of writtenoperating procedures will requirerailroads to go through the thoughtprocess necessary to analyze theiroperations during cold weatherconditions in order to determine theinherent safety hazards involved anddevelop procedures to minimize thosehazards. Due to the unique nature ofeach railroad and the difficulty indeveloping specific requirements thatare applicable to all operations, FRAdoes not intend to mandate specificoperating requirements at this time.However, FRA might considermandating specific operatingrequirements that should be included ina railroad’s cold weather operatingpractices if it is found that railroads donot develop sufficient requirements toaddress safe cold weather operations.

FRA recognizes that some railroadshave already developed certain coldweather operating procedures whichmight be useful as models on othersimilarly situated railroads. Forexample, BNSF has unilaterallyinstituted a cold weather operating planfor certain trains at specific locations inMontana. This plan requires trains withgreater than 100 tons per operativebrake to be inspected or operated in acertain manner when temperatures fallbelow zero degrees. Part of the planrequires that after the performance of a1,000-mile or initial terminal brake teston such trains, the brakes be reset andheld for 30 minutes after which time thetrain is to be reinspected to ensure that100 percent of the brakes remainedapplied. Brakes found not to haveremained applied must be set out of thetrain or repaired. FRA believes thatprocedures such as these could greatlyenhance the safety of the trains operatedin cold weather conditions. FRArecognizes that there may be other typesof operating or inspection criteria thatcould be implemented in extreme coldweather instead of, or in addition to,that noted above; such as, limits on thelength or tonnage of such trains, limitson the use of yard air sources, or otherenhanced inspection criteria. At thistime, FRA continues to believe that

railroads are in the best position todetermine what procedures are bestsuited to their operations.

Section 232.109 Dynamic BrakeRequirements

This section contains the operatingrequirements for trains equipped withdynamic brakes. Most, if not all, of therailroads participating in andcommenting on this rulemaking haveasserted that they do not considerdynamic brakes to be a safety device.However, these same commenters admitthat they promote and encourage the useof dynamic brakes for purposes of fuelefficiency and to avoid wear to brakecomponents. Due to thisencouragement, dynamic brakes arerelied on to control train speed and toprovide assistance in controlling trainson heavy grades. Contrary to continuedcomments of several laborrepresentatives, FRA does not feel thatlocomotives should be required to beequipped with dynamic brakes. FRAbelieves that the decision to equip alocomotive with dynamic brakes ismainly an economic one, bestdetermined by each individual railroad.However, in order to prevent accidentsand injuries that may result from anover-reliance on the dynamic brake,which may fail at any time, FRAbelieves that if the devices are available,engineers should be informed on theirsafe and proper use and be providedwith information regarding the amountof dynamic braking power actuallyavailable on their respective trains. FRAcontinues to believe that by providingan engineer with as much informationas possible on the status of the dynamicbrakes on a train, a railroad betterenables that engineer to operate thetrain in the safest and most efficientmanner.

Paragraph (a) generally retains theproposed requirement that a locomotiveengineer be informed of the operationalstatus of the dynamic brakes on thelocomotives the engineer will berequired to operate. This paragraphmakes clear that the information is to beprovided to the locomotive engineer ata train’s initial terminal and at otherlocations where a locomotive engineerfirst begins operation of a train. Thisparagraph slightly modifies theproposed method for providing thisinformation to the locomotive engineer.The NPRM proposed that thelocomotive engineer be provided therequired information in writing. Theintent of the proposed requirement tonotify the locomotive engineer inwriting as to the operational status ofthe dynamic brakes was to ensure thatthe engineer had timely information on



the condition of the locomotives so heor she could operate the train in thesafest possible manner based upon thatinformation. Thus, FRA tends to agreewith the comments of several railroadsand their representatives that themanner in which the information isprovided to the engineer should not bea major concern provided theinformation is accurate and up-to-date.Therefore, this paragraph allowsrailroads to provide a locomotiveengineer with the required informationby any means they deem appropriate.However, this paragraph also makesclear that a written or electronic recordof the information provided shall bemaintained in the cab of the controllinglocomotive. This will ensure that reliefor other oncoming engineer will havethe information provided to theprevious operator of the train.

This paragraph also clarifies that theinformation is to be provided to thelocomotive engineer at the train’s initialterminal and at other locations where anengineer ‘‘first begins operation’’ of thetrain rather than where the engineer‘‘takes charge of the train.’’ Thisclarification is in response to commentsprovided by certain laborrepresentatives to prevent possiblemisinterpretation or abuse of therequirement since most railroadsconsider the conductor to be in chargeof a train.

Paragraph (b) retains the proposedrequirement to repair a locomotive withinoperative dynamic brakes within 30days of its being found inoperative or atthe locomotive’s next periodicinspection, whichever occurs first.There are currently no requirementsgoverning the maintenance and repair ofdynamic brakes. Experience has shownthat, since railroads do not considerdynamic brakes to be a critical safetyitem, repairs are typically effectuatedwhen it is convenient and economicalfor the railroad, with little regard fortimeliness. FRA believes that, asrailroads have become increasinglydependent on the use of dynamic brakesas an integral part of their publishedsafe train handling procedures, it is areasonable expectation on behalf oflocomotive engineers to have operabledynamic brakes on those locomotiveunits which are so equipped. Due to theindustry’s reliance on these brakingsystems, as noted in the discussionabove, FRA continues to believe theyshould be repaired as soon as possibleafter being found inoperative. FRAagrees that there must be an appropriatebalance between the operationalconsiderations important to thelocomotive engineer and the logisticaland repair considerations that will be

imposed on the railroads. FRAcontinues to believe that 30 daysprovides a railroad with sufficient timeto get a locomotive to a location wherethe dynamic brakes can be repaired andallows for the reallocation of motivepower when necessary so as to causeminimal disruption to a railroad’soperation. Although certain commentersrequested that the period allowed forrepair be reduced to 15 days or less,FRA believes such a reduction is unwiseas it might jeopardize a railroad’s accessto available motive power and couldcause delay in the movement of freight,consequences that may create safetyhazards themselves.

This paragraph also eliminates the useof the term ‘‘ineffective dynamic brake’’and replaces it with the term‘‘inoperative dynamic brake.’’ The term‘‘inoperative dynamic brake’’ is definedin § 232.5 of the final rule to mean anydynamic brake which no longerprovides its designed retarding force onthe train, for whatever reason. FRAagrees with the comment of the AARthat the use and meaning of the term‘‘ineffective dynamic brake’’ in theproposal was unclear and had thepotential of creating misunderstandings.Consequently, for clarity this sectionuses only the term ‘‘inoperativedynamic brake’’ to describe a defectivedynamic brake.

Paragraph (c) retains the proposedrequirements related to the tagging of alocomotive found with inoperativedynamic brakes. FRA believes that thetags required by this paragraph arenecessary to ensure the prompt andtimely repair of locomotives found withdefective dynamic brakes and alsoprovide locomotive engineers and arailroad’s ground forces with specificknowledge of the presence of such alocomotive. Contrary to the commentsof some parties, FRA does not believethat the tagging provisions contained inthis paragraph would require thedevelopment of new tags. Thisparagraph would allow the use of anytype of tag provided it is placed in aconspicuous location on the cab of thelocomotive and contains the requiredinformation.

Paragraph (d) contains a requirementthat an electronic or written record ofrepairs made to a locomotive’s dynamicbrakes be maintained and retained for aperiod of 92 days. Although thisrequirement was not proposed in theNPRM, FRA believes these records fallwithin the scope of the notice and arenecessary to ensure that repairs areconducted on a locomotive’s dynamicbrakes in a timely fashion. FRA alsobelieves that such a record will providea railroad with information regarding

the operation of the dynamic brakes andwill potentially permit railroads toidentify a repeated problem with alocomotive’s dynamic brakes to preventrecurrences of the problem and thus,increase the utilization of a locomotive’sdynamic brakes.

The final rule continues toacknowledge that some railroads,primarily short lines, may ownlocomotives that are equipped withdynamic brakes but due to the physicalterrain over which the railroad operatesor the operating assignments of theparticular locomotive, the railroadrarely, if ever, has the need to employthe dynamic braking capabilities of theindividual locomotive. In theseinstances, the maintenancerequirements discussed above becomeunnecessarily burdensome. Therefore,FRA continues to believe that relief iswarranted in these situations provided aspecified set of parameters is developedand adhered to that prevents direct andintentional circumvention of theproposed repair requirements.Therefore, paragraph (e) retains theproposed provision permitting arailroad to declare a locomotive’sdynamic brakes ‘‘deactivated’’ if thefollowing requirements are met: (i) Thelocomotive is clearly marked with thewords ‘‘dynamic brake deactivated’’ in aconspicuous location in the cab of thelocomotive; and (ii) the railroad hastaken appropriate action to ensure thatthe deactivated locomotive is incapableof utilizing dynamic braking effort toretard or control train speed. It shouldbe noted that the final rule eliminatesthe requirement to stencil the outside ofa locomotive declared to havedeactivated dynamic brakes. FRA agreeswith the comments submitted by theAAR and other railroad representativesthat defacing the exterior of thelocomotive is unnecessary and woulddo little to inform the locomotiveengineer of the deactivation of thedynamic brake. FRA believes that therequirements to notify the locomotiveengineer of the operational status of thelocomotives and to have the cab of thelocomotive clearly marked that thelocomotive’s dynamic brakes aredeactivated provide sufficient notice tothe locomotive engineer as to the statusof that locomotive.

This paragraph does not prescribe thespecific manner in which a locomotiveis to be deactivated, so long as the unitis not physically capable of employingits dynamic brakes to aid in trainhandling. Although FRA does notenvision a significant number ofinstances where a locomotive which hasbeen declared ‘‘deactivated’’ wouldneed to be ‘‘reactivated,’’ FRA does



recognize that some railroads may needto reactivate the dynamic brakes insome circumstances, such as changes ina locomotive’s operating environment orsituations where a locomotive withpreviously ‘‘deactivated’’ dynamicbrakes is purchased by another railroad.However, FRA intends to interpret theprovision for ‘‘deactivating’’ alocomotive’s dynamic brakes ratherliterally to minimize contentions thatrailroads are merely playing a cat andmouse game with the requiredmaintenance interval to avoid repairingthe units. Furthermore, FRA wouldexpect the dynamic brakes on alocomotive to be fully functional at thetime the locomotive is consideredreactivated.

Paragraph (f) contains specificrequirements related to the use of alocomotive with inoperative,deactivated, or no dynamic brakes as acontrolling locomotive. Theserequirements are based on FRA’s reviewof the comments submitted in responseto FRA’s request regarding thepositioning of such locomotivescontained in the NPRM. See 63 FR48314. FRA tends to agree that there areno technical reasons why a locomotivewith inoperative dynamic brakes cannotfunction as the controlling locomotiveprovided it can control the dynamicbrakes on trailing units in thelocomotive consist. However, FRA alsoagrees that a locomotive engineer losesthe physical sensation of the operationof the dynamic brakes when the unit theengineer is riding loses dynamic brakecapability because the physicalsensation of operating dynamic brakesprovides the engineer with at least someassurance that the dynamic brakes onsome of the units in the consist areoperating. Thus, this paragraph makesclear that locomotives with inoperative,deactivated, or no dynamic brakes havethe capability of controlling thedynamic brakes on trailing units whenoperating as the controlling locomotive,and that such locomotives also have thecapability of displaying to thelocomotive engineer the decelerationrate of the train or the total traindynamic brake retarding force. FRAbelieves this requirement will ensurethat locomotive engineers have at leastsome information as to the operation ofthe dynamic brakes in the locomotiveconsist they are controlling. FRAintends that the information required bythis provision be provided by a deviceknown as an ‘‘accelerometer’’,‘‘predictor’’, or a similar type of device;or by a dynamic brake indicator capableof providing total train dynamic brakeretarding force to the locomotive

engineer. An ‘‘accelerometer’’ or‘‘predictor’’ is a device currently used inthe industry that indicates the predictedspeed in miles per hour of thelocomotive 60 seconds from the present,based on the computed acceleration ordeceleration rate. This would providethe engineer with an indication of theretarding performance of the dynamicbrakes and the train.

Paragraph (g) contains provisionsrequiring new locomotives to beequipped with some sort of dynamicbrake indicator. In the NPRM, FRAsought information and commentsregarding the feasibility of dynamicbrake indicators which continuallymonitor the operation of dynamicbrakes in a train consist. See 63 FR48334. The NTSB noted that the NPRMfailed to address its recommendationresulting from its investigation of theJanuary 12, 1997, freight trainderailment near Kelso, California, thatall locomotives equipped with dynamicbrakes be equipped with a device in thecab of the controlling locomotive toindicate real-time condition of thedynamic brakes on each trailing unit.See NTSB Recommendation R–98–6.Based on a review of the comments andinformation provided, FRA continues tobelieve that the technology does notcurrently exist to economically equipexisting locomotives with dynamicbrake indicators. However, FRA doesbelieve that the technology exists or issufficiently developed to provide newlocomotives with the ability to test theelectrical integrity of the dynamicbrakes at rest and to display the totaltrain dynamic brake retarding force atvarious speed increments in the cab ofthe controlling locomotive.Consequently, this paragraph requiresnew locomotives to be equipped withsuch indicators. FRA recognizes that theindustry will require a little time toincorporate the existing and developingtechnology into new locomotives.Therefore, the requirements containedin this paragraph will apply only tolocomotives ordered one and one-halfyears after the issuance of this final ruleand to locomotives placed in service forthe first time three years after theeffective date of the final rule.

Paragraph (h) contains requirementsfor equipping rebuilt locomotives withdevices to provide locomotive engineerswith additional information on theoperation of dynamic brakes on otherlocomotives in the train consist. Thisparagraph recognizes that not alllocomotives being rebuilt are designed,or have the capability of beingredesigned to have the capability todisplay the total train dynamic brakeretarding force in the cab of the

controlling locomotive. Thus, thisparagraph allows rebuilt locomotives tobe designed to display the traindeceleration rate (i.e., to be equippedwith an accelerometer, predictor, orsimilar device as described above) inlieu of being equipped with thedynamic brake indicator required onnew locomotives. FRA believes that theinformation provided by theseindicators is extremely useful to anengineer, will provide the engineer withready access to real-time information onthe operation of the dynamic brakes ina locomotive consist, and will permitthe engineer to control and operatetrains in the safest manner possible.

Paragraph (i) acknowledges that theinformation provided to a locomotiveengineer by a dynamic brake indicatorwould satisfy the need to provide thelocomotive engineer with informationregarding the operational status of thedynamic brakes when the engineer firstbegins operation of a train. As theindicators would provide real-timeinformation to the engineer on theoperation of the dynamic brakes in thetrain consist, a separate set ofinformation received by the engineerwhen beginning operation would beunnecessary. Therefore, this paragraphcarves out an exception to therequirement to inform locomotiveengineers of the status of the dynamicbrakes for situations when all of thelocomotives in the lead consist areequipped with dynamic brake indicatorsof the type required for newlocomotives. FRA believes that thisexception makes sense from a practicalperspective and also provides someincentive for railroads to equip existingequipment with such indicators wherepossible when the technology for doingso becomes economically feasible. Itshould be noted that there is norequirement that the dynamic brakestatus of distributed power units beprovided in order to eliminate the needto provide dynamic brake information tothe engineer. FRA agrees that thetechnology for transmitting thatinformation to the engineer is notcurrently available in a cost effectiveand reliable manner.

Paragraphs (j) and (k) retain theproposed provisions requiring railroadsto adopt and comply with writtenoperating rules governing the use ofdynamic brakes and to incorporatetraining on those operating rules intothe locomotive engineer certificationprogram pursuant to 49 CFR part 240.Contrary to the assertions of somecommenters FRA does not believe theserequirements are unclear. FRA intendsfor each railroad to develop appropriateoperating rules regarding train handling



procedures when utilizing dynamicbrakes that cover the equipment andterritory operated by the railroad. Manyrailroads already have these proceduresin place and already provide training totheir employees which adequately coverthe requirements. FRA continues tobelieve that training on proper trainhandling procedures is essential toensuring that locomotive engineers canproperly handle their trains with orwithout dynamic brakes and in theevent that these brake systems fail whilethe train is being operated. FRA alsodisagrees that it must specify theknowledge, skill, and ability criteria thata railroad must adopt into its trainingprogram. FRA believes that eachrailroad is in the best position todetermine what these criteria should beand what training is necessary toprovide that knowledge, skill, andability to its employees.

FRA continues to believe that theestablishment of these comprehensiveoperating rules and their incorporationinto a railroad’s training plans is themost effective means by which tominimize the possibility of futureaccidents caused by excessive relianceon dynamic brakes by a train crew as amethod of controlling the speed of atrain in its descent through a difficultgrade, as was the case in the SanBernardino incident. FRA views asunfortunate the number of existing trainhandling and power brake instructionsissued by freight railroads thatemphasize the use of dynamic brakesbut do not include prominent warningsthat such systems may not be reliedupon to provide the margin of safetynecessary to stop short of obstructionsand control points or to avoid overspeedconditions. FRA believes that suchinstructions, while not misleading toseasoned locomotive engineers, couldlead to an excessive reliance on thesesystems. Given the ever-increasingweight and length of freight trains, andthe severe grades that they are oftenrequired to negotiate en route, the needfor locomotive engineers who arethoroughly trained and knowledgeablein all aspects of train handling isparamount for continued safety in therail industry.

Paragraph (j)(2) requires that theoperating rules developed by railroadsunder this section include a ‘‘miles-per-hour-overspeed’’ requirement thatrequires trains to be immediatelystopped if they exceed the maximumauthorized speed by more than 5 mphwhen descending grades of one percentor greater. The NTSB recommended thatFRA adopt such a requirement as aresult of its investigation of the freighttrain derailment near Kelso, California

noted above. See NTSBRecommendation R–98–4. FRA agreeswith NTSB’s recommendation and alsoagrees with the comments provided byboth the NTSB and the CAPUC that thisrequirement accomplishes a criticalsafety function and reduces thepotential for runaways because itestablishes a clear rule for stopping atrain and removes any discretion fromthe operator to continue operation of atrain. This paragraph makes clear thatthe five-mph limitation is a good baselimitation which should be reduced bya railroad if it so desires or if areduction is indicated by validatedresearch. The five-mph limitation mayonly be increased with FRA approval.FRA notes that the operating rules ofvirtually every Class I railroad alreadyinclude a five-mph-overspeed provisionsimilar to that contained in thisparagraph. Consequently, FRA’sinclusion of the requirement in thisfinal rule should impose little or noburden on the operations of mostrailroads.

Section 232.111 Train InformationHandling

This section retains the proposedrequirements regarding the handling oftrain information, with slightmodification in response to thecomments submitted by interestedparties. The purpose of the train-information handling requirementscontained in this section is to ensurethat a train crew is provided accurateinformation on the condition of a train’sbrake system and other factors thataffect the performance of a train’s brakesystem when the crew assumesresponsibility for a train. This sectioncontains a list of the specificinformation railroads are to furnish traincrew members about the train and thetrain’s brake system at the time theytake charge of the train. FRA continuesto believe that train crews need thisinformation in order to avoid potentiallydangerous train handling situations andto be able to comply with variousFederal safety standards. Many railroadsalready provide their train crews withmost of the information required in thissection or have a process set up that cantransmit such information; thus, theimpact of these requirements should berelatively minor.

Paragraph (a) has been slightlymodified to clarify that the informationrequired to be provided in this sectionmay be provided by any meansdetermined appropriate by the railroad,provided, that a record of theinformation is maintained in the cab ofthe controlling locomotive. Thisrequirement does not constitute a

change from what was proposed in theNPRM but is merely a clarification toresolve an apparent misunderstandingof some parties. In the NPRM, FRAnoted that it intended to leave themethod in which the requiredinformation would be conveyed to traincrews to the discretion of each railroad.FRA believed that each individualrailroad is in the best position todetermine the method in which todispense the required information basedon the individual characteristics of itsoperations. However, FRA noted thatthe means for conveying the requiredinformation would have to be part of thewritten operating requirements, andrailroads would be required to followtheir own requirements.

Paragraphs (b)(1) and (b)(2) have alsobeen slightly modified, for purpose ofclarity, from what was proposed in theNPRM. Paragraph (b)(1) clarifies thattrain crews are to be provided therequired information when ‘‘takingcharge of a train’’ rather than when‘‘coming on duty’’ as was proposed.FRA agrees with the comments of theAAR that the modified language betterclarifies when the required informationis to be provided. Paragraph (b)(2) hasbeen modified to clarify that the weightand length information to be providedshould be based on the best informationavailable to the railroad. FRA agreeswith the comments of the AAR andseveral railroads that it is impossible toprovide the exact weight of each car ina train because the facilities to weigheach car do not exist. FRA also agreesthat it would be cost prohibitive andunrealistic to require that each car beweighed prior to being moved in a train.Consequently, the final rule makes clearthat the weight of the train can beestimated based on the best informationavailable to the railroad. It should benoted that FRA has eliminated theproposed requirement that train crewsbe provided a record of trainconfiguration changes sinceperformance of the last Class I braketest. FRA agrees that such information isnot necessary based on the otherinformation that is required to beprovided and has the potential ofcreating information overload for thetrain crews.

Subpart C—Inspection and TestingRequirements

Section 232.201 ScopeThis section contains the general

statement regarding the scope of thissubpart, indicating that it contains theinspection and testing requirements forbrake systems used in freight and othernon-passenger trains. This section also



indicates that this subpart contains thegeneral training requirements forrailroad and contract personnel whoperform the inspections and testsrequired by this part.

Section 232.203 TrainingRequirements

This section contains the generaltraining requirements for railroademployees and contractor employeesthat are used to perform the inspectionsrequired by this part. (See ‘‘Overview ofComments and General FRAConclusions’’ portion of the preambleunder the heading ‘‘V. Training andQualifications of Personnel’’ for adetailed discussion pertaining to theprovisions contained in this section.)This section retains the basic structureand concepts regarding the training andqualification of individuals performinginspections and tests required by thispart that were proposed in the NPRM.The training requirements contained inthis final rule have been slightly revisedfrom those proposed in the NPRM inorder to clarify FRA’s intent, torecognize existing training, and toreduce some of the burden that mayhave been inadvertently created by theproposed requirements.

Paragraph (a) requires that eachrailroad and each contractor adopt andcomply with a training, qualification,and designation program for railroademployees and contractor employeeswho perform air brake system tests,inspections and maintenance. Thisparagraph modifies the proposedprovision that would have required arailroad to provide training to thepersonnel of a contractor whom therailroad uses to perform the varioustasks required by the rule. Thisparagraph makes clear that thecontractor is responsible for providingappropriate training to its employeesand maintaining the required recordsand information. FRA agrees with thecomments submitted on behalf ofnumerous railroads that asserted thatrailroads should not bear the burden oftraining the employees of a contractor.However, FRA notes that this changedoes not relieve the railroad frompotential civil penalties for, e.g., failureto perform a proper Class I brake test,if the employees of a contractor arefound not to be qualified to perform thetask for which they are assignedresponsibility. Both the railroad and thecontractor would remain liable forpotential civil penalties if theemployees used to perform a particulartask were not trained and qualified inaccordance with the trainingrequirements contained in this finalrule.

For purposes of this section, a‘‘contractor’’ is defined as a personunder contract with a railroad or a carowner or an employee of a person undercontract with a railroad or a car owner.FRA intends for the training andqualification requirements to apply notonly to railroad personnel but also tocontract personnel that are responsiblefor performing brake systeminspections, maintenance, or testsrequired by this part. FRA believes thatrailroads and contractors are in the bestposition to determine the precisemethod of training that is required forthe personnel they use to conductrequired brake system inspections, tests,and maintenance. Although FRAprovides railroads and contractors withbroad discretion to develop trainingprograms specifically tailored to theiroperations and personnel, FRA willexpect railroads and contractors to fullycomply with the training andqualification plans they adopt. A criticalcomponent of this training will bemaking employees aware of specificFederal requirements that govern theirwork. Currently, many railroad trainingprograms fail to distinguish Federalrequirements from company policy.

Paragraph (b) contains generalrequirements or elements which mustbe part of any training and qualificationplan adopted by a railroad or contractor.FRA believes that the elementscontained in this section are specificenough to ensure high quality trainingand broad enough to permit a railroador contractor to adopt a training planthat is best suited to its particularoperation. This paragraph retains theproposed requirement that the planidentify the tasks related to theinspection, testing, and maintenance ofthe brake system required to beperformed by the railroad or contractorand identify the skills and knowledgenecessary to perform each task. FRAbelieves that most railroads alreadyhave a training plan and would merelyneed to revise it to reflect changes madeto existing requirements by this finalrule. The final rule eliminates theproposed requirement to developwritten procedures for performing eachtask identified. Although FRA believesthat each railroad or contractor shouldand will develop such procedures, FRAdoes not believe it is necessary torequire their development as FRAbelieves they will either be developed inthe required training curricula or aresufficiently detailed in the regulationitself.

This paragraph also clarifies that therequired training is intended to provideemployees with the skills andknowledge necessary to perform the

tasks required by this final rule. FRAdoes not believe it is necessary to trainan employee on every different type ofequipment that a railroad operates or oneach and every task an employees willbe required to perform. FRA’s intentwhen issuing the NPRM was to ensurethat the training received by anemployee provides that individual withthe knowledge and skills needed toperform the tasks he or she is assignedon the various types of brake systems onthe equipment the railroad operates.Therefore, this paragraph clarifies thisintent by specifically stating that thetraining curriculum, the examinations,and the ‘‘hands-on’’ capability shouldaddress the skills and knowledgeneeded to perform the various requiredtasks rather than focusing strictly on thetasks themselves or on the specific typesof equipment operated by the railroad.However, FRA does intend for thetraining developed by the railroad orcontractor to address the various typesof brake systems the employee will berequired to inspect, test, or maintain.For example, if an employee weretrained on how to perform a Class Ibrake test and demonstrated hands-oncapability to perform that task, FRAwould not expect the employee todemonstrate hands-on capability toperform a Class IA or Class II brake testsince the components of a Class I braketest cover these other inspections.However, FRA would expect theemployee to receive classroom trainingon when these other inspections arerequired and the tasks that are involvedin each.

This paragraph also clarifies that thetraining that an employee is required toreceive need only address the specificskills and knowledge related to the tasksthat the person will be required toperform under this part. Thus, a railroador contractor may tailor its trainingprograms to the needs of each of itsemployees based on the tasks that eachof its employees will be required toperform. FRA tends to agree withseveral commenters that there is noreason for an individual who performsstrictly brake inspections and tests to beas highly trained as a carman sincecarmen perform many other dutiesrelated to the maintenance and repair ofequipment in addition to brakeinspections.

This paragraph also clarifies thatprevious training and testing receivedby an employee may be considered bythe railroad. FRA did not intend torequire the complete retraining of everyemployee performing a task required inthis final rule. When proposing thetraining requirements, FRA intended forrailroads to incorporate existing training



regimens and curricula into theproposed training programs. In order toclarify this intent, this paragraphpermits railroads and contractors toincorporate an already existing trainingprogram, such as an apprenticeshipprogram, and contains a specificprovision which permits railroads andcontractors to consider previous trainingand testing received by an employeewhen determining whether an employeeis qualified to perform a particular task.Thus, railroads and contractors wouldmost likely not need to provide muchadditional training, except trainingspecifically addressing the newrequirements contained in this part andpossibly refresher training, to its carmenforces that have completed anapprentice program for their craft.However, the final rule also makes clearthat any previous training or testingconsidered by a railroad or contractormust be documented as required in thefinal rule. Thus, previous training ortesting which has not been properlydocumented cannot be considered. Thefinal rule also makes clear thatemployees must be trained on thespecific regulatory requirementscontained in this final rule related to thetasks that the employee will be requiredto perform. Therefore, all employeeswill require at least some training whichcovers the specific requirementsdetailed in this final rule.

This paragraph retains the proposedrequirements that any programdeveloped must include experiential or‘‘hands-on’’ training as well asclassroom instruction. FRA believes thatclassroom training by itself is notsufficient to ensure that an individualhas retained or grasped the conceptsand duties explained in a classroomsetting. In order to adequately ensurethat an individual actually understandsthe training provided in the classroom,some sort of ‘‘hands-on’’ capability mustbe demonstrated. FRA believes that the‘‘hands-on’’ portion of the trainingprogram would be an ideal place for arailroad to fully involve its labor forcein the training process. Appropriatelytrained and skilled employees would beperfectly suited to provide much of the‘‘hands-on’’ training envisioned by FRA.Consequently, FRA strongly suggeststhat railroads work in partnership withtheir employees to develop a trainingprogram which utilizes the knowledge,skills, and experience of the employeesto the greatest extent possible.

This paragraph also retains, withmodification for clarity, the proposedrequirement that employees pass eithera written or oral examination anddemonstrate ‘‘hands-on’’ capability.This paragraph clarifies that the tests

and demonstration of ‘‘hands-on’’capability cover the skills andknowledge the employee will need topossess in order to perform the tasksrequired by this part that the employeewill be responsible for performing ratherthan focusing strictly on the tasksthemselves or on the specific types ofequipment operated by the railroad.However, FRA does intend for thetesting and ‘‘hands-on’’ demonstrationto cover the various types of brakesystems the employee will be requiredto inspect, test, or maintain. FRAcontinues to believe that in order for aperson to be adequately trained toperform a task, the individual must notonly possess the knowledge of what isrequired to be performed but also mustpossess the capability of applying thatknowledge.

This paragraph also retains theproposed requirement regarding theperformance of periodic refreshertraining and testing. The final ruleretains the requirement that refreshertraining be provided at least once everythree years and that it include bothclassroom and experiential ‘‘hands-on’’training and testing. FRA continues tobelieve that periodic refresher trainingis essential to ensuring the continuedability of an employee to perform aparticular task. FRA does not intend forsuch training to be as lengthy or asformal as the initial training originallyprovided, but believes that the trainingshould reemphasize key elements ofvarious tasks and focus on items or tasksthat have been identified as beingproblematic or of poor quality by therailroad, contractor, or its employeesthrough the periodic assessment of thetraining program. This paragraph makesclear that a railroad or contractor mayuse efficiency testing to meet the hands-on portion of the required refreshertraining provided such testing isproperly documented and covers thenecessary tasks to ensure retention ofthe knowledge and skill required toperform the employee’s duties requiredby this part. FRA agrees that suchtesting provides the necessaryassurances that the individual continuesto have the knowledge and skillsnecessary to perform the task for whichthe employee is being tested.

This paragraph contains a provisionthat was not specifically included in theNPRM but which was intended by FRAto be covered by the established trainingprograms. This paragraph requires thatnew brake systems be added to trainingprograms prior to their introduction intorevenue service. Several laborrepresentatives recommended that thisprovision be explicitly added to thetraining provisions, and FRA believes

this requirement is only logical andmakes sense. FRA believes that, prior tothe introduction of any new brakesystem, the employees responsible forinspecting and maintaining theequipment need to be specificallytrained on the systems in order toadequately perform their required tasks.

This paragraph also retains theproposed requirement that supervisorsexercise oversight to ensure that allidentified tasks are performed inaccordance with the railroad’sprocedures and the specific Federalregulatory requirements contained inthis part. Although the final rule alsodoes not specifically address thetraining that must be provided tosupervisors as suggested by somecommenters, FRA believes thatsupervisors are sufficiently covered bythe requirements contained in thissection. FRA believes that in order fora supervisor to properly exerciseoversight of an employee’s work, thesupervisor must be trained and qualifiedto perform the tasks for which they haveoversight responsibilities.

Paragraph (c) requires each railroadthat operates trains required to beequipped with two-way EOTs and eachcontractor that maintains such devicesadopt and comply with a trainingprogram which specifically addressesthe testing, operation, and maintenanceof the devices. The final rule requiringthe use of two-way EOTs becameeffective on July 1, 1997. Since thattime, FRA has discovered numerousoperating and mechanical employeeswho do not fully understand when thedevices are required or how theinspection and testing of the devices areto be accomplished. Furthermore, FRAbelieves that it is vital for thoseemployees responsible for the use of thedevices (e.g. engineers and conductors)to be intimately familiar with the useand operation of the devices to ensurethat the full safety potential of thedevices is utilized and available.Consequently, FRA believes thatadequate training must be provided tothose employees responsible for theinspection, testing, operation and use oftwo-way EOTs.

Paragraph (d) requires railroads thatoperate trains under conditions thatrequire their employees to set retainingvalves to develop training programswhich specifically address the use ofretainers and provide such training tothose employees responsible for usingor setting retainers. This provision hasbeen added in response to an NTSBrecommendation which FRA supports.See NTSB Recommendation R–98–7.The NTSB specifically suggested that anexplicit requirement to provide this



training be contained in the final rule.The NTSB had previouslyrecommended such a requirement inearly 1998 based on its investigation ofthe 1997 derailment of a freight trainnear Kelso, California. Many railroadsare currently providing such trainingbased on that recommendation and FRAbelieves that a specific requirement toprovide such training will ensure thatall railroads that require theiremployees to set retainers adequatelytrain their employees responsible forperforming the task on the use ofretainers.

Paragraph (e) retains the recordkeeping requirements proposed in theNPRM with slight modification forconsistency with the changes notedabove regarding the application of theskills and knowledge necessary toperform a particular task. FRAcontinues to believe that the recordkeeping and designation requirementscontained in this final rule are thecornerstone of the trainingrequirements. Contrary to the views ofsome commenters, FRA believes thatsomething more than mere lists ofqualified employees is needed. Becausethe rule allows each railroad andcontractor the flexibility to develop atraining program that best fits itsoperation and does not impose specificcurriculum or experience requirements,FRA continues to believe it is vital forrailroads and contractors to maintaindetailed records on the training they doprovide. Such documentation will allowFRA to judge the effectiveness of thetraining provided and will provide FRAwith the ability to independently assesswhether the training provided to aspecific individual adequately addressesthe skills and knowledge required toperform the tasks that the person isdeemed qualified to perform. Moreover,requiring these records will deterrailroads and contractors fromcircumventing the training requirementsand discourage them from attempting toutilize insufficiently trained personnelto perform the inspections and testsrequired by this rule.

This paragraph makes clear that therequired records may be maintainedeither electronically or on paper. Manyrailroads currently maintain theirtraining records in an electronic format,and FRA sees no reason not to permitsuch a practice if the information can beprovided to FRA in a timely mannerupon request. The proposed provisionrequiring the railroad’s chief mechanicalor chief operating officer to sign astatement regarding each employee’squalifications has been modified in thefinal rule to merely requireidentification of the person or persons

making the determination that theemployee has completed the necessarytraining. This modification will permitthe information to be maintainedelectronically and will still provide theaccountability which FRA intended bythe provision in the NPRM. FRAbelieves it is absolutely essential thatthose individuals making thedeterminations regarding an employee’squalification be identified in order toensure the integrity of the trainingprograms developed and to preventpotential abuses by a railroad orcontractor.

FRA also objects to the portrayal bysome commenters that the requirementto maintain training records is overlyburdensome. Virtually all of the itemsrequired to be recorded are currentlymaintained by most railroads in somefashion or another. Contrary to theconcerns raised by some commenters,the rule does not require that thecontents of each training program bemaintained in each employee’s file.Railroads are free to develop whatevertype of cross-referencing system theydesire, provided the contents of thetraining program are maintained insome fashion and can be readilyretrieved. Furthermore, railroadscurrently maintain lists of individualsthey deem to be qualified persons, andthe companies inform those individualsas to their status to perform particulartasks. FRA believes this is a goodpractice and is necessary to ensure thatindividual employees do not attempt toperform, or are not asked to perform,tasks for which they have not beentrained.

Paragraph (e) requires that eachrailroad or contractor adopt and complywith a plan to periodically assess theeffectiveness of its training program.This paragraph modifies the proposedrequirement that railroads develop aninternal audit process to evaluate theeffectiveness of their training. AlthoughFRA agrees that a formal audit processmay not be necessary, FRA continues tobelieve that railroads and contractorsshould periodically assess theeffectiveness of their training programs.However, rather than require a formalinternal audit, FRA believes thatperiodic assessments may be conductedthrough a number of different meansand each railroad or contractor mayhave a need to conduct the assessmentin a different manner. This paragraphrequires that a railroad or contractorinstitute a plan to periodically assess itstraining program and, as suggested bysome commenters, the paragraphpermits the use of efficiency tests orperiodic review of employeeperformance as methods for conducting

such review. FRA agrees that manyrailroads, due to their small size, arecapable of assessing the quality of thetraining their employees receive byconducting periodic supervisory spotchecks or efficiency tests of theiremployees’ performance. However, FRAcontinues to believe that on largerrailroads the periodic assessment of atraining program should involve allsegments of the workforce involved inthe training. FRA believes it is vital thatlabor be intrinsically involved in theassessment process, from beginning toend. For example, evaluation of trainingtechniques might best be approachedthrough a ‘‘team’’ method, where severalobservers, including laborrepresentatives, periodically evaluatecourse or ‘‘hands-on’’ training contentand presentation.

Section 232.205 Class I Brake Test-Initial Terminal Inspection

This section describes thecircumstances that would mandate theperformance of a Class I brake test andoutlines the tasks that must beperformed when performing thisinspection. Most of the provisionscontained in this section are currentlycontained in § 232.12(a) and (c)–(h) orwere proposed in the 1998 NPRM inorder to clarify existing requirements, toeliminate potential abuses, and tostandardize certain provisions. Basicallya Class I brake test is intended to be thefunctional equivalent to what iscurrently referred to as an ‘‘initialterminal brake inspection.’’

Paragraph (a) identifies those trainsthat are required to receive a Class Ibrake test prior to movement from alocation. The provisions contained inthis paragraph are virtually identical tothose proposed in the NPRM, withslight modification for clarity. Paragraph(a)(1) requires that a train receive a ClassI brake test at the location where it isoriginally assembled. It should be notedthat the final rule eliminates the term‘‘point of origin’’ proposed in theNPRM. FRA agrees that the proposeddefinition of this term was duplicativeof the term ‘‘initial terminal’’ andmerely created potentialmisunderstandings. Moreover, FRAagrees that the problems attempted to beaddressed by the use of this term aresufficiently addressed by the variousinspections required in this final rulewhen cars are added to a train.

Paragraph (a)(2) requires theperformance of a Class I brake test whenthe train consist is changed other thanby adding or removing a solid block ofcars. Currently, there appears to be someconfusion over what constitutes a ‘‘solidblock of cars.’’ In order to clarify the



issue, FRA proposed a definition of‘‘solid block of cars’’ in the NPRM. Inresponse to numerous commentsregarding the proposed definition and tofurther clarify the issue, FRA hasmodified the definition in this final ruleand referenced that definition in thisparagraph. Although FRA believes thatthe definition it proposed is consistentwith current interpretations andenforcement of the requirement, FRAagrees with some of the commentersthat the proposed definition may havebeen too narrow and did not directlyaddress FRA’s primary concern, theblock of cars itself. FRA’s primaryconcern is the condition of the block ofcars being added to the train, especiallywhen the block of cars is made up ofcars from more than one train. Thus, thefinal rule will permit a solid block ofcars to be added to a train withouttriggering a requirement to perform aClass I brake test on the entire train.However, depending on the make-up ofthat block of cars, certain inspectionswill have to be performed on that blockof cars at the location where it is addedto the train.

FRA believes that limits have to beplaced on the number of blocks of carsbeing added to a train in order to ensurethat cars are being inspected in a timelymanner and in accordance with theintent of the regulations. Somecommenters suggest that a block of carsshould be permitted to be added to atrain with no inspection other than acontinuity test regardless of the numberof different trains the cars making upthe block came from provided all thecars received a Class I brake test at theirpoint of origin. Other commenterssuggest that any number of blocks ofcars should be permitted to be added toa train at a single location. FRA believesthat to accept either of these positionswould be tantamount to eliminatinginitial terminal and intermediateinspections and would drasticallyreduce the safety of freight trains beingoperated across the country. In FRA’sview, both of the positions noted aboveare merely means to circumventinspections and are akin to a practiceknown as ‘‘block swapping’’ in themechanical inspection context, apractice that FRA does not permit. InFRA’s opinion, the authority to addmultiple blocks of cars to a train at onelocation or add a single block of cars toa train that is composed of cars fromnumerous different trains withoutinspecting the cars in those blocks,would essentially allow railroads toassemble new trains without performingany direct inspection of any of the carsin the train. Furthermore, if cars are

permitted to be moved in and out of atrain at will, determining when andwhere a Class IA brake test must beperformed on the train will beimpossible.

