Democratic Revival –an Agenda for Action

by Dr. Jayaprakash NarayanLok Satta / Foundation for Democratic ReformsFlat No. 801 & 806, Srinivasa Towers, Beside ITC Kakatiya Hotel,

Begumpet, Hyderabad – 500016 Tel: 91-40-23419949; fax: 23419948email: drjploksatta@gmail.com

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The purpose of a government is to make it easy

for people to do good and difficult to do evil.

William Gladstone

Democracy – Myron Weiner’s Four ConditionsDemocracy – Myron Weiner’s Four Conditions

Competitive elections

Political freedoms for all

Peaceful transfer of power and no retribution

Real power with elected governments

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Distortions of state powerDistortions of state power

Positive Power restricted

Negative Power unchecked

State organs are dysfunctional

A system of alibis

Victims of vicious cycle

Change of players

No change in the rules of the game

Political process ought to be the solution

But has become the problem itself

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Indian democracy is a work in progressIndian democracy is a work in progress

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Policymakers have responded to emerging challenges :

• 73rd, 74th Amendments – Local Governments(1993)

• Voter registration and electoral process reforms (past 15

years)

• Mandatory disclosure of candidates antecedents (2003)

• Political funding reforms (2003)

• Strengthening anti-defection law (2003)

• Limiting size of cabinet (2003)

• Rajya Sabha elections reforms (2003)

Contd…

Indian democracy is a work in progressIndian democracy is a work in progress

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Policymakers have responded to emerging challenges :

• Right to Information (2005)

• Gram Nyayalayas Act (2009)

• 97th Amendment – Right to form Cooperatives (2012)

In the pipeline

• Lokpal Bill

• Service Guarantee Bill

• Judicial Standards & Accountability Bill

Under consideration

• National Judicial Commission

• Indian Judicial Service

However, much remains to be done.

To understand nature of crisis andresolve it, we need to focus on the initialconditions.

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• bribes & red-tape

• harassment & delays

• influence peddling

- Elected leaders as ‘monarchs’

- Legislators and party cadre should ‘somehow’ deliver

- No link with taxes

- No sense of public money,entitlement to public services

• No local leaders or local solutions

• Easy populism & wasteful use

• Citizen & public servants roles reversed

• Systemic distortions not corrected

• Links broken: Taxes↔Services, Vote ↔Public good

Authority ↔Accountability

The initial conditions…

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As a consequence…

excessive dependence on elected legislators

vote as a lever for getting even the smallest thing done

party cadres have to devote vast amount of time at local level

great sacrifice expected from legislators and political workers

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Elected Legislator

Burden on legislator & vast cadre network

desperation of citizens

vote as a lever

• Unsustainable sacrifice

• Ethical politics not sustainable

Good people marginalized

in politics

•Mounting corruption

•Political recruitments from dynasties, corrupt money bags

Even with best efforts, only 10% gets done

•Money for votes

•Freebies, sops & doles

•Divisive politics

Mounting dissatisfaction

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Drawbacks of First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) SystemDrawbacks of First-Past-The-Post (FPTP) System

Increased corruption by the

elected

Increased voter cynicism

Voter seeks money & liquor

Not spending large amounts

almost guarantees

defeat

Increased election expenditure

Most election expenditure is to buy votesMost election expenditure is to buy votes

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Consequences of Marginal VoteConsequences of Marginal Vote

Decline of National Parties

Rise of Sectarian

Parties

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Marginal Vote

Fiscal Imbalance at the cost of

Nation Building

Reckless Populism

Corruption

Vote Buying

… in more than half of IndiaBJP & Congress do not matter

… in more than half of India

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0%

0%

Lok Sabha - Big 6 States

Remaining States sending 252 MPs

Both Congress and BJP are not major players in ‘Big 6’ States sending 291 MPs*

Total Seats in : 543Lok SabhaHalfway Mark : 272-------------------------------------'Big 6' States : 291 Lok Sabha

