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Deobandi and Ahle Hadith Rivalry and The Saudi Connection: A Look at History
The following is an interesting research by an Indian journalist/freelance writer. It's a bit lengthy but very informative. This document is complied into PDF from following forum.
http://forums.islamicawakening.com/f18/deobandi-ahle-hadith-rivalry-saudi-connection-look-12597/ Ulema Rivalries and the Saudi Connection Yoginder Sikand
Introduction Its claim of representing Islamic âorthodoxyâ is the Saudi regimeâs principal tool of seeking ideological legitimacy. Saudi Arabia prides itself on being, as it calls itself, the only âtrulyâ Islamic state in the world, although this claim is stiffly disputed by many Muslims. Official Saudi Islam, or what is commonly referred to as âWahhabismâ by its opponents, is the outcome of the movement led by the eighteenth century puritan Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab (1703-91), who, along with Muhmmad ibn Saud, was the chief architect of the Saudi state. Exporting âWahhabiâ Islam to Muslims elsewhere in the world emerged, particularly from the 1970s onwards, as a major preoccupation of the Saudi regime. This was seen as a vital resource in order to gain legitimacy for the Saudi Arabia monarchy. Transnational linkages are thus crucial in the project of contemporary global âWahhabismâ. Since âWahhabismâ is seen by its proponents as the single, âauthenticâ and ânormativeâ form of Islam, it has an inherent tendency of expansionism, seeking to impose itself on or replace other ways of understanding and practising Islam. As home to a Muslim population of over 150 million, India has been an important target of Saudi âWahhabiâ propaganda. Private as well as semi-official Saudi Arabian assistance has made its way to numerous Indian Muslim individuals and organisations. This paper examines the impact of official and unofficial Saudi assistance to Sunni Muslim groups in India. Intra-Sunni Rivalry and the Emergence of the Ahl-i Hadith The establishment of British rule in India had momentous consequences for notions of Muslim and Islamic identity. The widely shared perception of Islam being under threat helped promote a feeling of Muslim unity transcending sectarian and ethnic boundaries.
Yet, at the same time, British rule opened up new spaces for intra-Muslim rivalry. It was in this period that serious differences emerged within the broader Sunni Muslim fold, leading to the development of neatly-defined, and, on numerous issues, mutually opposed, sect-like groups, the principal being the Deobandis, the Barelvis and the Ahl-i Hadith. Each of these groups claimed a monopoly of representing the âauthenticâ Sunni tradition, or the Ahl al- Sunnah waâl Jamaâah, branding rival claimants as aberrant and, in some cases, even as apostates. This brought to the fore the deeply fractured and fiercely contested nature of Sunni âorthodoxyâ. The pioneers of the Ahl-i Hadith saw themselves as struggling to promote what they believed to be the âtrueâ Islam of Muhammad and his companions. Like most other Sunni âulama, they considered the Shiâas to be outside the pale of Islam, and, therefore, kafirs. In addition, they believed that the other Sunni groups, too, had strayed from the path of the âpious predecessorsâ (salaf). They argued, through their writings and fatwas, that the Hanafis, the dominant section among the Indian Sunnis, erred in blind conformity (taqlid) of the âulama of the Hanafi school even when their prescriptions went against the express commandments of the Qurâan and the Hadith. They bitterly castigated this as akin to shirk or the sin of âassociationismâ. They fiercely opposed popular customs and beliefs, widely shared among the Indian Muslims, such as Sufism and the cults of the saints, insisting that these had no sanction in the sunnah or the practice of the Prophet, and were, therefore, wrongful innovations or bidaâah. They decried certain customs widely practised by many Indian Muslims, such as prostrating before graves or praying without uttering the word amin aloud or with the hands folded on the belly instead of on the chest, which they saw as against the practice of the Prophet. They insisted that Muslims must rely solely on the Qurâan and the Hadith for guidance, offering an extremely literalist understanding of these two primary sources of Islamic law. Overall, they saw their mission as rescuing Muslims from what they saw as the sin of shrik and guiding them to the âpure monotheismâ (khalis tauhid) of the Prophet and his companions. Most of them were inspired by the example of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and his companions, particularly appreciating the âWahhabiââs criticism of popular custom. Yet, they did not identify themselves as such, refusing the label of âWahhabiâ that their detractors used to dismiss them. Instead, they insisted that they alone represented the Islam of the Prophet, and that, far from setting up a new sect, they were simply reviving what they believed to be âtrueâ Islam. Hence, they claimed to be muwahhids, or âtrue monotheistsâ, or Ahl-i Hadith or âPeople of the Tradition of the Prophetâ. Despite their differences with the Hanafis, the late nineteenth and early twentieth century Indian Ahl-i Hadith âulama did not go so far as to openly denounce them as infidels, although this seems to have been implied in the writings of some of their scholars who accused their rivals of shirk. On the face of it, they seem to have considered them, in a
restricted sense, fellow Muslims, albeit having been allegedly led astray and hence in urgent need of reform. Some Ahl-i Hadith pioneers, such as Maulana Sanaullah Amritsari (1870-1943), even cooperated with the Deobandi âulama in the formation of the Jamiâat ul-âUlama-i Hind (âThe Union of the âUlama of Indiaâ), while still bitterly critiquing certain Hanafi practices and beliefs. While most early Ahl-i Hadith âulama admired the efforts of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, not all of them agreed entirely with his views. Thus, not all of them approved of his reported claim that Muslims who did not share his beliefs were kafirs and fit to be killed. Some of them also appear to have held certain views commonly attributed to the Ithna âAshari Shiâas, whom Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab had, in no uncertain terms, branded as apostates. In marked opposition to Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhabâs position on Sufism as wholly âun-Islamicâ, some late nineteenth century pioneers among the Indian Ahl-i Hadith, such as Nazir Ahmad Dehlvi, Siddiq Hasan Khan Bhopali and Daud Ghaznavi, were Sufis in their own right. An early Ahl-i Hadith scholar, Wahidduzaman Hyderabadi, is said to have believed in the intercession of holy men, both living as well as dead, as well as in the capacity of dead saints to listen to peopleâs requests. The doyen of the early Ahl-i Hadith, Siddiq Hasan Khan Bhopali, is said to have been convinced of a mystical light (nur) constantly emanating from his fatherâs grave.[1] He is even said to have opposed Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab in some of his writings, a charge that later Ahl-i Hadith scholars were quick to deny.[2] This, however, was an exception, for the majority of the early Indian Ahl-i Hadith appear to have warmly supported Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, although this did not mean that some of them did not have differences with him on certain contentious issues. The crystallisation of the Ahl-i Hadith in India as a separate sect (maslak) was a gradual process, given fillip by the setting up of separate mosques and madrasas from the late nineteenth century onwards, which gave the movement the shape of a community separate from the Hanafi majority. This owed, in part, to the fierce opposition that the Ahl-i Hadith encountered from the Hanafis. Many Hanafi âulama saw the Ahl-i Hadith as a hidden front of the âWahhabisâ, whom they regarded as âenemiesâ of Islam for their fierce opposition to the adoration of the Prophet and the saints, their opposition to popular custom and to taqlid, rigid conformity to one or the other of the four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence. Further, they also saw the Ahl-i Hadith as directly challenging their own claims of representing normative Islam. Numerous Hanafi âulama issued fatwas branding the Al-i Hadith as virtual heretics, contemptuously referring to them as ghair muqallids for their opposition to taqlid, which they believed to be integral to established Sunni tradition. Hanafi opposition to the Ahl-i Hadith was fierce. In many places Hanafis refused them admittance to their mosques, schools and graveyards. Marital ties with them were forbidden, and in some places followers of the Ahl-i Hadith even faced physical assault.
The notion of a separate Ahl-i Hadith identity was given a further boost with the establishment of the All-India Ahl-i Hadith Conference in 1906 which brought together âulama from different parts of India who shared a common commitment to the Ahl-i Hadith vision. From then on much scholarly effort was expended by Ahl-i Hadith âulama on seeking to prove rival Muslim groups, Sunni as well as, of course, Shiâa, as aberrant, stressing points of differences between them and the Ahl-i Hadith in order to argue their own claim of representing the single âauthenticâ Islamic tradition and to further fortify the notion of a separate Ahl-i Hadith identity. This was reciprocated by their rivals, who took upon themselves the task of fiercely denouncing the Ahl- i Hadith. Yet, despite the bitter relations between the Ahl-i Hadith and others the early Ahl-i Hadith âulama did not go so far as to explicitly brand other Sunni groups as apostates. To have done so would have been dangerous, for the Ahl-i Hadith, at that time, as now, formed only a miniscule minority among the Sunnis. The situation began to change, however, from the 1970s onwards, after access to Saudi funds and links with prestigious Saudi patrons gave numerous Ahl-i Hadith leaders a new aggressive confidence to take on their Hanafi rivals despite their continued minority status among the regionâs Muslims. This period also saw a marked transformation in Ahl-i Hadith self-identity. While some pioneers among the Ahl-i Hadith did not conceal their differences with the âWahhabisâ of Saudi Arabia on some points, access to Saudi funds led to a gradual erasure of these differences, so much so that the Ahl-i Hadith came to present itself as a carbon copy of Saudi-style âWahhabismâ, with nothing to distinguish itself from it and upholding this form of Islam as normative. As their Muslim critics saw it, this had only a single explanation: It was simply a clever means to win the favour of generous Saudi benefactors. The Saudi-Ahl-i Hadith Connection: Wahhabism as An External Policy Tool Close links between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi state and âWahhabiâ âulama go back to the early decades of the twentieth century. The early Ahl-i Hadith, although not a complete replica of the Saudi âWahhabisâ, did not conceal its support for the Saudi state, which it saw as leading a crusade for what it regarded as a âtrulyâ Islamic polity. When, in the early 1920s, âAbdul âAziz bin âAbdul Rahman ibn Faisal al-Saud, or Ibn Saud for short, conquered the Hijaz with British help and declared the founding of the second Saudi state, many Muslims in India and elsewhere were incensed, fearing that the fiercely iconoclastic âWahhabisâ would destroy the tomb of Muhammad and other holy sites in Arabia. Predictably, the conquest of the Hijaz led to heightened acrimony between the Ahl-i Hadith and other, including rival Sunni, Muslim groups in India. Indian Hanafi leaders set up an organisation, the Hizb ul-Ahnaf (âThe Hanafi Armyâ) to oppose the Saudi rulers and the Ahl-i Hadith, who were seen as their agents. A Muslim Hijaz Conference was organised in Lucknow by the Khuddam al-Haramayn (âServants of the
Two Holy Citiesâ) Society in 1926, which passed a resolution calling for the liberation of the Hijaz from Saudi control and suggesting that Muslims refrain from the pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina till the âWahhabisâ had been overthrown. Massive anti-âWahhabiâ demonstrations took place in different parts of India, denouncing the Saudi rulers as âanti-Muslimâ. At this time, when the Saudi rulers were faced with stiff opposition from many Muslim quarters, the Indian Ahl-i Hadith were quick to rush to their defence. They insisted that the Saudi rulers were âgenuinelyâ Islamic, and hence argued that they must be defended at all costs. In 1927 some Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars even travelled to Najd to meet Ibn Saud and to attend the Hijaz Conference that he had organised to galvanise worldwide Muslim support for himself. The All-India Ahl-i Hadith Conference organised a number of rallies to galvanise support for Ibn Saud and to oppose his detractors among the Indian Muslims. Numerous leading Ahl-i Hadith scholars also penned tracts and books defending the Saudi ruler and âWahhabismâ, claiming that Ibn Saudâs destruction of tombs over graves was fully in accordance with the injunctions of Islam. Echoing the views of many of his fellow Ahl-i Hadith, the founder and president of the All-India Ahl-i Hadith Conference, Muhammad bin Ibrahim Junagadhi (d.1942), in a pamphlet defending Ibn Saud declared that âFrom every angle, religious as well as political, Ibn Saud most well suited to be the servant [ruler] of the Hijazâ. For his part, Ibn Saud dispatched a number of letters to Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders acknowledging his gratitude for their help and expressing his support for their mission. These letters were later published in several Ahl-i Hadith newspapers.[1] The ties that were cemented between the Indian Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi state and its official âWahhabiâ âulama in the 1920s were to become even closer in the decades that followed. * The 1970s witnessed a growing involvement of certain Arab states, institutions and private donors in sponsoring a number of Islamic organisations and institutions in India. This was a direct outcome of the boom in oil revenues, particularly following the hike in oil prices by OPEC members in the wake of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Although the precise magnitude of Arab assistance to Indian Muslim organisations cannot be ascertained, it was certainly significant, although the Indian press routinely exaggerated it, leading to a scare of petrodollars flooding the country as part of an alleged grand conspiracy to convert poor, particularly âlowâ caste, Hindus to Islam. In actual fact, few Muslim organisations actually engaged in missionary work among Hindus received such money. Instead, most Arab, including Saudi, financial assistance went to Muslim organisations to establish mosques, madrasas and publishing houses. To a lesser extent, money was channelled to Muslim organisations to set up schools and hospitals in Muslim
localities and to provide scholarships to needy Muslim students. Saudi funds for Muslim institutions in India have come through a range of sources, including the Saudi state, various Saudi-sponsored Islamic organisations such as the Mecca-based Rabita al-âAlami al-Islami (World Muslim League) and the Dar ul-âIfta waâl Daâwat ul-Irshad, as well as private donors, mostly rich shaikhs, some with close links to the Saudi ruling family. Several Indian Muslims working in Saudi Arabia in various capacities also send back money to fund Islamic institutions, mostly based in towns and villages where their families live. In addition, the Saudi embassy in New Delhi is said to be closely linked to a number of Islamic religious scholars, Muslim journalists and managers of Muslim institutions in the country. Although this could not be verified, it is claimed that requests for financial aid are often made to the Embassy from these individuals and institutions, and the Embassy, in turn, forwards these requests to the appropriate authorities in Saudi Arabia itself. It is also claimed that a number of newspapers, Muslim-owned as well as others, receive money from Saudi sources to publish articles in support of the Saudi regime. Furthermore, the Saudi authorities are said to pay the salaries of a number of teachers, known as mabuth, employed in various Indian madrasas, almost all of these being graduates of Saudi universities and mostly associated with the Ahl-i Hadith. Monetary assistance to selected Islamic institutions is only one method through which the Saudis have sought to patronise and influence key Muslim leaders and opinion makers in India. Other forms of assistance include sponsored haj pilgrimages for Muslim leaders, including âulama, patronising of selected publishing houses, scholarships for madrasa students to study in Saudi Islamic universities and jobs for such graduates in both the private as well as public sector within Saudi Arabia. The largest beneficiary of this largesse is believed to be the Ahl-i Hadith, although the Jamaâat-i Islami and the Deobandis are also said to have benefited to some extent. The Barelvis and the Shiâas, both of whom regard âWahhabismâ as wholly heretical, have received little or no financial support at all from Saudi sources.[2] This itself suggests that Saudi finance to Muslim institutions in India is intended to serve and promote a particular ideological vision of Islam, one that ties in with the interests of the Saudi regime and its official âWahhabiâ âulama. Saudi Arabia emerged as a significant sponsor of Islamic institutions internationally, including in India, only in the 1970s. This was a period of intense ideological struggle in the Arab world. Arab socialism and pan-Arab nationalism under Nasser in Egypt and the Baâathists in Syria and Iraq and various communist parties active in numerous Arab states all called for the overthrow of monarchical regimes in the region, which they saw as lackeys of the United States and as helping the Zionist occupation of Palestine. Within
