Demosthenes Piety

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Classical Philology 108 (2013): 202–22

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DEMOSTHENES ON PHILANTHRŌPIA AS A DEMOCRATIC VIRTUE

matthew r. christ

IN HER INTELLECTUAL HISTORY of the development of the Greek idea of“gentleness,” Jacqueline de Romilly observes that a triad of associatedwords and their cognates—φιλανθρωπία, πραότης, and ἐπιείκεια—emerges

in the Greek vocabulary in the late fth century and rises to prominence infourth-century literary sources, and that these terms appear conspicuously

in Athenian characterizations of their city and its citizens. 1 Building onde Romilly’s general observations, this article proposes that Demosthenesplayed a pivotal role in formulating and promulgating a democratic ideal of

philanthr ō pia that draws together numerous preexisting strands of Atheniancivic ideology and promotes them under a single appealing and exible term. 2 A close examination of Demosthenes’ treatment of philanthr ō pia illuminateshis transformation of this concept into a democratic virtue, and suggeststhat he is an innovative political thinker who not only transmits receiveddemocratic ideology to his mass audiences in the Assembly and lawcourts,but revises and reshapes it. 3 Whereas recent scholarship has sought to tracethe inuence of Plato’s political thought on late fourth-century orators, 4 this

article argues that in Demosthenes’ case we can see a democratic orator ac-tively engaged in developing his own political ideas before mass audienceswhile at the same time exploiting these to advance himself and his agenda.

This paper considers rst how Demosthenes’ predecessors invoked the ideaof philanthr ō pia to advance their conservative political perspectives and thesignicance of his application of it instead to democratic Athens and its citi-zens. Next, it examines in detail Demosthenes’ presentation of philanthr ō pia as a distinctly Athenian virtue that is associated closely with democratic in-stitutions and a free and tolerant democratic way of life. Finally, it turns tothe question of what this may tell us about Demosthenes as a political thinker

1. De Romilly 1979, 37–52, 97–112.2. De Romilly (1979, 37) notes Demosthenes’ frequent use of philanthr ō pia (see below, n. 18) and the em-phasis he places on Athens’ “douceur” in general (101–3, 107–9; cf. 118–19, 124–25), but does not considerin her broad survey his role in promoting philanthr ō pia as a democratic virtue. When I speak of philanthr ō pia in this article, I am using this as shorthand for both the abstract noun and its cognates. All translations are myown unless otherwise noted.

3. On elite orators and their invocation of democratic ideology before mass audiences, see Ober 1989.4. Allen (2010, 89–107) argues that Plato’s political thought inuenced Aeschines, Lycurgus, and Hyper-

ides (among others), and that all three may have been students of the philosopher (192–93 n. 14); she does notnd evidence of Platonic inuence on Demosthenes and is rightly skeptical of the tradition that Demosthenesstudied with Plato (cf. Cooper 2000).

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203DEMOSTHENES ON P HILANTHRŌPIA

and about the potential for orators not only to invoke but to shape democraticideology before mass audiences.

Democratizing P

To understand the signicance of Demosthenes’ application of philanthr ō pia to the Athenian democracy and its people, it is important rst to set this inits fourth-century context. 5 Before Demosthenes, philanthr ō pia appears mostconspicuously in the works of two politically conservative fourth-centuryauthors, Xenophon and Isocrates, whose use of this term reects their ownpreoccupations and biases. For both of these writers, philanthr ō pia is an idealaristocratic attribute that is manifested primarily in the generosity and human-ity of kings, potentates, and generals toward those less powerful than them-selves. Consistent with this is their occasional application of philanthr ō pia

to the ultimate elites in the Greek world, heroes and gods, in their relationswith their mortal inferiors. 6

Xenophon speaks of philanthr ō pia most frequently in connection withCyrus the Great in his Cyropaedia, characterizing him at the start of thework as “most generous in spirit” (ψυχὴν δὲ φιλανθρωπότατος, 1.2.1) andemphasizing throughout it Cyrus’ ability to win and keep friends and al-lies through his unstinting personal generosity. 7 Similarly, Xenophon praisesthe Lacedaemonian king Agesilaus for his well-known philanthr ō pia towardconquered peoples, which makes his enemies more willing to surrender tohim ( Ages. 1.22). Elsewhere, Xenophon attributes philanthr ō pia to the godsin connection with their provision of food and re to humans ( Mem. 4.3.5,4.3.7; cf. Oec. 15.4, 19.17). 8 Only sparingly does this longtime Athenian

exile and Laconophile speak of philanthr ō pia in connection with his nativecity. His Euryptolemus defends the generals at Arginusae on the grounds thatthey acted with philanthr ō pia in giving orders that the shipwrecked survivorsof the battle be rescued ( Hell. 1.7.18). And Xenophon praises Socrates asmanifestly “a friend of the people and generous” (δημοτικὸς καὶ φιλάνθρωπος)since he spent his entire life helping others to become better men through hiscompany and conversation and charged no fee for this ( Mem. 1.2.60–61). 9 Far from identifying philanthr ō pia as a typical Athenian trait, Xenophon, likePlato, distinguishes Socrates from his fellow Athenians on the basis of hismanifestation of this. 10

5. Philanthr ō pia is securely attested only twice in fth-century sources, [Aesch.] PV 28 (of Prometheus)and Ar. Pax 392–94 (in an appeal to Hermes): see de Romilly 1979, 45, 47–48.

6. On philanthr ō pia and related virtues as ideal attributes of the powerful in Isocrates and Xenophon,see de Romilly 1979, 127–44; on the philanthr ō pia of the gods in these two writers and elsewhere, see ibid.44–47. As de Romilly observes, philanthr ō pia can be viewed as a “disposition” (43) or a “virtue” (48; cf. 99,107); cf. Konstan 2001, 88.

7. See Cyr. 1.4.1, 4.2.10, 8.2.1, 8.4.7–8, 8.7.25; cf. 7.5.73.8. Xenophon also speaks of philanthr ō pia in connection with animals that are well-disposed toward hu-

mans ( Eq. 2.3; Cyn. 3.9, 6.25) and legislation that he proposes concerning merchants ( Vect. 3).9. Cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.8, which applies both of these adjectives to Pisistratus.

10. Plato’s Socrates speaks of his philanthr ō pia in conversing with all men for no charge ( Euthphr. 3d5–9), and sets himself apart from other men on the basis of his helping of fellow citizens as if they were his kin( Ap. 31a7–b5). On the characterization of Socrates in these terms in Xenophon and Plato, see de Romilly 1979,46–47 and Christ 2012, 64–65.




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Isocrates, like Xenophon, most frequently speaks of philanthr ō pia as anideal trait of a king or potentate. Thus, for example, he praises Evagoras, king

of Cyprian Salamis, for administering his city piously and with philanthr ō pia (θεοφιλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως, 9.43) and exhorts Evagoras’ son, Nicocles, toact in the same manner (2.15); and he calls on Philip to imitate his ances-tor Heracles’ philanthr ō pia and goodwill (eunoia) toward the Greeks (5.114;cf. 116). 11 At one point, Isocrates suggests that he himself is a promoter of

philanthr ō pia in teaching his students an ethical and honorable rhetoric thatinduces them to embrace noble causes “that benet mankind and concernthe common good” (φιλανθρώπους καὶ περὶ τῶν κοινῶν πραγμάτων, 15.276).Isocrates speaks just once of philanthr ō pia in connection with Athens’ be-havior. In the portion of his Panegyricus (c. 380 B.C.E.) that draws on andimitates the tradition of the Attic funeral orations to praise Athens, he assertsthat the city acted generously (φιλανθρώπως) in sharing Demeter’s Mysteriesand gift of grain with all other peoples (29). Although this is noteworthyas an early attribution of philanthr ō pia to Athens, Isocrates is not drawn,as we shall see Demosthenes is, to develop the idea that philanthr ō pia isa characteristic Athenian virtue and one linked with the city’s democraticconstitution. 12 Indeed, Isocrates’ only other application of philanthr ō pia inan Athenian context is critical of “the many” in Athens on the grounds thatthey are attracted more to those active in public life “who deceive them witha show of cheerfulness and philanthr ō pia than those who benet them withdignity and gravity” (τοὺς μετὰ φαιδρότητος καὶ φιλανθρωπίας φενακίζοντας ἢ τοὺς μετ’ ὄγκου καὶ σεμνότητος ὠφελοῦντας, 15.132–33).