Seats--------------------------------------Uttar Pradesh - 80 SeatsMaharashtra - 48 SeatsWest Bengal - 42 SeatsAndhra Pradesh - 42 SeatsBihar - 40 SeatsTamil Nadu - 39 Seats

* AP included as Congress could not win a single seat in any of the by-elections since 2009

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009

Vo

te S

hare

Years

Declining vote share across major states (Lok Sabha Elections)

Andhra Pradesh

Tamil Nadu

Bihar

Maharashtra

West Bengal

Uttar Pradesh

Falling vote share of Congress since 1989 …Falling vote share of Congress since 1989 …

15

0

20

40

60

80

100

1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009

Seat

Sh

are

Years

Declining seat share across major states (Lok Sabha Elections)

Andhra Pradesh

Tamil Nadu

Bihar

Maharashtra

West Bengal

Uttar Pradesh

… Consequent decline in share of seats for Congress… Consequent decline in share of seats for Congress

Note: Only in UP & Bihar do seats and votes reflect Congress’ own strength; in other states alliances have given Congress better results. Also, Congress could not win a single seat in AP in any of the by-elections since 2009 16

Falling vote share of BJP in the major states since 1989 …Falling vote share of BJP in the major states since 1989 …

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0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009

Vo

te S

hare

Years

Vote share of BJP across major states (Lok Sabha Elections)

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar

Tamil Nadu

West Bengal

Uttar Pradesh

Maharashtra

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009

Seat

sh

are

Years

Seat share of BJP across major states (Lok Sabha Elections)

Andhra Pradesh

Bihar

Tamil Nadu

West Bengal

Uttar Pradesh

Maharashtra

… Consequent decline in share of seats for BJP… Consequent decline in share of seats for BJP

Note: In Bihar and Maharashtra BJP is in alliance with regional parties 18

Vote Share - Seat share disproportionalityVote Share - Seat share disproportionality

Gain in vote share and seatsBetween 2007 and 2012

PartyGain in

Vote shareGain inSeats

SP +3.70% +127 Seats (31.51%)

INC +3.04% +6 Seats (1.49%)

Experience from Uttar Pradesh Assembly Elections

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SAMAJWADI PARTY (SP)

YearVote

share %Seat

share %

Actual number of

seats

2007 25.43 24.07 97

2012 29.13 55.58 224

INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (INC)

YearVote

share %Seat

share %

Actual number of

seats

2007 8.61 5.46 22

2012 11.65 6.95 28

SP vs. Cong in Uttar Pradesh:Similar gain in vote share … but huge difference in seats gained

SP vs. Cong in Uttar Pradesh:Similar gain in vote share … but huge difference in seats gained

+3.70 %

+3.04 %

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

4.00

SP INC

Vo

te S

ha

re g

ain

ed

be

twe

en

20

07-2

01

2

127

6

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

SP INC

Se

ats

gain

ed

betw

ee

n 2

00

7-2

01

2

Difference in Vote Share between2007 and 2012 Assembly Elections

Difference in Seats gained

Difference in vote share gained by SP and INC is only 0.66% …

… but SP gained 127 seats - INC gained only 6 seats

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Best & brightest are unelectable in FPTPBest & brightest are unelectable in FPTP

• In most major states, it costs Rs. 2-6 crores to seriously compete to be an MLA & Rs.10 crores or more to be MP

• Most money is for vote-buying and has to involve law-breaking and black money

• Big money, muscle power and criminal nexus, caste base and entrenched personal following are often prerequisite for electoral success

• Absence of internal democracy in parties, and weak local governments make it even harder for enlightened citizens to participate in politics

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Populism and Fiscal ImbalancesPopulism and Fiscal Imbalances

• Reckless populism to gain marginal vote hurting the

exchequer

• Fiscal deficits are not under control

• Skewed priorities – populist schemes instead of

education, healthcare and infrastructure

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Parties are in declineParties are in decline