Saudi Arabia itself voices of dissent and protest emerged, including from those who had been influenced by socialist trends elsewhere in the region. Then came the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, which led to fears of an export of revolutionary, anti-monarchical Islam to the Arab world, including to Saudi Arabia. Ayatollah Khomeini vehemently denounced the Saudi kingdom, insisting that Islam had no place for monarchical rule. He also bitterly attacked the Saudis for being American stooges and for willingly acquiescing in American support for Israel. In his will, made public in 1989, he denounced the Saudi regime as âanti-Islamicâ, claiming that it was in league with âSatanic powersâ. He argued that âWahhabismâ represented âanti-Qurâanic ideasâ and a âbaseless, superstitious cultâ, and was aimed at destroying Islam from within.[3] Radical appeals emanating from Tehran, including anti-âWahhabiâ and anti-Saudi sentiments, soon caught the imagination of Muslims all over the world. The Iranian Revolution played the role of a major catalyst in moulding Saudi foreign policy, in which the export of its official âWahhabiâ form of Islam emerged as a key instrument. The anti-monarchical thrust of the Revolution was seen by the Saudi regime as a menacing threat. If the Shah of Iran, Americaâs closest and strongest ally in the region, could be overthrown as a result of the passionate appeals of a charismatic Imam, the Saudi rulers, it was painfully realised, could well meet the same fate. Consequently, the Saudis, backed by the Americans, began investing heavily in promoting âWahhabiâ Islam abroad in order to counter the appeal of the Iranian Revolution, both within Saudi Arabia itself and abroad. Stressing the regimeâs âIslamicâ credentials now came to be relied upon as the principal tool to strengthen it and to stave of challenges from internal as well as external opponents, from Muslims opposed to the regimeâs corrupt and dictatorial ways and its close alliance with the imperialist powers, principally the United States. Saudi export of âWahhabismâ was given a further boost with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, when the Saudis, supported by the Americans, pumped in millions of dollars to fund âWahhabiâ-style schools and organisations in Pakistan in order to train guerrillas to fight the Russians. While such assistance, in Afghanistan and elsewhere, was presented as a sign of Saudi Arabiaâs professed commitment to âtrueâ Islam, it also functioned as a thinly veiled guise for promoting the interests of the Saudi regime. In exporting this brand of Islam abroad, India, home to the second largest Muslim community in the world, received particular importance. The sort of Islam that the Saudis began aggressively promoting abroad, including in India, in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, had a number of characteristic features. It was extremely literalist; it was rigidly and narrowly defined, being concerned particularly with issues of âcorrectâ ritual and belief, rather than with wider social and political issues; it was viciously sectarian, branding dissenting groups, such as Shiâas and followers of the Sufis as âenemiesâ of Islam; and, finally, it was explicitly and fiercely
critical of ideologies and groups, Muslim as well as other, that were regarded as political threats to the Saudi regime. Accordingly, these were routinely castigated as ploys of the âenemies of Islamâ.[4] Saudi Patronage and the Indian Ahl-i Hadith A hugely disproportionate amount of Saudi aid to Indian Muslim groups in the decades after the Iranian Revolution is said to have gone to institutions run by the Ahl-i Hadith. This is hardly surprising, given the shared ideological tradition and vision of the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi âWahhabisâ. One result of the generous Saudi patronage of the Indian Ahl-i Hadith has been that there has been a growing convergence between the latter and the Saudi âWahhabiâ âulama so much so that today there is hardly any difference between the two groups. A revealing indication of the effort on the part of the Indian Ahl-i Hadith to identify themselves with their Saudi patrons, a Deobandi critic writes, is the fact that the Ahl-i Hadith now prefer to refer to themselves as âSalafisâ, a term that the Saudi âWahhabisâ commonly use for themselves.[5] As pointed out earlier, most Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries did hail Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab as a great âreformerâ and as a pioneer in reviving âtrueâ Islam and âauthenticâ monotheism, but, despite this, some of them were critical of his extremism and that of his followers. Today, this sort of criticism is completely absent in Indian Ahl-i Hadith circles, and Indian Ahl-i Hadith âulama now routinely hail the Wahhabi âulama of Najd as representing the only single âsaved sectâ (firqa al-najiya), and the Saudi regime as the only genuinely âIslamicâ regime in the world. Saudi finance to Indian Ahl-i Hadith institutions has heavily influenced the contents of the vast amount of literature that they produce and distribute. In the last two decades there has been a mushroom growth in the number of Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India. Several of them are said to receive Saudi funds, directly or otherwise. Many of them produce low-priced books, and, now, audiotapes, videocassettes and compact disks, and some even operate their own websites. Most of the authors whose works they publish are Indian, and to a lesser extent, Pakistani, Ahl-i Hadith âulama whom have received higher education in various Saudi universities. Several of them are presently working in various official as well as private Islamic organisations in Saudi Arabia itself. Their vision and understanding of Islam is indelibly shaped by their own experiences in Saudi Arabia. They see the Saudi âWahhabiâ version of Islam as normative, and other forms of Islam as deviant. In addition to the works of these writers, Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses are now churning out Urdu and, to a lesser extent, Hindi and English, translations of works, including fatwas, by leading Saudi Wahhabi âulama, the most prominent of whom being the late Shaikh âAbdul âAziz bin âAbdullah bin Baz (d. 1999), chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, and the late Shaikh Nasiruddin Albani (d. 1999) professor at the Islamic
University of Medina. This clearly reflects the understanding that local forms of Islam in India need to be stamped out and replaced by the puritanical, literalist Islam of the Saudi âWahhabisâ. Much of the literature produced by Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses focuses on the minutiae of ritual practises and beliefs. This is a reflection, in part, of the overwhelmingly literalist understanding of Saudi âWahhabiâ Islam. Scores of books penned by Ahl-i Hadith âulama are devoted to intricate discussion of what they regard as the âcorrectâ methods of praying, performing ablutions and offering supplications, as well as rules and regulations related to food, dress, marriage, divorce and so on. A principle purpose of these publications is to attack rival Muslim, including Sunni, groups, and to sternly condemn them as âaberrantâ on account of differences in their methods of performing rituals and their rules governing a range of issues related to normative personal and collective behaviour. These elaborate discussions also serve to critique the Hanafi insistence on taqlid, which several Ahl-i Hadith scholars condemn as akin to shirk or âassociationismâ, arguing that it logically leads to setting up an authority that rivals God.[6] These and related debates are used to reinforce the claim of the Ahl-i Hadith, as well as the Saudi Wahhabi âulama, being the only group that faithfully abides by the sunnah of the Prophet and to declare all other Muslim groups as deviant. Sometimes, this is taken to the extent of denouncing their rivals as being effectively outside the pale of the Ahl al- Sunnah waâl Jamaâah, and, hence, for all practical purposes, non-Muslims. Another interesting feature of the literature produced by Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India, and one that is directly linked to the close association between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Saudi âWahhabisâ, is a fierce hostility to local beliefs and practices. This hostility, while having been a defining feature of the early Ahl-i Hadith, has been further exacerbated with the growing Saudi-Ahl-i Hadith nexus. In recent years Ahl-i Hadith scholars have penned scores of books and tracts sternly denouncing customs that many Indian Muslims share with their Hindu neighbours, a legacy of their pre-Islamic past. These also includes customs, such as those associated with popular Sufism and the cults of the saints, which enabled Islam to take root in India and to adjust to the Indian cultural context. As Ahl-i Hadith writers see it, these are all âwrongful innovationsâ, having no sanction in the Prophetâs sunnah, and hence must be rooted out. In their place they advocate an adoption of a range of Arab cultural norms and practices which are seen as genuinely âIslamicâ. The publication of Urdu translations of the compendia of fatwas of leading Saudi âWahhabiâ âulama by Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses is a reflection of this cultural alternative that they seek to provide to take the place of what they see as âun-Islamicâ practices widely prevalent among many Indian Muslims. This has added to the conflict with other Muslim groups, most particularly with the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis. The âSaudi Arabisationâ of Islam and Indian
Muslim culture that the Ahl-i Hadith seeks to promote also inevitably further widens the cultural chasm between Muslims and Hindus. As many Ahl-i Hadith âulama see it, and this is reflected in their writings as well, Hinduism is hardly different from the pagan religion of the Arabs of the pre-Islamic jahiliya period. Although most of them do not advocate conflict with Hindus, some Ahl-i Hadith scholars insist on the need for Muslims to have as little to do with the Hindus as possible, for fear of the âdeleteriousâ consequences this might have for the Muslimsâ own commitment to and practice of Islam. Like other Muslim groups, Indian Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses have also paid particular attention to combating their Muslim rivals. This, as shall be later argued, cannot be understood without taking into account the Saudi connection. Scores of books have been penned by Indian Ahl-i Hadith âulama, branding Sufis, Shiâas and Deobandis as heretical [7]. Sometimes, this charge is stated openly. On other occasions it is articulated indirectly, but in a manner that the reader is driven to the conclusion that other groups who claim to be Sunni are not genuinely so or might not be even Muslim at all.[8] This concern to combat other Muslim groups has been particularly exacerbated as a result of links established with Saudi patrons. This campaign is led by high profile Indian and Pakistani Ahl-i Hadith scholars, who have generally trained in Saudi universities or are based in Islamic institutions in Saudi Arabia itself. Heated polemical attacks on other Muslim groups are a means for them to stress the separate identity of the Ahl-i Hadith and to press its claim of representing âauthenticâ Islam. It also provides them with positions of authority as spokesmen of âtrueâ Islam. Moderates among the Ahl-i Hadith do exist, who seek to lessen tensions with other Muslim groups, but they seem to be relatively powerless in the face of leaders who have access to Saudi funds and have a vested interest in stressing and reinforcing differences with other Muslim communities. Tirelessly claiming in their writings to being the sole representatives of ânormativeâ Islam and, in the process, identifying themselves with the Saudi âWahhabiâ âulama, enables the Indian Ahl-i Hadith âulama to present themselves as faithful allies of the Saudis, which, in turn, helps earn for them recognition as well as monetary assistance from Saudi sponsors. In addition, such publications also serve the purpose of presenting the Saudi âWahhabiâ version of Islam as normative, and in putting forward the claim of the Saudi regime being the only one in the world sincerely and seriously committed to âgenuineâ Islam. Access to Saudi funds has, therefore, led to heightened conflict between various Muslim sectarian groups in India, as Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses produce and distribute literature on a large scale bitterly attacking their rivals of being Muslim only in name. While earlier Ahl-i Hadith scholars did critique other Muslim groups, this criticism was relatively mild and did not go to the extent of denouncing fellow Sunnis as apostates.
This was probably a tactical move, for the Ahl-i Hadith were a small and beleaguered minority. Now, however, access to new patrons and sources of funds has provided the Ahl-i Hadith with an aggressive confidence to denounce their Muslim rivals, going even beyond the somewhat limited critique of their predecessors. According to Mohammed Zeyaul Haque, an Indian Muslim journalist, while earlier Ahl-i Hadith criticism of Hanafi practices was limited largely to âmatters of insignificant detailâ, such as âproperâ ritual practices during prayers, the method of divorce and so on, of late âa vicious campaign of slanderâ has been launched by âmischief-makers sitting in countries of the Middle Eastâ (by which he seems to refer to Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars based in Saudi Arabia) carefully âtargeting Hanafis of all kinds, and going to the extent of denouncing them as kafirsâ. Among their targets have been the widely respected and Hanafi-dominated All-India Muslim Personal Law Board and the leaders of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaâat, the largest Islamic movement in the world, which has its global headquarters in India. Haque claims that recently a number of books, originating from South Asian Ahl-i Hadith scholars based in the Middle East and fiercely denouncing the Hanafis (besides the Shiâas) as disbelievers, have âflooded the subcontinentâ.[9] Heightened intra-Muslim polemics within India are not unrelated to the interests of the Saudi regime. Thus, the virulently anti-Shiâa and anti-Sufi propaganda material churned out by various Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India, some of this said to be sponsored by Saudi patrons, serves the purpose of denouncing as outside the pale of Islam Muslim groups who are opposed to âWahhabismâ and the Saudi state, these often being branded as âenemiesâ of Islam. In this way the literature produced by several Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India helps promote a version and vision of Islam that is almost identical to that of the âWahhabisâ of Saudi Arabia, and hence one that fits in with the interests of both the Saudi Wahhabi âulama as well as the Saudi state. This function is served more directly through forms of literature that raise political, as opposed to simply theological, issues. As mentioned earlier, the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979 appeared to the Saudi regime as a major threat to its own survival as its claims for championing Islam were dismissed as hypocritical. Consequently, some Indian Ahl-i Hadith (as well as Deobandi) âulama penned tracts and booksâpaid for this by Saudi patrons, their critics allegeâto brand the Revolution as a Shiâa, and, therefore, âanti-Islamicâ, insurrection, Khomeini as an âenemy of Islamâ, and the Shiâa faith as a âJewish conspiracyâ to destroy Islam from within. Predictably, the Revolution was painted in the lurid colours. It was explained simply as an âanti-Islamicâ conspiracy hatched by the Shiâa âulama in order to export Shiâism and establish Shiâa political rule over the Sunnis. In this way, the appeal of the Revolution, its anti-monarchical thrust and its bitter critique of Western imperialism that had led to considerable support for Khomeini among many Sunnis, including in India, was sought to be countered. The attack on the Revolution was deliberately couched in an âIslamicâ form in order to dismiss the Khomeiniâs legitimacy.
