DEMOCRACY - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy€¦ · They are not forced to speak up, and they can allow others to decide and speak for them, if they so ... Democracy

DEMOCRACYin

D E F I N I N G THE CHALLENGE

Contributors:

Joshua MuravchikLaurie MylroieGraham FullerMartin Kramer

Mohammed Abdelbeki Hermassi

Edited by Yehudah Mirsky and Matt Ahrens

A WASHINGTON INSTITUTE MONOGRAPH

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Democracy in the Middle East: defining thechal lenge/ edited by Yehudah Mirsky and MattAhrens ; contributors, Josh Muravchik ... [et al.].

p. cm."A Washington Institute Monograph/ 'ISBN 0-944029-53-11. Democracy—Middle East. 2. Middle East—

Politics and government—1979- 3. United States—Foreign Relations—Middle East. 4. Middle East—Foreign Relations—United States. I. Mirsky,Yehudah. II. Ahrens, Matt. III. Muravchik, Joshua.IV. Washington Institute for Near East Policy.JQ1758.A91D46 1993321.8/0956--dc20 93-28820

C1P

Copyright © 1993 byThe Washington Institute for Near East Policy1828 L Street, N.W., Suite 1050Washington, D.C. 20036Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 93-28820ISBN 0-944029-53-1

Cover Design by Jill IndykCover photograph © Gregoire/EEA/SABAOctober 1992 Borj-Mlain, AlgeriaA FIS RALLY

CONTENTS

Contributors v

Preface vii

Exporting Democracy to the Arab WorldJoshua Muravchik 1

Promoting Democracy as a Principle ofU.S. Middle East PolicyLaurie Mylroie 11

A Phased Introduction of IslamistsGraham Fuller 21

Where Islam and Democracy Part WaysMartin Kramer 31

Islam, Democracy and the Challenge ofPolitical ChangeMohammed Abdelbeki Hermassi 41

SUPPLEMENTARY DOCUMENTS 53

CONTRIBUTORS

Graham Fuller, a senior political scientist at theRAND Corporation, served as the NationalIntelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asiaresponsible for long-range intelligence forecastingfrom 1982 to 1986. Previously, he held a number ofdiplomatic and intelligence posts in the Middle East.A frequent commentator on Middle Eastern andCentral Asian politics, he is author of TheDemocracy Trap: Perils of the Post-Cold War World(1992).

Mohammed Abdelbeki Hermassi, a sociologist andformer chairman of the Tunisian Political and SocialStudies Association, has served since September 1992as Tunisia's permanent representative to UnitedNations Educational, Scientific, and CulturalOrganization. Dr. Hermassi was previously the vicedean of the University of Tunis, and taught for eightyears at the University of California at Berkeley. Hiswritings on Islamic politics and the challenges ofpolitical reform in North Africa include U IslamProtestaire (1986), Societe et Islam dans le MaghrebArabe (1987), and Le Maghreb Face aux MutationsInternationales (forthcoming).

Martin Kramer is the associate director of the MosheDayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studiesat Tel Aviv University, a member of the advisoryboard of the Oxford Encyclopedia of the ModernIslamic World, and a former visiting fellow at TheWashington Institute. Among his many publishedworks on aspects of political Islam are Islam

Assembled (1986), Shi'ism, Resistance andRevolution (1987), Hezbollah's Vision of the West(Washington Institute Policy Paper No. 16), andIslam, Democracy, and the Peace Process(forthcoming, Washington Institute Policy Paper).

Joshua Muravchik is a resident scholar at theAmerican Enterprise Institute for Public PolicyResearch and an adjunct scholar of The WashingtonInstitute. One of the foremost thinkers on the rolesof democracy and human rights in U.S. foreignpolicy, he is the author of The Uncertain Crusade:Jimmy Carter and the Dilemmas of Human RightsPolicy (1986) and Exporting Democracy: FulfillingAmerica's Destiny (1991).

Laurie Mylroie is an Arab affairs fellow at TheWashington Institute. She has previously taught inthe Department of Government at HarvardUniversity and at the U.S. Naval War College. Aleading expert on Iraqi politics and regional securityin the Persian Gulf, she is the author of SaddamHussein and the Crisis in the Gulf (with JudithMiller, 1990), The Future of Iraq (WashingtonInstitute Policy Paper No. 24), and Iraq: Options forU.S. Policy (Washington Institute Policy Focus No.21).

The contributions in this monograph are editedversions of presentations delivered to a WashingtonInstitute policy forum on March 18, 1993. Dr.Hermassi delivered his presentation at a specialpolicy forum on March 30, 1993.

VI

PREFACE

The promotion of democracy abroad, long a majortenet of U.S. foreign policy, has taken on newfoundimportance in the wake of the Soviet Union'scollapse. President Clinton has promised to makethe promotion of democracy a key element of hisforeign policy. The Middle East, a region whereautocratic regimes are the rule, has been largelyuntouched by the wave of democratization in recentyears. Indeed, it may be the one area of the worldwhere a key element of democracy, i.e., popularelections, may generate as many problems as itsolves, especially if it results in the displacement ofundemocratic yet friendly regimes by anti-WesternIslamist forces which, onre~iTrpuwer, maynriiminatefuture elections and other facets of democracy—inessence "one man, one vote, one time."

These ambiguities have led some analysts toconclude that the U.S. foreign policy ideal ofpromoting democracy abroad should not apply to theMiddle East. Others argue that we should not giveup on the democratic ideal but that it should bepursued cautiously or instituted only in stages.

To help further this discussion, The WashingtonInstitute convened a panel of experts to discuss thefeasibility, desirability and implications of promotingdemocratization in the Middle East and theproblems and opportunities such a policy poses toU.S. interests in the region. These proceedings,together with the many documents gathered in theappendix to this volume, help define that challenge.

Mike Stein Barbi WeinbergPresident Chairman

EXPORTING DEMOCRACY TOTHE ARAB WORLD

Joshua Muravchik

Democracy is immensely desirable in the MiddleEast, and in the Arab world in particular, for the sakeof the Arabs, for the sake of the Israelis and, onecould say, for the sakes of America and the rest of theworld, as well.

For the sake of the Arabs, because it is axiomaticthat democracy is desirable for people everywhere,even people who have had no history or experiencewith democracy. There is much recent empiricalevidence that people do in fact want democracy andare willing to fight for it, even in obscure corners ofthe world where conventional skepticism orcynicism once said there would be little or nointerest in it.

It also seems a logical axiom that one cannot forcepeople to be free against their will. Sometimes it issaid that people in some nondemocratic parts of theworld do not want democracy; it is not their way; it isnot their style, or tradition, or culture or what haveyou.

But it is logically self-contradictory to say thatpeople do not want democracy. This is becauseunless one starts with the assumption that peopleought to be able to get what they want, which is thebasic assumption of democracy, what is the relevanceof what they want? Once the question of what peoplewant is invoked, you have already started with apremise that what people want is what they areentitled to have.

In a democratic setting, political participation isnot compulsory; that is, if most people in ademocratic setting really do not want democracy,

2/ Democracy in the Middle East

they do not have to exercise their democratic rights.They are not forced to speak up, and they can allowothers to decide and speak for them, if they sochoose. There is, in other words, no possibility ofdoing anyone harm by offering them a democraticchoice.

Rather, the more familiar and real danger is justthe opposite; that people who want the authority tobe their own masters and determine their own liveswill be denied that by others through the use ofcoercion.

With respect to the Arab world, I think democracyis desirable because the Arab world seems sounhappy. That is, Arab politics seems to be driven bya relentless spirit of grievance and self-pity, and asense of having been victims and that the Arab's fatehas been determined by others.

One key to the Arab world's finding some of thematurity, health, and happiness that has eluded it isthe process of people taking and acceptingresponsibility for their own situation, and their owndestinies. And the only way people can do that is in ademocratic system in which they can be their ownmasters.

Arab democracy is desirable as well for the sake ofIsrael. Israel needs to maintain its military strengthto defend itself, and to reach peace with its Arabneighbors if that is possible. But for the long run, thesurvival of Israel depends on its eventually beingaccepted by its neighbors in the region where it islocated. This would, for the first time, enable it tomove toward a more normal life, rather than havingto be a state perpetually armed to the teeth and onalert against would-be attackers.

The key to that deliverance could well be thedemocratization of the Arab world. There is a greatdeal of research, familiar to everyone, that shows

Joshua Muravchik /3

that democracies get into war much less often thandictatorships, and particularly not with each other.This was theorized about even before there were anydemocracies, by Immanuel Kant, who offered thelogical explanation that, if people who have to do thefighting and dying are the ones who make thedecisions, there will be fewer wars.

But there is actually a deeper explanation for this.Democracy is, at bottom, not just a political system,but an ethic that maintains that it is more importantto make decisions in the right way than to get one'sown way. It embodies the idea that differencesshould be resolved, not through violence, butthrough talking, voting and other forms of civic life.

There is, then, a very real connection inherent inthe notion that, in their relations with their fellowcitizens, people should resolve arguments withoutkilling each other, and the notion that, in relationswith other states, they should resolve argumentswithout recourse to war.

This connection was put most eloquently andbeautifully by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his veryfirst speech in America after he came out of theSoviet Union. Trying to rally the West to recognizethe enormity of the Soviet menace, he went througha blood-chilling litany of the executions andbarbarities perpetuated by the Soviet regime againstits own citizens. And then, at the end of this litany,he turned to the audience and said, "What makesyou think they will treat you any better?" That, itseems to me, is precisely the point.

There is, then, a long-term relationship betweenthe prospect for peace in the Middle East and theprospect of democracy there. But, of course, thatbrings us to the next question, namely, is democracypossible in the Arab world? We know that there arenow no Arab democracies. There are a small number


of Islamic democracies, but no Arab democracies.This leads some to conclude that, for whateverreason, it is simply not possible for democracy to takehold in this part of the world.

But this seems quite an unfounded inference. Wehave in the last two decades, beginning in 1974,witnessed an enormous tide of democratization thatfirst began in southern Europe and then spread toLatin America and East Asia, and, with the collapseof communism, to Eastern Europe, the formerSoviet Union and now even to Africa.

According to this year's count by Freedom House,there are eighty-five countries in the world thathave, at this moment, democratic governments or,in Freedom House's terms, are "free" countries,including many countries in which the advent ofdemocracy was not widely-anticipated: Nepal,Mongolia, Kirghizstan, Benin and so on.

Some say that a number of these countries thathave recently joined democratic ranks have veryshallow democratic roots and will probably revert todictatorship sometime soon. No doubt some of themwill. But a great many of the countries that we thinkof today as being stable democracies also had shakydemocratic beginnings. After a brief experiment withdemocracy, many reverted back to dictatorial rule fora while before finally establishing stable democraticsystems on their second or third try. This seems to benot so unusual of a pattern.

The overall growth of democracy in the world,which has been very dramatic not only over the lasttwenty years but over the last two centuries, has beenvery much an upward, but not necessarily smooth,curve. There are eighty-five democracies this year;maybe there will only be eighty next year, but there isno reason at all to doubt that this is part of a steadyupward trend in the expansion of democracy. There

Joshua Muravchik / 5

are no exact, hard and fast rules about where andhow democracy can come about.

Social science is terribly inexact, and perhaps itsmost exact pronouncement about democracy in theworld is that democracy correlates with affluence.The richer the country, the more likely it is to bedemocratic, and vice versa. But this is very far frombeing an absolute correlation. Of the eighty-fivecountries listed by Freedom House, fully thirty havea per capita GNP of under $2,000. Indeed, seventeenhave a per capita GNP of under $1,000.

