DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE PHASE 1 – INITIAL ASSESSMENT …€¦ · 2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure consistency. Multiple Times per Day Commander

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 1 – INITIAL ASSESSMENT AND REPORTING PROCESS MAP

6.1 MODELS:1A (PROPOSED) - LOW RECORDING THRESHOLD AND LOW REPORTING THRESHOLD1B (PROPOSED) - LOW RECORDING THRESHOLD AND HIGH REPORTING THRESHOLD1C (PROPOSED) - HIGH RECORDING THRESHOLD AND HIGH REPORTING THRESHOLD

Co

mm

an

der

/L

ine

Man

ag

er

(Un

it)

De

fen

ce

As

ses

sm

en

tan

dR

ep

ort

ing

Are

a

Ch

ain

of

Co

mm

an

d

Start

5.4

Receive trigger event notification

Refer to Recording and ReportingPolicy to determine recording and

reporting requirements

Review trigger event formTrigger Event Form

Trigger Event Form

5.4

Provide input, direction or makea decision based on service

specific requirements

6.1.65.4

Co-ordinate with DefenceAssessment and Reporting Areaabout involvement in decision-making process and action as

required

5.4

Communicate with Chain ofCommand as required

6.1.5

5.4

Review trigger event form

Has the Commander / LineManager requested for

support outside the Unit orChain of Command?

Yes

6.1.6

Co-ordinate support or actionrequired from Chain of

Command

5.4

Provide ongoing feedback toUnit or Chain of Command about

external support or action

6.1.8

5.4

Use trigger form to determineappropriate level of support or

action required outside the Unitor Chain of Command

5.4

Assess whether theCommander / Line Manager’s

assessment of the trigger eventwas appropriate

6.1.7

Was the Commander / LineManager’s assessment

appropriate?No Yes

Maintain a central repository of reportsto be used for whole-of-Defence

statistical analysis, trend tracking,policy development, monitoring and

audit purposes

End

5.4

Co-ordinate support or actionfrom outside the Unit or Chain of

Command

6.1.6

5.4

Liaise with the Chain ofCommand to determine

appropriate support or actionfrom outside the Unit or Chain of

Command

No

5.4

Complete trigger event formonline or in hardcopy form if

recording threshold met(if access to the online form is

not available)

6.1.2Trigger Event Form

Does the trigger need to bereported to the Defence

Assessment and ReportingArea?

Is external support requiredto manage the event?

Is external support requiredto make the decision?

Model 1A(Everything Recorded is Reported)

- High Level of Recording- High Level Reporting

Model 1B- High Level of Recording- Low Level of Reporting

Model 1C(Everything Recorded is Reported)

- Low Level of Recording- Low Level of Reporting

5.4

Submit trigger event form toDefence Assessment and

Reporting Area and Chain ofCommand

Yes

Yes

Yes

Phase 2No

No

Phase 2No

6.1.3

6.1.4

6.1.4

B5 B7

B1

B2

6.1.1

B3

B4

B9

B6

6.1.9

B8

X.X

X.X

Detective Control

Preventative Control

Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend

Process MapConnection

X.X Control Gap

XX

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

G1

G5

G9

G7

G3

G4

G6 G8 G10

G2

5.4

Perform telephone reporting ifrequired

Recording andReporting Policy

5.4

Update record of trigger event

6.1.1 6.1 Models 1A,1B and 1C (Proposed) -

Initial Assessment and Reporting

Consistency Commander / Line Manager (Unit) refer to Recording and Reporting

Policy to determine recording and reporting requirements.

1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome.

2. Governed by lawful procedures that are simple and easy to use.

Daily Service Groups Manual Preventative



Timeliness / Consistency A standard online form is used to capture all trigger events (a hard copy

form is used if access to the online form is not available).

1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.

2. Functions effectively in the integrated environment.

Multiple Times per

Day

Commander / Line

Manager

(Unit)

Manual Preventative

6.1.3 6.1 Model 1A (Proposed) - Initial

Assessment and Reporting

Consistency All trigger events on the list of subjects are required to be recorded on

the form and submitted to the Defence Assessment and Reporting

Area.

1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome. Daily Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative

6.1.4 6.1 Model 1B and 1C (Proposed) - Initial


Consistency External support, outside the Unit, is available to assist in the

management of a trigger event.


2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure

consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Commander / Line

Manager

(Unit)

Manual Preventative



Communication The Defence Assessment and Reporting Area communicate with the

Chain of Command in the decision-making process to ensure that the

level of involvement required is obtained.



consistency.

3. Prevents potential duplication of work required in the decision-making

process.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative



Consistency The Central Assessment and Reporting are available to co-ordinate

support or action from outside the Unit or Chain of Command.

The Chain of Command are available to provide input, direction or to

assist making a decision based on service specific requirements.


2. Incorporates safeguards for individuals.


consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative



Consistency Defence Assessment and Reporting Area assess whether the

Commander's / Line Manager’s assessment of the trigger event was

appropriate.




consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative



Communication The Defence Assessment and Reporting Area provides ongoing

feedback to the Unit or Chain of Command about any external support

or action that is required.



consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative



Monitoring The Defence Assessment and Reporting Area maintain and use a

central repository of reports for whole-of-Defence statistical analysis,

trend tracking, policy development, monitoring and audit purposes.




consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Detective

Department of Defence

Initial Assessment and Reporting Process Map

Control Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process

Responsible AreaManual /

AutomatedPreventative / DetectiveRef. Sub Process Control Type Control Description Control Objective Frequency

6.1 G1 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial


Consistency The essential components for an optimal system of

inquiry, investigation and review are not reflected in the

system/model utilised by Defence.

The essential components for an optimal system

of inquiry, investigation and review are not

reflected in the system/model utilised by Defence.

Provide guidance as to how the essential components

for an optimal system of inquiry, investigation and

review can be applied to the process.

Daily Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative



Timeliness There is no specific timing for when a trigger event

form needs to be completed and submitted by the

Commander / Line Manager.

Commanders / Line Managers may not complete

the trigger event form in a timely manner.

Specify a timeframe for submission of the trigger form

within applicable policies or procedures.

Implement a detective control to identify trigger events

that have not been completed and submitted within the

specified timeframe.

Multiple Times per

Day

Commander /

Line Manager

Manual Detective



Consistency The trigger event form may not fit the purposes as

required due to the generic fields and / or language in

the form, as opposed to the information being

incorrect.

The trigger event may not be completed in a

consistent manner as the trigger event form is too

generic.

Implement a detective control to review (quality

assurance) a sample of trigger events to review the

final trigger event recorded against the initial entry

made by the Commander / Line Manager. This is to

highlight any fundamental differences between the

initial complaint and trigger event recorded that are due

to deficiencies in the form.

Multiple Times per

Day

Commander /

Line Manager

Manual Detective

6.1 G4 6.1 Model 1B and 1C (Proposed) - Initial


Consistency The threshold level for reporting a trigger event is not

treated in a consistent manner by Commanders / Line

Managers (due to the level of judgement required or

lack thereof).

Trigger events may not be treated in a consistent

manner.

Implement a detective control to review (quality

assurance) a sample of trigger events to ensure the

recording of events is completed in a consistent

manner.

Provide regular training on how to treat or apply the

threshold appropriately.

Multiple Times per

Day

Commander /

Line Manager

Manual Detective



Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the recording

and reporting of a trigger event is not communicated

throughout Defence.

The process in relation to recording and reporting

of a trigger event is not understood by APS

employees / ADF members.

Provide guidance as to how the revised model will be

communicated throughout Defence.

Daily Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative



Efficiency A single trigger event is recorded multiple times (i.e.

duplicate entries are made for the one trigger event).

The trigger event is recorded multiple times which

results in duplicate reviews and impacts data

integrity for the performance of statistical analysis

of trigger events.

Implement a detective control to identity whether

duplicate trigger events are allocated to a APS

employee / ADF member.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Detective



Monitoring There is insufficient resourcing to monitor the

mechanism in place to track, manage and / or monitor

the progress of action taken for a recorded and

reported trigger event.

The trigger event is unable to be managed or

reviewed appropriately by the relevant

stakeholder/s and impacts the timeliness of the

process.

Provide guidance as to how trigger events will be track,

managed and monitored by the appropriate

stakeholders through the web-based recording tool.

Daily Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative



Consistency There is no proper record or review process in place to

ensure that all trigger events are recorded and

reported.

All trigger events are not recorded and reported. Ensure there is a consistent understanding across

Defence in regards to the recording and reporting

requirements for trigger events, through: face to face or

on-line training.

Maintain a proper record and conduct a regular review

of the trigger event form to ensure that information

recorded and reported is relevant and complete. To

monitor this, implement a detective control to

investigate statistical anomalies in relation to the

number and type of trigger reports.

Daily Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative



Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part of

the review process are not rectified to ensure the issue

(if due to a systematic error) does not re-occur in the

future.

Lessons learnt are not reflected in an updated

process.

Implement a process which identifies how control

weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in the process,

will be rectified to prevent a re-occurrence.

Daily Defence

Assessment and

Reporting Area

Manual Preventative

Gap Risks Frequency



Responsible

Area

Manual /

Automated

Preventative /

DetectiveReference Sub Process Gap Type Gap Description Recommendations

Control Gaps - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process

Risk ID Applicable Defence Process Operational Risk Description Significance Likelihood Risk Rating

Control

Activities in

Place?

Risk

Addressed?Control Gap / Weakness

6.1 R1 6.1 Initial Assessment and Reporting

(Models 1A, 1B and 1C)

The key difference between the proposed models

(i.e. Model 1A, 1B and 1C) relates to the thresholds

applied for the level of recording and reporting

performed by the Commander / Line Manager of a

Unit.

- Under Model 1A, a low recording and reporting

threshold will mean that a greater number of trigger

event forms will require recording and reporting.

- Under Model 1B, a low recording and high reporting

threshold will mean that a greater number of trigger

event forms will require completion, however fewer

will require reporting (as compared to Model 1A).

- Under Model 1C, a high recording and reporting

threshold will mean a few number of trigger event

forms will require completion (as compared to

Models 1B and 1C) and reporting.

The model selected by Defence will depend on

variety of factors, which include: risk appetite (noting

that Model 1A represents the least risk but also

presents the greatest administration burden) and the

robustness of the data repository Defence wishes to

maintain for whole of Defence statistical analysis,

trend tracking, policy development and audit

purposes.

