Deontological Eudaemonism

8/14/2019 Deontological Eudaemonism

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Deontological EudaemonismKeith Bustos

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Introduction

Kant and Aristotle have historically been understood to have radically opposing views on a

variety of perspectives. I intend to demonstrate that these two philosophic giants have a

strikingly similar understanding of what it takes to achieve true happiness (Happiness). Forexample, both Kant and Aristotle understood that the perfection of ones reason is a necessarycondition for achieving the highest good. However, for both, the perfection of ones reason is not

a sufficient condition for the realization of Happiness or Eudaemonia, but it does provide acondition in which Happiness/Eudaemonia may supervene on the act(s) of perfecting onesreason. For Aristotle, aiming at the Good specific to humans (i.e. the perfection of reason) is

merely a dictate of practical reason, and the cause of peoples failure to achieve this goal is theirlack of discipline to perfect the requisite virtues. Similarly, Kant believed that we have a duty,

which is a dictate of practical reason, to perfect our personal good-will, which also requires a

disciplined approach. An imperative that the good-will issues, according to Kant, is to seek ones

own morally deserved happiness so as to ensure that one remains content in doing ones duty.

Herein lays the foundation for our duty to be Happy: one has a categorical duty to perfect onesgood-will, which (subsequently) makes one deserving of Happiness. Moreover, the route taken

to achieve this morally deserved Happiness (espoused by Kant) is strikingly similar to Aristotlesplan for attaining Eudaemonia.

This essay will build upon the core ideas of Immanuel Kant and Aristotle while paying

particular attention to the relationship between virtue and Happiness.1

It will be shown that Kant

and Aristotle both believed that virtue is a necessary part of Happiness, but Happiness does notnecessarily result from virtue. In order to achieve Happiness, one must relinquish the goal of

sating every capricious desire in lieu of the loftier goal of personal excellence. By weaving

Kantian deontology with Aristotelian eudaemonism, a new perspective arises: deontologicaleudaemonism. Essentially, deontological eudaemonism suggests that all rational beings have the

ability to recognize the moral law and thus have the duty to employ their reason in such a way as

to develop a good-will, which requires the virtue of willingly placing limitations on ones

conditioned happiness; and through becoming a morally virtuous person, one paradoxicallyenjoys the supervenient result of true Happiness.

A brief sketch of the landscape may be helpful. I will first discuss both Kants and

Aristotles respective positions on teleology, virtue, duty, and Happiness/Eudaemonia. Once bothpositions are examined separately, I will survey the terrain of both camps to find a suitable

location upon which to erect a bridge that will unite the two seemingly contradictory

perspectives on happiness.

Deontology

In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Immanuel Kant says that in living organisms,

every organ is designed to carry out a specific function (or set of functions). Reason is the organ

in rational beings that controls voluntary action. If, in fact, reason and the will were given to

rational beings for their pursuit of happiness, then nature has hit on a very bad arrangement by

1For the purpose of simplicity, I will conflate Kants notion of happiness and eudaemonia by referring to both as

Happiness.


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choosing reason in the creature to carry out this purpose.2

Since reason is insufficient for the

teleological pursuit of happiness, it must have some other application that is more suited to itscapacity. Kant believed the application most appropriate for reason to be the development of a

good-willnot as a means to an end but as an end in itself.3

Kant claimed that reason has two primary functions: 1) to create a will that is good in

itself (an unconditioned good) and 2) to secure an agents own happiness (a subjectivelyconditioned good).4 Here we can see that there are two paths that a rational agent can take: he

can renounce his pursuit of his conditioned happiness for the pursuit of an absolutely good-will

or he can directly pursue his individual, conditioned happiness through prudent calculation andthe fulfillment of his inclinations. Kant believed that rational agents have a duty to subordinate

the latter (conditioned good) to the former (unconditioned good), and thereby find themselves

content with cultivating their reason through the production of a good-will. Kant made this claimbecause he thought that even by traveling the path that leads to conditioned happiness one may

haphazardly act in accord with moral principles. But actions aimed at conditioned happiness

cannot be considered moral, since the agent has not intentionally chosen such actions for the sake

of producing a good-will. The only actions that have any real moral worth are those that aim at

producing a good-will, which are governed by principles derived from the moral law and notfrom principles that are merely in agreement with it.