Against this backdrop, what we shall see to be Demosthenes’ repeated

attribution of philanthr ō pia to the Athenian d ē mos and the average citizenswho constitute it appears to be a largely new development. Indeed, it is quitepossible in light of this earlier usage that Demosthenes is consciously appro-priating as a democratic virtue a positive attribute that conservatives associ-ated with elite individuals. His democratization of philanthr ō pia, in fact, hastwo facets: he not only applies this to the collective actions of the Atheniand ē mos in its governance of the city and administration of its a ff airs, but alsoextends it to the behavior of average citizens in their daily lives. 13 Thereis ample precedent for this sort of democratic appropriation, for example,in the way that the city’s encomiasts attribute ἀρετή (“excellence”), whicharistocrats claimed as their exclusive possession, to the city’s democratic

11. For similar exhortations to the powerful to embrace philanthr ō pia, see Isoc. Epistulae 7.6, 7.12 (toTimotheus, ruler of Heracleia); 5.2 (to Alexander); and 4.9 (to Antipater). For the collocation of philanthr ō pia and eunoia, as in Isoc. 5.114, see Dem. 18.5 (cf. 19.99). On the importance of eunoia to Isocrates, seede Romilly 1958; cf. Mitchell 1997.

12. Isocrates does, however, speak repeatedly of the characteristic “mildness” (πραότης) of Athenians athome and abroad (10.37; 12.56; 14.17) and laments the occasions when Athenians have strayed from this(7.20; 14.39–40; 15.20, 15.299–300). Although Isocrates does not usually associate this mildness closely withthe city’s democratic constitution, at one point (7.67) he contrasts the mild behavior of the restored d ē mos in403 B.C.E. with the savage behavior of the Thirty.

13. Isocrates (4.29) anticipates Demosthenes in speaking of Athenians’ collective philanthr ō pia, but hedoes not attribute this to the d ē mos or to the city’s democratic constitution.




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hoplites. 14 If a desire to democratize an aristocratic virtue was one impe-tus behind Demosthenes’ use of philanthr ō pia, however, I will argue that

other considerations came into play as well. Namely, Demosthenes found in philanthr ō pia an attractive and exible term that could subsume a range ofpreexisting democratic ideals concerning especially the nature of political andsocial life within the city, and give new expression to them.

Before Demosthenes, the city’s encomiasts extol the characteristic generos-ity and humanity of the democratic city and its citizens in a variety of ways.In their relations with other states, Athenians nobly run to assist (βοηθέω)those suff ering wrong and exercise their own power with mildness (πραότης).Within their city, Athenians respect their fellow citizens’ freedom to liveas they wish and refrain from harsh judgment of, or interference with, this(Thuc. 2.37.2–3), and thus are able—unlike many peoples—to live in concord(ὁμόνοια) without the horrors of civil strife. In their lawcourts, Atheniansare naturally inclined to show pity and mildness (πραότης) in judging de-fendants. 15 Demosthenes, as we shall see, is intimately familiar with thesedemocratic ideals and the vocabulary traditionally used to articulate them, 16 but also links them to one another in nding Athenian philanthr ō pia operat-ing across these diverse spheres. Essential to this Demosthenic project is theexibility of philanthr ō pia, which Demosthenes uses to connote not only“humanity,” “generosity,” and “kindness,” but also the “civility,” “sociabil-ity,” and “tolerance” that hold the city together. 17

P as a Democratic Political and Social Virtue

As we turn to philanthr ō pia in Demosthenes, the rst thing that is striking isthe relative frequency with which he uses this word and its cognates. 18 Hisseventy-one attested uses of these represent more than double the total in-stances of them in Xenophon and Isocrates, and indeed exceed all occurrences

14. On the salience of ἀρετή in the state funeral orations for the war dead, see Ziolkowski 1981, 110–32and Loraux 1986. I agree with Ober (1989, 289–92, 339; contra Loraux 1986, 217, 334) that the democracyappropriates aristocratic virtues and ideals for its own purposes: “the aristocratic ethos and terminology didnot serve to suppress or undermine egalitarian ideals, but rather aristocratic ideals were made to conform to theneeds of the democratic state” (291). Cf. Balot’s excellent discussion (2010) of the Athenian democratizationof courage.

15. On the Athenian claim of helping wronged peoples, see Loraux 1986, 67–75; Mills 1997, 63–66; Tzan-etou 2005; Forsdyke 2005, 256–59; Low 2007, 177–86; Hunt 2010, 178, 194; Christ 2012, 118–76 (with fur-ther bibliography). On assertions of Athenian πραότης at home and abroad, see Dover 1974, 202; de Romilly

1979, 97–112; Hansen 1991, 310; Whitehead 2000, 437–38; Forsdyke 2005, 231–32, 265–66. On ὁμόνοια asan Athenian ideal from the late fth century on, see de Romilly 1972; Funke 1980; Wohl 2010, 213–14; Christ2012, 50–67 (with further bibliography). On the complex role of pity in the Athenian lawcourts, see Johnstone1999, 109–25; Konstan 2001, 27–48; cf. Sternberg 2005a.

16. De Romilly (1979, 49) observes that Demosthenes often uses philanthr ō pia in conjunction with relatedterms. On Demosthenes’ fondness of “doublets,” see Cook 2009, 43–44.

17. LSJ8 only captures some of these nuances in its denition of philanthr ō pia: “humanity, benevo-lence, kind-heartedness, humane feeling, or, in a weaker sense, kindliness, courtesy” (emphasis in original).On philanthr ō pia and sociability, see de Romilly 1979, 50. Dover (1974, 201–2) notes the wide range of

philanthr ō pia and its close connection with other value-terms.18. Dem. 6.1; 8.33, 8.71; 13.17; 16.9, 16.17; 18.5, 18.112, 18.186, 18.209, 18.231, 18.268, 18.298, 18.316;

19.39, 19.96, 19.99, 19.102, 19.139, 19.140 (2x), 19.220, 19.225, 19.315; 20.55, 20.109, 20.165; 21.12, 21.44,21.48, 21.49, 21.57, 21.75, 21.128, 21.148, 21.185; 23.13, 23.131, 23.156, 23.165; 24.24, 24.51, 24.156,24.191, 24.193, 24.196; 25.51, 25.76, 25.81, 25.86, 25.87 (2x), 25.89; 36.47, 36.55, 36.59; 40.32; 41.2; 44.8;45.4; 60.32; 61.13, 61.18, 61.21, 61.46; Prooemia 16 (2x), 23.1; Epistulae 1.10, 3.22, 3.41.




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of the word in these two authors, Plato, and Aristotle combined. 19 More sig-nicant than the number of times Demosthenes uses philanthr ō pia, however,

is how often he invokes it in connection with Athenians and their democraticpolity. Both in his own speeches before the Assembly and the popular law-courts and in the forensic speeches that he writes for clients, Demostheneslinks philanthr ō pia closely to the Athenian d ē mos and a democratic way oflife. 20

Consistent with what we shall see to be Demosthenes’ appropriation of philanthr ō pia as a democratic virtue is his denial of this virtue to the foreignautocrats with whom the city has dealings. While Xenophon and Isocratesare drawn especially to characterize the behavior of kings and other power-ful individuals in terms of philanthr ō pia, Demosthenes warns his Athenianaudiences repeatedly of the false philanthr ō pia of foreign potentates, in par-ticular Philip of Macedon. 21 In advance of Philip’s defeat of Athens and its

allies at Chaeronea in 338 B.C.E., he warns his audiences that Philip is a wolfin sheep’s clothing and that he is merely feigning philanthr ō pia toward theGreeks he intends to conquer. 22 After Chaeronea, Demosthenes asserts in Onthe Crown that Philip’s ostensible philanthr ō pia in granting moderate termsshould not veil his true nature from Athenians (18.231):

καὶ οὐκέτι προστίθημι ὅτι τῆς μὲν ὠμότητος, ἣν ἐν οἷς καθάπαξ τινῶν κύριος κατέστη Φίλιππος ἔστιν ἰδεῖν, ἑτέροις πειραθῆναι συνέβη, τῆς δὲ φιλανθρωπίας, ἣν τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν πραγμάτων ἐκεῖνος περιβαλλόμενος ἐπλάττετο, ὑμεῖς καλῶς ποιοῦντες τοὺς καρποὺς κεκόμισθε.

I need not add that other peoples have had experience of the savagery that is always ob-

servable once Philip has gained power over men, whereas you through your good fortune

enjoy the fruits of the philanthr ō pia that he feigns while pursuing the rest of his goals.