High

High

High

Low

Moderate

High

Moderate

Moderate

High No - - - - - NoThese risks are inherent to Models 1A, 1B and

1C.



The trigger event form is not flexible enough to cover

all possible subject matters or is unable to operate in

a range of diverse and unique environments.

High Low Moderate Yes 6.1.2 - - - - Yes N/a.



A Commander / Line Manager has not completed

and submitted a trigger event form in a timely

manner (i.e. trigger event forms are left open for an

excessive period of time).

High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No detective control is in place to ensure trigger

event forms are completed and submitted in a

timely manner.



The trigger event form is too generic (i.e. a form

submitted for a similar event does not capture

consistent information when completed by different

Commanders / Line Managers). Note: This risk does

not relate to where additional information is

discovered and then captured in the form. Rather it

highlights an event which is treated in a different

manner when handled by two different individuals -

even though the facts presented to both individuals

is exactly the same - due to the form not prompting

for the required information.

High Moderate High Yes 6.1.2 - - - - - Partially No detective control is in place to review

(quality assurance) a sample of trigger events

to review the final trigger event recorded

against the initial entry made by the

Commander / Line Manager - to highlight any

fundamental differences between the initial

complaint and trigger event recorded that are

due to deficiencies in the form.



Trigger events are not treated in a consistent

manner by Commanders / Line Managers (for events

with a similar fact pattern), with regards to the

recording and reporting of events.

High Low Moderate Yes 6.1.1 6.1.2 6.1.3 6.1.4 6.1.5 6.1.7 Partially No detective control is in place to review the

trigger events not reported to the Defence

Assessment and Reporting Area (i.e. those

marked as 'no external support required to

manage the event' or 'no external support

required to make the decision'). Note: This risk

increases as the level of reporting decreases.



Procedural documentation (Recording and Reporting

Policy) in relation to the recording and reporting of a

trigger event are not communicated throughout the

ADF.

Moderate Low Low Yes 6.1.1 6.1.5 - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to

how the documentation will be communicated

throughout the ADF.



Recording and reporting requirements for trigger

events are not easy to understand or are too

complicated to follow.

High Moderate High Yes 6.1.1 6.1.2 - - - Yes N/a.



Risk Matrix - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process

Control References


Control

Activities in

Place?

Risk





Control References



A single trigger event is recorded multiple times (i.e.

duplicate entries for the single event).

Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 6.1.2 - - - - Partially No detective control is in place to identify

duplicate trigger event entries.



Key stakeholders are unable to track and monitor

the progress of the action taken for a recorded and


High Low Moderate Yes 6.1.2 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in regards to

the monitoring functionality contained within the

web based recording tool.



All trigger events are not recorded and reported. High Moderate High Yes 6.1.2 6.1.9 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to

how the documentation will be communicated

throughout the ADF.



There is a lack of external support (outside the Unit)

to assist with the management of a trigger event.

High Low Moderate Yes 6.1.4 6.1.6 6.1.8 - - - Yes N/a.



Deficiencies identified in the online trigger form or

hard copy form are not rectified to ensure the issue

(if due to a systematic error - i.e. common user

misunderstanding of requirements) does not re-

occur in the future.

Moderate Low Low No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to

remediation action that will be taken for

deficiencies identified in the recording and

reporting of a trigger event.



A trigger event recorded via a hard copy form is not

correctly or completely captured in the subsequent

event lodged using the online tool.

Moderate Moderate Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to

who is responsible for transferring a hard copy

form to the online trigger recording and

reporting tool.



The recording and reporting of all trigger events lead

to an administrative burden on the Central

Administration and Reporting Area which could

reduce the quality of service provided to the ADF.

High High High Yes 6.1.4 6.1.5 - - - - Yes N/a.



Reporting of abuse or complaints may not be

actioned or investigated properly.

High Moderate High Yes 6.1.6 6.1.7 - - - - Partially No detective controls are in place to ensure that

trigger events are appropriately actioned. Refer

to Control Gaps G2, G3, G4, G6 and G9.



Events (including forms of abuse) may not be

reported if:

- leadership does not provide support to those who

report

- the system is ineffective and support mechanisms

do not exist, and

- leaders are not accountable / responsible for

maintaining a framework that facilitates reporting

High Moderate High Yes 6.1.6 6.1.7 - - - - Partially No clear guidance or requirements are provided

regarding:

- Communication - ensuring that APS

employees / ADF members are aware of the

framework that exists

- Training - ensuring that leadership and APS

employees / ADF members are aware of their

rights and obligations under the framework

- Support - ensuring that support mechanisms

exist and are available for APS employees /

ADF members who report.



After submission of the trigger form, Commanders/

Line managers may feel that they are absolved of

further responsibility regarding the matter.

High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No The process does detail any further

responsibility for Commander/Line Manager

after they have submitted the trigger form.

B1 6.1 Model 1A,1B,1C (Proposed) - Initial


Timeliness There is no specific timing for when a trigger event form needs

to be completed and submitted by the Commander / Line

Manager.

Specify a timeframe for submission of the trigger form within

applicable policies or procedures.

Implement a detective control to identify trigger events that

have not been completed and submitted within the specified

timeframe.

Timely recording and reporting of trigger

events.

Moderate



Consistency The trigger event form may not fit the purposes as required due

to the generic fields and / or language in the form.

Implement a detective control to review the final trigger event

recorded against the initial entry made by the Commander /

Line Manager. This is to highlight any fundamental differences

between the initial complaint and trigger event recorded that

are due to restrictions in the form.

Consistent recording of trigger events. Moderate



Consistency The threshold level for reporting a trigger event is not treated in

a consistent manner by Commanders / Line Managers (due to

the level of judgement required or lack thereof).

Implement a detective control to review (quality assurance) a

sample of trigger events to ensure the recording of events is

completed in a consistent manner.

Provide regular training on how to treat or apply the threshold

appropriately.

Compliance with internal guidelines. Moderate



Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the recording and

reporting of a trigger event is not communicated throughout the

ADF.


communicated throughout the ADF.

Consistent understanding throughout the ADF. Quick Win



Efficiency A single trigger event is recorded multiple times (i.e. duplicate

entries are made for the one trigger event).

Implement a detective control to identity whether duplicate

trigger events are allocated to a APS employee / ADF

member.

Efficiency in review of action process. Moderate



Monitoring There is no monitoring mechanism in place to track, manage

and / or monitor the progress of action taken for a recorded and


Provide guidance as to how trigger events will be track,

managed and monitored by the appropriate stakeholders

through the web-based recording tool.

Improved monitoring of recorded and reporting

trigger events.

Significant



Communication There is no proper record or review process in place to ensure

that all trigger events are recorded and reported.

Ensure there is a consistent understanding across the ADF in

regards to the recording and reporting requirements for trigger

events, through: face to face or on-line training.

Maintain a proper record and conduct a regular review of the

trigger event form to ensure that information recorded and

reported is relevant and complete. To monitor this, implement

a detective control to investigate statistical anomalies in

relation to the number and type of trigger reports.

Compliance with internal guidelines. Moderate



Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part of the

review process are not rectified to ensure the issue (if due to a

systematic error) does not re-occur in the future.

Implement a process which identifies how control weaknesses

or deficiencies identified, in the process, will be rectified to

prevent a re-occurrence.

Remediation of systematic errors. Moderate



Consistency Trigger events recorded in hard copy are not correctly or

completely captured in the subsequent event lodged using the

online tool.

Provide guidance in relation to the individuals responsible for

transferring the information from a hard copy form to the online

trigger recording and reporting tool.

Provide regular training to reduce the number of inappropriate

decisions being made by the Unit.

Consistent recording of trigger events. Quick Win



Reference Sub Process Improvement Type Current Situation Improvement Description Improvement BenefitsLevel of Investment

(Significant, Moderate, Quick Win)

Business Improvements - Inquiry, Investigation and Review Process

Control Type DescriptionCommunication Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through verbal or written communication.Timeliness Control assists to facilitate timely decision making.Approved Delegate Control is required to operated by an authorised individual.Consistency Control incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure consistency.Transparency Control assists to provide transparency in processes and outcomes through an external review process.

Gap Type DescriptionMonitoring A gap in the process as no monitoring or review activity is performed over the process.Communication A gap in the process as there may be a lack in the transparency of processes and outcomes.Efficiency A gap in the process which may assist to provide efficiencies in the process.Restricted Access A gap in the process which does not safeguard sensitive information.Timeliness A gap in the process which does not facilitate timely decision making.Re-performance A gap in the process which does not allow a decision to be supported at a subsequent point in time.

Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentCONTROL and GAP TYPE GLOSSARY

High Moderate Low

High High High Moderate

Moderate High Moderate Low

Low Moderate Low Low

Significance

Likelihood

Department of Defence Control & Risk AssessmentRISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 2 – FACT FINDING (NON-STATUTORY) PROCESS MAP

7.1 FACT FINDING PROCESS

Gro

up

/S

erv

ice

(In

clu

de

sC

ha

ino

fC

om

ma

nd

)

Defe

nc

eIn

ve

sti

gati

on

Are

a

5.4

Receive trigger event notification

5.4

Refer to policy documents forguidance on various ways to

collect information to commencefact finding process

7.1.1

Fact FindingGuidance

5.4

Identify decision-makers to beinvolved in the information

gathering process, includingdecision-makers outside the

Group / Service

Is advice from the DefenceInvestigation Area

required?

7.1.4

Complete fact finding task withinthe Group / Service (with the

assistance of the Chain ofCommand)

No

5.4

Request support from DefenceInvestigation Area

Yes

5.4

Co-ordinate with decision-makers to identify information,resourcing requirements and

priorities

7.1.5

5.4

Co-ordinate with the DefenceInvestigation Area (to complete

the fact finding process)

7.1.7

5.4

Consider Defence priorities andresource constraints

5.4

Co-ordinate with decision-makers to identify information

requirements and priorities

5.4

Consider Defence priorities andresource constraints

5.4

Co-ordinate provision ofprofessional investigators

Yes

No

FC 7.2Model

2A

FC 7.2Model

2B

FC 7.2Model

2C

5.4

Update record of trigger event

Is there sufficient expertisewithin the Group / Serviceto conduct fact finding for

decision?