Kant says that the cultivation of reason which is required for the first and unconditionedpurpose may in many ways, at least in this life, restrict the attainment of the second purpose

namely happiness which is always conditioned.5 He reinforces this statement by saying that

the good-will must be the highest good and the condition of all the rest, even of all our demands

for happiness.6

By developing a good-will, one has a source for providing principles of actionthat are not contingently based and are free from all inclination. Kant warns that deriving moral

principles from mere experience will lead to a heteronymous sort of morality from which one

can never reasonably hope to deserve to be happy. He poetically explains:

human reason in its weariness is fain to rest upon this pillow and in a dream of sweet illusions

(which lead it to embrace a cloud in mistake for Juno) to foist into the place of morality somemisbegotten mongrel patched up from limbs of very varied ancestry and looking like anything

you please, only not like virtue, to him who has once beheld her in her true shape.7

The development of an absolute good-will is nothing more than acting on principles that arederivedfrom the moral law. Kant considers that the correct use of reason is to seek virtue in hertrue shape by subordinating the conditioned good (sensuous inclinations or self-love) to the

unconditioned good (reverence for the moral law through the manifestation of a good-will).In striving to act virtuously, one also necessarily attempts to act morally.8 Kant says that

morality is the only condition under which a rational being can be an end in himselft herefore

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Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964),63.3

Ibid., 64.4

Ibid., 18.5 Ibid., 64.6

Ibid., 64.7

Ibid., 94. To hold virtue in her true shape is to see morality distilled from sensuous inclinations or self-love.8

Both Kant and H.J. Patton equate morality and virtue as seen in the following two quotations. What is then that

entitles a morally good attitude of mindor virtueto make claims so high? Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic

of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), 103. Morality or virtue and humanity


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morality, and humanity so far as it is capable of morality, is the only thing which has dignity.9

For a thing to have dignity is for it to be irreplaceable, which is to say that it has intrinsic value.

Ones dignity is grounded in the capacity to act morally, which requires an absolute good-will.

This means that the maxims of ones actions, when made into a universal law, can never be inconflict.

10For one to be assured that ones maxims never conflict with one another, one merely

has to apply the formula of the Categorical Imperative (C.I.) to every situation for action. In oneof many articulations of the C.I., Kant wrote that we ought to act on that maxim which can atthe same time have for its object itself as a universal law of nature It is precisely the fitness of

[ones] maxims to make universal law that marks [one] out as an end in [oneself].11

Thus,

according to Kant, morality lies in the relation of actions to the autonomy of the willthat is, to

a possible making of universal law by means of its maxims,12

and reverence for the law is the

motive which can give an action moral worth.13

So, to act virtuously is to willingly assert

control over ones passionate inclinations and subordinate them to the development of a good-

will; doing so requires the application of the supreme principle of autonomy (i.e. the C.I.) and

thus one arrives at moral principles for action.

This sketch of Kants moral position provides a look at the deontological foundation

from which he is able to support the attainment of ones own happiness.

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Consequently, theonly sort of happiness that one can truly deserve is a sort that is conditioned by the good-will,

which is the indispensable condition for our worthiness to be happy.15

This qualification pointsto the fact that ones worthiness to be happy is found only in virtuous action, which, incidentally,

is the willful act of surrendering ones conditioned good in order to strive for the unconditionedgood.

16So, it is only in first seeking to develop a good-will that we can ever deserve to be truly

happy.Kant is not completely satisfied in stating the conditions for achieving the highest good in

a positive way. He sees it necessary to caution his readers about the pitfall of allowing oneself to

cultivate reason in such a way that it aims directly at enjoying life and happiness, for in so doingwe distance ourselves from true contentment.17 He writes,

the cultivation of reason which is required for the first and unconditioned purpose may in many

ways at least in this life, restrict the attainment of the second purpose namely, happiness

which is always conditioned; and indeed that it can even reduce happiness to less than zero

without nature proceeding contrary to its purpose; for reason, which recognizes as its highest

practical function the establishment of a good-will, in attaining this end is capable only of its own

peculiar kind of contentmentcontentment in fulfilling a purpose which in turn is determined by

reason alone, even if this fulfillment should often involve interference with the purpose of

inclinations.18

so far as it is capable of moralityalone has dignity Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J.

Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964), 36.9

Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964),

102.10Ibid., 104.

11Ibid., 105.

12Ibid., 107.