(Trans. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince, modied)

In the same speech, Demosthenes also reminds his audience that unlikeAeschines and other rhē tores, he has consistently seen through Philip’s

19. De Romilly (1979, 37) tabulates the following gures for the use of philanthr ō pia and cognates infourth-century authors: Xenophon (18), Isocrates (12), Plato (5), Aristotle (11), Demosthenes (72). A searchof the TLG yields slightly diff erent results for Xenophon (19); Plato (3, excluding Def. 412e11 as spurious);and Demosthenes (71, excluding [Dem.] 7.31). The only Attic Orators besides Demosthenes and Isocrates whouse philanthr ō pia are Aeschines (9, excluding instances in the spurious Epistles), Lycurgus (1), and Hyperides(1). Philanthr ō pia only crops up once in fourth-century Athenian honorary decrees, in a mid-fourth-centuryinscription ( IG II2 1186 = Syll.3 1094) praising Damasius, a Theban metic at Eleusis, for acting generously(φιλανθρώπως) toward those dwelling in the deme (see Veligianni-Terzi 1997, 131, 216; cf. de Romilly 1979,51; Whitehead 1986, 151–52); on the virtues most commonly praised in these decrees, see Whitehead 1993and Veligianni-Terzi 1997.

20. In his extant speeches, Demosthenes uses philanthr ō pia six times before the Assembly,fty-four timesbefore the popular lawcourts (thirty-seven times in his own voice, seventeen times in speeches written for hisclients, that is, in Dem. 23, 24, 36, 40, 41, 44, 45), and once in his epitaphios (see the list of citations in n. 18).The larger number of uses in Demosthenes’ forensic speeches likely reects the fact that not only more ofthese survive than of his deliberative speeches, but also Demosthenes envisions philanthr ō pia operating morein a domestic context, on which forensic orations tend to focus, than in an interstate one, on which deliberativeorations usually center. Although the speeches in the Demosthenic corpus may sometimes have been revisedfor publication, they likely do not deviate substantially from the actual speeches presented by Demosthenesand his clients before Athenian audiences: see Hunt 2010, 270–74.

21. Besides exposing Philip in this way, Demosthenes warns of the false philanthr ō pia of Cersobleptes(23.13–14) and Charidemus (23.13–14; cf. 23.165), and of Cotys’ complete lack of philanthr ō pia toward Ath-ens (23.131).

22. See Dem. 19.39, 102, 139, 140, 315; cf. 19.220; 6.1.




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pretense of philanthr ō pia—his φιλανθρωπία λόγων—and has off ered Athe-nians honest and sound advice (18.297). 23

If Demosthenes adamantly rejects the pretended philanthr ō pia of Philipand other potentates, he regularly portrays this as a virtue that Athenians col-lectively embrace. This crops up, for example, in the orator’s representationof Athens’ relations with other states. In one of his prooimia, Demosthenesplays off the idea that Athenians routinely act with philanthr ō pia toward otherpeoples as he urges the Athenians in Assembly to look to their own interestsunder the current circumstances (16): 24

Ἐβουλόμην ἂν ὑμᾶς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ᾗ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἅπαντας εἰώθατε προσφέρεσθαι φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ταύτῃ καὶ πρὸς ὑμᾶς αὐτοὺς χρῆσθαι· νυνὶ δ’ ἀμείνους ἐστὲ τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δείν’ ἐπανορθοῦν ἢ τῶν ὑμῖν αὐτοῖς συμβαινόντων φροντίζειν. ἴσως μὲν οὖν αὐτὸ τοῦτό τις ἂν φήσειε μέγιστον ἔπαινον φέρειν τῇ πόλει, τὸ μηδενὸς ἕνεκα κέρδους ἰδίου πολλοὺς

κινδύνους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ δικαίου προῃρῆσθαι. ἐγὼ δὲ ταύτην τ’ ἀληθῆ τὴν δόξαν εἶναι νομίζω κατὰ τῆς πόλεως καὶ βούλομαι, κἀκεῖνο δ’ ὑπολαμβάνω σωφρόνων ἀνθρώπων ἔργον εἶναι, ἴσην πρόνοιαν τῶν αὑτοῖς οἰκείων ὅσηνπερ τῶν ἀλλοτρίων ποιεῖσθαι, ἵνα μὴ φιλάνθρωποι μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντες φαίνησθε.

I would have wished, men of Athens, that you treat yourselves with the philanthr ō pia that

you are accustomed to practice toward all other peoples. As it now is, you are better at

rectifying the problems of others than you are at giving thought to the troubles that befall

you. Someone may perhaps say that this is exactly what brings the greatest glory to the

city—to have chosen to assume many risks for the sake of justice alone with no thought

of any private gain. I myself believe this reputation that prevails concerning the city to be

true and wish it to be, but I assume it also to be an obligation of prudent men to exercise

as much foresight in their own a ff airs as in those of strangers, so that you may show your-

selves to be not only generous [φιλάνθρωποι] but sensible. 25

(Trans. N. W. DeWitt andN. J. DeWitt, modied)

While Demosthenes regularly invokes Athens’ tradition of generously assist-ing other Hellenes (see esp. 18.95–101), only occasionally does he attributethis, as here, to the city’s philanthr ō pia. 26 Interestingly, Demosthenes for themost part reserves philanthr ō pia for talking about ideal political and socialrelations within the city.

Philanthr ō pia, according to Demosthenes, permeates the democratic city’sinstitutions, laws, and citizen relations. 27 As we shall see, Demosthenes variesin how explicitly he links philanthr ō pia to the Athenian democracy. SometimesDemosthenes makes this connection overtly and emphatically when he identi-

es philanthr ō pia with the city’s democratic constitution and distinguishes

23. Aeschines, by contrast, speaks of the genuine philanthr ō pia and moderation of Philip toward thedefeated Athenians (3.57).

24. On the authenticity of Demosthenes’ “preambles,” see Yunis 1996, 287–89 and Worthington 2006, 57.25. For a similar appeal, see Dem. 2.24: “I am amazed . . . that you have so often saved other states, both

all of them together and each separately in turn, but now sit down under the loss of what is your own” (trans.J. H. Vince, modied) (ἀλλ’ ἐκεῖνο θαυμάζω . . . τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους σεσώκατε πολλάκις πάντας καὶ καθ’ ἕνα αὐτῶν ἐν μέρει, τὰ δ’ ὑμέτερ’ αὐτῶν ἀπολωλεκότες κάθησθε); cf. also 18.101.

26. On Athenian philanthr ō pia toward other Greeks, see esp. Dem. 23.156; cf. 8.33; 16.9; [Dem.] 7.30–31.By contrast, Demosthenes speaks of the false philanthr ō pia of the Spartans toward fellow Greeks (16.16).

27. On the wide range of application of philanthr ō pia in connection with Athens, see de Romilly 1979,49–50; cf. 99–100.




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between Athens and its oligarchic rivals on this basis (Dem. 20.109, 24.24;cf. 40.32, 22.51). More commonly, however, Demosthenes focuses on how

philanthr ō pia operates within democratic institutions, like the Assembly andlawcourts, and through democratic laws as the d ē mos collectively exercisesits authority to protect and advance its interests; or on how philanthr ō pia makes possible the easygoing and tolerant daily relations of members of thed ē mos with one another. Whether he makes the link with democracy moreor less explicitly in a particular instance, however, Demosthenes suggeststhat philanthr ō pia is central to collective and individual behavior in thedemocratic city.

Striking testimony to the philanthr ō pia of the Athenian d ē mos, Demos-thenes has a client point out, is found in its decision, upon the restorationof democracy in 403 B.C.E., not to force the sons of the Thirty into exile(Dem. 40.32). 28 According to Demosthenes, in fact, the democracy’s central

institutions through which the d ē mos exercises its authority, the Assemblyand the popular lawcourts, regularly embrace philanthr ō pia—at least whenthey behave as they should. Thus, he posits as a general principle that menactive in political life should accustom Athenians in the Assembly to be “mildand humane” (πράους καὶ φιλανθρώπους) in matters involving themselves andtheir allies, and to reserve their harshness for the city’s enemies (8.33). 29 Similarly, Demosthenes asserts that Athenians in their lawcourts ought to actwith humanity (φιλανθρώπους εἶναι), and reserve intimidation and threats formilitary campaigns (13.17). 30

One important way that the Assembly shows its philanthr ō pia, accordingto Demosthenes, is by reciprocrating the good deeds of its benefactors with

honors and privileges. Thus, in his Against Leptines Demosthenes arguesagainst the revocation of honors bestowed by the d ē mos in Assembly on itsvarious benefactors because this would be at odds with the philanthr ō pia that prompted the d ē mos to reward its benefactors and would violate the vitalprinciple of charis (20.55; cf. 20.165). 31 Demosthenes asserts, moreover, thatfreedom in a democracy hinges on the ability of the d ē mos to encourage mento compete to serve it through the rewards it off ers (20.108; cf. 20.111), anddistinguishes oligarchic regimes like those found in Sparta and Thebes fromthe Athenian democracy on the basis of their very diff erent practices in thedispensation of honors (20.105–8). He holds up the Thebans in particular asdark foils to the Athenians in this regard (20.109):

28. Cf. Isocrates 7.67, which cites this episode as evidence of the πραότης of the Athenian d ē mos. On thelikely authenticity of Demosthenes 40, see MacDowell 2009, 79.