Similarly, there is a correlation betweendemocracy and a high rate of literacy. But there areany number of countries, including several in LatinAmerica, that now enjoy democratic governmentand yet have literacy rates that are lower than someof the nondemocratic countries in the world,including a great many of the dictatorships of theMiddle East, such as Syria, Iraq, and Libya.

So then, there are no socioeconomic laws orindicators that would lead us to conclude that theArab world cannot be democratic. What we are leftwith, then, is the argument about culture; that is,while there is nothing inherent in the physical oreconomic conditions of this area of the world thatwould prevent the operation of democracy, it isnonetheless unlikely in this region because theculture of Islam is inhospitable to democracy.

While there may be some truth to this, manyother cultures are or have been regarded asinhospitable to democracy yet have undergone asuccessful transformation to democracy. SamuelHuntington twins Islam with Confucianism as thetwo large ethical/religious traditions that areregarded as being inhospitable to democracy. Yet wehave seen that democracy has been spreading andstill is spreading in the Confucian world. One need


think of Taiwan, South Korea, and Japan, which isone of the bulwark countries of the democraticworld. And yet the skepticism akin to that heardtoday about the prospects for democracy in theIslamic world was expressed in very similar termsabout the prospects for democracy in Japan before itbecame democratic.

During World War II, when the U.S. governmentstarted thinking about what to do with Japan, ourleading Japan expert in the State Department, JosephGrew, who had been our ambassador there, sentPresident Truman a memo that said, "From thelong-range point of view, the best we can hope for isa constitutional monarchy, experience havingshown that democracy in Japan would never work."

After we so thoroughly and successfullydemocratized Japan, one of the great Americanscholars on Japan, Robert Ward, commented wrylythat had General MacArthur and the occupationgovernment known more, they would haveaccomplished less. If they had really understoodJapanese culture, they would have thought itimpossible to democratize Japan. Japanese culturewould seem to be inherently inhospitable todemocracy as it is a culture based on obedience, andhierarchy, and group values, and getting along.

Huntington reminds us—to make the same pointin a different direction—that what has been saiduntil recently about Confucianism beinginhospitable to democracy was also said a fewdecades ago about Confucianism and economicgrowth. And we have certainly seen the wisdom inthat.

The relationship between culture and politics is abig, vague and amorphous thing, though no doubtquite important. Specific economic or politicaloutcomes or adaptation to specific economic and

Joshua Muravchik /7

political systems are subjects about which weunderstand very little.

If democracy is both, as I have argued, desirableand reasonable to hope for in the Islamic world, thequestion naturally arises as to how to bring it about.In order to answer that it is important to first answerthe question many ask now: Would democracy inArab countries be dangerous? In the last few years,Islamist parties have done very well in democraticelections held in several Arab countries, and this hasgenerated a lot of quite justified fear.

There is no easy answer. But while there may bereason to fear the outcome of a single election, andthere may be reason to fear a certain militant party'scoming to power, there is no reason to fear theinstitution of true democracy which means not oneelection for one time only, but a genuinecommitment to hold periodic elections.

If a state can achieve democracy, in the sense ofelections and free speech that will be followedeventually by more elections, there is not muchcause to fear that this or that party that is extreme orirresponsible may win some of the elections, because,in that circumstance, the democratic process itselfwill have an important moderating effect, as parties,in order to remain in power, are forced to beaccountable to the voters, for delivering on theirpromises, and in the give-and-take of democraticpolitics.

The thing to fear is the slip between cup and lip;that is, doing things in the name of democracy thatdo not bring democracy but may simply destabilizean existing government, and replace it with an evenworse one. That was exactly the experience we had inthe 1970s in Nicaragua and in Iran, where we werepursuing a policy under the rubric of human rightswithout thinking about the consequences in any


given situation.What we learned is that not all dictatorships are

equal, and that sometimes getting rid of onedictatorship results in a worse dictatorship, and thatis not progress.

So what needs to be done in trying to foster thegrowth of democracy in the Islamic world oranyplace else is to differentiate among situations.There are some dictatorial regimes that it is difficultto imagine any alternative being much worse, e.g.,Saddam Hussein in Iraq or Moammar Qadhafi inLibya—dictators that are as repressive as any onearth. They are cruel to their own people, have lotsof blood on their hands and are very irresponsible intheir international actions. While there could beother potential or aspiring dictators in theircountries who would be just as obnoxious to us or tothe citizens of those countries, it is not likely thatthere will be worse dictators. So we can afford to berather free about the question of whether we willdestabilize them by promoting democracy.

On the other hand, there are other unelectedrulers around the world and in the Middle East, forwhom it is easy to imagine worse successors, and,whom we therefore do not want to destabilize. Wedo want to pressure them for a process of reform andliberalization that will head toward democracy, butthis should not be done in a way that will lead totheir being overthrown.

And needless to say, while democracy is possiblealmost everywhere, much more broadly thanconventional wisdom has it, in some countries andsituations the short-term prospect for democracy isnonetheless much better than in others. And that,too, ought to be a guide to our policy.

Overall, our main task must be to nurturedemocratic forces in undemocratic countries. This

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can be accomplished through various means,including the National Endowment for Democracy,radio broadcasting, and political, informational, andaid programs, all of which aim to giveencouragement and strength to democratic groups ordemocratic-minded individuals in countries, inexile, wherever we may find them, so that ademocratic future becomes a more realistic prospectwhen there are changes of regime.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AS A PRINCIPLEOF U.S. MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Laurie Mylroie

That the basis for government is properly the willof the people is a widely-held idea in the latetwentieth century with intellectual origins in thepolitical philosophy of the seventeenth andeighteenth centuries. The notion that governmentsproperly represent the people was expressed in twoforms: the liberals, Hobbes and Locke, emphasizedthe obligation of governments to protect individualrights, above all the right to life and the right toproperty. They were writing in reaction, partly, to thereligious wars of the seventeenth century.

The idea, as it emerged, was to cause men toconcentrate on life in this world and on acquiringmaterial gain so as to make them think less aboutthe life hereafter; the theory was that peopleoccupied with making money would not be soquarrelsome about intangibles. The United Statesreflects the success of that idea.

Jean Jacques Rousseau, on the other hand,criticized the liberal view and argued that theindividualistic pursuit of material gain led toinequalities between men, which, in turn, led tostrife, envy and other unpleasant qualities. Rousseauargued that society should be a whole andgovernment should represent the general will.

So there are, in fact, two ways that governmentscould represent people—by protecting their rights asindividuals or by reflecting the general will, the willof the community. That governments shouldrepresent their people, or, as Joshua Muravchik hasjust put it, that people should get what they want, isa nearly universally-held sentiment.


Liberal democracies, like ours, are based on thetraditions of Hobbes and Locke. Others, including theformer Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics, werebased on Rousseau, as modified by Marx and Lenin.It was the claim of the Soviet Union, after all, torepresent the bulk of the population, the masses,more effectively than liberal democracy.

Of course, the history of the twentieth centuryvindicates Hobbes and Locke against Rousseau,Marx, and Lenin, and seems to prove the liberals'emphasis on the need to limit government byprotecting individual rights and dividingsovereignty. An important part of the protection ofindividual rights and division of sovereignty is theseparation of political and religious authority. Noperson or institution possesses a legitimate claim onabsolute truth or absolute power.

This does not fit with the Islamic tradition at allbecause, in Islam, political and religious authorityare one. Muhammad was a prophet, a political leaderand a military leader all in one. Moreover,sovereignty rests with God or his vice regent, theProphet and his successors. Traditionally, in Islam,sovereignty does not rest with the people.

So there is a big contradiction between thistraditional Muslim view and the modern Westernview. Now, we in the West can live with it. We donot feel threatened in our basic values by Islam.Westerners, by and large, are not importing Islamicways or otherwise acting like Muslims. Thiscontradiction is, however, a problem for Muslims,because they do not feel confident and strong in theirtradition.

This, in short, is the root of the Middle East'snotorious instability, which makes every otherproblem so much more difficult to resolve. It is alsowhat makes democracy problematic there. But I am

Laurie Mylroie /13

pointing to a very specific feature of traditional Islamand not Islamic culture per se.

This is not a complex or difficult argument, nor isit mine alone. Many have made it, but none soeloquently as Bernard Lewis in an essay in the March23, 1993 New York Review of Books entitled, "TheEnemies of God." Lewis writes that "It is theseductive appeal of American culture far more thanany possible acts by American governments thatIslamic fundamentalists see as offering the greatestmenace."

Indeed, Muslims have not escaped the influenceof the modern notion that sovereignty rests with thepeople. Like the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,there are nine Arab republics, including Syria andIraq. Their claim to rule is that they represent thepeople, in the Rousseauian sense. Even Iranprofesses to be a republic, an Islamic republic,representing the first time in history that a Muslimgovernment has claimed popular legitimacy alongwith religious legitimacy.

But all these so-called "republics" in the MiddleEast, with the possible exception of Iran, arediscredited, particularly after the collapse of themother of all such republics, the USSR. They areseen by their populations as incompetent, corruptdictatorships. They have failed to delivereconomically; they have failed to fulfill theirpromise to liberate Palestine and unite the Arabs;and, above all, they have failed to develop societiesin which Muslims could feel pride in relation to theWest.

Despite the recognized failure of these self-styledrepublics, there is, with the notable exception ofTurkey, no Middle East Muslim government withany plausible claim to be a liberal democracy.Significantly, modern Turkey was founded on the


principle of the separation of religious and politicalauthority, in contravention to established Islamictradition.

The dilemma for Muslims is that, while there hasalways been a gap between Islam's political theoryand its practice, modern times have exacerbated theproblems of political legitimacy for Muslim rulers,given the pervasive notion that governmentsshould rule on behalf of their peoples.

This can be illustrated best by looking at SaudiArabia. The Saudi government, a monarchy, rules inthe name of Wahhabism, a strict interpretation ofIslam. The political system makes no provision forinstitutionalized popular representation. Yet thedemand is there, reflected in the repeated promisesof the Saudi government going back to the 1960s toestablish a shura or consultative council, the mostminimal form of institutionalized politicalparticipation. Indeed, after the Gulf War, King Fahdonce again promised to create a consultative council.This latest attempt failed to materialize as well.

The Saudi government, unwilling or unable toshare political authority, continues to promote astrict Islamic view of the world while claiming to bethe guardian of that Islamic way of life.

The Islamic views promoted by the Saudigovernment do not represent the world as it is but assome would like to see it. In this view, Islam isseparate and distinct from the West, indeed superiorto it and the West is hostile to Islam. That hostility isdescribed by Muslims in terms of the West's actions:American indifference to the Palestinians, thebombing of Iraq, etc. But, as Bernard Lewis has said,the real threat is not Western actions but theseductively corrupting ways of the West, includingthe demand for political participation.

Even as the Saudi government promotes the idea

Laurie Mylroie /15

that the West is hostile, the country's defense and itswealth, from the sale of its oil, depend on theprotection it receives from a non-Muslim power.The West drove out an aggressor and did not itselftake the oil that was implicitly threatened hadSaddam moved on but returned it to thegovernment of Saudi Arabia.

For much of the Saudi public and government,the U.S. intervention is something to be forgottenand rationalized away. Hence, one finds not a fewpeople saying in Saudi Arabia that the war was anAmerican plot to weaken an Arab nation, that is,Iraq, in order to protect Israel.

The consequence of the Saudi government'sinability or unwillingness to share political authorityis that it promotes a myth which prevents it frommaking adequate provisions for its own defense. Theway that the Saudi government seeks to maintain itslegitimacy is self-defeating and the Saudi impact onthe region as it seeks to promote and maintain itslegitimacy is not so helpful.