13 Ibid.14

Ibid., 67.15

Ibid., 61.16

Ibid.17

Ibid., 62-63.18

Ibid., 64.


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Kant sincerely wants his readers to understand at the outset that seeking the fulfillment ofinclinations cannot be the primary aim for humans. Instead, the primary aim must be the

development of a good-will which is the only unconditioned good and the condition for all other

goods, even of all our demands for happiness.19

So, Kant claims that in doing ones duty one

can be truly content with ones efforts and only through meeting this requisite criterion can onereasonably hope to be happy.

Eudaemonism

At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle states that the Good is that at which all

things aim.20This statement alludes to Aristotles teleology, which supports the position that the

ultimate good for all things accords with the things unique faculties or endowments. According

to Aristotle, the Good for humans is Happiness and we always choose it [Happiness] for its own

sake and never as a means to something elsebut we also choos e them [other actions] for the

sake of happiness, in the belief that they will be means to our securing it.

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If all actions arechosen for the sake of Happiness, and nothing can be added or subtracted from Happiness to

make it more desirable, then Happiness is the final good. From this, Aristotle concludes that

Happiness is the End at which all actions aim since it is something final and self-sufficient.22

Aristotle is careful to define his conception of Eudaemonia (true happiness) in such a

way as to distinguish it from other sorts of happiness. He says that Eudaemonia is not merely

some characteristic of a person, for then one could be happy while in a life long slumber. Instead,it is a virtuous activity that is done for its own sake and not for the sake of some further end. 23

Moreover, Eudaemonia is an activity in accordance with the highest virtue that humans

possess.24

This supreme virtue is an act that accords with the intellect, which is the most divinepart of humans; and to perfect this virtue is to participate in the world of the divine, through

contemplation. Contemplation is the only human activity that can be engaged in indefinitely and

is self-sufficient. Also, contemplation is chosen for its own sake since it produces nothing more

than the act itself.However, the contemplative life is one that is beyond the realm of human attainment.

That is to say, not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something

within him that is divine; and by as much as this something is superior to his composite nature,

by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of the other forms of virtue.25 Thus,

contemplation is the Good at which all humans aim; it is complete eudaemonia since it is chosen

for its own sake, is self-sufficient, and the most divine activity in which humans can participate.Aristotle exposes a distinction between what he calls secondary and complete

eudaemonia. On the one hand, The life of moral virtueis happy only in a secondary degree.

For the moral activities are purely human in that they deal with what is due to our fellows in

19Ibid.

20 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. H Rackham (London, England: Harvard University Press, 1934), 3.21

Ibid., 27-29.22

Ibid., 31.23

Ibid., 607.24

Ibid., 613.25

Ibid., 617.


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contracts, services, other various social actions, and in our emotions.26

So, moral virtue is

concerned mainly with guiding human action to arrive at the mean between excess anddeficiency, i.e. moral virtues help us to act well in our daily affairs. The goal of moral virtue is to

attain moral excellence, which is a kind of happiness.

In contrast, the Good which Aristotle calls complete eudaemonia is the intellectual act of

contemplation. The highest human virtue deals with the divinest part of us, which is theintellect.27 Since contemplation is the primary object of the intellect, Aristotle concludes that

Happiness consists in contemplation,because it is at once the highest form of activity (since the

intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects with which the intellect deals are the highest

things that can be known).28

Building the Bridge

In a general way, it can now be said that Kant and Aristotle agree in their claims that all things,

including rational agents, aim at the Good. At first glance, Kant seems to disagree with Aristotle

as to what precisely constitutes the Good for rational beings. However, it will be demonstratedthat an agreement actually does exist. The remainder of this essay will be devoted to surveying

the topography of both Kant and Aristotles arguments in order to establish a fitting place for abridge. That point is found at the concept of the highest good: on the one side, Kants belief thatthe perfection of practical reason is absolutely necessary for the worthiness to be happy; and on

the other, Aristotles understanding that perfecting ones intellectual virtues is an indispensable

aspect of the contemplative life, and a requisite component of complete eudaemonia.For Kant, practical reason aims at bringing about (or creating) an object; it is a form of

creative reason. Kant distinguishes three aspects of Practical Reason. First, practical reasonas

skill, techne, crafthelps us to match means to ends. This sort of practical reason assists us insolving subjective problems, and any imperatives that are issued from this sort of practical