29. Cf. Dem. 19.99: The Athenian people, “acting the part of good and generous men” (πρᾶγμα ποιοῦντες ἀνθρώπων χρηστῶν καὶ φιλανθρώπων), receive with goodwill those who put themselves forwardin public life.

30. As we shall see later, however, Demosthenes qualies this view of the lawcourts when seeking sternverdicts against his opponents. On Dem. 13 as an authentic Demosthenic speech, see MacDowell 2009, 226–27.

31. For the city’s philanthr ō pia in honoring its benefactors, see also Dem. 36.47, in which Demosthenesspeaks of this in connection with its bestowal of citizenship on Pasio and Phormio; in the same speech, he alsoemphasizes Phormio’s philanthr ō pia toward the city and its citizens (36.55, 58–59).




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καὶ μὴν περὶ τοῦ γε μηδὲ Θηβαίους μηδένα τιμᾶν, ἐκεῖν’ ἂν ἔχειν εἰπεῖν ἀληθὲς οἴομαι.μεῖζον, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, Θηβαῖοι φρονοῦσιν ἐπ’ ὠμότητι καὶ πονηρίᾳ ἢ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ φιλανθρωπίᾳ καὶ τῷ τὰ δίκαια βούλεσθαι.

Again, concerning the absence of honors at Thebes, I think I can express the truth thus:

the Thebans, men of Athens, pride themselves more on savagery and iniquity than you on

philanthr ō pia and desire for justice. (Trans. J. H. Vince, modied)

Here and elsewhere, Demosthenes portrays philanthr ō pia as a mark of, andpreserver of, a civilized society in which relations are based on reciprocity andfairness; such a society, he emphasizes, lies in stark contrast to one that culti-vates savagery (ὠμότης) instead. 32 Thus, when the Athenian d ē mos embraces

philanthr ō pia and rewards its benefactors, it not only serves its own bestinterests by encouraging a competition among its benefactors that sustainsdemocratic freedom, but also establishes itself as superior to its oligarchic

rivals in its embrace of a civilized standard for social

life.If Demosthenes is committed to defend the honors that the d ē mos bestows

on others as a proper and admirable show of philanthr ō pia, he is also readyto defend the honors that Ctesiphon proposed for him on the same basis.In his On the Crown, Demosthenes speaks in support of Ctesiphon, whomAeschines had indicted on the grounds that his proposal in the Assemblythat Demosthenes should be honored with a crown was illegal. At the outset,Demosthenes declares that he has a signicant stake in the outcome of thisprosecution, as he stands to lose the people’s “goodwill and philanthr ō pia”(τῆς . . . εὐνοίας καὶ φιλανθρωπίας, 18.5). He blames Aeschines squarely foradvocating misanthr ō pia—that is, the polar opposite of philanthr ō pia—to-

ward a generous benefactor of the city (18.112):τίς γάρ ἐστι νόμος τοσαύτης ἀδικίας καὶ μισανθρωπίας μεστὸς ὥστε τὸν δόντα τι τῶν ἰδίων καὶ ποιήσαντα πρᾶγμα φιλάνθρωπον καὶ φιλόδωρον τῆς χάριτος μὲν ἀποστερεῖν, εἰς τοὺς συκοφάντας δ’ ἄγειν, καὶ τούτους ἐπὶ τὰς εὐθύνας ὧν ἔδωκεν ἐφιστάναι;

What law is so full of injustice and misanthropy that, when a man has given something

from his private resources and done something benevolent [φιλάνθρωπον] and generous,it would deprive him of the gratitude [charis] owed to him and drag him before malicious

prosecutors and put them in charge of holding an audit of what he has donated?

Demosthenes is especially irked by Aeschines’ denigration of his good servicesto the city on the grounds that they fall short of the great deeds of past patriots(cf. Aeschin. 3.177–89), expressing indignation that a wretch like Aeschinesshould thereby seek to deprive him of “the honor and philanthr ō pia” (τῆς . . . τιμῆς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας, 18.209) of the people. 33 He later asks (18.316):

πότερον κάλλιον καὶ ἄμεινον τῇ πόλει διὰ τὰς τῶν πρότερον εὐεργεσίας, οὔσας ὑπερμεγέθεις,οὐ μὲν οὖν εἴποι τις ἂν ἡλίκας, τὰς ἐπὶ τὸν παρόντα βίον γιγνομένας εἰς ἀχαριστίαν καὶ προπηλακισμὸν ἄγειν, ἢ πᾶσιν, ὅσοι τι μετ’ εὐνοίας πράττουσι, τῆς παρὰ τούτων τιμῆς καὶ φιλανθρωπίας μετεῖναι;

32. See also Dem. 18.231; 25.81, with 25.83–84. On the antithesis of philanthr ō pia and ὠμότης, see Dover1974, 202–3; cf. Kremmydas 2012, 377–78.

33. Elsewhere, Demosthenes attacks Aeschines for his pretense of philanthr ō pia (19.95).




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Is it more decent and better for the city that for the sake of the benefactions of men of old

times, enormous as they were and indeed great beyond expression, the services that are

now being rendered to the present age should be treated with ingratitude and vituperation,

or that every man who does something with goodwill should receive some share of the

honor and philanthr ō pia of his fellow citizens? 34 (Trans. C. A. Vince and J. H. Vince,

modied)

Thus, in Demosthenes’ view he, like his patriotic predecessors, merits the philanthr ō pia of the people as a show of charis in return for his services toit; as a benefactor of his fellow citizens, Demosthenes has himself shown

philanthr ō pia (18.112, quoted above), and he deserves the same in returnfrom the d ē mos. 35 It is not only right that the d ē mos act in this way, but also“better for the city” (ἄμεινον τῇ πόλει, 18.316), which relies on the goodwillof its benefactors (cf. 20.108).

The same spirit of philanthr ō pia should prevail, Demosthenes proposes,in the democracy’s laws, at least insofar as this serves the best interests ofthe d ē mos and the average citizens who constitute it. In the speech that hewrote for Diodorus in his prosecution of Timocrates for proposing an illegallaw, Demosthenes insists that the city’s laws under the democracy should beframed in such a way as to show philanthr ō pia to average citizens in theirdaily lives and relations, not to public men in their conduct of the city’s a ff airs(24.192–93):

ἀλλὰ μὴν πρός γε τὸ τοῖς πολλοῖς συμφέρειν τοὺς νόμους πράους καὶ μετρίους εἶναι τάδε χρὴ σκοπεῖν. ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, δύο εἴδη περὶ ὧν εἰσιν οἱ νόμοι καθ᾽ ἁπάσας τὰς πόλεις · ὧν τὸ μέν ἐστιν, δι’ ὧν χρώμεθ’ ἀλλήλοις καὶ συναλλάττομεν καὶ περὶ τῶν

ἰδίων ἃ χρὴ ποιεῖν διωρίσμεθα καὶ ζῶμεν ὅλως τὰ πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς, τὸ δέ, ὃν τρόπον δεῖ τῷ κοινῷ τῆς πόλεως ἕν’ ἕκαστον ἡμῶν χρῆσθαι, ἂν πολιτεύεσθαι βούληται καὶ φῇ κήδεσθαι τῆς πόλεως. ἐκείνους μὲν τοίνυν τοὺς νόμους τοὺς περὶ τῶν ἰδίων ἠπίως κεῖσθαι καὶ φιλανθρώπως ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν ἐστιν· τούσδε δὲ τοὺς περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸ δημόσιον τοὐναντίον ἰσχυρῶς καὶ χαλεπῶς ἔχειν ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν ἐστιν· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν ἥκισθ’οἱ πολιτευόμενοι τοὺς πολλοὺς ὑμᾶς ἀδικοῖεν. ὅταν δὴ τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ χρῆται, ἐπὶ ταῦτ’ἀπαντᾶτε, ὅτι τοὺς νόμους οὐκ ἐκείνους τοὺς ὑπὲρ ὑμῶν πράους ποιεῖ , ἀλλὰ τούσδε οἳ τοῖς πολιτευομένοις φόβον παρέχουσιν.