Yes

5.4

Identify the informationrequirements of decision-makers

5.4

Conduct internal investigation ofservice-related death

5.4

Report service-related deathinvestigation to an external

agency

FC 7.3ServiceRelatedDeaths

5.4

Report to decision-maker onoutcome of investigation

Fact FindingOutcome

5.4

Report to decision-maker onoutcome of investigation

FC 8.1

FC 8.1

No

FC 7.2Model

2A

FC 7.2Model

2B

FC 7.2Model

2C

7.1.2

7.1.3

Can the decision be madewithin the Group / Service

Yes

Should a professionalinvestigator be appointed?(with input from Chain of

Command)

7.1.6

5.4

Refer matter back to originatingGroup / Service and

communicate reasons for themto conduct further fact finding

with their own resources

7.1.2

B1

B2

B3

B4

B5

B6

B7

B8

X.X

X.X

Detective Control

PreventativeControl

Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

X.X

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

G3

G1

G4

G2

G3

G7 G8

Start

G9

I1

I1

Start(ServiceRelatedDeath)

5.4

Report death to DefenceInvestigation Area (and DefenceAssessment and Reporting Area)

Internal External

No


7.2 MODELS:2A (PROPOSED) – SINGLE INVESTIGATOR POOL2B (PROPOSED) – MULTIPLE INVESTIGATOR POOLS2C (PROPOSED) – HYBRID

Defe

nc

eIn

ve

sti

ga

tio

nA

rea

CIA

’sS

ing

leP

oo

lo

fIn

ve

sti

ga

tors

Se

rvic

eP

oli

ce

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

MODEL 2ASingle Investigator Pool

MODEL 2BMultiple Investigator Pools

MODEL 2CHybrid

5.4

Determine whether the purposeof the investigation is ‘human’,

‘system’ or both

5.4

Select an appropriateinvestigator(s) based on thepurpose of the investigation

7.2.1

Mu

ltip

leS

pe

cia

lis

tIn

ves

tig

ati

on

Are

as

5.4

Team of investigators withrelevant expertise based onDefence Investigation Area’s

needs is selected

7.2.2

5.4

Co-ordinate this selection fromthe Defence Investigation Area’s

single pool of investigators

5.4

Provide resources (i.e.Investigator) to decision-makerto investigate the trigger event

5.4

Make an authoritative decisionon the primary focus and priority

of the investigation

5.4

Prepare report for decision-maker based on outcome of fact

finding investigation

5.4

Review own resources andpriorities to address the requestfrom Defence Investigation Area

5.4

Co-ordinate with DefenceInvestigation Area to provide

Professional Investigators

7.2.6

5.4

Ensure that appropriateinformation is collected for

sharing with the Specialist Areas

5.4

Co-ordinate Defence’sprofessional investigative

capability with Specialist Areas

7.2.6

Trigger EventInformation

5.4

Ensure ProfessionalInvestigators have received

appropriate training andeducation

7.2.4

5.4



5.4

Select appropriate ProfessionalInvestigators at the Specialist

Area’s discretion

7.2.3

5.4

Determine whether the purposeof the investigation is ‘human’ or

‘system’, or both

5.4

Select an appropriateinvestigator(s) based on thepurpose of the investigation

7.2.1

5.4

Co-ordinate with Provost MarshalADF to ensure Service Police haveappropriate training and capacity to

perform the investigation

7.2.4

Is the nature of theinvestigation a low-level

DFDA offence?No

Yes

5.4

Working together with SpecialistAreas, provide Professional

Investigators to decision-makerto investigate the trigger event

5.4

Co-ordinate this selection fromthe Defence Investigation Area’s

single pool of investigators

5.4

Provide investigators to decision-maker to investigate the trigger

event

5.4

Team of investigators withrelevant expertise based onDefence Investigation Area’s

needs is selected

7.2.2 5.4



5.4

Conduct low-level investigations

Trigger EventInformation

5.4



FC 7.1Fact

Finding

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

Are investigators availableto conduct low-level

investigation?

Yes

5.4

Refer back to DefenceInvestigation Area

No

7.2.5

7.2.5

B3

B 3

B3B7

B7

B7

B8

B8

B8

B9

B9

B9

X.X

X.X

Detective Control


Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

XX

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

G8G7

G3

G3

G7 G8

G3

G8

G7

G11

B11

B10B10

B10

G10

G10

G10

G6

G5


7.3 SERVICE-RELATED DEATHS

De

fen

ce

Ex

tern

al

Inte

gri

tyA

ge

nc

y

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

5.4

Review initial assessment ofservice-related death

Conduct an independentinquiry about the death?

5.4

Consult with deceased next ofkin

5.4

Refer to any internal Defencefact finding or other external

investigation already performed

7.3.1 5.4

Make a decision whether theinquiry should be conducted in

public or in private

5.4

Conduct independentinvestigation into the death

7.3.4

Yes

5.4

Protect classified information ifrequired

7.3.3

5.4

Make recommendations basedon investigation

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

No

Is a Coronial inquiry and/orComcare investigation

being conducted?No

5.4

Co-ordinate investigation withComcare and/or State / Territory

Coroner

Yes

FC 7.1Fact

Finding

7.3.2

X.X

X.X

Detective Control


Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

XX

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

7.1.1 7.1 Fact Finding Process Communication &

Consistency

Policy documents provide guidance on the manner in which

information will be collected during the fact finding process.



Daily Group / Service Manual Preventative

7.1.2 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency The required expertise is identified and obtained to assist in the fact

finding process.

1. Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Multiple Times per

Day

Group / Service

and Chain of

Command

Manual Preventative

7.1.3 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency External support is available from the Defence Investigation Area to

assist the Group / Service.


consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Group / Service Manual Preventative

7.1.4 7.1 Fact Finding Process Coordination A coordinated process is adopted to complete the fact finding

process.


consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Group / Service

and Chain of

Command and

Defence

Investigation Area

Manual Preventative

7.1.5 7.1 Fact Finding Process Coordination The Defence Investigation Area co-ordinates with decision-makers

to identify information and resourcing requirements and priorities.



consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Investigation Area

Manual Preventative

7.1.6 7.1 Fact Finding Process Coordination Defence Investigation Area and Chain of Command work together

and determine whether a professional investigator is required.

1. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced

system.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Investigation Area

and Chain of

Command

Manual Preventative

7.1.7 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring The Service Group / Unit or Chain of Command co-ordinate with the

Defence Investigation Area to complete the fact finding process.



consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Chain of Command Manual Preventative

7.2.1 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Consistency The Defence Investigation Area selects an appropriate investigator

based on the purpose / scope of the investigation.


Day

Defence

Investigation Area

Manual Preventative

7.2.2 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Consistency A pool of professional investigators are maintained to ensure the

fact finding process is completed by knowledgeable experts.


Day

CIA's Single Pool

of Investigators

Manual Preventative

7.2.3 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Consistency Ensure that appropriate investigators are selected to meet the

purpose / scope of the investigation.


Day

Multiple Specialist

Investigation Areas

Manual Preventative

7.2.4 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Consistency The Defence Investigation Area ensures that the professional

investigators have received appropriate training and education and

have maintained their knowledge up-to-date.

Specifically in the Hybrid Model (Model 2C), this is co-ordinated with

the Provost Marshal ADF to ensure Service Police training required

for investigation is received.


Day

Defence

Investigation Area

Manual Preventative

7.2.5 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Monitoring Service Police determine whether there are investigators available

to conduct low-level investigation.

1. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced

system.

Multiple Times per

Day

Service Police Manual Preventative

7.2.6 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) Communication The Defence Investigation Area communicates with Defence's

specialist professional investigator pools to select the appropriate

type of investigator required.



consistency.

3. Prevents potential duplication of work required in the decision-

making process.

Multiple Times per

Day

Defence

Investigation Area

Manual Preventative

7.3.1 7.3 Service Related Deaths Efficiency Any internal Defence or external investigation fact finding already

conducted is utilised in the Defence External Integrity Agency's

review.



consistency.

3. Prevents potential duplication of work required in the decision-

making process.

As required Defence External

Integrity Agency

Manual Preventative

7.3.2 7.3 Service Related Deaths Transparency The Defence External Integrity Agency determines if an independent

inquiry about the death is required.

1. Provides transparency in processes and outcomes. As required Defence External

Integrity Agency

Manual Preventative

7.3.3 7.3 Service Related Deaths Confidentiality & Privacy Classified information relating to the service-related death is

protected if required.

1. Incorporates safeguards for individuals. As required Defence External

Integrity Agency

Manual Preventative

7.1 Fact Finding Process

7.2 Models for Fact Finding

7.3 Service Related Deaths


Fact Finding Process Map









7.3.4 7.3 Service Related Deaths Consistency External support, outside the Defence Investigation Area is available

to assist in the management of service-related deaths.



consistency.

As required Defence External

Integrity Agency

Manual Preventative

7.1 G1 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The essential components for an optimal system ofinquiry, investigation and review are not reflected in thesystem/model utilised by the ADF.

The essential components for an optimal systemof inquiry, investigation and review are notreflected in the system/model utilised by the ADF.

Provide guidance as to how the essential componentsfor an optimal system of inquiry, investigation andreview can be applied to the process.

Annual DefenceInvestigation Area

Manual Preventative

7.1 G2 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency The roles and responsibilities between the areas arenot sufficiently defined.

A lack of defined roles and responsibilitiesincreases the risk of poor management of the factfinding process, information not being distributedor captured and reduced level of accountability ofstaff.

Provide guidance on factors which should be consideredwhen overall responsibility for the process needs to bedetermined (for example, when decisions need to bemade by the Group / Service with assistance of theChain of Command).

Annual Group / Service Manual Preventative

7.1 G3 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The guidance provided in policy documents is notflexible and does not allow for judgement.

A lack of flexibility (e.g. minor events require sameprocess as major events) may causeadministrative burdens and delays in the factfinding process.

Provide guidance which is tailored to the risk of theevent (as opposed to a process which designed to be aone size fits all). If the event is rated as a high risk thana more detailed and prescriptive process should befollowed. However, if the event is determined as low riskthan less prescriptive process is required.


Manual Preventative

7.1 G4 7.1 Fact Finding Process

7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) -Models A, B and C

Restricted Access The documentation obtained during the fact findingprocess is not maintained as confidential.

Information which is not secured confidentiallymay have wider ramifications across the ADF,such as loss of confidence in the system andreputational risk for the ADF.

Provide guidance as to how documentation is securedfrom unauthorised access.


Manual /Automated

Preventative

7.1 G5 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency The Group / Service does not have the expertise toconduct the fact finding activities.