This paragraph requires theperformance of a Class I brake test atlocations where more than one ‘‘solidblock of cars’’ is added to or removedfrom a train. It should be noted that thefinal rule permits both the addition andthe removal of a ‘‘solid block of cars’’ ata location without requiring theperformance of a Class I brake test onthe entire train. Although this practiceis not permitted under the existingregulations, FRA believes that theinspection requirements contained inthis final rule ensure the safety of carsbeing added and removed in thisfashion. This paragraph also contains anadditional caveat that will permit theremoval of defective equipment atlocations where other cars are added orremoved without triggering therequirement to perform a Class I braketest on the entire train. FRA currentlypermits this practice, and it is consistentwith the requirements aimed at havingdefective equipment repaired as quicklyas possible.

Paragraph (a)(3) incorporates FRA’slongstanding administrativeinterpretation which permits trains toremain disconnected from a source ofcompressed air (‘‘off air’’) for a shortlength of time without having to beretested. Currently, FRA permits trainsto remain ‘‘off air’’ only for a period ofapproximately two hours before aninitial terminal brake inspection mustbe performed. This paragraph retainsthe proposed extension of thepermissible time ‘‘off air’’ to four hours.A detailed discussion regarding FRA’sretention of the proposed extension ofthe permissible time cars may be left‘‘off-air’’ is contained in the preceding‘‘Overview of Comments and GeneralFRA Conclusions’’ portion of thepreamble under the heading ‘‘II. C.Charging of Air Brake System.’’

Paragraph (a)(4) retains the proposedrequirement that unit or cycle trainsreceive a Class I brake test every 3,000miles. The final rule has been slightlymodified from the provision containedin the NPRM to clarify that thisrequirement applies to unit or cycletrains. FRA has also added a definitionof ‘‘unit train’’ and ‘‘cycle train’’ to thefinal rule in order to clarify theapplicability of the requirement.Historically, these trains operate forextended periods of time with only aseries of brake inspections similar toClass IA brake inspections. FRAbelieves that the proposed 3,000-milelimitation is appropriate as it represents

the approximate distance that a trainwould cover when traveling from coastto coast. In addition, the 3,000-milerequirement is consistent with theinterval for performing Class IA braketests and would equate to every thirdinspection on these trains being a ClassI brake test rather than a Class IA braketest. Furthermore, AAR does not seek amoderate extension of a couple hundredmiles so a few trains could completetheir cycle, but seeks to extend thedistance to more than 4,500 miles inmany instances. FRA is not willing tomodify the proposed requirement to thatextent and believes that a 3,000-mileinterval for these types of trainsprovides sufficient flexibility to therailroads to perform periodic Class Ibrake tests on these train in a cost-effective manner.

Paragraph (a)(5) retains the proposedprovisions for when trains received ininterchange must receive a Class I braketest. These are similar to what iscurrently contained in § 232.12(a)(1)(iii);however, this paragraph retains twoproposed provisions that are notcontained in the existing regulations.The final rule will permit trainsreceived in interchange to have apreviously tested solid block of carsadded to the train without requiring theperformance of a Class I brake test.Currently, the addition of these types ofcars to a train received in interchangewould require the performance of aninitial terminal inspection. As long asthe added block of cars has beenpreviously tested, FRA sees no safetyhazard in permitting the cars to beadded to a train at an interchangelocation. Furthermore, the final rule willpermit a train that is received ininterchange, and that will travel nomore than 20 miles from the interchangelocation, to have its consist changedother than as provided in paragraph(a)(5) without being required to receivea Class I brake test; provided that, anycars added to the consist at theinterchange location receive at least aClass II brake test pursuant to § 232.209.Historically, FRA has not had a problemwith these shorter distance trains andbelieves that a Class II brake test onthose cars added to the train is sufficientto ensure the safety of these operations.

Paragraph (b) details the requiredtasks comprising a Class I brake test. Aproper Class I brake test ensures that atrain is in proper working condition andis capable of traveling to its destinationwith minimal problems en route. Thefinal rule retains virtually all of theprovisions proposed in the NPRMregarding the specific tasks that are to bepart of the Class I brake test, whichinclude most of the tasks currently



required by § 232.12(c)-(h) for an initialterminal brake test, with somemodification in the interest ofstandardization and clarity.

The final rule retains a standardizedbrake-pipe reduction of 20 psi forvirtually all brake inspections and testsas was proposed in the 1994 and 1998NPRMs. FRA agrees with both labor andmanagement commenters that astandard brake-pipe reduction willsimplify train brake tests and will makeit easier to train workers. The 20-psistandardized reduction was suggestedby both labor and managementrepresentatives.

The brake-pipe leakage test willcontinue to be a valid method ofqualifying brake systems. However, thefinal rule retains the air flow method oftesting the condition of the brake pipeas an acceptable alternate to the brake-pipe leakage test. The air flow method(AFM) would be an alternative only fortrains having a lead locomotiveequipped with a 26-L brake valve orequivalent and outfitted with an EOTdevice. The maximum allowable flowwould be 60 CFM. The AFM ofqualifying train air brake systems hasbeen allowed in Canada as analternative to the leakage test since1984. In addition, several railroads inthe United States have been using theAFM since 1989 when FRA granted theAAR’s petition for a waiver ofcompliance to permit the AFM as analternative to the leakage test. FRArecognizes the concerns of several labororganization commenters opposing theadoption of the AFM; however, FRAbelieves these commenters’apprehension is based on theirunfamiliarity with the method. As FRApointed out in the ANPRM, the 1994NPRM, and the 1998 NPRM, the AFMis a much more comprehensive test thanthe leakage test. See 57 FR 62551, 59 FR47682–47683, 63 FR 48305–06. TheAFM tests the entire brake system justas it is used, with the pressure-maintaining feature cut in. FRA believesthe AFM is an effective and reliablealternative method of qualifying trainbrakes. In the 1998 NPRM, FRAexpressed some concern regarding theuse of the AFM on short trains.However, based on consideration of thecomments received and FRA’sexperiences in observing the use of theAFM, FRA agrees that the AFM shouldbe permitted as an alternative on anytrain provided the 15 psi gradient ismaintained on the train.

The brake-pipe gradient of 15 psi hasbeen retained for both the leakage andair flow method of train brake testing;however, the minimum rear-carpressure has been increased to at least

75 psi, which will require a locomotivebrake-pipe pressure of at least 90 psi.FRA feels that the added margin ofbraking power justifies the increase inpressure. The final rule modifies thelanguage used in the proposedprovisions related to the air pressure atwhich the brake tests are to beconducted based on commentssubmitted by the NTSB. The NTSBnoted that the language used by FRA inthe NPRM to describe the air pressuresettings for conducting the requiredbrake tests would permit some roadtrains to be tested at a lower pressurethan that at which the train would beoperated. The NTSB contends thatalthough most road freight trainsoperate at 90 psi, some road freighttrains are operated at 100 psi and theproposal would permit them to be testedat 90 psi. FRA agrees with NTSB’ssuggestion that a train’s brake systemshould be tested at the pressure atwhich the train will operate and hasmodified the language of the final ruleaccordingly. Consequently, the finalrule requires that the brake system becharged to the pressure at which thetrain will be operated and that the rearcar pressure be within 15 psi of thatpressure and not less than 75 psi whenconducting the required brake tests andinspections.

Based on FRA’s experience over thelast several years and based onnumerous comments received by FRAverifying the high reliability of the rear-car pressure transducers used inreporting brake-pipe pressure by an end-of-train (EOT) device, FRA now feelscomfortable and justified in allowingthe use of EOT devices in establishingthe rear car pressure for Class I braketests. FRA currently has requirements inplace for the inspection and testing ofEOT devices at the time of installation,which have been incorporated intosubpart E of this proposal. However, inusing an EOT to verify rear car pressureduring a Class I brake test, the readingof the rear car air pressure is onlypermitted from the controlling orhauling locomotive of the train. Underno circumstances may train air brakepressure be read from a remote highwayvehicle, another locomotive notattached to the train, or at any otherlocation such as a remote unit installedin an office or shop.

Paragraph (b)(2) retains the proposedlanguage regarding the duties ofindividuals performing brakeinspections contained in this final rule.The language in this paragraph isreiterated in the final rule provisions onboth the Class IA and Class II brake testsin order to ensure the properperformance of brake inspections.

Contrary to the assertions of somecommenters, FRA believes that theproposed provisions sufficientlydetailed how the various inspectionswere to be performed while providingflexibility for railroads to conduct theinspections in a manner most conduciveto their operations. The methods ofinspection proposed in the 1998 NPRMincorporated current practices andtechnical guidance previously issued byFRA.

Over the last few years there has beenextensive debate concerning whatconstitutes a proper train air brake testunder the current provisions containedin part 232, particularly relating to thepositioning of the person performing thebrake inspection. In early 1997, FRAissued a technical bulletin to its fieldinspectors in an attempt to clarify whatmust be done in order to properlyperform a brake test. This technicalbulletin stated that inspectors mustposition themselves in such a manner soas to be able to observe all of themovable parts of the brake system oneach car. At a minimum, this requiresthat the inspector observe both sides ofthe equipment sometime during theinspection process. FRA continues tobelieve that both sides of the equipmentmust be observed sometime after theoccurrence of activities that have thelikelihood of compromising the integrityof the brake components of theequipment, such as: hump switching;multiple switching; loading; orunloading. FRA also agrees with thecomments submitted by several railroadrepresentatives that if one side of theequipment is inspected to ensure theproper attachment and condition ofbrake components and the propercondition of brake shoes on that sideand the application of the brakes isobserved from the other side of theequipment, then based on the design ofbrake systems today it can be safelyassumed that in virtually every case anapplication of the brakes is occurring onthe other side of the equipment.Consequently, FRA would like to againmake clear that both sides of theequipment do not necessarily have to beinspected while the brakes are appliedif an adequate inspection of the brakecomponents was conducted on bothsides of the equipment sometime duringthe inspection process. However, FRAalso intends to make clear that thepiston travel on each car must beinspected while the brakes are applied;thus, an inspector must take appropriatesteps to make this observation.

As indicated in the NPRM, FRA doesnot intend to mandate specific methodsfor how the various inspections are to beperformed. FRA believes that each



railroad is in the best position todetermine the method of inspection thatbest suits its operations at differentlocations. To require that all inspectionsbe performed by walking the train, assuggested by several laborrepresentatives, would impose a hugefinancial and operational burden on therailroads and would ignore the variousdifferent methods by which inspectionsare currently performed and have beenperformed for years. FRA has nevermandated specific step-by-stepprocedures for conducting brakeinspections but merely requires that,whichever method is used, it mustensure that all of the componentsrequired to be inspected will be soinspected.

Paragraph (b)(4) contains therequirements for ensuring that a properapplication of a car’s brakes is madeduring the performance of brakeinspections and provides the proceduresfor retesting a car found not to beproperly applied during the initialperformance of a brake inspection. Inproposing the requirements containedin this paragraph, FRA attempted toclarify language contained in the currentregulation which requires that thebrakes ‘‘apply.’’ The existing languagehas been misinterpreted by some tomean that if the piston applies inresponse to a command from acontrolling locomotive or yard testdevice, and releases before the releasesignal is given, the brake system on thatcar is in compliance with the regulationbecause the brake simply applied. Theintent of the regulation has always beenthat the brakes apply and remainapplied until the release signal isinitiated from the controllinglocomotive or yard test device. In orderto eliminate any confusion, thisparagraph requires that the brakes on acar must remain applied until theappropriate release signal is given. If thebrakes on a car fail to do so, the carmust either be removed from the trainor repaired in the train and retested asdiscussed below.

This paragraph retains the generalconcepts for retesting cars with brakesthat are found not to apply or not toremain applied that were proposed inthe NPRM. However, some of thespecific requirements for performing aretest have been modified from thoseproposed in the NPRM based on FRA’sconsideration of the commentssubmitted and its determination that theproposed retesting provisions may havebeen overly restrictive. This paragraphmodifies the proposed retestrequirements by permitting any carfound with brakes not applied during arequired inspections to be retested

rather than just cars with obviousdefective conditions. FRA agrees withthe assertions of several commentersthat there are a number of circumstanceswhere the reason for the failure of thebrakes to apply is not readily apparent.This paragraph reduces the amount oftime that the brakes on a retested carmust remain applied to three minutesfrom the proposed five minutes. Thefinal rule makes clear that the brakes ona retested car remain applied until therelease is initiated and that the releasebe initiated no less than three minutesafter the application of the brakes. FRAbelieves three minutes is consistentwith the amount of time it would takea person to conduct a completeinspection of the retested car’s brakes.This paragraph also permits a car to beretested with the use of a suitable devicepositioned at the car being retestedrather than from the head of the consistor from the controlling locomotive.When a retest is performed in thisfashion, the final rule requires that thecompressed air be depleted from the carbeing retested prior to separating thetrain line to perform the retest in orderto prevent potential injury to employeesconducting the retest. This paragraphalso makes clear that any retestperformed must be conducted at the airpressure at which the train will beoperated. The modifications made to theretesting requirements in this paragraphare reiterated or referenced in the othertypes of brake inspections required inthis subpart. A detailed discussionregarding the modifications made to theretesting provision is contained in thepreceding ‘‘Overview of Comments andGeneral FRA Conclusions’’ portion ofthe preamble under the heading ‘‘II. D.Retesting of Brakes.’’

Paragraph (b)(5) retains the proposedand current requirement that pistontravel be adjusted during theperformance of a Class I brake test if itis found outside the nominal limitsestablished for standard 81⁄2 inch and10-inch diameter brake cylinder oroutside the limits established for othertypes, which will be contained on astencil, sticker, or badge plate. Thisprovision is identical to that proposedin the NPRM and is similar to theprovision currently contained at§ 232.12(f). The major difference is thatFRA has modified the existing provisionto require that piston travel found to beless than 7 inches or more than 9 inchesmust be adjusted nominally to 71⁄2inches. This change is based on arequest by AAR to change theadjustment to 71⁄2 inches from 7 inchesas its member railroads were finding itextremely difficult to adjust the piston

travel to precisely 7 inches and that insome cases the adjustment would bemarginally less than 7 inches, thusrequiring a readjustment. Thus, AARsought the extra 1⁄2 inch in order toprovide a small measure for error whenthe piston travel is adjusted. As FRAbelieves that AAR’s concerns are validlyplaced and would have no impact onsafety, FRA has accommodated therequest.

Paragraph (b)(7) retains the proposedprovision which clarified that brakeconnection bottom rod supports will nolonger be required on bottomconnection rods secured with lockingcotter keys. FRA recognizes that there isno need for bottom rod safety supportsin these circumstances and intends torelieve railroads of this unnecessaryexpense, which will provide theindustry a cost savings withoutcompromising safety.

Paragraph (b)(8) retains the proposedprovisions relating to the performanceof ‘‘roll-by’’ inspections of the release ofthe brakes on the cars of the train. Thismethod of inspection has been used foryears even though there is nothing inthe current regulation whichspecifically addresses the method. Theauthority to use this method ofinspection of the brake release permitsrailroads to expedite the movement oftrains and has not proven to create asafety hazard. Therefore, this paragraphis intended to clarify the authority ofrailroads to use such a method and toensure that the inspection is performedproperly. This paragraph makes clearthat when a railroad is performing a‘‘roll-by’’ inspection of the brake releasethe train’s speed shall not exceed 10mph, that the qualified personperforming the ‘‘roll-by’’ inspectionshall notify the engineer when and if the‘‘roll-by’’ has been successfullycompleted, and that the operator of thetrain shall note successful completion ofthe release portion of the inspection onthe written or electronic notificationrequired by this final rule. FRA intendsto make clear that the notification to theengineer may be made through a handheld radio, a cellular telephone, orcommunication with a train dispatcherbut that such information must beprovided to the engineer prior to thetrain’s departure. Based on the rationaleprovided for permitting only one side ofa train to be inspected during theapplication of the brakes, FRA intendsto make clear that only one side of thetrain must be inspected during therelease portion of a brake test. However,paragraph (b)(2) makes clear that a ‘‘roll-by’’ inspection of the brake release shallnot constitute an inspection of that side



for purposes of inspecting both sidesduring the inspection.

Paragraph (c) generally retains theprovision as it was proposed in theNPRM and as currently contained in§ 232.12(a), with slight modification forclarity, stating that a carman alone willbe considered a qualified person if arailroad’s collective bargainingagreement (CBA) provides that carmenare to perform the inspections and testsrequired by this section. FRA receiveda number of comments from variouslabor representatives objecting to FRA’sproposed modification of the provisionthat currently exists in § 232.12(a).These commenters contended that theproposed language would alter themeaning of the existing provision andeffectively eliminate its enforceability.Particularly, they objected to theproposed addition of the word ‘‘only’’ inthe first sentence of the provision andthe proposed elimination of the phrase‘‘existing or future collective bargainingagreement.’’ They contend that no CBAprovides that only a carman mayperform the inspections and that it isunclear whether the provision willapply to future CBAs due to theelimination of the specific language tothat effect. They also asserted that it isunnecessary to require that carmen betrained as a qualified person or a QMIsince carmen were recognized as thecraft qualified to perform the inspectionin 1982.

FRA’s intent in proposing thisprovision was to clarify the meaning ofthe provision and explain FRA’s abilityto enforce the existing provision. FRA’sintent was neither to expand nor reducethe applicability of the provision. FRArecognizes that its proposed addition ofthe word ‘‘only’’ could have the effectof altering the provision in a way thatwas not intended as FRA agrees thatmany existing CBAs do not require thatonly a carman perform the inspections.Thus, the language of the provision inthis final rule eliminates the word‘‘only’’ from the proposed clause,‘‘Where a railroad’s collectivebargaining agreement provides that onlya carman is to perform the inspectionsand tests required by this section.* * *’’ However, FRA does not agreethat it is necessary to include the phrase‘‘existing or future collective bargainingagreement,’’ as suggested by somecommenters. FRA intends for thereference to a collective bargainingagreement to include any existing orfuture CBA. FRA believes that theinclusion of the suggested phrase isunnecessary because the plain meaningof the text is the CBA that applies at thetime the issue arises. FRA sees no wayto read the provision contained in this

final rule as not to include both existingand future CBAs.

FRA also believes that it is essentialfor railroads to ensure that theindividuals required to perform theinspections covered by this provisionare properly trained and qualified toperform the inspections. As therequirements contained in this final rulefor performing these inspections differsomewhat from the existing regulation,FRA believes it is necessary foremployees performing the inspectionsto be trained on these newrequirements. This paragraph merelymakes clear that, in circumstanceswhere a collective bargaining agreementrequires that a carman is to perform theinspections and tests required by thissection, the railroad shall bear theresponsibility of ensuring that thecarman responsible for performing thistask is properly trained and designatedas qualified to perform the task. In thesecircumstances, FRA believes that therailroad must ensure that the employeeswith whom they have collectivelybargained to perform the inspectionsand tests required by this section areproperly trained and designated toperform the task. Furthermore, FRAbelieves that on virtually all railroadscarmen will be sufficiently trained andexperienced to be considered ‘‘qualifiedpersons’’ and ‘‘qualified mechanicalinspectors’’ as defined in this proposal,provided they receive some additionaltraining on the specific requirementscontained in this final rule.

The original provision was added tothe regulations in 1982 when thedistance between brake inspections wasincreased from 500 miles to 1,000 miles.The provision was included as part ofan agreement between the railroads andrail labor for permitting the maximumdistance between brake tests to beincreased and was presented to FRA atthe time. The language contained in thatagreement was included in the 1982regulatory revisions without change byFRA. Consequently, due to thecircumstances under which thisprovision was added to the regulationsand because it has existed for over 16years, FRA feels compelled to retain thelanguage in this final rule. FRA willcontinue to interpret the provision as ithas always interpreted the provision. Incircumstances where a railroad’scollective bargaining agreement requiresthat a carman perform the inspectionsand tests required by this section, acarman alone will be considered aqualified person. This has been FRA’sapproach to the provision since itsinception.

As FRA lacks the authority to issuebinding interpretations of collective

bargaining agreements, FRA lacks theauthority to settle a dispute between arailroad and its employees as to whichgroup of its employees is to performwhat work. FRA intends to make clear,that in order for FRA to proceed with anenforcement action under the provisioncontained in this paragraph, one of theparties to the collective bargainingagreement would first have to obtain adecision from a duly authorized bodyinterpreting the relevant agreement,specifically identifying the involvedlocation, and adequately resolving all ofthe interpretative issues necessary forFRA to conclude that the work belongsto a particular group of employees.

Paragraph (d) contains therequirement regarding the notificationto the locomotive engineer and traincrew of the successful completion of aClass I brake test by a qualified person.This paragraph slightly modifies thenotification requirement from thatproposed in the NPRM. In the NPRM,FRA proposed that the engineer beinformed in writing of the successfulcompletion of the Class I brake test. Theintent of this proposed requirement wasto ensure that the locomotive engineerwas adequately informed of the resultsof the inspection; however, FRArecognizes that a requirement to providethe information in writing ignorestechnological advances and operationalefficiencies. Consequently, thisparagraph permits the notification to bemade in whatever format the railroaddeems appropriate; provided that thenotification contains the properinformation and a record of thenotification and the requisiteinformation is maintained in the cab ofthe controlling locomotive. FRAbelieves these changes are consistentwith the intent and purpose of theproposed requirement for writtennotification and ensure necessaryinformation is relayed to the operator ofthe train.

Paragraph (f) retains the proposed andexisting requirements relating to theadding of cars or blocks of cars while atrain is en route. This paragraph informsrailroads that cars picked up en routethat have not been previously tested andkept connected to a source ofcompressed air are to receive a Class Ibrake test when added to the train.Alternatively, a railroad may elect toperform only a Class II brake test at thetime that a car is added to the train enroute, but FRA intends to make clearthat if this option is elected then thecars added in this fashion must be givena Class I brake test at the next forwardlocation where facilities are available forproviding such attention.



Section 232.207 Class IA Brake Tests—1,000-Mile Inspection

This section retains the proposedrequirements related to the performanceof a Class IA brake test. Many of theprovisions contained in this section arecurrently contained at § 232.12(b)regarding the performance of 1,000-mileinspections. FRA has modified some ofthe existing requirements for purposesof clarity and has added a fewadditional requirements in order tomake the inspection requirement moreenforceable and to prevent some of thecurrent abuses which FRA fieldinspectors have observed in theirenforcement activities.

FRA recognizes that since 1982 newtechnologies and improved equipmenthave been developed that allow trains tooperate longer distances with fewerdefects. The data submitted by AARappear to support this assertion, andFRA does not dispute the potentialcapability of certain equipment to traveldistances in excess of 1,000 mileswithout becoming defective. However,the capability of the equipment to travelextended distances safely is contingenton the condition of the equipment whenit begins operation and on the nature ofthe operation in which it is to beengaged. FRA believes that in order forbrake equipment to travel extendeddistances between brake inspections,the condition and planned operation ofthe equipment must be thoroughlyassessed at the beginning of a train’sjourney through high qualityinspections. As noted in the generalpreamble discussion above, FRAbelieves that railroads are notconducting high quality initial terminalinspections at many locations becausethe railroads are utilizing employeeswho are not sufficiently qualified ortrained to perform the inspections.Therefore, FRA believes that the 1,000-mile brake inspection interval continuesto be necessary and important to ensurethe safe operation of trains inspected byqualified personnel pursuant to thisfinal rule. Furthermore, no trainsoperated in the United States arecurrently permitted to travel greaterthan 1,000 miles between brakeinspections. Consequently, FRA is notwilling to permit trains to travel inexcess of 1,000 miles between brakeinspections, except in the limited,controlled situations where data on theequipment can be gathered. (Seediscussion and provisions related to‘‘Extended Haul Trains.’’) FRA notesthat Canada eliminated intermediateinspections in 1994. However, Canadahas different inspection requirementsthan those contained in this final ruleand vastly different operating

conditions and environments than thoseprevalent on most American railroads,operating conditions and environmentsthat are more conducive to theinspection regimen imposed by thatcountry.

Paragraph (a) provides that each trainshall receive a Class IA brake test at alocation that is not more than 1,000miles from the point where any car inthe train last received a Class I or ClassIA brake test. FRA intends to make clearthat the most restrictive car or block ofcars in the train will determine thelocation where this test must beperformed. For example, if a traindeparts point A and travels 500 miles topoint B where it picks up a previouslytested block of cars en route which hastravelled 800 miles since its last ClassI brake test and the crew does notperform a Class I brake test whenentraining the cars, then the entire trainmust receive a Class IA brake test within200 miles from point B even though thatlocation is only 700 miles from point A.

Paragraph (b) contains the taskswhich must be performed whenconducting a Class IA brake test. Thesetask are virtually identical to some ofthe tasks required to be performedduring a Class I brake test. A leakage orair flow test must be performed. Thus,when locomotives are equipped with a26–L brake valve or equivalent, FRAwill permit the use of the air flowmethod as an alternative to the brakepipe leakage test. This paragraph makesclear that the brakes shall apply on eachcar in the train in response to a 20-psibrake pipe reduction and shall remainapplied until a release is initiated. Inaddition, the paragraph reiterates theparameters for performing a retest of thebrakes on those cars found not to havesufficiently applied, which arecontained in the Class I brake testrequirements. It should be noted that,defective equipment may be movedfrom or past a location where a Class IAbrake test is performed only if all of therequirements contained in § 232.15 havebeen satisfied. The only change to thetasks contained in this paragraph fromthose proposed in the NPRM is theclarification that the brake system becharged to the pressure at which thetrain will be operated and that the rearcar pressure be within 15 psi of thatpressure and not less than 75 psi whenconducting the required brake tests andinspections. This change is identical tothe change made in the Class I brake testand is discussed in detail in thatsection.

This paragraph also makes clear thatin order to properly perform a Class IAbrake test under this section both sidesof the equipment must be observed

sometime during the inspection process.FRA finds the comments of AAR andother railroad representativescontending that both sides of theequipment should not be required to beinspected at Class IA brake tests to lackmerit. The Class IA brake test basicallyincorporates the current 1,000-milebrake inspection, which FRA believesrequires an inspection of both sides ofthe equipment during the inspectionprocess. The current 1,000-mileinspection requires that brake rigging beinspected to ensure it is properly secureand does not bind or foul and that thebrakes apply on each car in the train.See 49 CFR 232.12(b). In order to makethese inspections properly, FRAbelieves that both sides of theequipment must be observed sometimeduring the inspection process and, toFRA’s knowledge, railroads currentlyconduct these inspections in thismanner. Thus, the NPRM and the finalrule merely clarify what is required tobe performed under the currentregulations to properly perform a 1,000-mile inspection. Therefore, contrary tothe contentions of certain commenters,retention of this current requirementdoes not impose any additional burdenon the railroads.

Paragraph (c) retains the proposedprovision which would require railroadsto maintain a list of locations whereClass IA inspections will be performedand that FRA be notified at least 30 daysin advance of any change to that list oflocations. Based on a review of thecomments submitted, FRA recognizesthat the proposed requirement fordesignating locations where Class IAinspections will be performed wassomewhat unclear and may have causedconfusion. The intent of the proposedrequirement was to ensure that FRA wasinformed of those locations where arailroad intends to perform Class IAbrake inspections and that FRA had theinformation with which to hold therailroad responsible for conducting theinspections at those locations. FRA wasnot intending to require that railroadseparately identify a specific Class IAinspection location for each train itoperates. Consequently, this paragraphhas been slightly modified from thatproposed in order to make clear that thedesignation required is for locationswhere such inspections will beperformed and permits deviance fromthose locations only in emergencysituations.

The current regulations merelyrequire that railroads designatelocations where intermediate 1,000-milebrake inspections will be performed butplace no limitation on changing thelocations. Therefore, FRA has found



some railroads changing the locationswhere these intermediate inspectionsare to occur on a daily basis whichprevents FRA from observing theseinspections being performed or avoidsfull performance of the requiredinspection by mechanical forces. Inorder to ensure that these types ofinspections are being properlyperformed, FRA must be able todetermine where the railroad plans toconduct these types of inspections. Thisparagraph recognizes that there may beoccurrences or emergencies, such asderailments, that make it impossible orunsafe for a train to reach a location thatthe railroad has designated as a Class IAinspection site. Consequently, thisparagraph permits railroads to bypassthe 30-day written notificationrequirement in these instances providedFRA is notified within 24 hours after adesignation has been changed. Thisparagraph also makes clear that failureto perform a Class IA brake test at adesignated location will constitute afailure to properly perform theinspection.

Section 232.209 Class II Brake Tests—Intermediate Inspection

This section contains therequirements related to the performanceof Class II brake tests. The requirementscontained in this section are similar tothe proposed requirements and therequirements currently contained in§ 232.13(d) but have been slightlymodified for clarity and to addresssituations where solid blocks of cars areadded to an en route train. Paragraph (a)identifies those cars that are required toreceive a Class II brake test when addedto a train. This paragraph has beenmodified to address situations whencertain ‘‘solid blocks of cars’’ are addedto a train. As discussed previously, thefinal rule modifies the definition of‘‘solid block of cars’’ from that proposedin the NPRM. (See section-by-sectionanalysis of § 232.5.) Although FRAbelieves the definition it proposed wasconsistent with current interpretationsand enforcement of the requirement,FRA agrees with some of thecommenters that the definition mayhave been too narrow and did notdirectly address FRA’s primary concern,the block of cars itself. FRA’s primaryconcern is the condition of the block ofcars being added to the train especiallywhen the block of cars is made up ofcars from more than one train. Thus, thefinal rule permits a ‘‘solid block of cars’’to be added to a train without triggeringa requirement to perform a Class I braketest on the entire train. However, thisparagraph identifies the situations when

‘‘solid blocks of cars’’ must be inspectedwhen added to a train.

This paragraph makes clear that a caror a solid block of cars that has notpreviously received a Class I brake testor that has been off a source ofcompressed air for longer than fourhours must, at a minimum, receive aClass II brake test when added to an enroute train. This paragraph also makesclear that a Class II brake test is requiredto be performed on each ‘‘solid block ofcars’’ added to a train which iscomposed of cars from more than oneother train or that is composed of carsfrom only one other train but that havenot remained continuously andconsecutively coupled together. Itshould be noted that this paragraphspecifically acknowledges that theremoval of defective equipment from asolid block of cars will not result in thesolid block of cars being considered notto be continuously and consecutivelycoupled together. FRA believes thisapproach is consistent with the intent ofboth FRA and Congress to havedefective equipment repaired as quicklyas possible.

Paragraph (b) retains the proposedtasks which must be performed whenconducting a Class II brake test. Theonly changes to the tasks contained inthis paragraph from those proposed inthe NPRM is the clarification that thebrake system be charged to the pressureat which the train will be operated andthat the rear car pressure be within 15psi of that pressure and not less than 75psi when conducting the required braketests and inspections and theprocedures for performing retests oncars. These changes are identical to thechanges made in the Class I and ClassIA brake tests and are discussed indetail in those sections.

A Class II brake test is intended toensure that the brakes on those carsadded apply and release and that theadded cars do not compromise theintegrity of the train’s brake system.Therefore, a leakage or air flow test mustbe performed when the cars are addedto the train to ensure the integrity of thetrain’s brake system. This paragraphmakes clear that in order to properlyperform an inspection under thissection both sides of the equipmentmust be observed sometime during theinspection process. This paragraph alsomakes clear that the brakes shall applyon each car added to the train andremain applied until a release isinitiated and reiterates the parametersthat are contained in the Class I braketest requirements for performing a reteston those cars whose brakes were foundnot to have sufficiently applied. Itshould be noted that, defective

equipment may be moved from or pasta location where a Class II brake test isperformed only if all of therequirements contained in § 232.15 havebeen satisfied. Paragraph (b) alsorequires that the release of the brakes onthose cars added to the train and on therear car of the train be verified andallows railroads to conduct ‘‘roll-by’’inspections for this purpose.

Paragraph (c) continues to permit theproposed and existing alternative to therear car application and release portionof this test. This alternative permits thelocomotive engineer to rely on a rear cargauge or end-of-train device todetermine that the train’s brake pipepressure is being reduced by at least 5psi and then restored by at least 5 psiin lieu of direct observation of the rearcar application and release. Althoughcertain labor representatives contendedthat this practice should not be allowedand that it is in violation of the existingregulations, this alternative has beenpermitted for years under the currentregulations (§ 232.13(c)(1), (d)(1))without any degradation of safety, andthus, FRA intends to permit the practiceto continue.

Paragraph (d) retains the proposedand existing requirements relating to theinspection of cars or blocks of carsadded to a train while a train is enroute. This paragraph makes clear thatif cars are given a Class II brake testwhen added to a train then the carsadded must receive a Class I brake testat the next forward location where thefacilities are available for performingsuch an inspection.

Section 232.211 Class III BrakeTests—Trainline Continuity Inspection

This section contains therequirements related to the performanceof Class III brake tests. The requirementscontained in this section are generallythe same as those proposed, whichincorporated the requirements currentlycontained in § 232.13(c), but have beenslightly modified for clarity andstandardization with the changes madein other inspection requirementscontained in this final rule. Some of thechanges made in this section from thatproposed clarify the need to perform aClass III brake test when a solid blockof cars is added to a train which doesnot require the performance of either aClass I or Class II brake test. Paragraph(b) of this section has been modified toincorporate the clarification that thebrake system be charged to the pressureat which the train will be operated andthat the rear car pressure be within 15psi of that pressure and not less than 75psi when conducting the requiredinspection.



The purpose of a Class III brake testis to ensure the integrity of the trainlinewhen minor changes in the train consistoccur. Basically, a Class III brake testensures that the train brake pipe isproperly delivering air to the rear of thetrain. FRA intends to make clear thatthis inspection is designed to beperformed whenever the continuity ofthe brake system is broken orinterrupted. For example, if a railroaddisconnects a locomotive from a trainconsist to perform switching duties fora short period and then reattaches thelocomotive to the consist, without anyother change being made in the consist,the railroad would be required toperform a Class III brake test prior to thetrain’s departure. Similarly, a Class IIIbrake test would be required if arailroad disconnects a locomotive fromthe train and adds a differentlocomotive to the train, only to discoverthat the added locomotive is notoperating properly, and thus, adds theoriginal locomotive back into theconsist. Because the continuity of thetrainline was interrupted when thelocomotive was removed and thenplaced back in the train, even thoughthe same cars and locomotives remainedin the consist, a Class III brake test mustbe performed.

Paragraphs (b) and (c) contain thetasks related to the performance of aClass III brake test. These paragraphsrequire that the brakes on the rear carof the train apply in response to a 20-psi brake pipe reduction and that thebrakes subsequently release on the rearcar of the train when the release isinitiated. Similar to a Class II brake test,paragraph (c) permits an alternative todirect observation of the application andrelease of the rear car’s brakes bypermitting the operator to rely on a rearcar gauge or end-of-train device todetermine that the brake pipe pressureis being reduced and restored inresponse to the controlling locomotive.

Section 232.213 Extended Haul TrainsThis section generally retains the

proposed provisions, which permit anextension of the allowable maximumdistance a train may travel betweentrain brake system tests. Afterconsideration of all the commentssubmitted on this matter, FRA continuesto believe that if a train is properly andthoroughly inspected, with as manydefective conditions being eliminated aspossible, then the train is capable oftraveling much greater than 1,000 milesbetween brake inspections. (A detaileddiscussion of the comments submittedon this issue is contained in thepreceding ‘‘Overview of Comments andGeneral FRA Conclusions’’ portion of

the preamble under the heading ‘‘II. B.Extended Haul Trains.’’) Therefore, thefinal rule retains the provisionspermitting railroads to designate trainsas extended haul trains and allowingsuch trains to be operated up to 1,500miles between brake inspections.Although FRA recognizes that retentionof the 1,500-mile limitation may limitthe utility of the provision on somerailroads, FRA is not willing to increasethe proposed mileage restriction at thistime. Currently, no train is permitted totravel more than 1,000 miles withoutreceiving an intermediate brakeinspection. Therefore, FRA does notbelieve it would be prudent toimmediately double or triple thecurrently allowed distance withoutevaluating the safety and operationaleffects of an incremental increase in thedistance. Consequently, until sufficientinformation and data are collected ontrains operating under the provisionscontained in this final rule, FRA is notwilling to permit trains to travel thedistances suggested by somecommenters without additional brakeinspections. FRA continues to believethat the requirement for performinginbound inspections and therequirement to maintain records of alldefective conditions discovered onthese trains provides the basis fordeveloping the information and datanecessary to determine the viability ofallowing greater distances betweenbrake inspections.

After consideration of the commentssubmitted, FRA agrees that the benefitsestimated in the NPRM in associationwith the extended haul provisions mayhave been overstated. FRA realizes thatthe retention of the 1,500-milelimitation may eliminate certain trainsfrom being operated pursuant to theextended haul provisions and reducethe benefits estimated at the NPRMstage of the proceeding. (See detaileddiscussion in the Regulatory ImpactAnalysis portion of the preamblebelow.) In order to increase the viabilityof the extended haul provisions, thefinal rule provides some flexibility fordesignating extended haul trains andallows for the limited pick-up and set-out of equipment as discussed below.

Certain commenters have portrayedthe provisions related to extended haultrains as merely being an extension ofthe current intermediate inspectiondistances. FRA objects to such acharacterization. In FRA’s view, theextended haul provisions contained inthis section constitute a completely newinspection regimen. This sectioncontains stringent inspectionrequirements, both brake andmechanical, by highly qualified

inspectors and establishes stringentrequirements whenever cars are addedto or removed from such trains. Thissection also contains a means to assessthe safety of such operations byrequiring that records be maintained ofthe defective conditions that develop onthese trains while en route.Consequently, FRA believes that therequirements related to extended haultrains not only ensure the safe operationof the trains operated under them, butactually increase the safety of suchoperations over that which is providedin the current regulations.

In paragraph (a), FRA generallyretains the proposed provisionspermitting railroads to designatespecific trains that will move up to1,500 miles between brake andmechanical inspections provided therailroad meets various stringentinspection and monitoringrequirements, which FRA believes willensure the safe and proper operation ofthese trains. FRA intends to make clearthat a railroad must meet all of therequirements contained in thisparagraph in order to designate a trainas an extended haul train. Paragraph(a)(1) contains the requirements fordesignating trains a railroad intends tomove in accordance with this section.Several commenters contended that theproposed provisions regarding theadvance designation of extended haultrains would prohibit certainunscheduled trains from being operatedas extended haul trains. In an effort toprovided some flexibility in this area,this paragraph has been modified toallow railroads to designate certainlocations as locations where extendedhaul trains will be initiated and requiresrailroads to describe those trains thatwill be so operated rather than requiringspecific identification of every train.FRA believes this modification willallow railroads to capture some of theirunscheduled trains by identifying thetrains by the locations where theyoriginate. This paragraph sets forth theinformation that must be provided toFRA in writing when designating a trainor a location for such operation. Theinformation required to be submitted isnecessary to facilitate FRA’s ability toindependently monitor a railroad’soperation of these extended haul trains.

FRA continues to believe that in orderfor a train to be permitted to travel 1,500miles between inspections, the trainmust receive inspections that ensure theoptimum condition of both the brakesystem and the mechanical components.In paragraphs (a)(2), (a)(3), and (a)(8),FRA retains the proposed requirementthat these inspections be performed byhighly qualified and experienced



inspectors in order to ensure thatquality inspections are being performed.As FRA intends the Class I brake teststhat are required to be performed onthese trains to be as in-depth andcomprehensive as possible, FRAcontinues to believe that theseinspections must be performed byindividuals possessing not only theknowledge to identify and detect adefective condition in all of the brakeequipment required to be inspected butalso the knowledge to recognize theinterrelational workings of theequipment as well as a generalknowledge of what is required to repairthe equipment. Therefore, paragraphs(a)(2) and (a)(8) retain the use of theterm ‘‘qualified mechanical inspector’’to identify and describe thoseindividuals it believes possess thenecessary knowledge and experience toperform the required Class I brake testson these trains. A ‘‘qualified mechanicalinspector’’ is a person with training orinstruction in the troubleshooting,inspection, testing, maintenance, orrepair of the specific train brake systemsfor which the person is assignedresponsibility and whose primaryresponsibilities include work generallyconsistent with those functions. (See§ 232.5 of this section-by-sectionanalysis for a more detailed discussionof ‘‘qualified mechanical inspector.’’)FRA also continues to believe thesesame highly qualified inspectors mustbe the individuals performing therequired inbound inspection, containedin paragraph (a)(6) of this section, onthese extended haul trains in order toensure that all defective conditions areidentified at the train’s destination or1,500 mile location. Similarly, inparagraph (a)(3), FRA requires that all ofthe mechanical inspections required tobe performed on these trains beconducted by inspectors designatedpursuant to 49 CFR 215.11, rather thantrain crew members, in order to ensurethat all mechanical components are inproper condition prior to the trainsdeparture.

As discussed in detail above, FRA isnot willing to allow more than 1,500miles between brake inspections untilappropriate data are developed whichestablish that equipment moved underthe criteria contained in this final ruleremains in proper condition throughoutthe train’s journey. FRA believes thatthe provisions contained in paragraphs(a)(6) and (a)(7), requiring theperformance of an inbound inspectionat destination or at 1,500 miles andrequiring carriers to maintain records ofall defective conditions discovered onthese trains for a period of one year,

create the basis for developing suchdata. FRA believes the informationgenerated from these inboundinspections will be extremely useful inassessing the quality of a railroad’sinspection practices and will help FRAidentify any systematic brake ormechanical problems that may result inthese types of operations. It should benoted that paragraph (a)(7) has beenslightly modified from what wasproposed in order to clarify that therequired records may be maintainedeither electronically or on paper.