Even as we today are alarmed by the rise of Islamicfundamentalism, particularly in North Africa, weshould not forget that it was the government ofSaudi Arabia which supported nearly every one ofthe fundamentalist groups which now threatens thestability of North Africa, including the IslamicSalvation Front (FIS) in Algeria, Hassan al-Turabi inSudan and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. TheSaudis thought that they were gaining leverage bysupporting these fundamentalists against secularArab nationalists.

What if a Middle Eastern government seeks toopen up? The problem today is that liberal democratsdo not seem to emerge as much as illiberalfundamentalists who may be worse than what in factexists. Algeria is a case in point. Algeria held


elections in December 1991 in whichfundamentalists won 189 out of 231 seats in the firstround of a two-round election. The Algerian armystepped in to prevent things from going any further.However, these results are misunderstood to asignificant degree, because despite the distribution ofthe seats, the fundamentalists won only 30 percent ofthe vote. The ruling party, the National LiberationFront (FLN), had concocted a system where itexpected to translate a small plurality into a majority.This strategy backfired and the FIS, rather than theFLN, became the beneficiary of this system. Theremaining 70 percent of the vote was split amongtwenty secular parties. A similar distribution of voteshas occurred in the parliamentary elections in Jordanin November 1989.

In other words, when given the opportunity tovote, even though a majority of the Arab populationdoes not vote for fundamentalists, a significantminority does. And within that minority that votesfor fundamentalists are some who are ferventlydevoted to that cause. Moreover, the secular vote isdivided.

So, one might argue that if the liberalization ofauthoritarian regimes produces a 30 percentfundamentalist minority, it is perhaps better thatstrong men should rule the Middle East, i.e.,liberalization should yield to stability. But this ideadoes not work either. Saddam Hussein is a reminderthat dictatorial rule is usually unstable. There is aconstant tendency to deal with internal problems byexternalizing them in aggression.

Gamal Abdul Nasser is another example which isappropriate to recall. After World War II, Egypt faceda more serious threat from Islamic fundamentalismthan anything that it has encountered recently. TheCIA had some intimation of the plotting of the

Laurie Mylroie /17

Egyptian Free Officers in the early 1950s and, in somerespects, welcomed the 1952 coup.

The idea at the time was that the military could bea modernizing force in the Arab world that wouldget rid of corrupt dictatorships and deal moreeffectively with reactionary threats like Islamicfundamentalism. But it did not work that way.Initially, the coup was not popular in Egypt; onlywhen Nasser began to adopt the same anti-Westernism as the fundamentalists did he becomean Arab hero.

An Egyptian friend once explained this to me interms of his personal experience. When Nasser tookover, he at first did not like Nasser because he hadpromised democracy but did not follow through onthis promise. But when Nasser nationalized theSuez Canal, little Egypt stood up to Great Britain,which had ruled it for a century, and he felt so happyand excited that he forgot all about democracy.

Like Joshua Muravchik, I believe that nothing butthe establishment of liberal democracy in the MiddleEast will bring peace and stability to the region. But itis not an easy project; maybe it is not even possible.But there are ways in which it can be pursuedwithout undue risk of making the situation worsethan it is.

First, it is important to differentiate among MiddleEastern states and peoples. Populations of differentcountries in the Middle East have different interests,a fact that can be hidden by the promiscuous use ofphrases such as "Arab world" and "Muslim world."There are Arab countries and Arab peoples. In thosecountries, whose populations have suffered grievouspain because of the excesses of anti-Western ideology(an ideology shared by both Islamic fundamentalistsand Arab nationalists like Nasser), the attitudes ofthe various populations are different.


Both Kuwait and Iraq certainly fall into thiscategory. Kuwait restored its national assembly andheld elections last year. Those elections did notproduce a bunch of fanatics; rather, the nationalassembly is a reasonably sober body and it is breakingmany ideological tenets that usually compromiseWestern relations with Arab states. Above all,Kuwaitis increasingly define their interests usingWestern catch phrases and ideology.

For example, a fundamentalist member ofparliament recently suggested that Kuwait shouldestablish an Islamic guidance body. In response,several Kuwaiti papers averred that such a body wasunnecessary as it would limit personal freedoms,and that Kuwait had more urgent problems to dealwith, like economic reconstruction. This response isindicative of a new approach on the part of theKuwaiti press. Typically, public Arab discourse isvery delicate in its coverage of issues related to Islamor Arab nationalism, and direct refutation of theirdesirability is unusual.

Iraq is another example of a population which hasbeen so abused by the excesses of a fundamentalist ornationalist ideology that may provide fertile groundfor responsible self-government. Indeed, thecomplaint of the Iraqi population regarding the GulfWar was not that the United States attacked Iraq butthat it left Saddam in power. The idea that apopulation would welcome a war against its owngovernment was so foreign to the way manyAmericans imagined Arab politics, or Iraqi politics,and the way other Arabs described Iraq that theWestern media was, in fact, very slow to reportaccurately the general Iraqi perception: "The war isfine, just get rid of Saddam for us/'

One of the few Arab communities in which thereis a free-ranging political debate, where prominent

Laurie Mylroie /19

figures speak the language of liberal democracy,shorn of the anti-Western sentiment or the uneasyrelations with the West that characterizes many Arabintellectuals, is the Iraqi exile community. For that,many outspoken individuals have been brutallycriticized by other Arabs, particularly by Palestinians,as traitors and agents.

The mainstream Iraqi opposition, the IraqiNational Congress, maintains a neutral position onthe ideological issues which usually divide the Westfrom the Arab countries, including the Palestinianquestion. This is a reflection of the extremity of therepression in Iraq and a willingness to abandon theideologies which other Arab populations seemcommitted to.

This phenomenon is particularly evident amongIraq's Kurds, who held elections in May 1992,without violence. The Kurdish elections were thefreest elections ever held in Iraq, indeed the freestelections held in an Arab country in recent times. Onthe surface, there was nothing in the experience ofthe Kurds, a tribal people who had never knownfreedom, to suggest that they were capable of such athing. I suppose a cultural argument about the Kurdswould say they could not democratize with no priorexperience.

But, upon reflection, there were reasons for thesuccess of the Kurds' democratic experiment. Theyinclude a very deep revulsion against dictatorshipbecause of the genocidal repression they suffered atthe hands of a brutal dictator and also a sense thatdemocracy was somehow the only form of civilizedgovernment.

In principle, the West should be promotingdemocracy and human rights in the Middle East,because ultimately that is the only way that theregion will know peace and stability. That principle


could probably be held in abeyance where the effortto promote it would lead to regimes that are morerepressive than those that exist now. That does notmean abandoning the principle. Furthermore, thereare places in the Middle East where it is appropriateto promote democracy. And, finally, one of the moreeffective tools that the West has against Islamicfundamentalist countries that seek to export theirfundamentalism and their terror is precisely anemphasis on human rights and democracy. TheWest should stress that the treatment of the sizablemajority of their populations that do not necessarilygo along with the government and its policies by thegovernments of Iran and Sudan will not be tolerated.

A PHASED INTRODUCTION OF ISLAMISTS

Graham Fuller

There is little virtue in holding Jesuitical debatesabout whether Islam is compatible with democracy.The same discussions might apply to Judaism orChristianity, and they have been debated forcenturies. The real issue is how Muslims are going tothink about democracy. And it is very difficult tothink that, a priori, most Muslims are going to say,"No, we prefer not to have democracy/'

The issue is, how are Muslims, as members oftheir society, going to deal with democracy? Whatare Muslims' aspirations? How do they want to liveand under what kinds of government and rule?What do they want done to them by regimes?

I do not think there is a consensus on the part ofMuslims for the abolition of freedoms that might begranted to them. It is clear, furthermore, that manyMuslims who believe there is a role for Islam inpolitics do not agree with all Islamists and radicals.So, here again, in talking about what Muslims want,there is a considerable spectrum of opinion thatneeds to be kept in mind.

I believe the entry of Islam in some form intoMiddle Eastern politics is inevitable for severalreasons.

First of all, and most worrisome, the status quo inmost countries of the Middle East now isunacceptable, unstable and illegitimate in terms ofthe kinds of governments that currently rule.Governments are under tremendous assault from allquarters, with economic desperation being fueled byvery high population growth rates, huge needs toimport food and vast under- and unemployment.

And, politically, many governments are not able


to meet the demands of the people. They are findingit increasingly difficult to repress the people in orderto stay in power, yet seem to be unwilling to broadenthe basis of rule or bring more people into thegovernment—even to share the blame. And"sharing the blame" is often one of the basic meansby which democracies come into being.

Given this disastrous status quo, I am afraid thatsomething is going to give, and fairly soon, in manycountries of the Middle East where regimes aresimply not able to meet the needs of the people orthe country.

Unfortunately, Islamists are best poised, of allpolitical groups in the region, to take advantage ofthis situation. The tragedy is that there are fewpolitical alternatives. It need not necessarily be thatway, but given how governments are nowconstructed in the Middle East, few plausible, viableopposition parties have been allowed to gatherstrength and present themselves as real alternativesto the Islamists. So this is another reason why Islamwill inevitably become part of the political process.

It is furthermore impossible to think that, insocieties where Islam is the basic religion, it will notenter into the political discourse. Religion entersinto the Christian and Jewish discourse, both in theUnited States, a country which has ostensibly gonefar toward the separation of church and state, inIsrael and elsewhere. The question is how and inwhat way will Islam enter into the political discoursein the Middle East.

Islam is also a nativist tradition in a regionthirsting for some kind of legitimate nativist rootsfor its own political philosophy. I am not sayingIslam has to be anti-Western or it has to be totallydifferent than the West, but it is reassuring toMuslims when political theory has some kind of

Graham Fuller /23

Islamic basis.It must be remembered, too, that Islam is not

homogeneous. It is very dangerous to think of Islamas simply being one movement. There are manydifferent groups, even within the Islamists, whodisagree strongly among themselves.

It should be noted parenthetically that there areeven some modernizing aspects to Islamism.Ironically, Islamist movements are bringing womeninto the political system in many countries, such asIran, North Africa, and elsewhere. Islamists areregularly joined by secular opposition forces, forinstance. At one point in Algeria, they marchedvirtually in lockstep against government policy.

The Islamist movements are likewise serving topoliticize and mobilize elements of the populationin states where this has never happened before. Onemay regret that the Islamists are almost the onlyones carrying out this mobilization process, but theyare doing it, and the mobilization and politicizationof populations is an essential stage in societies'gradual movement towards democratization.

Many Islamists are actually critiquing existinggovernments on the basis of absence of humanrights and democratic instruments. This may seemto some to be just a cynical move to exploit liberalprinciples to gain power, only to abolish them oncein power. Some may undoubtedly want to do that;others do not. But the fact is, Islamists are compelledto base their critique of existing regimes on many ofthe liberal grounds that we ourselves would use tocriticize regimes.

A critical point is that Islamism, once it enters thepolitical system will surely weaken over time, for anumber of reasons. First, Islamism does not havemany unique answers to problems. Islamists maycome up with some interesting thoughts, or some


useful approaches in certain areas, but Islam does nothave any unique answers. Yet the longer Islamistsare excluded from the system, the more they are ableto maintain that Islam is the only answer. Let themprove whether they have the answers. Let themdemonstrate that they have a particular approach. Isubmit that they do not have the answers and thatultimately this point will be demonstrated. Theirinterpretations are contested, even by many Muslimswithin their own ranks. There is no Islamist unitythat will be able to be maintained throughout thatperiod.