Without experienced individuals performing thefact finding activities, there is a risk that activitieshave not been performed in a competent andconsistent manner which could have widerramifications across the ADF, such as loss ofconfidence in the system and reputational risk forthe ADF.

Implement a detective control for the DefenceInvestigation Area to review the fact finding activitiesperformed by the Group / Service (Unit) and monitorthis.

Monthly DefenceInvestigation Area

Manual Detective

7.1 G6 7.1 Fact Finding Process Communication The Defence Investigation Area is unable to influencethe allocation of resources adequately or direct thefocus of an investigation.

Without allocating sufficient resources and / orlack of direction during the fact finding process,Commanders / Line Managers might be inclinednot to refer matters to the Defence InvestigationArea.

Provide guidance on quality assurance / performancereviews in the Defence Investigation Area to ensure it isaccountable and capable to deliver its required services.

Multiple Times perDay

DefenceInvestigation Area

Manual Detective

7.1 G7 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The Defence Investigation Area may have a lack ofcontrol over the allocation of resources.

Areas of the highest organisational priority are notbeing targeted and therefore making the processinefficient and ineffective.

Provide guidance as to how the Defence InvestigationArea will liaise with the relevant Specialist InvestigationArea.


/ SpecialistInvestigation Area

Manual Preventative

7.1 G8 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The prioritising of resources by the DefenceInvestigation Area do not align with the type of eventand or operational expectations.

Areas of the highest organisational priority are notbeing targeted and therefore making the processinefficient and ineffective.

Provide guidance on a prioritising model which is flexibleenough for allocating investigative resources to thegreatest areas of concern / organisational risk.


Manual Preventative



Monitoring Inconsistent distribution of investigators betweendifferent types of investigations.

Inconsistent distribution of resources could havewider ramifications across Defence, such as: lossof confidence in the system and reputational riskfor Defence.

Implement detective controls to reviewing the allocationof investigators between ADF and APS focusedinvestigations.

Multiple Times perDay

DefenceInvestigation Area

Manual Detective



Monitoring Investigators do not have required expertise to conductthe fact finding process.

Without experienced individuals performing thefact finding activities, there is a risk that activitieshave not been performed in a competent andconsistent manner which could have widerramifications across the ADF, such as loss ofconfidence in the system and reputational risk forthe ADF.

Implement detective controls, promote quality assurance/ performance of investigators and establish trainingprograms for investigators to address any performancegaps.


Manual Detective

7.1 G11 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring &Consistency

There is no proper record or review process in place toensure that all trigger events are recorded and reported.

All trigger events are not recorded and reported. Ensure there is a consistent understanding across theADF in regards to the recording and reportingrequirements for trigger events, through: face to face oron-line training.

Maintain a proper record and conduct a regular reviewof the trigger event form to ensure that informationrecorded and reported is relevant and complete.

Annual Group / Service Manual Detective

7.2 G11 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) -Models A, B and C

Efficiency & Consistency The geographic distribution and deployment ofprofessional investigators may not be as cost effectiveas compared to other arrangements such as appointinginternal inquiry officers.

Without guidance, there could be an inefficientallocation of resources and delay in thecommencement of the fact finding process in thesearch for an appropriate investigator that may notbe easily accessible due to geographicdistribution.

Provide guidance in relation to the fact findingprocesses for circumstances where investigators frommultiple specialist investigation areas cannot becontacted or are not available for the DefenceInvestigation Area's needs.


Manual Preventative

7.2 G12 7.2 Models for Fact Finding (Proposed) -Models A, B and C

Consistency There are no thresholds or guidelines in place for anauthoritative decision to be made on the investigation'sprimary focus and priority.

There is no consistency in what investigator will bechosen for fact finding if there are no commonguidelines to prioritise and categorise its focus andimportance.

Provide thresholds or guidance in relation to the primaryfocus and priority of the investigation.


Manual Preventative

7.1 Fact Finding Process


Gap Risks Frequency



Responsible

Area

Manual /

Automated

Preventative /




Control

Activities in

Place?

Risk


7.1 R1 7.1 Fact Finding The essential components for an optimal system of

inquiry, investigation and review are not reflected in the

system/model utilised by the ADF.

High Low Moderate Yes All All All All All All Partially This risk is driven by the ability of the existing

control environment to address all identified

operation risks.

7.1 R2 7.1 Fact Finding Fact finding activities are not performed within the

Australian legislative framework.

High Low Moderate Yes 7.1.1 - - - - - Yes N/a

7.1 R3 7.1 Fact Finding The roles and responsibilities between the areas are not

sufficiently defined and as a result causes issues such

as poor management, information not being distributed

or captured and a low level accountability of staff.

High Moderate High No - - - - - - No Guidance should be provided in relation to the

management of fact finding processes (when all

three areas have been engaged in the process).

7.1 R4 7.1 Fact Finding The guidance provided in policy documents is not flexible

and does not allow for any level of judgement (e.g. minor

events require same process as major events) which

causes an administrative burden and delays in the fact

finding process.

High Moderate High Yes 7.1.1 - - - - - Partially Guidance should be provided to demonstrate the

flexibility of policy documentation to facilitate

various fact finding processes.

7.1 R5 7.1 Fact Finding The documentation obtained during the fact finding

process is not maintained as confidential.

High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to how

the information obtained during the fact finding

process will be maintained in a confidential

manner.

7.1 R6 7.1 Fact Finding The Group / Service does not have the expertise to

conduct the fact finding activities.

High Moderate High Yes 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.4 7.1.5 - - Partially No detective control is in place to review the fact

finding activities performed by the Group /

Service (Unit).

7.1 R7 7.1 Fact Finding The Defence Investigation Area is unable to influence the

allocation of resources or direct the focus of an

investigation.

High Low Moderate Yes 7.1.6 7.1.7 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to any

quality assurance / performance reviews on the

Defence Investigation Area to ensure that it is

accountable and capable to deliver its required

services.

7.1 R8 7.1 Fact Finding The prioritising of resources by the Defence Investigation

Area do not align with the type of event and / or

operational expectations.

High Moderate High Yes 7.1.6 7.1.7 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to how

the events will be prioritised and linked to

operational expectations.

7.1 R9 7.1 Fact Finding Inconsistent distribution of investigators between ADF

and APS focused investigations.

High Low Moderate Yes 7.1.6 - - - - - Partially No detective controls are in place to review the

allocation of investigators between ADF and APS

focused investigations.

7.1 R10 7.1 Fact Finding Investigators do not have required expertise to conduct

the fact finding process.

High Moderate High Yes 7.1.6 - - - - - Partially No detective controls are in place for quality

assurance / performance of investigators.

7.1 R11 7.1 Fact Finding External support is not available to the Group / Service

unit from the Defence Investigation Area.

High Low Moderate Yes 7.1.2 7.1.3 7.1.5 7.1.7 - - Yes N/a

7.2 R1 7.2 Models for Fact Finding

(Proposed) - Model 2A

Fact finding activities are not performed within the





Investigators do not have required expertise to conduct


High Moderate High Yes 7.2.1 7.2.2 - - - - Yes N/a



The geographic distribution and deployment of

professional investigators may not be as cost effective

as compared to other arrangements.

High Moderate Moderate Yes 7.2.1 7.2.2 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to the

fact finding processes in deployed environments.



The documentation obtained during the fact finding


High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided associated to

how the information obtained during the fact

finding process will be maintained in a

confidential manner.



Defence priorities are not considered in the fact finding

process.




Resource constraints do not allow for all investigations to

be carried out in a timely manner (i.e. as both low-level

and high-level offences are investigated by professional

investigators).

High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No This is a risk inherent to Model 2A.


(Proposed) - Model 2B








High Moderate High Yes 7.2.4 7.2.6 - - - - Yes N/a






High Moderate Moderate Yes 7.2.3 - - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to the













process.

High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.3 - - - - - Partially Defence priorities may not considered in the

assignment of investigators as they are selected

at the discretion of the Specialist Investigation

Area.






investigators).

High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No This is a risk inherent to Model 2B.


(Proposed) - Model 2C



High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.1 7.2.4 - - - - Yes N/a





High Moderate High Yes 7.2.1 7.2.2 7.2.4 - - - Yes N/a






High Moderate Moderate Yes 7.2.1 7.2.2 - - - - Partially No guidance has been provided in relation to the













process.







investigators).

High Low Moderate Yes 7.2.4 7.2.5 - - - - Yes N/a

7.3 R1 7.3 Service Related Deaths The internal review of a service related death is not

conducted appropriately.


7.3 R2 7.3 Service Related Deaths The external inquiry does not leverage on the information

gained during the fact finding process.


7.2 Models for Fact Finding - Model 2A (Proposed)

7.3 Service Related Deaths




Control References

7.1 Fact Finding

7.2 Models for Fact Finding - Model 2B (Proposed)

7.2 Models for Fact Finding - Model 2C (Proposed)

B1 7.1 Fact Finding Process Communication The roles and responsibilities between the areas are

not sufficiently defined.

Provide guidance on factors which should be considered

when overall responsibility for the process needs to be

determined (for example, when decisions need to be made by

the Group / Service with assistance of the Chain of

Command).

Consistent understanding throughout

the ADF.

Quick Win

B2 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The guidance provided in policy documents is not

flexible and does not allow for judgement.

Provide guidance which is tailored to the risk of the event (as

opposed to a process which designed to be a one size fits all).

If the event is rated as a high risk than a more detailed and

prescriptive process should be followed. However, if the event

is determined as low risk than less prescriptive process is

required.

Reduces administrative burden. Moderate

B3 7.1 Fact Finding Process


(Proposed) - Model A, B

and C

Restricted Access The documentation obtained during the fact finding


Provide guidance as to how documentation is secured from

unauthorised access.

Maintains confidentiality over sensitive

information.

Quick Win

B4 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring The Group / Service does not have the expertise to

conduct the fact finding activities.

Implement a detective control to review the fact finding

activities performed by the Group / Service (Unit).

Consistent outcomes are achieved

from the fact finding process.

Moderate

B5 7.1 Fact Finding Process Consistency The Defence Investigation Area is unable to influence

the allocation of resources or direct the focus of an

investigation.

Provide guidance on quality assurance / performance reviews

in the Defence Investigation Area to ensure it is accountable

and capable to deliver its required services.

Consistent understanding throughout

the ADF.

Moderate

B6 7.1 Fact Finding Process Efficiency The prioritising of resources by the Defence

Investigation Area do not align with the type of event

and or operational expectations.