This also served as a means to defend the Saudi regime in âIslamicâ terms, it being routinely described in Ahl-i Hadith literature as the only âtrulyâ Islamic regime in the world. This claim of the Saudi monarchy as representing the sole âauthenticâ Islamic regime in the world is repeatedly stressed in several Ahl-i Hadith writings, and reflects the close links, ideological as well as financial, between several Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders and the Saudi state and its official âWahhabiâ âulama. Numerous books penned by Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars discuss in detail the âgreatâ contributions of the present rulers of Saudi Arabia to the âIslamic causeâ, inevitably concluding with the claim that Saudi Arabia under its present masters represents the only âtrulyâ Islamic state in the world today. They also make it a point to call on God to bless the Saudi king and pray for his continued rule. The Saudi monarch is invariably presented as a pious, fully committed Muslim, whose sole concern is, so it is sought to be argued, the protection and promotion of âauthenticâ Islam. Support for this âauthenticâ Islam and for the Saudi rulers are presented as indivisible. Interestingly, there is no reference at all in Ahl-i Hadith writings to the widespread dissatisfaction within Saudi Arabia itself with the ruling family. Nor is there any reference to the rampant corruption in the country, the lavish lifestyles of the princes, and to Saudi Arabiaâs close links with the United States. Nor, still, is there ever any mention of the claim, put forward by many Muslims, that monarchy is âun-Islamicâ, particularly one like the despotic and corrupt Saudi regime. This is added evidence of the fact that Saudi-sponsored propaganda abroad is tailor-made to suit the interests of its ruling family. A case in point is a book financed by a Saudi professor, published by the apex Ahl-i Hadith madrasa in India and authored by an Indian Ahl-i Hadith writer based in Saudi Arabia, âAbul Mukarram âAbdul Jalil. The author insists that because the message of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab is based on âtrueâ (sahih) Islamic beliefs, every Muslim must accept and follow it. At the same time, because the present Saudi regime, allegedly, continues to follow faithfully in the footsteps of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, it is, the author writes, imperative on all Muslims to support the Saudi rulers.[10] Similarly, a booklet penned by the late Shaikh âAbdul âAziz bin âAbdullah bin Baz, chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, and translated into Urdu and published in India by an Ahl-i Hadith publishing company, hails the Saudi ruling family for allegedly working for the victory of âtrueâ Islam. The pamphlet ends with a prayer to God to keep the Saudi ruling family on the âstraight pathâ.[11] A particularly interesting text in this regard is a recent Urdu translation of a voluminous book, running into almost 400 pages, penned by a Saudi scholar devoted to extolling the praises of the Saudi regime for what its title refers to as its impressive âIslamic
missionary and educational servicesâ. The author of the book, Saleh bin Ghanim al-Sadlan, is a professor at the Jamiâa Imam Muhammad bin Saud University, Riyadh, and is associated with a number official Saudi Islamic organisations and institutions. The book is an expanded version of a paper presented by the author at a conference organised by the Department of Religious Affairs and Endowments, Riyadh. The book has been translated into Urdu and published by an Indian Ahl-i Hadith student of his, âAbdur Rahman bin âAbdul Jabbar Farewai, who runs an Islamic institution in New Delhi.[12] The book provides details of various Islamic organisations set up and funded by the Saudi regime, both inside as well as outside the Kingdom. These institutions, so its author claims, are engaged in what he calls âamazingâ contributions to the cause of Islam, âproviding peace and satisfaction to the hearts and minds of the followers of Islamâ. All these efforts are said to be a reflection of the commitment of the Saudi rulers to the Islamic cause. As al-Sadlan tells his readers, this shows that âIn this period of the decline of the Muslims the existence of Saudi Arabia is a great blessing for the Islamic worldâ.[13] Expectedly, the book reads as a crude piece of undisguised propaganda for the Saudi monarchy. The author claims that Saudi Arabia is the âonlyâ state in the world that is governed according to the Qurâan. The rulers and the âulama of Saudi Arabia, he writes, âhave created a model Islamic governmentâ which has âraised high the flag of Islamâ, âworked for the spread of true Islam all over the worldâ, and has made âimmense contributions in the field of Islamic unity and service of humanityâ. The Saudi government, he says, âhas always supported human and moral valuesâ and is a âmodel of justice, peace, security, love and unityâ.[14] âAll its revenue, trade and economic institutionsâ, he claims, âare based on the shariâahâ. He describes it newly established, but toothless, consultative committee (nizam-i shurâa) as having been set up âonly in order that the country should firmly and strictly follow the path of the shariâah and Muhammad, peace be upon himâ.[15] Predictably, there is no mention at all about Saudi Arabiaâs key role in the Western-dominated global capitalist economy, and of its close financial and political relations with the United States and other Western imperialist powers. For his part, the Saudi king is described by al-Sadlan as the âCustodian of the Two Holy Citiesâ (khadim al-harimayn al-sharifayn), and is portrayed as having been appointed by God Himself to serve the cause of Islam. He is described as performing this onerous responsibility with diligence and fervour. He is said to have âfull faith in the fact that his government must work for the prosperity of Islamâ. He is said to âfirmly believe in the supremacy of the Qurâan and the sunnahâ[16], and is quoted as declaring that âThe Constitution of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the Qurâan itself, which falsehood cannot touch, from front or from behindâ.[17] Concluding his book, the author prays that God should protect the âIslamic Sultanateâ of Saudi Arabia âin this age of terrorismâ so that it
can âcarry on in the service of Islamâ.[18] Ahl-i Hadith-Deobandi Polemics and the Saudi Nexus Central to âWahhabismâ is the understanding that it alone represents ânormativeâ Islam, and that other understandings of the faith are, by definition, âfalseâ. One might argue that the âWahhabisâ are not unique in this, and that, in fact, all Muslim sectarian groups do share this conviction. While that may well be true, âWahhabiâ attitudes towards other Muslim groups have historically been characterised by a fierce extremism quite unparalleled in the case of other contemporary Muslim sects. This is another feature that Saudi-style âWahhabismâ shares with the Ahl-i Hadith. As a claimant to Sunni âorthodoxyâ, the Ahl-i Hadith is not alone in denouncing the Shiâas as heretics, and, therefore, outside the pale of Islam. In fact, many Deobandi and Barelvi âulama share the same opinion. Hence, the virulent opposition to the Shiâas on the part of the Ahl-i Hadith is hardly surprising. Given its commitment to what it sees as âpureâ monotheism and its fierce opposition to âwrongful innovationsâ, its denunciation of the Barelvis, who are associated with the cults of the Sufis, is also understandable. What seems particularly intriguing, however, is the fact that, of late, Ahl-i Hadith publishing houses in India have been devoting particular attention to denouncing the Deobandis, who, while being muqallids as well as proponents of a reformed Sufism, share with the Ahl-i Hadith a commitment to strict compliance with the shariâah and the extirpation of what they describe as bidaâah. In that sense, the Ahl-i Hadith are closer in doctrinal terms to the Deobandis than to any other Indian Sunni group. Despite this, it appears that in recent years Indian Ahl-i Hadith scholars have been focussing considerably more attention to combating the Deobandis than to critiquing their Barelvi and Shiâa rivals. This seemingly puzzling development begs an explanation. One possible reason for this is that the Deobandis in India are far more organised and influential than the Barelvis. The Deobandis manage a number of influential organisations, madrasas and publishing houses all over India. Consequently, they have probably been more effective in critiquing the Ahl-i Hadith than their other rivals, which, in turn, has forced the Ahl-i Hadith to pay particular attention to the challenge they face from the Deobandi front. In addition to this factor are other developments, related to struggles over money, influence and authority, which have made for a sharp intensification of rivalries between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in recent years. The Saudi connection seems to have played a major role in abetting these conflicts. Relations between the Ahl-i Hadith and the Deobandis in India have, since their
inception, been strained. Seeing the Ahl-i Hadith as a potent challenge to their own authority, early Deobandi âulama bitterly critiqued and denounced them. Some even wrote boldly against Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, arguing that his movement had nothing at all to do with Islam. Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), rector of the Deoband madrasa, penned a polemical tract, al-Shahab al-Shaqab, where he claimed that Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab preached âpatent falsehoodâ (âaqaâid-i batila), killed numerous Sunni Muslims and forced many others to accept his âfalseâ creed (âaqaâid-i fasida). He referred to him as a âtyrantâ (zalim), âtraitorâ (baghi), and âdespicableâ (khabis), and labelled him and his followers as the âdespicable Wahhabisâ (wahhabiya khabisia).[19] He wrote that Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab had declared the wealth of all Muslims, including Sunnis, who did not follow him as property that could be rightfully looted (mal-i ghanimat), and their slaughter as a cause of merit (sawab), considering all but his own followers as apostates. This is why, he claimed, the Arabs âdetestedâ Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and his followers, their hatred for them âexceeding their hatred for Jews, Christians, Magians and Hindusâ. âUndoubtedlyâ, Madani asserted, Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab had committed such heinous crimes that âsuch hatred for him is a mustâ.[20] Other Deobandis seem to have displayed similar views on the Saudi âWahhabisâ, although there were exceptions. A leading Deobandi scholar, Anwar Shah Kashmiri, insisted that Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab was âstupidâ (bewaquf) and had âlittle knowledgeâ (kam âilm), because of which he was âquick to declare other Muslims as kafirsâ. On the other hand, Rashid Ahmad Gangohi, teacher and spiritual master of Husain Ahmad Madani, issued a fatwa laying down that the âWahhabisâ beliefs were âgoodâ (âumdah) and that they were âgoodâ people, although he added that Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhabâs views were âextremeâ (shiddat) and that when his followers transcended the âlimitsâ it lead to considerable strife (fasad).[21] Gangohiâs views were contradicted by some of his own students. Thus, Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri considered the âWahhabisâ as deviant, and claimed, referring to Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, that âneither he nor any of his followers and clan are among our teachers in any of our chains of transmission in Islamic knowledge, whether in jurisprudence, Hadith, Qurâanic commentary or Sufismâ.[22] Likewise, Husain Ahmad Madani, also a student of Gangohi, dissented from his teacherâs opinion. Gangohi, he said, did not have a proper, complete and first-hand knowledge of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhabâs beliefs.[23] The opposition of the early Deobandis to the Ahl-i Hadith and to the Saudi âWahhabisâ stemmed, in part, from the âWahhabiâ critique of rigid taqlid and Sufism, which the Deobandis upheld but which the âWahhabisâ branded as heretical. Deobandi opposition to the âWahhabi label might also have been motivated, in large measure, by fear of British reprisal. âWahhabisâ, as the British Indian authorities saw them, were Muslim groups
who sought to challenge colonial rule, and who were, therefore, regarded as deadly enemies of the Raj. Furthermore, it appears that Deobandi efforts to clearly distance themselves from the âWahhabisâ had also to do with Deobandi-Barelvi rivalries. Thus, for instance, Husain Ahmad Madani undertook to write his al-Shahab al-Shaqab against the âWahhabisâ as a response to a book, Husam al-Harmayn, written by Ahmad Raza Khan, leader of the Barelvis. In his book Khan culled out statements from the writings of numerous Deobandi elders which âprovedâ, so he argued, that the Deobandis were âWahhabisâ and, therefore, kafirs, adding that those who doubted their being kafirs were kafirs themselves. In order to gain support for his stand he travelled to the Hijaz and had his claims against the Deobandis endorsed by several anti-âWahhabiâ âulama of Mecca and Medina, whose statements he reproduced in his book. Alarmed that the book would turn Indian Muslim opinion against the Deobandis, Madani, it is said, was forced to pen his polemical tract, wherein he claimed that the Deobandis had nothing at all to do with the âWahhabisâ at all, effectively declaring Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and his followers as outside the Sunni fold.[24] Although several early Deobandi leaders sought to distance themselves from the Saudi âWahhabisâ, on the whole a distinct ambiguity seems to have characterised their response to the charge of being âWahhabisâ themselves. This owed to the ambiguity of the term âWahhabiâ as it was commonly understood and used in India. While the Deobandis were careful to insist that they were not âWahhabisâ in the sense of being followers of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, some Deobandis, recognising the commitment that they shared with the Saudi âWahhabisâ to the extirpation of what they regarded as bidaâah, accepted the label âWahhabiâ in that limited sense. Thus, for instance, Muhammad Zakariya, chief ideologue of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaâat, is said to have proudly announced before his followers, âI am a more staunch Wahhabi than all of youâ. Likewise, Yusuf Kandhalavi, son and successor of the founder of the Tablighi Jamaâat, Ilyas Kandhalavi, declared, âWe are staunch Wahhabisâ. Given the shared vision, albeit limited in extent, of the Saudi âWahhabisâ and the Deobandis, it was possible for the two groups to seek to work together for common purposes. Thus, Ilyas Kandhalavi and a group of his followers met the Saudi ruler in 1938, and discussed with him and the Saudi âWahhabiâ âulama plans for allowing the Tablighi Jamaâat to function in the country.[25] Yet, although it is claimed that the Saudi monarch and several of his âulama welcomed the prospect, the movement was not allowed to establish a presence in Saudi Arabia. The situation remains the same today. It appears that the fact that the movementâs Deobandi links were a major cause for concern on the part of numerous Saudi âWahhabiâ âulama, who regarded the Deobandi tradition as bidaâah and as promoting shirk. Further, it might also be that the Saudi authorities viewed with concern the possibility of any independent, particularly foreign-based, Islamic movement, such as the Tablighi Jamaâat, being active in their own country, fearing that it might work to undermine their own legitimacy.