Islamism has the allure of the untried; once triedin politics, however, much of that allure willdisappear. In Turkey, Islamists generally get 12 to 15percent of the vote since having been allowed intopolitics. In Pakistan, they have never done muchbetter than 12 to 15 percent in elections. In Iran, todayor tomorrow or ten years from now, if genuinely freeelections are held there, it is unlikely that manypeople will get excited at the idea of voting for anIslamist party after the experience of the IslamicRepublic. One would not wish upon every nationthe need to go through an Islamist experience to findthat out, but I think the experience of Islam inpolitics, even to a limited extent, will lessen itsmomentum and appeal.

Islamism is now in the process of becoming amovement and not just a political party. Movementsas such tend to be stronger, more emotive and moreappealing in many respects. Political parties, on theother hand, have to come up with cold, hardanswers to life's problems.

Women, increasingly, will grow hostile to Islamistmovements, if the latter are intent on keepingwomen isolated and out of political power and out ofthe job market in the future.

Graham Fuller /25

Islamists will inevitably be forced to compromisewith political reality as they move into positions ofauthority within parliaments and have to deal withthose they do not agree with. When Islamism is inpower, there will be winners and losers, according tothe reforms and changes made. They will makeenemies.

Islamists are already forced to talk in terms of theUniversal Declaration of Human Rights and justifywhy they are not fully supporting democraticprinciples, for example, in Sudan, Iran or evenPakistan. They have had to apologize on thosegrounds and find justifications to explain why thereare variations. In other words, the basis for theliberal democratic argument is already largelyaccepted. The terms of the liberal dialogue have inmany cases been implicitly accepted, even if notexplicitly.

There are, of course, many negative features toIslamism coming to power. I do not, in fact, advocateits coming to power. But this is going to happen inmany states, in one fashion or another; the questionis, how do we manage the process in order to limitany possible negative repercussions.

There are many negative features to politicalIslam. There are criminal aspects to many of theIslamic extremist organizations, of which in Egyptwe see some particularly vicious examples, includingassassinations, murders, bombings—criminal actsthat must be punished appropriately.

Secondly, some Islamists have ideologicallytotalitarian visions, but they are essentially part of asmall minority. The issue is how to prevent theseviolent minorities from gaining total control overIslamist movements and imposing totalitarian ideas.

Certainly, another negative feature is that themost prominent example of an Islamist government


in power, Iran, has so far not been encouraging. ButIran is evolving very quickly, even if the mostradical of the Islamist elements control the "export ofIslam/' a disruptive element of Iranian policy. Butthat aside, processes in Iran are slowly moving in thedirection of de-Islamizing the state in criticalrespects, as pragmatism gains ground in many otherareas, including a remarkably open parliament.

Iran possesses a poor human rights record andcertainly a conservative social agenda under whichmost of us would not want to live. But these issuesare the subject of legitimate debate among theIslamists.

As democracy comes to the Middle East, it is goingto be almost universally destabilizing, at leastinitially. We have to recognize this. The minoritiesthat now run Bahrain, Iraq and Syria will no longerbe running those states. Other states that are ruled bymajorities in which minorities are repressed willfind those minorities having a much greater voice.

There will be increasing social change. Old elitesthat have been holding onto power will lose out, andthe process will surely be destabilizing. But what isthe alternative? During the Cold War, one couldargue that destabilization worked in the interest ofthe Soviets. That excuse is gone today.

We must navigate the process by whichgovernments eventually achieve the kind ofstabilization of political forces that occurs whengovernments reflect the rough proportionality offorces within society. The process is not going to beeasy, and it may have unpleasant and negativeconsequences. We must get through this process ifwe are to ever arrive at that state of more democraticgovernance that is the sole, long-term guarantee ofmoderate and more stable politics free from theuncontrolled whims of dictatorial rule.

Graham Fuller /27

Ultimately, the mechanics of how this happens isall important. It will happen. But how it happens iscritical. When Islamists emerge from a state of utterrepression and explode into some democraticvictory, this sudden release of forces represents thesingle most negative and undesirable manner Islamcan enter the political process.

The clearest model of this phenomenon is, ofcourse, Iran. Algeria could have moved in thatdirection as well. We should hope to see Islamicforces gradually enter the political system—and notbecause we want them or like them, but because theywill inevitably enter under some guise or other. Letthem take over cities and municipalities, as theyhave in Algeria. Let people see how the cities theyrun experience serious problems. Let them comegradually into parliaments. Phased introduction, inother words, is a very critical point.

In future elections, states should agree in advanceon compacts of behavior, such that political partieswho contest for power will agree not to later abolishthe democratic process. Of course, compacts cannotprovide an absolute guarantee. Islamists can sign anypiece of paper they want, then come to power andabolish the system. But the greater the restraints andthe greater the advance agreements on the rules ofthe game, the harder it will be to delegitimize thesystem.

But inevitably, there is going to be somemovement backwards as well as forwards. Turkeyhas taken at least three attempts—three coups—toget democracy on track, but now it is not looking toobad. There may even be a fourth setback in Turkey,but Turks are beginning to get used to the democraticprocess. This will, in time, happen elsewhere.

There are thresholds by which fringe groups canbe kept out, by establishing, for example, that parties


must obtain a minimum of 3 to 4 percent of the voteto be represented in parliament, etc. Thesemechanical aspects of democracy are very important.Israel itself knows that threshold election laws canhave a critical impact on the governability or thenongovernability even of democracies. An electoralstructure of "winner take all" versus other kinds ofrepresentational systems is very critical to howIslamists will do in some of these elections.

Rather than just one Islamist party, I would like tosee a multiplicity of Islamic parties, with naturaldisagreements among them. Let more of them comeout. Let one hundred flowers bloom so that they willoppose each other, so that there will be debate. Oneof the biggest problems within Islamic society so faris that there has not been honest critique of theshortcomings and weaknesses of other Islamicmovements. Islamists have been very coy andunwilling to talk about these sensitive issues,especially when they are out of power, because theyfeel this quest for solidarity.

I believe that there will be a growth in Islamicforces. It is regrettable that, at this point, they are theonly opposition forces that exist. Many states thatnow face election pressures must make it theirbusiness, urgently, to assure that other oppositionparties emerge, apart from the Islamists.

One basic, negative feature of the Islamists that isvery disturbing is their fundamental anti-Westernism. The degree of anti-Westernism thatwill remain within these systems will dependcritically on the character of international politics. Ifthe West, and the United States in particular, usesdemocracy as a means to attack our enemies, butoverlooks democratic criterion when it comes to ourfriends, then Muslims will be convinced that thedemocratic rhetoric that is coming from the West is

Graham Fuller /29

just the latest Western idea about how to dominatethe Middle East.

If the West does seem to apply questions ofprinciple equitably, if there are no double standardsand if we see a general diminution of Westernefforts to dominate the Middle East, in one respect oranother, then our values will be accepted morereadily and less cynically than they have been to date.

Surely, illegitimate regimes all over the entireMiddle East are now very much against the ropes.We have to figure out how we are going to getthrough the process of liberalization anddemocratization, while simultaneously managingthe process of Islam entering the political system.

If there is no liberalization because of our fear ofIslam, then we will simply build towards greaterpolitical and social explosion with worseconsequences for all. This is the supreme challengeof the next several decades as we seek to change thevery political groundwork in the Middle East thathas brought forth the likes of Saddam Hussein.There has to be a better way for politics to beconducted in the Middle East, and Muslims know it.After all, they have been the chief victims in thepast.

WHERE ISLAM AND DEMOCRACYPART WAYS

Martin Kramer

My purpose is to consider and critique theargument which has emerged as conventionalwisdom about Islamic fundamentalism, and whichhas been echoed here in the presentation by GrahamFuller, that is that Islamic fundamentalistmovements are, in reality, democracy movementsand reform movements in disguise.

Graham did make the case, most eloquently, andperhaps a bit extravagantly, in the piece he wrote onIslamic fundamentalism for the Washington Postlast year, when he called it "a movement that ishistorically inevitable and politically 'tamable.' Overthe long run, it even represents ultimate politicalprogress toward greater democracy and populargovernment."1

Robin Wright has made a parallel argument, inwhich she declared Islam to be "at a junctureincreasingly equated with the ProtestantReformation," thanks to the growing number offundamentalists who "are now trying to reconcilemoral and religious tenets with modern life, politicalcompetition and free markets."2

This representation of Islamic fundamentalism,which has gained widespread currency in academicand journalistic circles, is being drivensimultaneously by two different rationales. The firstis a variation of democracy theory, largely the

1 Graham Fuller, "Islamic Fundamentalism: No Long-TermThreat/' Washington Post, January 13, 1992.2 Robin Wright, "Islam, Democracy, and the West," ForeignAffairs, Vol. 71, No. 3, Summer 1992.


province of political scientists; the second is atendency towards Islamic apologetics, which isevident among some Western students of Islam. Isubmit that their shared conclusion, that Islamicfundamentalism is really not fundamentalism at allbut an earnest yearning for democracy and reform inIslamic guise, is driven more by disciplinarycommitments and biases than by the evidence.

This variation of democracy theory, first of all, iscommitted to a thesis that the world is movingsteadily and inexorably towards democratization in auniversal and inevitable process. The Islamic Arabworld is no exception. But there is a difficulty in thecase of the Arab world because there are no obviousdemocracy movements, movements with whichWestern opinion would immediately sympathize, asthere are in Eastern Europe.

Nonetheless, these are immensely popular andpopulist movements, Islamic in nature, and theydemand free elections and the "rule of law/' Sincetheory posits that democracy movements must beemerging here as elsewhere, and since the onlymovements that seem to be thriving are Islamic,logic strongly suggests that Islamic movements maywell be democracy movements in disguise.

To be sure, much that they actually say and do istroubling. They talk about Islamic governmentrather than democracy; Bernard Lewis is right whenhe writes that fundamentalists do not use or evenmisuse the term "democracy" in their discourse.1

And their notion of the "rule of law" refers to theunalterable law of Islam.

Nevertheless, the argument goes, this is adifferent cultural setting. If we cannot see the

1 Bernard Lewis, "Islam and Liberal Democracy/' The AtlanticMonthly, February 1993.

Martin Kramer /33

democratic yearning beneath the surface, thenperhaps it is a narrowness of our own vision and theresult of our Western biases.

Some Western students of Islam are equallycommitted. They have invested immense energiesin trying to bring about a Western understanding ofIslam, an understanding that has always been sorelylacking. They are quite right that Islam, as a system ofbeliefs that comforts and inspires hundreds ofmillions of people, has not always gotten its due inthe West, certainly not in the media. And one doesfind in the West, a lamentable tendency to associatethe religion of Islam with terror and despotism.

These students of Islam find themselves in theawkward position of being asked about Islam onlywhen someone is assassinated or something isblown up. They have been more than justified inreminding the world on these occasions that Islam isnot Islamic fundamentalism.

But, recently, they have begun to realize that inmany places, Islamic fundamentalism is becomingnormative Islam. This is not the Islam that they hadbeen defending. They had assumed that Islam wasmoving in another direction, towards Islamicmodernism, the attempt to reconcile Islam withmodern values.

In point of fact, Islamic modernism has been ineclipse for some time, yet the basic assumption ofmany scholars remains that the mainstream ofIslamic thought must move, inevitably, again,towards some sort of enlightened reform. And if thisis so, then the burgeoning fundamentalistmovements cannot be what they seem to be, that is,an atavistic regression. Beneath their rough exterior,then, the work of reform must be underway. And ifwe cannot see this clearly, it is because of Westernprejudice against Islam.


As you will have noted, a similar determinismhas led both the democracy theorists and thestudents of Islam to their conclusions about Islamicfundamentalism. And these conclusions, I submit,are basically ideological. Not surprisingly, they flystraight in the face of an overwhelming amount ofevidence, both of fundamentalist thought andpractice.1

Several salient issues need to be addressed. First,are the fundamentalists attempting to reconcileIslam with democracy? Are they indeed formulatingtheir thought within the confines of the democraticdiscourse, as defined in the preceding presentations?