Paragraphs (a)(4) and (a)(8) retain theproposed requirements that these trainshave 100 percent operative brakes andcontain no cars with mechanical defectsunder part 215 at either the train’sinitial terminal or at the time ofdeparture from a 1,500-mile point, ifmoving in excess of 1,000 miles fromthat location. FRA has modified theprovision proposed in paragraph (a)(5)that restricted extended haul trains fromconducting any pick-ups or set-outs enroute, except for the removal ofdefective equipment. Paragraph (a)(5) ismodified to permit extended haul trainsthe limited ability make one pick-upand one set-out while en route. Thismodification will provide railroads theflexibility to set out a block of cars atone location and pick up a block of carsat the same or another location. FRAbelieves that this limited abilityprovides the railroads with someflexibility to move equipment efficientlywhile minimizing the disruptions madeto the train’s brake system and ensuringthat cars added to such trains can beadequately tracked and inspected.Paragraph (a)(5) makes clear that anycars added to extended haul trains mustbe inspected in the same manner as thecars at the train’s initial terminal. Thisparagraph also makes clear that any carremoved from the train must beinspected in the same manner as a carat the train’s point of destination or1,500-mile location.

Paragraph (b) is retained as proposedand makes clear that failure to complywith any of the restrictions contained inthis section will be considered animproper movement of a designatedextended haul train for whichappropriate civil penalties may beassessed. FRA has included specificcivil penalties in appendix A to thisfinal rule pertaining to the impropermovement of these types of trains. Inaddition to the imposition of civilpenalties, this paragraph makes clearthat FRA reserves the right to revoke arailroad’s authority to designate any orall trains for repeated or willfulnoncompliance with any of theprovisions contained in this section.

Section 232.215 Transfer Train BrakeTests

This section generally retains theproposed requirements related to theperformance of transfer train brake tests.The final rule requirements have beenslightly modified for consistency withother inspection requirements and toclarify when a transfer train brake testis to be performed. The requirementscontained in this section generallyincorporate the requirements currentlycontained in § 232.13(e). ‘‘Transfertrain’’ is defined in § 232.5 of this finalrule as a train that travels between apoint of origin and a point ofdestination, located not more than 20miles apart. The definition makes cleara transfer train may pick up or deliverfreight equipment while en route to itsdestination. This final rule makes clearthat the decision as to whether aparticular consist is subject to thetransfer train inspection requirements isprimarily based on a determination thatthe movement the train is engaged in isconsidered a ‘‘train movement’’ ratherthan a ‘‘switching movement.’’ FRA’sdetermination of whether the movementof cars is a ‘‘train movement,’’ subject tothe requirements of this section, or a‘‘switching movement’’ is and will bebased on the voluminous case lawdeveloped by various courts of theUnited States. (See section-by-sectionanalysis for § 232.5 for a detaileddiscussion of the terms ‘‘trainmovement’’ and ‘‘switchingmovement.’’)

FRA intends to make clear that a trainwill be considered a transfer train onlyif the train moves no more than 20 milesbetween its point of origin and its pointof final destination. If the train willmove greater than 20 miles between thepoint of origin and point of finaldestination, it cannot be considered atransfer train, and a Class I brake testmust be performed on the train prior todeparture from its point of origin.Although cars may be added to atransfer train while the train is en route,as discussed below, with a transfer trainbrake test being performed on the carsadded, the train is limited to a total of20 miles from its point of origin, notfrom the location where new cars areadded. The distance the entire train willmove between its point of origin andpoint of final destination is thedeterminative factor in determiningwhether the train is a transfer train, carsdropped-off or picked-up en route donot affect this distance.

Paragraph (a) retains the proposedtasks that are required to be performedwhen conducting a transfer train braketest. Due to the short distance these



types of trains will travel, FRA willcontinue to permit the brake system tobe charged to only 60 psi but will makeclear that this must be verified by anaccurate gauge or end-of-train device.Although the current regulations do notrequire the use of a gauge or device,FRA is at a loss to understand how aninspector can know the pressure in thebrake system without getting a readingfrom the rear of the train. Thisparagraph also retains the requirementthat the brakes apply in response to a15-psi brake pipe reduction. FRAcontinues to believe that the reducedpressure at which this test is performed(i.e., 60 psi rather than 75 psi) requiresthat an application be obtained with asmaller pressure reduction than thatrequired for other brake tests. Thisparagraph also makes clear that thebrakes shall apply on each car added tothe train and remain applied until arelease is initiated and reiterates theparameters for performing a retest onthose cars found not to have sufficientlyapplied that are contained in the ClassI brake test requirements.

Paragraph (b) clarifies that cars maybe added to a transfer train while it isen route to its destination. This activityis currently conducted by these trains,and it was not FRA’s intent whenissuing the NPRM to proposeprohibiting these trains from being usedin this fashion. This paragraph makesclear that when cars are added to atransfer train the added cars are to beinspected pursuant to the requirementscontained in paragraph (a) of thissection. This is generally consistentwith what FRA currently requires whencars are added to a transfer train, andthis paragraph has been added to clarifyFRA’s retention of the existing practice.

Section 232.217 Train Brake SystemTests Conducted Using Yard Air

This section contains therequirements for performing train brakesystem tests when using yard air. Therequirements contained in this sectionhave been modified from thoseproposed in the NPRM in response tothe comments and recommendationsreceived. Paragraph (a) retains theproposed requirements regarding theuse of an engineer’s brake valve or asuitable test device capable of makingany increase or decrease of brake pipeair pressure at the same, or slower, rateas an engineer’s brake valve whenconducting brake tests utilizing yard air.The requirement to use such a devicealso applies when retesting cars duringClass I, Class IA, Class II, and transfertrain brake tests.

Paragraph (b) generally retains therequirement to connect the air test

device to the end of the cut of cars thatwill be nearest to the controllinglocomotive. However, this paragraphpermits the test device to be connectedto other than the end nearest thecontrolling locomotive if a railroad hasappropriate procedures in place toensure the safety of such a practice. FRArecognizes that some currently existingyards are designed in such a manner sothat performance of a test from the frontof the consist is extremely difficult orimpossible. FRA also recognizes that thesafety concerns that arise when cars arecharged from other than the head-end ofthe consist can be eliminated if properprocedures are in place to ensure thatovercharge conditions do not occur. An‘‘overcharge condition’’ describes asituation in which the brake equipmentof cars, or locomotives, or both ischarged to a higher pressure than themaximum brake pipe pressure that cannormally be achieved in that part of thetrain; this may result in the locomotiveengineer’s lacking the ability to controlthe application or release of the brakesat the rear of the train. This paragraphrecognizes that there are a number ofoperating or testing procedures whichmay be used to eliminate the existenceof potential overcharge conditions.Rather than specify a procedure, thisparagraph permits a railroad to adoptand comply with whatever procedure itdetermines is best suited to itsoperation. However, this paragraphmakes clear that the procedure must bein writing and that the procedure mustbe followed by the railroad.Consequently, FRA will hold a railroadresponsible for complying withwhatever procedure it adopts.

Paragraph (c) modifies some of theprovisions related to conducting braketests utilizing yard air sources that wereproposed in the NPRM. Rather thanrequiring yard air tests to be performedat 80 psi as was proposed, thisparagraph reduces the required pressureto 60 psi at the end of the consist as iscurrently required. FRA recognizes thatmany yard air sources and rentalcompressors are not capable ofproducing 80 psi of air pressure. Inorder to address the concerns raisedregarding the inadequacy of conductinga leakage or air flow test at this lowerpressure, this paragraph includes arequirement that leakage and air flowtests be conducted at the operatingpressure of the train. Thus, if the yardair is not capable of producing the airpressure at which the train will beoperated, then the leakage or air flowtest must be conducted when thelocomotives are attached. Thisparagraph also retains the proposed

requirement that a Class III brake test asproposed in § 232.211 must beperformed on cars tested with yard airat the time that the road locomotive isattached. This paragraph also retains theproposed requirement for retesting carsthat remain disconnected from a sourceof compressed air for more than fourhours.

Paragraph (c) and (d) retain theproposed requirements regarding thecalibration and accuracy of yard testdevices and gauges with slightmodification for clarity. Paragraph (c)requires that mechanical yard testdevices and gauges be calibrated every92 days and that electronic yard testdevices and gauges be calibratedannually. Based on observations madeby FRA’s field inspectors, FRA has someconcerns regarding the condition ofmany yard test devices and gauges. FRAhas found numerous mechanical gaugesthe condition of which creates seriousdoubt as to the accuracy of the gauge.Mechanical gauges have been foundwith broken or missing glass whichwould allow moisture and othercontaminates to be present in the gauge.As many of the yard test plants beingused today are portable, they areexposed to a wide array of handling andenvironmental hazards while beingtransported from location to location.Therefore, this paragraph requires thatmechanical devices and gauges be testedand calibrated every 92 days. On theother hand, electronic gauges anddevices appear to have much lessexposure to many of the hazardsencountered by mechanical devices andgauges and tend to be much morereliable and accurate for a longer periodof time. Consequently, this paragraphrequires electronic yard test devices andgauges to be tested or calibrated, orboth, on an annual basis. Paragraph (d)retains the proposed requirement thatany yard air test device and any yard airtest equipment used to test a train beaccurate and function as intended. FRAwill consider a device or gauge to beaccurate if it is within the calibrationparameters contained in paragraph (c) ofthis section.

Section 232.219 Double Heading andHelper Service

This section contains therequirements related to double headingand helper service. This section hasbeen modified from that proposed inorder to clarify that the requirementscontained in this section do not applyto distributed power units and toremove unnecessary provisions. Thus,the second sentence of proposedparagraph (a) has been removed as thebrake valve on distributed power units



are left cut in to accelerate responsetime. In addition, proposed paragraph(b) has been eliminated as it wasoriginally intended to apply topassenger equipment and is notapplicable to freight operations.Paragraph (a) retains the proposedclarification regarding the inspectionthat is to be performed when acontrolling locomotive is changed.Paragraph (a) clearly identifies that aClass III brake test pursuant to § 232.211must be performed when a newlocomotive is placed in control of thetrain. FRA believes that the provisionsretained in paragraph (a) are necessaryand have been in place for years inorder to ensure that locomotives takingcontrol of a train have the ability toactually control the brakes on the train.

Paragraph (b), previously proposed asparagraph (c), retains the proposedrequirement aimed at ensuring that thebrake systems on helper locomotivesrespond as intended to brake commandsfrom the controlling locomotive at thetime it is placed in the train. Althoughthe brake system on locomotives arerequired to be inspected on a dailybasis, FRA continues to believe that avisual confirmation of the properoperation of a helper locomotive’sbrakes should be made at the time thelocomotive is added to a train. Failureof a helper locomotive to respond to thecommand of the controlling locomotivecould result in a very serious safetyhazard in that a helper locomotive maycontinue to push the rear of the trainwhile the brakes are applied, potentiallyresulting in a derailment or otherincident. FRA intends to make clear inthis paragraph that a helper locomotivefound with inoperative or ineffectivebrakes is to be repaired prior to use orelse removed from the train.

Paragraph (c) contains basic designand testing requirements for helperlocomotives utilizing a Helper Linkdevice or similar technology. TheHelper Link device is an electronicdevice, mounted on the front end of thelead helper locomotive and is used tocontrol the automatic air brakes onhelper locomotive consists. When thisdevice is used, the train’s brake pipe isnot connected between the rear car ofthe train being pushed and the helperlocomotives. The end-of-train device,attached to the rear car of the train,sends a radio signal which is receivedby the Helper link device. The HelperLink device is connected to the brakepipe of the helper locomotives, andelectronic commands from the EOTdevice cause the air pressure in thehelper locomotive brake pipe to bereduced or increased, thus applying orreleasing the brakes on the helper

locomotives. A signal is transmittedfrom the EOT device to the Helper Linkdevice at 10-second intervals to ensurecommunication. The Helper Link is alsoused to operate the uncoupling lever todetach the helper locomotives from therear of the train without stopping thetrain.

Based on information currentlyavailable to FRA, it appears that whenthere is a loss of communicationbetween the EOT device and the HelperLink device, the engineer of the helperlocomotive consist is not immediatelyaware of the failure. If thecommunication between the EOT deviceand the Helper Link is not reestablishedwithin the next 40-secondcommunication cycle, the Helper Linkdevice will automatically disable itself.Consequently, if the train experiencesan emergency application of the airbrakes while the Helper Link device isdisabled, the brakes on the helperlocomotives would not apply and wouldresult in the helper locomotivescontinuing to push under power.Furthermore, in order forcommunications to be reestablishedbetween the EOT and Helper Link, theengineer must leave the locomotivecontrols, exit the locomotive cab, andproceed to the front of the locomotive tomanually press the reset buttons locatedon the Helper Link device itself. Inaddition, there are currently noregulations which address the use,testing, or calibration of these HelperLink devices.

On August 22, 1996, the UTUsubmitted a petition for rulemakingwith FRA regarding Helper Link devicesraising many of the concerns notedabove. See Petition for ProposedRulemaking, Docket 96–1. In order toaddress the UTU petition in thisrulemaking and to address the concernsof FRA noted above, FRA soughtinformation and comment from personsinterested in the NPRM. See 63 FR48345. A presentation and discussionregarding the use, operation, and designof Helper Link devices was engaged inat the technical conference conducted inWalnut Creek, California, on November23 and 24, 1998. Written commentsregarding the device were alsosubmitted by the manufacturer of thedevice. Based on consideration of thisinformation, FRA has determined thatcertain minimum design and testingrequirements should be included in thisfinal rule to ensure the safety of thosetrains utilizing Helper Link technology.

Paragraph (c) contains the design andtesting requirements that FRA believesare appropriate when railroads utilizeHelper Link devices or similartechnology. This paragraph ensures that

a locomotive engineer is notified by adistinctive alarm of any loss ofcommunication for more than 25seconds between the device and thetwo-way EOT. This paragraph alsorequires that the engineer be provided amethod of resetting the device in the cabof the helper locomotive and that thedevice be tested and calibrated on anannual basis. Due to the limited numberof Helper Link devices currently beingused, FRA believes that themanufacturer of these devices can easilyprovide railroads utilizing the deviceswith the information and hardware tomeet the requirements contained in thisparagraph at a minimal cost to therailroad.

Subpart D—Periodic Maintenance andTesting Requirements

This subpart provides the periodicbrake system maintenance and testingrequirements for equipment used infreight and other non-passenger trains.As stated in the 1994 NPRM and 1998NPRM, FRA firmly believes that thenew repair track test and single car test,which have been used industry-widesince January of 1992, are a much betterand more comprehensive method ofdetecting and eliminating defectivebrake equipment and components thanthe old, time-based COT&Srequirements. FRA believes thatperformance of these tests hassignificantly reduced the number ofdefective components found and hasdramatically increased the reliability ofbrake equipment. Through theimplementation of the repair track andsingle car tests, the safety of bothrailroad employees and the public hasgreatly improved due to brakeequipment being in better and safercondition. At the same time, however,FRA is cognizant that contentions byrail labor regarding the carrier’s directand intentional circumvention of theserevised requirements through theelimination of repair tracks, by movingcars to expediter tracks for repair, orsimply by making repairs in the fieldraise a legitimate concern that needs tobe addressed to ensure that the industryfully benefits from the advantages of theimproved tests.

Although this subpart retains many ofthe proposed maintenancerequirements, several modificationshave been made in this final rule inresponse to comments received andbased upon the current best practicesoccurring within the industry. FRAagrees that the proposed incorporationof AAR Rule 3, Chart A, is unnecessaryas it would remove the determination ofwhen certain maintenance is performedfrom the discretion of the railroads, and



would make it difficult for railroads tochange the requirements related to theperformance of that maintenance. FRAbelieves that a railroad is in the bestposition to determine when and whereit will perform various maintenance onits equipment and should not have itshands tied in this area by overlyprescriptive federal requirements.Furthermore, FRA’s primary intentwhen proposing incorporation of AARRule 3, Chart A, was to codify theexisting requirements for performingsingle car and repair track air brake testsand eliminate the ability of the industryto unilaterally change the frequency andmethod of performing these tests. Asthis subpart retains the requirements forwhen and how these tests are to becompleted and retains certaininspections that are to be performedwhen equipment is on a shop or repairtrack, FRA believes that it isunnecessary to incorporate everymaintenance procedure covered inAAR’s Rule 3, Chart A. Consequently,the final rule does not incorporateAAR’s Rule 3, Chart A, and continues toallow railroads some flexibility indetermining appropriate maintenancepractices. (A detailed discussion of thecomments and recommendationssubmitted on the maintenancerequirements contained in this subpartis contained in the preceding ‘‘Overviewof Comments and General FRAConclusions’’ portion of the preambleunder the heading ‘‘VII. MaintenanceRequirements.’’)

Section 232.303 General RequirementsThis section contains the general

requirements regarding themaintenance, repair, and testing offreight cars. Paragraph (a) containsvarious definitions for determiningwhether a particular track or facilityconstitutes a shop or repair track. Thedefinitions contained in this paragraphwere not previously proposed in theNPRM but are consistent with currentFRA enforcement policies and arenecessary to clarify when various testsand inspections required in this sectionare to be performed.

As the current regulations and thissubpart require that certain inspectionsand tests are to be performed when a caris on a shop or repair track and becausea repair track air brake test is requiredto be performed when a car is on arepair track and such a test has not beenperformed within the last twelvemonths, FRA believes it is necessary toclarify what constitutes a shop or repairtrack. This issue has become moreprevalent over the last few years due tothe growing use of mobile repair trucksand due to the requirements for

conducting repair track air brake tests.For years, many railroads haveconducted minor repairs on trackscalled ‘‘expedite tracks.’’ Generally, thetypes of repairs that were performed onthese tracks were minor repairs thatcould be made quickly with a limitedamount of equipment, and neither therailroads or FRA considered the tracksto be repair tracks. However, recentlyrailroads have started performingvirtually every type of repair on theseexpedite tracks. These tracks are nolonger limited to minor repairs but arebeing used to perform heavy, complexrepairs that require the jacking of entirecars or the disassembly and replacementof major portions of a car’s truck orbrake system. At many locations theseexpedite tracks are positioned next tooperative repair shops. Furthermore,several railroads have closed previouslyexisting repair shop facilities and arenow using fully equipped mobile repairtrucks to perform the same type ofrepairs that were previously performedin the shop or on established repairtracks and are attempting to call thetracks serviced by these mobile repairtrucks ‘‘expedite’’ or ‘‘light repair’’tracks. Thus, the line between whatconstitutes a repair or shop track andwhat constitutes an ‘‘expedite’’ or ‘‘lightrepair’’ track has become unclear ornonexistent.

Appendix A of AAR’s Field Manual ofInterchange Rules provides a definitionof both ‘‘shop or repair track’’ and‘‘expedite track.’’ Although FRA doesnot consider these definitions to becontrolling with regard to whatconstitutes a repair track under thecurrent regulations, FRA does believethat AAR’s definitions of the aboveterms have created confusion within theindustry regarding what constitutes arepair track. If the AAR’s definitions areread together they appear to excluderepairs made by mobile repair trucks,regardless of where they are made or thenature of the repairs conducted, fromever being considered as beingperformed on a repair track. FRAbelieves it is both illogical andinconsistent with the intent andmeaning of the existing regulations andwith the provisions proposed in theNPRM to exclude from the definition of‘‘shop or repair track’’ tracks at locationswhere repairs of all types are regularlyand consistently performed from merelybecause they are serviced by a mobilerepair vehicle. Furthermore, it would beinconsistent with previous technicalbulletins and enforcement guidanceissued by FRA to allow major repairwork to be performed on ‘‘expedite’’ or‘‘light repair’’ tracks merely because the

repairs are performed by a mobile repairvehicle.

FRA believes that the operationalchanges, noted above, are partly anattempt by the railroads to circumventthe requirements that currently applywhen a car is on a shop or repair track.Currently, if a car is on a shop or repairtrack, it must have its brakes inspected,under 49 CFR 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv), andthe car is to receive a repair track airbrake test if it has not received one inthe last twelve months under AAR Rule3, Chart A. Some railroads contend thatan expedite track is not a repair or shoptrack; therefore, the requirements of§ 232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv) and AAR Rule 3,Chart A, do not apply. FRA finds thispractice and interpretation to beunacceptable and believes that railroadsare abusing the concept of expeditetracks to avoid performing requiredmaintenance. Therefore, the industry’sown actions have caused the need forFRA to clarify what constitutes a shopor repair track. Consequently, paragraph(a) includes a definition of what FRAwill consider to be repair or shop tracksrequiring the performance of certaintests and inspections.

Paragraph (a) makes clear that FRAwill consider certain tracks to be repairor shop tracks based on the frequencyand types of repairs that are made onthe tracks, not necessarily thedesignation given by a railroad. Thedefinitions in this paragraph also makeclear that it is the nature of the repairsbeing conducted on a certain track thatis the determining factor not whether amobile repair truck is being used tomake the repairs. Due to the ability ofmobile repair trucks to make virtuallyany type of repair necessary and due totheir growing use, FRA does not believethat tracks regularly and continuallyserviced by these types of vehiclesshould be excepted from the definitionof ‘‘repair track.’’ FRA believes that if atrack is designated by the railroad as an‘‘expedite’’ track (i.e., one where minorrepairs will be conducted) then therailroad should ensure that only carsneeding minor repairs are directed tothat track for repair. FRA does notintend to eliminate the concept ofexpedite tracks but limits the use ofsuch tracks to those types of repairs thatare truly minor in nature and thatrequire a limited amount of equipmentto perform. At locations where arailroad conducts repairs of all types ona regular and consistent basis, eitherwith fixed facilities or with mobilerepair trucks, FRA would expect therailroad to designate certain trackage atthe location as repair tracks and certaintrackage as ‘‘expedite tracks’’ whereonly minor repairs would be conducted.



In such circumstances, FRA wouldexpect railroads to direct cars in need ofheavier repairs, the kind that have beentraditionally performed on a shop orrepair track, to be directed to trackagedesignated at the location as a repairtrack.

Paragraph (a) places the burden on therailroad to designate those tracks it willconsider repair tracks at locations whereit performs both minor and heavyrepairs on a regular and consistent basis,and makes the railroad responsible fordirecting the equipment in need ofrepair to the appropriate trackage. If therailroad determines that repairs of aheavy nature will be performed oncertain trackage, then the track shouldbe treated as a repair track, and any carrepaired on that trackage should beprovided the attention required by thisfinal rule for cars on a shop or repairtrack. Further, if a railroad determinesthat minor repairs will be performed oncertain trackage, then the railroad bearsthe burden of ensuring that only carsneeding minor repairs are directed tothat trackage. If the railroad fails toadequately distinguish the tracksperforming minor repairs from thosetracks performing heavy repairs orimproperly performs heavy repairs on atrack designated as an ‘‘expedite track,’’then the railroad will be required totreat all cars on the trackage at the timethat the heavy repairs are beingconducted as though they are on arepair or shop track.

It should be noted that the issue ofwhat constitutes a repair or shop trackfor the purposes of this subpart iscompletely separate and distinct fromthe issue of whether a location is alocation where necessary repairs can beperformed for purposes of 49 U.S.C.20303 and § 232.15 of this final rule.Although an outlying location might beconsidered a location where certainbrake repairs can be conducted, thatdoes not mean the track where thoserepairs are performed should beconsidered a repair track. FRA does notintend for trackage located at outlyinglocations or sidings which areoccasionally or even regularly servicedby mobile repair trucks to be consideredrepair tracks. FRA believes that repair orshop tracks should exist at locationsthat have fixed repair facilities and atlocations where repairs of all types areperformed on a regular and consistentbasis regardless of whether the repairsare performed in fixed facilities or bymobile repair vehicles.

Paragraphs (b)–(d) retain the proposedprovisions requiring certain tests andinspections to be performed whenever acar is on a shop or repair track.Although the AAR asserts that it did

away with the requirements to performa set and release of the brakes and adjustpiston travel on all cars on repair orshop tracks, the requirements arecurrently contained in power brakeregulations separate and apart from anyAAR requirements. See 49 CFR232.17(a)(2)(ii), (iv). FRA believes thatrepair and shop tracks provide an idealsetting for railroads to conduct anindividualized inspection on a car’sbrake system to ensure its properoperation and that such an inspection isnecessary to reduce the potential of carswith excessive piston travel beingoverlooked when employees areperforming the ordinary brakeinspections required by this final rule.If any problems are detected at thatlocation, the personnel needed to makeany necessary corrections are alreadypresent. Furthermore, performing theseinspections at this time ensures properoperation of the cars’ brakes andeliminates the potential of having to cutcars out of an assembled train and, thus,should reduce inspection times andmake for more efficient operations.

Paragraph (b) retains the proposedrequirement that a car on a shop orrepair track be tested to determine thatits air brakes apply and remain applieduntil a release is initiated. Thisparagraph requires that the air brakesremain applied until the release signalis initiated and is intended to maintainconsistency with the requirementcontained in § 232.205(b)(4). Paragraph(b)(4) is an attempt to clarify languagecontained in the current regulationwhich require that the brakes ‘‘apply.’’This language has been misinterpretedby some to mean that if the pistonapplies in response to a command froma controlling locomotive or yard testdevice, and releases before the releasesignal is given, the brake system on thatcar is in compliance with the regulationbecause the brake simply applied. Theintent of the regulation has always beenthat the brakes apply and remainapplied until the release signal isinitiated from the controllinglocomotive or yard test device.Therefore, clarifying language wasproposed in this paragraph to eliminateall doubt as to what is required.Consequently, this paragraph makesclear that the brakes on a car mustremain applied until the appropriaterelease signal is given. If it fails to doso, the car must be repaired andretested.

Paragraph (c) retains the proposedrequirement that if piston travel isfound to be less than 7 inches or morethan 9 inches, it must be adjusted tonominally 71⁄2 inches, which is a changefrom the 7 inches as currently required,

in order to maintain consistency withthe requirement proposed at§ 232.205(b)(5). This change wasproposed in the NPRM and is based ona request by AAR to change theadjustment to 71⁄2 inches from 7 inchesas its member railroads were finding itextremely difficult to adjust the pistontravel to precisely 7 inches and that insome cases the adjustment would bemarginally less than 7 inches, thusrequiring a readjustment. Therefore,AAR sought the extra 1⁄2 inch in orderto provide a small margin for error whenthe piston travel is adjusted. As FRAbelieves that AAR’s concerns are validlyplaced and would have no impact onsafety, FRA has accommodated therequest.

Paragraph (d) retains the proposedlisting of brake system components thatare to be inspected prior to a car beingreleased from a shop or repair track.Many of the items contained in thisparagraph are currently required to beinspected pursuant to § 232.17(a)(2)(iv).It should be noted that the proposedrequirement, retained in this final rule,regarding the proper functioning ofangle cocks was modified in the NPRMfrom the existing requirement byclarifying that angle cocks must beinspected to ensure that they areproperly positioned to allow maximumair flow. This is a clarification regardingthe normal functioning of the anglecock, and should pose little, if any,additional inspection burden on therailroads. This paragraph adds twoitems to the inspections that are to beconducted when a car is on a shop orrepair track. They are an inspection ofa car’s hand brake and an inspection ofthe accuracy and operation of any brakeindicators on cars so equipped. As thefinal rule does not provide for thespecific inspection of these items duringany of the other required brake tests,FRA believes this is an ideal time for therailroad to inspect these items whileimposing the least burden on therailroad’s inspection and repair forces.

Paragraph (e) retains the proposedprovisions permitting cars to be movedfrom a location where necessary repairsare made to a location where a single caror repair track air brake test can beperformed if it cannot be performed atthe same location where the repairs areconducted. FRA disagrees with theassertions of some commenters that airbrake repairs should not be required atlocations that lack the ability to performsingle car or repair track air brake tests.FRA believes that position is not onlycontrary to the statutory mandatesregarding the movement of equipmentwith defective brakes but would openthe door to potential abuse by railroads.



Furthermore, the operation of a car’sbrake system can generally be testedafter a repair without performing acomplete repair track air brake test. Forthe most part, single car and repair trackair brake tests are intended to bemaintenance requirements that attachbased on a condition in which a car isfound or on a repair that is required tobe performed. If the condition of a caris such that a repair track air brake testis necessary to determine the defect,then the final rule would permitmovement of the car to the nearestlocation where a repair track air braketest can be performed. However, FRAbelieves that most defective conditionscan be easily determined withoutperforming a repair track air brake test.Moreover, for years FRA has requiredthe performance of repairs where theycan be performed and has allowed suchequipment to be moved to the nextforward location for performance of asingle car or repair track air brake testand has not found that such a practicehas created any potential safety hazard.

Paragraph (e) also retains theproposed requirements for taggingequipment which is being hauled for theperformance of a single car or repairtrack air brake test after the appropriaterepairs have been conducted. FRAbelieves that the tagging requirementsare necessary not only to provide noticeto a railroad’s ground forces as to thepresence of the car but also to ensurethat railroads are properly performingthe tests at appropriate locations.Furthermore, many railroads currentlymove equipment in this fashion, andthere has been no indication that safetyhas been compromised. The final rulealso retains the requirement that a copyor record of the tag be retained for 90days and made available to FRA uponrequest. Contrary to the objections ofsome commenters, FRA continues tobelieve that the record keepingrequirements are necessary so that thereis accountability on the part of therailroads to conduct these tests at theproper locations and that equipment isnot moved for extended periods withoutreceiving its required maintenance. Itshould be noted that the final ruleclarifies that the record or copy of thetag may be maintained eitherelectronically or in writing provided allthe required information is recorded.This paragraph retains the proposedalternative to the tagging requirements,which permits a railroad to utilize anautomated tracking system to monitorthese cars and ensure they receive therequisite tests as prescribed in thissection provided the automated systemis approved by FRA. It should be noted

that the final rule does not define orrequire identification of locations thatcan or will perform single car or repairtrack air brake tests as suggested bysome commenters. FRA does not believethat such a requirement is necessarybecause the rule specifically establisheswhen the tests are to be performed andit is in the railroad’s best interests toperform the tests in a timely manner.

Paragraph (f) contains therequirements for railroads to adequatelytrack when single car or repair track airbrake tests were last performed on apiece of equipment. This paragraphmodifies the proposed requirementsregarding the use of an automatedtracking system in lieu of stencilingequipment with the date and location ofthe last single car or repair track testreceived. Since 1992, the industry hasutilized the AAR’s UMLER reportingsystem to electronically track theperformance of single car and repairtrack air brake test as well as otherrepair information. Based on theperformance and use of this system overthe last seven years, FRA believes thatthe AAR’s UMLER system has provenitself effective for tracking theinformation required in this paragraphand ensuring the timely performance ofsingle car and repair track air braketests. Furthermore, FRA continues tobelieve that the information required tobe tracked in this paragraph with regardto these tests is easily maintainedthrough an electronic medium.Moreover, FRA has found nosubstantiated instances of railroadsfalsifying or altering the informationmonitored and tracked by AAR’sUMLER system. Thus, this paragraphpermits railroads to utilize an electronicrecord keeping system to track single carand repair track air brake tests withoutobtaining prior FRA approval of thesystem. The final rule makes clear thatFRA will monitor the performance ofsuch systems and retains the right torevoke a railroad’s authority to utilizethe system if FRA finds that it is notproperly secure, inaccessible to FRA ora railroad’s employees, or fails toproperly or adequately track andmonitor the equipment.

Section 232.305 Repair Track AirBrake Tests and Section 232.307Single Car Tests

These sections generally retain theproposed requirements related to theperformance of single car and repairtrack air brake tests. Contrary to theassertions of some commenters, FRAcontinues to believe that certainmaintenance procedures are critical toensuring the safe and proper operationof the brake equipment on the nation’s

fleet of freight cars. FRA does notbelieve that the determination of whatmaintenance should be performedshould be left solely to the discretion ofthe railroads operating the equipment inall circumstances. As periodic COT&Smaintenance has been eliminated andreplaced with the performance of singlecar and repair track tests, which FRAagrees is a better and morecomprehensive method of detectingdefective brake equipment andcomponents, FRA believes that specificand determinable limits must be placedon the manner and frequency ofperforming these tests. Therefore, thesesections generally retain the proposedrequirements regarding the performanceof single car and repair track brake tests.

FRA recognizes that the proceduresfor performing single car and repairtrack tests proposed in the NPRM havebeen modified by the AAR since theissuance of the proposal. As it is FRA’sintent to incorporate the most recentversion of the single car and repair trackair brake test procedures, paragraph (a)of each section incorporates byreference the test procedures that wereissued by the AAR in April of 1999.These test procedures are contained inAAR standard S–486–99, Sections 3.0and 4.0, which are located in the AAR’s‘‘Manual of Standards andRecommended Practices, Section E’’(April 1999). Both these sectionsrecognize that the industry may find itnecessary to modify the test proceduresfrom time to time in order to addressnew equipment or utilize newtechnology. Thus, paragraph (a) of eachsection permits railroads to seekapproval of alternative proceduresthrough the special approval processcontained in § 232.17 of this final rule.The special approval process isintended to speed FRA’s considerationof a party’s request to utilize analternative procedure from the onesidentified in the rule itself. FRAbelieves that it is essential for FRA toapprove any change made in theprocedures for conducting these safety-critical tests in order to preventunilateral changes and to ensureconsistency in the method in which thetests are performed.

It should be noted that theincorporated procedures for performingsingle car and repair track air brake testsare the minimum requirements forperforming such tests. The specialapproval process is required to be usedonly if the incorporated procedures areto be changed in some manner. Forinstance, if the industry were to elect toadd a new test protocol to theincorporated procedures, there wouldbe no need to seek approval of such an



addition as long as the procedurescontained in the incorporated standardare still maintained. This final rule isnot intended to prevent railroads fromvoluntarily adopting additional or morestringent maintenance standardsprovided they are consistent with thestandards incorporated.

Both sections retain the proposedfrequency at which single car and repairtrack air brake tests are to be performed.As noted in the preceding discussion,the primary intent of the proposedprovisions was to codify the existingrequirements regarding the performanceof single car and repair track air braketests and prevent any unilateral changesto those requirements. FRA believes thatthe frequency at which these tests arecurrently required to be performedunder industry standards has proven tobe sufficient and a substantial economicburden would be imposed if thefrequency were increased. Both sectionsalso retain the requirement that thesetests be conducted by a qualifiedperson. FRA continues to believe thatthe person performing these tests mustbe specifically trained and tested onhow the test is to be performed and beable to determine the appropriateactions that must be taken based on theresults of the test. FRA does not believethat the mere fact that a person is acarman or a QMI is sufficient to makethat person qualified to perform singlecar or repair track air brake tests. FRAbelieves that the training and testingrequirements required by this final ruleensures that a person is qualified toperform these tests.

Section 232.305(b) generally retainsthe proposed list of conditions thatwould require the performance of arepair track air brake test. However, twoof the proposed conditions for when arepair track air brake test would berequired to be performed have beenslightly modified in order to make themconsistent with the currently existingAAR requirements for performing thesetests. FRA agrees that the proposedrequirement to perform a repair track airbrake test on any car removed from atrain for a brake-related defect is overlyrestrictive and inconsistent with therequirements of AAR’s Rule 3, Chart A.FRA agrees that the proposedrequirement would require theperformance of the test when minorbrake system repairs are conducted,which is not the intent of the AAR’srule. Therefore, this paragraph modifiesthe proposed condition to require theperformance of a repair track test oncars that have inoperative or cut-out airbrakes when removed from a train.Furthermore, the proposed provisionsrequiring the performance of a repair

track air brake test whenever a car isfound with a wheel with built-up treador slid flat have been slightly modified.Under the final rule, the test will not berequired if the built-up tread or slid flatwheel is known to have been caused bya hand brake that was left applied.These modifications are consistent withwhat is currently required under AARRule 3, Chart A.

Paragraphs (c) and (d) of § 232.305retain the proposed requirements thateach freight car receive a repair track airtest within eight years from the date thecar was built or rebuilt, and withinevery five years thereafter. FRA stronglybelieves that these minimum attentionperiods are sufficient to ensure thesafety of the freight car fleet whenconsidered in conjunction with theincreased attention that freight carsreceive when these types of tests areperformed.

Paragraph (c) of § 232.307 retains theproposed requirement that a single cartest be conducted by a qualified personprior to a new or rebuilt car beingplaced in or returned to revenue service.FRA believes that it is essential for newand rebuilt cars to receive this test priorto being placed in revenue service inorder to ensure the proper operation ofthe brake system on the vehicle. Mostrailroads already require this attentionto be given to new and rebuilt cars; thus,the cost of this requirement is minimaland merely incorporates the bestpractices currently in place in theindustry.

Section 232.309 Repair Track Testand Single Car Test Equipment andDevices

This section generally retains theproposed requirements for maintainingthe equipment and devices used inperforming repair track and single carair brake tests. This section modifiessome of the proposed provisionsregarding the testing and calibration ofsingle car test devices and othermechanical devices used to performsingle car and repair track air braketests. FRA’s intent when proposing therequirements contained in this sectionwas to codify the current best practicesof the industry. Thus, FRA did notintend to propose testing and calibrationrequirements that were more stringentthat those currently imposed by AARstandards. Therefore, FRA agrees withthe comments submitted by AAR thatthe testing and calibration requirementsfor single car test devices should not beimposed until the devices are actuallyplaced in service, which is consistentwith current AAR requirements. FRArecognizes that the proposed calibrationand testing requirements may have

resulted in the unnecessary acquisitionof single car testing devices.Consequently, this section has beenmodified to clarify that the 92-day andthe 365-day calibration and testingrequirements related to single car testdevices are to be calculated from theday on which the device is first placedin service. FRA continues to believesthat the devices and equipment used toperform these single car and repair trackair brake tests are safety-critical items.Consequently, FRA believes that thesedevices must be kept accurate andfunctioning properly in order to ensurethat repair track and single car tests areproperly performed.

Subpart E—End-of-Train Devices

This subpart incorporates the design,performance, and testing requirementsrelating to end-of-train devices (EOTs)that were issued on January 2, 1997,which became effective for all railroadson July 1, 1997, except for those forwhich the effective date was extendedto December 1, 1997 by notice issued onJune 4, 1997. See 62 FR 278 and 62 FR30461. This subpart also incorporatesthe recent modifications made to thetwo-way EOT requirements to clarifythe applicability of the requirements tocertain passenger train operations wheremultiple units of freight-typeequipment, material handling cars, orexpress cars are part of a passengertrain’s consist. See 63 FR 24130.

As noted in the discussion of theapplicability provisions contained in§ 232.3 of this final rule, this subpartapplies to all trains unless specificallyexcepted by the provisions contained inthis subpart. As the provisionscontained in this subpart were justrecently issued, there is little need todiscuss these requirements in detail asthey were fully discussed in thepublications noted above. However,after their issuance, FRA discovered thata few of the provisions were in need ofminor modification for clarificationpurposes and to address some validconcerns that have been raised bothinternally by FRA inspectors and byoutside parties. Consequently, in theNPRM FRA proposed various changes tothe provisions related to end-of-traindevices and discussed other issueswhich might require modification of theexisting provisions. See 63 FR 48347–49. This discussion is intended to focuson the proposed changes and addressthose issues discussed in the preambleto the NPRM as well as address theissues raised at the public hearings andin written comments.



Section 232.405 Design andPerformance Standards for Two-WayEnd-of-Train Devices

Paragraph (d) retains the proposedmodification of the requirement relatingto the diameter of the valve opening andhose on two-way EOTs, which iscurrently contained in § 232.21(d). Thecurrent regulation requires that thevalve opening and hose have aminimum diameter of 3⁄4 inch to effectan emergency application. FRA hasdiscovered that sometime prior to theissuance of the final rule on two-wayEOTs, Pulse Electronics beganmanufacturing its two-way EOT withthe internal diameter of the hose being5⁄8 inch. Testing of the devicesmanufactured with these smallerdiameter hoses showed that they met allcriteria for emergency applicationcapability based on standards andguidelines set forth by the AAR.Furthermore, testing of the devices atthe Westinghouse facility inWilmerding, Pennsylvania,demonstrated that the 5⁄8 inch diameterhose permitted 14 consecutive 50-footcars with cut-out control valves or 750feet of brake pipe to be jumped. This ismore than double the AAR standard forcontrol valve requirements. Moreover,FRA’s intent when issuing the two-wayEOT design requirements was toincorporate designs that existed at thetime the rule became effective.Consequently, paragraph (d) of thissection is modified to permit the use ofa 5⁄8 inch internal diameter hose in thedesign of the devices.

