Eddie Smith

Democratic Theory and Practice

Paper 1

2/25/15

Word Count: 2922

An Examination of Procedural, Critical, and Polyarch Democratic Theory: A Comparison of

Jürgen Habermas, Sheldon Wohlin, and Robert Dahl

In his theory, “Three Normative Models of Democracy”, Jürgen Habermas presents two

competing conceptions of democracy before offering his own third conception that he theorizes

achieves harmony and balance between the other two. In his theory, “Fugitive Democracy”,

Sheldon Wohlin presents a radical conception of democracy with strong emphasis on the

procedures that restrict or limit democracy in modern society. And in his text, On Democracy,

Robert Dahl examines what he holds as ideal democratic arrangements as well as the conditions

that he believes favor or restrict the development of these arrangements in societies across time.

Each conception of democracy features elements compatible and competing with the other two,

and the purpose of this writing is to orient the reader with the necessary facts of each conception

for this comparison and then demonstrate their compatibility and incompatibility.

Overview of Habermas

In his theory, Jürgen Habermas begins by outlining two traditional conceptions of democracy—

the liberal and republic paradigms. Habermas holds that the liberal conception of democracy

idealizes a government administration that simply provides a criminal justice system and other

basic public safety services in order to equally protect the pursuits of all individual self-interests

within the boundaries of community-determined law (i.e. provides negative liberties). Habermas

explains that the democratic community under this minimalistic conception is nothing more than

the aggregate of the atomistic pursuits of whatever market or exchange preferences the

community members happen to hold, and any activity from the government to foster common

values or to provide assistance with certain types of pursuits is an undemocratic interference with

natural market interactions.

In contrast, Habermas explains that the republican conception of democracy idealizes a

government that strengthens and unifies its community through fostering its community values

and socializing members toward a common identity. Habermas argues that under this conception

of democracy, the government exists to establish a civic society that reinforces common values

by mandating public traditions and ceremonies (e.g. Memorial Day; Pledge of Allegiance), as

well as providing assistance and services (positive liberties) that encourage community members

to pursue endeavors that reinforce community values (e.g. government grants; community

improvement projects).

Habermas then contrasts the significant drawbacks of both ideal conceptions of democracy.

Habermas holds that a necessary condition of democracy is examination by and deliberation

between community members over whether certain activities support or undermine community

norms and values. Habermas argues that because the liberal conception of democracy simply is

the protection of all legal exchange activity, and because the liberal conception of democracy

does not recognize community norms and values as anything more than aggregated legal

exchange activity, community deliberations concerning whether certain legal exchange activities

support or undermine aggregated exchange activity would be irrelevant deliberations. Indeed,

Habermas writes, “Given an indissoluble pluralism of pre-political values and interests that are at

best aggregated with equal weight in the political process, politics loses all reference to the

normative core of a public use of reason.” (3) Thus, Habermas holds that the liberal conception

is incapable of providing the necessary condition of normative public deliberation that

democracy requires.

In scrutinizing the republican conception, Habermas argues that the public is incapable of fairly

deliberating and examining whether its own values, goals, and collective identity are indeed

ethical values, goals, and collective identities. Habermas explains, “Political questions may not

be reduced to the type of ethical questions where we, as members of a community, ask ourselves

who we are and who we would like to be. In its communitarian interpretation the republican

model is too idealistic even within the limits of a purely normative analysis.” (4) Thus,

Habermas believes that the republican conception is limited and too idealistic because

communities are limited in their normative analysis, and would inevitably advance the common

values, collective identity, and ideals already in place.