The Deobandis, by and large, seem to have maintained the somewhat ambiguous attitude of their elders towards the Ahl-i Hadith and the âWahhabisâ till at least the late 1970s, when the situation began to change with new access to Saudi funding. In the course of the Afghan war against the Soviets the Saudis recognised that the Deobandis were far more influential and had a far larger presence than the Ahl-i Hadith, in both Pakistan as well as Afghanistan. Consequently, much Saudi funding began making its way to Deobandi madrasas in Pakistan in order to train guerrilla fighters armed with a passion for jihad against the Russians. A shared commitment to a shariâah-centric Islam made such assistance acceptable to both parties. The Pakistani Deobandis were, on the whole, not reluctant to accept such assistance, despite the views of their own elders about the âWahhabisâ. Over time, in India, too, several Deobandi âulama are said to have begun receiving Saudi aid, in some form or the other, for their madrasas and other religious institutions. It is said that several Deobandi leaders sort to court prospective Saudi patrons by claiming to be fellow defenders of âauthenticâ monotheism, adducing their fierce and unremitting critiques of the Barelvis as evidence. Naturally, the newly established links with Saudi patrons forced them to reconsider their own position on âWahhabismâ and the Saudi state. A clear indication of the flexibility that the Deobandis were willing to display in their relations with the Saudi âWahhabisâ was the publication in 1978 of a book revealingly titled Shaikh Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab Ke Khilaf Propaganda Aur Hindustan Ke âUlama-i Haq Par Uske Asrat (âThe Propaganda Against Shaikh Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and Its Impact on the True âUlamaâ).[26] The timing of the publication was significant. It came at a time when the Deobandis, in both India and Pakistan, were increasingly turning to Saudi patrons, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This necessitated a thorough revision of the Deobandi understanding and presentation of Saudi âWahhabismâ and of its founder. As earlier pointed out, several Deobandi elders had bitterly critiqued Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, going so far as to declare him, for all practical terms, as âanti-Muslimâ. Now, however, the increasingly close relations between certain Deobandis and Saudi patrons called for both an apology and an explanation for the bitter critique of the founding-father of âWahhabismâ by the elders of Deoband. This is precisely what this book set out to do. The author of the book, the late Manzur Nuâmani (d.1997), was one of the leading Indian Deobandi âulama, having served as member of the governing council (majlis-i shurâa) of the Deoband madrasa for many years. He had dozens of books to his credit and was the founder and editor of the widely circulated Urdu magazine al-Furqan. A fiercely committed Deobandi, he wrote extensively against the Barelvis and the Shiâas and in defence of Deobandi doctrines. His book in praise of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab has
gone into numerous editions, a sign of its considerable popularity in Deobandi circles. He described the book as the outcome of a dream of the then rector of the Deoband madrasa, the late Qari Muhammad Tayyeb, who, he wrote, had repeatedly requested him to write a full-fledged book to bridge the gulf and remove the âmisunderstandingsâ between the Deobandis and the followers of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, both of whom he is said to have regarded as âservants of the faithâ and as âupholders of monotheism and the sunnahâ. The book appears to have received the official approval of several leading Deobandi âulama, concerned as they were about improving relations with the Saudis, including, probably, prospective Saudi patrons. In fact, in the concluding section Nuâmani explicitly stated that the book laid out the position of the âulama of Deoband. He backed this claim by including the testimonies of two leading Deobandi âulama, the late Muhammad Zakariya Kandhalavi, chief ideologue of the Deobandi-related Tablighi Jamaâat movement, and Qari Muhammad Tayyeb. Zakariyaâs statement declared the book to be âvery goodâ.[27] For his part, Tayyeb heaped praises on the book, and claimed that it finally âprovedâ that there is actually no âdifference of principleâ (âusuli ikhtilaf) between the Deobandis and the âWahhabisâ, and that âto a very great extent they âare unitedâ. He also advised that the book be translated into Arabic as soon as possible.[28] The book was later rendered into Arabic in order to convince Arab readers, including possible patrons, that the Deobandis were not opposed to Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and his followers. Nuâmani begins his book by claiming that because of the wave of virulent propaganda unleashed by the âreligious and political enemiesâ of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, numerous âtrue âulamaâ (âulama-i haq) (by which Nuâmani probably means the âulama of Deoband) unwittingly opposed his message. He stresses the point that the Deobandi elders were not alone in this. Numerous Indian Ahl-i Hadith leaders, he points out, also shared the same opinion, and one of them, Siddiq Hasan Khan, even penned a tract condemning him. He seeks to suggest that the initial opposition to Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab on the part of some Deobandi elders might have stemmed, in part, from the influence of Khanâs writings. This point is crucial, for it enables him to counter the Ahl-i Hadith claim of always and unanimously having being supportive of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and his mission, an argument which the Ahl-i Hadith generally use in order to gain Saudi support. He then hastens to add that when the âtruthâ of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhabâs mission and message dawned on them the Deobandi elders did not hesitate to retract their statements against him and to express support for him and his mission.[29] Nuâmani takes, as a case in point, the views of the rector of the Deoband madrasa, Husain Ahmad Madani, who, as noted earlier, penned a book bitterly attacking Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab. As a child, Nuâmani writes, Madani was brought up to understand that
Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and the âWahhabisâ generally were fierce âenemiesâ of Islam. This was, he says, a result of a massive propaganda campaign conducted in India and elsewhere against the âWahhabisâ by their âenemiesâ, who regarded the âWahhabiâ movement as a major challenge to their own authority and privileges as custodians of Sufi shrines. Nuâmani probably makes this point deliberately to stress the Barelvi opposition to âWahhabismâ and to deny any Deobandi involvement in the matter. Because in his early years Madani did not have access to the âtruthâ about the âWahhabisâ, and because of the influence of the anti-âWahhabiâ campaign, Madani, Nuâmani admits, did write against Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab. In 1910 he penned a tract, al-Shahab al-Shaqib, fiercely denouncing him and his followers. However, later on, when he read the books of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab for himself, he is said to have realised that his message was actually one of âpureâ monotheism and a bitter, and, therefore, legitimate, critique of bidaâah. After this apparent change of views, he is said to have heaped praises on Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab for âlaunching a jihad against those who bow before graves, ask the dead for help, construct domes over graves and engage in other such polytheistic practicesâ.[30] The reference here is to groups like the Barelvi opponents of the Deobandis. The point is probably deliberately made in order to stress the common commitment of both the Deobandis and the Saudi âWahhabisâ to the extirpation of what they regard as bidaâah. In order to argue the case for a radical change in Madaniâs views about âWahhabismâ Nuâmani argues that after recognising the ârealityâ and alleged legitimacy of âWahhabismâ Madani worked closely with several âWahhabiâ âulama, particularly in the governing council of the Saudi-based World Muslim League, of which he was appointed a member in 1965. His involvement in the work of the League is said to have brought him in close touch with two prominent Saudi âWahhabiâ scholars, Shaikh âAbdul âAziz bin âAbdullah bin Baz, chief mufti of Saudi Arabia, and Shaikh âAbdullah bin Humid, a senior official Saudi religious leader. Nuâmani hastens to add that these two scholars were âvery piousâ Muslims and âgood modelsâ of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhabâs message and movement.[31] The same radical change of views, Nuâmani claims, occurred in the case of another leading Deobandi scholar, Khalil Ahmad Saharanpuri. Under the influence of the anti-âWahhabiâ propaganda, Saharanpuri declared the âWahhabisâ to be outside the Sunni fold. In his al-Tasdiqat he went so far as to brand Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and his followers as kafirs and âtraitorsâ (baghi). However, like Madani, after he read the books of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab for himself he is said to have realised the âerrorâ of his earlier views. He then recanted from them and wrote in favour of the âWahhabiâ movement, and even went to the extent of claiming that âthere was not even a grain of differenceâ between the âWahhabisâ and the other Sunnis. Further, he is said to have come out in support of the Saudi government at a time when it was being fiercely criticised by the Barelvis and Shiâas, by claiming that it was âtruly religiousâ.[32]
After struggling to defend his Deobandi elders from the charge of being anti-âWahhabiâ, Nuâmani shifts to discussing the present Saudi regime and the question of its âIslamicâ legitimacy. Since the underlying aim of his book seems to be to âproveâ the similarities between the Deobandism and âWahhabismâ and to encourage greater cooperation between the Deobandis and the Saudis, it is hardly surprising that Nuâmani presents the Saudi regime in glowing terms. Thus, he proclaims that the Saudi state is based on âIslam, obedience of the shariâah and the sunnahâ, and is the âtrue heirâ of the âpure Islamic stateâ established by Ibn Saud. He even goes so far as to declare that, as far as he is aware, Saudi Arabia is the only state in the world that is governed strictly according to the prescriptions of the Qurâan and the sunnah. In support of this claim he cites the fact that in Saudi Arabia thieves are punished with their hands being chopped off, unmarried adulteresses are whipped and male adulterers are stoned to death, all in accordance with Islamic law. Added evidence for this assertion is the alleged piety of Saudi Arabiaâs rulers. Nuâmani describes the Saudi king as a model Muslim monarch. The Saudi ruler is, he says, âpraise be to God, strictly observant of the fasts, prayers and religious dutiesâ, and insists that his subjects follow in the same path. This, Nuâmani says, is the result of the great âblessingsâ of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhabâs movement. Aware of the enormous influence of the al-Shaikh family, descendants of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, Nuâmani also refers to them in laudable terms. The family, he says, has produced numerous illustrious Islamic scholars, and this, Nuâmani claims, is âundoubtedly an immense blessing from Godâ. [33] Nuâmaniâs presentation of the âWahhabiâ doctrine and the Saudi state appears to have been carefully calculated to minimise points of difference between âWahhabismâ and the Deobandi understanding of Islam and to focus only on issues on which they are agreed, in order to argue that there were no fundamental differences between the two, particularly on the question of âpure monotheismâ and opposition to bidaâah. Thus, the fact that, in contrast to the âWahhabisâ, the Deobandis believe in the legitimacy of Sufism, although of a shariâah-minded sort, and that they insist on the need for taqlid of one of the four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence, was conveniently ignored. This can be said to be a reflection of a growing âWahhabisationâ of Deobandism under Arab influence. This explanation is only partially valid, however. It appears that Nuâmani was, in fact, deliberately seeking to conceal the major differences between the Deobandis and the Saudi âWahhabisâ. Critics accused Nuâmani of doing so simply in order to win the favour of prospective Arab donors. This charge was levelled by several Ahl-i Hadith scholars, probably angered at the prospect of growing links between their Deobandi rivals and patrons in Saudi Arabia.
Nuâmaniâs book was met with a swift rebuttal by numerous Ahlâi Hadith scholars, who accused
him of deliberately distorting the reality of Husain Ahmad Madaniâs views, and that of the
Deobandis generally, on Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab in order to win Saudi support. In 1986,
the Jamiâa Salafiya, Varanasi, the main Ahlâi Hadith madrasa in India, published a lengthy
diatribe against Nuâmaniâs book penned by an Indian Ahlâi Hadith scholar, Mahfuz urâRahman
Faizi.[34] In his preface to the book, Safi urâRahman Mubarakpuri, a leading Indian Ahlâi Hadith
âalim, quoted at length from Madaniâs alâShahab alâShaqib, pointing out that Madani had
fiercely condemned Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, reserving the choicest epithets for him. He
claimed that Madani had âleft no stone unturned â to vilify the Saudi rulers. He added that even
at the present time the Deobandis were secretly carrying on in that tradition, while cunningly
seeking to brand the Saudi governmentâs âtrue wellâwishersâ (by which he meant the Ahlâi
Hadith) as its enemies. Nuâmaniâs book, he claimed, was part of this sinister plot.[35]
Developing this argument further, Faizi claimed that Nuâmani had unfairly accused certain
pioneers of the Ahlâi Hadith in India, most notably Siddiq Hasan Khan, of having been opposed
to Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab. He had gone so far as to âwronglyâ claim that Madaniâs initial
opposition to Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab owed to the influence of Khanâs alleged antiâ
âWahhabiâ writings. Faizi stoutly defended Khan from the charge of having been opposed to
Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab. He quoted profusely from Khanâs various writings to show that
he considered Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab to have been a true Sunni and a staunch and
passionate defender of the Qurâan and the sunnah. He admitted that in some âminorâ matters
Khan and certain other earlier Ahlâi Hadith had differences with the âWahhabisâ but this did not
mean, he said, that, as Nuâmani had tried to argue, they were opposed to them. Nuâmani had,
he claimed, deliberately ignored the praise that Khan and other early Indian Ahlâi Hadith
scholars had showered on Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab in order to âproveâ that the early
Deobandis were not alone in opposing him, and that, like them, some Ahlâi Hadith âulama had
also expressed their hostility towards his movement. If Madani had been influenced by the
alleged writings of Khan against the âWahhabisâ, how was it, Faizi asked, that he had completely
ignored Khanâs other writings that portrayed them in glowing terms? This itself âprovedâ, Faizi
insisted, that Madaniâs opposition to the âWahhabisâ was not a result of the influence of Khanâs
writings.
Faizi also dismissed Nuâmaniâs argument that Madani was simply an innocent victim of the
massive antiââWahhabiâ propaganda that the âenemiesâ of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab had
unleashed. He pointed out that Madani had spent more than a dozen years in the Hijaz, where
he could have gained a âtrueâ understanding of âWahhabismâ if he had cared to. Further, at the
time of writing his book against Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, a considerable deal of proâ
âWahhabiâ literature, purporting to present a âtrueâ image of the movement, was available in
India and Arabia, in both Urdu and Arabic. Given this, how was it, Faizi asked, that Madani did
not care to consult these âauthenticâ sources while writing his book? The fact that Madani did
not refer to these books itself showed that he was not simply an innocent victim of antiâ
âWahhabiâ propaganda, contrary to what Nuâmani had claimed, Faizi insisted.
Nuâmaniâs claim that Madani later retracted his antiââWahhabiâ views was also dismissed by
Faizi, who argued that his note disclaiming his earlier stance was published in the columns of an
antiâDeobandi newspaper, and was not widely known among the Deobandis themselves. If
Madani had genuinely changed his position on Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab and his
followers, Faizi asked, how was it that this clarificatory note did not appear in subsequent
editions of his alâShahab alâShaqib, which, he claimed, continued to be published unâamended?