Again, with regard to the plea that mild and moderate laws are good for the many, you

must consider this. There are two sorts of things, men of Athens, with which the laws

of all cities are concerned. First, what are the principles under which we associate with

one another, have dealings with one another, dene the obligations of private life, and

in general, live among ourselves? Second, in what manner is every man among us toact in regard to our common city, if he wishes to take part in public life and says that

he cares for the city? Now it is to the advantage of the many that laws of the former

category, laws concerning private a ff airs, be distinguished by mildness and humanity

34. On Demosthenes’ emphasis on his goodwill (εὔνοια) in this speech, see Cook 2009, 40–52.35. On Demosthenes’ philanthr ō pia, see also 18.268, in which the orator, after listing his liturgies (18.267),

speaks of his philanthr ō pia in his private life toward those in need, including his ransoming of captives andprovision of dowries. Cf. Dem. 8.70–71, in which Demosthenes speaks of his trierarchies, chor ē giai, paymentof eisphorai, ransoming of captives, and “other such acts of philanthr ō pia” (τοιαύτας ἄλλας φιλανθρωπίας).Lycurgus (1.3) goes so far as to speak of his service as volunteer prosecutor as an act of philanthr ō pia (on thisclaim, see Christ 2012, 86–87).




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[φιλανθρώπως]. In contrast, it is to your common advantage that laws of the second type,the laws that govern our relations to the state, be strong and strict, because, if they are

so, those who are politically active will do the least harm to you, the many. Therefore,

when my opponent makes use of this plea, refute it by telling him that he is introduc-

ing mildness not into the laws that benet you, but into the laws that intimidate politi-cians. 36 (Trans. J. H. Vince, modied)

Viewed in this light, the philanthr ō pia of the laws is intimately connectedwith the interests of “the many,” which entail treating private persons with

philanthr ō pia but politicians with strictness and sternness. 37 If Demosthenestailors his theory of law here, as elsewhere, to do the most harm to a particulardefendant, he is consistent in arguing that the d ē mos and the laws it makesmust protect the interests of average citizens by showing philanthr ō pia selec-tively rather than indiscriminately. 38

In other forensic contexts, Demosthenes posits that philanthr ō pia is cen-tral not only to the law’s regulation of private a ff airs under the democracy,but to social relations themselves. In this context, philanthr ō pia encapsulatesfor Demosthenes the sociability, civility, and tolerance that are essential foramicable citizen relations under the democracy. Although Demosthenes’ pre-decessors, as noted earlier, had sought in diverse ways to articulate whatwas distinctive about the relations among free and equal citizens under thedemocracy, speaking, for example, of widespread tolerance among citizenstoward each other’s pursuits and the harmony (homonoia) among them arisingfrom mutual restraint and respect, the manner in which the orator elaboratesthis ideal vision of social relations and the emphasis he places on this isquite striking, and, I believe, largely unprecedented in extant Athenian public

discourse. Especially noteworthy is the way that Demosthenes invites jurorscollectively as members of the d ē mos who are alert to their interests to enforcethe practice of philanthr ō pia in social relations through their own selectiveexercise of philanthr ō pia in the lawcourts.

Demosthenes invokes philanthr ō pia as central to Athenian social relationsin a variety of legal contexts, for example, when he has one of his clients tellan Athenian lawcourt that he has only brought suit against his brother-in-lawas a last resort (41.1–2):

καὶ εἰ μέν, ὦ ἄνδρες δικασταί, μὴ πᾶσαν σπουδὴν καὶ προθυμίαν ἐποιησάμην βουλόμενος διαλύεσθαι καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ἐπιτρέπειν, ἐμαυτὸν ἂν ᾐτιώμην, εἰ μᾶλλον ᾑρούμην δίκας καὶ πράγματ’ ἔχειν ἢ μίκρ’ ἐλαττωθεὶς ἀνέχεσθαι· νῦν δ’ ὅσῳ πραότερον ἐγὼ καὶ

φιλανθρωπότερον τούτῳ διελεγόμην, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλόν μου κατεφρόνει.

36. Demosthenes also has Diodorus point out that Timocrates is seeking to exploit and manipulate Athe-nian philanthr ō pia through his proposed law (24.51–52), and that he misrepresents his law as motivated by

philanthr ō pia (24.190–91, 195–97; cf. 156).37. By contrast, Hyperides ( Dem. 24–25) asserts that the Athenian people embrace philanthr ō pia in letting

public men prot, within limits, from their positions.38. As we shall see later in the text, Demosthenes off ers a diff erent distinction regarding the scope of the

law’s philanthr ō pia in his Against Meidias, positing that it diff erentiates between intentional and unintentionaloff enses. Ober (2005, 410) well observes, on the basis of such passages, that Demosthenes “served as a ‘publicpolitical theorist of law.’” On Athenians’ diverse characterizations of “the law,” see Wohl 2010.




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And if, men of the jury, I had not shown all zeal and eagerness in my desire to nd asettlement and to submit the matters at issue to our friends, I would have blamed myself

for choosing to engage in a troublesome lawsuit rather than suff er a triing loss. But, asit is, the more mildly and civilly [φιλανθρωπότερον] I conversed with the defendant, themore contempt he showed toward me. (Trans. Murray, modied)

Although Demosthenes’ client suggests that philanthr ō pia should especiallyprevail over contentiousness among kin (cf. Dem. 25.87–89, discussed later),he frames his appeal to jurors broadly in terms of the social ideals of coopera-tion and harmony that his opponent has violated. 39

In his own public prosecutions, Demosthenes likewise invokes philanthr ō pia precisely because his sociopathic opponents have acted contrary to it. In hisprosecutions of Meidias and Aristogeiton, in fact, Demosthenes develops indetail a picture of the centrality of philanthr ō pia to social life under the de-

mocracy in the course of showing how his opponents’ behavior constitutesan attack on this. 40 As so often in Athenian public discourse, the articulationand advancement of citizen ideals goes hand in hand with the repudiation oftheir opposites. 41 Let us consider rst how Demosthenes casts Meidias’ hubrisagainst him as a violation of philanthr ō pia, and then how he portrays Aris-togeiton’s vicious and lawless behavior as a threat to this democratic virtue.

When Demosthenes prosecutes Meidias for slapping him in the face whilehe was serving as chor ē gos at the City Dionysia, he presents this as an actof hubris that poses a threat to the community at large. 42 An important,but not fully appreciated, aspect of his legal counterassault on Meidias isDemosthenes’ development of the position that Meidias has acted contraryto philanthr ō pia, which is central to democratic life, and therefore does nothimself deserve philanthr ō pia from a jury that represents, and acts in theinterests of, the d ē mos at large. Near the beginning of his speech, Demos-thenes amplies the egregious nature of Meidias’ off ense against a chor ē gos participating in the festival by pointing out that the city’s laws provide forthe prosecution even of those who simply disturb the festival by seeking toexact payments from their debtors during it; this, he asserts, attests to thehigh level of “ philanthr ō pia and piety” (φιλανθρωπίας καὶ εὐσεβείας) thatAthenians observe during the festival (21.12). If the city’s laws hold citizensto an especially high standard of philanthr ō pia through the course of thefestival, however, they also seek to ensure that philanthr ō pia will prevail overthreats to it in daily life. Thus, as Demosthenes expands on the heinous nature

of hubris, he declares that while the city’s laws treat unintentional off enses,even in the case of homicide, “with much consideration and philanthr ō pia”

39. On ideals of cooperation among family members and fellow citizens in the Athenian courts, see Christ1998, 160–92.

40. Demosthenes uses philanthr ō pia and its cognates sixteen times in these two speeches: nine times inDem. 21 and seven times in Dem. 25 (see n. 18, above, for the citations).

41. On this feature of Athenian discourse, see Hunter 1994, 110 and Christ 2006, 4.42. On this speech, see Ober 1989, 208–12; 1994; MacDowell 1990, 1–37; 2009, 245–53; Wilson 1991;

2000, 156–68; Fisher 1992, 44–51; Cohen 1995, 90–101; Roisman 2003, 136–41; Wohl 2010, 181–88; Christ2012, 109–13.




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(αἰδέσεως καὶ φιλανθρωπίας πολλῆς), they are strict (χαλεπούς) toward menwho are willfully hubristic (21.42–44). 43 This strictness toward hubristic

off enders is, in fact, a consequence of

the law’s philanthr ō pia (τοῦ νόμου τῆς φιλανθρωπίας) toward the weak, which protects even slaves from hubris(21.48). Indeed, if someone were to relay to the barbarian lands from whichthese slaves come that “there are some people in Hellas who are so mildand humane” (εἰσὶν Ἕλληνές τινες ἄνθρωποι οὕτως ἥμεροι καὶ φιλάνθρωποι,21.49) as to treat even their enemies with this regard, they would want tomake the Athenians their proxenoi (21.50). This humane character of the lawis useless, however, if jurors fail to enforce it against malefactors (21.57):

ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδέν ἐστ’ ὄφελος καλῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως τοὺς νόμους ὑπὲρ τῶν πολλῶν κεῖσθαι,εἰ τοῖς ἀπειθοῦσι καὶ βιαζομένοις αὐτοὺς ἡ παρ’ ὑμῶν ὀργὴ τῶν ἀεὶ κυρίων μὴ γενήσεται.