Provide guidance on a prioritising model which is flexible

enough for allocating investigative resources to the greatest

areas of concern / organisational risk.

Ensures the process is as efficient as

possible.

Moderate

B7 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring Inconsistent distribution of investigators between ADF

and APS focused investigations.

Implement detective controls to reviewing the allocation of

investigators between ADF and APS focused investigations.

Consistent and timely outcomes are

achieved from the fact finding process.

Moderate

B8 7.1 Fact Finding Process Monitoring Investigators do not have required expertise to

conduct the fact finding process.

Implement detective controls, promote quality assurance /

performance of investigators and establish training programs

for investigators to address any performance gaps.



Moderate

B9 7.2 Models for Fact Finding


and C

Efficiency There is no proper record or review process in place

to ensure that all trigger events are recorded and

reported.

Ensure there is a consistent understanding across the ADF in

regards to the recording and reporting requirements for trigger

events, through: face to face or on-line training.

Maintain a proper record and conduct a regular review of the

trigger event form to ensure that information recorded and

reported is relevant and complete.



Moderate



and C

Efficiency & Consistency The geographic distribution and deployment of



Provide guidance in relation to the fact finding processes for

deployed environments.

Efficiencies in allocation of resources

and commencement of the fact finding

process.

Moderate



and C

Consistency There are no thresholds or guidelines in place for an

authoritative decision to be made on the

investigation's primary focus and priority.

Provide thresholds or guidance in relation to the primary focus

and priority of the investigation.



Moderate









High Moderate Low





Significance

Likelihood

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 3 – REVIEW OF ACTION PROCESS MAP

8.1 ADF INTERNAL REVIEW PROCESS

Ori

gin

al

Dec

isio

n-

Ma

ke

r

Co

mm

an

din

gO

ffic

er

AD

FM

em

be

r

Start

5.4

Notify decision to ADF member

8.1.1

Decision Reasons provided indecision?

5.4

Submit review application form toCommanding Officer within 90

days of original decision, or otherspecified time-frame

8.1.2

Yes

5.4

Request reasons for decisionNo

5.4

Provide ADF member withreasons for decision

Reason for Decision

SupportingDocumentation

5.4

Commanding Officer reviewsapplication (within 14 days)

8.1.3

5.4

Notify ADF member

Does the CommandingOfficer (or their

subordinate) change thedecision?

Review ApplicationForm

5.4

Complete application form toindicate decision is not

supported

Does the CommandingOfficer Support the

Application?

No

5.4

Complete application form toindicate application is supported

Yes

Yes

No

No

5.4

Submit application form to theInternal Review area

8.1.4

Model3A

Model3B

Model3C

5.4

Application received byCommanding Officer

Was the CommandingOfficer (or their

subordinate) the originaldecision maker?

Yes

Does the ADF memberdecide to have the original

decision reviewed?

Yes

No End

Reason for Decision

SupportingDocumentation

Review ApplicationForm (Authorised byCommanding Officer)

G7

G1 G2 G3

G4 G5

G6

G7

B1

B2

B3

B4

B5

B6

B6

X.X

X.X

Detective Control


Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

XX

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

End

FC 8.1


8.2 MODEL 3A (PROPOSED) – SINGLE INTERNAL REVIEW AREA

Inte

rnal

Rev

iew

Are

a

Serv

ice

or

Oth

er

De

fen

ce

Dele

gate

Does Internal Review areahave delegation to re-make

the decision?

5.4

Refer application form to Serviceor Other Defence Delegate

Should original decision beamended?

5.4

Amend original decisionYes

5.4

Notify member, CommandingOfficer, original decision-maker

and Internal Review area ofoutcome

8.2.10

Amended Decision

5.4

Notify member, CommandingOfficer, original decision-maker

and Internal Review area ofoutcome, if required, advise

member of external review rights

8.2.9

No

Non-AmendedDecision

End

Should application beimmediately rejected due to

discretionary reasons?

5.4

Advise Commanding Officer andADF member of decision, ifrequired, advise member of

external review rights

8.2.7

Yes

Internal ReviewDecision End

No

5.4

Begin assessment(within 28 days)

8.2.4Yes

Amend original decision?

5.4

Amend original decision

5.4

Notify member, CommandingOfficer and original decision-

maker of outcome

8.2.6

Amended InternalReview Decision

5.4


maker of outcome, if required,advise member of external

review rights

8.2.5

Non-AmendedInternal Review

Decision End

5.4

Review application (APSemployees are reviewed under

Sec 33 Public Service Act 1999)

5.4

Gather extra information

Is further informationrequired?

No

Yes

5.4

Internal Review area receivesthe application

5.4

Internal Review area todetermine if the decision should

be reviewed(within 7 days)

8.2.2

5.4

Delegate’s area to consider theapplication

8.2.8

8.2.1 8.2.3

No

G1

G2

G2

G3

G4G4

G4

G5

G6

G6

G6

G6 G7

G7

G7

G7

G8 G9

B2

B5

B7

B9

B9

B4

B8

B6

B1

B4

X.X

X.X

Detective Control


Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

XX

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

G10

G11

G11

G11

Yes

No


No

5.4


Yes


8.3 MODEL 3B (PROPOSED) – MULTIPLE INTERNAL REVIEW AREAS

Inte

rnal

Rev

iew

Are

a-

Arm

y

FC 8.1Should application be

immediately rejected due todiscretionary reasons?

5.4



8.3.7

Yes

Rejected InternalReview (Army)

Decision End

No

5.4

Begin assessment and reviewapplication

(within 28 days)

8.3.4


5.4


5.4

Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer and original

decision-maker of outcome

8.3.6

Amended InternalReview (Army)

Decision

5.4


decision-maker of outcome, ifrequired, advise member of


8.3.5

Non-AmendedInternal Review(Army) Decision

End

Yes


B2

B5 B7

B8

B4B1

B9

8.3.1 5.4



8.3.2

No

Refer to alternate Defencedelegate

Inte

rna

lR

evie

wA

rea

–A

irF

orc

e


the decision?Yes No

8.3.3

B4 B6

X.X

X.X

Detective Control

PreventativeControl

Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

X.X

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

G6 G7 G11

G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10 G4 G2 G2

G4

G6 G7 G11

G4

G6

G11

End


No

5.4


Yes



5.4



8.3.7

Yes


Decision End

No

5.4


(within 28 days)

8.3.4


5.4


5.4



8.3.6


Decision

5.4




8.3.5


End

Yes


B2

B5 B7

B8

B1

B9

8.3.1 5.4



8.3.2

No



the decision?Yes No

8.3.3

B4 B6

G6 G7 G11

G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10 G4 G2 G2

G4

G6 G7 G11

G4

G6

G11

End


No

5.4


Yes

B4


8.3 MODEL 3B (PROPOSED) – MULTIPLE INTERNAL REVIEW AREAS

Inte

rna

lR

evie

wA

rea

–N

av

y

Inte

rna

lR

ev

iew

Are

a–

AP

S



5.4



8.3.7

Yes


Decision End

No

5.4


(within 28 days)

8.3.4


5.4


5.4



8.3.6


Decision

5.4




8.3.5


End

Yes


B2

B5 B7

B8

B1

B9

8.3.1 5.4



8.3.2

No



the decision?Yes No

8.3.3

B4 B6

G6 G7 G11

G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10 G4 G2 G2

G4

G6 G7 G11

G4

G6

G11

End


No

5.4


Yes

B4



5.4



8.3.7

Yes


Decision End

No

5.4


(within 28 days)

8.3.4


5.4


5.4



8.3.6


Decision

5.4




8.3.5


End

Yes


B2

B5 B7

B8

B1

B9

8.3.1 5.4



8.3.2

No



the decision?Yes No

8.3.3

B4 B6

G6 G7 G11

G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10 G4 G2 G2

G4

G6 G7 G11

G4

G6

G11

End


No

5.4


Yes

B4

X.X

X.X

Detective Control

PreventativeControl

Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

X.X

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

FC 8.1


8.4 MODEL 3C (PROPOSED) – INSPECTOR GENERAL ADF INTERNAL REVIEW AREA

Inte

rnal

Re

vie

wA

rea

-A

PS

Serv

ice

Ch

ief

Dele

gate

s(A

rmy

,A

irF

orc

ean

dN

av

y)

Ins

pec

tor

Ge

nera

lA

DF

Should application beimmediately rejected due to

discretionary reasons?

5.4

Advise Commanding Officer andAPS employee of decision, ifrequired, advise employee of


8.4.7

Yes

Rejected InternalReview (APS)

Decision End

No Amend original decision?

5.4


5.4

Notify employee, CommandingOfficer and original decision-

maker of outcome

8.4.6

Amended InternalReview (APS)

Decision

5.4

Notify employee, CommandingOfficer and original decision-maker, and if required, adviseemployee of external review

rights

8.4.5

Non-AmendedInternal Review(APS) Decision

End

5.4

Begin assessment and reviewapplication under Sec 33 Public

Service Act 1999(within 28 days)

8.4.4

Yes

No

FC 8.1 Should application beimmediately rejected due to

exception rules?

5.4



8.4.12

Yes

Rejected InspectorGeneral ADF

Decision End

No

5.4

Recommend to Service Chiefsthat decision should be re-made

8.4.11

Recommend amendmentto original decision?

Yes

Should original decision beamended?

5.4


5.4

Notify ADF member,Commanding Officer, originaldecision-maker and Inspector

General ADF of outcome

8.4.15

Amended ServiceChief Delegates’

Decision

5.4

Notify ADF member, CommandingOfficer, original decision-maker andInspector General ADF of outcome,

if required, advise member ofexternal review rights

8.4.14

No

Non-AmendedService Chief

Delegates’ Decision

End


5.4



8.4.2

Refer application form to externalagency for review


the decision?

No

Phase 4

Yes

Inspector General receives theapplication

5.4

Inspector General to determine ifthe decision should be reviewed

8.4.9

No

5.4


maker, if required, advisemember of external review rights

8.4.10

Non-AmendedInspector General

ADF Decision

5.4

Service Chief to consider theapplication and the

recommendation provided by theInspector General ADF

8.4.13

8.4.1

8.4.8

B4

B9

B4

B9

B4 B9

B4

B1

B1

B2 B5 B7 B8

B2 B5 B7 B8

End

8.4.3

B6

X.X

X.X

Detective Control


Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

XX

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

G1 G3 G5 G8 G9 G10

G3 G5 G8 G9 G10

G4 G2

G4 G2G1

G4

G2

G2G1

G6 G7 G11

G6 G7 G11

G6 G7 G11

G6 G7 G11

G6 G7 G11

G2G1

G6 G7 G11

8.1.1 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Communication The original decision maker to notify the ADF member of the decision. 1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making.