reason are hypothetical imperatives. Second, practical reason issues in councils of prudence for

the goal of happiness (at which all humans aim); these are rules that help each individual attain

conditioned happiness. Again, any imperatives issued from this sort of practical reason arepurely hypothetical. In the Groundwork,29 Kant clearly condemns Aristotles position on

eudaemian by showing that Aristotle has happiness as the object of his will. Moreover, Kant

believes the moral principles that Aristotle derives from this are based merely on experience:offering no sound principles by which he is able to decide with complete certainty what will

make him truly happy.30

Finally, practical reason issues categorical imperatives that are not

based on empirical grounds and are derived from the formal structure of practical reason or themoral law. Even though the former two sorts of practical reason are not, by themselves,

conducive to leading a moral life, the full development of practical reason must include the

perfection of all three forms. However, the third form must always remain superior in order to

26 Ibid., 619.27

Ibid., 613.28

Ibid.29

Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals, trans. H.J. Paton (New York: Harper & Row Publishers, 1964),

82-87.30

Ibid., 85-86.


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lead a life of moral worth. And leading a life in accord with principles derived from the moral

law is the only sufficient condition for our worthiness to be happy.

Although Kant is attempting to distance himself from Aristotles position, it seems thathe is not giving Aristotle a fair interpretation. The possible reason for not giving Aristotle his due

may be because Kant attempted to create a Copernican revolution in ethics by grounding

morality in a transcendent reality free from the determinate laws of nature. If he describedAristotle as much more a friend than a foe, he would effectively be admitting that his own

project was nothing new. Now this may be an unfair treatment of Kants quick dismissal of

Aristotles ethics, but it is helpful to examine Aristotles conception of practical reason (orpractical wisdom) to see ifKants view actually is divergent from Aristotles.

Aristotle has a conception of the distinction between practical wisdom and philosophical

wisdom that is similar to Kants. Practical wisdom is associated with the moral virtues, which are

connected with the passions, and issues principles that guide ones pursuit of acting and livingwell. Philosophical wisdom, on the other hand, is associated with the intellectual virtues and

functions primarily for the operation of understanding (contemplation). Remember that Aristotle

distinguishes between two sorts of eudaemonia. Virtuous living constitutes secondary

eudaemonia, since it deals primarily with striking a mean between excess and deficiency in allfunctions of lifethis is a purely human sort of happiness. This purely human happiness seems

to be that which Kant was condemning as a proper object of the will, since achieving this sort ofhappiness requires an intimate understanding of the empirical world. But Aristotle didntadvocate for secondary eudaemonia. Instead, he believed that we all desire to transcend the mere

human happiness by participating in the divine. In so doing one must perfect the highest thing in

us, the intellect, which allows us to engage in the activity of contemplation; and this is completeeudaemonia.

Now it seems that we have hit solid ground upon which the footing for our bridge can be

constructed. This footing manifests itself as the agreement between Kant and Aristotle as to whatthe highest good consists of, namely the activity of our rational intellect. The agreement here is

between Kants conception of Happiness as being dependent upon the perfection of practical

reason and Aristotles notion of complete eudaemonia as a perfection of the intellectual virtues

so that one may participate in the divine activity of contemplation. Both are sought for their ownsake, not as a means to some other end, but as ends in themselves; thereby constituting the

highest good.

Now that the foundation has been set, the remainder of the bridge can be completed. Kantcan be interpreted as not being far removed from Aristotle when examining Kants notion of

moral motivation. Kant believes that to act from duty is to act from the respect for the moral law.

The moral law in this case is merely the object of respect and not its cause. This sort of respectfor the moral law is a feeling; and since it is a feeling, it has the power to motivate. The move

that Kant is making here is vital to his overall project, since he has to account for the intrinsic

motivating force of moral imperatives. Moral imperatives arise from ourselves (practical reason)

and are binding on us. From this process arises the feeling of respect which provides themotivation to follow moral imperatives. Put differently, practical reason creates objects for itself.