I see no evidence for this. Indeed, it seems that theprincipled position of every major fundamentalistthinker, the authors of the source texts thatfundamentalists read, from Casablanca to Kabul, isthat democracy is irrelevant to Islam and that Islamis superior to democracy. In this view, the fatal flawof democracy is that it rests upon the sovereignty ofthe people. In Islam, God is sovereign, and his will isexpressed in the sharia, the divinely revealed law ofIslam. Democracy, which places the prerogative oflegislation in the hands of the people, is the veryessence of arbitrary government, because it turns onthe whim of a shifting electorate, and electoratesalways shift, by their nature. No fundamentalist isprepared to submit to the will of that electorate, if itdefies Islamic law. As Algeria's most outspokenfundamentalist put it, "One does not vote for God.One obeys him/'

There are those in these movements today whoallow that believers may participate in elections,envisioned as a kind of referendum of allegiance to a

* See Martin Kramer, "Islam vs. Democracy/' Commentary,January 1993.

Martin Kramer /35

regime of divine justice, which would eventuallybring Islam to power. But once established in power,the fundamentalists would be remiss in their Islamicobligation were they to let it slip from their hands. Anomocracy of Islamic law cannot envision its owndisestablishment.

This does not mean that there can be no debateabout the implementation of Islamic law where thelaw is vague, but there can be no debate over theprimacy of the law itself, especially on points whereit is not vague: the duties and punishments itimposes, and its principled inequalities betweenMuslims and non-Muslims, and men and women.

Nor can the debate take the freewheeling formoften associated with democracy, with the formationof parties or individual campaigning. Thefundamentalist revulsion against party conflict andpersonalities in democratic politics was bestexpressed by Dr. Hassan al-Turabi, himself armedwith law degrees from the University of London andthe Sorbonne, whose tract on the Islamic state arguesthat such a state has no need of party politics orpolitical campaigns.

While Islamic law does not expressly forbid amulti-party system, he has written that "This is aform of factionalism that can be very oppressive ofindividual freedom and divisive of the community,and it is therefore antithetical to a Muslim's ultimateresponsibility to God."

As for campaigning, he goes on to say that "InIslam, no one is entitled to conduct a campaign forthemselves, directly or indirectly, in the manner of aWestern electoral campaign. The presentation ofcandidates would be entrusted to a neutralinstitution that would explain to the people theoptions offered in policies and personalities."

I think we all recognize this formula of elections


without parties or candidates for what it is. It is a tacitjustification of one-party rule, such as that overwhich Dr. Turabi currently presides in the Sudan.

But surely there must be significant differencesamong Islamic fundamentalists on these points?After all, note the doubters, the Arab Muslim worldcovers a vast expanse. There are many differentmovements which go by many different names.Perhaps it is possible to sort the moderates from theradicals and encourage the process of moderation inthese movements.

Now it is, of course, quite obvious thatcircumstances do differ across the expanse of Islam.No two situations are identical. No twofundamentalist movements are identical. In the past,such movements often functioned in isolation. Butthe world is a changing place, and so is the Islamicworld.

Just as modern technology has wiredfundamentalism in this country (the televangelistscome readily to mind), so it is now wiring Islamicfundamentalism. The jet, the fax, and the cassettehave created global villages of Islamicfundamentalism. I say "villages" and not "village"because there are several of them. Perhaps the mostimportant are that of the Muslim Brotherhood andthat of the Islamic Republic of Iran. But each of thesevillages stretches from one end of the Muslim worldto the other, and, at some crucial points, they evenoverlap.

In these villages, ideas and people move rapidly.Movements learn from, imitate, and often assist oneanother. The international Islamic jihad against theSoviet occupation of Afghanistan was one of theirgreat achievements, a moral equivalent of theSpanish Civil War, which drew men and materielfrom throughout Islam in a way that would have

Martin Kramer /37

been unthinkable only a decade before. And thephenomenon of Hezbollah in Lebanon cannot beunderstood without reference to its place in theclosely-linked network that revolves around Iran.

Today these global villages are indeed global,extending even into the great cities of the West, asrecent events have demonstrated quite vividly. Inshort, no Islamic fundamentalist movement can beregarded sui generis. No fundamentalistorganization exists in a vacuum. In thisinterconnected world, there is no sealed laboratory inwhich a fundamentalist experiment can beconducted. Fundamentalism's fortunes in Algeria,for example, will affect the entirety of North Africaand much of the Middle East in ways that will bedifficult to predict, but affect they will.

Maybe so, one might ask, but why should all thisaffect Western interests adversely? After all, stateswhich have sold oil will continue to sell it. Stateswhich have needed aid, will continue to need it,even if they come under fundamentalist rule. Oncein power, argues John Esposito, fundamentalists will"generally operate on the basis of national interestsand demonstrate a flexibility that reflects acceptanceof the realities of a globally interdependent world."1

Once enmeshed in the world of real politics, thefundamentalists will have to accommodate it.

The argument has also been made, in the specificAmerican context, that the Sunni fundamentalistmovements did work with Pakistan, Saudi Arabiaand even the U.S. in promoting the jihad against theSoviet occupation of Afghanistan. This is sometimesintroduced as evidence that they are not anti-Western or are even prepared to work with the

1 John Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Myth or Reality (NewYork: Oxford University Press, 1992).


West.The argument, here again, seems to me very thin.

Even in the promotion of the Afghan jihad, thefundamentalists never saw themselves as partners ofthe West in the Cold War. They realized that theWest, for its own reasons, was prepared to arm themfor their jihad, but, in their view, they were actingsolely for the purpose of creating an IslamicAfghanistan. No doubt, were the U.S. prepared tosell them even more guns to create even moreIslamic states, they would deal happily with it. But,ultimately, the idea would be to turn all these gunsand states into the basis for Islam's emergence intogreat power status.

The fundamentalists do not speak in terms of aglobally interdependent world. They now fantasizeabout a new world order very different from the oneimagined in the West. In their vision, Islam willindeed sell its oil, provided Muslims would beallowed to invest the proceeds in instruments of warto enable them to reverse the course of modernhistory. This proliferation will eventually create anew world order based not on American hegemonybut on a new balance of power between areawakened Islam and the West.

As Hezbollah's mentor, Sayyid Fadlallah, has putit, "We may not have the actual power the U.S. has,but we had the power previously and we now havethe foundations to develop that power in thefuture."

From the fundamentalist point of view, therestored balance between Islam and the Westexcludes the intrusive existence of Israel in the landsof Islam. Fundamentalists are uncompromisinglytheological in their understanding of the Arab-Israeliconflict. You no have doubt heard the Hamascovenant recited to you chapter and verse now, ad

Martin Kramer /39

nauseam. I would only suggest, though, that it bekept in mind that this happens to be a livingcovenant, unlike those of some other organizations.

In the fundamentalist view, Palestine is a landsacred to Islam; it is a land stolen by the Jews. Israel isa cancer in the Islamic world, planted by Westernimperialism and nurtured by the United States. Thisis the general view held by all these movements,from the Shi'ite movements that receive guidanceand support from Iran to the Sunni movements inthe Muslim Brotherhood tradition.

Fundamentalist opposition to the American-sponsored Arab-Israeli peace process has beenunequivocal and often violent, and I defy anyone tofind a silver lining in the fundamentalist position.

In sum, the hopes placed on these fundamentalistmovements by Western intellectuals have beenmisplaced in the way that so many Westernintellectuals have misplaced their hopes before.Whether the rationale is democracy theory,apologetics for Islam or garden variety ThirdWorldism, the basic argument is the same: Ignorewhat the fundamentalists say to one another, ignorewhat they do to others. They must inevitably becomewhat we need them to be. And the quicker we givein to them, the sooner that will happen.

Frankly, I confess I have moments when I wishthis were true. However, the fundamentaliststhemselves have countered each of the argumentsmade on their behalf. I find them persuasive andthey have raised more than reasonable doubt aboutthe wisdom which has become so conventional thispast year.

My purpose here has not been to prescribe specificpolicies for particular governments but to note somesimple truths about Islamism. But the debate overwhat should be done has to be prefaced by a hard


look at what is and a return to the careful reading ofthe sources. If you wish, call this fundamentalism.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CHALLENGEOF POLITICAL CHANGE

Mohammed Abdelbeki Hermassi

Ten years ago, many people wondered whether itwould be possible for Muslim countries to have, inthe age of the nation-state, the equivalent of aEuropean Christian Democrat party.

This question was very seriously debated by manypolitical scientists, sociologists and journalists. Interms of strict intellectual debate, the response wasnot very encouraging for two reasons. First of all,because the Christian Democrat parties in Europeappeared after a set of processes had first taken place:the formation of nation-states, political parties andunions, including parties that had decided to excludereligion from political affairs. Most ChristianDemocratic parties have entered the political processas a component of a larger system. They haveaccepted the removal of the church from secularaffairs, though maintaining the right to draw onreligious values. This has not been the case of mostIslamist movements, whose blueprints exclude mostof what has been accumulated historically in theircountry and elsewhere.

The second reason that led us to be a little bit morepessimistic was the fact that Christianity wentthrough the Reformation. Christianity facedchallenges that led it to revise its principles and itsbasic positions on life and politics. In the Muslimworld, there has been no equivalent period ofreform. The occupation of Islamic lands by colonialand imperial powers has led Islam to do what it doesbest; that is, to oppose, but not to really reform itselfor modernize.

Thus, today we find ourselves discussing the


Islamization of modernity, while rarely do we raisethe question of the modernization of Islam.

But, in the last few years, this debate has somehowdisappeared, partly because it was settled in practicalterms. How? The idea of incorporating andrecognizing a Muslim party has ceased, because thebasis for that idea has disappeared. To incorporate anIslamist party into the body politic would require theexistence of a moderate form of Islamism, onecapable of debating issues, making compromises,allowing participation in elections and accepting, orat least tolerating, groups other than themselves.

What is obvious today is the radicalization of theIslamic movement. After the killing of politicalofficials, security personnel and tourists, after theattacks on non-Muslim minorities, after thebombing of public places, it is obvious that we cannottalk about a moderate Islamism anymore, for theconcept of moderate Islamism is practically dead.

The generation of political leaders who tried togive elections a chance and tried to play the politicalgame legally have been replaced. This newgeneration of leaders is often a terrorist apparatus,not very different from the Red Army, the RedBrigade, Action Directe and other terrorist groupswhich appeared in Europe in the 1970s after thebreakdown of what the Left had represented inEurope.

Even Egypt, which for many years set the patternfor other Arab countries, has had to revise its ownapproach. For many years, Egypt's Islamists weredivided between those who were cooptable, able to betaken, through different devices, into the parliamentand into the political life of the country, and thosewho are noncooptable, like Jihad and Jama'at, whowere pushed to the margin and, at times, repressed.

This distinction cannot be drawn anymore,

Mohammed Abdelbeki Hermassi /43

because the young men from Jihad and from Jama'at,are, when pursued in the rural areas, received by theyoung followers of the Muslim Brotherhood. So themodel of trying to coopt those moderates and rejectintransigent Islamists no longer works.

Actually, the whole philosophy and attitudetoward violence has changed. In the 1930s, when theMuslim Brotherhood first became politically activeunder the leadership of Hassan al-Banna, the use ofviolence was rare, though there are some prominentexamples such as the murder of Boutros Boutros-Ghali's father. There were, to be sure, alreadyfrightening occurrences, but these were exceptions.