Parties often at the mercy of local strong men…

• with abnormal money power, patronage networks and caste connections

• built impregnable modern fiefdoms without legitimate democratic mandate… operating entirely outside party

• weaken the party when they switch sides

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Politics at the cost of nation-buildingPolitics at the cost of nation-building

• Parties, in the quest for marginal vote, are compelled to offer short-term freebies

• This is often resulting in competitive populism and serious fiscal deficits

• Even major parties behave differently while in power and opposition. Instability is the consequences; and national interest is the casualty. ex: Petrol price hike, FDI, nuclear agreement

• Even when parties know the consequences, they are helpless; a slight fall in vote share eliminates them from the race to power

• Much of this problem is because of parties’ fear of losing marginal vote

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Distortions of FPTP - SummaryDistortions of FPTP - Summary

• National Parties marginalized in most large states

• Political fragmentation

• Money power for marginal vote leading to corruption

• The best and brightest shun elections and politics

• Politics of fiefdoms has taken root .. Parties in decline

• Competitive populism to attract marginal vote

• Divisions exacerbated for local political gains

• Political recruitment flawed, to ‘somehow’ win constituencies

• Tactical voting because of ‘wasted’ votes

• Voter apathy and cynicism25

Need for an alternative electoral systemNeed for an alternative electoral system

That is …

1. Fair

2. Broadly Acceptable

3. Easy to Accomplish

4. Corrects Most of the Present Distortions

5. Minimal Negative Impact

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Proportional Representation (PR) instead of FPTPProportional Representation (PR) instead of FPTP

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Candidate Based

Constituency Based

High Threshold for Success

FPTPFPTPParty Based

State Based

Moderate Threshold for Success

PRPR

Merits of PRMerits of PR

• Vote buying diminishes as marginal vote is not critical

• Competent and honest politicians with good image become electoral assets

• Rational, long-term policies can be pursued as marginal vote is unimportant

• National parties will be viable in all states

• Vote reflects voters’ views

• Greater voter participation

• Voice and representation to all segments and views28

Altered Incentives & Outcomes for PARTIESAltered Incentives & Outcomes for PARTIES

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… under FPTP … under PR

Dependence on marginal voteDependence on overall voteshare in each state

Contest is constituency-based; therefore need for ‘strong’ candidates with money power & entrenched network

Contest is state-wide; therefore need for clean and crediblecandidates and leadership

National parties are not viable in states where they fall below 30-35% vote share

National parties viable if they have a reasonable vote share of even 5-10%

Electoral alliances marginalizing national parties over time

National parties can contest on their own and retain footprint;can have post-election alliance

Altered Incentive & Outcomes for CANDIDATESAltered Incentive & Outcomes for CANDIDATES

… under FPTP … under PR

Dependence on vote-buying to get marginal vote

Incentive to enhance voting share through image and credible campaigns

Entrenched networks of patronage and corruption to sustain election machine

Quality leadership and delivery to sustain image

Adversarial approach and extreme partisanship to deny space to opponents

Conciliatory approach and harmony to enhance electoral appeal

Only candidates with hugemoney power and caste base can survive. Entry barrier for clean, credible citizens

Clean candidates with good image and ability will thrive

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Altered Incentives & Outcomes for VOTERAltered Incentives & Outcomes for VOTER

… under FPTP … under PR

Vote has a price; Marginal vote forces vote buying.

“Take money from all candidates & vote for one of your choice”

Vote has value; It becomes a means for improving governance

A ‘good’ & clean candidate cannot win – therefore vote for him is wasted

All votes have value.No vote is wasted

A totally undesirable candidate may win. Therefore tactical voting for any ‘winnable’ candidate to defeat him

Voting for party of your choice.No need for tactical voting

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Altered Incentives & Outcomes for VOTER (contd…)Altered Incentives & Outcomes for VOTER (contd…)

… under FPTP … under PR

Vote for a ‘good’ party is futile as its vote share is not high enough

Vote for a party that represents your views and concerns

No matter who wins, nothing much changes

Electoral verdicts can change outcomes

“My vote does not matter –therefore I stay away.” Many abstain from voting

“My vote matters – therefore I will vote.”