After all, there is no benet in having laws that admirably and with philanthr ō pia protectthe many, if those who disobey and violate them escape the anger of you who have author-

ity to enforce them on each occasion. (Trans. MacDowell, modied)

Thus, the protection of the many that the city’s laws provide out of philanthr ō pia requires that jurors actively defend their common interests and come downhard on those who arrogantly and intentionally violate these laws.

Demosthenes goes on to argue that although jurors rightly take pity ondecent men and show them philanthr ō pia when judging them, this would becompletely out of place in the case of a villain like his hubristic opponent.Meidias, Demosthenes insists, cannot claim that his life has generally been“moderate and humane” (μέτριον . . . καὶ φιλάνθρωπον) and thereby escape

the current charge against him (21.128); he is, in fact, a wicked, violent,and hubristic man whom the jury should not deem worthy of “any pardon, philanthr ō pia, or favor [charis]” (συγγνώμης ἢ φιλανθρωπίας ἢ χάριτός τινος, 21.148). 44 Demosthenes thus suggests that forensic charis, as an actof collective philanthr ō pia, should be withheld from individuals who forego

philanthr ō pia in their social relations and therefore do not deserve this favor-able treatment. Demosthenes elaborates on this principle of reciprocity moreexplicitly in a passage that draws metaphorically on the eranos—a friendly,interest-free loan to which men contribute with the expectation that the recipi-ent will reciprocate in like form if a lender should ever be in nancial distress(21.184–85): 45

ἔστιν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, μεγάλη τοῖς ἀδικοῦσιν ἅπασι μερὶς καὶ πλεονεξία ἡ τῶν ὑμετέρων τρόπων πραότης. ὅτι δὴ ταύτης οὐδ’ ὁτιοῦν ὑμῖν μεταδοῦναι τούτῳ προσήκει, ταῦτ’ἀκούσατέ μου. ἐγὼ νομίζω πάντας ἀνθρώπους ἐράνους φέρειν παρὰ τὸν βίον αὑτοῖς, οὐχὶ τούσδε μόνους οὓς συλλέγουσί τινες καὶ ὧν πληρωταὶ γίγνονται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλους. οἷον

43. By contrast, Demosthenes asserts in 24.192–93, discussed earlier in the text, that the laws reserve theirstrictness for men in public life.

44. On charis in forensic oratory, see Davies 1971, xvii–xviii; 1981, 92–97; Millett 1998; Johnstone 1999,100–106; Rubinstein 2000, 212–31; Christ 2006, 180–84; 2012, 72–76, 106–9. On charis as a binding forcewithin the city, see Fisher 2010.

45. On the eranos, see Millett 1991, 153–59; cf. MacDowell 1990, 322–24.




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ἔστι μέτριος καὶ φιλάνθρωπός τις ἡμῶν καὶ πολλοὺς ἐλεῶν· τούτῳ ταὐτὸ δίκαιον ὑπάρχειν παρὰ πάντων, ἄν ποτε εἰς χρείαν καὶ ἀγῶν’ ἀφίκηται. ἄλλος οὑτοσί τις ἀναιδὴς καὶ πολλοὺς ὑβρίζων, καὶ τοὺς μὲν πτωχούς, τοὺς δὲ καθάρματα, τοὺς δ’ οὐδὲν ὑπολαμβάνων εἶναι· τούτῳ τὰς αὐτὰς δίκαιον ὑπάρχειν φοράς, ἅσπερ αὐτὸς εἰσενήνοχεν τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἂν τοίνυν ὑμῖν ἐπίῃ σκοπεῖν, τούτου πληρωτὴν εὑρήσετε Μειδίαν ὄντα τοῦ ἐράνου, καὶ οὐκ ἐκείνου.

One thing that contributes greatly to the advantage of all off enders, men of Athens, is yourcharacteristic mildness. Let me explain why it is not appropriate for you to extend any

of it whatsoever to this man. I believe that all men contribute to loans [ eranoi] through-

out their life for their own benet—not just these loans that people collect and that havecontributors, but others too. For example, one of us is moderate, kind [φιλάνθρωπος], andsympathetic to many; it is right for him to get the same treatment from everyone, if ever he

gets into a difficulty or a legal contest. Suppose someone else is shameless and treats manywith hubris, regarding some men as paupers, some as rubbish, and some as negligible:

it is right for him to get the same payments as he has given to the others. So, if you will

look into the matter, you will nd that Meidias is a contributor to the latter kind of loan[eranos], not the former. 46 (Trans. MacDowell, modied)

Viewed in this light, those who reject philanthr ō pia in their own social rela-tions do not merit philanthr ō pia from the jurors collectively judging theirsuits, and jurors thus are in the important position of enforcing this principleof social relations as they determine who deserves their charis. 47

In his prosecution of Aristogeiton for addressing the Assembly and bring-ing suits before the lawcourts when he was disfranchised because of hisdebts to the city, Demosthenes paints a similar picture of the centrality of

philanthr ō pia to social relations under the democracy while at the same timeelaborating on some of the details of this. 48 Although some scholars havechallenged the authenticity of this speech, it is quite plausibly Demosthen-ic. 49 Indeed, its presentation of philanthr ō pia, as we shall see, has much incommon with that found in Demosthenes’ Against Meidias and this may becounted as a further indication of its authenticity. 50

Throughout his prosecution, Demosthenes casts Aristogeiton as an enemyof the democracy and of a peaceful and harmonious democratic way of life,who must be driven from the city. 51 Aristogeiton openly outs the city’s laws,challenges the governing authority of the d ē mos, and generally perverts themeaning of democratic freedom by interpreting it as license to do whateverbase thing he desires (25.20–32). Aristogeiton not only threatens the democ-racy itself, but social relations within the city, as he acts as a sykophant in

46. Dem. 21.101, which invokes eranos in a similar vein, may be an earlier version of this passage: seeMacDowell 1990, 322.

47. On philanthr ō pia and reciprocity, see de Romilly 1979, 51–52; cf. 109.48. On the charge against Aristogeiton and the state debts attributed to him, see MacDowell 2009,

298–301.49. On the speech’s likely authenticity, see MacDowell 2009, 310–13, with earlier bibliography.50. Although some might argue that this would be consistent with Dem. 25 being the work of a Demos-

thenic imitator, it is simpler to view the resemblance as evidence of common authorship. It is interesting inthis regard that the numerous speeches of Apollodorus that are included in the Demosthenic corpus do not use

philanthr ō pia at all (it appears in Dem. 45.4, but this speech could well be Demosthenic: see Trevett 1992, 73,but note the reservations of MacDowell 2009, 120).

51. On Demosthenes’ characterization of Aristogeiton, see Christ 1998, 56–59; Rosenbloom 2003; Wor-man 2008, 230–32; MacDowell 2009, 298–310; Lape 2010, 71–78; Wohl 2010, 50–64.




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abusing law and the legal process to harass, and extort money from, innocentAthenians. 52 In complete contrast to other citizens who frequent the agora on

personal or public business, Aristogeiton (25.51–52):οὐ φιλανθρωπίας, οὐχ ὁμιλίας οὐδεμιᾶς οὐδενὶ κοινωνεῖ · ἀλλὰ πορεύεται διὰ τῆς ἀγορᾶς,ὥσπερ ἔχις ἢ σκορπίος ἠρκὼς τὸ κέντρον, ᾄττων δεῦρο κἀκεῖσε, σκοπῶν τίνι συμφορὰν ἢ βλασφημίαν ἢ κακόν τι προστριψάμενος καὶ καταστήσας εἰς φόβον ἀργύριον εἰσπράξεται.

takes no part in any aspect of philanthr ō pia or social intercourse, but rather moves through

the agora like a snake or a scorpion with stinger held up, darting here and there, on the

lookout for someone on whom he can inict disaster or calumny or mischief of some sort,and whom he can terrify till he extorts money from him. (Trans. J. H. Vince, modied)

The philanthr ō pia that is essential to social relations among citizens, Demos-thenes suggests, is utterly alien to the bestial and savage Aristogeiton.