What has changed is that violence, formerly anexception, is now used as a method and as a strategyto get power. This changes everything. Today,Tunisia, not Egypt, is setting the trend by saying thatpolitics and religion do not mix, and that no partyshould ever be allowed to exist if it is based on areligious, ethnic or other primordial basis. I am notsaying this because I am Tunisian; I am saying thisbecause this is what the Algerians are saying, andthis is what Egyptian President Hosni Mubarakhimself has said.

Almost all Arab governments have come to thesame conclusion, i.e., that no government is reallysafe from Islamist radicalism, which has becomeincreasingly a threat to political order. This is thecase in Algeria, Tunisia and Egypt, as well as in theGulf countries, which have entirely re-evaluatedtheir attitude since the Gulf War. Having sided withBaghdad, the Islamists lost their subsidies, and now,for the first time, Saudi Arabia, a country that hastraditionally supported fundamentalism, isexpressing opposition to the use of mosques inpolitics.

Actually, the Islamist challenge is leading almost


all Arab governments, for the first time, to agree oncertain basic things. Last January, the interiorministers from the Arab states met in Tunis andagreed on a set of principles. One such principle isthat no Arab country is safe from extremism. Theyalso agreed on the principle of extradition ofterrorists.

I believe that it is not only the Islamists who havechanged. I think the Arab governments have takenpart in this change, and that the big powers havereached similar conclusions.

France's discussions of these issues—with which Iam more familiar than the debate in the UnitedStates—are illustrative of European thinking on thewhole. In France there were two schools of thoughtwith respect to Islamism and particularly theAlgerian situation.

The first camp, which I call "the cynical laissez-faire/' avers that the Islamists may come to power,particularly in Algeria, but once they are there, thelaws of politics will take their own course. TheIslamists will expose their own inability to govern,devise economic and social policies, and would failto bring anything different from what is prevailing.In other words, regimes should allow the Islamists tocome to power because, once there, the inadequaciesof their solutions will become readily observable andthe popularity of the Islamists will thus wane.

The camp that finally prevailed in France,however, argues that if the Islamists were to gainpower in Algeria, they would certainly seek to spreadtheir influence, setting off a "domino effect"throughout North Africa and have a very negativeeffect in the whole Mediterranean area. Securityexperts, in particular, were extremely frightened bywhat may happen in France itself because of thepresence of millions of Algerians there.


This fear is just one illustration why France, in theend, chose to support the existing government inAlgeria, despite their differences. France wouldrather support its bete noire than permit theestablishment of fundamentalist rule in theMaghreb.

With respect to the Arab-Israeli peace process, Ithink it is fair to say that all the Arab governmentsare now involved in one way or another and haveadapted themselves to the idea of this process. In theArab world, the notion of a new world order, whichappeared with the aftermath of the Cold War, istaken very seriously.

No Arab government wants to be left out of thisemerging new world order. No Arab governmentnow is left to oppose the Camp David process, as it iscalled. There is no more "rejectionist front/' I submitto you that the Islamists, helped by Iran and Sudan,perceive themselves as the last rampart ofrejectionism and steadfastness. And that, I think, isimportant for the area and for the peace process aswell.

We have moved from Islamism as a moderatepolitical formation to Islamism as a new form ofattempted terrorist takeover. The Islamist protest hasdrifted into fundamentalist violence and that, inturn, has led various governments to adopt a policyof exclusion and crackdown.

Does this seriously endanger the prospects ofdemocratization in the region? It certainly does. Ifthe situation remains as it is—we will see what it iscalled in French, le tout subversif contre le toutrepressif—all-out repression against all-outsubversion. This would be a catastrophe for all.

Usually, this problem is thought of as a dichotomybetween the strictly security-based approach toIslamism and the political approach. Many advocate


political openness, overtures to the Islamists,increased democratization, the integration of theIslamists, giving them a political party and devisinga scheme for power-sharing. That would have beenfine had it happened twelve or fifteen years ago. Butin view of the violent radicalization of Islamism,this political approach is a little bit too late. It isanachronistic.

The Islamists' drift toward violence is easilyobservable in their public statements and actions. InTunisia, for instance, Rashid Ghannouchi has formany years adopted a Jeffersonian tone. Recently, hesaid, "For a while we have been looking for a stall inthe souk. Well, we did not receive it, that could notbe, and now we want the whole souk."

The arguments themselves have changed.Formerly, the Islamists described themselves as onepart of the political puzzle. In the last few years,however, they have started saying that they are theparty of the majority. I would argue that, to theextent that single parties have lost their legitimacy,there is absolutely no room to replace one nationalparty with one religious party.

At any rate, with this radicalization of theIslamists, I believe that the first scenario ofincorporation is, as I said, inadequate and naive.

On the other hand, democratization does notdepend on an instantaneous decision, as if a good,enlightened despot could turn into a democrat.Democracy is, as we all know, a long-term processthat requires foundations. Such foundations are stillto be established in the Middle East. But, I think, weare entitled to start the first step, to provide thepreconditions and the foundations for democracy. Adifferent approach, a political/developmentalapproach, needs to be followed.

In order to face the Islamist challenge and open up


the political system, we have to both strengthen andconsolidate political openness and, at the same time,try to improve the daily living conditions of thepopulation.

The first political step in facing the Islamists interms of democratization, is the development of acredible opposition.

The FIS may have won the Algerian elections inDecember 1991 and January 1992, but it did not winbecause it enjoys a monopoly on the population'ssupport. As many observers have pointed out, only25 percent of the eligible voters voted for the FIS—itsvictory was by default. It won because the FLNbecame terribly weak and discredited and neverwanted to strengthen the various opposition parties.

In Egypt and Tunisia, the ruling parties have beenstrong. This is why each time there are free elections,the ruling parties win. But this is not enough; therehave to be credible opposition parties.

One might think that most incumbent rulers arenot going to develop a credible opposition easily. Butthis has been done in Turkey and in Mexico. And inTunisia, the laws have lately been changed toguarantee political parties access to parliament.

Another element of this political openness, is toallow freedom of the press. We should alsoemphasize an independent judiciary and,particularly, while waiting for full democratization,accord respect to the leagues of human rights in theArab world. Indeed, leagues of human rights areimportant, not only on humanist grounds, but onpolitical grounds.

In his recent book on human rights in the Arabworld, Kevin Dwyer, a leader of a human rightsleague, said that:


You know the league in our country is not theequivalent of a human rights league in France orthe United States. In those democratic countries,political parties fill the political stage and thehuman rights organizations are marginal. Theybusy themselves with particular cases ofindividuals whose rights have been violated. Buthere, because freedoms are so weak, because theparties are so weak, they do not fill the politicalstage, [andl the league is called to play a centralrole.1

Now, when the unions, the Islamists or any otherparties are attacked, everyone turns to the league andwants to know what the league's position is, suchthat the league is pushed into a role that is muchmore important than what its fundamental roleshould be.

There is another reason to emphasize the role ofleagues of human rights in Egypt, Tunisia andAlgeria. In the absence of full debate, and given theweakness of the older political parties, these leaguesrepresent the whole spectrum of opinion. In all threecountries, the leagues have included people from leftto right; there are Arabs, Jews, Berbers and Copts—the whole political spectrum and the whole ethnicspectrum are truly represented. Human rightsleagues are the only forum that is bothrepresentative and where debate is conducted in asdemocratic a manner as possible. This, then, is thepolitical component of my approach.

The other component is development. Arabsocieties are in general bifurcated; they are dividedright down the middle between those who are in andthose who are out, those who are included in the

1 Kevin Dwyer, Arab Voices: The Human Rights Debate in theMiddle East (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991).


modern, world-class economy, and those who arenot. The term that is often used around theMediterranean is "double-speed development/' ordeveloppement a deux vitesses.

In societies like these, discourse on secularization,free speech and the emergence of pluralism wouldremain empty, ineffective and, at best, would belimited to the elite, as long as something substantialhas not been done to improve the living conditionsof the majority.

This is why political liberalization must go handin hand with a developmental program thatincludes, first, the encouragement ofentrepreneurism and the development of a middleclass. Only a middle class that is educated, capable ofreflection, aware of its interests and tied to aproductive process will foster truly seriousparticipation. Otherwise, we will have the usualmobilization that one-party systems have been ableto develop.

One of the few historical rules of Marxism thatremains viable to this day and will be so for a longtime, is that there can be no democracy without abourgeoisie. The middle class is the bulwark, the basefor genuine democracy.

But one cannot limit attention to the middle class.Serious effort must be made to improve the livingcondition of the majority, in terms of housing,health care and education. Governments need toinstill hope for the possibility of a better future, if notfor this generation, at least for the next generation.This is a crucial area for competition betweengovernments currently in power and the Islamists,because the Islamists have been very effective, itmust be said, in exploiting people's misery and tryingto show that they care for the people more than theexisting government.


We have all followed what happened in naturaldisasters in Tebessa in 1989, in Algeria and Egypt in1992, and seen how the Islamist movements werevery quick to show their efficiency in bringing reliefand compassion to the population, while thegovernment reaction was ineffective and slow. InNorth Africa, we have great experience with theinformal Islamist sector.

Among their activities are distributing books tochildren, distributing photocopies of textbooks forgraduate students, defending squatters' rights,working hand in hand with the trabendah orunderground markets. They have been extremelyeffective in developing connections with theinformal economy and contraband to provideservices when government has lost its welfarecapacities.

The resulting situation resembles a race to get tothe poor first. And unless governments are able toattend to the needs of the poor, Islamism, in itsexploitative aspect, will remain with us.

When studying Islamism in historical terms, onesees that there are correlations. In Tunisia, forexample, the weakening of unions has coincidedwith the strengthening of Islamism. In Egypt,Tunisia and Algeria, only after the weakening of thewelfare state did the Islamists start presentingthemselves as a counter-patronage system: "Whatthe government cannot provide for you, we arewilling to provide for you." This is a very crucial racewith very large stakes.

Most of the resources used by the Islamists arestate resources that are diverted to serve theIslamists' own supporters at the expense of others.But, to be fair, the Islamists are not the onlypatronage clientele system.

The final ingredient of this developmental


approach is the recognition that North Africa cannotface up to the Islamists and the challenge ofdemocratization alone. North Africa cannot do italone because the whole Mediterranean region,Europe and the United States are all involved. Theyneed to participate in a new strategy of cooperationand aid for these countries.

This is especially important for Europe. If Europedoes not want to have the side effects of Islamismand does not want to be visited by this form ofprotest, it really has to help these governments toliberalize economically and politically.