2. Provides transparency in processes and outcomes.

Multiple Times per

Day

Original Decision

Maker

Manual Preventative

8.1.2 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Timeliness ADF member is required to submit the review application form to their

Commanding Officer within a 90 day period of when the original

decision was made.


2. Delivers cost-effective outcomes in an adequately resourced system.

Multiple Times per

Day

ADF Member Manual Preventative

8.1.3 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Timeliness Commanding Officer has 14 days to review the application. 1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per

Day

Commanding

Officer

Manual Preventative

8.1.4 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Communication Commanding Officer to submit application form to Internal Review

area.




Multiple Times per

Day

Commanding

Officer

Manual Preventative

8.2.1 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single

Internal Review Area

Communication Internal Review area to determine whether the application is to be

immediately rejected due to discretionary reasons (which are

documented).




Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative



Timeliness Internal review of the decision to be completed within a specific

timeframe (7 days).

1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative



Approved Delegate The review of action is sent to an authorised delegate to conduct the

review and communicate the outcome.

1. Functions effectively in the integrated environment. Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative



Timeliness Internal Review area to perform assessment within a designated

timeframe (28 days).


Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative



Communication Internal Review area to notify ADF member, Commanding Officer and

original decision-maker area of outcome.



consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative



Communication Internal Review area to notify ADF member, Commanding Officer and




consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative



Communication Advise Commanding Officer and ADF member of the fact the review

action has been rejected and external review rights.




Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative



Consistency Service area to consider the application. 1. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure

consistency.


Multiple Times per

Day

Service or Other

Defence Delegate

Manual Preventative



Communication Notify ADF member, Commanding Officer, original decision-maker and

Internal Review area of outcome and external review rights.



consistency.



Multiple Times per

Day

Service or Other

Defence Delegate

Manual Preventative



Communication Notify ADF member, Commanding Officer, original decision-maker and

Internal Review area of outcome.

1. Provides transparency in processes and outcome. Multiple Times per

Day

Service or Other

Defence Delegate

Manual Preventative

8.3.1 8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple

Internal Review Areas

Communication Internal Review area to determine whether the application is to be


documented).




Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative




timeframe (7 days).


Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative






Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative






Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.2 Single Internal Review Area

8.1 ADF Review of Action

8.3 Multiple Internal Review Areas


ADF Review of Action Process Map











Communication Advise Commanding Officer and APS employee / ADF member of the

fact the review action has been rejected and if required, advise

member of external review rights.




Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative









Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative









Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.4.1 8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector

General and Internal Audit

Communication Internal Review area to determine whether the application to be


documented).




Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - APS

Manual Preventative




timeframe (7 days).


Day

Internal Review

Area - APS

Manual Preventative






Day

Internal Review

Area - APS

Manual Preventative






Day

Internal Review

Area - APS

Manual Preventative



Communication Internal Review area to notify APS employee, Commanding Officer and




consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - APS

Manual Preventative



Communication Internal Review area to notify APS employee Commanding Officer and




consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - APS

Manual Preventative



Communication Internal Review area to notify APS employee, Commanding Officer and




consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - APS

Manual Preventative



Communication Inspector General to determine whether the application to be

immediately rejected due to exception rules (which are documented).




Multiple Times per

Day

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative



Timeliness Inspector General to determine if the decision should be reviewed. 1. Facilitates sound and timely decision-making. Multiple Times per

Day

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative



Communication Inspector General ADF area to notify ADF member, Commanding

Officer and original decision-maker area of outcome. Advise member

of external review rights.



consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative



Timeliness Inspector General ADF to provide recommendation to Service Chiefs

that decision should be re-made.


Day

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative



Communication Inspector General ADF area to notify ADF member, Commanding

Officer and original decision-maker area of outcome. Advise member

of external review rights.



consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative



Consistency Service Chief to consider the application. 1. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure

consistency.


Multiple Times per

Day

Service Chief Manual Preventative



Communication Service Chief to notify ADF member, Commanding Officer and original

decision-maker area of outcome. Advise member of external review

rights.



consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day




Communication Service Chief to notify ADF member, Commanding Officer and original

decision-maker area of outcome.



consistency.

Multiple Times per

Day


8.4 Inspector General ADF Internal Review Area

8.1 G1 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Monitoring No detective control is in place to ensure decisions

are made within the required timeframes.

Decisions may not be made within the required

timeframes.

Implement the performance of an independent review

(quality assurance) over all decisions made (on a

sample basis) to ensure decisions are made within the

required timeframes.

Multiple Times per

Day

Original Decision

Maker

Manual Detective

8.1 G2 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Monitoring Decisions made are not consistent (for events with a

similar fact pattern), regardless of whether the ADF

member requests a review to be performed.

Decisions made are not consistent. Implement the performance of an independent review

(quality assurance) over all decisions made (on a

sample basis) to ensure decisions made are

consistent.

Multiple Times per

Day

Original Decision

Maker

Manual Detective

8.1 G3 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the decision

and review of action process is not communicated

throughout the ADF.

The process in relation to the decision and

review of action process is not understood by

ADF members.



Annual Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative

8.1 G4 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Re-performance /

Efficiency

Documentation is not retained to support the initial

decision made.

A decision made is difficult to review as the

documentation supporting the decision is not

retained.

Provide guidance as to how documentation to support

the initial decision is retained (which may include the

development of mechanisms for records

management).

Annual Original Decision

Maker

Manual Preventative

8.1 G5 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Communication Decisions made do not reference applicable

guidelines or underlying framework.

Decisions made do not reference applicable

guidelines or underlying framework - resulting in

a lack of understanding for the ADF member of

the original decision.

While commentary has been provided in relation the

positive outcomes (for example, a reduced

administrative burden) of implementing prescribed

formats for the response provided to the ADF member

in regards to the original decision - this has not been

captured in the model.


Maker

Manual Preventative

8.1 G6 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Restricted Access An ADF members request for review and the original

decision made (and supporting documentation) are

not secured as confidential information.

An ADF members information is not secured as

confidential and private information, which may

have wider ramifications across the ADF, such

as: loss of confidence in the system and

reputational risk for the ADF.

Provide guidance as to how ADF member

documentation is secured from unauthorised access.


Maker

Manual /

Automated

Preventative

8.1 G7 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Efficiency The subsequent review performed by the

Commanding Officer (where applicable) does not

consider whether the benefit of the process outweighs

all associated costs.

Decisions made do not consider whether the

benefit of the process outweighs all associated

costs.

Provide guidance in relation to how thresholds (of time

or money spent) have been or are to be applied in

relation to decisions.

Annual Commanding

Officer

Manual Preventative

8.2 G1 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal

Review Area

Efficiency The system/model is unable to operate in a range of

diverse and unique environments.

The system/model is unable to operate in a

range of diverse and unique environments.

Provide guidance as to how an ADF members location

will impact the model/system (or lack thereof).


Area

Manual Preventative


Review Area

Timeliness Internal reviews performed are not made (and

communicated) in a timely manner and are not in

accordance with the timeframes set out in procedural

documentation (taking into account deployed

environments).

Internal reviews performed are not made (and

communicated) in a timely manner.

Implement a detective control to ensure reviews are

performed and communicated within the required

timeframes.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area and Service

or Other Defence

Delegate

Manual Detective


Review Area

Timeliness The system/model does not consider the deployed

environment of the ADF member when

communicating review of action outcomes.





timeframes.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Detective


Review Area

Monitoring Decisions reached by the Internal Review area do not

result in consistent outcomes.


over all reviews performed (on a sample basis) to

ensure decisions are made are consistent.

Note: The structure proposed by Model 3A (a single

internal review area) would ideally result in a

consistent review of actions process - as all reviews

would be performed centrally using a common

process.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Detective


Review Area

Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the review

process is not communicated throughout the ADF.



ADF members.




Area

Manual Preventative


Review Area

Re-performance /

Efficiency

Documentation is not retained to support the review

performed.

A review of action performed is unable to be

reviewed as the documentation supporting the

outcome is not retained.


the initial decision is retained.


Area and Service

or Other Defence

Delegate

Manual Preventative



Gap Risks Frequency



Responsible

Area

Manual /

Automated

Preventative /



Gap Risks Frequency



Responsible

Area

Manual /

Automated

Preventative /




Review Area

Communication Reviews performed do not reference applicable

guidelines or underlying framework and / or do not

provide reasons for the review decision made.

A review of action performed does not reference

applicable guidelines or underlying framework -

resulting in a lack of understanding for the ADF

member of the review performed.




formats for the response provided to the ADF member -

this has not been captured in the model.


Area and Service

or Other Defence

Delegate

Manual Preventative


Review Area

Restricted Access An APS employee's / ADF member's request for

review and supporting documentation are not secured

as confidential information.

An APS employee's / ADF member's information

is not secured as confidential information.

Provide guidance as to how APS employee / ADF

member documentation is secured from unauthorised

access.


Area

Manual /

Automated

Preventative


Review Area

Efficiency The internal review performed does not consider

whether the benefit of the process outweighs all

associated costs.

Internal reviews performed do not consider


associated costs.



relation to internal reviews.


Area

Manual Preventative


Review Area

Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part

of the review process are not rectified to ensure the

issue (if due to a systematic error) does not re-occur

in the future.


process.


weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in the original

decision process, will be rectified to prevent a re-

occurrence.


Area

Manual Preventative


Review Area

Monitoring An APS employee / ADF member is unable to request

an explanation for a review performed by the Internal

Review area.

The outcome of the review process is not

understood by APS employees / ADF members

and may result in a loss of transparency in the

process and/or outcome.

Provide guidance if follow up action is available to

APS employees / ADF members to request additional

documentation in regards to the review of action

outcome (similar to that available from the original

decision maker).

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area

Manual Preventative

8.3 G1

8.3 Model 3B (Proposed) - Multiple Internal

Review Area





Provide guidance as to how an APS employees / ADF

members location will impact the model/system (or

lack thereof).


Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.3 G2


Review Area





environments).





timeframes.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Detective

8.3 G3


Review Area


environment of the APS employee / ADF member

when communicating review of action outcomes.





timeframes.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Detective

8.3 G4


Review Area

Monitoring Decisions reached by the Internal Review area do not

result in consistent outcomes.




Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Detective

8.3 G5


Review Area





APS employees / ADF member.




Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.3 G6


Review Area

Re-performance /

Efficiency


performed.







Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.3 G7


Review Area


guidelines or underlying framework and / or do not

provide reasons for the review decision made.



resulting in a lack of understanding for the APS

employees / ADF member of the review

performed.




formats for the response provided to the APS

employees / ADF member - this has not been captured

in the model.


Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.3 G8


Review Area

Restricted Access An APS employee / ADF member request for review

and supporting documentation are not secured as

confidential information.

An APS employees / ADF members information


Provide guidance as to how APS employees / ADF


access.


Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual /

Automated

Preventative

8.3 G9


Review Area



associated costs.



associated costs.





Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.3 G10


Review Area




in the future.


process.




occurrence.


Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.3 Multiple Internal Review Areas

Gap Risks Frequency



Responsible

Area

Manual /

Automated

Preventative /



8.3 G11


Review Area



Review area.









decision maker).

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area - Army, Air

Force, Navy and

APS

Manual Preventative

8.4 G18.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector

General and ADF






members location will impact the model/system (or

lack thereof).


Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative


General and ADF





environments).





timeframes.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Detective


General and ADF


environment of the APS employee / ADF member

when communicating review of action outcomes.





timeframes.

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Detective


General and ADF

Monitoring Decisions reached by the Internal Review area /

Inspector General do not result in consistent

outcomes.




Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Detective


General and ADF





APS employees / ADF member.




Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative


General and ADF

Re-performance /

Efficiency


performed.







Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative


General and ADF


guidelines or underlying framework.



resulting in a lack of understanding for the APS

employees / ADF member of the review

performed.





employees / ADF member - this has not been captured

in the model.


Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative


General and ADF

Restricted Access An APS employee / ADF member request for review

and supporting documentation are not secured as

confidential information.

An APS employees / ADF members information




access.


Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual /

Automated

Preventative


General and ADF



associated costs.



associated costs.





Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative


General and ADF




in the future.


process.




occurrence.


Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative


General and ADF



Review area / Service Chief.









decision maker).

Multiple Times per

Day

Internal Review

Area APS and

Inspector General

ADF

Manual Preventative

8.4 Inspector General ADF Internal Review Area


Control

Activities in

Place?

Risk


8.1 R1 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process

Map

Decisions are not made (and communicated) in a

timely manner and are not in accordance with the

timeframes set out in procedural documentation

(taking into account deployed environments).

Moderate High High Yes 8.1.1 - - - - - Partially No detective control is in place to ensure

decisions are made within the required

timeframes.


Map

Decisions made are not consistent (for events with a

similar fact pattern), regardless of whether the ADF

member requests a review to be performed.

High Moderate High Yes 8.1.1 8.1.2 - - - - Partially No control is in place to review decisions which

are not referred to the Internal Review area.


Map

Procedural documentation in relation to the decision

and review of action process is not communicated

throughout the ADF.

Moderate Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to

how the revised model will be communicated

throughout the ADF.


Map

Documentation is not retained to support the initial

decision made.

High Moderate High No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to

how the documentation to support the initial

decision is retained.


Map

Decisions made do not refer to applicable guidelines

or underlying framework - resulting in a lack of

understanding for the ADF member of the original

decision.

Moderate Moderate Moderate No - - - - - - No While commentary has been provided in

relation to the positive outcomes (for example,

a reduced administrative burden) of

implementing prescribed formats for the

response provided to the ADF member in

regards to the original decision - this has not

been captured in the model.


Map

An ADF member is unable to request an explanation

for a decision made.

High Low Moderate Yes See

Comment

- - - - - Yes The control relates to the follow up rights

available to each ADF member.


Map

An ADF members request for review and the original

decision made (and supporting documentation) are

not secured as confidential information.

High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to

how ADF member documentation is secured

from unauthorised access.


Map

The subsequent review performed by the

Commanding Officer (where applicable) does not

consider whether the benefit of the process

outweighs all associated costs.


how thresholds (time spent and $ impact of

decision) have been or are to be applied in

relation to decisions.


Map

The ADF member is unsure as to the outcome of the

review performed by their Commanding Officer

(review of the decision made by the original decision

maker).

High Low Moderate Yes 8.1.3 8.1.4 - - - - Yes N/a.


Map

Resources are not sufficient to review a large

volume of decision applications.

Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 8.1.2 - - - - - Yes N/a.

8.2 R1 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single


The essential components for an optimal system of

inquiry, investigation and review are not reflected in

the system/model utilised by the ADF.



operational risks.



The review process is not sufficiently robust (lack of

documented procedures and guidelines or an

immature system/model under which reviews are

performed) to stand up to external scrutiny.



operational risks.



The system/model is unable to operate in a range of



how an ADF members location will impact the

model/system (or lack thereof).



Internal reviews are not performed (and


accordance with the timeframes set out in

procedural documentation (taking into account

deployed environments).

Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 8.2.1 8.2.2 8.2.4 - - - Partially No detective control is in place to reviews are

performed and communicated within the

required timeframes.





Control References



Control

Activities in

Place?

Risk





Control References



The system/model does not consider the deployed

environment of the ADF member when

communicating review of action outcomes.


how differing subject matters or an ADF

members location will impact the model/system

(or lack thereof).



Decisions reached by the Internal Review area do

not result in consistent outcomes.

High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No control is in place to review decisions made

for consistency with other events with a

similar/consistent fact pattern.

Note: The structure proposed by Model 3A (a

single internal review area) would in itself result

in a consistent review of actions process - as all

reviews would be performed centrally using a

common process.



Procedural documentation in relation to the review



how the revised model will be communicated

throughout the ADF.




performed.


how the documentation to support the review

performed is retained.



Decisions made do not refer to applicable guidelines

or underlying framework - resulting in a lack of

understanding for the ADF member of the review of

action performed.

Moderate Low Moderate No - - - - - - No While commentary has been provided in

relation the positive outcomes (for example, a

reduced administrative burden) of implementing

prescribed formats for the response provided to

the ADF member in regards to the reviewed

performed and the outcome - this has not been

captured in the model.



An ADF member is unable to request an explanation

for a review performed by the Internal Review area.

High Low Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance has been provided as to whether

an ADF member has follow up rights following a

review of action process.



An ADF members request for review and supporting

documentation are not secured as confidential

information.


how ADF member documentation is secured

from unauthorised access.



The internal review performed does not consider


associated costs.


how thresholds (time spent and $ impact of

decision) have been or are to be applied in

relation to reviews performed.



The outcome of a review performed by the Internal

Review area is not consistently communicated to all

parties (ADF member, Commanding Officer and the

original decision maker).

High Low Moderate Yes 8.2.5 8.2.6 8.2.7 8.2.10 - - Yes N/a.



Reviews performed are not able to be subject to an

external review.

High Low Moderate Yes 8.2.5 8.2.9 - - - - Yes N/a.



Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part



in the future.


control weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in

the original decision process, will be rectified to




Internal reviews are not performed by an approved

delegate.

Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 8.2.3 8.2.8 - - - - No No guidance has been provided in relation to

control weaknesses or deficiencies identified, in

the original decision process, will be rectified to


B1 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map

8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal

Review Area


Review Area

8.4 Model 3C (Proposed) - Inspector General

and Internal Audit

Monitoring No detective control is in place to ensure decisions and internal

reviews are made within the required timeframes and are

consistent (for events with a similar fact pattern), regardless of

whether the APS employees / ADF member requests a review

to be performed.

Implement the performance of an independent review

(quality assurance) over all decisions made and internal

reviews performed (on a sample basis) to ensure

decisions are made within the required timeframes and

are consistent.

Compliance with internal

guidelines.

Moderate



Review Area


Review Area


and Internal Audit

Communication Procedural documentation in relation to the decision and review

of action process is not communicated throughout the ADF.



Consistent understanding

throughout the ADF.

Quick Win

B3 8.1 ADF Review of Action Process Map Re-performance /

Efficiency

Documentation is not retained to support the initial decision

made or the internal review performed.


the initial decision and internal review is retained (which

may include the development of mechanisms for

records management).

Ability to re-evaluate decision

made after the fact.

Quick Win



Review Area


Review Area


and Internal Audit

Communication Decisions made and reviews performed do not reference

applicable guidelines or underlying framework (where

applicable).





employees / ADF member in regards to the original

decision - this has not been captured in the model.

Reduced administrative burden. Moderate



Review Area


Review Area


and Internal Audit

Restricted Access An APS employees / ADF members request for review and the

original decision made (and supporting documentation) are not

secured as confidential information.



access.

Maintaining confidentiality over

sensitive information.

Quick Win



Review Area


Review Area


and Internal Audit

Efficiency Decisions made by the original decision maker (and

subsequent review by the Service Delegate / Inspector

General, where applicable) and the internal review performed

do not consider whether the benefit of the process outweighs all

associated costs.

Provide guidance in relation to how thresholds (time

spent and $ impact of decision) have been or are to be

applied in relation to decisions and the internal review of

actions.

Efficiency in review of action

process.

Moderate











B7 8.2 Model 3A (Proposed) - Single Internal

Review Area


Review Area


and Internal Audit

Efficiency The system/model is unable to operate in a range of diverse

and unique environments.


members location will impact the model/system (or lack

thereof).

Consistent understanding

throughout the ADF.

Quick Win


Review Area


Review Area


and Internal Audit

Monitoring Control weaknesses or deficiencies identified as part of the

review process are not rectified to ensure the issue (if due to a

systematic error) does not re-occur in the future.




occurrence.

Remediation of systematic

errors.

Moderate


Review Area


Review Area


and Internal Audit

Monitoring An APS employees / ADF member is unable to request an

explanation for a review performed by the Internal Review area.

Provide guidance if follow up action is available to APS

employees / ADF members to request additional


process (similar to that available from the original

decision maker).

Reduced administrative burden. Quick Win




High Moderate Low





Significance

Likelihood

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 4 – EXTERNAL REVIEW

9.1 EXTERNAL REVIEW PROCESS

AD

FM

em

be

rM

eri

tP

rote

cti

on

Co

mm

issio

ne

rA

PS

Em

plo

yee

Start

5.4

Apply to Merit ProtectionCommissioner for review of

decision or action (Note:Termination decisions go to Fair

Work Commission)

5.4

Review decision or action inaccordance with the Public

Service Act 1999

9.1.1 5.4

Make recommendations to theSecretary in relation to the

decision or action under review

5.4

Apply to Administrative AppealsTribunal for review of decision or

action in relation to ADFallowances and benefits

5.4

Inform APS Employee andDefence of outcome of review

9.2.4

Outcome /Recommendations of

Review

De

fen

ce

Do the CDF / ServiceChiefs accept outcome /

recommendations ofreview?