As further evidence of his claim that Madani had not actually changed his views on the
âWahhabisâ, Faizi quoted from Madaniâs autobiography, published almost three decades after he
wrote alâShahab alâShaqib, where he is said to have repeated the same charges against the
âWahhabisâ that he made in his earlier work, branding them as âextremistsâ (sakht ghali), and as
having given âimmense troubleâ to their opponents, because of which, Madani wrote, âthe
people of Mecca and Medina hate them and the Hijazis detest Wahhabism more than
Christianity and Judaismâ. In his autobiography Madani also allegedly charged the âWahhabisâ
with âblasphemyâ (gustakhana kalimat) against the Prophet, and claimed that the Deobandis had
ânot even the remotest relationsâ with âWahhabi beliefsâ. As further confirmation of the âfactâ
that Madani had never changed his antiââWahhabiâ views, Faizi quoted Madani has having
written in an article published in the Deobandi journal alâJamiâat in 1952 that Muhammad bin
âAbdul Wahhab and his followers had âgone astrayâ (gumrah) and, hence, were to be counted
among the Kharijites, implying, therefore, that they could not be considered part of the Sunni
fold.[36]
*
The controversy that erupted in the 1980s over Nuâmaniâs book illustrated the fact that Saudi
assistance to selected Deobandi âulama and their schools in India and Pakistan was seen by Ahlâi
Hadith scholars and leaders as a major challenge, fearing, critics claim, that this would mean a
diminution in their own earnings from generous Arab patrons. This, at least, is how several
Deobandis explain the fierce diatribe mounted by some Ahlâi Hadith scholars against them in
recent years. In addition to this, Saudi pressure is said to have been behind the escalation of Ahlâ
i Hadith polemical attacks on the Deobandis. Thus, a leading Indian Barelvi scholar, Yasin Akhtar
Misbahi, writes that although some early Deobandis were vehemently opposed to Muhammad
bin âAbdul Wahhab and his movement, later, in order to ingratiate themselves with oilârich
Saudis, the Deobandis sought to come closer to the âWahhabisâ and even to identify with them.
This, he says, continued till 1991, that is till the outbreak of the first Gulf War, when the Saudis,
fearing an Iraqi invasion, called in American troops and allowed them to be stationed in the
country. âNot a single Muslimâ in India and Pakistan, Misbahi writes, approved of this step, not
even the Deobandis who had earlier received considerable financial assistance from the Saudis.
This is why, he argues, relations between the Deobandis and the Saudis began to sharply
deteriorate, resulting in a massive propaganda campaign conducted by the âNajdisâ against the
Deobandis of South Asia.[37]
A turning point in Ahlâi HadithâDeobandi relations was the publication in the late 1990s of a
book titled adâDeobandiyah, penned by a certain Sayyed Talib urâRahman, a Pakistani Ahlâi
Hadith scholar based in Saudi Arabia who is said to work for an official Saudi Islamic
organisation. The book was published by a Pakistani Ahlâi Hadith institution, the Dar ulâKitab
waâl Sunnah in Karachi, and, a critic alleges, was âdelivered, in a well planned manner, to the
shaikhs of the Hijaz and Najd and to [Saudi] government officesâ. Probably deliberately, the book
was written in Arabic and widely distributed in Saudi Arabia itself, in order to turn Saudi opinion,
including that of the Saudi state and rich Saudi patrons, against the Deobandis. The book is said
to have openly declared the Deobandis as apostates and mushriks (polytheists), and to have
even argued that many Deobandis âhad gone even further [in their infidelity] than the
polytheists of Meccaâ. It was alleged that the book claimed that the Deobandi âulama âwere
totally bereft of faith in monotheismâ, and that some leading Deobandis âattributed lies to Godâ,
tampered with the Qurâan and entertained âstern hatredâ for the âupholders of monotheism and
the sunnah of the Prophetâ.[38] Along with their fellow Barelvi Hanafis they were described as
quburin (grave worshippers) for their veneration of prophets and saints and for their practice of
offering fatiha (the opening verse of the Qurâan) at the graves of the dead.[39]
Shortly after the publication of adâDeobandiyah, a series of similar books, making somewhat the
same sort of arguments, began to appear in Arabic and Urdu in India and Pakistan, as well as in
Saudi Arabia itself. Several of these, it is alleged, were sponsored, directly or otherwise, by rich
Saudi patrons. Most of them were authored by Indian and Pakistani Ahlâi Hadith scholars,
although a few were penned by Saudi shaikhs. One such book, published in both Arabic and
Urdu by the Riyadhâbased Maktab alâTaâwuni alâDaâwah waâlâIrshad, and distributed in large
quantities to Muslim pilgrims during the Haj season, allegedly declared the Deobandis to be
effectively outside the Sunni fold, and, hence, implicitly, outside the pale of Islam itself. A
second book, written in Arabic by a Saudi mufti, Shaikh Hamud bin âAbdullah, referred to the
Deobandis and the Tablighi Jamaâat as âwrongful innovatorsâ (bidaâati) and as having âgone
astrayâ (gumrah) and even as being a âSatanic sectâ (shaitani jamaâat). It claimed that the
âforemost effortâ of the Tablighis was to âspread innovations in Godâs religion and to oppose the
sunnah of the Prophetâ.[40] Another similar book, penned by a certain Shamsuddin Salafi, a
South Asian graduate of the Meccaâbased Islamic University, referred to the Deobandis as âthe
sect of grave worshippersâ (firqa alâquburiya), and hence, for all practical purposes, as outside
the pale of Islam.[41]Salafi is said to have described the Hanafi âulama as âpolytheistsâ and
âdwellers of hellâ.[42] A third book, published in 2001, bore the provocative title of âAre the
âUlama of Deoband Sunnis?â. Its cover flap proudly proclaimed that âthousandsâ of copies of the
book had been published in Saudi Arabia. The book consisted of a virulent diatribe against the
Deobandis, accusing them of all manner of âunâIslamicâ beliefs and practices. As evidence for this
claim, the author argued that the Deobandisâ alleged insistence on taqlid even if the
prescriptions of the schools of fiqh violate the Qurâan and Hadith went against the practice of
Muhammadâs companions.[43] The Deobandis, he claimed, like their fellow Hanafi Barelvis,
follow various Sufi practices and enrol in different Sufi orders, whereas this was unknown at the
time of the Prophet. Unlike Muhammadâs companions, the Deobandis, as well as the Barelvis,
believe that the Prophet is still alive. Hence, the author concluded, many Deobandi âulama
cannot be considered to be Sunnis or Muslims at all.[44] The assumption, as well as conclusion,
probably is that the Ahlâi Hadith, who are presented as identical with the âWahhabisâ of Saudi
Arabia, alone can claim to represent genuine Sunnism, the single âsavedâ sect. An even more
hardâhitting attack on the Deobandis, and on the Hanafis generally, was a book which appeared
in 1999, authored by an Indian Ahlâi Hadith scholar, Abu Iqbal Salafi. It bore the provocative title
Mazhabâi Hanafi Ka Mazhabâi Islam Se Ikhtliaf (âThe Opposition of the Hanafi Religion to the
Religion of Islamâ), thus clearly announcing the authorâs conviction that the Hanafis, including
both Deobandis as well as Barelvis, were not Muslims at all. The book went on to declare in no
uncertain terms that the âHanafi religionâ had no relation whatsoever with Islam, which, the
author argued, was synonymous with the Ahlâi Hadith. Thus, the author claimed that the Hanafis
regarded Imam Abu Hanifa, and not Allah, as their deity (rab), and that they âworshippedâ
him.[45] The âHanafi religionâ, he argued, was âtotally opposed to Islamâ and âfully against the
Qurâan and the Hadithâ, and was, in fact, invented by Islamâs âenemiesâ to undermine it. The
Hanafis were, he said, identical to the Jews, who, he claimed, were inveterate âenemiesâ of
Islam. Because of this, he went on, the Hanafis âdid not recognise the Qurâan and the Hadithâ,
and in fact, âbore enmityâ against the Islamic scriptures. He also charged the Hanafis with
âabusingâ the companions of the Prophet and for allegedly giving a higher status to their Imam
than to Muhammad.[46] He made no exceptions in this regard, effectively branding all Hanafis
as infidels. Thus, he insisted, âAll Hanafis follow the Hanafi religion (mazhabâi hanafi) and not the
religion of Islam (mazhabâi islam)â, claiming that the two were completely different.[47]
As part of their campaign against the Deobandis, South Asian Ahlâi Hadith scholars appear to
have paid considerable attention to conveying to various Arab âWahhabiâ shaikhs, mostly
resident in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, information about the âfalseâ and
âunâIslamicâ beliefs of their Deobandi rivals. This is illustrated in the number of articles penned
and fatwas delivered by leading Arab âWahhabiâ âulama against the Deobandis in recent years, a
fairly new development. These writings and pronouncements have been given considerable
publicity by Ahlâi Hadith websites and publishing houses, aware as they are of the prestige and
authority that the views and statements of Arab âulama carry among many South Asian Muslims.
An interesting case in point is an Ahlâi Hadith website, probably based in India, www.
allahuakbar.net. This site hosts numerous fatwas against the Deobandis and the Tablighi Jamaâat
(in addition to groups like the Barelvis, Shiâas and the Jamaâatâi Islami) delivered by important
Arab âWahhabiâ scholars. One of the fatwas, delivered by Shaikh âAbdul âAziz bin âAbdullah bin
Baz, declares the Tablighi Jamaâat as containing âmany deviationsâ, including âaspects of bidaâah
and shirkâ. Accordingly, bin Baz argues that it is not permissible for a Muslim to join the
movement unless âhe has knowledgeâ and accompanies the Tablighis simply to âdisapproveâ of
them and in order to âteach them [the truth]â so that âthey leave their falsehood and embrace
the way of the Ahl usâSunnah waâlâJamaâahâ.[48] The implicit message contained in this
statement is, therefore, that the Tablighis cannot be said to follow the Sunni âwayâ. In a second
fatwa hosted on the website bin Baz is quoted as having explicitly declared the Tablighis outside
the Sunni fold.[49] The website carries yet another fatwa, issued by the late Saudiâbased
âWahhabiâ scholar Shaikh Muhammad Nasiruddin alâAlbani, condemning the Tablighis for not
âuphold[ing] the manjah (method) of the Book of Allah and the sunnah of His Messengerâ and
for being association with Sufism. alâAlbani then go on to declare it impermissible for âtrueâ
Muslims to join the movement.[50] The website hosts several similar articles and fatwas against
the Tablighis by other leading Arab âWahhabiâ scholars, including Shaikh Abu âAbd urâRahman
Muqbil bin Hadi alâWadi, Shaikh Rabiâ bin Hadi alâMadkhali, Shaikh Salih bin Fouzan alâFouzan,
Shaikh Muhammad bin Ibrahim alâShaikh and Shaikh âAbdur Razzaq Afifi.[51] The website also
carries several articles by both Arab and South Asian âWahhabiâ scholars against the Deobandis
in general, accusing them of shirk and bidaâah, and, hence, implying that they cannot be
considered to be genuine Sunnis or even as proper Muslims at all.[52]
Efforts by the Ahlâi Hadith to win support among the Arab âWahhabiâ âulama for their campaign
against the Deobandis seem to have met with considerable success. A clear indication of this is
the fact that leading South Asian Ahlâi Hadith scholars have managed to prevail upon the Saudiâ
managed Islamic University of Medina to ban the publication of the Tafsirâi âUsmani, an Urdu
translation of the Qurâan by Mahmud ulâHasan (d.1920), for many years the rector of the
Deoband madrasa, and a commentary on it by another leading Deobandi, Shabbir Ahmad
âUsmani. This book had reportedly been published for many years by an official Saudi publishing
house, the Medinaâbased King Fahd Complex for Printing the Holy Qurâan, for mass distribution.
Its publication is said to have been stopped after Ahlâi Hadith activists claimed that it
propagated âantiâIslamicâ beliefs such as appealing to âthe people of the graveâ (ahlâi qubur) for
help. By arguing that the Deobandis were not true or full Muslims, the Ahlâi Hadith managed to
convince the Saudi authorities to replace Mahmud ulâHasanâs translation of the Qurâan by one
written by a leading Indian Ahlâi Hadith scholar, Maulana Muhammad Junagadhi.[53]
The success of the Ahlâi Hadith in their campaign against the Deobandis was not limited to
winning the support of key Saudi âulama. Some Deobandis themselves, so Ahlâi Hadith soures
claim, are also said to have been won over to the Ahlâi Hadith fold in the wake of the heated
polemical exchanges between the two groups. The most dramatic such âconversionâ was that of
Muhammad Anas, proprietor of the Idaraâi Ishaâatâi Diniyat, a New Delhiâbased Islamic
publishing house associated with the Deobandiârelated Tablighi Jamaâat. This story was widely
touted about by the Ahlâi Hadith as âproofâ of the falsity of Deobandi beliefs and of the claim of
the Ahlâi Hadith as being the sole âgenuineâ Sunni sect. The interview was reproduced in full, in
Urdu and in English translation, in the form of a booklet, on audio cassettes and on Ahlâi Hadith
websites.[54] Muhammad âAqil, the Saudiâbased editor of the booklet, termed Anasâ decision to
join the Ahlâi Hadith as ârepentanceâ (tauba) and claimed that by abandoning the Tablighi
Jamaâat Anas had turned his back on âpolytheismâ and âwrongful innovationâ and had entered
the fold of âmonotheismâ, thereby suggesting that the Deobandis and Tablighis were not
monotheists or Muslims themselves.[55] He attacked the Tablighi Jamaâat, and the Deobandis in
general, for allegedly being âa group devoted to spreading polytheistic beliefs and wrongful
practicesâ, for âtampering with (tahrif) the Qurâan and Hadithâ, and for allegedly âstopping their
followers from reading the Qurâan and Hadithâ and thus of wrongly claiming to be genuine
Sunnis.[56] The Tablighi message, he declared, was an open âinvitation to distortion in the true
religionâ. For his part, Anas announced that following his âconversionâ he had decided to stop the
publishing and sale of several dozen books, mainly texts penned by revered Deobandi elders,
which, he claimed, contained numerous âwrongâ beliefs that were clearly against the Qurâan and
Hadith. He also revealed that he was replacing numerous books by Deobandi scholars by texts
prepared by Ahlâi Hadith âulama.[57] It was urgent, Anas argued, that the âtruthâ of the Ahlâi
Hadith position be put forward against the claims of the Deobandis, because, he insisted, the
Deobandis did not properly follow the Qurâan and the Hadith. Referring to the Tablighis, he said,
âVery few of their practices are in accordance with the Qurâan and sunnahâ. âEven their prayers
are not in conformity with the Prophetic practiceâ, he claimed, referring to the Deobandi
method of praying that differs in some ways from that of the Ahlâi Hadith.[58] âPrayers are the
most important thingâ, he stressed, probably suggesting that if the Deobandi, or Hanafi more
generally, method of worship was âwrongâ, it was hardly surprising that in other respects, too,
they had gone far âastrayâ from the practice of the Prophet.