DOCUMENTS

SECTION A: MISCELLANEOUS

Freedom House Table of Independent CountriesComparative Measures of Freedom 57

Parliamentary Representation in Selected ArabCountries 58

SECTION B: SELECTED STATEMENTSBY U.S. OFFICIALS

Edward Djerejian, November 20,1991 61Margaret Tutwiler, January 13, 1992 62Bill Clinton, April 1, 1992 63Edward Djerejian, June 2,1992 64Bill Clinton, August 13, 1992 68Bill Clinton, September 1992 69Edward Djerejian, September 11,1992 70Bill Clinton, October 1,1992 71Marlin Fitzwater, October 7, 1992 73Warren Christopher, January 13,1993 73Warren Christopher, April 23, 1993 76Richard Boucher, April 27, 1993 77State Department Spokesman, April 28, 1993 78Edward Djerejian, May 12,1992 78

SECTION C: SELECTED DOCUMENTSAND STATEMENTS ON DEMOCRACY IN THE

ARAB WORLD

ALGERIASkeikh Abdelkader Hachani, November 20, 1991 80Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, January 6,1992 80

President Chadli Bendjedid, letter of resignation,January 11,1992 81

State Higher Security Council, statement, January 12,1992 83Higher Security Council Blueprint for Transition to

Democracy, June 21,1993 83

EGYPTPresident Hosni Mubarak, December 16,1992 85Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, December 20,1992 86President Hosni Mubarak, January 25,1993 87President Hosni Mubarak, March 17,1993 88Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, March 18, 1993 89Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, April 12, 1993 89

IRAQCharter 91 91Jalal Talabani, September 27, 1991 93Laith Kubba, July 30,1992 96INC General Assembly statement, October 27-31,1992 97Hoshyar Zebari, March 17, 1993 98

JORDANJordanian National Charter 100King Hussein bin Talal, June 9,1991 102King Hussein bin Talal, May 2,1993 105

KUWAITPrime Minister Abdallah al-Sabah, September 19,

1992 106Prime Minister Abdallah al-Sabah, October 3, 1992 106Jasim Hamad al-Saqr, October 20, 1992 108

LEBANONThe Ta'if Accords, October 23,1989 108Lebanese-Syrian Treaty, May 23, 1991 115Draft Electoral Law, June 16,1992 118General Hasan Nasrallah, June 30,1992 118General Hasan Nasrallah, September 3, 1992 119General Hasan Nasrallah, October 13, 1992 120

Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, November 2, 1992 121

SAUDI ARABIAThe "Secular'' Petition, December 1990 122The "Religious" Petition, February 1991 124King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, March 30,1992 127Basic Law of Government, March 1992 129Shura Council Statute, March 1992 132King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, December 21,1992 134

YEMENPresident Ali Abdallah Salih, April 29, 1993 135President Ali Abdallah Salih, May 4, 1993 137

SECTION A: MISCELLANEOUS

Freedom House Table of Independent CountriesComparative Measures of Freedom

Country

< AlgeriaBahrain< EgyptIranIraqIsraelJordanLebanonLibyaMorocco> OmanQatarSaudi ArabiaSudanSyria< TunisiaTurkeyUAEYemen

PR

7<656723>5>76<677776<266

CL

6<56<6<723>4755>6<7<775454>

FreedomRatings

not freepartly freepartly freenot freenot freefreepartly freepartly freenot freepartly freepartly freenot freenot freenot freenot freepartly freepartly freepartly freepartly free

Notes:1. PR and CL stand for Political Rights and Civil

Liberties. 1 represents the most free and 7 the least freecategory. When next to a country name, arrows facing left(<) and arrows facing right (>) indicate a general trend infreedom downward or upward respectively. When next to anumber in the Political Rights or Civil Liberties columns,the arrows represent an upward or downward change causedby real world events since the last survey. The FreedomRating is an overall judgment based on survey results.1

Freedom Review, January-February 1993.

58/ Democracy in the Midddle East

Parliamentary Representation in Selected Arab Countries

COUNTRY ANDELECTION YEAR

Algeria (1991)l

PARTY NUMBER OFSEATS

Total: 231Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) 189Socialist Forces Front (FFS) 25National Liberation Front (FLN) 15Independents 2

Egypt (1990)2 Total: 454National Democratic Party (NDP) 348IndependentsPresident's NomineesUnionist Progressive Nationalist

Grouping

8310

Notes:1. Figures for the 1990 Egyptian election are incomplete.

Seven members, not elected by the end of 1990 due to votingirregularities, are not included.

Jordan (1989)3

CentristMuslim BrotherhoodIndependent IslamistLeftist

Total: 803820139

1 Christian Science Monitor, January 9, 1992, p. 19.^ Middle East Contemporary Survey (Boulder: Westview Press,1990), p. 328, and Communication from U.S. Department of State,uly21,1993.

Who is Who in Jordanian Parliament: 1989-1993 (Amman:Friedrich Ebert Stiftong, 1993).

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Kuwait (1992)1 Total: 50Kuwaiti Democratic Forum 2affiliated with Kuwaiti

Democratic Forum 1endorsed by Islamic Constitutional

Movement 14Deputies Bloc 10endorsed by Islamic Popular

Grouping 9Independents 4Islamic Constitutional Movement 3Islamic Patriotic Coalition 3Islamic Popular Grouping 3Constitutional Bloc 1

Lebanon (1992)2

Omar Karami ListBirri ListHezbollahHoss ListIndependentsMurr ListSyrian Social Nationalist

Party (SSNP)Junblatt ListProgressive Socialist Party (PSP)AmalKhatib ListShuhayyib ListJama'ah IslamiyyahSkaff ListClose to Tashnag partyHusayni ListAhmad Karami Listal-Wa'ad partyArab Democratic party

Total: 128211412977

6554443322111

Communication from U.S. Department of State, July 23, 1993.The Lebanon Report, October 10, 1992, pp. 8-9.

60/ Democracy in the Midddle East

Lebanon (cont)

Arab Socialist UnionBa'ath Arab Socialist partyHentchag partyHubayqah ListIslamic Charitable Works

AssociationJournalistPopular Nasirite OrganizationPro-Syrian Ba'ath partySolh ListTashnag partyUnion of Popular CommitteesUnion of Workers

1111

11111111

Notes:1. By the end of the secondary elections in Kesrwan-Al-

Foutouh on October 11, 1992, the membership in theLebanese parliament became complete. Five Maronitesjoined the parliament increasing the number of membersfrom 123 to 128.

Yemen (1993)1 Total: 300People's General Congress 122Yemeni Congregation party 62Yemeni Socialist party 56Independents 48Arabic Ba'ath party 7Al-Haq Party 2People's Nasserite party 1Democratic Nasserite party 1Al-Tashib Al-Nasir party 1

Communication from the Embassy of Yemen, July 20, 1993.

SECTION B: SELECTED STATEMENTSBY U.S. OFFICIALS

Edward Djerejian, Assistant Secretary of State for NearEast and South Asian Affairs, Hearing of the Europe andMiddle East Subcommittee of the House Foreign AffairsCommittee, November 20, 1991

Question: "With respect to objectives in this region—andI'm not now just talking about the Madrid conference—is oneof our objectives in the Middle East to promote democracyand pluralism?"Djerejian: "Absolutely."

Q: "And that would apply, for example, to all the countriesin the region."Djerejian: "To all the countries."

Q: "Do we press the question of democracy and pluralismvigorously, for example, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait?"Djerejian: "Yes, we do. No matter what the relationship, ifthe countries are close friends of ours, we press the issue. Ifwe have... a less friendly or more adversarial relationshipwith certain countries, we press the issue. It doesn't matterthe nature of the regime. The agenda item ofdemocratization and urging privatization is usedthroughout."

Q: "Let me ask you to be as specific as you can. Take thecases of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. How do we press theissue of democracy with these governments? Who does it, atwhat level, and how do you press it?"Djerejian: "Well, in the first instance, our ambassadors doit... And the president of the United States, I know, hasbeen involved in... pressing the issue of democratization... Ithink democratization is one of the key issues that we dealwith in our relations with the countries of the MiddleEast... It was even part of my mandate in Damascus to talkto the regime in Damascus about democratization andprivatization."


Q: "But specifically, we have good relations with SaudiArabia... and with Kuwait. How do we press this issuewith them, and who does it?"Djerejian: "In the first instance, it's the job of ourambassadors in their interaction with the hostgovernments, and the issues come up in many ways. I knowthat our ambassador in Kuwait has raised this issuerepeatedly, and we know that there are some results interms of parliamentary elections that are scheduled inKuwait in October of 1992, and that the Kuwaitigovernment is even considering seriously extending thefranchise in Kuwait. So, the issue is joined in all countries,no matter what the nature of the government is. It can be amonarchy, an emirate, a republic, an authoritativeregime... I think they're feeling an increasing need todemonstrate wider participation by the people in thegovernment, and this need... is a worldwide developmentthat really had a great deal of impetus from the events inEastern Europe and the Soviet Union."

Q: "It's remarkable to some of us that from Central andEastern Europe through the Soviet Union, South Africa,Central America, South America, everywhere we aredealing with [democratization and pluralism] in a veryforceful fashion, but somehow the Middle East region isexempt from any pressures along these lines, which isdistressing to some of us."Djerejian: "It is not exempt. We raise [the issue] with thegovernments."1

Margaret Tutwiler, State Department Spokesman, Briefingfollowing the cancellation of the Algerian elections andthe imposition of military rule, January 13, 1992

"We view the situation [in Algeria] with concern—theinterruption of the electoral process. We commend the factthat Algeria has made impressive strides toward

1 As transcribed by Federal News Service [hereinafter cited asFNS], November 20,1991.

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democracy in recent years and we hope a way can be foundto resume progress as soon as possible.

"In the meantime, we urge all parties to remain calm andto find a peaceful resolution in accordance with theAlgerian constitution...

"The United States has been consistent and verysupportive of the moves down a democratic road in Algeria.That process appears to have been interrupted. What I amsaying is that... the mechanisms that have kicked in arethe ones that were set up under their constitution...

"Concerning Islamic fundamentalism, let me make threepoints. First, it is important not to generalize about such acomplicated subject. The term 'Islamic fundamentalism' isused in different ways by different people. It embraces awide variety of religious, political and social concepts.This is not a single coordinated international movement.

"Secondly, for many years, the United States has hadproductive and excellent relations with a number of Islamicor deeply observant governments and parties. We lookforward to continuing doing so. The United States believesstrongly in the principles of peaceful relations betweenneighbors, democracy and human rights. We want tocontinue to work with all parties to promote thoseprinciples.

"Thirdly, at the same time, we and the rest of theinternational community will continue to resist the effortsof extremists of whatever stripe to undermine thoseprinciples/'1

Bill Clinton, Address to Foreign Policy Association, NewYork, April 1,1992

"Promoting democracy abroad is not just a task for theAmerican government. For years, labor unions, universitiesand volunteer organizations here in our nation havenurtured the democratic revolutions around the world.Without democratic institutions and values, economic

As transcribed by FNS, January 13,1992.


reforms cannot succeed over the long run. Our nation'sgreatest resource is ultimately not our dollars, not ourtechnical expertise, but our values of pluralism, enterprise,freedom and the rule of law, and the centuries of experiencein making those values work for ordinary citizens. In an eraof fledgling democracies, those values can be our proudestexport and our most effective tool of foreign policy."1

Edward Djerejian, Address to the Meridian InternationalCenter, Washington, D.C., June 2, 1992

"Reviewing the main thrusts of our policy in the MiddleEast reminds us that, even in the 1990s, our nationalsecurity interests in the region continue to exert a powerfulclaim on our attention. But there is more to our policyagenda than protection of vital resources and conflictresolution. Another pillar of U.S. policy is our support forhuman rights, pluralism, women's and minority rights,popular participation in the government and our rejection ofextremism, oppression and terrorism. These worldwideissues constitute an essential part of the foundation forAmerica's engagement with the countries of the NearEast—from the Maghreb to Iran and beyond. In this context,there are certain factors which we should underscore indiscussing U.S. relations with these countries.

"The first is diversity. Not only is this aiea diversewithin itself, so are the relations with the countries thatmake it up. This diversity requires not only that a clearsense of our own values and interests guide our policy, butalso that understanding and tolerance be key factors in ourdealings with other political cultures.

"The second point is interaction. U.S. relations with thispart of the world are just the latest chapter in a history ofinteraction between the West and the Middle East that isthousands of years old. Our interaction spans political,economic, social, cultural and military fields. We shouldnot ignore this totality.

As transcribed by FNS, April 1,1992.

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'The third point is common aspirations. Despite obviousdifferences, we and the peoples of the Near East shareimportant aspirations, which I will touch on later. Thesecommon aspirations provide a promising foundation forfuture cooperation.