Paragraph (e) has been slightlymodified, from what is currentlyrequired in § 232.21(e), to permit themanually operated switch capable ofinitiating an emergency brake commandto the rear unit to be located either onthe front unit itself or on the engineercontrol stand. Several railroads and amanufacturer of locomotivesrecommended that the provisionregarding the placement of the manuallyoperated switch be modified torecognize existing designs of the devicesand the locomotives on which they areplaced. These commenters stated thatmany front units do not have the switchlocated directly on the front unit itselfbut that the switch is located on theengineer’s control stand. FRA agreeswith this recommendation and currentlydoes not take exception to locomotivesdesigned in the manner describedabove. Consequently, this paragraphpermits the manually operated switch tobe located either on the front unit itselfor on the engineer’s control stand.

A new paragraph (f) has been addedto this section which incorporates a

recommendation from AAR and itsmember railroads that new locomotivesbe equipped with a means toautomatically activate an emergencybrake application from the rear unitwhenever the locomotive engineerplaces the train air brakes in emergency.On June 1, 1998, FRA issued SafetyAdvisory 98–2, which recommendedthat railroads adopt a procedure torequire activation of the rear unit toeffectuate an emergency brakeapplication either by using the manualtoggle switch or through automaticactivation, whenever it becomesnecessary for a locomotive engineer toplace the train air brakes in emergencyusing either the automatic brake valveor the conductor’s emergency brakevalve or whenever an undesiredemergency application of the train airbrakes occurs. See 63 FR 30808. FRAapplauds the industry for taking theinitiative to incorporate availabletechnology on new locomotives andagrees with the representatives of therailroads that it is not economicallyfeasible to require existing equipment tobe retrofitted with this capability at thistime. Furthermore, existing equipmentis addressed in § 232.407(f)(3), whichretains the proposed requirement for theengineer to manually activate anemergency application from the rearunit when the engineer initiates anemergency application in thecontrolling locomotive if the locomotiveis not equipped to do so automatically.

FRA issued Safety Advisory 98–2 inresponse to several recent freight trainincidents potentially involving theimproper use of a train’s air brakes,events that caused FRA to focus onrailroad air brake and train handlingprocedures related to the initiation of anemergency air brake application,particularly as they pertain to theactivation of the two-way EOT from thelocomotive. The NPRM discussed fouraccidents in which a train was placedinto emergency braking by use of thenormal emergency brake valve handleson the locomotive, and although thetrain in each instance was equippedwith an armed and operable two-wayEOT, the device was not activated bythe locomotive engineer. See 63 FR48348. Preliminary findings indicatethat in all of the incidents noted above,there was evidence of an obstructionsomewhere in the train line, caused byeither a closed or partially closed anglecock or a kinked air hose. Thisobstruction prevented an emergencybrake application from being propagatedthroughout the entire train, front to rear,after such an application was initiatedfrom the locomotive using either the

engineer’s automatic brake valve handleor the conductor’s emergency brakevalve. Furthermore, the locomotiveengineers in each of the incidents statedthat they did not think to use the two-way EOT, when asked why they failedto activate the device.

Section 232.407 Operations RequiringUse of Two-Way End-of-Train Devices;Prohibition on Purchase ofNonconforming Devices

Paragraph (e) generally retains theproposed modification of the provision,currently contained in § 232.23(e)(1),which excepts from the two-way EOTrequirements trains operating with alocomotive capable of effectuating anemergency application located in therear third of the train. In the NPRM,FRA proposed to modify this exceptionso that it would be applicable only totrains operating with a locomotive onthe rear of the train. Data supplied byVOLPE demonstrates that stoppingdistances are greatly increased, andcould potentially result in a runawaytrain or derailment depending on thelength of the train, if an obstruction ofthe brake pipe were to occur directlybehind a locomotive located in the rearthird of the train. Therefore, FRAproposed that a train with a locomotivelocated in the rear third of the consistno longer be excepted from the two-wayEOT requirements, unless the trainqualifies for relief under one of the otherspecific exceptions contained in§ 232.407(e). Although FRA received noobjections to this specific change,several commenters did recommendthat the exception contained inparagraph (e)(1) be modified to includelocomotive consists at the rear of a train.These commenters asserted that theexisting rule needed to recognize thatsome locomotives have fuel tendersattached. FRA finds this requestedmodification to be sensible and logical.Consequently, paragraph (e)(1) has beenretained as proposed, with a slightmodification to clarify that theexception extends to trains with eithera locomotive or a locomotive consistlocated at the rear of the train.

A new exception to the two-way EOTrequirements has been added atparagraph (e)(9) to address the practiceof ‘‘doubling a hill.’’ The practice of‘‘doubling a hill’’ occurs in situationswhere a train must be divided in two inorder to traverse a particularly heavygrade due to the lack of sufficientmotive power to haul the entire train upthe grade. This issue was discussed inthe NPRM and at the public technicalconference conducted subsequent to theissuance of the NPRM. Initially, FRAbelieved that the two-way EOT should



be connected to that portion of the traintraversing the grade. However, such anapproach creates a multitude ofoperational as well as safety concerns.Such an approach would require traincrews to repeatedly switch the rear unitfrom one portion of the train to another,which would require these individualsto repeatedly walk sections of the trainat locations where it may not be safe todo so. Alternatively, such an approachmight require some trains to carry extradevices while in transit. At the publictechnical conference, there wasuniversal agreement between allrepresentatives at the conference thatthe device should remain on the rearunit of the train in these circumstances.Consequently, paragraph (e)(9) has beenadded to except trains from the two-wayEOT requirements that must be dividedinto two sections in order to traverse agrade. This paragraph makes clear thatthe exception only applies to the extentnecessary to traverse the grade and onlywhile the train is divided into two toconduct that movement.

Paragraph (f)(1) has been slightlymodified from what is currentlycontained § 232.23(f)(1) in order toclarify and address an issue related tothe ability of a railroad to dispatch atrain with an inoperative two-way EOTfrom a location where the device isinstalled. Section 232.23(f)(1) of thecurrent regulations, § 232.407(f)(1) ofthe NPRM, requires that ‘‘the deviceshall be armed and operable from thetime the train departs from the pointwhere the device is installed until thetrain reaches its destination.’’ Therefore,the existing regulations clearly require atrain to be equipped with an armed andoperable two-way EOT when dispatchedfrom a location where the device isinstalled. When issuing thisrequirement, FRA intended railroads toinstall repeater stations at locationswhere communication problems areprevalent.

Several commenters, both at thepublic hearings and in writtencomments, assert that this requirementis impossible to meet at some locationsregardless of whether repeater stationsare installed. These commenterscontend that certain locations have deadspots where it is impossible to establishcommunication between the front andrear unit. These parties recommend thatsome allowance be provided to permittrains at these locations to be moved ashort distance to restorecommunication. FRA agrees that thereare a few locations where dead spotsexist which make it difficult if notimpossible to establish communicationbetween the two units when they areinstalled. Therefore, paragraph (f)(1) has

been modified to allow a train thatexperiences a loss of communication orthat fails to establish communicationbetween the two units at the locationwhere the device is installed to move upto one mile from that location in orderto establish communication. FRAbelieves that this allowance should besufficient at most locations to establishthe required communication.Furthermore, if communication cannotbe established within these limits, thenFRA believes the railroad needs toinstall additional repeater stations. Ifadditional repeater stations still fail toaddress the issue, then FRA believesthat a railroad should be required toapply for a waiver of the requirement ata particular location, pursuant to therequirements of 49 CFR part 211. Thisapproach will allow FRA to address theunique circumstances of each locationon a case-by-case basis and ensure thatthe railroad implements otheroperational safeguards to ensure thesafety of those trains dispatched withoutarmed and operable devices.

Paragraph (f)(3) generally retains theproposed provision requiring the two-way EOT to be activated to effectuate anemergency brake application either byusing the manual toggle switch orthrough automatic activation, wheneverit becomes necessary for the locomotiveengineer to initiate an emergencyapplication of the train’s air brakesusing either the automatic brake valveor the conductor’s emergency brakevalve. As discussed previously in regardto the addition of § 232.405(f), theproposed requirement incorporates therecommendations contained in FRA’sSafety Advisory 98–2, issued on June 1,1998. See 63 FR 30808. FRA believesthat the operational requirementcontained in this paragraph must bestressed by the railroads whenconducting the two-way EOT trainingrequired in § 232.203 of this final rule.FRA continues to believe that thelikelihood of future incidents, such asthe ones described in the NPRM, will begreatly reduced if the train handlingprocedure contained in this paragraph ismade part of a train crew’s training andfollowed by members of the crew inemergency situations. FRA believes thatthis additional procedure, together withthe required training, will not onlyensure that an emergency brakeapplication is commenced from both thefront and rear of the train in emergencysituations, but will familiarize theengineer with the activation andoperation of the devices and willeducate the engineer to react in thesafest possible manner whenever

circumstances require the initiation ofan emergency brake application.

FRA recognizes that a number ofrailroads have already adoptedprocedures similar to those required inthis paragraph and commends suchactions. Although this paragraph allowsthe device to be activated eithermanually or automatically, FRA intendsto make clear that the front unit of thedevice or the engineer’s control standmust be equipped with a manuallyoperated switch. See § 232.405(e).Although some railroads havedeveloped, and this final rule requires,new locomotives to be equipped with ameans by which the rear unit isautomatically activated when anengineer makes an emergencyapplication with the brake handle, FRAbelieves that an engineer must also beprovided a separate, manually operatedswitch which is independent of anyautomatic system in order to ensure theactivation of the rear unit in the eventthat the automatic system fails.

It should be noted that the provisioncontained in paragraph (f)(3) has beenslightly modified from that proposed inthe NPRM. This final rule haseliminated the requirement to activatethe rear unit when an undesiredemergency brake application occurs to atrain. FRA agrees with the assertions ofvarious commenters that such arequirement might distract a locomotiveengineer from performing other criticalduties required to bring a train to a stopwhen an undesired emergency brakeapplication occurs. As an undesiredemergency brake application is notinitiated by the locomotive engineer,such an event will usually take theengineer by surprise, and FRA agreesthat the engineer’s attention would bebest focused on the activity of bringingthe train to a stop in suchcircumstances. Furthermore, all of theinstances where an engineer failed toactivate the rear device that werediscussed in the NPRM occurred inconjunction with an emergency brakeapplication knowingly initiated by theengineer.

Based on the above discussionregarding paragraph (e)(1) of thissection, paragraph (g)(1) retains theproposed modification of therequirements for operating a train thatexperiences an en route failure of thetwo-way EOT over a section of trackwith an average grade of two percent orgreater over a distance of twocontinuous miles. In the NPRM, FRAproposed modification of the alternativemeasure, currently contained at§ 232.23(g)(1)(iii), which permits theoperation over such a grade if a radio-controlled locomotive is placed in the



rear third of the train consist and underthe continuous control of the engineerin the head end of the train. FRAproposed modification of thisalternative measure to permit suchoperation only if the radio-controlledlocomotive is placed at the rear of thetrain consist. This modification isretained in this final rule in order thatthe alternative methods of operationover a heavy grade remain consistentwith the exception from the two-wayEOT requirements contained in§ 232.407(e)(1) as discussed in thepreceding paragraph. Although somecommenters suggested elimination of allof the requirements related to operatinga train experiencing an en route failureof its two-way EOT over heavy grades,FRA believes that the alternativemethods are necessary to ensure thesafety of such a train when descendinga heavy grade and ensure that railroadsproperly maintain the required devices.

Paragraphs (g)(1)(i)(A) and (B) havealso been slightly modified to clarify therequirements that a train be stopped incertain situations where communicationis lost between a helper locomotive andthe controlling locomotive. The finalrule makes clear that the stopping oftrains in such circumstances should bein accordance with the railroad’soperating rules. When issuing the two-way EOT requirements, FRA did notintend for engineers to place themselvesin unsafe situations when theyencounter an en route failure of thedevice when traversing a heavy grade.Although the existing rule prohibits theoperation of a train over certain heavygrades when a failure of the deviceoccurs en route, FRA did not intend thatthe train be immediately stopped whena failure of the device occurs whileoperating on a heavy grade. Rather, FRAintended for the locomotive engineer toconduct the movement in accordancewith the railroad’s operating rules forbringing the train safely to a stop at thefirst available location. Therefore, safetymay require that the train continuedown the grade or to a specific sidingrather than come to an immediate halt.Consequently, the modificationscontained in these paragraphs areintended to reflect FRA’s expectationswhen issuing the two-way EOTregulations.

Paragraph (g) has also been slightlymodified in order to clarify whatconstitutes a loss of communicationbetween the front and the rear units ontwo-way EOTs. The 16 minutes 30seconds time period for determiningwhen a loss of communication betweenthe front and the rear unit was adoptedbased on the design of the devices,which automatically checks

communication between the front andrear units every ten minutes. If noresponse is received, the front unitautomatically requests communicationfrom the rear unit 15 seconds later; if noresponse is received to that request,another request is made six minuteslater; and if there is still no response,the front unit makes another request 15seconds later. If there is still noresponse, a message is displayed to thelocomotive engineer that there is acommunication failure. This has causedsome confusion in the industry, in thatmany people believe the 16 minutes and30 seconds time frame should startwhen the message is first displayed onthe front unit. This is incorrect. Basedon the design of the currently operatingdevices, the 16 minutes and 30 secondshas elapsed when the failure message isbroadcast. This paragraph has beenmodified to explain this design feature.Thus, appropriate action should betaken immediately upon receiving thefailure message on the front unit. FRAalso realizes that there may be sometime lapse when the requests are madeand the message is displayed, thereforethe manufacturers of the devices shouldtake care to factor any time lag into the16 minute and 30 second time framedesigned into the devices.

Section 232.409 Inspection andTesting of End-of-Train Devices

Paragraph (c) of this section regardingthe notification of the locomotiveengineer when the device is tested bysomeone other than a train crewmember has been slightly modified fromthat proposed in the NPRM. In theNPRM, FRA proposed that thelocomotive engineer be notified inwriting in such circumstances. FRAagrees that this proposed requirementmay have been overly burdensome andbelieves that the intent of the proposedrequirement can be met withoutspecifically requiring writtennotification. FRA’s intent in proposingthe written requirement was to ensurethat locomotive engineers are providedsufficient information to confirm thatthe devices are properly inspected andtested and to provide locomotiveengineers with a measure of confidencethat the devices will work as intended.FRA believes these goals can beaccomplished by permitting therequired information to be provided byany means a railroad deems appropriate.FRA believes that the informationrequired to be provided to an engineer(the date and time of the test, thelocation where the test was performed,and the name of the person performingthe test) will ensure that the proper testsand inspections are performed. The

modifications made in this paragraphmake clear that a written or electronicrecord of the required information mustbe maintained in the cab of thecontrolling locomotive.

Paragraph (d) retains the proposedchanges to the language related to theannual calibration and testing of EOTdevices currently contained at§ 232.25(d). The regulation currentlystates that the devices shall be‘‘calibrated’’ annually. FRA intends tomake clear that it intended for railroadsto perform whatever tests or checks arenecessary to ensure that the devices areoperating within the parametersestablished by the manufacturers of thedevices. Several railroads haveattempted to ‘‘sharp shoot,’’ or narrowlyinterpret, the language currentlycontained in the regulation, claimingthat the manufacturer states that frontunits do not need to be calibrated on anannual basis, in order to avoid doingany testing of the devices. AlthoughFRA agrees that the front units may nothave to be calibrated every year, thedevices must be tested in some fashionto verify that they are operating withinthe manufacturer’s specification withregard to radio frequency, signalstrength, and modulation and do notrequire recalibration. FRA has beenprovided written instructions from themanufacturers of the devices whichcontain procedures for testing both thefront and rear units. Furthermore,railroads using the devices in Canadaacknowledge that the radio functions ofthe front and rear units are testedperiodically. Consequently, thisparagraph retains the proposedclarifying language in order to avoid anymisconceptions as to what actions arerequired to be performed on thesedevices on an annual basis.

Paragraph (d) has also been slightlymodified to require the readyaccessibility of the informationregarding the calibration and testing ofa front unit, which the currentregulation requires to be placed on asticker or other marking device affixedto the exterior of the front unit.Recently, FRA has discovered that somerailroads have locked the cabinets thathouse the front units and that there isno way for either FRA or railroadoperating crews to inspect the markingdevices and verify the informationrequired to be maintained. In order forthe marking device to serve its intendedpurpose, it must be readily capable ofbeing inspected by both FRA andrailroad operating crews. FRA intends tomake clear that the required informationregarding the date and location that theunit was last calibrated is to be easilyaccessible to both FRA and train crews



for inspection either on the markingdevice attached to the outside of thefront unit or, if the front unit isinaccessible, in a readily accessiblelocation in the cab of the locomotive.

In the NPRM, FRA discussed thepotential need to amend paragraph (c) ofthis section by including specificprovisions in this final rule to addressthe performance of bench testing on thefront and rear units of two-way EOTs.See 63 FR 48322. After consideration ofthe comments received, FRA believesthat specific regulatory requirements forperforming these tests are unnecessary.FRA believes that its existing guidance,FRA Technical Bulletin MP&E 97–8,regarding the performance of bench testson two-way EOTs is sufficient at thistime. Since the issuance of thisguidance on July 28, 1997, FRA hasdiscovered very few instances where theissued guidance was not being followedand has found no evidence indicatingthat bench tests have compromised theproper operation of the devices.Consequently, FRA will not issuespecific regulations regarding theperformance of bench test at this time.However, FRA will continue to monitorthe performance of these tests and willcontinue to expect railroads to performthe tests in accordance with theguidance previously issued by FRA.

FRA issued Technical Bulletin MP&E97–8 to its inspectors to clarify what isrequired when a railroad performs abench test. In this guidance, FRA madeclear that a bench test may be performedon both the front and rear units,independent of each other, if the test isperformed within the yard limits orlocation where the unit will be installedon the train. In FRA’s view, benchtesting the rear unit requires applyingair pressure to the device and thentransmitting an emergency brakeapplication from a front unit using thefront unit manual switch; the individualperforming the test would determinethat the emergency valve functionsproperly either by observing theemergency indicator pop out or byobserving brake pipe pressure at the reardevice go to zero while hearing theexhaust of air from the device. On theother hand, bench testing the front unitwould entail transmitting an emergencybrake application from the front unit,using the front unit manual switch, andobserving that a rear unit successfullyreceives the signal and activates theemergency air valve.

The guidance also indicated that bothtests must be performed within areasonable time period prior to thedevice being armed and placed on thetrain. To determine a reasonable timeperiod, the environment where the

device is stored and the conditions thedevice is subjected to after completinga successful bench test have to beconsidered. If the device is tested andstored in a controlled environment thatis free from weather elements, excessivedust, grease, and dirt prior to theimmediate installation on a train, thenfour to eight hours would be acceptable.If the device is tested and haphazardlythrown into a corner of a shop or areplaced in the rear of a truck to bebounced around a yard, one hour wouldlikely be considered reasonable beforeinstallation. The guidance also madeclear that bench tests must be performedat the location or yard where the devicewill be installed on a train.

Subpart F—Introduction of New BrakeSystem Technology

This subpart retains, without change,the proposed tests and proceduresrequired to introduce new train brakesystem technology into revenue service.The technology necessary for theintroduction of advanced brakingsystems is quickly developing. The newtechnology includes various forms ofelectronic braking systems, a variety ofbraking sensors, and computer-controlled braking systems. In order toallow and encourage the development ofnew technology, this subpart establishestests and procedures for introducingnew brake system technology. Theseprovisions require the submission toFRA of a pre-revenue service acceptancetesting plan.

FRA intends to make clear that thissubpart applies only to new train brakesystem technology that complies withthe statutory mandates contained in 49U.S.C. 20102, 20301–20304, 20701–20703, 21302, and 21304, but that is notspecifically covered by this final rule.Any type of new train brake system thatrequires an exemption from the Federalrailroad safety laws in order to beoperated in revenue service may not beintroduced into service pursuant to thissection. In order to grant a waiver of theFederal railroad safety laws, FRA islimited by the specific statutoryprovisions contained in 49 U.S.C. 20306as well as any FRA proceduralrequirements contained in this chapter.

Section 232.503 Process to IntroduceNew Brake System Technology

This section retains the proposedprocedural requirements which must bemet when a railroad intends tointroduce new brake system technologyinto its system. This section makes clearthat the approval of FRA’s AssociateAdministrator for Safety must beobtained by a railroad prior to therailroad’s implementation of a pre-

revenue service acceptance test planand before introduction of new brakesystem technology into revenue service.This section requires that such approvalbe obtained pursuant to the specialapproval process contained in § 232.17of this final rule. FRA believes thespecial approval process should speedthe process for taking advantage of newtechnologies over that which iscurrently available under the waiverprocess. However, in order to providean opportunity for all interested partiesto provide comment for use by FRA inits decision making process, as requiredby the Administrative Procedure Act,FRA believes that any special approvalprovision must, at a minimum, provideproper notice to the public of anysignificant change or action beingconsidered by the agency with regard toexisting regulations.

Section 232.505 Pre-Revenue ServiceAcceptance Testing Plan

This section retains the proposedrequirements for pre-revenue servicetesting of new brake system technology.These tests are extremely important inthat they are intended to prove that thenew brake system can be operated safelyin its intended environment. Forequipment that has not previously beenused in revenue service in the UnitedStates, paragraph (a) requires theoperating railroad to develop a pre-revenue service acceptance testing planand obtain FRA approval of the planunder the procedures stated in § 238.17before beginning testing. Previoustesting of the equipment at theTransportation Test Center, on anotherrailroad, or elsewhere will beconsidered by FRA in approving the testplan. Paragraph (b) requires the railroadto fully execute the tests required by theplan, to correct any safety deficienciesidentified by FRA, and to obtain FRA’sapproval to place the equipment inrevenue service prior to introducing theequipment in revenue service.Paragraph (c) requires the railroad tocomply with any operational limitationsimposed by FRA. Paragraph (d) requiresthe railroad to make the plan availableto FRA for inspection and copying.Paragraph (e) enumerates the elementsthat must be included in the plan. FRAbelieves this set of steps and thedocumentation required by this sectionare necessary to ensure that all safetyrisks have been reduced to a level thatpermits the new brake systemtechnology to be used in revenueservice. In lieu of the requirements ofparagraphs (a) through (e), paragraph (f)provides for an abbreviated testingprocedure for new brake systemtechnology that has previously been



used in revenue service in the UnitedStates. The railroad need not submit atest plan to FRA; however, a descriptionof the testing shall be maintained by therailroad and made available to FRA forinspection and copying.

IV. Regulatory Evaluation

A. Executive Order 12866 and DOTRegulatory Policies and Procedures

This final rule has been evaluated inaccordance with existing policies andprocedures and is considered to besignificant under both Executive Order12866 and DOT policies and procedures(44 FR 11034; Feb. 26, 1979). FRA hasprepared and placed in the docket aregulatory evaluation of this final rule.This evaluation estimates the costs andconsequences of this final rule as wellas its anticipated economic and safetybenefits. It may be inspected andphotocopied during normal businesshours by visiting the FRA Docket Clerkat the Office of Chief Counsel, FRA,Seventh Floor, 1120 Vermont Avenue,NW., in Washington, DC. Photocopiesmay also be obtained by submitting awritten request by mail to the FRADocket Clerk at the Office of ChiefCounsel, Federal RailroadAdministration, 1120 Vermont Avenue,NW., Mail Stop 10, Washington, DC20590.

FRA believes that this rule willproduce net benefits to society. Theestimated Net Present Value (NPV) ofthe total 20-year costs associated withthis final rule is approximately $109million. The total 20-year benefits(safety and economic) consist ofquantified benefits estimated at betweenapproximately $112 and $130 millionand various non-quantified benefitsdiscussed in detail below. The followingtables contain the estimated 20-yearquantified costs and quantified benefitsassociated with this final rule.

TABLE 3.—ESTIMATED COSTS

Category NPV costs

Training ................................. $61,221,156Retest ................................... 8,276,574Piston Travel Stickers ........... 3,385,681Air Quality ............................. 1,819,214Dynamic Brake ..................... 11,657,846Cycle Trains .......................... 16,012,217Class I Brake Test Notifica-

tion .................................... 4,414,173Helper Locomotive Inspec-

tion .................................... 1,929,071Helper Link ........................... 164,933

Total ........................... 108,880,865

TABLE 4.—ESTIMATED BENEFITS

Category NPV benefits

Extended Haul .................... $29,590,556—$46,735,494

Safety Improvements .......... 57,460,452EOT Use at Class I Brake

Test ................................. 22,070,863Bottom Rod Safety Sup-

ports ................................ 3,239,650

Total ......................... 112,361,521—129,506,459

Although the quantified benefits ofthis final rule exceed the quantifiedcosts of the rule, FRA believes that thequantified benefits significantlyunderestimate the total benefits of thisrule for several reasons. The informationavailable to FRA on the value ofproperty damage significantlyunderstates the true value of the damagein railroad accidents. The propertydamage estimate provided by therailroad(s) in the aftermath of anaccident are only for ‘‘railroad propertydamage’’ (equipment, track, andstructures). Although the numbersprovided by the railroads regardingrailroad property damage have beenenhanced to account for chronicunderestimation of these damages, thefigures used by FRA do not include thecosts of evacuations, individual (non-railroad employee) or community healthexpenses, environmental cleanup, theclosure of adjacent roads, or any of theother potential costs which are borne bysociety after a railroad accident.

A review of recent incidents thatinvolve a train that loses its ability tostop or decrease speed show that thereis a significant risk that such anoccurrence could result in the release oflarge amounts of hazardous materialswhich, if the incident occurred in adensely populated or environmentallysensitive area, could produce trulycatastrophic results. The costs ofevacuation and medical treatment forthose near the accident site could besubstantial, and associated road closurescould also produce significant economicimpact to travelers and the communitiesnearby. Should a hazardous materialrelease impact a river or stream, theconsequences to wildlife in the areacould also be severe and lasting.Furthermore, because derailments orcollisions of trains which lose theability to stop or decrease speed oftenoccur due to overturning on curves orentering congested areas, third partycasualties and property damage can alsobe substantial. As the inspection,testing, and maintenance provisions ofthis final rule are intended to ensurethat the brakes on a train are effective

and operable and because this final rulewill ensure that a locomotive engineeris provided information regarding thecondition of the brakes on the train theyare operating, FRA believes that thisfinal rule will reduce the number ofinstances where a train loses its abilityto stop or decrease speed that create thepotential for catastrophic consequences.

An example of the catastrophicconsequences that could result when afreight train loses the ability to stop ordecrease speed occurred on February 1,1996, in Cajon Pass in California. Thisaccident resulted in two fatalities, 32injuries (32 emergency respondersrequired medical treatment due toinhalation of toxic chemicals), therelease of hazardous materials, and thesubsequent evacuation of thesurrounding area. In addition, a 20 milesegment of Interstate 15, the main routebetween Los Angeles and Las Vegas,was closed for 5 days as a result of thehazardous materials release. The roadclosure forced 89,000 vehicles a day touse detours. This added approximately2 hours to the travel time between LasVegas and Los Angeles. The losses tothe surface transportation sector due toroad and track closure, revenue losses tobusinesses and tourism, and the costs ofemergency response related to thisincident were not included in theestimated $15 million damage figureused by FRA when including thisincident in the regulatory impactanalysis of the two-way end-of-traindevice final rule. See 62 FR 291. FRArecognizes that an exact figure cannot beplaced on these costs, but believes thatthe figure would be in the tens, if nothundreds, of millions of dollars. Asdevastating and costly as this incidentwas, it is probable that the results of thisparticular incident could have beenmuch more disastrous. An Amtrakpassenger train passed 17 minutesahead of the train involved in theincident. Had the Amtrak train beenstopped on the tracks or otherwisedelayed, the consequences of theincident would have been much moresevere, with the potential for scores offatalities. (As illustration of potentialconsequences, a freight-to-passengertrain collision at Hinton, Alberta, onFebruary 8, 1986, resulted in 29fatalities.)

Other power-brake related accidentsillustrate the potential for high severitywhen a heavy-tonnage freight train losesbraking control. On May 12, 1989, aSouthern Pacific TransportationCompany train accelerated out ofcontrol descending a 2.2 percent gradeinto San Bernardino, California. Twoemployees were killed and threeinjured. The entire train was effectively



destroyed. The incident destroyed sevenresidences adjacent to the right-of-way,killing two residents and injuring athird. A 14-inch gasoline pipelinewhich may have been damaged in eitherthe incident or the ensuing clean-up,ruptured 13 days later, resulting in thedeath of two additional residents,serious injuries to two residents, andminor injuries to 16 others. Elevenadditional homes were destroyed, alongwith 21 motor vehicles.

On February 2, 1989, near Helena,Montana, freight cars from a MontanaRail Link train rolled eastward down amountain grade and struck a helperlocomotive consist, slightly injuring twocrewmembers. Hazardous materials inthe consist which included hydrogenperoxide, isopropyl alcohol, andacetone were later released. The releaseof these hazardous materials resulted ina fire and explosions necessitating theevacuation of approximately 3,500residents of Helena for over two days.According to the NationalTransportation Safety Board, railroadand other property damage aloneexceeded $6 million, and all of thebuildings of Carroll College sustaineddamage. Furthermore, the City of Helenareceived 154 reports of property damagefrom residents within a three-mileradius of the incident. Consequently,FRA believes that the potentialunquantified benefits derived from theprevention of just one accident similarto the Cajon Pass incident or the otherincidents noted above would mostlikely outweigh the potential costs ofthis final rule.

In addition to the potentialunderestimation of the quantified safetybenefits, there may also be significantnon-quantified business benefits thatmay be available as a consequence ofthis rule. The quantified benefits fromthe extended haul provisions may besignificantly understated. FRA’sestimates for the number of trainseligible for this benefit, and the costsaving that it produces, were muchhigher in the NPRM than those suppliedby AAR in response to the NPRM. Whilewe have used the figures provided byAAR to develop a range for the benefitsrelated to the extended haul provisions,FRA continues to believe that morepotential benefits are available to theindustry than have been quantified inthe Regulatory Impact Analysis.

Another business benefit for whichFRA has insufficient information toform a credible estimate relates to theprovision permitting previously testedcars to be added to trains received ininterchange and the allowance toconduct a Class II brakes test on onlythose cars added to trains received in

interchange that will move less than 20miles from the interchange location.Under the existing regulations theaddition of cars to such trains wouldrequire the performance of either aninitial terminal brake test or a transfertrain brake test on the entire train. Theindustry may realize substantial costsavings by being permitted to add carsto such trains without inspection of theentire train. By permitting the additionof cars to trains received in interchange,FRA allows the railroads to savesignificant time (labor and train delaycosts) by not having to inspect the entiretrain consist when such cars are addedto these trains. Because FRA does nothave information on the number ofinterchanged trains engaging in suchactivity (and none were provided inresponse to the NPRM), we have notestimated the extent of this potentialbenefit. Actual business benefits to berealized due to this rule, therefore, maybe significantly understated.

Moreover, Congress mandated thatFRA review and revise the existingpower brake regulations wherenecessary and specifically required thatFRA prescribe standards regardingdynamic brakes, where applicable.Consequently, FRA believes that thisfinal rule produces a net benefit tosociety. The costs that have beenquantified represent the maximum thatthis rule is expected to cost, and thequantified projected benefits are theminimum which should be realized.

B. Regulatory Flexibility Act

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980(5 U.S.C. 601 et seq.) requires anassessment of the impacts of proposedand final rules on small entities. FRAhas conducted a regulatory flexibilityanalysis of this rule’s impact on smallentities, and the assessment has beenplaced in the public docket for thisrulemaking.

1. Why Action By the Agency Is BeingConsidered

In 1992, Congress amended theFederal rail safety laws by addingcertain statutory mandates related topower brake safety. See 49 U.S.C. 20141.These amendments specifically addressthe revision of the power brakeregulations by adding a new subsectionwhich states:

(r) POWER BRAKE SAFETY.—(1) TheSecretary shall conduct a review of theDepartment of Transportation’s rules withrespect to railroad power brakes, and notlater than December 31, 1993, shall revisesuch rules based on such safety data as maybe presented during that review.

(2) In carrying out paragraph (1), theSecretary shall, where applicable, prescribe

standards regarding dynamic brakeequipment. * * * Pub. L. No. 102–365,section 7; codified at 49 U.S.C. 20141,superseding 45 U.S.C. 431(r).

In addition to this statutory mandate,FRA received various recommendationsand petitions for rulemaking, anddetermined on its own that the powerbrake regulations were in need ofrevision. FRA has been in the process ofrevising the power brake regulationssince 1992. An ANPRM and two NPRMsrevising the power brake regulationswere previously issued on December 31,1992, September 16, 1994, andSeptember 9, 1998, respectively. See 57FR 62546, 59 FR 47676, and 63 FR48294. A detailed discussion of thehistory leading up to this final rule iscontained in the preamble. The reasonsfor the actual provisions of the actionconsidered by the agency are explainedin the body of the preamble and thesection-by-section analysis.

2. The Objectives and Legal Basis for theRule

The objective of the rule is to enhancethe safety of rail transportation,protecting both those people travelingand working on the system, and thosepeople off the system who might beaffected by a rail incident by revisingthe regulations related to the brakingsystems used and operated in freightand other non-passenger trains toaddress potential deficiencies in theexisting regulations, better address theneeds of contemporary railroadoperations, and facilitate the use ofadvanced technologies. The legal basisfor this action is reflected in theresponse to 1. above and in thepreamble.

3. A Description of and an Estimate ofthe Number of Small Entities to Whichthe Final Rule Would Apply

The Small Business Administration(SBA) uses an industry wide definitionof ‘‘small entity’’ based on employment.Railroads are considered small by SBAdefinition if they employ fewer than1,500 people for line haul railroads, and500 for switching and terminalrailroads. An agency may establish oneor more other definitions of this term, inconsultation with the SBA and after anopportunity for public comment, thatare appropriate to the agency’sactivities.

The classification system used in thisanalysis is that of the FRA. Prior to theSBA regulations establishing sizecategories, the Interstate CommerceCommission (ICC) developed aclassification system for freight railroadsas Class I, II, or III, based on annualoperating revenue. A Class I railroad has



operating revenue of $250 million ormore, a Class II railroad has operatingrevenue greater than $20 million dollarsbut less than $250 million and a ClassIII railroad has operating revenue of $20million or less. The Department ofTransportation’s Surface TransportationBoard, which succeeded the ICC, hasnot changed these classifications. TheICC/STB classification system has beenused pervasively by FRA and therailroad industry to identify entities bysize. In the NPRM, FRA discussed theserevenue thresholds in terms of therevenue levels actually achieved bythese different classes of railroads ratherthan by the specific limits established inthe Surface Transportation Board’sregulations. See 49 CFR part 1201 1–1.

After consultation with the Office ofAdvocacy of the SBA and as explainedin detail in the ‘‘Interim PolicyStatement Concerning Small EntitiesSubject to the Railroad Safety Laws,’’published August 11, 1997 at 62 FR43024, FRA has decided to define‘‘small entity,’’ on an interim basis, toinclude only those entities whoserevenues would bring them within theClass III definition. In response to FRA’srequest for comments on its alternatedefinition, the American Short Line andRegional Railroad Association(ASLRRA) suggested that the definitioninclude all Class II and Class IIIrailroads. However, the ASLRRA offeredno support for this request nor providedany rationale for why such a largenumber of railroads should beconsidered ‘‘small entities.’’Consequently, this final rule retains thealternate definition of ‘‘small entity’’which includes only Class III railroads.

All of the small entities directlyaffected by this rule are Class IIIrailroads. FRA certifies that this finalrule is expected to have a significantimpact on a substantial number of ClassIII railroads. Although FRA did notquantify the estimated annual cost orbenefit to the average Class III railroad(of which there are approximately 600–650 at any given time), the RegulatoryImpact Analysis contains discussionsand cost estimates for certain specificprovisions where the impact could beestimated for non-Class I and Class IIIrailroads.

The only significant costs to Class IIIrailroads imposed by this final rule arerelated to the training of employees. Inthe NPRM, FRA estimated that Class IIIrailroads would absorb approximately15 percent of the training costs beingimposed on non-Class I railroads. Thisestimate was based on the fact that ClassIII railroads employ approximately 15percent of the employees on non-ClassI railroads and because virtually all of

the training costs are related to thenumber and types of employeesemployed by a railroad. FRA receivedno specific comment from anyinterested party objecting to thisestimate. The final rule has beenmodified to reduce the potential impactof the training requirements on thesesmall railroads based on commentsreceived, by eliminating the need todevelop internal audit programs and byallowing efficiency tests to be utilized toassess the effectiveness of a railroad’straining program. Moreover, asdiscussed above and below, the trainingthat employees of Class III railroads willbe required to receive is significantlyless than the required training of manyemployees on Class I and Class IIrailroads. Thus, although FRA believesthat the actual cost to Class III railroadswill be much less than the 15 percentoriginally assigned, FRA will retain thevery conservative cost estimate relatedto training for Class III railroads of 15percent of the training costs for non-Class I railroads which results in anestimated impact of approximately$740,579, or less than $1,200 for theaverage Class III railroad. These costwill be apportioned among the 600 to650 Class III railroads, and will varyaccording to the number of employeeseach railroad must train. This is a roughestimate based on the number of ClassIII employees as a percentage of totalemployees. Actual impact should beless, as discussed below.

4. A Description of the ProjectedReporting, Recordkeeping and OtherCompliance Requirements of the FinalRule, Including an Estimate of theClasses of Small Entities Which Will BeSubject to the Requirements and theType of Professional Skills Necessaryfor Preparation of the Report or Record

Other than the training requirementsdiscussed above, this rule will have a deminimus impact on small entities. Mostof the final rule provisions will noteffect small railroad costs because of thenature and limits to their operations, orthe small railroad costs are inseparablefrom the industry-wide costs. Forexample, small railroads do notgenerally operate helper locomotives, sothey will not be subject to the costsassociated with that new rule provision.In the case of provisions such as thoserequiring piston travel stickers, FRA hasno basis for assigning to any particularsegment of the industry the costs forequipping the entire fleet of non-standard piston travel cars with pistontravel stickers. But in reality, it isunlikely that these costs will fall on thesmaller railroads.

In various places in the RegulatoryImpact Analysis, FRA has attempted toassign burdens to the smaller membersof the industry based on some measureof their size relative to the rest of theindustry. In those cases, FRA hasprobably overestimated the burden forthe smaller carriers. A good example isthe requirement regarding the repair anddocumentation of dynamic brakefailures. While FRA has assigned thesecosts based on the total number oflocomotives operated by each segmentof the industry, the reality is that fewsmall railroads operate locomotivesequipped with operative dynamicbrakes and they will not actually besubject to these costs. The costs shownin the Regulatory Impact Analysisshould be viewed as a maximum.Similarly, smaller railroads perform alimited number of Class I brake tests, donot generally own and operate yard airsources, and do not usually perform thetype of maintenance that will trigger thenew record keeping requirements, thusthe reporting and record keepingrequirements related to those activitieswill be minimal or non-existent forthese smaller carriers.

5. Federal Rules Which May Duplicate,Overlap, or Conflict With the Rule

None.Significant Alternatives:1. Differing compliance or reporting

requirements or timetables which takeinto account the resources available tosmall entities:

2. Clarification, consolidation, orsimplification of compliance andreporting requirements under the rulefor such small entities:

3. Exemption from coverage of therule, or any part thereof, for such smallentities:

FRA considered the role that non-Class I railroads (Class II and IIIrailroads) have in today’s freightindustry. FRA believes that the currentmarketplace requires Class I railroadsand these smaller railroads to operate asan integrated system. Many of today’ssmaller railroads rely on Class Irailroads for the training of theiremployees and the maintenance of theirequipment. In addition, many non-ClassI railroads and Class I railroadsinterchange and operate each other’sequipment. Therefore, except in limitedcircumstances, it is impossible, from aregulatory standpoint, to separate thesesmaller railroads from the larger Class Irailroads. Therefore, in order to ensurethe safety and quality of train andlocomotive power braking systemsthroughout the entire freight industry,this final rule generally imposes aconsistent set of requirements on Class



I, II, and III railroads as a group.Although FRA recognizes that many ofthe operational benefits created by thisfinal rule are not available to many ofthe smaller operations, FRA feels thatthe integrated nature of the freightindustry requires that universallyconsistent requirements be imposed onboth Class I and non-Class I railroads.

Where possible, efforts were taken inthis final rule to minimize the impact onnon-Class I railroads. The dynamicbrake provisions of this final ruleprovide railroads with the option ofdeclaring the dynamic brake portion ofa locomotive deactivated. Thus, smallerrailroads which do not choose to utilizedynamic brakes are not required toincur the cost of maintaining theequipment. The final rule alsoeliminates the proposed requirement tostencil a locomotive with deactivateddynamic brakes which further reducesthe cost to smaller railroads. The finalrule permits railroads to perform ClassII brake tests on cars added to a trainreceived in interchange, if the train willtravel a distance not to exceed 20 milesfrom the point at which it was receivedin interchange. The current regulationsrequire the performance of at least atransfer train brake test on the entiretrain, rather than testing only those carsadded. FRA believes this will provide acost savings to smaller railroads as theygenerally move short distances frominterchange points to destination.