Overview of Dahl

Dahl presents the case that by providing certain opportunities to members of an association,

democratic arrangements emerge within the community that avoid tyranny, provide essential

rights and general freedom, foster self-determination and moral autonomy, and result in peace

and prosperity. (45) Dahl holds that these five democratic opportunities are (1) effective

participation, (2) equality in voting, (3) gaining enlightened understanding, (4) exercising final

control over the agenda, and (5) inclusion of adults. (38)

Dahl argues that each of these opportunities is a necessary condition for democracy; Dahl

explains, “Why these criteria?... each is necessary if the members are to be politically equal in

determining the policies of the association….to the extent that any of the requirements is

violated, the members will not be politically equal.” (38) Dahl then argues that the presence of

all five opportunities is a sufficient condition for democracy---Dahl writes, “Is it not self-evident

that in order to satisfy these standards a political system would have to insure its citizens certain

rights?... By definition, no nondemocratic system allows its citizens this broad array of political

rights. If any political system were to do so, it would, by definition, be a democracy!” (48-49)

To provide these necessary and sufficient conditions in large societies, Dahl insists that six

institutional arrangements are necessary: (1) elected representatives, (2) free, fair, and frequent

elections, (3) freedom of expression, (4) alternative information, (5) associational autonomy, and

(6) inclusive citizenship. Dahl defends the second institutional arrangement by arguing that

“…without frequent elections citizens would lose a substantial degree of control over their

elected officials.” (96) Dahl defends and explains that under the fourth set of institutional

arrangements, “Citizens have a right to seek out alternative and independent sources of

information from other citizens, experts, newspapers, magazines, books, telecommunications,

and the like…. that are not under the control of the government or any other political group

attempting to influence public political beliefs and attitudes...” (86)

To ensure ongoing presence of these arrangements in large societies, Dahl holds that

constitutions are necessary. Dahl explains that constitutions institutionalize stability,

fundamental rights, neutrality, accountability, informed consensus, and transparency and

comprehensibility. Dahl explains that constitutions are necessary for ensuring comprehensibility

(and perhaps other conditions such as accountability and informed consensus) because

constitutions ensure basic structure and that “[the operation of government] must not be so

complexly constructed that citizens cannot understand what is going on and, because they do not

understand their government, cannot readily hold their leaders accountable, particularly at

elections.” (126) Dahl concludes that the American political system meets all of the necessary

conditions for democracy.

Overview of Wohlin

Sheldon Wohlin offers a theory that explains why American democracy is in jeopardy and why

there are only few moments that are truly democratic in modern American society. Wohlin

begins by explaining that while constitutions are often conceived as procedural safeguards

protecting citizen interests from government officials, one must also realize that constitutions act

as procedural safeguards protecting government officials from the interest of citizens. Wohlin

argues that to the extent that constitutions regulate the terms of elected office, constitutions also

regulate how often and to what degree public will matters concerning the actions of government

officials---this is to say that constitutions spell out the length of term and the necessary

conditions and procedures for removing elected officials from office, and to the extent that these

conditions and procedures are difficult to prove or carry out, or the extent that the length of term

is long, is the extent that constitutions provide public officials with protections from public will.

Thus, Sheldon Wohlin explains that because politicians are only held accountable to the voting

public on election days, and because constitutions determine how often election days are held,

constitutions necessarily distance public accountability from the practices of elected officials.

In his text, Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political Thought, Wohlin

explains that while these constitutional procedures clearly limit the importance of public will and

the practice of democracy, democracy is even further restricted in societies where constitutional

governments coexist in information societies with strong technocratic and consumerist cultures.

In these societies, vast consumer markets and widespread technology overwhelm the public with

consumer and popular cultural information that diverts their scrutiny from government action

and their awareness from important political issues. Wohlin argues that while constitutions

afford the voter only a moment of democracy for one day every several years, the voter in

modern consumer society is even further disadvantaged by distractions (e.g. American Idol,

NFL, Amazon) that restrict the attention and vigilance of voters from holding elected officials

accountable during the next election. Thus, Wohlin explains that these societies have cultivated a

new breed of citizen — the imperial citizen — that remains unengaged and unchallenging of the

political status quo.

Wohlin explains that constitutions are often created by governments to preserve stability and

prevent revolutions. “Revolution… is the extreme antithesis to a settled constitution….