*
The publication of adâDeobandiyah and similar literature and the banning of Mahmud ulâ
Hasanâs translation of the Qurâan came as a summons for battle for the Deobandis. Being
branded as âpolytheistsâ, and, therefore, effectively as apostates, was taken as a major insult. It
was also probably feared that such virulent antiâDeobandi propaganda, particularly when
conducted inside Saudi Arabia itself, could lead to a complete loss of valuable Saudi as well as
other Arab patronage, besides greatly tarnishing the image of the Deobandis throughout the
Muslim world. The Deobandis were, therefore, not slow in reacting. They responded with a
powerful counterâattack, churning out massive quantities of literature to prove that the Ahlâi
Hadith had, in actual fact, no liking at all for the âWahhabisâ of Saudi Arabia and that their
profession of being followers of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab was just a clever ruse to attract
Saudi money, thus repeating the Ahlâi Hadith charges against them. In addition to claiming to
represent the âWahhabiâ tradition themselves and denying the claims of the Ahlâi Hadith in this
regard, some Deobandi scholars penned tracts branding the Ahlâi Hadith as being fiercely âantiâ
Islamicâ. Thus, for instance, a Deobandi âalim from Ghazipur prepared a set of five books to
denounce the Ahlâi Hadith and even launched a new journal, ZamâZam, devoted solely to
rebutting Ahlâi Hadith doctrines. In order probably to curry favour with the Saudis, he published
a book in Arabic, possibly meant for prospective Arab patrons, arguing that the Ahlâi Hadith
were actually âenemiesâ of Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab but falsely claimed to be his
followers simply in order to attract Arab funds.[59] Numerous other Deobandis followed with
their own tracts and books fiercely opposing the Ahlâi Hadith. Many of these books were penned
in Arabic, directed at an Arab, particularly Saudi, audience, damning the Ahlâi Hadith as âantiâ
Islamicâ. They were condemned for allegedly abusing the companions of the Prophet, the
revered Imams of the four generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence, and the Sufis and
other âpious eldersâ, and for defying the âijma or jurisprudential consensus of the âulama.[60]
Consequently, numerous Deobandi scholars sought to argue, the Ahlâi Hadith could hardly be
regarded as proper Sunnis or Muslims at all. Muhammad Jamal Bulandshahri, a teacher at the
Deoband madrasa, argued, expressing the views of many of his fellow Deobandis, that, given
their âfalseâ beliefs, the Ahlâi Hadith could not be considered to be true Sunnis. Their claim to the
contrary, and their assertion that they represented true âSalafismâ, was, he insisted, simply a
ruse to âcheat the Saudis and garner their wealthâ.[61]
Commenting on the bitter wrangling between the two groups, a leading Indian Barelvi scholar,
Mufti Muhammad Akhtar Yasin Qadri, caustically wrote:
Today here is great strife between the ghair muqallids (Ahlâi Hadith) and the Deobandis, both of
them lusting for the oil wealth of Arabia. Hence, both are now fighting to claim before the Arabs
that each of them alone represents the true Wahhabi tradition and that the other is wrong. [62]
Matters came to a head in midâ2001, when heightened polemics between the Deobandis and
the Ahlâi Hadith and the efforts of Ahlâi Hadith leaders to discredit the Deobandis in Saudi Arabia
as âpolytheistsâ led the Deobandiâdominated Jamiâat ulââUlamaâi Hind to organise a mammoth
twoâday convention in Delhi. The convention was widely advertised as the âSave the Sunnahâ
(tahaffuzâi sunnah) Conference, and was addressed by leading Indian Deobandi âulama. The
message that was sought to be conveyed, as the title of the conference itself suggested, was
that it was the Deobandis alone who represented the authentic sunnah or practice of the
Prophet, and that, therefore, they had the right and the duty of âprotectingâ it. The focus of the
impassioned speeches delivered at the conference was the denunciation of the Ahlâi Hadith,
which, speaker after speaker claimed, had emerged as the single major threat to the sunnah of
the Prophet.
In his inaugural address to the conference, the head of the Jamiâat and influential Deobandi
leader, Sayyed âAsad Madani (styled by himself and his followers as imam alâhind or the âImam
of Indiaâ), denounced the Ahlâi Hadith as the product of a sinister âimperialist conspiracyâ to
âdivideâ Muslims. He bitterly harangued the Ahlâi Hadith for their belief that they alone were
true Muslims and for allegedly considering all other Muslims as kafirs and polytheists. He
accused them of falsely interpreting the Qurâan and the Hadith in order to stress their own
claims of representing âauthenticâ Islam, and for insulting the Sufis and learned elders and even
the companions of the Prophet. He described the antiâDeobandi propaganda unleashed by the
Ahlâi Hadith as the result of a sinister âantiâIslamicâ plot, stemming from an acute realisation that
the Deobandi âulama had made âgreat sacrificesâ for and âimmense contributionsâ to Islam.
Consequently, he said, as the case of the controversial book adâDeobandiyah suggested, some
Ahlâi Hadith leaders had gone so far as to declare the Deobandis outside the Sunni fold and had
even claimed that Deoband âwas an institution that had declared war on the Prophet and had
thrown aside his method (tariqa)â. They had also falsely alleged that the âvery foundationsâ of
Deoband were âbased on disobedience of the Prophetâ.[63]
Interestingly, Madani did not mince words in critiquing the Saudi government for what he saw
as its role in fanning antiâDeobandi sentiments through the Ahlâi Hadith. This represented a
major shift in Deobandi strategy, an indication that many Deobandis were now seeking to
consciously distance themselves from their earlier efforts of appeasing the Saudi regime. Noting
that many antiâDeobandi books had been penned by Ahlâi Hadith scholars who had studied in
Saudi universities, some of these books having been brought out by leading Saudi Islamic
publishing houses, he exclaimed, âIt is a matter of great sorrow that these institutions that had
been established to promote the Qurâan and Hadith and other Islamic sciences are today
working to lead Muslims outside the path of the true faithâ. He even went so far as to charge the
Saudi regime of abetting the AhlâI Hadith in their campaign against the Deobandis, stating that
he suspected that âconsciously or otherwise it appears that the Saudi kingdom was engaged, or
even leading, the baseless campaign against the âulama of Deobandâ.[64] Concluding his speech,
Madani warned Muslims to stay away from the âstrifeâ (fitna) of the âghayr muqallidsâ,
reiterating his assertion that the Ahlâi Hadith had mounted a concerted campaign against the
Muslimsâ âfaith and âulamaâ. The hidden message contained in that statement, probably, was
that the Ahlâi Hadith could not be considered as genuine Muslims at all. Madani also advised his
followers to reduce, as far as possible, their relations with the âghair muqallidsâ, so as to remain
protected from what he called as their âevil influenceâ.[65]
The speeches and papers delivered at the conference were later published in the form of lowâ
priced pamphlets meant for mass distribution. The basic intention of all these pamphlets was to
argue the case that the Ahlâi Hadith did not represent Islam at all, despite their claims to do so.
Thus, the author of one pamphlet, Maulana Sayyed Mahdi Hasan Shahjahanpuri, former chief
mufti of the Deoband madrasa, produced a list of fifty points on which, he argued, the Ahlâi
Hadith violated the Qurâan and the Hadith. Hence, he insisted, the claim of the Ahlâi Hadith of
following the Qurâan and the Hadith, and thus of being âtrueâ Muslims, was bogus.[66] A second
pamphlet, penned by Mahmud ulâHasan Bulandshahri, mufti at the Deoband madrasa, went so
far as to claim the existence of a âglobal conspiracyâ hatched by âantiâIslamic forcesâ to attack the
âprotectors of the forts of Islamâ, insisting that the Ahlâi Hadith were deliberately or otherwise
part of this sinister plot by denouncing all other Muslim groups as outside the pale of Islam.[67]
Another pamphlet, written by Muhammad Jamal Bulandshahri, teacher at the Deoband
madrasa, argued that the Ahlâi Hadith were identical, in several respects, with the Shiâas, whom
he branded as the product of what he described as a âJewish conspiracyâ to destroy Islam from
within by creating dissensions among Muslims. He claimed that the British had sponsored the
emergence and growth of the Ahlâi Hadith to set Muslims against each other.[68] In other
words, he appeared to argue that the Ahlâi Hadith could not be considered part of the Sunni,
that is, Muslim, fold, despite their claims to the contrary. Yet another pamphlet, authored by
Mufti Sayyed Muhammad Salman Mansurpuri, a leading Deobandi and a teacher at the Madrasa
Shahi, Moradabad, went so far as to declare the âghair muqallidinâ as âthe most dangerous
threatâ to Muslim unity and as a dangerous source of âchaosâ (fitna), suggesting that it was a
major player in a grand âconspiracyâ hatched by the âenemiesâ of Islam to set Muslims against
each other by projecting âminorâ issues of difference between Muslim groups as âquestions of
faith versus infidelityâ. Significantly, he directly and explicitly accused the government of Saudi
Arabia and leading Saudi âWahhabiâ âulama of providing âmoralâ and âmaterialâ help to the Ahlâi
Hadith in their campaign against the muqallids, followers of one or the other of the four
generally accepted schools of Sunni jurisprudence. He pointed out with concern that the Ahlâi
Hadith had established a strong presence in various official Islamic organisations in Saudi Arabia,
singling out the Department of Religious Preaching in Mecca and Medina in particular, which, he
said, Ahlâi Hadith scholars were using to âheap abusesâ on the âpious âulamaâ and the Imams of
the schools of Sunni jurisprudence. If the âghair muqallidsâ were to go unchallenged, in Saudi
Arabia and elsewhere, they might even âthreaten the peace and securityâ of Mecca and Medina,
he warned. Mansurpuri left his readers in no doubt about his actual opinion on the Ahlâi Hadith.
Thus, he appealed to the âulama to rise up and oppose them in the same way as they had
responded to the challenge of âthe Qadiani religion and other such false (batil) forcesâ, thus
seeming to suggest that he considered them as, in a sense, akin to the Ahmadiyyas or Qadianis,
whom most Muslims regard as heretics and apostates.[69]
Impact of Recent Developments on Saudi Links with Indian Muslim Groups
The 1990s were characterised by fierce polemical battles between the Ahlâi Hadith and the
Deobandis in India, with each group charging the other of being âantiâIslamicâ and as hidden
fronts of the âenemiesâ of Islam. Although the two groups continue to regard each other as
fierce rivals, the sharp polemical exchanges between them now seem to have dampened
somewhat. One factor for this is probably the strong need that many Muslims feel to present a
united front to combat the challenge of aggressive Hindu groups in the country. In addition to
this is the widespread feeling among many Indian Muslims that the DeobandiâAhlâi Hadith
rivalry was simply yet another case of the âulama squabbling among themselves to promote
their own vested interests, and hence of not pressing relevance to the community at large.
Another important factor for the apparent decline in overt strife between the Ahlâi Hadith and
the Deobandis in recent years is what seems to be a significant shift in Saudi strategy. Following
the attacks by events of September, 2001, Saudi Arabia came under tremendous pressure from
the United States to clamp down on âWahhabiâ militants at home and abroad. The Saudi strategy
of sponsoring radical âWahhabismâ seemed to have boomeranged, as a new generation of
Islamist radicals emerged within Saudi Arabia itself, critiquing the Saudi regime for its corruption
and for its close links with the United States. Conseqeuntly, the Saudis Arabia was forced to take
action against their own internal radical Islamist opponents, realising the major challenge that
they posed to the Saudi monarchy. Simultaneously, and because of these developments, Saudi
aid to âWahhabiâ groups abroad, including India, is said to have declined somewhat. This will
naturally have a major impact on relations between different Muslim groups in India, and will
most notably impact on the expansion of the Ahlâi Hadith, who have been the major recipient of
Saudi assistance in recent years. An indication of the impact of the American as well as domestic
pressure on the Saudi regime today is the claim that Saudi authorities are now advising their
Ahlâi Hadith contacts in India to exercise restraint in their bitter polemical war against the
Deobandis. This might well be happening, being further promoted by considerable
disenchantment among many Muslims, including âmoderateâ Deobandis and Ahlâi Hadith, with
intraâMuslim rivalries at a time when Muslims in India see themselves faced with the growing
challenge of Hindu militancy.
Another possible indication of the shift in Saudi strategy is the fact that of late certain Ahlâi
Hadith publishing houses in India have brought out books praising the Saudi state and critiquing
what they describe as the âterroristsâ who wish to weaken it. These books argue that the
âcorrectâ method of the political âreformâ that Islamist opponents of the regime seek is not
through violence, but, rather, through âguidingâ the political authorities to follow the path of
God by providing them with âIslamicâ advice. As before, this sort of propaganda is carefully
crafted to suit the interests of the increasingly beleaguered Saudi regime, which today finds
itself faced by the challenge of radical Islamism, which, for several years, it had so heavily
invested in.
A good illustration of the political direction in which the Saudi âWahhabisâ want to steer their
Indian Ahlâi Hadith counterparts is the recent publication of a lengthy diatribe by two leading
official Saudi âulama against Islamist groups inside and outside Saudi Arabia that are allegedly
plotting to overthrow the present Saudi regime, principally because of its close nexus with the
United States. The book consists of two essays, one by the late Shaikh âAbdul âAziz bin âAbdullah
bin Baz and the other by Shaikh Saleh bin âAbdul âAziz alâShaikh, the Saudi Minister of Religious
Affairs and Endowments. The book has been rendered into Urdu and published in India by
âAbdur Rahim bin âAbdul Jabbar Farewai, an Indian Ahlâi Hadith scholar who teaches at the Imam
Muhammad ibn Saud Islamic University in Riyadh.[70] That the book is intended to propagate
the official Saudi line in order to defend Saudi Arabiaâs alliance with the United States is evident
from the subâtitle that appears inside the book, âThe Path to Salvation From Chaos: The Gulf
Crisis and Lessons From the Iraqi Strifeâ (Fitno se Nijat ka Rasta: Khaliji Bahran Aur Iraqi Fitna se
IbratâoâMuâazat ke Pehlu).