Furthermore, virtually all of theinspection and testing requirementsimposed by this final rule on Class IIIrailroads reflect current practices onthose operations.

The final rule also modifies some ofthe proposed training requirements inorder to reduce the costs to smallerrailroads based on comments receivedby the ASLRRA. The final ruleeliminates the requirement thatrailroads develop an internal auditprogram to assess the effectiveness oftheir training programs and allowsefficiency tests to be utilized to assessthe effectiveness of such programs. Thiswas a change requested by the ASLRRAand will reduce the impact of thetraining requirements by permittingsmaller railroads to utilize existingsupervisory oversight to assess theeffectiveness of training. The final rulealso clarifies that each employee needonly be trained on the knowledge andskills necessary to perform the tasksthey are required to perform. Becauseemployees of Class III railroadsgenerally are not required to performmany of the tasks covered by this finalrule, these employees would not berequired to be trained on those tasks.For example, Class III railroadsgenerally do not operate a large varietyof brake systems on their lines thus,their employees would only have to betrained on a limited number of differentbrake systems. In addition, the

employees of Class III railroadsgenerally will not be required to receiveany training in the areas of EPIC brakes,dynamic brakes, two-way EOT devices,or on some of the brake tests andmaintenance mandated in this final ruledue to the limited distances traveled bytrains on these operations, the lowtonnages hauled, and because many ofthe maintenance functions on thesesmaller railroads are contracted out tolarger railroads. Thus, the final rule hasattempted to narrow the trainingrequirements for employees of smallerrailroads to only those tasks they arerequired to perform and thus, reduce theeconomic impact of the requirements.

4. Use of performance, rather thandesign standards:

Where possible, especially withregard to advanced technologies andcertain brake system components, anattempt was made to tie the proposedrequirements to performance.

C. Paperwork Reduction Act

The information collectionrequirements in this final rule have beensubmitted for approval to the Office ofManagement and Budget (OMB) underthe Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995,44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. The sections thatcontain the new information collectionrequirements and the estimated time tofulfill each requirement are as follows:

CFR section Respondent universe Total annual responses Average time per re-sponse

Total annual burdenhours

Total annual burden cost(dollars)

229.27—Annual tests ...... 20,000 locomotives ........ 18,000 tests .................... 15 minutes ...................... 4,500 hours .................... 157,500231.31—Drawbars for

freight cars—approvalto operate on track withnon-standard gage.

545 railroads ................... 0 letters ........................... N/A .................................. N/A .................................. N/A

232.1—Purpose andScope—Requests forEarlier Application tocomply with Subparts Dthrough F.

545 railroads ................... 4 requests/letters ............ 60 minutes ...................... 4 hours ........................... 180

232.3—Applicability— Ex-port, industrial, & othercars not owned by rail-roads-identification.

545 railroads ................... 8 cards ............................ 10 minutes ...................... 1 hour ............................. 45

232.7—Waivers ............... 545 railroads ................... 10 petitions ..................... 40 hours ......................... 400 hours ....................... 18,000232.11—Penalties—

Knowing falsifying arecord/report.

545 railroads ................... 1 falsified recd/rpt ........... 10 minutes ...................... .20 hour .......................... 9

232.15—Movement ofDefective Equipment:

—Tags ...................... 1,620,000 cars ................ 128,400 tags ................... 2.5 minutes ..................... 5,350 hours .................... 187,250— Written Notification 1,620,000 cars ................ 21,200 notices ................ 3 minutes ........................ 1,060 hours .................... 37,100

232.17—Special ApprovalProcedure:

—Petitions for specialapproval of safety-critical revision.

545 railroads ................... 4 petition ......................... 100 hours ....................... 400 hours ....................... 18,000

—Petitions for specialapproval of pre-revenue serviceacceptance plan.

545 railroads ................... 2 petitions ....................... 100 hours ....................... 200 hours ....................... 9,000

—Service of petitions 545 railroads ................... 6 petitions ....................... 40 hours ......................... 240 hours ....................... 10,800—Statement of inter-

est.Public/railroads ............... 20 statements ................. 8 hours ........................... 160 hours ....................... 7,200

—Comments ............. Public/railroads ............... 15 comments .................. 4 hours ........................... 60 hours ......................... 2,700






232.103—Gen’l require-ments—all train brakesystems:

1,600,000 cars ................ 246,866 stickers ............. 10 minutes ...................... 41,144 hours .................. 835,156

—Locomotives—1stYear—Procedures.

545 railroads ................... 50 procedures ................ 4 hours ........................... 200 hours ....................... 9,000

—Locomotives—Sub-sequent Years—Procedures.

25 new railroads ............. 1 procedure .................... 4 hours ........................... 4 hours ........................... 180

232.105—Gen’l require-ments for locomotives-Inspection.

545 railroads ................... 20,000 insp. forms .......... 5 minutes ........................ 1,667 hours .................... 58,345

232.107—Air source re-quirements:.

—1st Year ................ 545 railroads ................... 50 plans .......................... 40 hours ......................... 2,000 hours .................... 90,000—Subsequent Years 25 new railroads ............. 1 plan .............................. 40 plans .......................... 40 hours ......................... 1,800—Amendments to

Plan.50 existing plans ............ 10 amendments .............. 20 hours ......................... 200 hours ....................... 9,000

—Recordkeeping ...... 50 existing plans ............ 1,150 records ................. 20 hours ......................... 23,000 hours .................. 1,035,000—Cold weather situa-

tions.545 railroads ................... 37 plans .......................... 20 hours ......................... 740 hours ....................... 33,300

232.109—Dynamic brakerequirements:.

—status .................... 545 railroads ................... 1,656,000 records .......... 4 minutes ........................ 110,400 hours ................ 3,864,000—Inoperative dy-

namic brakes.20,000 locomotives ........ 6,358 repair recds .......... 4 minutes ........................ 424 hours ....................... 14,840

—Tag bearing words‘‘inoperative dy-namic brakes’’.

20,000 locomotives ........ 6,358 tags ....................... 30 seconds ..................... 53 hours ......................... 1,855

—Deactivated dy-namic brakes—1stYear.

8,000 locomotives .......... 2,800 stencilings ............. 5 minutes ........................ 233 hours ....................... 8,155

—Subsequent Years 8,000 locomotives .......... 20 stencilings .................. 5 minutes ........................ 2 hours ........................... 70—Displays to Loco-

motive Engineer-Deceleration rate.

8,000 locomotives .......... 2,800,000 Disp. .............. .50 second ...................... 400 hours ....................... 0

—Operating rules—1st Year.

545 railroads ................... 300 oper. rules ............... 4 hours ........................... 1,200 hours .................... 54,000

—Subsequent Years 5 new railroads ............... 5 operating rules ............ 4 hours ........................... 20 hours ......................... 900—Amendments ......... 545 railroads ................... 15 amendments .............. 1 hour ............................. 15 hours ......................... 675—Miles-per-hour-

overspeed-top rulein operating proc..

545 railroads ................... 545 rules ......................... 60 minutes ...................... 545 hours ....................... 24,525

—Requests to in-crease 5 mph over-speed restriction.

545 railroads ................... 5 requests/lttrs. ............... 30 min. + 20 hrs. ............ 103 hours ....................... 4,635

—Knowledge cri-teria—locomotiveengineers—1stYear.

545 railroads ................... 300 amendments ............ 16 hours ......................... 4,800 hours .................... 216,000

—Subsequent Years 5 new railroads ............... 5 amendments ................ 16 hours ......................... 80 hours ......................... 3,600232.111—Train informa-

tion handling:—1st Year ................ 545 railroads ................... 545 procedures .............. 50 hours ......................... 27,250 hours .................. 1,226,250—Subsequent Years 10 new railroads ............. 10 procedures ................ 40 hours ......................... 400 hours ....................... 18,000—Amendments ......... 100 railroads ................... 100 amendments ............ 20 hours ......................... 2,000 hours .................... 90,000—Report require-

ments to train crew.545 railroads ................... 2,112,000 reports ........... 10 minutes ...................... 352,000 hours ................ 12,320,000

232.203—Training re-quirements—Tr. Prog.:

—1st Year ................ 545 railroads ................... 300 programs ................. 100 hours ....................... 30,000 hours .................. 1,350,000—Subsequent years 15 railroads ..................... 1 program ....................... 100 hours ....................... 100 hours ....................... 4,500—Amendments to

written program.545 railroads ................... 545 amendments ............ 8 hours ........................... 4,360 hours .................... 196,200

—Training records .... 545 railroads ................... 67,000 records ............... 8 minutes ........................ 8,933 hours .................... 312,655—Training notifica-

tions.545 railroads ................... 67,000 notific. ................. 3 minutes ........................ 3,350 hours .................... 117,250

—Audit program ....... 545 railroads ................... 545 plans ........................ 40 hours ......................... 21,800 hours .................. 981,000—Amendment to

audit program.545 railroads ................... 50 amendments .............. 20 hours ......................... 1,000 hours .................... 45,000

232.205—Class 1 braketest—Notifications.

545 railroads ................... 1,656,000 notific. ............ 45 seconds ..................... 20,700 hours .................. 724,500

232.207—Class 1A braketests:

545 railroads ................... 25 lists ............................ 30 minutes ...................... 13 hours ......................... 585

—1st Year ................ 545 railroads ................... 1 list ................................ 1 hour ............................. 1 hour ............................. 45—subsequent years—Notification ............ 545 railroads ................... 5 amendments ................ 1 hour ............................. 5 hours ........................... 225

232.209—Class II braketests-intermediate in-spection.

545 railroads ................... 1,600,000 comnnt ........... 3 seconds ....................... 1,333 hours .................... 46,655

—Operator of train ... 545 railroads ................... 1,600,000 comm. ............ 2 seconds ....................... 889 hours ....................... 31,115—Electronic commu-

nication link.545 railroads ................... 32,000 messages ........... 2 seconds ....................... 18 hours ......................... 630






232.211—Class II braketest-trainline continuityinsp..

545 railroads ................... 500,000 commun. ........... 5 seconds ....................... 694 hours ....................... 24,290

—Electronic commu-nication link.

545 railroads ................... 5,000 messages ............. 5 seconds ....................... 7 hours ........................... 245

232.213—Extended haultrains.

84,000 long dist. mvmts. 70 letters ......................... 15 minutes ...................... 18 hours ......................... 810

—Record of all de-fective/inoperativebrakes.

84,000 long dist. mvmts. 25,200 records ............... 20 minutes ...................... 8,400 hours .................... 294,000

232.303—Gen’l require-ments—single car test.

1,600,000 frgt. cars ........ 5,600 tags ....................... 5 minutes ........................ 467 hours ....................... 16,345

—Last repair trackbrake test/singlecar test.

1,600,000 frgt. cars ........ 320,000 stncl. ................. 5 minutes ........................ 26,667 hours .................. 993,345

232.307—Single Car ....... 545 railroads ................... Inc. under 232.17 ........... Inc. under 232.17 ........... Inc. under 232.17 ........... Inc. under 232.17232.309—Repair track

brake test.640 shops ....................... 5,000 tests ...................... 30 minutes ...................... 2,500 hours .................... 87,500

232.403—Design stds—1way end-of-train (EOTs)dev..

545 railroads ................... 4 billion mess. ................ 1/186,000 sec. ................ 6 hours ........................... 0

—Unique Code ......... 545 railroads ................... 12 requests ..................... 5 minutes ........................ 1 hour ............................. 35232.405—Design + Per-

formance stds.—2 wayEOTs.

545 railroads ................... 8 billion mess. ................ 1/186,000 sec. ................ 12 hours ......................... 0

232.407—Operations 2-way EOTs.

545 railroads ................... 50,000 comm. ................. 30 seconds ..................... 417 hours ....................... 14,595

232.409—Insp. and Test-ing of EOTs.

245 railroads ................... 450,000 comm. ............... 30 seconds ..................... 3,750 hours .................... 168,750

—Telemetry Equip-ment—Testing andCalibration.

245 railroads ................... 32,708 units .................... 1 minute .......................... 545 hours ....................... 24,525

232.503—Process to in-troduce new braketechnology.

545 railroads ................... 1 letter ............................ 1 hour ............................. 1 hour ............................. 45

—Special approval ... 545 railroads ................... 1 request ........................ 3 hours ........................... 3 hours ........................... 135232.505—Pre-revenue

service accept. testplan:

—1st Yr. ................... 545 railroads ................... 1 main. procedure .......... 160 hours ....................... 160 hours ....................... 7,200—Subsequent years 545 railroads ................... 1 main. procedure .......... 160 hours ....................... 160 hours ....................... 7,200—Amendments ......... 545 railroads ................... 1 main. procedure .......... 40 hours ......................... 40 hours ......................... 1,800—Design description 545 railroads ................... 1 petition ......................... 67 hours ......................... 67 hours ......................... 3,015—Report to FRA

Assoc. Admin.. forSafety.

545 railroads ................... 1 report ........................... 13 hours ......................... 13 Hours ......................... 585

—Brake system tech-nology testing.

545 railroads ................... 5 descriptions ................. 40 hours ......................... 200 hours ....................... 9,000

All estimates include the time forreviewing instructions; searchingexisting data sources; gathering ormaintaining the needed data; andreviewing the information. Forinformation or a copy of the paperworkpackage submitted to OMB contactRobert Brogan at 202–493–6292.

OMB is required to make a decisionconcerning the collection of informationrequirements contained in this final rulebetween 30 and 60 days afterpublication of this document in theFederal Register.

FRA cannot impose a penalty onpersons for violating informationcollection requirements which do notdisplay a current OMB control number,if required. This final rule has beenassigned OMB control number 2130–0008.

D. Environmental Impact

FRA has evaluated this final rule inaccordance with its ‘‘Procedures for

Considering Environmental Impacts’’(FRA Procedures)(64 FR 28545, May 26,1999) as required by the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.4321 et seq.), other environmentalstatutes, Executive Orders, and relatedregulatory requirements. FRA hasdetermined that this final rule is not amajor FRA action (requiring thepreparation of an environmental impactstatement or environmental assessment)because it is categorically excluded fromdetailed environmental review pursuantto section 4(c) of FRA’s Procedures.Section 4(c) of FRA’s Proceduresidentifies twenty classes of FRA actionsthat are categorically excluded from therequirements for conducting a detailedenvironmental review. FRA furtherconsidered this final rule in accordancewith section 4(c) and (e) of FRA’sProcedures to determine if extraordinarycircumstances exist with respect to thisfinal rule that might trigger the need fora more detailed environmental review.

After conducting this review, FRA hasdetermined that extraordinarycircumstances do not exist because thisfinal rule: Is not judged to beenvironmentally controversial; is notinconsistent with Federal, State, or locallaws, regulations, ordinances, or judicialor administrative determinationsrelating to environmental protection;will not have any significant adverseimpact on any natural, cultural,recreational, or scenic environments;will not use protected properties,involve new construction in wetlands,or affect a base floodplain; and will notcause a significant short- or long-termincrease in traffic congestion or otheradverse environmental impact on anymode of transportation. As a result, FRAfinds that this regulation is not a majorFederal action significantly effecting thequality of the human environment.



E. Federalism Implications

FRA believes it is in compliance withExecutive Order 13132. This final rulewill not have a substantial effect on theStates, on the relationship between thenational government and the States, oron the distribution of power andresponsibilities among the variouslevels of government. This final rulewill not have federalism implicationsthat impose substantial directcompliance costs on State and localgovernments. FRA notes that Statesinvolved in the State ParticipationProgram, pursuant to 49 CFR part 212,may incur minimal costs associatedwith the training of their inspectorsinvolved in the enforcement of this finalrule. Meanwhile, State officials wereconsulted to a practicable extentthrough their participation in the RSAC,a federal advisory committee discussedearlier in the preamble. Although thisrule was removed from the RSACprocess prior to the issuance of the 1998NPRM, representatives of state officialswere represented in the RSAC PowerBrake Working Group and the concernsand comments raised by theserepresentatives during that process werefully considered during thedevelopment of both the 1998 NPRMand this final rule. Specifically, theNational Association of RegulatoryCommissioners, the AmericanAssociation of State Highway andTransportation Officials, and theCalifornia Public Utilities Commission(CAPUC) were all represented when thisrule was being considered by the RSACPower Brake Working Group. TheCAPUC submitted extensive commentsin response to the 1998 NPRM whichare detailed and addressed in thepreamble to this final rule.

In any event, Federal preemption of aState or local law occurs automaticallyas a result of the statutory provisioncontained at 49 U.S.C. 20106 when FRAissues a regulation covering the samesubject matter as a State or local lawunless the State or local law is designedto reduce an essentially local safetyhazard, is not incompatible with Federallaw, and does not place an unreasonableburden on interstate commerce (seediscussion in the section-by-sectionanalysis of § 232.13). It should be notedthat the potential for preemption alsoexists under various other statutory andconstitutional provisions. Theseinclude: the Locomotive Inspection Act(now codified at 49 U.S.C. 20701–20703), the Safety Appliance Acts (nowcodified at 49 U.S.C. 20301–20304), andthe Commerce Clause of the UnitedStates Constitution.

List of Subjects

49 CFR Part 229

Railroad locomotive safety, Railroadsafety.

49 CFR Part 231

Railroad safety, Railroad safetyappliances.

49 CFR Part 232

Incorporation by reference, Railroadpower brakes, Railroad safety, Two-wayend-of-train devices.

The Rule

In consideration of the following, FRAamends chapter II, subtitle B of title 49,Code of Federal Regulations as follows:

Part 229—[AMENDED]

1. The authority citation for part 229is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20107,20133, 20137–20138, 20143, 20701–20703,21301–21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

2. Section 229.5 is amended byadding a new paragraph (p) to read asfollows:

§ 229.5 Definitions.

* * * * *(p) Electronic air brake means a brake

system controlled by a computer whichprovides the means for control of thelocomotive brakes or train brakes orboth.

3. Section 229.25 is amended byrevising paragraph (a) to read as follows:

§ 229.25 Tests: Every periodic inspection.

* * * * *(a) All mechanical gauges used by the

engineer to aid in the control or brakingof the train or locomotive, except loadmeters used in conjunction with anauxiliary brake system, shall be testedby comparison with a dead-weight testeror a test gauge designed for thispurpose.* * * * *

4. Section 229.27 is amended byrevising paragraph (b) to read as follows:

§ 229.27 Annual tests.

* * * * *(b) The load meter shall be tested.

Each device used by the engineer to aidin the control or braking of the train orlocomotive that provides an indicationof air pressure electronically shall betested by comparison with a test gaugeor self-test designed for this purpose. Anerror of greater than five percent or threepounds per square inch shall becorrected. The date and place of the testshall be recorded on Form FRA F 6180–49A, and the person conducting the test

and that person’s supervisor shall signthe form.* * * * *

5. Section 229.53 is revised to read asfollows:

§ 229.53 Brake gauges.All mechanical gauges and all devices

providing indication of air pressureelectronically that are used by theengineer to aid in the control or brakingof the train or locomotive shall belocated so that they may beconveniently read from the engineer’susual position during operation of thelocomotive. A gauge or device shall notbe more than five percent or threepounds per square inch in error,whichever is less.

Part 231—[AMENDED]

6. The authority citation for part 231is revised to read as follows:

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20107,20131, 20301–20303, 21301–21302, 21304;49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

7. Section 231.0 is amended byadding paragraphs (b)(3) through (5) andparagraph (g) to read as follows:

§ 231.0 Applicability and penalties.

* * * * *(b) * * *(3) Freight and other non-passenger

trains of four-wheel coal cars.(4) Freight and other non-passenger

trains of eight-wheel standard loggingcars if the height of each car from thetop of the rail to the center of thecoupling is not more than 25 inches.

(5) A locomotive used in hauling atrain referred to in paragraph (b)(4) ofthis section when the locomotive andcars of the train are used only totransport logs.* * * * *

(g) Except as provided in paragraph(b) of this section, § 231.31 also appliesto an operation on a 24-inch, 36-inch, orother narrow gage railroad.

8. Part 231 is further amended byadding § 231.31 to read as follows:

§ 231.31 Drawbars for freight cars;standard height.

(a) Except on cars specified inparagraph (b) of this section—

(1) On standard gage (561⁄2-inch gage)railroads, the maximum height ofdrawbars for freight cars (measuredperpendicularly from the level of thetops of the rails to the centers of thedrawbars) shall be 341⁄2 inches, and theminimum height of drawbars for freightcars on such standard gage railroads(measured in the same manner) shall be311⁄2 inches.



(2) On 36-inch gage railroads, themaximum height of drawbars for freightcars (measured perpendicularly fromthe level of the tops of the rails to thecenters of the drawbars) shall be 26inches, and the minimum height ofdrawbars for freight cars on such 36-inch gage railroads (measured in thesame manner) shall be 23 inches.

(3) On 24-inch gage railroads, themaximum height of drawbars for freightcars (measured perpendicularly fromthe level of the tops of the rails to thecenters of the drawbars) shall be 171⁄2inches, and the minimum height ofdrawbars for freight cars on 24-inch gagerailroads (measured in the samemanner) shall be 141⁄2 inches.

(4) On railroads operating on trackwith a gage other than those containedin paragraphs (a)(1) through (a)(3) of thissection, the maximum and minimumheight of drawbars for freight carsoperating on those railroads shall beestablished upon written approval ofFRA.

(b) This section shall not apply to arailroad all of whose track is less than24 inches in gage.

9. Appendix A of Part 231 is amendedby adding an entry for § 231.31 to theend of the Schedule of Civil Penalties toread as follows:

Appendix A to Part 231—Schedule ofCivil Penalties

FRA safety appliance de-fect code section

Viola-tion

Willfulviola-tion

* * * * *231.31 Drawbars, stand-

ard height ...................... 2,500 5,000

* * * * *

10. Part 232 is revised to read asfollows:

PART 232—BRAKE SYSTEM SAFETYSTANDARDS for FREIGHT and OTHERNON-PASSENGER TRAINS andEQUIPMENT; END-of-TRAIN DEVICES

Subpart A—General

Sec.232.1 Scope.232.3 Applicability.232.5 Definitions.232.7 Waivers.232.9 Responsibility for compliance.232.11 Penalties.232.13 Preemptive effect.232.15 Movement of defective equipment.232.17 Special approval procedure.232.19 Availability of records.232.21 Information collection.

Subpart B—General Requirements232.101 Scope.

232.103 General requirements for all trainbrake systems.

232.105 General requirements forlocomotives.

232.107 Air source requirements and coldweather operations.

232.109 Dynamic brake requirements.232.111 Train handling information.


232.201 Scope.232.203 Training requirements.232.205 Class I brake tests—initial terminal

inspection.232.207 Class IA brake tests—1,000-mile

inspection.232.209 Class II brake tests—intermediate

inspection.232.211 Class III brake tests—trainline

continuity inspection.232.213 Extended haul trains.232.215 Transfer train brake tests.232.217 Train brake tests conducted using

yard air.232.219 Double heading and helper service.

Subpart D—Periodic Maintenance andTesting Requirements232.301 Scope.232.303 General requirements.232.305 Repair track air brake tests.232.307 Single car tests.232.309 Repair track air brake test and

single car test equipment and devices.

Subpart E—End-of-Train Devices232.401 Scope.232.403 Design standards for one-way end-

of-train devices.232.405 Design and performance standards

for two-way end-of-train devices.232.407 Operations requiring use of two-

way end-of-train devices; prohibition onpurchase of nonconforming devices.

232.409 Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.

Subpart F—Introduction of New BrakeSystem Technology232.501 Scope.232.503 Process to introduce new brake

system technology.232.505 Pre-revenue service acceptance

testing plan.

Appendix A—Schedule of Civil Penalties

Appendix B—49 CFR part 232 prior to April1, 2001

Authority: 49 U.S.C. 20102–20103, 20107,20133, 20141, 20301–20303, 20306, 21301–21302, 21304; 49 CFR 1.49(c), (m).

Subpart A—General

§ 232.1 Scope.(a) This part prescribes Federal safety

standards for freight and other non-passenger train brake systems andequipment. Subpart E of this partprescribes Federal safety standards notonly for freight and other non-passengertrain brake systems and equipment, butalso for passenger train brake systems.This part does not restrict a railroad

from adopting or enforcing additional ormore stringent requirements notinconsistent with this part.

(b) Except as otherwise specificallyprovided in this paragraph or in thispart, railroads to which this part appliesshall comply with all the requirementscontained in subparts A through C andsubpart F of this part beginning on April1, 2004. Sections 232.1 through 232.13and 232.17 through 232.21 of this partwill become applicable to all railroadsto which this part applies beginning onApril 1, 2001. Subpart D of this part willbecome applicable to all railroads towhich this part applies beginning onAugust 1, 2001. Subpart E of this partwill become applicable to all trainsoperating on track which is part of thegeneral railroad system of transportationbeginning on April 1, 2001.

(c) A railroad may request earlierapplication of the requirementscontained in subparts A through C andsubpart F of this part upon writtennotification to FRA’s AssociateAdministrator for Safety. Such a requestshall indicate the railroad’s readinessand ability to comply with all of therequirements contained in thosesubparts.

(d) Except for operations identified in§ 232.3(c)(1), (c)(4), and (c)(6) through(c)(8), all railroads which are part of thegeneral railroad system of transportationshall operate pursuant to therequirements contained in this part 232as it existed on April 1, 2001 andincluded as Appendix B to this partuntil they are either required to operatepursuant to the requirements containedin this part or the requirementscontained in part 238 of this chapter orthey elect to comply earlier thanotherwise required with therequirements contained in this part orthe requirements contained in part 238of this chapter.

§ 232.3 Applicability.

(a) Except as provided in paragraphs(b) and (c) of this section, this partapplies to all railroads that operatefreight or other non-passenger trainservice on standard gage track which ispart of the general railroad system oftransportation. This includes theoperation of circus trains and privatecars when hauled on such railroads.

(b) Subpart E of this part, ‘‘End-of-Train Devices,’’ applies to all trainsoperating on track which is part of thegeneral railroad system of transportationunless specifically excepted in thatsubpart.

(c) Except as provided in § 232.1(d)and paragraph (b) of this section, thispart does not apply to:



(1) A railroad that operates only ontrack inside an installation that is notpart of the general railroad system oftransportation.

(2) Intercity or commuter passengertrain operations on standard gage trackwhich is part of the general railroadsystem of transportation;

(3) Commuter or other short-haul railpassenger train operations in ametropolitan or suburban area (asdescribed by 49 U.S.C. 20102(1)),including public authorities operatingpassenger train service;

(4) Rapid transit operations in anurban area that are not connected withthe general railroad system oftransportation;

(5) Tourist, scenic, historic, orexcursion operations, whether on or offthe general railroad system;

(6) Freight and other non-passengertrains of four-wheel coal cars;

(7) Freight and other non-passengertrains of eight-wheel standard loggingcars if the height of each car from thetop of the rail to the center of thecoupling is not more than 25 inches; or

(8) A locomotive used in hauling atrain referred to in paragraph (c)(7) ofthis subsection when the locomotiveand cars of the train are used only totransport logs.

(d) The provisions formerly containedin Interstate Commerce CommissionOrder 13528, of May 30, 1945, asamended, now revoked, are codified inthis paragraph. This part is notapplicable to the following equipment:

(1) Scale test weight cars.(2) Locomotive cranes, steam shovels,

pile drivers, and machines of similarconstruction, and maintenancemachines built prior to September 21,1945.

(3) Export, industrial, and other carsnot owned by a railroad which are notto be used in service, except formovement as shipments on their ownwheels to given destinations. Such carsshall be properly identified by a cardattached to each side of the car, signedby the shipper, stating that suchmovement is being made under theauthority of this paragraph.

(4) Industrial and other than railroad-owned cars which are not to be used inservice except for movement within thelimits of a single switching district (i.e.,within the limits of an industrialfacility).

(5) Narrow-gage cars.(6) Cars used exclusively in switching

operations and not used in trainmovements within the meaning of theFederal safety appliance laws (49 U.S.C.20301–20306).

§ 232.5 Definitions.For purposes of this part—

AAR means the Association ofAmerican Railroads.

Air brake means a combination ofdevices operated by compressed air,arranged in a system, and controlledmanually, electrically, electronically, orpneumatically, by means of which themotion of a railroad car or locomotiveis retarded or arrested.

Air Flow Indicator, AFM means aspecific air flow indicator required bythe air flow method of qualifying trainair brakes (AFM). The AFM Air FlowIndicator is a calibrated air flowmeasuring device which is clearlyvisible and legible in daylight anddarkness from the engineer’s normaloperating position. The indicator facedisplays:

(1) Markings from 10 cubic feet perminute (CFM) to 80 CFM, in incrementsof 10 CFM or less; and

(2) Numerals indicating 20, 40, 60,and 80 CFM for continuous monitoringof air flow.

Bind means restrict the intendedmovement of one or more brake systemcomponents by reduced clearance, byobstruction, or by increased friction.

Brake, dynamic means a train brakingsystem whereby the kinetic energy of amoving train is used to generate electriccurrent at the locomotive tractionmotors, which is then dissipatedthrough resistor grids or into thecatenary or third rail system.

Brake, effective means a brake that iscapable of producing its requireddesigned retarding force on the train. Acar’s air brake is not consideredeffective if it is not capable of producingits designed retarding force or if itspiston travel exceeds:

(1) 101⁄2 inches for cars equipped withnominal 12-inch stroke brake cylinders;or

(2) the piston travel limits indicatedon the stencil, sticker, or badge plate forthat brake cylinder.

Brake, hand means a brake that can beapplied and released by hand to preventor retard the movement of a locomotive.

Brake indicator means a device whichindicates the brake application rangeand indicates whether brakes areapplied and released.

Brake, inoperative means a primarybrake that, for any reason, no longerapplies or releases as intended.

Brake, inoperative dynamic means adynamic brake that, for any reason, nolonger provides its designed retardingforce on the train.

Brake, parking means a brake that canbe applied by means other than byhand, such as spring, hydraulic, or airpressure when the brake pipe air isdepleted, or by an electrical motor.

Brake pipe means the system ofpiping (including branch pipes, anglecocks, cutout cocks, dirt collectors,hoses, and hose couplings) used forconnecting locomotives and all railroadcars for the passage of compressed air.

Brake, primary means thosecomponents of the train brake systemnecessary to stop the train within thesignal spacing distance without thermaldamage to friction braking surfaces.

Brake, secondary means thosecomponents of the train brake systemwhich develop supplemental brakeretarding force that is not needed to stopthe train within signal spacing distancesor to prevent thermal damage to wheels.

Emergency application means anirretrievable brake application resultingin the maximum retarding forceavailable from the train brake system.

End-of-train device, one-way meanstwo pieces of equipment linked by radiothat meet the requirements of § 232.403.

End-of-train device, two-way meanstwo pieces of equipment linked by radiothat meet the requirements of §§ 232.403and 232.405.

Foul means any condition whichrestricts the intended movement of oneor more brake system componentsbecause the component is snagged,entangled, or twisted.

Freight car means a vehicle designedto carry freight, or railroad personnel, byrail and a vehicle designed for use in awork or wreck train or other non-passenger train.

Initial terminal means the locationwhere a train is originally assembled.

Locomotive means a piece of railroadon-track equipment, other than hi-rail,specialized maintenance, or othersimilar equipment, which may consistof one or more units operated from asingle control stand—

(1) With one or more propellingmotors designed for moving otherrailroad equipment;

(2) With one or more propellingmotors designed to transport freight orpassenger traffic or both; or

(3) Without propelling motors butwith one or more control stands.

Locomotive cab means that portion ofthe superstructure designed to beoccupied by the crew operating thelocomotive.

Locomotive, controlling means thelocomotive from which the engineerexercises control over the train.

Off air means not connected to acontinuous source of compressed air ofat least 60 pounds per square inch (psi).

Ordered date or date ordered meansthe date on which notice to proceed isgiven by a procuring railroad to acontractor or supplier for newequipment.



Piston travel means the amount oflinear movement of the air brake hollowrod (or equivalent) or piston rod whenforced outward by movement of thepiston in the brake cylinder or actuatorand limited by the brake shoes beingforced against the wheel or disc.

Pre-revenue service acceptance testingplan means a document, as furtherspecified in § 232.505, prepared by arailroad that explains in detail how pre-revenue service tests of certainequipment demonstrate that theequipment meets Federal safetystandards and the railroad’s own safetydesign requirements.

Previously tested equipment meansequipment that has received a Class Ibrake test pursuant to § 232.205 and hasnot been off air for more than fourhours.

Primary responsibility means the taskthat a person performs at least 50percent of the time. The totality of thecircumstances will be considered on acase-by-case basis in circumstanceswhere an individual does not spend 50percent of the day engaged in any onereadily identifiable type of activity.

Qualified mechanical inspectormeans a qualified person who hasreceived, as a part of the training,qualification, and designation programrequired under § 232.203, instructionand training that includes ‘‘hands-on’’experience (under appropriatesupervision or apprenticeship) in one ormore of the following functions:troubleshooting, inspection, testing,maintenance or repair of the specifictrain brake components and systems forwhich the person is assignedresponsibility. This person shall alsopossess a current understanding of whatis required to properly repair andmaintain the safety-critical brakecomponents for which the person isassigned responsibility. Further, thequalified mechanical inspector shall bea person whose primary responsibilityincludes work generally consistent withthe functions listed in this definition.

Qualified person means a person whohas received, as a part of the training,qualification, and designation programrequired under § 232.203, instructionand training necessary to perform one ormore functions required under this part.The railroad is responsible fordetermining that the person has theknowledge and skills necessary toperform the required function for whichthe person is assigned responsibility.The railroad determines thequalifications and competencies foremployees designated to performvarious functions in the manner setforth in this part. Although the rule usesthe term ‘‘qualified person’’ to describe

a person responsible for performingvarious functions required under thispart, a person may be deemed qualifiedto perform some functions but notqualified to perform other functions. Forexample, although a person may bedeemed qualified to perform the ClassII/intermediate brake test required bythis part, that same person may or maynot be deemed qualified to perform theClass I/initial Terminal brake test orauthorize the movement of defectiveequipment under this part. The railroadwill determine the required functionsfor which an individual will be deemeda ‘‘qualified person’’ based upon theinstruction and training the individualhas received pursuant to § 232.203concerning a particular function.

Railroad means any form of non-highway ground transportation that runson rails or electromagnetic guideways,including:

(1) Commuter or short-haul railroadpassenger service in a metropolitan orsuburban area and commuter railroadservice that was operated by theConsolidated Rail Corporation onJanuary 1, 1979; and

(2) High speed ground transportationsystems that connect metropolitan areas,without regard to whether those systemsuse new technologies not associatedwith traditional railroads. The term‘‘railroad’’ is also intended to mean aperson that provides transportation byrailroad, whether directly or bycontracting out operation of the railroadto another person. The term does notinclude rapid transit operations in anurban area that are not connected to thegeneral railroad system oftransportation.

Rebuilt equipment means equipmentthat has undergone overhaul identifiedby the railroad as a capital expenseunder the Surface TransportationBoard’s accounting standards.

Refresher training means periodicretraining required for employees orcontractors to remain qualified toperform specific equipmenttroubleshooting, inspection, testing,maintenance, or repair functions.

Respond as intended means toproduce the result that a device orsystem is designed to produce.

‘‘Roll-by’’ inspection means aninspection performed while equipmentis moving.

Service application means a brakeapplication that results from one ormore service reductions or theequivalent.

Service reduction means a decrease inbrake pipe pressure, usually from 5 to25 psi at a rate sufficiently rapid tomove the operating valve to serviceposition, but at a rate not rapid enough

to move the operating valve toemergency position.

Solid block of cars means two or morefreight cars consecutively coupledtogether and added to or removed froma train as a single unit.

State inspector means an inspector ofa participating State rail safety programunder part 212 of this chapter.

Switching service means theclassification of freight cars according tocommodity or destination; assemblingof cars for train movements; changingthe position of cars for purposes ofloading, unloading, or weighing; placingof locomotives and cars for repair orstorage; or moving of rail equipment inconnection with work service that doesnot constitute a train movement.

Tourist, scenic, historic, or excursionoperations are railroad operations thatcarry passengers, often using antiquatedequipment, with the conveyance of thepassengers to a particular destinationnot being the principal purpose.

Train means one or more locomotivescoupled with one or more freight cars,except during switching service.

Train line means the brake pipe orany non-pneumatic system used totransmit the signal that controls thelocomotive and freight car brakes.

Train, unit or train, cycle means atrain that, except for the changing oflocomotive power and the removal orreplacement of defective equipment,remains coupled as a consist andcontinuously operates from location Ato location B and back to location A.

Transfer train means a train thattravels between a point of origin and apoint of final destination not exceeding20 miles. Such trains may pick up ordeliver freight equipment while en routeto destination.

Yard air means a source ofcompressed air other than from alocomotive.

§ 232.7 Waivers.(a) Any person subject to a

requirement of this part may petitionthe Administrator for a waiver ofcompliance with such requirement. Thefiling of such a petition does not affectthat person’s responsibility forcompliance with that requirement whilethe petition is being considered.

(b) Each petition for waiver must befiled in the manner and contain theinformation required by part 211 of thischapter.

(c) If the Administrator finds that awaiver of compliance is in the publicinterest and is consistent with railroadsafety, the Administrator may grant thewaiver subject to any conditions theAdministrator deems necessary. If awaiver is granted, the Administrator



publishes a notice in the FederalRegister containing the reasons forgranting the waiver.

§ 232.9 Responsibility for compliance.(a) A railroad subject to this part shall

not use, haul, permit to be used orhauled on its line, offer in interchange,or accept in interchange any train,railroad car, or locomotive with one ormore conditions not in compliance withthis part; however, a railroad shall notbe liable for a civil penalty for suchaction if such action is in accordancewith § 232.15. For purposes of this part,a train, railroad car, or locomotive willbe considered in use prior to departurebut after it has received, or should havereceived, the inspection required formovement and is deemed ready forservice.

(b) Although many of therequirements of this part are stated interms of the duties of a railroad, whenany person performs any functionrequired by this part, that person(whether or not a railroad) is required toperform that function in accordancewith this part.

(c) Any person performing anyfunction or task required by this partshall be deemed to have consented toFRA inspection of the person’soperation to the extent necessary todetermine whether the function or taskis being performed in accordance withthe requirements of this part.

§ 232.11 Penalties.(a) Any person (including but not

limited to a railroad; any manager,supervisor, official, or other employeeor agent of a railroad; any owner,manufacturer, lessor, or lessee ofrailroad equipment, track, or facilities;any employee of such owner,manufacturer, lessor, lessee, orindependent contractor) who violatesany requirement of this part or causesthe violation of any such requirement issubject to a civil penalty of at least $500,but not more than $11,000 per violation,except that: Penalties may be assessedagainst individuals only for willfulviolations, and, where a grosslynegligent violation or a pattern ofrepeated violations has created animminent hazard of death or injury topersons, or has caused death or injury,a penalty not to exceed $22,000 perviolation may be assessed. Each day aviolation continues shall constitute aseparate offense. Appendix A to thispart contains a schedule of civil penaltyamounts used in connection with thisrule.

(b) Any person who knowingly andwillfully falsifies a record or reportrequired by this part is subject to

criminal penalties under 49 U.S.C.21311.

§ 232.13 Preemptive effect.

(a) Under 49 U.S.C. 20106, issuance ofthe regulations in this part preempts anyState law, rule, regulation, order, orstandard covering the same subjectmatter, except for a provision necessaryto eliminate or reduce a local safetyhazard if that provision is notincompatible with this part and doesnot impose an undue burden oninterstate commerce.

(b) Preemption should also beconsidered pursuant to the LocomotiveBoiler Inspection Act (now codified at49 U.S.C. 20701–20703), the SafetyAppliance Acts (now codified at 49U.S.C. 20301–20304), and theCommerce Clause based on the relevantcase law pertaining to preemption underthose provisions.

(c) FRA does not intend by issuanceof the regulations in this part to preemptprovisions of State criminal law thatimpose sanctions for reckless conductthat leads to actual loss of life, injury,or damage to property, whether suchprovisions apply specifically to railroademployees or generally to the public atlarge.

§ 232.15 Movement of defectiveequipment.

(a) General provision. Except asprovided in paragraph (c) of thissection, a railroad car or locomotivewith one or more conditions not incompliance with this part may be usedor hauled without civil penalty liabilityunder this part only if all of thefollowing conditions are met:

(1) The defective car or locomotive isproperly equipped in accordance withthe applicable provisions of 49 U.S.C.chapter 203 and the requirements of thispart.