Democracy was born in transgressive acts, for the demos could not participate in power without

shatter the class, status and value systems by which it was excluded.” (17) Wohlin strongly holds

that revolutions present the necessary conditions for democracy because revolutions are a state of

affairs in modern society where public will determines the government arrangement and where

elected officials are held accountable. Wohlin adds, “Revolutions activate the demos and destroy

boundaries that bar access to political experience. Individuals from the excluded social strata

take on responsibilities, deliberate about goals and choices, and share in decisions that have

broad consequences and affect unknown and distant others.” (19) However, Wohlin does believe

that revolutionary democratic conditions can be institutionalized into a governmental form;

“Democracy seems destined to be a moment rather than a form. Throughout the history of

political thought virtually all writers emphasize the unstable and temporary character of

democracy.” (19) While these moments are rare, Wohlin concludes that revolutionary actions of

protest and social movements are the only cases of modern day American democracy.

Theoretical Compatibilities

Although Dahl argues that democracy is more favorable in richly democratic political cultures

where citizens value democratic participation, Dahl leaves it up to other institutions in society to

manage democratic cultural indoctrination (e.g. families). In this way, Dahl does not provide a

republican conception of democracy as described by Habermas, where fostering civic and

democratic participation would be carried out by the state. Instead, Dahl describes many ideal

democratic arrangements as political structures with restricted-government models similar to the

liberal conception under Habermas that offer protections for autonomous associations and free

markets.

Dahl emphasizes the ability to form free and independent associations as a necessary condition

for democratic practice. While Wohlin might argue that the products and practices of some free

and independent associations harm the practice of democracy, Wohlin would agree that the

ability to form free and independent associations is a necessary condition for democratic

practice. Indeed, Wohlin holds that organized protest and social movement direct actions are the

last true forms of democratic practice in modern American democracy, and the ability to form

free and independent associations is needed for organized protest and the formation of effective

social movements.

Although Habermas describes his normative model as an alternative to the ideal arrangements

under the liberal and republican conceptions of democracy, Habermas does not provide a

sufficient explanation for the successful transition into the deliberative sphere. Habermas writes,

“Informal public opinion-formation generates ‘influence’; influence is transformed into

‘communicative power’ through the channels of political elections; and communicative power is

again transformed into ‘administrative power’ through legislation.” (8) While not incompatible

with the limitations of modern American democracy described by Wohlin, Habermas certainly

does not provide any solution to the lack of a deliberative sphere that Wohlin highlights as a

sufficient condition for the absence of democracy.

Wohlin’s conception of the modern American political arrangement is fully compatible with the

conception of liberal democracy described by Habermas. Habermas explains the market focus of

the liberal conception, and uses capitalist rhetoric to describe the political process, stating, “In

the liberal view, the political process… is measured by the citizens’ approval, quantified as

votes, of persons and programs. In their choices at the polls, voters give expression to their

preferences. Their voting decisions have the same structure as the acts of choice made by

participants in a market. They license access to the positions of power that political parties fight

over in the same success-oriented attitude.” (3) While Wohlin is not describing ideal

arrangements, but rather offering his description of political reality, Wohlin similarly writes in

Politics and Vision, “Civic virtue is redefined as economic rationality, while externally, it

appears disconnected from empire. The citizen, the crucial actor in the theory of democracy,

merges with homo economicus and, like the constitution, is hybridized (‘vote your

pocketbook!’).” (564)

Theoretical Incompatiblities

Wohlin’s conception of constitutionally-restricted democracy is incompatible with Dahl’s

conception of constitutionally-protected democracy. Wohlin presents the case that constitutions

preserve political arrangements and restrict accountability despite public will, and that it is only

in revolutionary and social movement action that true democracy can be found in modern

society. Indeed, Wohlin states, “What this means, literally, is that democracy as we know it…

has been constituted, that is, given forms structure, and boundaries. Constitutional democracy is

democracy fitted to a constitution. It is not democratic or democratized… because a constitution

regulates the amount of democratic politics that is let in.” (13-14) Thus, Wohlin’s conception

holds that any stability constitutions offer necessarily comes at the cost of effectuating public

will in the arrangements of government administration. In contrast, Dahl insists that the stability

of constitutions is necessary to preserve the needed institutions that provide democratic

opportunities. Dahl’s conception holds that restrictions on accountability can be mitigated

through constitutions that institute free, fair, and frequent public elections in a manner that

balances the benefits of stability with the benefits of accountability.