Kant presupposes that humans desire to create a concept of ourselves as rational, moral, duty-

bound creatures that are in some ways similar to God. In directly desiring such objects, we desire

to order our lives to meet this conception we have created for ourselves. This psychologicalphenomena stands as a description for the mechanism that creates the motivation (or desire) to


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bring our subjective obstacles in line with God, i.e., the desire to be unobstructed when acting

from the moral law.Here, it looks like Kant is admitting that although humans ought to first desire to develop

a will that is good in itself, he realizes that we must first construct a conception of our individual

selves as being the sort of people who willingly and unhesitatingly embrace our moral duties. If

this account is correct, then its difficult to see the vast difference between constructing a conceptof ourselves as undeviating moral agents and setting for ourselves the object of perfecting the

intellectual virtues so as to participate in complete eudaemonia. It seems that on both accounts

one must first understand what the highest good is, then construct a conception of oneself as aperson who acts in accordance with the principles of the highest good, and finally one must

desire to actualize this constructed conception of oneself.

Also, both Kant and Aristotle believe that the virtuous life is a pleasant life. Aristotle isfairly explicit about this throughout his discussion of virtue and explains that the life of virtue is

the most pleasant life. Contrary to popularly held positions, Kant agreed with Aristotle on this

point but seems to have kept this notion under wraps until he felt that his audience had received

an authentic taste of what should constitute virtue. Many times Kant is interpreted as an ascetic,

but in fact, he sees that pleasure is a necessary component of the virtuous life, for pleasure iswhat motivates one to continue to do ones duty.

But what we do cheerlessly and merely as compulsory service has no intrinsic value for us, and so

also if we attend to our duty in this way; we do not love it but rather shirk as much as we can the

occasion for practicing it.Hence the training (discipline) which man exercises on himself can

become meritorious and exemplary only by the cheerfulness that accompanies it.31

Consequently, Kant does allow for a morally acceptable sort of pleasure to accompany a virtuous

life.Finally, my interpretation of Kant and Aristotle suggests that they both agreed that the

perfection of practical reason (or the intellectual virtues for Aristotle) is not by itself sufficient

for Happiness. However, some may contend that there is actually a latent disagreement lurking intheir respective conceptions of Happiness. For Aristotle the attainment of complete eudaemonia

involves not only the perfection of ones reason but also contingent external goods such as goodhealth, luck, material goods, etc. Although Aristotle maintained that the perfection of practical

reason necessarily involves doing many things well and succeeding in many areas of practicallife, the perfection of practical reason will constitute a good bit of Happiness. Conversely, Kant

believed that there is no reason to think that the person of good-will necessarily will succeed in

any of life's endeavors, for what is key to having a good-will is not that one succeeds in acting invarious ways, but rather that one acts in conformity with, and ultimatelyfrom, a set of universal

moral principles.

The following elucidation of Kants conception ofHappiness may help to clear things up.

He explains that not everyone is worthy of being Happy even though they all desire to be so.

Now the force in you that strives only toward happiness is inclination; but the power that limits

your inclination to the condition of your first being worthy of happiness is your reason; and your

power to restrain and overcome your inclination by your reason is the freedom of your will.32

31Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), 158-

160.32

Ibid., 154.


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This point is very important for Kant and he drives it home by explaining that the instructions forbecoming Happy, in a morally acceptable way, are found in reason alone. As a result, the

fulfillment of ones duty is the sole condition of ones worthiness to be Happy. Nevertheless,

merely meeting the requirements for a worthiness to be Happy does not necessarily mean that

one actually will be Happy. Doing ones duty merely gives one a reason to hope that Happinesswill be realized during an earthly life.33

In summary, Kant and Aristotle agree that the perfection of ones reason is the highest

good. Kant considers this to be the highest good because it aids in the development of a good-will, which is the only unconditioned good in the universe. Aristotle deems this to be the highest

good because it allows one to transcend ones mere humanity and participate in the divine. Both

believe that in order to achieve Happiness, one must necessarilyperfect ones reason; this givesrise to a position that bridges Kants deontology and Aristotles eudaemonism . As a result,

deontological eudaemonism asserts that one has a duty to perfect ones reason so as to develop agood-will, which prescribes for itself a duty to act virtuously. Through incessantly embracing

ones duty one becomes content and, consequently, one can reasonably hope to achieve true

Happiness through striving to live a morally worthy life, which includes a degree of pleasure.

33This rational hope is grounded in a belief that the world is rationally ordered by its creator and that as long as one

does not become unworthy of happiness through the transgression of ones duty, one can rationally hope that

happiness will supervene on ones dutiful life. Kant, The Doctrine of Virtue, trans. Mary J. Gregor (Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 1964), 153-156.

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