(2) The car or locomotive becomesdefective while it is being used by therailroad on its line or becomes defectiveon the line of a connecting railroad andis properly accepted in interchange forrepairs in accordance with paragraph(a)(7) of this section.

(3) The railroad first discovers thedefective condition of the car orlocomotive prior to moving it forrepairs.

(4) The movement of the defective caror locomotive for repairs is from thelocation where the car or locomotive isfirst discovered defective by therailroad.

(5) The defective car or locomotivecannot be repaired at the location wherethe railroad first discovers it to bedefective.

(6) The movement of the car orlocomotive is necessary to make repairsto the defective condition.

(7) The location to which the car orlocomotive is being taken for repair isthe nearest available location wherenecessary repairs can be performed onthe line of the railroad where the car orlocomotive was first found to bedefective or is the nearest availablelocation where necessary repairs can beperformed on the line of a connectingrailroad if:

(i) The connecting railroad elects toaccept the defective car or locomotivefor such repair; and

(ii) The nearest available locationwhere necessary repairs can beperformed on the line of the connectingrailroad is no farther than the nearestavailable location where necessaryrepairs can be performed on the line ofthe railroad where the car or locomotivewas found defective.

(8) The movement of the defective caror locomotive for repairs is not by atrain required to receive a Class I braketest at that location pursuant to§ 232.205.

(9) The movement of the defective caror locomotive for repairs is not in a trainin which less than 85 percent of the carshave operative and effective brakes.

(10) The defective car or locomotive istagged, or information is recorded, asprescribed in paragraph (b) of thissection.

(11) Except for cars or locomotiveswith brakes cut out en route, thefollowing additional requirements aremet:

(i) A qualified person shalldetermine—

(A) That it is safe to move the car orlocomotive; and

(B) The maximum safe speed andother restrictions necessary for safelyconducting the movement.

(ii) The person in charge of the trainin which the car or locomotive is to bemoved shall be notified in writing andinform all other crew members of thepresence of the defective car orlocomotive and the maximum speedand other restrictions determined underparagraph (a)(11)(i)(B) of this section. Acopy of the tag or card described inparagraph (b) of this section may beused to provide the notification requiredby this paragraph.

(iii) The defective car or locomotive ismoved in compliance with themaximum speed and other restrictionsdetermined under paragraph(a)(11)(i)(B) of this section.

(12) The defective car or locomotive isnot subject to a Special Notice forRepair under part 216 of this chapter,unless the movement of the defective



car is made in accordance with therestrictions contained in the SpecialNotice.

(b) Tagging of defective equipment.(1) At the place where the railroad

first discovers the defect, a tag or cardshall be placed on both sides of thedefective equipment or locomotive andin the cab of the locomotive, or anautomated tracking system approved foruse by FRA shall be provided with thefollowing information about thedefective equipment:

(i) The reporting mark and car orlocomotive number;

(ii) The name of the inspectingrailroad;

(iii) The name and job title of theinspector;

(iv) The inspection location and date;(v) The nature of each defect;(vi) A description of any movement

restrictions;(vii) The destination of the equipment

where it will be repaired; and(viii) The signature, or electronic

identification, of the person reportingthe defective condition.

(2) The tag or card required byparagraph (b)(1) of this section shallremain affixed to the defectiveequipment until the necessary repairshave been performed.

(3) An electronic or written record ora copy of each tag or card attached toor removed from a car or locomotiveshall be retained for 90 days and, uponrequest, shall be made available within15 calendar days for inspection by FRAor State inspectors.

(4) Each tag or card removed from acar or locomotive shall contain the date,location, reason for its removal, and thesignature of the person who removed itfrom the piece of equipment.

(5) Any automated tracking systemapproved by FRA to meet the taggingrequirements contained in paragraph(b)(1) of this section shall be capable ofbeing reviewed and monitored by FRAat any time to ensure the integrity of thesystem. FRA’s Associate Administratorfor Safety may prohibit or revoke arailroad’s authority to utilize anapproved automated tracking system inlieu of tagging if FRA finds that theautomated tracking system is notproperly secure, is inaccessible to FRAor a railroad’s employees, or fails toadequately track and monitor themovement of defective equipment. FRAwill record such a determination inwriting, include a statement of the basisfor such action, and provide a copy ofthe document to the railroad.

(c) Movement for unloading orpurging of defective cars. If a defectivecar is loaded with a hazardous materialor contains residue of a hazardous

material, the car may not be placed forunloading or purging unless unloadingor purging is consistent withdeterminations made and restrictionsimposed under paragraph (a)(11)(i) ofthis section and the unloading orpurging is necessary for the safe repairof the car.

(d) Computation of percent operativepower brakes.

(1) The percentage of operative powerbrakes in a train shall be based on thenumber of control valves in the train.The percentage shall be determined bydividing the number of control valvesthat are cut-in by the total number ofcontrol valves in the train. A controlvalve shall not be considered cut-in ifthe brakes controlled by that valve areinoperative. Both cars and locomotivesshall be considered when making thiscalculation.

(2) The following brake conditions notin compliance with this part are notconsidered inoperative power brakes forpurposes of this section:

(i) Failure or cutting out of secondarybrake systems;

(ii) Inoperative or otherwise defectivehandbrakes or parking brakes;

(iii) Piston travel that is in excess ofthe Class I brake test limits required in§ 232.205 but that does not exceed theoutside limits contained on the stencil,sticker, or badge plate required by§ 232.103(g) for considering the powerbrakes to be effective; and

(iv) Power brakes overdue forinspection, testing, maintenance, orstenciling under this part.

(e) Placement of equipment withinoperative brakes.

(1) A freight car or locomotive withinoperative brakes shall not be placed asthe rear car of the train.

(2) No more than two freight cars witheither inoperative brakes or notequipped with power brakes shall beconsecutively placed in the same train.

(3) Multi-unit articulated equipmentshall not be placed in a train if theequipment has more than twoconsecutive individual control valvescut-out or if the brakes controlled by thevalves are inoperative.

(f) Guidelines for determininglocations where necessary repairs canbe performed. The following guidelineswill be considered by FRA whendetermining whether a location is alocation where repairs to a car’s brakesystem or components can be performedand whether a location is the nearestlocation where the needed repairs canbe effectuated.

(1) The following general factors andguidelines will be considered whenmaking determinations as to whether a

location is a location where brakerepairs can be performed:

(i) The accessibility of the location topersons responsible for making repairs;

(ii) The presence of hazardousconditions that affect the ability tosafely make repairs of the type neededat the location;

(iii) The nature of the repair necessaryto bring the car into compliance;

(iv) The need for railroads to have inplace an effective means to ensure thesafe and timely repair of equipment;

(v) The relevant weather conditions atthe location that affect accessibility orcreate hazardous conditions;

(vi) A location need not have theability to effectuate every type of brakesystem repair in order to be considereda location where some brake repairs canbe performed;

(vii) A location need not be staffedcontinuously in order to be considereda location where brake repairs can beperformed;

(viii) The ability of a railroad toperform repair track brake tests or singlecar tests at a location shall not beconsidered; and

(ix) The congestion of work at alocation shall not be considered

(2) The general factors and guidelinesoutlined in paragraph (f)(1) of thissection should be applied to thefollowing locations:

(i) A location where a mobile repairtruck is used on a regular basis;

(ii) A location where a mobile repairtruck originates or is permanentlystationed;

(iii) A location at which a railroadperforms mechanical repairs other thanbrake system repairs; and

(iv) A location that has an operativerepair track or repair shop;

(3) In determining whether a locationis the nearest location where thenecessary brake repairs can be made, thedistance to the location is a key factorbut should not be considered thedetermining factor. The distance to alocation must be considered inconjunction with the factors andguidance outlined in paragraphs (f)(1)and (f)(2) of this section. In addition, thefollowing safety factors must beconsidered in order to optimize safety:

(i) The safety of the employeesresponsible for getting the equipment toor from a particular location; and

(ii) The potential safety hazardsinvolved with moving the equipment inthe direction of travel necessary to getthe equipment to a particular location.

(g) Based on the guidance detailed inparagraph (f) of this section andconsistent with other requirementscontained in this part, a railroad and therepresentatives of the railroad’s



employees may submit, for FRAapproval, a joint proposal containing aplan designating locations where brakesystem repairs will be performed.Approval of such plans shall be made inwriting by FRA’s AssociateAdministrator for Safety and shall besubject to any modifications or changesdetermined by FRA to be necessary toensure consistency with therequirements and guidance contained inthis part.

§ 232.17 Special approval procedure.(a) General. The following procedures

govern consideration and action uponrequests for special approval of analternative standard under §§ 232.305and 232.307; and for special approval ofpre-revenue service acceptance testingplans under subpart F of this part.

(b) Petitions for special approval of analternative standard. Each petition forspecial approval of an alternativestandard shall contain:

(1) The name, title, address, andtelephone number of the primary personto be contacted with regard to review ofthe petition;

(2) The alternative proposed, in detail,to be substituted for the particularrequirement of this part;

(3) Appropriate data or analysis, orboth, for FRA to consider indetermining whether the alternative willprovide at least an equivalent level ofsafety; and

(4) A statement affirming that therailroad has served a copy of thepetition on designated representatives ofits employees, together with a list of thenames and addresses of the personsserved.

(c) Petitions for special approval ofpre-revenue service acceptance testingplan. Each petition for special approvalof a pre-revenue service acceptancetesting plan shall contain:

(1) The name, title, address, andtelephone number of the primary personto be contacted with regard to review ofthe petition; and

(2) The elements prescribed in§ 232.505.

(d) Service.(1) Each petition for special approval

under paragraph (b) or (c) of this sectionshall be submitted in triplicate to theAssociate Administrator for Safety,Federal Railroad Administration, 4007th Street, SW., Washington, DC 20590.

(2) Service of each petition for specialapproval of an alternative standardunder paragraph (b) of this section shallbe made on the following:

(i) Designated employeerepresentatives responsible for theequipment’s operation, inspection,testing, and maintenance under thispart;

(ii) Any organizations or bodies thateither issued the standard incorporatedin the section(s) of the rule to which thespecial approval pertains or issued thealternative standard that is proposed inthe petition; and

(iii) Any other person who has filedwith FRA a current statement of interestin reviewing special approvals underthe particular requirement of this part atleast 30 days but not more than 5 yearsprior to the filing of the petition. If filed,a statement of interest shall be filedwith FRA’s Associate Administrator forSafety and shall reference the specificsection(s) of this part in which theperson has an interest.

(e) Federal Register notice. FRA willpublish a notice in the Federal Registerconcerning each petition underparagraph (b) of this section.

(f) Comment. Not later than 30 daysfrom the date of publication of thenotice in the Federal Registerconcerning a petition under paragraph(b) of this section, any person maycomment on the petition.

(1) A comment shall set forthspecifically the basis upon which it ismade, and contain a concise statementof the interest of the commenter in theproceeding.

(2) The comment shall be submittedin triplicate to the AssociateAdministrator for Safety, FederalRailroad Administration, 400 7th Street,SW., Washington, DC 20590.

(3) The commenter shall certify that acopy of the comment was served oneach petitioner.

(g) Disposition of petitions.(1) If FRA finds that the petition

complies with the requirements of thissection and that the proposedalternative standard or pre-revenueservice plan is acceptable and justified,the petition will be granted, normallywithin 90 days of its receipt. If thepetition is neither granted nor deniedwithin 90 days, the petition remainspending for decision. FRA may attachspecial conditions to the approval ofany petition. Following the approval ofa petition, FRA may reopenconsideration of the petition for cause.

(2) If FRA finds that the petition doesnot comply with the requirements ofthis section and that the alternativestandard or pre-revenue service plan isnot acceptable or justified, the petitionwill be denied, normally within 90 daysof its receipt.

(3) When FRA grants or denies apetition, or reopens consideration of thepetition, written notice is sent to thepetitioner and other interested parties.

§ 232.19 Availability of records.

Except as otherwise provided, therecords and plans required by this partshall be made available torepresentatives of FRA and Statesparticipating under part 212 of thischapter for inspection and copyingupon request.

§ 232.21 Information Collection.

(a) The information collectionrequirements of this part were reviewedby the Office of Management andBudget pursuant to the PaperworkReduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C. 3501et seq.) and are assigned OMB controlnumber 2130–0008.

(b) The information collectionrequirements are found in the followingsections: §§ 229.27, 231.31, 232.1, 232.3,232.7, 232.11, 232.15, 232.17, 232.103,232.105, 232.107, 232.109, 232.111,232.203, 232.205, 232.207, 232.209,232.211, 232.213, 232.303, 232.307,232.309, 232.403, 232.405, 232.407,232.409, 232.503, 232.505.

Subpart B—General Requirements

§ 232.101 Scope.

This subpart contains generaloperating, performance, and designrequirements for each railroad thatoperates freight or other non-passengertrains and for specific equipment usedin those operations.

§ 232.103 General requirements for alltrain brake systems.

(a) The primary brake system of atrain shall be capable of stopping thetrain with a service application from itsmaximum operating speed within thesignal spacing existing on the track overwhich the train is operating.

(b) If the integrity of the train line ofa train brake system is broken, the trainshall be stopped. If a train line usesother than solely pneumatic technology,the integrity of the train line shall bemonitored by the brake control system.

(c) A train brake system shall respondas intended to signals from the trainline.

(d) One hundred percent of the brakeson a train shall be effective andoperative brakes prior to use ordeparture from any location where aClass I brake test is required to beperformed on the train pursuant to§ 232.205.

(e) A train shall not move if less than85 percent of the cars in that train haveoperative and effective brakes.

(f) Each car in a train shall have its airbrakes in effective operating conditionunless the car is being moved for repairsin accordance with § 232.15. The airbrakes on a car are not in effective



operating condition if its brakes are cut-out or otherwise inoperative or if thepiston travel exceeds:

(1) 101⁄2 inches for cars equipped withnominal 12-inch stroke brake cylinders;or

(2) The piston travel limits indicatedon the stencil, sticker, or badge plate forthe brake cylinder with which the car isequipped.

(g) Except for cars equipped withnominal 12-inch stroke (81⁄2 and 10-inchdiameters) brake cylinders, all cars shallhave a legible decal, stencil, or stickeraffixed to the car or shall be equippedwith a badge plate displaying thepermissible brake cylinder piston travelrange for the car at Class I brake testsand the length at which the piston travelrenders the brake ineffective, if differentfrom Class I brake test limits. The decal,stencil, sticker, or badge plate shall belocated so that it may be easily read andunderstood by a person positionedsafely beside the car.

(h) All equipment ordered on or afterAugust 1, 2002, or placed in service forthe first time on or after April 1, 2004,shall have train brake systems designedso that an inspector can observe from asafe position either the piston travel, anaccurate indicator which shows pistontravel, or any other means by which thebrake system is actuated. The designshall not require the inspector to placehimself or herself on, under, or betweencomponents of the equipment to observebrake actuation or release.

(i) All trains shall be equipped withan emergency application feature thatproduces an irretrievable stop, using abrake rate consistent with prevailingadhesion, train safety, and brake systemthermal capacity. An emergencyapplication shall be available at alltimes, and shall be initiated by anunintentional parting of the train line orloss of train brake communication.

(j) A railroad shall set the maximummain reservoir working pressure.

(k) The maximum brake pipe pressureshall not be greater than 15 psi less than

the air compressor governor starting orloading pressure.

(l) Except as otherwise provided inthis part, all equipment used in freightor other non-passenger trains shall, at aminimum, meet the Association ofAmerican Railroads (AAR) Standard S–469–47, ‘‘Performance Specification forFreight Brakes,’’ contained in the AARManual of Standards andRecommended Practices, Section E(April 1, 1999). The incorporation byreference of this AAR standard wasapproved by the Director of the FederalRegister in accordance with 5 U.S.C.552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You mayobtain a copy of the incorporateddocument from the Association ofAmerican Railroads, 50 F Street, NW,Washington, DC. 20001. You mayinspect a copy of the document at theFederal Railroad Administration, DocketClerk, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW, Suite7000, Washington, DC or at the Office ofthe Federal Register, 800 North CapitolStreet, NW, Suite 700, Washington, DC20408.

(m) If a train qualified by the Air FlowMethod as provided for in subpart C ofthis part experiences a brake pipe airflow of greater than 60 CFM or brakepipe gradient of greater than 15 psiwhile en route and the movable pointerdoes not return to those limits within areasonable time, the train shall bestopped at the next available locationand be inspected for leaks in the brakesystem.

(n) Securement of unattendedequipment. A train’s air brake shall notbe depended upon to hold equipmentstanding unattended on a grade(including a locomotive, a car, or a trainwhether or not locomotive is attached).For purposes of this section,‘‘unattended equipment’’ meansequipment left standing and unmannedin such a manner that the brake systemof the equipment cannot be readilycontrolled by a qualified person.Unattended equipment shall be secured

in accordance with the followingrequirements:

(1) A sufficient number of handbrakes shall be applied to hold theequipment. Railroads shall develop andimplement a process or procedure toverify that the applied hand brakes willsufficiently hold the equipment with theair brakes released.

(2) Where possible, an emergencybrake application of the air brakes shallbe initiated prior to leaving equipmentunattended.

(3) The following requirements applyto the use of hand brakes on unattendedlocomotives:

(i) All hand brakes shall be fullyapplied on all locomotives in the leadconsist of an unattended train.

(ii) All hand brakes shall be fullyapplied on all locomotives in anunattended locomotive consist outsideof yard limits.

(iii) At a minimum, the hand brakeshall be fully applied on the leadlocomotive in an unattended locomotiveconsist within yard limits.

(4) A railroad shall adopt and complywith a process or procedures to verifythat the applied hand brakes willsufficiently hold an unattendedlocomotive consist. A railroad shall alsoadopt and comply with instructions toaddress throttle position, status of thereverse lever, position of the generatorfield switch, status of the independentbrakes, position of the isolation switch,and position of the automatic brakevalve on all unattended locomotives.The procedures and instruction requiredin this paragraph shall take into accountwinter weather conditions as they relateto throttle position and reverser handle.

(5) Any hand brakes applied to holdunattended equipment shall not bereleased until it is known that the airbrake system is properly charged.

(o) Air pressure regulating devicesshall be adjusted for the followingpressures:

Locomotives PSI

(1) Minimum brake pipe air pressure:Road Service ............................................................................................................................................................................... 90Switch Service ............................................................................................................................................................................. 60

(2) Minimum differential between brake pipe and main reservoir air pressures, with brake valve in running position ..................... 15(3) Safety valve for straight air brake ................................................................................................................................................. 30–55(4) Safety valve for LT, ET, No. 8–EL, No. 14 El, No. 6–DS, No. 6–BL and No. 6–SL equipment ................................................. 30–68(5) Safety valve for HSC and No. 24–RL equipment ......................................................................................................................... 30–75(6) Reducing valve for independent or straight air brake ................................................................................................................... 30–50(7) Self-lapping portion for electro-pneumatic brake (minimum full application pressure) ................................................................ 50(8) Self-lapping portion for independent air brake (full application pressure) .................................................................................... 30 or less(9) Reducing valve for high-speed brake (minimum) ......................................................................................................................... 50

(p) Railroad or contract supervisorsshall be held jointly responsible with

the inspectors and train crew membersthey supervise for the condition and

proper functioning of train brakesystems to the extent that it is possible



to detect defective equipment by theinspections and tests required by thispart.

§ 232.105 General requirements forlocomotives.

(a) The air brake equipment on alocomotive shall be in safe and suitablecondition for service.

(b) All locomotives ordered on or afterAugust 1, 2002, or placed in service forthe first time on or after April 1, 2004,shall be equipped with a hand orparking brake that is:

(1) Capable of application oractivation by hand;

(2) Capable of release by hand; and(3) Capable of holding the unit on a

three (3) percent grade.(c) On locomotives so equipped, the

hand or parking brake as well as itsparts and connections shall beinspected, and necessary repairs made,as often as service requires but no lessfrequently than every 368 days. Thedate of the last inspection shall be eitherentered on Form FRA F 6180–49A orsuitably stenciled or tagged on thelocomotive.

(d) The amount of leakage from theequalizing reservoir on locomotives andrelated piping shall be zero, unless thesystem is capable of maintaining the setpressure at any service application withthe brakes control valve in the freightposition. If such leakage is detected enroute, the train may be moved only tothe nearest forward location where theequalizing-reservoir leakage can becorrected. On locomotives equippedwith electronic brakes, if the system logsor displays a fault related to equalizingreservoir leakage, the train may bemoved only to the nearest forwardlocation where the necessary repairs canbe made.

(e) Use of the feed or regulating valveto control braking is prohibited.

(f) The passenger position on thelocomotive brake control stand shall beused only if the trailing equipment isdesigned for graduated brake release orif equalizing reservoir leakage occurs enroute and its use is necessary to safelycontrol the movement of the train untilit reaches the next forward locationwhere the reservoir leakage can becorrected.

(g) When taking charge of alocomotive or locomotive consist, anengineer must know that the brakes arein operative condition.

§ 232.107 Air source requirements andcold weather operations.

(a) Monitoring plans for yard airsources.

(1) A railroad shall adopt and complywith a written plan to monitor all yard

air sources, other than locomotives, todetermine that they operate as intendedand do not introduce contaminants intothe brake system of freight equipment.

(2) This plan shall require the railroadto:

(i) Inspect each yard air source at leasttwo times per calendar year, no lessthan five months apart, to determine itoperates as intended and does notintroduce contaminants into the brakesystem of the equipment it services.

(ii) Identify yard air sources found notto be operating as intended or foundintroducing contaminants into the brakesystem of the equipment it services.

(iii) Repair or take other remedialaction regarding any yard air sourceidentified under paragraph (a)(2)(ii) ofthis section.

(3) A railroad shall maintain recordsof the information and actions requiredby paragraph (a)(2). These records shallbe maintained for a period of at leastone year from the date of creation andmay be maintained either electronicallyor in writing.

(b) Condensation and othercontaminants shall be blown from thepipe or hose from which compressed airis taken prior to connecting the yard airline or motive power to the train.

(c) No chemicals which are known todegrade or harm brake systemcomponents shall be placed in the trainair brake system.

(d) Yard air reservoirs shall either beequipped with an operable automaticdrain system or be manually drained atleast once each day that the devices areused or more often if moisture isdetected in the system.

(e) A railroad shall adopt and complywith detailed written operatingprocedures tailored to the equipmentand territory of that railroad to coversafe train operations during coldweather. For purposes of this provision,‘‘cold weather’’ means when theambient temperature drops below 10degrees Fahrenheit (F) (minus 12.2degrees Celsius).

§ 232.109 Dynamic brake requirements.

(a) Except as provided in paragraph (i)of this section, a locomotive engineershall be informed of the operationalstatus of the dynamic brakes on alllocomotive units in the consist at theinitial terminal or point of origin for atrain and at other locations where alocomotive engineer first beginsoperation of a train. The informationrequired by this paragraph may beprovided to the locomotive engineer byany means determined appropriate bythe railroad; however, a written orelectronic record of the information

shall be maintained in the cab of thecontrolling locomotive.

(b) Except as provided in paragraph(e) of this section, all inoperativedynamic brakes shall be repaired within30 calendar days of becominginoperative or at the locomotive’s nextperiodic inspection pursuant to § 229.23of this chapter, whichever occurs first.

(c) Except as provided in paragraph(e) of this section, a locomotivediscovered with inoperative dynamicbrakes shall have a tag bearing thewords ‘‘inoperative dynamic brake’’securely attached and displayed in aconspicuous location in the cab of thelocomotive. This tag shall contain thefollowing information:

(1) The locomotive number;(2) The name of the discovering

carrier;(3) The location and date where

condition was discovered; and(4) The signature of the person

discovering the condition.(d) An electronic or written record of

repairs made to a locomotive’s dynamicbrakes shall be retained for 92 days.

(e) A railroad may elect to declare thedynamic brakes on a locomotivedeactivated without removing thedynamic brake components from thelocomotive, only if all of the followingconditions are met:

(1) The locomotive is clearly markedwith the words ‘‘dynamic brakedeactivated’’ in a conspicuous locationin the cab of the locomotive; and

(2) The railroad has taken appropriateaction to ensure that the deactivatedlocomotive is incapable of utilizingdynamic brake effort to retard or controltrain speed.

(f) If a locomotive consist is intendedto have its dynamic brakes used whilein transit, a locomotive with inoperativeor deactivated dynamic brakes or alocomotive not equipped with dynamicbrakes shall not be placed in thecontrolling (lead) position of a consistunless the locomotive has the capabilityof:

(1) Controlling the dynamic brakingeffort in trailing locomotives in theconsist that are so equipped; and

(2) Displaying to the locomotiveengineer the deceleration rate of thetrain or the total train dynamic brakeretarding force.

(g) All locomotives equipped withdynamic brakes and ordered on or afterAugust 1, 2002, or placed in service forthe first time on or after April 1, 2004,shall be designed to:

(1) Test the electrical integrity of thedynamic brake at rest; and

(2) Display the available total traindynamic brake retarding force at variousspeed increments in the cab of thecontrolling (lead) locomotive.



(h) All rebuilt locomotives equippedwith dynamic brakes and placed inservice on or after April 1, 2004, shallbe designed to:

(1) Test the electrical integrity of thedynamic brake at rest; and

(2) Display either the traindeceleration rate or the available totaltrain dynamic brake retarding force atvarious speed increments in the cab ofthe controlling (lead) locomotive.

(i) The information required byparagraph (a) of this section is notrequired to be provided to thelocomotive engineer if all of thelocomotives in the lead consist of a trainare equipped in accordance withparagraph (g) of this section.

(j) A railroad operating a train with abrake system that includes dynamicbrakes shall adopt and comply withwritten operating rules governing safetrain handling procedures using thesedynamic brakes under all operatingconditions, which shall be tailored tothe specific equipment and territory ofthe railroad. The railroad’s operatingrules shall:

(1) Ensure that the friction brakes aresufficient by themselves, without theaid of dynamic brakes, to stop the trainsafely under all operating conditions.

(2) Include a ‘‘miles-per-hour-overspeed-stop’’ rule. At a minimum,this rule shall require that any train,when descending a grade of 1 percent orgreater, shall be immediately brought toa stop, by an emergency brakeapplication if necessary, when thetrain’s speed exceeds the maximumauthorized speed for that train by morethan 5 miles per hour. A railroad shallreduce the 5 mile per hour overspeedrestriction if validated researchindicates the need for such a reduction.A railroad may increase the 5 mile perhour overspeed restriction only withapproval of FRA and based uponverifiable data and research.

(k) A railroad operating a train witha brake system that includes dynamicbrakes shall adopt and comply withspecific knowledge, skill, and abilitycriteria to ensure that its locomotiveengineers are fully trained in theoperating rules prescribed by paragraph(j) of this section. The railroad shallincorporate such criteria into itslocomotive engineer certificationprogram pursuant to Part 240 of thischapter,

§ 232.111 Train handling information.(a) A railroad shall adopt and comply

with written procedures to ensure thata train crew employed by the railroad isgiven accurate information on thecondition of the train brake system andtrain factors affecting brake system

performance and testing when the crewtakes over responsibility for the train.The information required by thisparagraph may be provided to thelocomotive engineer by any meansdetermined appropriate by the railroad;however, a written or electronic recordof the information shall be maintainedin the cab of the controlling locomotive.

(b) The procedures shall require thateach train crew taking charge of a trainbe informed of:

(1) The total weight and length of thetrain, based on the best informationavailable to the railroad;

(2) Any special weight distributionthat would require special trainhandling procedures;

(3) The number and location of carswith cut-out or otherwise inoperativebrakes and the location where they willbe repaired;

(4) If a Class I or Class IA brake testis required prior to the next crew changepoint, the location at which that testshall be performed; and

(5) Any train brake system problemsencountered by the previous crew of thetrain.


§ 232.201 Scope.This subpart contains the inspection

and testing requirements for brakesystems used in freight and other non-passenger trains. This subpart alsocontains general training requirementsfor railroad and contract personnel usedto perform the required inspections andtests.

§ 232.203 Training requirements.(a) Each railroad and each contractor

shall adopt and comply with a training,qualification, and designation programfor its employees that perform brakesystem inspections, tests, ormaintenance. For purposes of thissection, a ‘‘contractor’’ is defined as aperson under contract with the railroador car owner. The records required bythis section may be maintained eitherelectronically or in writing.

(b) As part of this program, therailroad or contractor shall:

(1) Identify the tasks related to theinspection, testing, and maintenance ofthe brake system required by this partthat must be performed by the railroador contractor and identify the skills andknowledge necessary to perform eachtask.

(2) Develop or incorporate a trainingcurriculum that includes both classroomand ‘‘hands-on’’ lessons designed toimpart the skills and knowledgeidentified as necessary to perform each

task. The developed or incorporatedtraining curriculum shall specificallyaddress the Federal regulatoryrequirements contained in this part thatare related to the performance of thetasks identified.

(3) Require all employees tosuccessfully complete a trainingcurriculum that covers the skills andknowledge the employee will need topossess in order to perform the tasksrequired by this part that the employeewill be responsible for performing,including the specific Federal regulatoryrequirements contained in this partrelated to the performance of a task forwhich the employee will be responsible;

(4) Require all employees to pass awritten or oral examination covering theskills and knowledge the employee willneed to possess in order to perform thetasks required by this part that theemployee will be responsible forperforming, including the specificFederal regulatory requirementscontained in this part related to theperformance of a task for which theemployee will be responsible forperforming;

(5) Require all employees toindividually demonstrate ‘‘hands-on’’capability by successfully applying theskills and knowledge the employee willneed to possess in order to perform thetasks required by this part that theemployee will be responsible forperforming to the satisfaction of theemployee’s supervisor or designatedinstructor;

(6) Consider training and testing,including efficiency testing, previouslyreceived by an employee in order tomeet the requirements contained inparagraphs (b)(3) through (b)(5) of thissection; provided, such training andtesting can be documented as requiredin paragraph (e) of this section;

(7) Require supervisors to exerciseoversight to ensure that all theidentified tasks are performed inaccordance with the railroad’s writtenprocedures and the specific Federalregulatory requirements contained inthis part;

(8) Require periodic refresher trainingat an interval not to exceed three yearsthat includes classroom and ‘‘hands-on’’training, as well as testing. Efficiencytesting may be used to meet the ‘‘hands-on’’ portion of this requirement;provided, such testing is documented asrequired in paragraph (e) of this section;and

(9) Add new brake systems to thetraining, qualification and designationprogram prior to its introduction torevenue service.

(c) A railroad that operates trainsrequired to be equipped with a two-way



end-of-train telemetry device pursuantto Subpart E of this part, and eachcontractor that maintains such devicesshall adopt and comply with a trainingprogram which specifically addressesthe testing, operation, and maintenanceof two-way end-of-train devices foremployees who are responsible for thetesting, operation, and maintenance ofthe devices.

(d) A railroad that operates trainsunder conditions that require the settingof air brake pressure retaining valvesshall adopt and comply with a trainingprogram which specifically addressesthe proper use of retainers foremployees who are responsible forusing or setting retainers.

(e) A railroad or contractor shallmaintain adequate records todemonstrate the current qualificationstatus of all of its personnel assigned toinspect, test, or maintain a train brakesystem. The records required by thisparagraph may be maintained eitherelectronically or in writing and shall beprovided to FRA upon request. Theserecords shall include the followinginformation concerning each suchemployee:

(1) The name of the employee;(2) The dates that each training course

was completed;(3) The content of each training

course successfully completed;(4) The employee’s scores on each test

taken to demonstrate proficiency;(5) A description of the employee’s

‘‘hands-on’’ performance applying theskills and knowledge the employeeneeds to possess in order to perform thetasks required by this part that theemployee will be responsible forperforming and the basis for finding thatthe skills and knowledge weresuccessfully demonstrated;

(6) A record that the employee wasnotified of his or her currentqualification status and of anysubsequent changes to that status;

(7) The tasks required to be performedunder this part which the employee isdeemed qualified to perform; and

(8) Identification of the person(s)determining that the employee hassuccessfully completed the trainingnecessary to be considered qualified toperform the tasks identified inparagraph (e)(7) of this section.

(9) The date that the employee’s statusas qualified to perform the tasksidentified in paragraph (e)(7) of thissection expires due to the need forrefresher training.

(f) A railroad or contractor shall adoptand comply with a plan to periodicallyassess the effectiveness of its trainingprogram. One method of validation andassessment could be through the use of

efficiency tests or periodic review ofemployee performance.

§ 232.205 Class I brake test-initial terminalinspection.

(a) Each train and each car in the trainshall receive a Class I brake test asdescribed in paragraph (b) of thissection by a qualified person, as definedin § 232.5, at the following points:

(1) The location where the train isoriginally assembled (‘‘initialterminal’’);

(2) A location where the train consistis changed other than by:

(i) Adding a single car or a solid blockof cars;

(ii) Removing a single car or a solidblock of cars;

(iii) Removing cars determined to bedefective under this chapter; or

(iv) A combination of the changeslisted in paragraphs (a)(2)(i) through(a)(2)(iii) of this section (See §§ 232.209and 232.211 for requirements related tothe pick-up of cars and solid blocks ofcars en route.);

(3) A location where the train is off airfor a period of more than four hours;

(4) A location where a unit or cycletrain has traveled 3,000 miles since itslast Class I brake test; and

(5) A location where the train isreceived in interchange if the trainconsist is changed other than by:

(i) Removing a car or a solid block ofcars from the train;

(ii) Adding a previously tested car ora previously tested solid block of cars tothe train;

(iii) Changing motive power;(iv) Removing or changing the

caboose; or(v) Any combination of the changes

listed in paragraphs (a)(5) of thissection.

(A) If changes other than thosecontained in paragraph (a)(5)(i)–(a)(5)(v)of this section are made to the trainconsist when it is received ininterchange and the train will move 20miles or less, then the railroad mayconduct a brake test pursuant to§ 232.209 on those cars added to thetrain.

(B) Reserved.(b) A Class I brake test of a train shall

consist of the following tasks andrequirements:

(1) Brake pipe leakage shall notexceed 5 psi per minute or air flow shallnot exceed 60 cubic feet per minute(CFM).

(i) Leakage Test. The brake pipeleakage test shall be conducted asfollows:

(A) Charge the air brake system to thepressure at which the train will beoperated, and the pressure at the rear of

the train shall be within 15 psi of thepressure at which the train will beoperated, but not less than 75 psi, asindicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at the rear end of train;

(B) Upon receiving the signal to applybrakes for test, make a 20-psi brake pipeservice reduction;

(C) If the locomotive used to performthe leakage test is equipped with ameans for maintaining brake pipepressure at a constant level during a 20-psi brake pipe service reduction, thisfeature shall be cut out during theleakage test; and

(D) With the brake valve lapped andthe pressure maintaining feature cut out(if so equipped) and after waiting 45–60seconds, note the brake pipe leakage asindicated by the brake-pipe gauge in thelocomotive, which shall not exceed 5psi per minute.

(ii) Air Flow Method Test. When alocomotive is equipped with a 26-Lbrake valve or equivalent pressuremaintaining locomotive brake valve, arailroad may use the Air Flow MethodTest as an alternate to the brake pipeleakage test. The Air Flow Method(AFM) Test shall be performed asfollows:

(A) Charge the air brake system to thepressure at which the train will beoperated, and the pressure at the rear ofthe train shall be within 15 psi of thepressure at which the train will beoperated, but not less than 75 psi, asindicated by an accurate gauge or end-of-train device at the rear end of train;and

(B) Measure air flow as indicated bya calibrated AFM indicator, which shallnot exceed 60 cubic feet per minute(CFM).

(iii) The AFM indicator shall becalibrated for accuracy at periodicintervals not to exceed 92 days. TheAFM indicator calibration test orificesshall be calibrated at temperatures ofnot less than 20 degrees Fahrenheit.AFM indicators shall be accurate towithin ± 3 standard cubic feet perminute (CFM).

(2) The inspector shall positionhimself/herself, taking positions on eachside of each car sometime during theinspection process, so as to be able toexamine and observe the functioning ofall moving parts of the brake system oneach car in order to make thedeterminations and inspections requiredby this section. A ‘‘roll-by’’ inspectionof the brake release as provided for inparagraph (b)(8) of this section shall notconstitute an inspection of that side ofthe train for purposes of thisrequirement;

(3) The train brake system shall becharged to the pressure at which the



train will be operated, and the pressureat the rear of the train shall be within15 psi of the pressure at which the trainwill be operated, but not less than 75psi, angle cocks and cutout cocks shallbe properly positioned, air hoses shallbe properly coupled and shall not kink,bind, or foul or be in any othercondition that restricts air flow. Anexamination must be made for leaks andnecessary repairs made to reduceleakage to the required minimum.Retaining valves and retaining valvepipes shall be inspected and known tobe in proper condition for service;

(4) The brakes on each car and shallapply in response to a 20-psi brake pipeservice reduction and shall remainapplied until a release of the air brakeshas been initiated by the controllinglocomotive or yard test device. Thebrakes shall not be applied or releaseduntil the proper signal is given. A carfound with brakes that fail to apply orremain applied may be retested andremain in the train if the retest isconducted at the pressure the train willbe operated from the controllinglocomotive, head end of the consist, ora suitable test device, as described in§ 232.217(a) of this part, positioned atone end of the car(s) being retested andthe brakes remain applied until a releaseis initiated after a period which is noless than three minutes. If the retest isperformed at the car(s) being retestedwith a suitable device, the compressedair in the car(s) shall be depleted priorto disconnecting the hoses between thecar(s) to perform the retest;

(5) For cars equipped with 81⁄2-inch or10-inch diameter brake cylinders, pistontravel shall be within 7 to 9 inches. Ifpiston travel is found to be less than 7inches or more than 9 inches, it must beadjusted to nominally 71⁄2 inches. Forcars not equipped with 81⁄2-inch or 10-inch diameter brake cylinders, pistontravel shall be within the piston travelstenciled or marked on the car or badgeplate. Minimum brake cylinder pistontravel of truck-mounted brake cylindersmust be sufficient to provide properbrake shoe clearance when the brakesare released. Piston travel must beinspected on each freight car while thebrakes are applied;

(6) Brake rigging shall be properlysecured and shall not bind or foul orotherwise adversely affect the operationof the brake system;

(7) All parts of the brake equipmentshall be properly secured. On carswhere the bottom rod passes throughthe truck bolster or is secured withcotter keys equipped with a lockingdevice to prevent their accidentalremoval, bottom rod safety supports arenot required; and

(8) When the release is initiated bythe controlling locomotive or yard testdevice, the brakes on each freight carshall be inspected to verify that it didrelease; this may be performed by a‘‘roll-by’’ inspection. If a ‘‘roll-by’’inspection of the brake release isperformed, train speed shall not exceed10 MPH and the qualified personperforming the ‘‘roll-by’’ inspectionshall communicate the results of theinspection to the operator of the train.The operator of the train shall notesuccessful completion of the releaseportion of the inspection on the recordrequired in paragraph (d) of this section.

(c) Where a railroad’s collectivebargaining agreement provides that acarman is to perform the inspectionsand tests required by this section, acarman alone will be considered aqualified person. In thesecircumstances, the railroad shall ensurethat the carman is properly trained anddesignated as a qualified person orqualified mechanical inspector pursuantto the requirements of this part.

(d) A railroad shall notify thelocomotive engineer that the Class Ibrake test was satisfactorily performedand provide the information required inthis paragraph to the locomotiveengineer or place the information in thecab of the controlling locomotivefollowing the test. The informationrequired by this paragraph may beprovided to the locomotive engineer byany means determined appropriate bythe railroad; however, a written orelectronic record of the informationshall be retained in the cab of thecontrolling locomotive until the trainreaches its destination. The written orelectronic record shall contain the date,time, number of freight cars inspected,and identify the qualified person(s)performing the test and the locationwhere the Class I brake test wasperformed.

(e) Before adjusting piston travel orworking on brake rigging, cutout cock inbrake pipe branch must be closed andair reservoirs must be voided of allcompressed air. When cutout cocks areprovided in brake cylinder pipes, thesecutout cocks only may be closed and airreservoirs need not be voided of allcompressed air.

(f) Except as provided in § 232.209,each car or solid block of cars, asdefined in § 232.5, that has not receiveda Class I brake test or that has been offair for more than four hours and that isadded to a train shall receive a Class Itest when added to a train. A Class IIIbrake test as described in § 232.211 shallthen be performed on the entire newtrain.

§ 232.207 Class IA brake tests—1,000-mileinspection.

(a) Except as provided in § 232.213,each train shall receive a Class IA braketest performed by a qualified person, asdefined in § 232.5, at a location that isnot more than 1,000 miles from thepoint where any car in the train lastreceived a Class I or Class IA brake test.The most restrictive car or block of carsin the train shall determine the locationof this test.