Demosthenes insists that Aristogeiton, as an aggressive rogue who shakesup and confounds society (25.19, 25, 75, 90), cannot seek, as other defendantsdo, pity and philanthr ō pia from jurors on the basis of moderation or prudencein his life or on any other grounds (25.76). 53 To merit collective philanthr ō pia from a jury, a defendant must himself embrace this virtue (25.81–82):

τί οὖν λοιπόν, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι; ἃ κοινὰ νὴ Δία πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις παρὰ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ὑμῶν φύσεως, καὶ οὐδεὶς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ταῦτα φέρει τῶν κρινομένων, ἀλλ’ὑμῶν ἕκαστος ἔχων οἴκοθεν ἔρχεται, ἔλεον, συγγνώμην, φιλανθρωπίαν. ἀλλὰ τούτων γ’οὐδ’ ὅσιον οὐδὲ θέμις τῷ μιαρῷ τούτῳ μεταδοῦναι. διὰ τί; ὅτι ὃν ἂν αὐτὸς ἕκαστος νόμον τῇ φύσει κατὰ πάντων ἔχῃ, τούτου τυγχάνειν παρ’ ἑκάστου δίκαιός ἐστι καὶ αὐτός. τίνα οὖν νόμον ὑμῖν ἢ τίνα βούλησιν ἔχειν Ἀριστογείτων κατὰ πάντων δοκεῖ ; πότερον εὐτυχοῦντας

ὁρᾶν καὶ ἐν εὐδαιμονίᾳ καὶ χρηστῇ δόξῃ διάγοντας; καὶ τί ποιῶν ζήσεται; τὰ γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κακὰ τοῦτον τρέφει. οὐκοῦν ἐν κρίσεσι καὶ ἀγῶσι καὶ πονηραῖς αἰτίαις ἅπαντας εἶναι βούλεται.

What help, then, remains for him, Athenians? The help, by Zeus, that comes to all defen-

dants alike from the natural temper of the jury, the help that no man on his trial provides

for himself, but that each of you brings with him from home to the court—I mean pity,

pardon, and philanthr ō pia. But of such help it is neither pious nor lawful that this polluted

creature partake. Why? Because whatever law each man’s nature prompts him to apply

to others, that law it is only fair that they should apply to him. What law do you think

Aristogeiton applies to all other men, and what are his wishes concerning them? Does he

wish to see them enjoying prosperity, happiness, and good reputation? If so, what becomes

of his livelihood? For he thrives on the misfortunes of others. Therefore, he wants to see

everyone involved in trials, lawsuits, and vile charges. (Trans. J. H. Vince, modied)

As in his extended deployment of the eranos-metaphor in his prosecution ofMeidias to emphasize that those who reject philanthr ō pia in their private rela-tions cannot seek philanthr ō pia from the community in court, Demosthenesinsists here that Aristogeiton’s complete inversion of philanthr ō pia in his

52. On Athenian views of sykophancy, see Harvey 1990; Osborne 1990; Christ 1998.53. Cf. how Demosthenes asserts that Timocrates can lay no claim to philanthr ō pia when he has joined

tax-collectors in the aggressive invasion of other citizens’ homes (24.196–97).




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social relations and utter “savagery” (ὠμότης, 25.84) bar him from receivingpity and philanthr ō pia from jurors.

Aristogeiton shows his disdain for philanthr ō pia, Demosthenes asserts, notonly in his direct and aggressive harassment of citizens, but in his attemptin court to assimilate his situation to that of other state-debtors and thus tobring unwarranted collective hostility down upon them by association withhim. Other state-debtors have found themselves unable to pay their obligationsbecause of their standing surety for friends, acts of philanthr ō pia, and privatedebts that involve no wrong to the city; by contrast, Aristogeiton’s debt arosefrom a judicial ne imposed on him for his illegal attempt to have citizensexecuted without trial (86–87; cf. 83). The former deserve philanthr ō pia fromtheir fellow citizens, whereas Aristogeiton does not. The indulgence due to in-nocuous state-debtors, which Aristogeiton’s line of defense threatens, promptsDemosthenes to discourse on the proper nature of social relations in the city

and the role of philanthr ō pia within this. His striking reections, which set forthan ideal vision of the democratic city’s ethos, merit quoting in full (25.87–90):

ἔπειθ’ ὅτι τὴν κοινὴν φιλανθρωπίαν ἣν ὑμεῖς ἔχετ’ ἐκ φύσεως πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὗτος ἀναιρεῖ καὶ διαφθείρει. ὑμεῖς γάρ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τῇ τῆς φύσεως, ὅπερ εἶπον, χρώμενοι φιλανθρωπίᾳ, ὥσπερ αἱ συγγένειαι τὰς ἰδίας οἰκοῦσιν οἰκίας, οὕτω τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖτε δημοσίᾳ. πῶς οὖν ἐκεῖναι; ὅπου πατήρ ἐστι καὶ υἱεῖς ἄνδρες, τυχὸν δὲ καὶ τούτων παῖδες,ἐνταῦθ’ ἀνάγκη πολλὰς καὶ μηδὲν ὁμοίας εἶναι βουλήσεις · οὐ γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν οὔτε λόγων οὔτ’ ἔργων ἐστὶν ἡ νεότης τῷ γήρᾳ. ἀλλ’ ὅμως οἵ τε νέοι πάνθ’ ὅσ’ ἂν πράττωσιν, ἄνπερ ὦσιν μέτριοι, οὕτω ποιοῦσιν ὥστε μάλιστα μὲν πειρᾶσθαι λανθάνειν, εἰ δὲ μή, φανεροί γ’εἶναι τοῦτο βουλόμενοι ποιεῖν· οἵ τε πρεσβύτεροι πάλιν, ἂν ἄρ’ ἴδωσιν ἢ δαπάνην ἢ πότον ἢ παιδιὰν πλείω τῆς μετρίας, οὕτω ταῦθ’ ὁρῶσιν ὥστε μὴ δοκεῖν ἑωρακέναι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων

γίγνεταί τε πάντα ἃ φέρουσιν αἱ φύσεις καὶ καλῶς γίγνεται. τὸν αὐτὸν τοίνυν τρόπον ὑμεῖς, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, τὴν πόλιν οἰκεῖτε συγγενικῶς καὶ φιλανθρώπως, οἱ μὲν οὕτως ὁρῶντες τὰ τῶν ἠτυχηκότων ἔργα ὥστε, τὸ τῆς παροιμίας, ὁρῶντας μὴ ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούοντας μὴ ἀκούειν, οἱ δ’ οὕτω ποιοῦντες ἃ πράττουσιν ὥστ’ εἶναι φανεροὶ καὶ φυλαττόμενοι καὶ αἰσχυνόμενοι. ἐκ δὲ τούτων ἡ κοινὴ καὶ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τῇ πόλει μένει καὶ συνέστηκεν ὁμόνοια. ταῦτα τοίνυν Ἀριστογείτων τὰ καλῶς οὕτω πεπηγότα τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἤθεσι τοῖς ὑμετέροις κινεῖ καὶ ἀναιρεῖ καὶ μεταρρίπτει.

[Further reason for hating Aristogeiton] is that he upturns and destroys the mutual

philanthr ō pia

that you yourselves naturally preserve toward one another. For you, Athe-

nians, observing what I have called a natural philanthr ō pia, live in this city in public just

as families live in their private homes. How then do families live? Where there is a father

and grown-up sons and possibly also grandchildren, there are bound to be many divergentwishes; for youth and old age do not talk or act in the same way. Nevertheless, whatever

the young men do, if they are modest, they do in such a way as to most avoid notice; or if

not, at any rate they make it clear that such was their intention. The elders in their turn, if

they see any immoderation in spending or drinking or amusement, manage to see it with-

out showing that they have seen it. The result is that everything that their various natures

suggest is done, and done well. And that is just how you, men of Athens, live in this city

like relatives and with philanthr ō pia [φιλανθρώπως], some watching the proceedings ofthe unfortunate in such a way that, as the saying runs, “seeing, they see not; hearing, do

not hear”; while the others by their behavior show that they are both on their guard and

alive to a sense of shame. The result is that that general concord [homonoia], which is the

source of all good things, abides and stands rmly established in our city. Those feelings,




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that have been so admirably implanted in your nature and your character, Aristogeiton

would change and remove and overturn. (Trans. J. H. Vince, modied)

When Demosthenes emphasizes here the importance of philanthr ō pia toAthenian society, he is clearly advocating not philanthropy in the commonmodern sense of active assistance to those in need, but rather a benign toler-ance of others’ minor off enses in the interest of civic harmony. 54 BecauseAristogeiton poses a threat to this fundamental social principle in and out ofcourt, the orator insists, he is manifestly an enemy of the Athenian people andthey should take decisive action to expel him from the city (25.95).