5.4

Implement anyrecommendations from the

review

5.4

Draft reasons for notimplementing recommendations

to table to Parliament

9.1.2

EndYes

No

StartWas original decision

related to ADF allowancesand benefits?

5.4

Apply to External Integrity Agency(Model 4A), Defence Force

Ombudsman (Model 4B) or InspectorGeneral ADF (Model 4B) for review of

decision or action in relation to all otherADF-related decisions

Start

5.4

Receive investigations related to:- Service-related deaths- Complaints about conduct ofprofessional investigators- Scrutiny of Defence actions- Request of a Minister in Defence

FC 9.2Model

4A

Yes

No

FC 9.2Models

4A or 4B

FC 9.2Model

4A

FC 9.2Model

4A

End

X.X

X.X

Detective Control


Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

XX

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

G1B1

5.4

Send to External IntegrityAgency for investigation

I2

5.4

Secretary makes a decision

5.4

Inform APS Employee and MeritProtection Commissioner of

decision (if necessary)

9.2.4

End

5.4

Administrative Appeals Tribunaldecisions are binding on

Defence

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCEPHASE 4 – EXTERNAL REVIEW

9.2 (PROPOSED) MODELS 4A AND 4B - EXTERNAL REVIEW

De

fen

ce

Fo

rce

Om

bu

ds

ma

nIn

sp

ec

tor

Gen

era

lA

DF

Exte

rna

lIn

teg

rity

Ag

en

cy

5.4

Conduct further investigation

Has decision beenreviewed in any other

external review process?

Has the ADF Memberexhausted internal review

options?No

Should application beconsidered?

5.4

Inform ADF Member andDefence of outcome /

recommendations of review

Should an investigation beundertaken

Yes

Yes

No

5.4

Determine outcome and makerecommendations

Yes

No

Should decision be referredto Merit Protection

Commissioner?

Yes

No

FC 9.1ExternalReview

No


Yes


5.4

Review action that relates to amatter of administration with

respect to the application

9.2.3 5.4


5.4



9.2.4

MODEL 4BDefence Force Ombudsman and Inspector General ADF


5.4

Review action that relates tomilitary justice with respect to the

application

5.4


5.4



9.2.4 5.4

Report to Parliament onoutcome / recommendations of

review

9.2.5

MODEL 4AExternal Integrity Agency

9.2.1 9.2.2


5.4

Review original decision oraction in relation to ADFallowances and benefits

9.2.3

Re-make decision basedon review?

5.4

Inform ADF Member andDefence of outcome

9.2.45.4


No

Ad

min

istr

ati

ve

Ap

pea

lsT

rib

un

al

End

9.2.4

9.2.3

9.2.3

G1

B2

B2

B3

B3

G1 G2

G2

G3

G3

X.X

X.X

Detective Control


Database / Storage

Activity / Process

Document

Decision

Legend


X.X Control Gap

XX

BusinessImprovement

X.X

InsightsX.X

End

B4

B4

B4

B4

9.2.3


End

9.1.1 9.1 External Review Process Compliance &

Consistency

Merit Protection Commissioner reviews the decision or action in

accordance with the Public Service Act 1999 .

1. Ensures compliance to the relevant legislative Act when making a

recommendation.

Daily Merit Protection

Commissioner

Manual Preventative

9.1.2 9.1 External Review Process Transparency &

Consistency

Reasons for not implementing a recommendation by the Administrative

Appeals Tribunal, External Integrity Agency, Defence Force

Ombudsman, and/ or Inspector General ADF are tabled to Parliament.

1. Acknowledges that recommendations have been considered, and if

not implemented, are explained and justified in a transparent manner to

Parliament.

Daily Defence Manual Preventative

9.2.1 9.2 Models 4A (Proposed) - External

Review

Efficiency Discretion is available to exclude any complaint, which has been

reviewed externally, for further investigation (on the same facts).

1. Ensure that all external review decisions are final and binding, and

prevents duplication of effort.

Multiple Times per

Day

External Integrity

Agency

Manual Preventative


Review

Efficiency Discretion is available to exclude any complaint, which has been

reviewed externally, for further investigation (on the same facts).

1. Prevent duplication of effort and promotes proper use of resources. Multiple Times per

Day

External Integrity

Agency

Manual Preventative


Review

Consistency There is an independent review of decisions conducted by

Administrative Appeals Tribunal, External Integrity Agency, Defence

Force Ombudsman and Inspector General ADF to ensure decisions

are made consistently.

1. Facilitates consistent review outcomes. Daily External Integrity

Agency / Merit

Protection

Commissioner

Manual Preventative

9.2.4 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -

External Review

Transparency Provides an external oversight mechanism in relation to the ADF by the

external parties.

1. Facilitates consistent review outcomes and transparency. Daily External Integrity

Agency /

Administrative

Appeals Tribunal /

Defence Force

Ombudsman /

Inspector General

ADF / Merit

Protection

Commissioner /

Secretary

Manual Preventative

9.2.5 9.2 Models 4B (Proposed) - External

Review

Transparency The Inspector General ADF reports to Parliament on the outcome and/

or recommendations of their review.

1. Promotes transparency and independence of the Inspector General's

external review from the ADF.

Daily IGADF / Defence

Force Ombudsman

Manual Preventative

9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) - External Review

9.1 External Review Process


External Review Process Map




9.1 G1 9.1 External Review Process Monitoring There is no subsequent review process in place to

ensure recommendations have been implemented

properly.

Recommendations made by the Administrative

Appeals Tribunal, External Integrity Agency,

Defence Force Ombudsman, and/ or Inspector

General ADF may not be implemented correctly

or appropriately to address the original reason

why a recommendation was made.

A review process should be implemented to monitor

the progress of the implementation of

recommendations made.

Monthly Defence Legal Manual Detective

9.2 G1 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -

External Review

Timeliness &

Consistency

No guidance on how to facilitate sound and timely

decisions made by applicable agencies.

Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Merit Protection

Service, External Integrity Agency, Defence

Force Ombudsman and Inspector General ADF

do not provide timely response for ADF to

making decisions on review outcomes.

In the proposed model, outline timeframes in which

each agency is required to provide a response to ADF

and provide regular training to ensure efficient

decision-making is made.

Throughout a year Administrative

Appeals Tribunal,

Merit Protection

Service, External

Integrity Agency,

Defence Force

Ombudsman and

Inspector General

ADF (IGADF)

Manual Preventative


External Review

Efficiency No guidance on how this process will promote flexible

options to initiate a review in deployed environments.

ADF members / APS employees may not be able

to initiate an external review due to limited

options available.

In the proposed models, outline how the process will

allow an ADF member / APS employee to initiate the

external review using various methods in deployed

operations.

Once-off Defence Legal Manual Preventative


External Review

Monitoring There are no controls in place to co-ordinate and

monitor the progress of external reviews.

Reviews conducted by external parties may not

be appropriate and completed in a timely

manner.

Establish a reporting mechanism that requires

Defence to follow up with external agencies to obtain

status reports on a regular basis.

Monthly Administrative

Appeals Tribunal,

Merit Protection

Service,

External Integrity

Agency,

Defence Force

Ombudsman and

Inspector General

ADF (IGADF)

Manual Preventative



Responsible

Area

Manual /

Automated

Preventative /





Gap Risks Frequency


Control

Activities in

Place?

Risk


9.1 R1 9.1 External Review Process There is a risk that the recommendations may not be

implemented appropriately and/ or in a timely

manner.

Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 9.2.1 9.2.2 - - - - Partially No guidance on how to monitor the

implementation of recommendations in an

appropriate and/ or timely manner.

9.2 R1 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -

External Review

Administrative Appeals Tribunal, Merit Protection

Service, External Integrity Agency, Defence Force

Ombudsman, and Inspector General ADF do not

provide timely responses to making decisions on

review outcomes.

Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 9.2.1 9.2.2 9.2.3 - - - Partially No guidance on how to facilitate sound and

timely decisions made by applicable agencies.


External Review

ADF members / APS employees may not be able to

initiate an external review due to limited options

available.

Moderate Moderate Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance on how this process will promote

flexible options to initiate a review in deployed

environments.


External Review

Defence is unable to co-ordinate and monitor

progress of external reviews in progress.

Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 9.2.3 - - - - - Partially There are no controls in place to co-ordinate

and monitor the progress of external reviews.


External Review

ADF members / APS employees may not use the

external review process appropriately.

Moderate Moderate Moderate Yes 9.2.3 - - - - - No No guidance on how to appropriately use the

external review process.


External Review

The privacy of individuals may not be protected. High Low High Yes 9.1.1 - - - - - Yes N/a


External Review

The models may be too complex to be used or

applied by individuals.

Moderate Moderate Moderate No - - - - - - No No guidance on how to appropriately use the

external review process.




Control References



B1 9.1 External Review Process Monitoring There is no subsequent review process in place to ensure

recommendations have been implemented properly.

A review process should be developed to monitor the progress

of the implementation of recommendations made.

Keeping track of recommendations that have

not been implemented correctly or

appropriately allows ADF to remedy these in a

timely manner.

Quick Win

B2 9.2 Models 4A and 4B (Proposed) -

External Review

Timeliness &

Consistency

No guidance on how to facilitate sound and timely decisions

made by applicable agencies.

In the proposed model, outline timeframes in which each

agency is required to provide a response to ADF and provide

regular training to ensure efficient decision-making is made.

Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Quick Win


External Review

Efficiency No guidance on how this process will promote flexible options

to initiate a review in deployed environments.

In the proposed models, outline how the process will allow an

ADF member / APS employee to initiate the external review

using various methods in deployed operations.

Promotes flexibility in response options in the

deployed environment.

Moderate


External Review

Monitoring There are no controls in place to co-ordinate and monitor the

progress of external reviews.

Establish a reporting mechanism that requires each agency to

provide status reports on its external reviews on a regular

basis.

Facilitates sound and timely decision making. Quick Win









High Moderate Low





Significance

Likelihood

Documents

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENCE PHASE 1 – INITIAL ASSESSMENT …€¦ · 2. Incorporates co-ordinating and monitoring mechanisms to ensure consistency. Multiple Times per Day Commander