In his introduction, Farewai explains the background of the book and the reasons for publishing
it, clearly indicating its political import. He writes that in the aftermath of the first Gulf War in
1990â91, when passions were aroused all over the Muslim world (the reference here is probably
to the anger felt by many Muslims against the Saudi regime for supporting America against Iraq
and for allowing American troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia), it was felt by the two authors
that Muslims, including those living in South Asia, were in âurgent need of guidanceâ. In short,
the book was intended to present before the Muslims of the world what the official Saudi
âWahhabiâ âulama felt should be their appropriate reaction to the political developments in
which Saudi Arabia had emerged as a key player, and about which there was considerable
resentment among many Muslims.[71]
In his essay, bin Baz writes that âstrifeâ or âchaosâ (fitna)â can only be countered by following the
Qurâan and the sunnah. In turn, this requires Muslims to follow the guidance and instruction of
what he describes as the âtrue âulamaâ. After thus warning Muslims not to react to the presence
of âstrifeâ on their own, but, instead, to do as they are told by the âtrue âulamaâ (by which is
probably meant Bin Baz and âulama of his own persuasion), he writes that those who wreck
violence on innocent people in the name of Islam and Islamic jihad cannot be considered to be
true, practising Muslims. In fact, such actions reflect âhypocrisy (nifaq), open infidelity (kufrâi
sarih), evil (dajl) and deceit (fareb)â. Presumably, bin Baz is here referring to Islamist groups
responsible for a wave of violent attacks within Saudi Arabia in order to destabilise the Saudi
regime. The reference also seems to be to Saddam Husain, who, ironically, was earlier heavily
backed as the âsword of Islamâ by the Saudis in his war against Iran.
In times of âstrifeâ, such as these, bin Baz continues, it is legitimate for Muslim rulers to seek the
help of nonâMuslims in order to âeliminate the tyrant (zalim)â. This statement probably refers to
the assistance sought by the Saudis from the Americans in the wake of Saddamâs invasion of
Kuwait. Such help can be procured, bin Baz says, if the nonâMuslim power has the capacity to
end the âstrifeâ of the âtyrantâ. There is no religious bar involved here. Assistance can be taken
from any quarter, from Jews, Christians and even from âidolatorsâ. To back his argument, bin Baz
refers to the Prophet having received the help of âpaganâ Arabs on certain occasions when there
was no other course open to him. It is thus permissible, bin Baz says, for Muslims to seek the
help of âlesser enemiesâ in order to fight a âgreater enemyâ. He ends his article by seeking Godâs
protection from the âstrifeâ of Saddam Husain, whom he names explicitly. Not once in his long
diatribe does he critique the United States for its war on Iraq, for its killing of thousands of Iraqi
innocent civilians through its sanctions against the country and through its invasion of the
country. Also absent is even a hint of criticism of the Saudi regime. Likewise, there is no mention
of Saudi Arabiaâs own earlier passionate support for Saddam Husain for his invasion of and war
against Iran.[72]
The article by Shaikh Saleh bin âAbdul âAziz alâShaikh, follows, predictably enough, on identical
lines, but is argued in considerably more detail. alâShaikh begins by referring to the Gulf War,
which, he says, led to âimmense divisionsâ among Muslims worldwide. Hence, he writes, he
deems it is duty to state the âcorrect Islamic perspectiveâ on the matter. The âcorrect Islamic
perspectiveâ that he proceeds to set out, is, not surprisingly, the official Saudi line. âPraise be to
Godâ, he exclaims, âin Saudi Arabia we are witness to true Islamic awakening and are spreading
the true message, while the missionaries of this true message are not visible elsewhereâ. His
advice to the Muslims of the world is, to put it bluntly, to simply follow and acquiesce in official
Saudi policy. In the face of âstrifeâ, he explains, Muslims must exercise âpatient restraintâ (sabr)
and âtoleranceâ (tahammul), following strictly the commandments of the Qurâan and the sunnah
as understood and interpreted by what he calls as the âaccepted Sunni âulamaâ. These âulama, he
tells his readers, have laid down that in times of âstrifeâ Muslims must refrain from
âimpulsivenessâ (jald bazi), and should, instead, display âgentlenessâ (naram ravi) and must
carefully examine matters in their entirety and complexity before taking any action. He quotes
two statements attributed to the Prophet to argue that in âevery matterâ and for âevery decisionâ
Muslims must act in this manner, refrain from impulsive actions and stay away from those who
act contrarily.[73]
Tolerance, a virtue that is otherwise generally missing in âWahhabiâ propaganda, is repeatedly
stressed by alâShaikh in his appeal to opponents of the Saudi regime. âTolerance is a very
praiseworthy virtue and no praise is sufficient to express its loftinessâ, he writes, recommending
that it must be displayed even at times of great âstrifeâ. In the face of âstrifeâ one should remain
composed and not react in a hurry, he advises, quoting a hadith to press the argument.
Adducing Qurâanic support for this claim, he says that in such situations Muslims must ânot even
talk about matters related to strifeâ, but, instead, must simply do as they are told by the âpious
Muslim rulerâ and the doctors of Islamic law. To talk about the prevailing âstrifeâ might threaten
to make the problem even more intractable, he cautions. No action must be taken that would
lead to divisions among the Muslims, he warns, probably suggesting that opposing the Saudi
rulers would be tantamount to setting Muslims against each other. âAll forms of dissensionsâ, he
announces, âbe it because of difference of views, words or deedsâ, are a âcurseâ (azab) that
would be punished by God, and would inevitably lead one to âstray from the Sunni foldâ and
from the âtruthâ itself. Hence, on all occasions, particularly in times of âstrifeâ, Muslims must seek
to preserve Muslim unity, refrain from acting on their own, and, instead, must follow the âtrue
âulamaâ, who are said to possess proper knowledge of Islam, in contrast to others. alâShaikh here
refers explicitly to the Saudi case, claiming that since a âgenuineâ Islamic judicial system exists in
the country, Muslims there must abide strictly by the opinions of the judges appointed by the
state, whose views on the current situation of âstrifeâ alâShaikh presumably represents.[74]
In contrast to bin Baz, alâShaikh appears to admit, albeit indirectly, the existence of certain
legitimate grounds for disaffection with the Saudi regime. Yet, like bin Baz, he rules out the
legitimacy any form of vocal or effective opposition to the regime. True Sunnis, he argues,
âalways stress the unity of the communityâ, and are âwell wishers of their rulers and constantly
pray to God for themâ, even if they witness in their rulers âthings that they find distastefulâ. âIf
this point sits firm in our heartsâ, he adds, âwe will be counted among the Sunnisâ. This assertion
probably is probably intended to suggest the illegitimacy, on âIslamicâ grounds, of opposition to
the Saudi regime despite the regimeâs possible âdistastefulâ deeds. Suitable âIslamicâ arguments
are marshalled for this claim. Muhammad is said to have insisted that rulers and the ruled relate
to each other in a spirit of âcompassionâ (khair khwahi), and the âtrueâ Sunni âulama are said to
have insisted on the âunity of rulers and their subjectsâ. alâShaikh admits that subjects can advise
their rulers, but insists that in this they must follow the rules laid down by the Qurâan and
sunnah and explained by the âtrueâ Sunni âulama. He quotes a hadith to the effect that such
advice must not be done âopenlyâ or âexplicitlyâ (khullam khulla). Rather, it must be done in
private. Further, the ruler is not bound to accept the advice rendered to him. If Muslims do not
act in this manner in relating to their rulers, alâShaikh warns, they will be counted among the
âsinnersâ for âgoing against the methodâ of the Sunnis.[75]
Direct opposition to established rulers is a gross violation of Godâs will, alâShaikh writes, for God
is said to have appointed the rulers in their place. It is thus, he says, a right that the ruler has
over his subjects that they should pray for him. In this regard alâShaikh quotes an unnamed
source, whom he describes as a âlearned, pious Sunni scholarâ, as saying, âWhen you see
someone praying for his ruler then you should know that his beliefs are correct. If you see
someone cursing his ruler then know that he is an innovator (bidaâati)â. It is incumbent on
subjects to pray for their rulers even if the latter are impious, alâShaikh adds, to further buttress
his argument. This statement is perhaps directed at the Islamist opposition to the Saudi regime
angered at the corruption and licentiousness of the Saudi rulers and for their alliance with the
United States. Opposition to the rulers is thus equated with âstrifeâ, even if such opposition is
seen by its proponents as a means to counter âstrifeâ. Hence, ârevoltâ (baghawat) against rulers is
presented as wholly âunâIslamicâ. alâShaikh here approvingly refers to Imam Ahmad bin Hanbal,
who is said to have declared that â there is no benefit in opposing established rulersâ.[76]
In alâShaikhâs scheme of things the monarch appears as allâpowerful, although in some sense he
is dependent on the âtrueâ âulama for âadviceâ. This advisory role is said to be the prerogative of
these âulama because they alone are allegedly qualified to decide on issues in the light of Islamic
teachings, given their own training. They are, because of their knowledge, the âheirs of the
Prophetâ. No one else, alâShaikh says, has the right of marjiyat, of deciding between âfaith and
infidelityâ, âIslam and nonâIslamâ, in relation to any matter. âExplaining the truthâ (haq ka bayan)
is, he asserts, a right that belongs to these âulama alone. Independent action against the rulers is
thus ruled out. Ordinary Muslims can only convey their views (in this context, about âstrifeâ) to
these âulama, and it is up to them to accept or to reject them. In short, alâShaikh appears to
argue that any vocal opposition to the Saudi regime is âunâIslamicâ and that, therefore,
opponents of the Saudi regime who seek its overthrow have deviated from âtrueâ Islam.[77]
Recognising the fact that the Saudi regimeâs close links with the United States, particularly its
support for the Americanâled war on Iraq, has incensed many Muslims, alâShaikh seeks to
provide suitable âIslamicâ legitimacy for the SaudiâAmerican alliance. He quotes the Qurâanic
verse, regularly invoked by many radical Islamists, that forbids Muslims from befriending Jews
and Christians on the grounds that they are friends of each other. If a Muslim were to befriend
them, alâShaikh says, he would be counted among them and would be considered an
âoppressorâ. He also warns that Muslims must not have âexcessiveâ (bhar pur) love for kafirs, and
nor must they help kafirs against Muslims. Yet, in the same breath, in order to argue that the
Saudi regime has not violated the Qurâan in this regard in its alliance with the United States, he
says that it is permissible in Islam for Muslims to work along with kafirs for âworldly
advancementâ.[78]
alâShaikhâs lengthy and convoluted essay, which in its Urdu translation runs into more than forty
pages, is thus carefully crafted to deny the legitimacy of internal opponents, Islamist as well as
other, to the Saudi regime. There is, as in bin Bazâs presentation, no explicit recognition at all of
the real grievances of the opponents of the Saudi regime and nor any sign of critique of the
regime for its internal and external policies, in particular for its role in abetting the American
invasion of a fellow Muslim country. Like several other such books and tracts that have been
brought out and disseminated by Indian Ahlâi Hadith publishing houses in recent years, it is
intended as an apology for and defence of the Saudi regime. Its translation into Urdu and its
publication and distribution in India is a clear indication of the importance that the Saudi regime
and its client âulama place on the urgent need to counter opposition to the regimeâs policies
among Muslim communities abroad. It highlights the fact that several Ahlâi Hadith institutions in
India have been willing to work along with the Saudis in pursuance of this agenda. It also
indicates how Islam is conveniently marshalled, and interpreted in often diametrically opposing
ways, by the Saudi regime to suit its own strategic and ideological purposes abroad. Saudi
Arabia is said to have been the largest financer of radical Islamist groups abroad, some of whom,
as in the Philippines, Chechenya, Bosnia and Kashmir, have taken to armed struggle and
terrorism against nonâMuslim states. Saudiâfunded literature routinely extols such groups as
mujahids engaged in a legitimate Islamic jihad. Yet, faced now with its own internal and
increasingly vocal Islamist opposition, it considers similar movements within Saudi Arabia as
major sources of âstrifeâ and as clearly âunâIslamicâ. Whether, as a result of increasing
international pressure, the Saudis will be willing to extend the same logic to Islamist groups
abroad whom they have been patronising for many years is a moot point.
Conclusion
Transnational links and support, as this paper has sought to show, have been central to the
Saudi strategy of gaining legitimacy, both at home and abroad. This has taken the form of
aggressive promotion of the Saudi form of âWahhabiâ Islam, which is presented as the sole form
of âauthenticâ Islam. Inherent in this claim is the assumption that all other forms of Islam are, by
definition, aberrant or even âantiâIslamicâ. The propagation of âWahhabismâ has been a key
instrument for promoting the image of the Saudi regime at home and abroad, for âWahhabiâ
propaganda is inextricably linked with the claim of Saudi Arabia under its present rulers being
the only state in the world allegedly firmly committed to âimplementingâ Islam.
As part of the global expansion of âWahhabismâ, numerous Indian Muslim organisations and
individuals have been the recipient of different forms of Saudi assistance, from both unofficial
and official sources. Sharing much in common with the Saudi âWahhabisâ, the Ahlâi Hadith,
although a small minority among the countryâs Muslims, have been the largest beneficiary of
this largesse. This has promoted an increasing aggressiveness on the part of the Ahlâi Hadith,
who have been led to take on their Sunni, particularly Deobandi, rivals with a new sense of
aggression. This clearly illustrates the fact that Sunni âorthodoxyâ, to which different Muslim
groups lay claim, is a deeply fractured as well as a fiercely contested notion. Ahlâi Hadith attacks
on the Deobandis, virtually dismissing them from the Sunni fold, have been reciprocated from
the Deobandi side with equal passion and vigour, resulting in heated polemical debates, with
each side claiming to represent the single âauthenticâ and ânormativeâ Islamic tradition, branding
the other as aberrant or worse. Interestingly, Saudi funding has also made for the narrowing
down and, indeed, eclipsing of differences between the Saudi âWahhabisâ and the Ahlâi Hadith as
the latter seek to present themselves as identical with the former. This has, although to a
limited extent, also been the case with the Deobandis, who have sought to present an alternate
reading of the legacy of their elders in order to win crucial Saudi support. Thus, while at one
level the Saudi connection has helped to promote intraâSunni differences, at another level it has
also worked to promote and reinforce the image of Saudi Arabia and of its official form of
âWahhabiâ Islam as the ultimate arbiter of the âIslamicityâ of diverse understandings of the faith
and of Sunni âorthodoxyâ. As this paper has tried to show, as a result of the Saudi connection,
both the Ahlâ Hadith and the Deobandis have attempted, in their own ways and to varying
degrees, to present themselves as synonymous with (in the case of the former) or to a great
extent similar to (in the case of the latter) the âWahhabisâ of Saudi Arabia. This competitive
âWahhabisationâ of both traditions has occurred in a sharply charged polemical context and over
access to generous Saudi patronage. In turn, and perhaps unwittingly, this has led to the
emergence of a broad convergence between the two rival groups on the content and contours
of ânormativeâ Islam, as defined by Saudi âWahhabismâ, and a common commitment, despite
their other differences, to opposing forms of Islam that both see as âaberrantâ.