Several features of this excursus are noteworthy. First, while Demostheneswas not the rst to praise the democracy for the way its free and equal citizenstolerate each others’ pursuits and pleasures, he innovates in rooting this toler-ance in the specic virtue of philanthr ō pia, which encapsulates the generalhumanity and benevolence of Athenians toward one another. 55 Second, hevividly envisions the philanthr ō pia that Athenians practice as similar to thatof family members, whose philanthr ō pia enables them to live in harmonywith each other, despite their diverse ages and desires. 56 Third, Demosthenesproposes that the philanthr ō pia that governs relations among Athenians is, infact, responsible for the general concord (homonoia) that prevails within thecity, which he and other orators ag as a signal achievement of the Atheniandemocracy

(Dem. 20.110;

Lys. 2.18–19;

Andoc. 1.106–9; cf. Dem. 18.246). 57 Thus, Demosthenes directly links the tolerance of democratic Athenians forone another and the resulting general harmony of their democratic city, whichmirrors that of a family, with their embrace of philanthr ō pia as an essential

virtue.It is against this backdrop of Demosthenes’ exposition of the centrality of philanthr ō pia to peaceful coexistence in the democratic city that we shouldunderstand his designation of it as something “natural” to Athenians. He doesnot mean to suggest by this that philanthr ō pia comes into being independentlyof the democratic regime in which it is practiced, but rather that

its practiceand cultivation by members of the d ē mos, whom he is addressing in a court,has led it to become ingrained in the nature and character of Athenians. No-tably, Demosthenes speaks of “nature” here, not as if it is something immu-table, but rather as something, along with “character,” that can be shaped andmodied; the perfect participle, πεπηγότα conveys that the Athenian natureand character have come into being through a process over time, and thatvirtues like philanthr ō pia can thus become implanted in these. Although De-mosthenes does not pause here to explain precisely how philanthr ō pia cameto be a part of the nature and character of Athenians, he is likely thinking ofthis as a product of the democratic city’s laws and institutions. Earlier in his

54. See Christ 2012, 55–56.55. De Romilly (1979, 102; cf. 97–99) rightly notes how Demosthenes elaborates here on the idea of toler-

ance in daily life found in Thucydides’ Periclean funeral oration (2.37.2–3).56. Demosthenes also associates philanthr ō pia with ideal familial relations in 41.1–2 (quoted in the text);

45.4; 60.32. For the city as an extended family, see Dem. 10.39–40.57. On homonoia in Dem. 25.87–90, see Christ 2012, 54–56.




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speech, in fact, Demosthenes speaks of the salutary eff ect of laws in imposingorder on men’s diverse natures (25.15–16); 58 and in his funeral oration for the

city’s war dead after the Battle of Chaeronea, he echoes the city’s encomiastsin crediting the democratic city for cultivating virtue (ἀρετή) through its idealsand institutions (60.16–17; cf. Thuc. 2.36; Lys. 2.69). Thus, if philanthr ō pia is “natural” to Athenians, this is because their democratic environment hasmade it so.

Demosthenes as Popular Political Theorist

Demosthenes’ development of the idea that philanthr ō pia is a quintessen-tial democratic virtue is simultaneously bold, opportunistic, and insightful.His audacity shows forth in the fact that, having to a large extent invented

philanthr ō pia as a democratic virtue, he instructs and exhorts his popular au-

diences to embrace this collectively in administering the city and individuallyin their daily lives. 59 There is at the same time an unmistakeable opportun-ism in Demosthenes’ deployment of this concept to promote himself and hisagenda in the Assembly and the lawcourts, as he insists that he himself em-braces philanthr ō pia and that his rivals and enemies at home and abroad rejectit. Likewise, when Demosthenes speaks of philanthr ō pia in the speeches hecomposed for his legal clients, he does so to advance their interests at theexpense of those of their opponents. If Demosthenes is bold and opportunisticin his deployment of philanthr ō pia in his speeches, however, it would be amistake to view his treatment of this simply as further evidence of his oratori-cal skills and shrewdness. There is something intellectually ambitious andeven compelling in Demosthenes’ presentation of philanthr ō pia as a deningattribute of the democratic city and its citizens.

In linking together the disparate characterizations of the Athenian demo-cratic ethos that he inherited from his predecessors under the single rubric of

philanthr ō pia, Demosthenes off ers his popular audience a new and uniedway to conceptualize what is distinctive about themselves and their demo-cratic polity. Philanthr ō pia, Demosthenes suggests, subsumes many positiveaspects of the Athenian character, including gentleness, generosity, kindness,tolerance, civility, and sociability. Demosthenes indicates, moreover, that thisvirtue is central to the Athenian experience, as it shapes how citizens relateto one another in their daily lives, how democratic laws regulate life withinthe city, and how the d ē mos administers the Assembly and the lawcourts. If

philanthr ō pia is ubiquitous in Athens, however, Demosthenes insists that theAthenian d ē mos does not apply this indiscriminately in governing the city;instead, it employs its philanthr ō pia in a manner that is consistent with itsstrong interest in honoring those who benet the city and punishing thosewho threaten average citizens and the ruling authority of the d ē mos. In brief,one might say that Demosthenes identies for his audience a distinctively

58. For an insightful analysis of Demosthenes’ portrayal of the interplay of nomos and phusis in thisspeech, see Wohl 2010, 50–64.

59. On Demosthenes’ didactic stance toward his audiences, see Ober 1989, 186 –87, 321–22 (cf. 2008,272) and Yunis 1996, 247–77.




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democratic ethos, delineates where and how this manifests itself across thespectrum of Athenian social and political experience, and proposes param-

eters for its application that protect the interests of the Athenian d ē mos.Demosthenes’ reection on philanthr ō pia as a democratic ideal in theseterms qualies him as a serious and innovative political thinker. 60 To besure, Demosthenes does not convey his political ideas in the systematic andexpository form that we may nd in Plato and Aristotle, but rather elaboratesthem in relatively short excurses in orations presented before mass audiencesacross time and always as part of his broader project of defeating rivals inthe competitive arena of the Assembly or lawcourts. The manner in whichDemosthenes presents his political ideas, however, reects his medium andthe exigencies of persuading mass audiences rather than any deciency inthe depth and sophistication of his thinking. Indeed, despite the constraintsof his medium, Demosthenes often reects thoughtfully and expansively on

philanthr ō pia and its place in the city’s laws and in social and political life.There is, moreover, a broad consistency to Demosthenes’ presentation of

philanthr ō pia as a fundamental democratic virtue and some subtlety to hisapplication of this across diverse spheres of Athenian experience and to hiseff orts to establish parameters for its application by the Athenian d ē mos.

Although Demosthenes’ expression of political thought necessarily di-verges in form from that found in the works of contemporary philosophers,this should not prevent us from appreciating its importance and signicance asan articulation of the democratic ethos that pervades daily life and the city’sinstitutions. While it was uncontroversial in the popular mind that freedomand equality were fundamental to democracy, 61 the precise implications of

these for political and social relations were less clear and open to diverse in-terpretations. Viewed against this backdrop, Demosthenes’ elaboration of thecentrality of philanthr ō pia to democratic life takes on special signicance asa thoughtful expression of how free and equal citizens should behave in theirrelations with one another and in their administration of the democratic city.To judge from Demosthenes’ frequent invocations of philanthr ō pia beforelarge popular audiences, these may well have resonated with them as an ap-pealing articulation of the democratic ethos that—though it was difficult toencapsulate—helped bind them together.

If Demosthenes’ exposition of philanthr ō pia as a democratic virtue illu-minates his status as a political thinker, it may also provide insights moregenerally into the relationship between elite orators and mass audiences.Demosthenes’ promotion of democratic philanthr ō pia illustrates how an ora-tor might not only invoke the received commonplaces of democratic ideologythat mass audiences expected him to employ and on which his predecessorshad drawn, but elaborate on, and give new expression to, them. Indeed, while

60. As Yunis (1996, 238–41) observes in a diff erent context, Demosthenes’ opportunism does not meanwe should not take him seriously as a political thinker. As noted earlier (see n. 38, above), Ober (2005, 410)suggests that Demosthenes’ reections on law make him a sort of public political theorist of law; cf. Ober1998, 370 (on “dialectical” passages in forensic oratory).

61. On the centrality of freedom and equality in Athenian democracy, see Hansen 1991, 74–85.




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we can identify recurring elements of democratic ideology in public discoursethrough the Classical period, this continuity should not lead us to believe that

democratic ideology was entirely xed and ossied. Demosthenes’ examplesuggests, on the contrary, that public speakers were free to interpret andclarify for their audiences what received democratic ideals meant for themas citizens. Although Demosthenes was surely not the rst to engage in thisprocess of innovation and elaboration, his advancement of philanthr ō pia as acentral democratic virtue in diverse ways across his large corpus allows us tosee vividly how a talented individual might shape how Athenians understoodthemselves and their polity. This is testament not only to Demosthenes’ abili-ties as orator and political thinker, but to the wisdom of the Athenian d ē mos inallowing speakers freedom to innovate in interpreting for it what is essentialto democracy and a democratic way of life. 62

Indiana University

62. I am grateful to this journal’s editors and its two anonymous referees for their very helpful suggestionsand criticisms.

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Documents

Demosthenes Piety