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Concerns about PRConcerns about PR

Issue Solution

• Political fragmentation as each caste/group floats a party

• Reasonable threshold level of, say, 5% vote in a large state – as required for representation, in and from, that state

• Link between vote and legislator

• Allocation of each constituency to a member on agreed basis. A member will represent an area within a larger multi-member constituency

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Concerns about PRConcerns about PR

• At first glance, FPTP favours several groups to come together

• In reality, the local caste group or other identity dominates in many constituencies

• FPTP is constituency-based election; favourssectarian politics• Eg: MIM in parts of Hyderabad

• PMK – with Vanniar vote in North Tamil Nadu

• Local Caste domination – Lingayat, Vokkaliga, Maratha, Reddi, Kamma, etc..

But, PR allows parties to reconcile conflicting interests for maximum acceptance – State-wide appeal matters; not local domination

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Concerns about PR (contd…)Concerns about PR (contd…)

Therefore,

FPTP• Constituency based• High barrier for winning• Difficulty in entry

As a consequence, local leaders are dictating State level and national politics

PR• State based• Moderate / reasonable threshold for winning• Wide support base needed

As a consequence, relatively easy, wide acceptance of national parties…

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Will PR affect stability?Will PR affect stability?

• At national level, we already have coalitions. Government

in PR countries are more stable

• At the state level, there may be fewer instances of single

party rule under PR. This may be a small price to pay.

Alternatively, we can combine PR for legislature with

direct election of executive only at the state level

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Constitution allows PR - No amendment neededConstitution allows PR - No amendment needed

Art. 81(2)(b) of The Constitution Of India

For elections to Lok Sabha:

each State shall be divided into territorial constituencies in

such manner that the ratio between the population of each

constituency and the number of seats allotted to it is, so far

as practicable, the same throughout the State…

Similar provision exists for elections to Legislative Assemblies under Art. 170(2)

Only Representation of the People’s Act needs to be amended37

A simple PR model for IndiaA simple PR model for India

• State as unit for PR threshold (for State Assembly & Lok Sabha)

• Multi-member constituencies having 6 to10 seats.

• Parties get seats in proportion to their votes in a state, if they cross the minimum required vote of, say, 5% in a large state

• Members are elected from party lists in each multi-member constituency

• Each elected member is allotted to an Assembly / Lok Sabha segment by preferential choice based on party vote share in the MMC

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LOCAL GOVERNMENTS

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Local GovernmentsLocal Governments

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VOTE Public Good Reduced role of vote buying Participation of enlightened citizens

TAXES

Services

Better Public policy

Focus on infrastructure and nation building

Better fiscal management

AUTHORITY Accountability

Better service delivery

Greater legitimacy and democracy

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Local Government – Cupertino vs SunnyvaleLocal Government – Cupertino vs Sunnyvale

• Sunnyvale & Cupertino are two cities in Bay Area of California on either side of Homestead Road

• Through all conditions are similar, property values of Cupertino are 40 – 50% higher

• Reason: School District in Cupertino has good reputation for outcomes. Only local residents (tax payers) can send kids to local public schools. Hence, greater demand for houses in Cupertino

• Taxes Services Property value

Vote

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Local Government - J&K experienceLocal Government - J&K experience

• It was a vote for self-governance, not self-determination

• 79% of voters came out to exercise their franchise in the party-less election for local self-government institutions and elected some 33,000 representatives in 4,200 panchayats.

• This election result gave India a priceless opportunity in a militant-plagued state

• If funds are devolved with powers at Rs.1000/capita to every panchayat and municipal ward, people would be involved in things that matter in their lives.

• Terrorism and secessionism would recede with people’s participation and satisfaction in outcomes.

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THANK YOU

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