Dahl views the autonomy of the market, associations, and their sources of information from

government regulation as essential conditions for democratic practice. Dahl argues that if the

government does not offer these protections, citizens are hindered from accessing alternative and

independent sources of information needed to achieve comprehensibility, informed consensus,

and accountability over the government. Wohlin insists that it is exactly the proliferation of such

autonomous, independent market associations and their sources of information that have

overwhelmingly distracted citizens from gaining comprehensibility, informed consensus, and

accountability over the government. For Wohlin, these conditions and their distractions are the

main contributors to the unfocused American public opinion, American voter apathy, and low

American civic participation, and thus are sufficient conditions for the absence of democratic

practices in America.

Continuing with Dahl’s conception of free and independent associations as necessary to the

democratic form, however, Wohlin conceives of other manners that free associations may

compromise democracy in this form. Wohline writes, “In the political economy, elections are

‘free’ in the double sense that no one coerces the citizen into voting and the voter does not pay

directly for the privilege of voting; that expense is footed by the dominant powers that organize,

operate, and finance campaigns. For them elections are investment opportunities from which

they hope to reap a return.” (14) For Wohlin, this is to say that free and independent associations

in a market society are motivated to financially influence elections to the extent it returns

profitable conditions for their affairs, and this necessarily comes at the expense of democracy.

In a similar vein, Dahl emphasizes the importance of seeking alternative information and

engaging in deliberation among citizens and organizations to reach an informed consensus.

However, Dahl leaves this task up to free associations independent of government regulation.

This view is incompatible with Habermas’ conception of the government’s role in fostering

communicative action and empowering communities through deliberation.

Finally, Wohlin describes four of Dahl’s five necessary conditions for democratic opportunity,

and still holds that these institutionalized forms can never result in democracy because true

democracy is momentary, fleeting, and fugitive. Wohlin writes, “Today, democracy is

universally acclaimed as the only true criterion of legitimacy for political systems and its real

presence is said to consist of free elections, free political parties, and free press. And of course,

the free market…. Democracy needs to be reconceived as something other than a form of

government: as a mode of being which is conditioned by bitter experience doomed to succeed

only temporarily, but is a recurrent possibility as long as the memory of the political survives.”

(22-23)

Conclusion

Jürgen Habermas presents deliberation theory as a balance between the limitations of the liberal

and the republican conceptions of democracy. Sheldon Wohlin theorizes that democracy is

incapable of institutionalization and requires moments of expressive revolutionary action. Robert

Dahl holds that democracy can be institutionalized through structures that provide five necessary

and sufficient democratic opportunities. While each theory describes different ideal

arrangements and holds incompatibilities with the others, there are significant compatibilities:

Dahl’s conception of democracy is fully compatible with the liberal conception described by

Habermas, Wohlin’s conception of revolutionary democracy requires some ability to form

independent associations as conceived by Dahl, and Habermas’ arrangements of participatory

and deliberative action are arrangements described in Wohlin’s revolutionary direct action.

References

Dahl, Robert Alan. 2000. On Democracy. Yale University Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1984. The Theory of Communicative Action, Volume One: Reason and the

Rationalization of Society. Boston: Beacon Press.

Habermas, Jürgen. 1994. "Three Normative Models of Democracy." Constellations 1.1: 1-10.

Wolin, Sheldon S. 1994. "Fugitive Democracy." Constellations 1.1: 11-25.

Wolin, Sheldon S. 2009. Politics and Vision: Continuity and Innovation in Western Political

Thought. Princeton University Press.