In these complex ways, links with Saudi patrons and institutions have worked to promote the
image and influence of the Saudi âWahhabiâ âulama and the Saudi regime. Competition between
the Deobandis and the Ahlâ i Hadith for Saudi patronage has resulted in both these groups
seeking to stress their closeness to Saudi âWahhabiâ Islam and to the Saudi regime.
Consequently, completely absent in the ongoing DeobandiâAhlâi Hadith polemical war and in the
writings and speeches of Ahlâi Hadith and Deobandi âulama has been any critique of the policies
of the Saudi regime, despite widespread dissatisfaction among Muslims over its close nexus with
the United States. The lure of Saudi aid has meant that neither the Ahlâi Hadith nor the
Deobandis have been willing, at least publicly, to express any criticism of the Saudis. This
explains why Saudi policies, particularly Saudi Arabiaâs association with the United States, are
never mentioned in the heated polemical debates between the Ahlâi Hadith and the Deobandis,
which remain restricted simply to issuing charges and counterâcharges of âdisbeliefâ, often over
minor points of ritual practice. The contrast with the Indian Barelvis and Shiâas in this regard is
remarkable. Not receiving any Saudi assistance, they have been vocal in their opposition to
Saudi Arabia, particularly for its alliance with the United States, which they regard as pursuing
policies inimical to Muslim interests.
Recent events, particularly the attacks of September 2001, have resulted in growing pressure on
the Saudis to reign in radical Islamist groups radicals whom it has generously patronised for
several decades. To add to this is the fact that within Saudi Arabia itself a growing Islamist
movement threatens to challenge the regime on its own terms, critiquing it for not being
âIslamicâ enough and for its nexus with imperialist powers. This twin challenge, from within and
without, is bound to impact on Saudi Arabiaâs relations with various Muslim groups in India and
elsewhere, although what direction this will take remains to be seen.
[1] For details, see Abul Mukarram âAbdul Jalil, Imam Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab Ki Daâwat
Aur âUlamaâi Ahlâi Hadith Ki Masaâi, Varanasi: Idara alâBahuth alâIslamiya, 2001, pp.37â159.
[2] For an Indian Shiâa critique of âWahhabismâ, see Farogh Kazmi, Fitnaâi Wahhabiyat, Lucknow:
Idaraâi Tahzibâi Adab, 1998.
[3] Stephen Schwartz, The Two Faces of Islam: Saudi Fundamentalism and Its Role in Terrorism,
New York: Anchor Books, p.179.
[4] For an interesting discussion of the political economy of Saudi foreign aid and the promotion
of Saudi âWahhabismâ abroad, see âAbdul Qayyum, Amriki Khalijâi Fars Palisi Aur Saudi Arab,
published by the author, Hyderabad, 2004.
[5] Muhammad Jamal Bulandshahri, op.cit., p.10.
[6] For details, see âAbdullah Bahawalpuri, Ikhtilafi Masaâil Mai HaqâoâInsaf Ki Rah, Delhi: Dar ulâ
Kutub alâSalafiyah, 2004.
[7] For Ahlâi Hadith attacks against these groups, see various articles on www.ahya.org. This is a
Mumbaiâbased Ahlâi Hadith website, which has clear Saudi connections, and carries numerous
articles penned by contemporary Saudi âWahhabiâ âulama.
http://www.ahya.org/amm/modules.php?...rticles&cid=14
[8] Thus, for instance, Shakil Ahmad Meeruthi, a Delhiâbased Ahlâi Hadith scholar, claims that
the muqallids, who advocate strict compliance with one of the four generally accepted schools
of Sunni fiqh, concoct statements which they wrongly attribute to the Prophet, and insists that
the punishment for this crime is punishment in hell (Shakil Ahmad Meeruthi, âIntroductionâ, in
Salahuddin Yusuf, Tehrikâi Jihad: Jamaâatâi Ahlâi Hadith Aur âUlamaâi Ahnaf, Delhi: Dar ulâKitab alâ
Islamiya, 2000, p.3).
[9] Mohammed Zeyaul Haque, âThe Dangerous Divideâ,
htttp://www.milligazette.com/Archives/15072001/sign.htm
[10] Abul Mukarram âAbdul Jalil, op.cit., p.37. The author mentions that his Saudi teacher.
âAbdur Rahman bin âAbdul Latif alâShaikh was instrumental in getting him to write the book, and
paid the Jamiâa Salafiya, Varanasi, the apex madrasa of the Indian Ahlâi Hadith to publish ten
thousand copies of the book (p.12).
[11] âAbdul âAziz bin âAbdullah bin Baz, Siratâi Shaikh Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab, alâKitab
International, New Delhi, n.d., pp.47â48.
[12] Saleh bin Ghanim alâSadlan, Saudi Arabia Ki DaâwatiâoâTaâlimi Sargarmiyan Aur Unke Nataâij
(translated by âAbdur Rahman bin âAbdul Jabbar Farewai), New Delhi: Farewai Academy, 2004.
[13] Ibid., pp.13â14.
[14] Ibid., p.17. Also, p.82.
[15] ibid., p.81.
[16] Ibid., p.46.
[17] Ibid., p.81.
[18] Ibid., p.17.
[19] Cited in Mahfuz urâRahman Faizi, Shaikh Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab Ke Bare Mai Do
Mutazid Nazren, Varanasi: Jamiâa Salafiya, 1986, p.i.
[20] Cited in Qadri, op.cit., p.136.
[21] Cited in Faizi, op.cit., p.20.
[22] âGangohi Fatwas on Wahhabismâ, http://www.mailâ
archive.com/msa_ec@l.../msg02780.html
[23] Faizi, op.cit., 43.
[24] Faizi, p.37.
[25] âGangohi Fatwas on Wahhabismâ, http://www.mailâ
archive.com/msa_ec@l.../msg02780.html
[26] Numani, op.cit..
[27] Interestingly enough, despite Zakariyaâs approval here of the âWahhabisâ, his Fazaâilâi âAmal,
a compilation of stories widely used in the Tablighi Jamaâat, is banned in Saudi Arabia. So, too,
are the activities of the Tablighi Jamaâat, which is officially not allowed to function in the
Kingdom.
[28] Nuâmani, op.cit., pp.141â43.
[29] Nuâmani, op.cit., pp.5â17.
[30] Nuâmani, op.cit., p.34.
[31] Nuâmani, op.cit., pp.73â102
[32] Nuâmani, op.cit., pp.37â47.
[33] Nuâmani, op.cit., pp.104â07.
[34] Faizi, op.cit.
[35] Faizi, op.cit., pp.iâii.
[36] Faizi, op.cit., pp.10â39.
[37] Yasin Akhtar Misbahi, in âAbdul Sattar Rizvi, Tablighi Jamaâat Saudi Mufti Ki Nazar Mai,
Delhi: Maktaba Naâimiya, n.d., pp.5â6.
[38] Sayyed âAsad Madani, Khutbaâi Sadarat, New Delhi: Farid Book Depot, 2001, pp.6â20.
[39] Mohammed Zeyaul Haque, op.cit.. An abridged Urdu version of the book was later
published in India and Pakistan, making somewhat the same arguments. Quoting from the
books of numerous Deobandi elders, the author claimed that the Deobandis held numerous
beliefs that were clearly âunâIslamicâ. These included belief in pantheism (wahdat alâwujud), faith
in the intercessionary powers of the dead, and several other Sufistic beliefs that, the author
argued, made the Deobandis âgo even further [in their disbelief] than the polytheists of Meccaâ
(Sayyed Talib urâRahman, Deobandi Aqaâid Ka Tahqiqi Jaâiza: QurâanâoâHadith Ki Roshni Mai,
Delhi: alâHamd Publications, 1997). The author is said to have also written a book in Arabic
against the Deobandiârelated Tablighi Jamaâat movement.
[40] âAbdul Sattar Rizvi, op.cit., pp.8â10.
[41] Sayyed Husain Ahmad Madani, op.cit., p.18. Salafiâs book appeared in the form of three
volumes, and was based on the authorâs doctoral thesis submitted to the Islamic University of
Medina.
[42] Ahmad Irfani, âMuslim Scholars Battle Over Qurâanâ, http://www.mailâ
archive.com/msa_ec@l.../msg03381.html
[43] In his introduction, Shakil Ahmad Meeruthi, the owner of the Delhiâbased publishing house
which published the Indian edition of the book, writes that the book was first issued by the
Maktab alâDaâwah waâl Irshad wa Taâwiya alâJaliyat, the Saudi âOffice for the Invitation and
Guidance of Expatriatesâ, as a response to alleged âwrongâ propaganda by the Deobandis against
the Ahlâi Hadith.
[44] Sayyed Yusuf urâRahman Rashid, Kya âUlama Ahlâi Sunnat Waâl Jamaâat Hai?, Delhi: Dar ulâ
Kutub alâIslamiya, 2001. As a cautionary note the author adds that he does not claim that all
Deobandis are kafirs and polytheists. Yet, he says, they need to be ârescued from their
ignoranceâ, but advises that the temptation to issue fatwas against them must be resisted.
However, he adds that Muslims should not pray behind Deobandi âulama who hold âfalseâ beliefs
(p.95). He also declares that âworshippers of the saintsâ) (pir pujari) and followers of pantheism
(wahdat alâwujud) are apostates (murtads) and, therefore, fit to be killed (wajib ulâqatl) (p.97).
[45] Abu Iqbal Salafi, Mazhabâi Hanafi Ka Mazhabâi Islam Se Ikhtilaf, Mumbai: Idara Daâwat ulâ
Islam, 1999, pp.6â7.
[46] Ibid., pp.16â20.
[47] Ibid., p.78.
[48] http://www.allaahuakbar.net/tableegi...h_bin_baaz.htm
[49] http://www.allaahuakbar.net/tableegi...e_72_sects.htm
[50] http://www.allaahuakbar.net/tableegi...ykh_albani.htm
[51] These articles can be accessed on http://www.allaahuakbar.net/tableegi_jamaat/
[52] http://www.allaahuakbar.net/deobandism/index.htm
[53] Ahmad Irfani, op.cit.
[54] The interview can be read and listened to on www.ahya.org, an Indian AhlâI Hadith website
probably based in Mumbai, which seems to have strong Saudi âWahhabiâ connections.
[55] Muhammad âAqil, Fazaâilâi âAmal Ke Nashir Ki Tauba, Delhi: Dar ulâKutub alâIslamiya, n.d.,
p.35.
[56] Ibid., pp.4â10.
[57] Among the books by Deobandi âulama that Anasâ publishing house has now ceased
publishing is the second volume of the Fazaâilâi âAmal, an immensely popular book among the
Tablighis penned by the chief ideologue of the movement, Muhammad Zakariya. It was Anasâ
father, the founder of the Idaraâi Ishaâatâi Diniyat, who had given the book its name and who
had first published it. In fact, the publishing house raked in immense profits from this book,
bringing it out in four languages, Urdu, Arabic, English and French. Anas added that he planned
to cease publishing the first volume of the book shortly, confessing that he could do not do so
immediately as that might badly affect the profits of his publishing house.
[58] Ibid., pp.20â35.
[59] Muhammad Ishaq Zahid, Maslaâi Taqlid, Fatiha Khalf alâImam, Talaqâi Thalitha, Namazâi
Tarawih Ke Mutaliq Ahlâi Hadith Aur âUlamaâi Harimain Ka Ittifaqi Rai, Delhi: Dar ulâKutub alâ
Islamia, n.d., p.13.
[60] See, for instance, Muhammad Jamal Bulandshahri, op.cit..
[61] Muhammad Jamal Bulandshahri, op.cit., p.40.
[62] Muhammad Akhtar Yasin Qadri, op.cit., p.119.
[63] Sayyed âAsad Madani, op.cit., pp.16â17.
[64] Sayyed âAsad Madani, op.cit., pp.16â17.
[65] Sayyed âAsad Madani, op.cit., p.20.
[66] Sayyed Mahdi Hasan Shahjahanpuri, QurâanâoâHadith Ke Khilaf Ghayr Muqallidin Ke Pachas
Masaâil, New Delhi: Farid Book Depot, n.d.
[67] Mahmud Hasan Bulandshahri, TawassulâoâIsteghasiya Baghayr Allah Aur Ghayr Muqallidin
Ka Mazhab, New Delhi: Farid Book Depot, n.d., p.2.
[68] Muhammad Jamal Bulandshahri, op.cit., pp.1â5.
[69] Sayyed Muhammad Salman Mansurpuri, Tehrikâi La Mazhabiyat, New Delhi: Farid Book
Depot, pp.1â15.
[70] âAbdur Rahman bin âAbdul Jabbar Farewai (ed.), Fitna Se Nijat, Delhi: Dar ulâKitab alâ
Islamiya, 2004.
[71] Ibid., pp.1â10.
[72] Ibid., pp.10â26.
[73] Ibid., pp.35â45.
[74] Ibid., pp.50â57.
[75] Ibid., pp.50â65.
[76] Ibid., pp. 62â67.
[77] Ibid., pp.61â63.
[78] Ibid., pp.68â79.
[1] Muhammad Akhtar Yasin Qadri, Izalaâi Fareb: Ba Jawab Taqlidâi Shaksi Ke Asib, Delhi: Kutub
Khana Amjadiya, 2001, pp.82â118.
[2] Manzur Nuâmani, Shaikh Muhammad bin âAbdul Wahhab Ke Khilaf Propaganda Aur
Hindustan Ke âUlamaâi Haq Par Uske Asrat, Lucknow: alâFurqan Book Depot, 1998, p.19.