(b) A Class IA brake test of a trainshall consist of the following tasks andrequirements:

(1) Brake pipe leakage shall notexceed 5 psi per minute or air flow shallnot exceed 60 cubic feet per minute(CFM). The brake pipe leakage test or airflow method test shall be conductedpursuant to the requirements containedin § 232.205(b)(1);

(2) The inspector shall positionhimself/herself, taking positions on eachside of each car sometime during theinspection process, so as to be able toexamine and observe the functioning ofall moving parts of the brake system oneach car in order to make thedeterminations and inspections requiredby this section;

(3) The air brake system shall becharged to the pressure at which thetrain will be operated, and the pressureat the rear of the train shall be within15 psi of the pressure at which the trainwill be operated, but not less than 75psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge orend-of-train device at rear end of train;

(4) The brakes on each car shall applyin response to a 20-psi brake pipeservice reduction and shall remainapplied until the release is initiated bythe controlling locomotive. A car foundwith brakes that fail to apply or remainapplied may be retested and remain inthe train if the retest is conducted asprescribed in § 232.205(b)(4); otherwise,the defective equipment may only bemoved pursuant to the provisionscontained in § 232.15, if applicable;

(5) Brake rigging shall be properlysecured and shall not bind or foul orotherwise adversely affect the operationof the brake system; and

(6) All parts of the brake equipmentshall be properly secured.

(c) A railroad shall designate thelocations where Class IA brake tests willbe performed, and the railroad shallfurnish to the Federal RailroadAdministration upon request adescription of each location designated.A railroad shall notify FRA’s AssociateAdministrator for Safety in writing 30days prior to any change in the locationsdesignated for such tests andinspections.



(1) Failure to perform a Class IA braketest on a train at a location designatedpursuant to this paragraph constitutes afailure to perform a proper Class IAbrake test if the train is due for such atest at that location.

(2) In the event of an emergency thatalters normal train operations, such as aderailment or other unusualcircumstance that adversely affects thesafe operation of the train, the railroadis not required to provide prior writtennotification of a change in the locationwhere a Class IA brake test is performedto a location not on the railroad’s list ofdesignated locations for performingClass IA brake tests, provided that therailroad notifies FRA’s AssociateAdministrator for Safety and thepertinent FRA Regional Administratorwithin 24 hours after the designationhas been changed and the reason forthat change.

§ 232.209 Class II brake tests—intermediate inspection.

(a) At a location other than the initialterminal of a train, a Class II brake testshall be performed by a qualifiedperson, as defined in § 232.5, on thefollowing equipment when added to atrain:

(1) Each car or solid block of cars, asdefined in § 232.5, that has notpreviously received a Class I brake testor that has been off air for more thanfour hours;

(2) Each solid block of cars, as definedin § 232.5, that is comprised of cars frommore than one previous train; and

(3) Each solid block of cars that iscomprised of cars from only oneprevious train but the cars of whichhave not remained continuously andconsecutively coupled together with thetrain line remaining connected, otherthan for removing defective equipment,since being removed from its previoustrain.

(b) A Class II brake test shall consistof the following tasks and requirements:

(1) Brake pipe leakage shall notexceed 5 psi per minute or air flow shallnot exceed 60 cubic feet per minute(CFM). The brake pipe leakage test or airflow method test shall be conducted onthe entire train pursuant to therequirements contained in§ 232.205(b)(1);

(2) The air brake system shall becharged to the pressure at which thetrain will be operated, and the pressureat the rear of the train shall be within15 psi of the pressure at which the trainwill be operated, but not less than 75psi, as indicated by an accurate gauge orend-of-train device at the rear end oftrain;

(3) The brakes on each car added tothe train and on the rear car of the trainshall be inspected to ensure that theyapply in response to a 20-psi brake pipeservice reduction and remain applieduntil the release is initiated from thecontrolling locomotive. A car foundwith brakes that fail to apply or remainapplied may be retested and remain inthe train if the retest is conducted asprescribed in § 232.205(b)(4); otherwise,the defective equipment may only bemoved pursuant to the provisionscontained in § 232.15, if applicable;

(4) When the release is initiated, thebrakes on each car added to the trainand on the rear car of the train shall beinspected to verify that they did release;this may be performed by a ‘‘roll-by’’inspection. If a ‘‘roll-by’’ inspection ofthe brake release is performed, trainspeed shall not exceed 10 MPH, and thequalified person performing the ‘‘roll-by’’ inspection shall communicate theresults of the inspection to the operatorof the train; and

(5) Before the train proceeds theoperator of the train shall know that thebrake pipe pressure at the rear of thetrain is being restored.

(c) As an alternative to the rear carbrake application and release portion ofthe test, the operator of the train shalldetermine that brake pipe pressure ofthe train is being reduced, as indicatedby a rear car gauge or end-of-traintelemetry device, and then that thebrake pipe pressure of the train is beingrestored, as indicated by a rear car gaugeor end-of-train telemetry device. (Whenan end-of-train telemetry device is usedto comply with any test requirement inthis part, the phrase ‘‘brake pipepressure of the train is being reduced’’means a pressure reduction of at least 5psi, and the phrase ‘‘brake pipe pressureof the train is being restored’’ means apressure increase of at least 5 psi). If anelectronic communication link betweena controlling locomotive and a remotelycontrolled locomotive attached to therear end of a train is utilized todetermine that brake pipe pressure isbeing restored, the operator of the trainshall know that the air brakes functionas intended on the remotely controlledlocomotive.

(d) Each car or solid block of cars thatreceives a Class II brake test pursuant tothis section when added to the trainshall receive a Class I brake test at thenext forward location where facilitiesare available for performing such a test.A Class III brake test as described in§ 232.211 shall then be performed onthe entire train.

§ 232.211 Class III brake tests-trainlinecontinuity inspection.

(a) A Class III brake test shall beperformed on a train by a qualifiedperson, as defined in § 232.5, to test thetrain brake system when theconfiguration of the train has changed incertain ways. In particular, a Class IIIbrake test shall be performed at thelocation where any of the followingchanges in the configuration of the trainoccur:

(1) Where a locomotive or a cabooseis changed;

(2) Where a car or a block of cars isremoved from the train with the consistotherwise remaining intact;

(3) At a point other than the initialterminal for the train, where a car or asolid block of cars that is comprised ofcars from only one previous train thecars of which have remainedcontinuously and consecutively coupledtogether with the trainline remainingconnected, other than for removingdefective equipment, since beingremoved from its previous train that haspreviously received a Class I brake testand that has not been off air for morethan four hours is added to a train;

(4) At a point other than the initialterminal for the train, where a car or asolid block of cars that has received aClass I or Class II brake test at thatlocation, prior to being added to thetrain, and that has not been off air formore than four hours is added to a train;or

(5) Whenever the continuity of thebrake pipe is broken or interrupted.

(b) A Class III brake test shall consistof the following tasks and requirements:

(1) The train brake system shall becharged to the pressure at which thetrain will be operated, and the pressureat the rear of the train shall be within15 psi of the pressure at which the trainwill be operated, but not less than 75psi, or 60 psi for transfer trains, asindicated at the rear of the train by anaccurate gauge or end-of-train device;

(2) The brakes on the rear car of thetrain shall apply in response to a 20-psibrake pipe service reduction and shallremain applied until the release isinitiated by the controlling locomotive;

(3) When the release is initiated, thebrakes on the rear car of the train shallbe inspected to verify that it did release;and

(4) Before proceeding the operator ofthe train shall know that the brake pipepressure at the rear of freight train isbeing restored.

(c) As an alternative to the rear carbrake application and release portion ofthe test, it shall be determined that thebrake pipe pressure of the train is beingreduced, as indicated by a rear car gauge



or end-of-train telemetry device, andthen that the brake pipe pressure of thetrain is being restored, as indicated bya rear car gauge or end-of-train telemetrydevice. If an electronic or radiocommunication link between acontrolling locomotive and a remotelycontrolled locomotive attached to therear end of a train is utilized todetermine that brake pipe pressure isbeing restored, the operator of the trainshall know that the air brakes functionas intended on the remotely controlledlocomotive.

§ 232.213 Extended haul trains.(a) A railroad may be permitted to

move a train up to, but not exceeding,1,500 miles between brake tests andinspections if the railroad designates atrain as an extended haul train. In orderfor a railroad to designate a train as anextended haul train, all of the followingrequirements must be met:

(1) The railroad must designate thetrain in writing to FRA’s AssociateAdministrator for Safety. Thisdesignation must include the following:

(i) The train identification symbol oridentification of the location whereextended haul trains will originate anda description of the trains that will beoperated as extended haul trains fromthose locations;

(ii) The origination and destinationpoints for the train;

(iii) The type or types of equipmentthe train will haul; and

(iv) The locations where all trainbrake and mechanical inspections andtests will be performed.

(2) A Class I brake test pursuant to§ 232.205 shall be performed at theinitial terminal for the train by aqualified mechanical inspector asdefined in § 232.5.

(3) A freight car inspection pursuantto part 215 of this chapter shall beperformed at the initial terminal for thetrain and shall be performed by aninspector designated under § 215.11 ofthis chapter.

(4) All cars having conditions not incompliance with part 215 of this chapterat the initial terminal for the train shallbe either repaired or removed from thetrain. Except for a car developing sucha condition en route, no car shall bemoved pursuant to the provisions of§ 215.9 of this chapter in the train.

(5) The train shall have no more thanone pick-up and one set-out en route,except for the set-out of defectiveequipment pursuant to the requirementsof this chapter.

(i) Cars added to the train en routeshall be inspected pursuant to therequirements contained in paragraphs(a)(2) through (a)(5) of this section at the

location where they are added to thetrain.

(ii) Cars set out of the train en routeshall be inspected pursuant to therequirements contained in paragraph(a)(6) of this section at the locationwhere they are set out of the train.

(6) At the point of destination, if lessthan 1,500 miles from the train’s initialterminal, or at the point designated bythe railroad pursuant to paragraph(a)(1)(iv) of this section, not to exceed1,500 miles, an inbound inspection ofthe train shall be conducted by aqualified mechanical inspector toidentify any defective, inoperative, orineffective brakes or any other conditionnot in compliance with this part as wellas any conditions not in compliancewith part 215 and part 231 of thischapter.

(7) The railroad shall maintain arecord of all defective, inoperative, orineffective brakes as well as anyconditions not in compliance with part215 and part 231 of this chapterdiscovered at anytime during themovement of the train. These recordsshall be retained for a period of one yearand made available to FRA uponrequest. The records required by thissection may be maintained eitherelectronically or in writing.

(8) In order for an extended haul trainto proceed beyond 1,500 miles, thefollowing requirements shall be met:

(i) If the train will move 1,000 milesor less from that location beforereceiving a Class IA brake test orreaching destination, a Class I brake testshall be conducted pursuant to§ 232.205 to ensure 100 percent effectiveand operative brakes. The inboundinspection required by paragraph (a)(6)of this section may be used to meet thisrequirement provided it encompassesall the inspection elements contained in§ 232.205.

(ii) If the train will move greater than1,000 miles from that location withoutanother brake inspection, the train mustbe identified as an extended haul trainfor that movement and shall meet all therequirements contained in paragraphs(a)(1) through (a)(7) of this section. Suchtrains shall receive a Class I brake testpursuant to § 232.205 by a qualifiedmechanical inspector to ensure 100percent effective and operative brakes, afreight car inspection pursuant to part215 of this chapter by an inspectordesignated under § 215.11 of thischapter, and all cars containing non-complying conditions under part 215 ofthis chapter shall either be repaired orremoved from the train. The inboundinspection required by paragraph (a)(6)of this section may be used to meetthese inspection requirements provided

it encompasses all the inspectionelements contained paragraphs (a)(2)through (a)(4) of this section.

(9) FRA inspectors shall have physicalaccess to visually observe all brake andfreight car inspections and testsrequired by this section.

(b) Failure to comply with any of therequirements contained in paragraph (a)of this section will be considered animproper movement of a designatedpriority train for which appropriate civilpenalties may be assessed as outlined inAppendix A to this part. Furthermore,FRA’s Associate Administrator forSafety may revoke a railroad’s ability todesignate any or all trains as extendedhaul trains for repeated or willfulnoncompliance with any of therequirements contained in this section.Such a determination will be made inwriting and will state the basis for suchaction.

§ 232.215 Transfer train brake tests.(a) A transfer train, as defined in

§ 232.5, shall receive a brake testperformed by a qualified person, asdefined in § 232.5, that includes thefollowing:

(1) The air brake hoses shall becoupled between all freight cars;

(2) After the brake system is chargedto not less than 60 psi as indicated byan accurate gauge or end-of-train deviceat the rear of the train, a 15-psi servicebrake pipe reduction shall be made; and

(3) An inspection shall be made todetermine that the brakes on each carapply and remain applied until therelease is initiated by the controllinglocomotive. A car found with brakesthat fail to apply or remain applied maybe retested and remain in the train if theretest is conducted as prescribed in§ 232.205(b)(4); otherwise, the defectiveequipment may only be moved pursuantto the provisions contained in § 232.15,if applicable.

(b) Cars added to transfer trains enroute shall be inspected pursuant to therequirements contained in paragraph (a)of this section at the location where thecars are added to the train.

(c) If a train’s movement will exceed20 miles or is not a transfer train asdefined in § 232.5, the train shallreceive a Class I brake test in accordancewith § 232.205 prior to departure.

§ 232.217 Train brake tests conductedusing yard air.

(a) When a train air brake system istested from a yard air source, anengineer’s brake valve or a suitable testdevice shall be used to provide anyincrease or reduction of brake pipe airpressure at the same, or slower, rate asan engineer’s brake valve.



(b) The yard air test device must beconnected to the end of the train orblock of cars that will be nearest to thecontrolling locomotive. However, if therailroad adopts and complies withwritten procedures to ensure thatpotential overcharge conditions to thetrain brake system are avoided, the yardair test device may be connected toother than the end nearest to thecontrolling locomotive.

(c) Except as provided in this section,when a yard air is used the train airbrake system must be charged andtested as prescribed by § 232.205(b) andwhen practicable should be keptcharged until road motive power iscoupled to train, after which, a Class IIIbrake test shall be performed asprescribed by § 232.211.

(1) If the cars are off air for more thanfour hours, these cars shall be retestedin accordance with § 232.205(b) through(e).

(2) At a minimum, yard air pressureshall be 60 psi at the end of the consistor block of cars opposite from the yardtest device and shall be within 15 psi ofthe regulator valve setting on yard testdevice.

(3) If the air pressure of the yard testdevice is less than the pressure at whichthe train will be operated, then a leakageor air flow test shall be conducted at theoperating pressure of the train when thelocomotives are attached in accordancewith § 232.205(b)(1).

(d) Mechanical yard air test devicesand gauges shall be calibrated every 92days. Electronic yard test devices andgauges shall be calibrated annually.Mechanical and electronic yard air testdevices and gauges shall be calibratedso that they are accurate to within ± 3psi.

(e) If used to test a train, a yard air testdevice and any yard air test equipmentshall be accurate and function asintended.

§ 232.219 Double heading and helperservice.

(a) When more than one locomotive isattached to a train, the engineer of thecontrolling locomotive shall operate thebrakes. In case it becomes necessary forthe controlling locomotive to give upcontrol of the train short of thedestination of the train, a Class III braketest pursuant to § 232.211 shall be madeto ensure that the brakes are operativefrom the automatic brake valve of thelocomotive taking control of the train.

(b) When one or more helperlocomotives are placed in a train, avisual inspection shall be made of eachhelper locomotive brake system todetermine that the brake systemoperates as intended in response to a 20-

psi reduction initiated from thecontrolling locomotive of the train. Ahelper locomotive with inoperative orineffective brakes shall be repaired priorto use or removed from the train.

(c) If a helper locomotive utilizes aHelper Link device or a similartechnology, the locomotive and deviceshall be equipped, designed, andmaintained as follows:

(1) The locomotive engineer shall benotified by a distinctive alarm of anyloss of communication between thedevice and the two-way end-of-traindevice of more than 25 seconds;

(2) A method to reset the device shallbe provided in the cab of the helperlocomotive that can be operated fromthe engineer’s usual position duringoperation of the locomotive;

(3) The device shall be tested foraccuracy and calibrated if necessaryaccording to the manufacturer’sspecifications and procedures every 365days. This shall include testing radiofrequencies and modulation of thedevice. A legible record of the date andlocation of the last test or calibrationshall be maintained with the device.

Subpart D—Periodic Maintenance andTesting Requirements

§ 232.301 Scope.This subpart contains the periodic

brake system maintenance and testingrequirements for equipment used infreight and other non-passenger trains.

§ 232.303 General requirements.(a) Definitions. The following

definitions are intended solely for thepurpose of identifying what constitutesa shop or repair track under thissubpart.

(1) Shop or repair track means:(i) A fixed repair facility or track

designated by the railroad as a shop orrepair track;

(ii) A fixed repair facility or trackwhich is regularly and consistently usedto perform major repairs;

(iii) track which is used at a locationto regularly and consistently performboth minor and major repairs where therailroad has not designated a certainportion of that trackage as a repair track;

(iv) A track designated or used by arailroad to regularly and consistentlyperform minor repairs during the periodwhen major repairs are being conductedon such a track; and

(v) The facilities and tracks identifiedin paragraphs (a)(1)(i) through (a)(1)(iv)shall be considered shop or repair tracksregardless of whether a mobile repairvehicle is used to conduct the repairs.

(2) Major repair means a repair ofsuch a nature that it would normally

require greater than four man-hours toaccomplish or would involve the use ofspecialized tools and equipment. Majorrepairs would include such things ascoupler replacement, draft gear repair,and repairs requiring the use of an airjack.

(3) Minor repair means repairs, otherthan major repairs, that can beaccomplished in a short period of timewith limited tools and equipment.Minor repairs would include suchthings as safety appliance straightening,handhold replacement, air hosereplacement, lading adjustment, andcoupler knuckle or knuckle pinreplacement.

(b) A car on a shop or repair trackshall be tested to determine that the airbrakes apply and remain applied untila release is initiated.

(c) A car on a shop or repair trackshall have its piston travel inspected.For cars equipped with 81⁄2-inch or 10-inch diameter brake cylinders, pistontravel shall be within 7 to 9 inches. Ifpiston travel is found to be less than 7inches or more than 9 inches, it must beadjusted to nominally 71⁄2 inches. Forcars not equipped with 81⁄2-inch or 10-inch diameter brake cylinders, pistontravel shall be within the piston travelstenciled or marked on the car or badgeplate.

(d) Before a car is released from ashop or repair track, a qualified personshall ensure:

(1) The brake pipe is securelyclamped;

(2) Angle cocks are properly locatedwith suitable clearance and properlypositioned to allow maximum air flow;

(3) Valves, reservoirs, and cylindersare tight on supports and the supportsare securely attached to the car;

(4) Hand brakes are tested, inspected,and operate as intended; and

(5) Brake indicators, on cars soequipped, are accurate and operate asintended.

(e) If the repair track air brake test orsingle car test required in §§ 232.305and 232.307 cannot be conducted at thepoint where repairs can be made to thecar, the car may be moved after therepairs are effectuated to the nextforward location where the test can beperformed. Inability to perform a repairtrack air brake test or single car test doesnot constitute an inability to effectuatethe necessary repairs.

(1) If it is necessary to move a carfrom the location where the repairs areperformed in order to perform a repairtrack air brake test or a single car testrequired by this part, a tag or card shallbe placed on both sides of theequipment, or an automated trackingsystem approved for use by FRA, with



the following information about theequipment:

(i) The reporting mark and carnumber;

(ii) The name of the inspectingrailroad;

(iii) The location where repairs wereperformed and date;

(iv) Indication whether the carrequires a repair track brake test orsingle car test;

(v) The location where theappropriate test is to be performed; and

(vi) The name, signature, if possible,and job title of the qualified personapproving the move.

(2) The tag or card required byparagraph (e)(1) of this section shallremain affixed to the equipment untilthe necessary test has been performed.

(3) An electronic or written record orcopy of each tag or card attached to orremoved from a car or locomotive shallbe retained for 90 days and, uponrequest, shall be made available within15 calendar days for inspection by FRAor State inspectors.

(4) The record or copy of each tag orcard removed from a car or locomotiveshall contain the date, location, and thesignature or identification of thequalified person removing it from thepiece of equipment.

(f) The location and date of the lastrepair track brake test or single car testrequired by §§ 232.305 and 232.307 ofthis part shall be clearly stenciled,marked, or labeled in two-inch highletters or numerals on the side of theequipment. Alternatively, the railroadindustry may use an electronic orautomated tracking system to track therequired information and theperformance of the tests required by§§ 232.305 and 232.307 of this part.

(1) Electronic or automated trackingsystems used to meet the requirementcontained in this paragraph shall becapable of being reviewed andmonitored by FRA at any time to ensurethe integrity of the system. FRA’sAssociate Administrator for Safety mayprohibit or revoke the railroadindustry’s authority to utilize anelectronic or automated tracking systemin lieu of stenciling or marking if FRAfinds that the electronic or automatedtracking system is not properly secure,is inaccessible to FRA or railroademployees, or fails to adequately trackand monitor the equipment. FRA willrecord such a determination in writing,include a statement of the basis for suchaction, and will provide a copy of thedocument to the affected railroads.

(2) [Reserved.]

§ 232.305 Repair track air brake tests.(a) Repair track brake tests shall be

performed by a qualified person in

accordance with either Section 3.0,‘‘Procedures for Repair Track Test forAir Brake Equipment,’’ of theAssociation of American RailroadsStandard S–486–99, ‘‘Code of Air BrakeSystem Tests for Freight Equipment,’’contained in the AAR Manual ofStandards and Recommended Practices,Section E (April 1, 1999) or analternative procedure approved by FRApursuant to § 232.17. The incorporationby reference of this AAR standard wasapproved by the Director of the FederalRegister in accordance with 5 U.S.C.552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You mayobtain a copy of the incorporateddocument from the Association ofAmerican Railroads, 50 F Street, NW.,Washington, DC 20001. You mayinspect a copy of the document at theFederal Railroad Administration, DocketClerk, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW.,Suite 7000, Washington, DC or at theOffice of the Federal Register, 800 NorthCapitol Street, NW., Suite 700,Washington, DC.

(b) Except as provided in § 232.303(e),a railroad shall perform a repair trackbrake test on a car when:

(1) A car has its brakes cut-out orinoperative when removed from a trainor when placed on a shop or repairtrack;

(2) A car is on a repair or shop track,as defined in § 232.303(a), for anyreason and has not received a repairtrack brake test within the previous 12month period;

(3) A car is found with missing orincomplete repair track brake testinformation;

(4) One or more of the followingconventional air brake equipment itemsis removed, repaired, or replaced:

(i) Brake reservoir;(ii) Control valve mounting gasket; or(iii) Pipe bracket stud.(5) A car is found with one or more

of the following wheel defects:(i) Built-up tread, unless known to be

caused by hand brake left applied;(ii) Slid flat wheel, unless known to

be caused by hand brake left applied; or(iii) Thermal cracks.(c) Except as provided in paragraph

(d) of this section, each car shall receivea repair track brake test no less thanevery 5 years.

(d) Each car shall receive a repairtrack brake test no less than 8 years fromthe date the car was built or rebuilt.

§ 232.307 Single car tests.(a) Single car tests shall be performed

by a qualified person in accordancewith either Section 4.0, ‘‘Tests-StandardSingle Capacity Freight BrakeEquipment (Single Car Test),’’ of theAssociation of American Railroads

Standard S–486–99, ‘‘Code of Air BrakeSystem Tests for Freight Equipment,’’contained in the AAR Manual ofStandards and Recommended Practices,Section E (April 1, 1999) or analternative procedure approved by FRApursuant to § 232.17. The incorporationby reference of this AAR standard wasapproved by the Director of the FederalRegister in accordance with 5 U.S.C.552(a) and 1 CFR part 51. You mayobtain a copy of the incorporateddocument from the Association ofAmerican Railroads, 50 F Street, NW.,Washington, DC 20001. You mayinspect a copy of the document at theFederal Railroad Administration, DocketClerk, 1120 Vermont Avenue, NW.,Suite 7000, Washington, DC or at theOffice of the Federal Register, 800 NorthCapitol Street, NW., Suite 700,Washington, DC.

(b) Except as provided in § 232.303(e),a railroad shall perform a single car teston a car when one or more of thefollowing conventional air brakeequipment items is removed, repaired orreplaced:

(1) Service portion;(2) Emergency portion; or(3) Pipe bracket.(c) A single car test pursuant to

paragraph (a) of this section shall beperformed on a new or rebuilt car priorto placing or using the car in revenueservice.

§ 232.309 Repair track air brake test andsingle car test equipment and devices.

(a) Test equipment and devices usedto perform repair track air brake tests orsingle car tests shall be tested for correctoperation at least once each calendarday of use.

(b) Except for single car test devices,mechanical test devices such aspressure gauges, flow meters, orifices,etc. shall be calibrated once every 92days.

(c) Electronic test devices shall becalibrated at least once every 365 days.

(d) Test equipment and single car testdevices placed in service shall be taggedor labeled with the date its nextcalibration is due.

(e) Each single car test device shall betested not less frequently than every 92days after being placed in service andmay not continue in service if more thanone year has passed since its last 92-daytest.

(f) Each single car test device shall bedisassembled and cleaned not lessfrequently than every 365 days afterbeing placed in service.



Subpart E—End-of-Train Devices

§ 232.401 Scope.This subpart contains the

requirements related to theperformance, operation, and testing ofend-of-train devices. Unless expresslyexcepted in this subpart, therequirements of this subpart apply to alltrains operating on track which is partof the general railroad system oftransportation.

§ 232.403 Design standards for one-wayend-of-train devices.

(a) General. A one-way end-of-traindevice shall be comprised of a rear-of-train unit (rear unit) located on the lastcar of a train and a front-of-train unit(front unit) located in the cab of thelocomotive controlling the train.

(b) Rear unit. The rear unit shall becapable of determining the brake pipepressure on the rear car and transmittingthat information to the front unit fordisplay to the locomotive engineer. Therear unit shall be—

(1) Capable of measuring the brakepipe pressure on the rear car with anaccuracy of ±3 pounds per square inch(psig) and brake pipe pressure variationsof ±1 psig;

(2) Equipped with a ‘‘bleeder valve’’that permits the release of any air underpressure from the rear of train unit orthe associated air hoses prior todetaching the rear unit from the brakepipe;

(3) Designed so that an internal failurewill not cause an undesired emergencybrake application;

(4) Equipped with either an air gaugeor a means of visually displaying therear unit’s brake pipe pressuremeasurement; and

(5) Equipped with a pressure reliefsafety valve to prevent explosion from ahigh pressure air leak inside the rearunit.

(c) Reporting rate. Multiple datatransmissions from the rear unit shalloccur immediately after a variation inthe rear car brake pipe pressure of ±2psig and at intervals of not greater than70 seconds when the variation in therear car brake pipe pressure over the 70-second interval is less than ±2 psig.

(d) Operating environment. The rearunit shall be designed to meet theperformance requirements of paragraphs(b) and (c) of this section under thefollowing environmental conditions:

(1) At temperatures from ¥40°C to60°C;

(2) At a relative humidity of 95%noncondensing at 50°C;

(3) At altitudes of zero to 12,000 feetmean sea level;

(4) During vertical and lateralvibrations of 1 to 15 Hz., with 0.5 g.

peak to peak, and 15 to 500 Hz., with5 g. peak to peak;

(5) During the longitudinal vibrationsof 1 to 15 Hz., with 3 g. peak to peak,and 15 to 500 Hz., with 5 g. peak topeak; and

(6) During a shock of 10 g. peak for0.1 second in any axis.

(e) Unique code. Each rear unit shallhave a unique and permanentidentification code that is transmittedalong with the pressure message to thefront-of-train unit. A code obtained fromthe Association of American Railroads,50 F Street, NW., Washington, DC 20036shall be deemed to be a unique code forpurposes of this section. A unique codealso may be obtained from the Office ofSafety Assurance and Compliance(RRS–10), Federal RailroadAdministration, Washington, DC 20590.

(f) Front unit. (1) The front unit shallbe designed to receive data messagesfrom the rear unit and shall be capableof displaying the rear car brake pipepressure in increments not to exceedone pound.

(2) The display shall be clearly visibleand legible in daylight and darknessfrom the engineer’s normal operatingposition.

(3) The front device shall have ameans for entry of the uniqueidentification code of the rear unit beingused. The front unit shall be designedso that it will display a message onlyfrom the rear unit with the same codeas entered into the front unit.

(4) The front unit shall be designed tomeet the requirements of paragraphs(d)(2), (3), (4), and (5) of this section. Itshall also be designed to meet theperformance requirements in thisparagraph under the followingenvironmental conditions:

(i) At temperatures from 0°C to 60°C;(ii) During a vertical or lateral shock

of 2 g. peak for 0.1 second; and(iii) During a longitudinal shock of 5

g. peak for 0.1 second.(g) Radio equipment. (1) The radio

transmitter in the rear unit and the radioreceiver in the front unit shall complywith the applicable regulatoryrequirements of the FederalCommunications Commission (FCC)and use of a transmission formatacceptable to the FCC.

(2) If power is supplied by one ormore batteries, the operating life shallbe a minimum of 36 hours at 0°C.

§ 232.405 Design and performancestandards for two-way end-of-train devices.

Two-way end-of-train devices shall bedesigned and perform with the featuresapplicable to one-way end-of-traindevices described in § 232.403, exceptthose included in § 232.403(b)(3). In

addition, a two-way end-of-train deviceshall be designed and perform with thefollowing features:

(a) An emergency brake applicationcommand from the front unit of thedevice shall activate the emergency airvalve at the rear of the train within onesecond.

(b) The rear unit of the device shallsend an acknowledgment message to thefront unit immediately upon receipt ofan emergency brake applicationcommand. The front unit shall listen forthis acknowledgment and repeat thebrake application command if theacknowledgment is not correctlyreceived.

(c) The rear unit, on receipt of aproperly coded command, shall open avalve in the brake line and hold it openfor a minimum of 15 seconds. Thisopening of the valve shall cause thebrake line to vent to the exterior.

(d) The valve opening shall have aminimum diameter of 3⁄4 inch and theinternal diameter of the hose shall be 5⁄8inch to effect an emergency brakeapplication.

(e) The front unit shall have amanually operated switch which, whenactivated, shall initiate an emergencybrake transmission command to the rearunit or the locomotive shall be equippedwith a manually operated switch on theengineer control stand designed toperform the equivalent function. Theswitch shall be labeled ‘‘Emergency’’and shall be protected so that there willexist no possibility of accidentalactivation.

(f) All locomotives ordered on or afterAugust 1, 2001, or placed in service forthe first time on or after August 1, 2003,shall be designed to automaticallyactivate the two-way end-of-train deviceto effectuate an emergency brakeapplication whenever it becomesnecessary for the locomotive engineer toplace the train air brakes in emergency.

(g) The availability of the front-to-rearcommunications link shall be checkedautomatically at least every 10 minutes.

(h) Means shall be provided toconfirm the availability and properfunctioning of the emergency valve.

(i) Means shall be provided to arm thefront and rear units to ensure the rearunit responds to an emergencycommand only from a properlyassociated front unit.

§ 232.407 Operations requiring use of two-way end-of-train devices; prohibition onpurchase of nonconforming devices.

(a) Definitions. The followingdefinitions are intended solely for thepurpose of identifying those operationssubject to the requirements for the useof two-way end-of-train devices.



(1) Heavy grade means:(i) For a train operating with 4,000

trailing tons or less, a section of trackwith an average grade of two percent orgreater over a distance of twocontinuous miles; and

(ii) For a train operating with greaterthan 4,000 trailing tons, a section oftrack with an average grade of onepercent or greater over a distance ofthree continuous miles.

(2) Train means one or morelocomotives coupled with one or morerail cars, except during switchingoperations or where the operation is thatof classifying cars within a railroad yardfor the purpose of making or breakingup trains.

(3) Local train means a train assignedto perform switching en route whichoperates with 4,000 trailing tons or lessand travels between a point of originand a point of final destination, for adistance that is no greater than thatwhich can normally be operated by asingle crew in a single tour of duty.

(4) Work train means a non-revenueservice train of 4,000 trailing tons or lessused for the administration and upkeepservice of the railroad.

(5) Trailing tons means the sum of thegross weights—expressed in tons—ofthe cars and the locomotives in a trainthat are not providing propelling powerto the train.

(b) General. All trains not specificallyexcepted in paragraph (e) of this sectionshall be equipped with and shall useeither a two-way end-of-train devicemeeting the design and performancerequirements contained in § 232.405 ora device using an alternative technologyto perform the same function.

(c) New devices. Each newlymanufactured end-of-train devicepurchased by a railroad after January 2,1998 shall be a two-way end-of-traindevice meeting the design andperformance requirements contained in§ 232.405 or a device using analternative technology to perform thesame function.

(d) Grandfathering. Each two-wayend-of-train device purchased by anyperson prior to July 1, 1997 shall bedeemed to meet the design andperformance requirements contained in§ 232.405.

(e) Exceptions. The following types oftrains are excepted from therequirement for the use of a two-wayend-of-train device:

(1) Trains with a locomotive orlocomotive consist located at the rear ofthe train that is capable of making anemergency brake application, through acommand effected by telemetry or by acrew member in radio contact with thecontrolling locomotive;

(2) Trains operating in the push modewith the ability to effectuate anemergency brake application from therear of the train;

(3) Trains with an operational cabooseplaced at the rear of the train, carryingone or more crew members in radiocontact with the controlling locomotive,that is equipped with an emergencybrake valve;

(4) Trains operating with a secondary,fully independent braking systemcapable of safely stopping the train inthe event of failure of the primarysystem;

(5) Trains that do not operate overheavy grades and do not exceed 30 mph;

(6) Local trains, as defined inparagraph (a)(3) of this section, that donot operate over heavy grades;

(7) Work trains, as defined inparagraph (a)(4) of this section, that donot operate over heavy grades;

(8) Trains that operate exclusively ontrack that is not part of the generalrailroad system;

(9) Trains that must be divided intotwo sections in order to traverse a grade(e.g., doubling a hill). This exceptionapplies only to the extent necessary totraverse the grade and only while thetrain is divided in two for such purpose;

(10) Passenger trains in which all ofthe cars in the train are equipped withan emergency brake valve readilyaccessible to a crew member;

(11) Passenger trains that have a carat the rear of the train, readily accessibleto one or more crew members in radiocontact with the engineer, that isequipped with an emergency brakevalve readily accessible to such a crewmember; and

(12) Passenger trains that havetwenty-four (24) or fewer cars (notincluding locomotives) in the consistand that are equipped and operated inaccordance with the following train-configuration and operatingrequirements:

(i) If the total number of cars in apassenger train consist is twelve (12) orfewer, a car located no less than halfwaythrough the consist (counting from thefirst car in the train) must be equippedwith an emergency brake valve readilyaccessible to a crew member;

(ii) If the total number of cars in apassenger train consist is thirteen (13) totwenty-four (24), a car located no lessthan two-thirds (2⁄3) of the way throughthe consist (counting from the first carin the train) must be equipped with anemergency brake valve readilyaccessible to a crew member;

(iii) Prior to descending a section oftrack with an average grade of twopercent or greater over a distance of twocontinuous miles, the engineer of the

train shall communicate with theconductor, to ensure that a member ofthe crew with a working two-way radiois stationed in the car with the rearmostreadily accessible emergency brakevalve on the train when the train beginsits descent; and

(iv) While the train is descending asection of track with an average grade oftwo percent or greater over a distance oftwo continuous miles, a member of thetrain crew shall occupy the car thatcontains the rearmost readily accessibleemergency brake valve on the train andbe in constant radio communicationwith the locomotive engineer. The crewmember shall remain in this car untilthe train has completely traversed theheavy grade.

(f) Specific requirements for use. If atrain is required to use a two-way end-of-train device:

(1) That device shall be armed andoperable from the time the train departsfrom the point where the device isinstalled until the train reaches itsdestination. If a loss of communicationoccurs at the location where the deviceis installed, the train may depart thelocation at restricted speed for adistance of no more than one mile inorder to establish communication.When communication is established,the quantitative values of the head andrear unit shall be compared pursuant to§ 232.409(b) and the device testedpursuant to § 232.409(c), unless the testwas performed prior to installation.

(2) The rear unit batteries shall besufficiently charged at the initialterminal or other point where the deviceis installed and throughout the train’strip to ensure that the end-of-traindevice will remain operative until thetrain reaches its destination.

(3) The device shall be activated toeffectuate an emergency brakeapplication either by using the manualtoggle switch or through automaticactivation, whenever it becomesnecessary for the locomotive engineer toinitiate an emergency application of theair brakes using either the automaticbrake valve or the conductor’semergency brake valve.

(g) En route failure of device on afreight or other non-passenger train.Except on passenger trains required tobe equipped with a two-way end-of-train device (which are provided for inparagraph (h) of this section), en routefailures of a two-way end-of-train deviceshall be handled in accordance with thisparagraph. If a two-way end-of-traindevice or equivalent device fails enroute (i.e., is unable to initiate anemergency brake application from therear of the train due to certain losses ofcommunication (front to rear) or due to



other reasons, the speed of the train onwhich it is installed shall be limited to30 mph until the ability of the device toinitiate an emergency brake applicationfrom the rear of the train is restored.This limitation shall apply to a trainusing a device that uses an alternativetechnology to serve the purpose of atwo-way end-of-train device. Withregard to two-way end-of-train devices,a loss of communication between thefront and rear units is an en route failureonly if the loss of communication is fora period greater than 16 minutes and 30seconds. Based on the existing design ofthe devices, the display to an engineerof a message that there is acommunication failure indicates thatcommunication has been lost for 16minutes and 30 seconds or more.

(1) If a two-way end-of-train devicefails en route, the train on which it isinstalled, in addition to observing the30-mph speed limitation, shall notoperate over a section of track with anaverage grade of two percent or greaterfor a distance of two continuous miles,unless one of the following alternativemeasures is provided:

(i) Use of an occupied helperlocomotive at the end of the train. Thisalternative may be used only if thefollowing requirements are met:

(A) The helper locomotive engineershall initiate and maintain two-wayvoice radio communication with theengineer on the head end of the train;this contact shall be verified just priorto passing the crest of the grade.

(B) If there is a loss of communicationprior to passing the crest of the grade,the helper locomotive engineer and thehead-end engineer shall act immediatelyto stop the train until voicecommunication is resumed, inaccordance with the railroad’s operatingrules.

(C) If there is a loss of communicationonce the descent has begun, the helperlocomotive engineer and the head-endengineer shall act to stop the train, inaccordance with the railroad’s operatingrules, if the train has reached apredetermined rate of speed thatindicates the need for emergencybraking.

(D) The brake pipe of the helperlocomotive shall be connected and cutinto the train line and tested to ensureoperation.

(ii) Use of an occupied caboose at theend of the train with a tested,functioning brake valve capable ofinitiating an emergency brakeapplication from the caboose. Thisalternative may be used only if the trainservice employee in the caboose and theengineer on the head end of the trainestablish and maintain two-way voice

radio communication and respondappropriately to the loss of suchcommunication in the same manner asprescribed for helper locomotives inparagraph (g)(1)(i) of this section.

(iii) Use of a radio-controlledlocomotive at the rear of the train undercontinuous control of the engineer inthe head end by means of telemetry, butonly if such radio-controlled locomotiveis capable of initiating an emergencyapplication on command from the lead(controlling) locomotive.

(2) [Reserved.](h) En route failure of device on a

passenger train.(1) A passenger train required to be

equipped with a two-way end-of-traindevice that develops an en route failureof the device (as explained in paragraph(g) of this section) shall not operate overa section of track with an average gradeof two percent or greater over a distanceof two continuous miles until anoperable two-way end-of-train device isinstalled on the train or an alternativemethod of initiating an emergency brakeapplication from the rear of the train isachieved.

(2) Except as provided in paragraph(h)(1) of this section, a passenger trainrequired to be equipped with a two-wayend-of-train device that develops an enroute failure of the device (as explainedin paragraph (g) of this section) shall beoperated in accordance with thefollowing:

(i) A member of the train crew shallbe immediately positioned in the carwhich contains the rearmost readilyaccessible emergency brake valve on thetrain and shall be equipped with anoperable two-way radio thatcommunicates with the locomotiveengineer; and

(ii) The locomotive engineer shallperiodically make running tests of thetrain’s air brakes until the failure iscorrected; and

(3) Each en route failure shall becorrected at the next location where thenecessary repairs can be conducted or atthe next location where a required braketest is to be performed, whichever isreached first.

§ 232.409 Inspection and testing of end-of-train devices.

(a) After each installation of either thefront or rear unit of an end-of-traindevice, or both, on a train and before thetrain departs, the railroad shalldetermine that the identification codeentered into the front unit is identical tothe unique identification code on therear unit.

(b) After each installation of either thefront or rear unit of an end-of-traindevice, or both, on a train and before the

train departs, the functional capabilityof the device shall be determined, aftercharging the train, by comparing thequantitative value of the air pressuredisplayed on the front unit with thequantitative value of the air pressuredisplayed on the rear unit or on aproperly calibrated air gauge. The end-of-train device shall not be used if thedifference between the two readingsexceeds three pounds per square inch.

(c) A two-way end-of-train deviceshall be tested at the initial terminal orother point of installation to ensure thatthe device is capable of initiating anemergency power brake applicationfrom the rear of the train. If this test isconducted by a person other than amember of the train crew, thelocomotive engineer shall be notifiedthat a successful test was performed.The notification required by thisparagraph may be provided to thelocomotive engineer by any meansdetermined appropriate by the railroad;however, a written or electronic recordof the notification shall be maintainedin the cab of the controlling locomotiveand shall include the date and time ofthe test, the location where the test wasperformed, and the name of personconducting the test.

(d) The telemetry equipment shall betested for accuracy and calibrated ifnecessary according to themanufacturer’s specifications andprocedures at least every 365 days. Thisshall include testing radio frequenciesand modulation of the device. The dateand location of the last calibration ortest as well as the name of the personperforming the calibration or test shallbe legibly displayed on a weather-resistant sticker or other marking deviceaffixed to the outside of both the frontunit and the rear unit; however, if thefront unit is an integral part of thelocomotive or is inaccessible, then theinformation may be recorded on FormFRA F6180–49A instead, provided theserial number of the unit is recorded.

Subpart F—Introduction of New BrakeSystem Technology

§ 232.501 Scope.

This subpart contains generalrequirements for introducing new brakesystem technologies. This subpart isintended to facilitate the introduction ofnew complete brake systemtechnologies or major upgrades toexisting systems which the currentregulations do not adequately address(i.e., electronic brake systems). Thissubpart is not intended for use in theintroduction of a new brake componentor material.



§ 232.503 Process to introduce new brakesystem technology.

(a) Pursuant to the procedurescontained in § 232.17, each railroadshall obtain special approval from theFRA Associate Administrator for Safetyof a pre-revenue service acceptancetesting plan, developed pursuant to§ 232.505, for the new brake systemtechnology, prior to implementing theplan.

(b) Each railroad shall complete a pre-revenue service demonstration of thenew brake system technology inaccordance with the approved plan,shall fulfill all of the other requirementsprescribed in § 232.505, and shall obtainspecial approval from the FRAAssociate Administrator for Safetyunder the procedures of § 232.17 priorto using such brake system technologyin revenue service.

§ 232.505 Pre-revenue service acceptancetesting plan.

(a) General; submission of plan.Except as provided in paragraph (f) ofthis section, before using a new brakesystem technology for the first time onits system the operating railroad orrailroads shall submit a pre-revenueservice acceptance testing plancontaining the information required byparagraph (e) of this section and obtainthe approval of the FRA AssociateAdministrator for Safety, under theprocedures specified in § 232.17.

(b) Compliance with plan. Afterreceiving FRA approval of the pre-revenue service testing plan and beforeintroducing the new brake systemtechnology into revenue service, theoperating railroad or railroads shall:

(1) Adopt and comply with such FRA-approved plan, including fullyexecuting the tests required by the plan;

(2) Report to the FRA AssociateAdministrator for Safety the results ofthe pre-revenue service acceptance tests;

(3) Correct any safety deficienciesidentified by FRA in the design of theequipment or in the inspection, testing,and maintenance procedures or, if safetydeficiencies cannot be corrected bydesign or procedural changes, agree tocomply with any operational limitationsthat may be imposed by the AssociateAdministrator for Safety on the revenueservice operation of the equipment; and

(4) Obtain FRA approval to place thenew brake system technology in revenueservice.

(c) Compliance with limitations. Theoperating railroad shall comply witheach operational limitation, if any,imposed by the Associate Administratorfor Safety.

(d) Availability of plan. The plan shallbe made available to FRA for inspectionand copying upon request.

(e) Elements of plan. The plan shallinclude all of the following elements:

(1) An identification of each waiver,if any, of FRA or other Federal safetyregulations required for the tests or forrevenue service operation of theequipment.

(2) A clear statement of the testobjectives. One of the principal testobjectives shall be to demonstrate thatthe equipment meets the safety designand performance requirements specifiedin this part when operated in theenvironment in which it is to be used.

(3) A planned schedule forconducting the tests.

(4) A description of the railroadproperty or facilities to be used toconduct the tests.

(5) A detailed description of how thetests are to be conducted. Thisdescription shall include:

(i) An identification of the equipmentto be tested;

(ii) The method by which theequipment is to be tested;

(iii) The criteria to be used to evaluatethe equipment’s performance; and

(iv) The means by which the testresults are to be reported to FRA.

(6) A description of any specialinstrumentation to be used during thetests.

(7) A description of the information ordata to be obtained.

(8) A description of how theinformation or data obtained is to beanalyzed or used.

(9) A description of any criteria to beused as safety limits during the testing.

(10) A description of the criteria to beused to measure or determine thesuccess or failure of the tests. Ifacceptance is to be based onextrapolation of less than full leveltesting results, the analysis to be doneto justify the validity of theextrapolation shall be described.

(11) A description of any specialsafety precautions to be observed duringthe testing.

(12) A written set of standardoperating procedures to be used toensure that the testing is done safely.

(13) Quality control procedures toensure that the inspection, testing, andmaintenance procedures are followed.

(14) Criteria to be used for the revenueservice operation of the equipment.

(15) A description of all testing of theequipment that has previously beenperformed, if any.

(f) Exception. For brake systemtechnologies that have previously beenused in revenue service in the UnitedStates, the railroad shall test theequipment on its system, prior toplacing it in revenue service, to ensurethe compatibility of the equipment withthe operating system (track, signals, etc.)of the railroad. A description of suchtesting shall be retained by the railroadand made available to FRA forinspection and copying upon request.

Appendix A to Part 232—Schedule ofCivil Penalties 1

Section Violation Willful violation

Subpart A—General232.15 Movement of power brake defects:

(a) Improper movement, general .................................................................................................................. (1) (1)(11) Failure to make determinations and provide notification of en route defect ................................. $2,500 $5,000

(b) Complete failure to tag ........................................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(1) Insufficient tag or record .................................................................................................................. 1,000 2,000(2), (4) Improper removal of tag ............................................................................................................ 2,000 4,000(3) Failure to retain record of tag .......................................................................................................... 2,000 4,000

(c) Improper loading or purging .................................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(e) Improper placement of defective equipment .......................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.19 Availability of records ............................................................................................................................ (1) (1)Subpart B—General Requirements

232.103 All train brake systems:(a)–(c), (h)–(i) Failure to meet general design requirements ....................................................................... 2,500 5,000(d) Failure to have proper percentage of operative brakes from Class I brake test ................................... 5,000 7,500(e) Operating with less than 85 percent operative brakes ........................................................................... 5,000 7,500(f) Improper use of car with inoperative or ineffective brakes ..................................................................... 2,500 5,000(g) Improper display of piston travel ............................................................................................................ 2,500 5,000




(m) Failure to stop train with excess air flow or gradient ............................................................................ 2,500 5,000(n) Securement of unattended equipment:.

(1) Failure to apply sufficient number of hand brakes; failure to develop or implement procedure toverify number applied ........................................................................................................................ 5,000 7,500

(2) Failure to initiate emergency ........................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(3) Failure to apply hand brakes on locomotives ................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(4) Failure to adopt or comply with procedures for securing unattended locomotive .......................... 5,000 7,500

(o) Improper adjustment of air regulating devices ....................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(p) Failure to hold supervisors jointly responsible ....................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.105 Locomotives:(a) Air brakes not in safe and suitable condition ......................................................................................... 1,000-

5,0002,000-7,500

(b) Not equipped with proper hand or parking brake ................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(c)(1) Failure to inspect/repair hand or parking brake ................................................................................. 2,500 5,000

(2) Failure to properly stencil, tag, or record ........................................................................................ 2,000 4,000(d) Excess leakage from equalizing reservoir .............................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(e) Improper use of feed or regulating valve braking .................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(f) Improper use of passenger position ........................................................................................................ 2,500 5,000(g) Brakes in operative condition ................................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000

232.107 Air sources/cold weather operations:(a)(1), (2) Failure to adopt or comply with monitoring program for yard air sources .................................. 5,000 7,500

(3) Failure to maintain records .............................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(b) Failure to blow condensation .................................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(c) Use of improper chemicals ..................................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(d) Failure to equip or drain yard air reservoirs ........................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(e) Failure to adopt or comply cold weather operating procedures ............................................................. 5,000 7,500

232.109 Dynamic brakes:(a) Failure to provide information ................................................................................................................. 5,000 7,500(b) Failure to make repairs ........................................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(c) Failure to properly tag ............................................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(d) Failure to maintain record of repair ........................................................................................................ 2,000 4,000(e) Improper deactivation ............................................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(f) Improper use of locomotive as controlling unit ........................................................................................ 2,500 5,000(g) Locomotive not properly equipped with indicator ................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(h) Rebuilt locomotive not properly equipped .............................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(j) Failure to adopt or comply with dynamic brake operating rules ............................................................. 5,000 7,500(k) Failure to adopt or comply with training on operating procedures ......................................................... 5,000 7,500

232.111 Train handling information:(a) Failure to adopt and comply with procedures ........................................................................................ 5,000 7,500(b) Failure to provide specific information .................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

Subpart C—Inspection and Testing Requirements232.203 Training requirements:

(a) Failure to develop or adopt program ...................................................................................................... 7,500 11,000(b)(1)–(9) Failure to address or comply with specific required item or provision of program ..................... 5,000 7,500(c) Failure to adopt or comply with two-way EOT program ......................................................................... 5,000 7,500(d) Failure to adopt or comply with retaining valve program ....................................................................... 5,000 7,500(e) Failure to maintain adequate records ..................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(f) Failure to adopt and comply with periodic assessment plan .................................................................. 7,500 11,000

232.205 Class I brake test—initial terminal inspection:(a) Complete failure to perform inspection ................................................................................................... 1 10,000 15,000(b)(1)–(4), (6)–(8) Partial failure to perform inspection ................................................................................ 5,000 7,500(b)(5) Failure to properly adjust piston travel (per car) ................................................................................ 2,500 5,000(c) Failure to use carman when required ..................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(d) Failure to provide proper notification ...................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(e) Failure to void compressed air ............................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(f) Failure to perform inspection on cars added ........................................................................................... 5,000 7,500

232.207 Class IA brake tests—1,000-mile inspection:(a) Complete failure to perform inspection ................................................................................................... 1 15,000 7,500(b)(1)–(6) Partial failure to perform inspection ............................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(c) Failure to properly designate location ..................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(c)(1) Failure to perform at designated location ........................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(c)(2) Failure to provide notification ............................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000

232.209 Class II brake tests—intermediate inspection:(a) Complete failure to perform inspection ................................................................................................... 1 5,000 7,500(b)(1)–(5), (c) Partial failure to perform inspection ....................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.211 Class III brake tests—trainline continuity inspection:(a) Complete failure to perform inspection ................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(b)(1)–(4), (c) Partial failure to perform inspection ....................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.213 Extended haul trains:(a)(1) Failure to properly designate an extended haul train ........................................................................ 5,000 7,500(a)(2)–(3), (5)(i), (8) Failure to perform inspections ..................................................................................... (2) (2)

(a)(4) Failure to remove defective car (per car) ........................................................................................... 2,000 4,000(a)(5)(ii), (6) Failure to conduct inbound inspection ..................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(a)(7) Failure to maintain record of defects (per car) .................................................................................. 2,000 4,000




232.215 Transfer train brake tests:(a) Failure to perform inspection .................................................................................................................. 5,000 7,500(b) Failure to perform on cars added ........................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.217 Train brake system tests conducted using yard air:(a) Failure to use suitable device ................................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(b) Improper connection of air test device ................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(c) Failure to properly perform inspection .................................................................................................... (2) (2)(d) Failure to calibrate test device ................................................................................................................ 2,500 5,000(e) Failure to use accurate device ............................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.219 Double heading and helper service:(a) Failure to perform inspection or inability to control brakes .................................................................... 2,500 5,000(b) Failure to make visual inspection ........................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(c) Use of improper helper link device ......................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

Subpart D—Periodic Maintenance and Testing Requirements232.303 General requirements:

(b)–(d) Failure to conduct inspection or test when car on repair track ....................................................... 2,500 5,000(e) Improper movement of equipment for testing ........................................................................................ 2,500 5,000(e)(1) Failure to properly tag equipment for movement ............................................................................... 2,000 5,000(e)(2)–(4) Failure to retain record or improper removal of tag or card ........................................................ 2,000 4,000(f) Failure to stencil or track test information ............................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.305 Repair track air brake tests:(a) Failure to test in accord with required procedure ................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(b)–(d) Failure to perform test ...................................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.307 Single car tests:(a) Failure to test in accord with required procedure ................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(b)–(c) Failure to perform test ...................................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

232.309 Repair track air brake test and single car test equipment and devices:(a)–(f) Failure to properly test or calibrate ................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

Subpart E—End-of-Train Devices232.403 Design standards for one-way devices:

(a)–(g) Failure to meet standards ................................................................................................................ 2,500 5,000232.405 Design standards for two-way devices:

(a)–(i) Failure to meet standards .................................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000232.407 Operating requirements for two-way devices:

(b) Failure to equip a train ............................................................................................................................ 5,000 7,500(c) Improper purchase .................................................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(f)(1) Failure of device to be armed and operable ....................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(f)(2) Insufficient battery charge ................................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(f)(3) Failure to activate the device .............................................................................................................. 2,500 5,000(g) Improper handling of en route failure, freight or other non-passenger .................................................. 5,000 7,500(h) Improper handling of en route failure, passenger .................................................................................. 5,000 7,500

232.409 Inspection and testing of devices:(a) Failure to have unique code ................................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(b) Failure to compare quantitative values ................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(c) Failure to test emergency capability ....................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(d) Failure to properly calibrate .................................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000

Subpart F—Introduction of New Brake System Technology232.503 Process to introduce new technology:

(b) Failure to obtain FRA approval ............................................................................................................... 10,000 15,000232.505 Pre-revenue service acceptance testing plan:

(a) Failure to obtain FRA approval ............................................................................................................... 5,000 7,500(b) Failure to comply with plan ..................................................................................................................... 2,500 5,000(f) Failure to test previously used technology .............................................................................................. 5,000 7,500

1 A penalty may be assessed against an individual only for a willful violation. Generally when two or more violations of these regulations arediscovered with respect to a single unit of equipment that is placed or continued in service by a railroad, the appropriate penalties set forth aboveare aggregated up to a maximum of $11,000 per day. An exception to this rule is the $15,000 penalty for willful violation of § 232.503 (failure toget FRA approval before introducing new technology) with respect to a single unit of equipment; if the unit has additional violative conditions, thepenalty may routinely be aggregated to $15,000. Although the penalties listed for failure to perform the brake inspections and tests under§ 232.205 through § 232.209 may be assessed for each train that is not properly inspected, failure to perform any of the inspections and tests re-quired under those sections will be treated as a violation separate and distinct from, and in addition to, any substantive violative conditions foundon the equipment contained in the train consist. Moreover, the Administrator reserves the right to assess a penalty of up to $22,000 for any viola-tion where circumstances warrant. See 49 CFR part 209, appendix A.

Failure to observe any condition for movement of defective equipment set forth in § 232.15(a) will deprive the railroad of the benefit of themovement-for-repair provision and make the railroad and any responsible individuals liable for penalty under the particular regulatory section(s)concerning the substantive defect(s) present on the equipment at the time of movement.

Failure to provide any of the records or plans required by this part pursuant to § 232.19 will be considered a failure to maintain or develop therecord or plan and will make the railroad liable for penalty under the particular regulatory section(s) concerning the retention or creation of thedocument involved.

Failure to properly perform any of the inspections specifically referenced in § 232.213 and § 232.217 may be assessed under each section ofthis part or this chapter, or both, that contains the requirements for performing the referenced inspection.



Appendix B to Part 232—Part 232 Priorto April 1, 2001

PART 232—RAILROAD POWERBRAKES AND DRAWBARS

Sec.232.0 Applicability and penalties.232.1 Power brakes; minimum percentage.232.2 Drawbars; standard height.232.3 Power brakes and appliances for

operating power-brake systems.232.10 General rules; locomotives.232.11 Train air brake system tests.232.12 Initial terminal road train airbrake

tests.232.13 Road train and intermediate

terminal train air brake tests.232.14 Inbound brake equipment

inspection.232.15 Double heading and helper service.232.16 Running tests.232.17 Freight and passenger train car

brakes.232.19 End of train device.232 App A Appendix A to Part 232232 App B Appendix B to Part 232

Authority: 45 U.S.C. 1, 3, 5, 6, 8–12, and16, as amended; 45 U.S.C. 431, 438, asamended; 49 app. U.S.C. 1655(e), asamended; Pub. L. 100–342; and 49 CFR1.49(c), (g), and (m).

§ 232.0 Applicability and penalties.(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b),

this part applies to all standard gagerailroads.

(b) This part does not apply to:(1) A railroad that operates only on track

inside an installation which is not part of thegeneral railroad system of transportation; or

(2) Rapid transit operations in an urbanarea that are not connected with the generalrailroad system of transportation.

(c) As used in this part, carrier means‘‘railroad,’’ as that term is defined below.

(d) Railroad means all forms of non-highway ground transportation that run onrails or electromagnetic guideways, including(1) commuter or other short-haul railpassenger service in a metropolitan orsuburban area, and (2) high speed groundtransportation systems that connectmetropolitan areas, without regard to

whether they use new technologies notassociated with traditional railroads. Suchterm does not include rapid transitoperations within an urban area that are notconnected to the general railroad system oftransportation.

(e) Any person (including a railroad andany manager, supervisor, official, or otheremployee or agent of a railroad) who violatesany requirement of this part or causes theviolation of any such requirement is subjectto a civil penalty of at least $250 and notmore than $10,000 per violation, except that:Penalties may be assessed against individualsonly for willful violations, and, where agrossly negligent violation or a pattern ofrepeated violations has created an imminenthazard of death or injury to persons, or hascaused death or injury, a penalty not toexceed $20,000 per violation may beassessed. Each day a violation continuesshall constitute a separate offense.

§ 232.1 Power brakes; minimumpercentage.

On and after September 1, 1910, on allrailroads used in interstate commerce,whenever, as required by the SafetyAppliance Act as amended March 2, 1903,any train is operated with power or trainbrakes, not less than 85 percent of the carsof such train shall have their brakes used andoperated by the engineer of the locomotivedrawing such train, and all power-brake carsin every such train which are associatedtogether with the 85 percent shall have theirbrakes so used and operated.

§ 232.2 Drawbars; standard Height.

Not included in this Appendix. Moved to49 CFR part 231.

§ 232.3 Power brakes and appliances foroperating power-brake systems.

(a) The specifications and requirement forpower brakes and appliances for operatingpower-brake systems for freight service setforth in the appendix to the report on furtherhearing, of May 30, 1945, are hereby adoptedand prescribed. (See appendix to this part fororder in Docket 13528.)

Rules for Inspection, Testing andMaintenance of Air Brake Equipment

§ 232.10 General rules; locomotives.

(a) Air brake and hand brake equipment onlocomotives including tender must beinspected and maintained in accordance withthe requirements of the LocomotiveInspection and United States SafetyAppliance Acts and related orders andregulations of the Federal RailroadAdministrator (FRA).

(b) It must be known that air brakeequipment on locomotives is in a safe andsuitable condition for service.

(c) Compressor or compressors must betested for capacity by orifice test as often asconditions require but not less frequentlythan required by law and orders of the FRA.

(d) Main reservoirs shall be subjected totests periodically as required by law andorders of the FRA.

(e) Air gauges must be tested periodicallyas required by law and orders of the FRA,and whenever any irregularity is reported.They shall be compared with an accuratedeadweight tester, or test gauge. Gaugesfound inaccurate or defective must berepaired or replaced.

(f)(1) All operating portions of air brakeequipment together with dirt collectors andfilters must be cleaned, repaired and testedas often as conditions require to maintainthem in a safe and suitable condition forservice, and not less frequently than requiredby law and orders of the FRA.

(2) On locomotives so equipped, handbrakes, parts, and connections must beinspected, and necessary repairs made asoften as the service requires, with date beingsuitably stenciled or tagged.

(g) The date of testing or cleaning of airbrake equipment and the initials of the shopor station at which the work was done shallbe placed on a card displayed undertransparent covering in the cab of eachlocomotive unit.

(h)(1) Minimum brake cylinder pistontravel must be sufficient to provide properbrake shoe clearance when brakes arereleased.

(2) Maximum brake cylinder piston travelwhen locomotive is standing must not exceedthe following:

Inches

Steam locomotives:Cam type of driving wheel brake ................................................................................................................................................. 31⁄2Other types of driving wheel brakes ............................................................................................................................................ 6Engine truck brake ....................................................................................................................................................................... 8Engine trailer truck brake ............................................................................................................................................................. 8Tender brake (truck mounted and tender bed mounted) ............................................................................................................. 8Tender brake (body mounted) ...................................................................................................................................................... 9

Locomotives other than steam:Driving wheel brake ...................................................................................................................................................................... 6Swivel type truck brake with brakes on more than one truck operated by one brake cylinder .................................................. 7Swivel type truck brake equipped with one brake cylinder .......................................................................................................... 8Swivel type truck brake equipped with two or more brake cylinders .......................................................................................... 6

(i)(1) Foundation brake rigging, and safetysupports, where used, must be maintained ina safe and suitable condition for service.Levers, rods, brake beams, hangars and pins

must be of ample strength and must not bindor foul in any way that will affect properoperation of brakes. All pins must beproperly applied and secured in place with

suitable locking devices. Brake shoes must beproperly applied and kept approximately inline with treads of wheels or other brakingsurfaces.



(2) No part of the foundation brake riggingand safety supports shall be closer to the railsthan specified by law and orders of the FRA.

(j)(1) Main reservoir leakage: Leakage frommain air reservoir and related piping shallnot exceed an average of 3 pounds perminute in a test of three minutes’ duration,made after the pressure has been reduced 40percent below maximum pressure.

(2) Brake pipe leakage: Brake pipe leakagemust not exceed 5 pounds per minute aftera reduction of 10 pounds has been made frombrake pipe air pressure of not less than 70pounds.

(3) Brake cylinder leakage: With a fullservice application of brakes, and withcommunication to the brake cylinders closed,brakes must remain applied not less than fiveminutes.

(4) The main reservoir system of each unitshall be equipped with at least one safetyvalve, the capacity of which shall besufficient to prevent an accumulation ofpressure of more than 10 pounds per squareinch above the maximum setting of thecompressor governor fixed by the chiefmechanical officer of the carrier operating thelocomotive.

(5) A suitable governor shall be providedthat will stop and start the air compressorwithin 5 pounds above or below thepressures fixed.

(6) Compressor governor when used inconnection with the automatic air brakesystem shall be so adjusted that thecompressor will start when the mainreservoir pressure is not less than 15 poundsabove the maximum brake-pipe pressure

fixed by the rules of the carrier and will notstop the compressor until the reservoirpressure has increased not less than 10pounds.

(k) The communicating signal system onlocomotives when used in passenger servicemust be tested and known to be in a safe andsuitable condition for service before eachtrip.

(l) Enginemen when taking charge oflocomotives must know that the brakes are inoperative condition.

(m) In freezing weather drain cocks on aircompressors of steam locomotives must beleft open while compressors are shut off.

(n) Air pressure regulating devices must beadjusted for the following pressures:

Pounds

Locomotives:(1) Minimum brake pipe air pressure:

Road Service ......................................................................................................................................................................... 70Switch Service ....................................................................................................................................................................... 60

(2) Minimum differential between brake pipe and main reservoir air pressures, with brake valve in running position .............. 15(3) Safety valve for straight air brake ........................................................................................................................................... 30–55(4) Safety valve for LT, ET, No. 8–EL, No. 14 El, No. 6–DS, No. 6–BL and No. 6–SL equipment ........................................... 30–68(5) Safety valve for HSC and No. 24–RL equipment .................................................................................................................. 30–75(6) Reducing valve for independent or straight air brake ............................................................................................................ 30–50(7) Self-lapping portion for electro-pneumatic brake (minimum full application pressure) .......................................................... 50(8) Self-lapping portion for independent air brake (full application pressure) ............................................................................. 30–50(9) Reducing valve for air signal .................................................................................................................................................. 40–60(10) Reducing valve for high-speed brake (minimum) ................................................................................................................. 50

Cars:(11) Reducing valve for high-speed brake ................................................................................................................................... 58–62(12) Safety valve for PS, LN, UC, AML, AMU and AB–1–B air brakes ...................................................................................... 58–62(13) Safety valve for HSC air brake ............................................................................................................................................. 58–77(14) Governor valve for water raising system .............................................................................................................................. 60(15) Reducing valve for water raising system .............................................................................................................................. 20–30

§ 232.11 Train Air Brake System Tests.

(a) Supervisors are jointly responsible withinspectors, enginemen and trainmen forcondition of train air brake and air signalequipment on motive power and cars to theextent that it is possible to detect defectiveequipment by required air tests.

(b) Communicating signal system onpassenger equipment trains must be testedand known to be in a suitable condition forservice before leaving terminal.

(c) Each train must have the air brakes ineffective operating condition, and at no timeshall the number and location of operative airbrakes be less than permitted by Federalrequirements. When piston travel is in excessof 101⁄2 inches, the air brakes cannot beconsidered in effective operating condition.

(d) Condensation must be blown from thepipe from which air is taken beforeconnecting yard line or motive power totrain.

§ 232.12 Initial Terminal Road TrainAirbrake Tests.

(a)(1) Each train must be inspected andtested as specified in this section by aqualified person at points—

(i) Where the train is originally made up(initial terminal);

(ii) Where train consist is changed, otherthan by adding or removing a solid block of

cars, and the train brake system remainscharged; and

(iii) Where the train is received ininterchange if the train consist is changedother than by—

(A) Removing a solid block of cars from thehead end or rear end of train;

(B) Changing motive power;(C) Removing or changing the caboose; or(D) Any combination of the changes listed

in (A), (B), and (C) of this subparagraph.Where a carman is to perform the

inspection and test under existing or futurecollective bargaining agreement, in thosecircumstances a carman alone will beconsidered a qualified person.

(2) A qualified person participating in thetest and inspection or who has knowledgethat it was made shall notify the engineerthat the initial terminal road train air braketest has been satisfactorily performed. Thequalified person shall provide thenotification in writing if the road crew willreport for duty after the qualified person goesoff duty. The qualified person also shallprovide the notification in writing if the trainthat has been inspected is to be moved inexcess of 500 miles without being subjectedto another test pursuant to either this sectionor § 232.13 of this part.

(b) Each carrier shall designate additionalinspection points not more than 1,000 miles

apart where intermediate inspection will bemade to determine that—

(1) Brake pipe pressure leakage does notexceed five pounds per minute;

(2) Brakes apply on each car in responseto a 20-pound service brake pipe pressurereduction; and

(3) Brake rigging is properly secured anddoes not bind or foul.

(c) Train airbrake system must be chargedto required air pressure, angle cocks andcutout cocks must be properly positioned, airhose must be properly coupled and must bein condition for service. An examinationmust be made for leaks and necessary repairsmade to reduce leakage to a minimum.Retaining valves and retaining valve pipesmust be inspected and known to be incondition for service. If train is to be operatedin electro-pneumatic brake operation, brakecircuit cables must be properly connected.

(d)(1) After the airbrake system on a freighttrain is charged to within 15 pounds of thesetting of the feed valve on the locomotive,but to not less than 60 pounds, as indicatedby an accurate gauge at rear end of train, andon a passenger train when charged to not lessthan 70 pounds, and upon receiving thesignal to apply brakes for test, a 15-poundbrake pipe service reduction must be madein automatic brake operations, the brakevalve lapped, and the number of pounds ofbrake pipe leakage per minute noted as



indicated by brake pipe guage, after whichbrake pipe reduction must be increased tofull service. Inspection of the train brakesmust be made to determine that angle cocksare properly positioned, that the brakes areapplied on each car, that piston travel iscorrect, that brake rigging does not bind orfoul, and that all parts of the brakeequipment are properly secured. When thisinspection has been completed, the releasesignal must be given and brakes released andeach brake inspected to see that all havereleased.

(2) When a passenger train is to beoperated in electro-pneumatic brakeoperation and after completion of test ofbrakes as prescribed by paragraph (d)(1) ofthis section the brake system must berecharged to not less than 90 pounds airpressure, and upon receiving the signal toapply brakes for test, a minimum 20 poundselectro-pneumatic brake application must bemade as indicated by the brake cylinder gage.Inspection of the train brakes must then bemade to determine if brakes are applied oneach car. When this inspection has beencompleted, the release signal must be givenand brakes released and each brake inspectedto see that all have released.

(3) When the locomotive used to haul thetrain is provided with means for maintainingbrake pipe pressure at a constant level duringservice application of the train brakes, thisfeature must be cut out during train airbraketests.

(e) Brake pipe leakage must not exceed 5pounds per minute.

(f)(1) At initial terminal piston travel ofbody-mounted brake cylinders which is lessthan 7 inches or more than 9 inches must beadjusted to nominally 7 inches.

(2) Minimum brake cylinder piston travelof truck-mounted brake cylinders must besufficient to provide proper brake shoeclearance when brakes are released.Maximum piston travel must not exceed 6inches.

(3) Piston travel of brake cylinders onfreight cars equipped with other thanstandard single capacity brake, must beadjusted as indicated on badge plate orstenciling on car located in a conspicuousplace near the brake cylinder.

(g) When test of airbrakes has beencompleted the engineman and conductormust be advised that train is in propercondition to proceed.

(h) During standing test, brakes must not beapplied or released until proper signal isgiven.

(i)(1) When train airbrake system is testedfrom a yard test plant, an engineer’s brakevalve or an appropriate test device shall beused to provide increase and reduction ofbrake pipe air pressure or electro-pneumaticbrake application and release at the same ora slower rate as with engineer’s brake valveand yard test plant must be connected to theend which will be nearest to the hauling roadlocomotive.

(2) When yard test plant is used, the trainairbrakes system must be charged and testedas prescribed by paragraphs (c) to (g) of thissection inclusive, and when practicableshould be kept charged until road motivepower is coupled to train, after which, an

automatic brake application and release testof airbrakes on rear car must be made. If trainis to be operated in electro-pneumatic brakeoperation, this test must also be made inelectro-pneumatic brake operation beforeproceeding.

(3) If after testing the brakes as prescribedin paragraph (i)(2) of this section the train isnot kept charged until road motive power isattached, the brakes must be tested asprescribed by paragraph (d)(1) of this sectionand if train is to be operated in electro-pneumatic brake operation as prescribed byparagraph (d)(2) of this section.

(j) Before adjusting piston travel or workingon brake rigging, cutout cock in brake pipebranch must be closed and air reservoirsmust be drained. When cutout cocks areprovided in brake cylinder pipes, thesecutout cocks only may be closed and airreservoirs need not be drained.

§ 232.13 Road train and intermediateterminal train air brake tests.

(a) Passenger trains. Before motive poweris detached or angle cocks are closed on apassenger train operated in either automaticor electro-pneumatic brake operation, exceptwhen closing angle cocks for cutting off oneor more cars from the rear end of train,automatic air brake must be applied. Afterrecouping, brake system must be recharged torequired air pressure and before proceedingand upon receipt of proper request or signal,application and release tests of brakes on rearcar must be made from locomotive inautomatic brake operation. If train is to beoperated in electro-pneumatic brakeoperation, this test must also be made inelectro-pneumatic brake operation beforeproceeding. Inspector or trainman mustdetermine if brakes on rear car of trainproperly apply and release.

(b) Freight trains. Before motive power isdetached or angle cocks are closed on afreight train, brakes must be applied with notless than a 20-pound brake pipe reduction.After recoupling, and after angle cocks areopened, it must be known that brake pipe airpressure is being restored as indicated by arear car gauge or device. In the absence of arear car gauge or device, an air brake testmust be made to determine that the brakeson the rear car apply and release.

(c)(1)At a point other than an initialterminal where a locomotive or caboose ischanged, or where one or more consecutivecars are cut off from the rear end or head endof a train with the consist otherwiseremaining intact, after the train brake systemis charged to within 15 pounds of the feedvalve setting on the locomotive, but not lessthan 60 pounds as indicated at the rear of afreight train and 70 pounds on a passengertrain, a 20-pound brake pipe reduction mustbe made and it must be determined that thebrakes on the rear car apply and release. Asan alternative to the rear car brakeapplication and release test, it shall bedetermined that brake pipe pressure of thetrain is being reduced as indicated by a rearcar gauge or device and then that brake pipepressure of the train is being restored asindicated by a rear car gauge or device.

(2) Before proceeding it must be knownthat brake pipe pressure as indicated at rearof freight train is being restored.

(3) On trains operating with electro-pneumatic brakes, with brake system chargedto not less than 70 pounds, test must be madeto determine that rear brakes apply andrelease properly from a minimum 20 poundselectro-pneumatic brake application asindicated by brake cylinder gauge.

(d)(1) At a point other than a terminalwhere one or more cars are added to a train,after the train brake system is charged to notless than 60 pounds as indicated by a gaugeor device at the rear of a freight train and 70pounds on a passenger train. A brake testmust be made by a designated person asdescribed in § 232.12 (a)(1) to determine thatbrake pipe leakage does not exceed five (5)pounds per minute as indicated by the brakepipe gauge after a 20-pound brake pipereduction has been made. After the test iscompleted, it must be determined that pistontravel is correct, and the train airbrakes ofthese cars and on the rear car of the trainapply and remain applied, until the releasesignal is given. As an alternative to the rearcar brake application and release portion ofthe test, it shall be determined that brakepipe pressure of the train is being reduced asindicated by a rear car gauge or device andthen that brake pipe pressure of the train isbeing restored as indicated by a rear cargauge or device. Cars added to a train thathave not been inspected in accordance with§ 232.12 (c) through (j) must be so inspectedand tested at the next terminal wherefacilities are available for such attention.

(d)(2)(i) At a terminal where a solid blockof cars, which has been previously chargedand tested as prescribed by § 232.13 (c)through (j), is added to a train, it must bedetermined that the brakes on the rear car ofthe train apply and release. As an alternativeto the rear car application and release test, itshall be determined that brake pipe pressureof the train is being reduced as indicated bya rear car gauge or device and then that brakepipe pressure of the train is being restored asindicated by a rear car gauge or device.

(d)(2)(ii) When cars which have not beenpreviously charged and tested as prescribedby § 232.12 (c) through (j) are added to atrain, such cars may either be giveninspection and tests in accordance with§ 232.12 (c) through (j), or tested asprescribed by paragraph (d)(1) of this sectionprior to departure in which case these carsmust be inspected and tested in accordancewith § 232.12 (c) through (j) at next terminal.

(3) Before proceeding it must be knownthat the brake pipe pressure at the rear offreight train is being restored.

(e)(1) Transfer train and yard trainmovements not exceeding 20 miles, musthave the air brake hose coupled between allcars, and after the brake system is charged tonot less than 60 pounds, a 15 pound servicebrake pipe reduction must be made todetermine that the brakes are applied on eachcar before releasing and proceeding.

(2) Transfer train and yard trainmovements exceeding 20 miles must havebrake inspection in accordance with § 232.12(c)–(j).

(f) The automatic air brake must not bedepended upon to hold a locomotive, cars ortrain, when standing on a grade, whetherlocomotive is attached or detached from cars



or train. When required, a sufficient numberof hand brakes must be applied to hold train,before air brakes are released. When ready tostart, hand brakes must not be released untilit is known that the air brake system isproperly charged.

(g) As used in this section, device meansa system of components designed andinspected in accordance with § 232.19.

(h) When a device is used to comply withany test requirement in this section, thephrase brake pipe pressure of the train isbeing reduced means a pressure reduction ofat least five pounds and the phrase brakepipe pressure of the train is being restoredmeans a pressure increase of at least fivepounds.

§ 232.14 Inbound Brake EquipmentInspection.

(a) At points where inspectors areemployed to make a general inspection oftrains upon arrival at terminals, visualinspection must be made of retaining valvesand retaining valve pipes, release valves androds, brake rigging, safety supports, handbrakes, hose and position of angle cocks andmake necessary repairs or mark for repairtracks any cars to which yard repairs cannotbe promptly made.

(b) Freight trains arriving at terminalswhere facilities are available and at whichspecial instructions provide for immediatebrake inspection and repairs, trains shall beleft with air brakes applied by a service brakepipe reduction of 20 pounds so thatinspectors can obtain a proper check of thepiston travel. Trainmen will not close anyangle cock or cut the locomotive off until the20 pound service reduction has been made.Inspection of the brakes and needed repairsshould be made as soon thereafter aspracticable.

§ 232.15 Double Heading and HelperService.

(a) When more than one locomotive isattached to a train, the engineman of theleading locomotive shall operate the brakes.On all other motive power units in the trainthe brake pipe cutout cock to the brake valvemust be closed, the maximum main reservoirpressure maintained and brake valve handleskept in the prescribed position. In case itbecomes necessary for the leading locomotiveto give up control of the train short of thedestination of the train, a test of the brakesmust be made to see that the brakes are

operative from the automatic brake valve ofthe locomotive taking control of the train.

(b) The electro-pneumatic brake valve onall motive power units other than that whichis handling the train must be cut out, handleof brake valve kept in the prescribedposition, and air compressors kept running ifpracticable.

§ 232.16 Running Tests.

When motive power, engine crew or traincrew has been changed, angle cocks havebeen closed except for cutting off one or morecars from the rear end of train or electro-pneumatic brake circuit cables betweenpower units and/or cars have beendisconnected, running test of train air brakeson passenger train must be made, as soon asspeed of train permits, by use of automaticbrake if operating in automatic brakeoperation or by use of electro-pneumaticbrake if operating in electro-pneumatic brakeoperation. Steam or power must not be shutoff unless required and running test must bemade by applying train air brakes withsufficient force to ascertain whether or notbrakes are operating properly. If air brakes donot properly operate, train must be stopped,cause of failure ascertained and correctedand running test repeated.

§ 232.17 Freight and passenger train carbrakes

(a) Testing and repairing brakes on carswhile on shop or repair tracks. (1) When afreight car having brake equipment due forperiodic attention is on shop or repair trackswhere facilities are available for making airbrake repairs, brake equipment must be givenattention in accordance with therequirements of the currently effective AARCode of Rules for cars in interchange. Brakeequipment shall then be tested by use of asingle car testing device as prescribed by thecurrently effective AAR Code of Tests.

(2)(i) When a freight car having an air brakedefect is on a shop or repair track, brakeequipment must be tested by use of a singlecar testing device as prescribed by currentlyeffective AAR Code of Tests.

(ii) All freight cars on shop or repair tracksshall be tested to determine that the airbrakes apply and release. Piston travel on astandard body mounted brake cylinder whichis less than 7 inches or more than 9 inchesmust be adjusted to nominally 7 inches.Piston travel of brake cylinders on all freightcars equipped with other than standard

single capacity brake, must be adjusted asindicated on badge plate or stenciling on carlocated in a conspicuous place near brakecylinder. After piston travel has beenadjusted and with brakes released, sufficientbrake shoe clearance must be provided.

(iii) When a car is equipped for use inpassenger train service not due for periodicalair brake repairs, as indicated by stenciled orrecorded cleaning dates, is on shop or repairtracks, brake equipment must be tested byuse of single car testing device as prescribedby currently effective AAR Code of Tests.Piston travel of brake cylinders must beadjusted if required, to the standard travel forthat type of brake cylinder. After pistontravel has been adjusted and with brakesreleased, sufficient brake shoe clearance mustbe provided.

(iv) Before a car is released from a shop orrepair track, it must be known that brake pipeis securely clamped, angle cocks in properposition with suitable clearance, valves,reservoirs and cylinders tight on supportsand supports securely attached to car.

(b)(1) Brake equipment on cars other thanpassenger cars must be cleaned, repaired,lubricated and tested as often as required tomaintain it in a safe and suitable conditionfor service but not less frequently than asrequired by currently effective AAR Code ofRules for cars in interchange.

(2) Brake equipment on passenger carsmust be clean, repaired, lubricated and testedas often as necessary to maintain it in a safeand suitable condition for service but not lessfrequently than as required in Standard S–045 in the Manual of Standards andRecommended Practices of the AAR.

(3) Copies of the materials referred to inthis section can be obtained from theAssociation of American Railroads, 1920 LStreet, NW., Washington, DC 20036.

§ 232.19 through § 232.25 Provisionsrelated to end-of-train devices.

Not included in this Appendix as they arecontained in Subpart E of this rule.

Issued in Washington, DC, on January 4,2001.John V. Wells,Acting Administrator, Federal RailroadAdministration.[FR Doc. 01–606 Filed 1–16–01; 8:45 am]BILLING CODE 4910–06–P


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