"Politics in the region has increasingly focused on theissues of change, openness and economic and socialinequities. As part of a trend that predates the events Ihave recounted, the role of religion has become moremanifest and much attention is being paid to a phenomenonvariously labeled Political Islam, the Islamic Revival orIslamic Fundamentalism.

"Uncertainty regarding this renewed Islamic emphasisabounds. Some say that it is causing a widening gapbetween Western values and those of the Muslim world. Itis important to assess this phenomenon carefully, so thatwe do not fall victim to misplaced fears or faultyperceptions.

"A cover of a recent issue of the Economist, under theheadline 'Living with Islam/ portrayed a man intraditional dress, standing in front of a mosque, and holdinga gun. Inside the magazine, we are told that 'Islam resumesits march!' and that 'one anti-Westernism is growingstronger/ If there is one thought I can leave you withtonight, it is that the United States government does notview Islam as the next 'ism' confronting the West orthreatening world peace. That is an overly-simplisticresponse to a complex reality.

"The Cold War is not being replaced with a newcompetition between Islam and the West. It is evident thatthe Crusades have been over for a long time; indeed, theecumenical movement is the contemporary trend. Americansrecognize Islam as one of the world's great faiths; it ispracticed on every continent; it counts among its adherentsmillions of citizens of the United States. As Westerners, weacknowledge Islam as an historic civilizing force among themany that have influenced and enriched our culture. Thelegacy of the Muslim culture which reached the IberianPeninsula in the Eighth Century is a rich one in thesciences, arts and culture, and in tolerance of Judaism and


Christianity. Islam acknowledges the major figures of theJudeo-Christian heritage: Abraham, Moses, and Christ.

"In countries throughout the Middle East and NorthAfrica, we thus see groups or movements seeking to reformtheir societies in keeping with Islamic ideals. There isconsiderable diversity on how these ideals are expressed.We detect no monolithic or coordinated international effortbehind these movements. What we do see are believersliving in different countries placing renewed emphasis onIslamic principles, and governments accommodatingIslamist political activity to varying degrees and indifferent ways.

"For our part as Americans, we are proud of theprinciples on which our country is founded. They havewithstood many severe challenges over more than twocenturies. We know they work. We therefore are committedto encouraging greater openness and responsiveness ofpolitical systems throughout the world.

"I am not talking here about trying to impose anAmerican model on others. Each country must work out, inaccordance with its own traditions, history and particularcircumstances, how and at what pace to broaden politicalparticipation. In this respect, it is essential that there bereal political dialogue between government on the one handand other institutions on the other. Those who are preparedto take specific steps toward free elections, creatingindependent judiciaries, promoting the rule of law, reducingrestrictions on the press, respecting the rights of minoritiesand guaranteeing individual rights, will find us ready torecognize and support their efforts, just as those moving inthe opposite direction will find us ready to speak candidlyand act accordingly. As Secretary Baker has said: We bestcan have truly close and enduring relations with thosecountries with which we share fundamental values.

"Those who seek to broaden political participation inthe Middle East will, therefore, find us supportive, as wehave been elsewhere in the world. At the same time, weare suspect of those who would use the democratic process tocome to power, only to destroy that very process in order toretain power and political dominance. While we believe in

Documents /67

the principle of 'one person, one vote/ we do not support 'oneperson, one vote, one time/

"Let me make it very clear with whom we differ: Wediffer with those, regardless of religion, who practiceterrorism, oppress minorities, preach intolerance or violateinternationally accepted standards of conduct regardinghuman rights; with those who are insensitive to the needfor political pluralism; with those who cloak theirmessage in another brand of authoritarianism; with thosewho substitute religious and political confrontation forconstructive engagement with the rest of the world; withthose who do not share our commitment to peacefulresolution of conflict, especially the Arab-Israeli conflict;and with those who would pursue their goals throughrepression and violence.

"It is for just these reasons that we have such basicdifferences with the avowedly secular governments in Iraqand Libya. To the extent that other governments pursue oradopt similar practices, we will distance ourselves fromthem, regardless of whether they describe their approachin secular, religious or any other terms. Simply-stated,religion is not a detriment—positive or negative—in thenature or quality of our relations with other countries. Ourquarrel is with extremism, and the violence, denial,intolerance, intimidation, coercion and terror which toooften accompany it.

"The facts bear that out. The United States has good,productive relations with countries and peoples of allreligions throughout the world, including many whosesystems of government are firmly grounded in Islamicprinciples. Religious freedom and tolerance are integralelements of our American national character andconstitutional system. Indeed, as much as any society, theAmerican people understand the meaning of diversity andthe virtues of tolerance.

"The broad policy goals of the United States in the NearEast region have been laid out by President Bush andSecretary Baker: genuine peace between Israel and its Arabneighbors; enhancing security and deterring or defeatingaggression; helping to protect the world's economic security;


promoting economic and social justice; and promoting thevalues in which we believe.

"I believe these are the aspirations in which thepeoples of the region—whether Muslim, Jewish, Christianor otherwise—can realistically share. Like us, they seek apeaceful, better future. They aspire to work productively inpeace and safety to feed, house and clothe their families;in which they can have a say and can find personalfulfillment and justice. In this respect, the pursuit of viableeconomic and social development programs, privatizationand adequate educational and vocational trainingopportunities, are key to responding to the basic materialneeds of the region's people.

"Working with an international community ofunprecedented solidarity, we have come a long way in thepast few years in repelling aggression and in promoting anegotiated peace to a seemingly intractable conflict in theregion. We still have a long way to go before these worthyefforts will have achieved success and before otheraspirations we share are realized. We can get therethrough close engagement and constructive interactionbetween the United States and all the countries of the NearEast region at all levels: government-to-government, group-to-group, person-to-person and faith-to-faith."1

Bill Clinton, Address to Los Angeles World Affairs CouncilAugust 13,1992

"My administration will stand up for democracy. Wewill offer international assistance to emerging fragiledemocracies...

"We will stand by Israel, our only democratic ally in theMiddle East, and, while supporting the peace process, willpress for more accountable governance throughout theregion, work for demilitarization and make sure thatweapons of mass destruction do not enter the hands of

Mideast Mirror, June 4, 1992.

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tyrants all too willing to use them."1

Bill Clinton, excerpt from Putting People First, September1992

Israel and the Middle East"The end of the Cold War does not mean the end of U.S.

responsibility abroad, especially in the Middle East. Thepeople of the region are still denied peace and democracy.America's friend, Israel, is still threatened by herneighbors.

"The United States has vital interests in the MiddleEast. That is why we supported President Bush's efforts tothrow Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait. We must remainengaged in the region and continue to promote the spread ofdemocracy, human rights and free markets.

"Among all the countries in the Middle East, only Israelhas experienced the peaceful transfer of power by ballot—not by bullet. We will never let Israel down..."

Democracy"Our foreign policy must promote democracy as well as

stability. We cannot, as the Bush-Quayle administrationhas done, ignore the link between the two.

"We should promote democracy in the Middle East andthroughout the world. The Bush-Quayle administrationlost an opportunity to promote democracy in Kuwait.

"A Clinton-Gore administration will never forgestrategic relationships with dangerous, despotic regimes.Bush failed to learn from his appeasement of SaddamHussein when he shared intelligence with him, awardedhim credits and opposed sanctions until the invasion ofKuwait. Today the Bush administration repeats the samemistake as it casts a blind eye on Syria's human rightsabuses and on its support for terrorism."2

1 As transcribed by FNS, August 13,1992.2 Bill Clinton, Putting People First (New York: Times Books,1992).


Edward Djerejian, Address to the National Association ofArab Americans, September 11, 1992

"U.S. policy toward Lebanon remains firm andconsistent. This policy was reiterated to both the Syrianand Lebanese leadership... We support full implementationof both the letter and the spirit of the Ta'if Accord and thewithdrawal of all non-Lebanese forces from Lebanon, andwe have repeatedly made this clear to all concernedparties. The Ta'if Accord requires coordination now by thegovernments of Lebanon and Syria on the decision toredeploy Syrian troops to the western entrances to theBekaa Valley. In our view, that decision should be takenby both governments this month with redeploymentoccurring shortly thereafter and as soon as possible. It alsorequires the completion of the process of disarming allmilitias, particularly Hezbollah. Implementation of thisagreement helped bring to an end the turbulent era of civilwar in Lebanon. With full adherence and compliance of theparties of the Ta'if agreement, we believe it will offer thebest chance of restoring the unity, independence,sovereignty and territorial integrity of Lebanon.

"Lebanon recently conducted three rounds of voting toelect a new parliament. These were the first parliamentaryelections held in Lebanon since 1972 and the tragic civil warwhich so ravaged Lebanon and its people. In the weeksleading to the election, we repeatedly called for free andfair voting held in an environment devoid of intimidationand coercion. We consistently stated that the decision toproceed with elections at this time was that of theLebanese government to make. Similarly, the decision ofsome Lebanese political figures not to participate wastheirs to make.

"The United States is clearly disappointed that theelections were not prepared and conducted in a manner toensure the broadest national consensus. The turnout ofeligible voters in some locations was extremely low. Therewere also widespread reports of irregularities, whichmight have been avoided had there been impartialinternational observers at hand. As a consequence, the

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results do not reflect the full spectrum of the Lebanese bodypolitic.

"We fervently hope that the Lebanese people and theirgovernment will renew their commitment to nationalreconciliation and to the unity and sovereignty theydeserve. We will continue to support the expansion of theauthority of the central institutions of the Lebanesegovernment and the Lebanese armed forces throughoutLebanon, and we will continue to work with other countriesand international organizations to encourage and supportthe Lebanese people as they get on with the priority taskof reconstruction...

"Finally, I would like to say a few words about ourefforts to promote the values we Americans cherish andwhich form the foundation of all that has made thiscountry great. These fundamental values, which underlieU.S. foreign policy globally—basic human rights, popularparticipation in government, pluralism and minority andwomen's rights—also find reflection in our approach to thecountries of the Near East, including the Arab states ofNorth Africa...

"We are wary of those who would use the democraticprocess to come to power, only to destroy that very processin order to retain political dominance."1

Bill Clinton, Address on "Democracy In America/'Milwaukee, October 1, 1992

"Let there be no mistake, this world is still a dangerousplace. Military power still matters. And I am committed tomaintaining a strong and ready defense. I will use thatstrength where necessary to defend our vital interests. Butpower must be accompanied by clear purpose.

"Mr. Bush's ambivalence about supporting democracy,his eagerness to befriend potentates and dictators hasshown itself time and again. It has been a disservice notonly to our democratic values, but also to our national

1 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, September 14, 1992.


interests. For in the long run, I believe Mr. Bush's neglect ofour democratic ideals abroad could do as much harm as hisneglect of our economic needs at home.

"The administration has sometimes treated the conflictbetween Israel and the Arab states as just another quarrelbetween religions and nations rather than one in which thesurvival of a democratic ally—Israel—has been at stake. Isupport strongly the peace talks that are under way, and ifelected, I will continue without interruption America's rolein them.

"I also believe that American policy in the Middle Eastshould be guided by a vision of the region in which ourIsraeli and Arab partners are secure in their peace andwhere the practices and principles of both personal libertyand governmental accountability are spreading. Forexample, I believe we can and must work with others tohelp build a more democratic and more free Lebanon. Thispattern continues in other parts of the world.

"It is the powerful appeal of our democratic values andour enduring political institutions to people around theworld that make us special. That does not mean we canembark on reckless crusades that we can force every ideal,including the promotion of democracy on other people. Ouractions must be tempered with prudence and common sense.We know that ballot boxes alone do not solve every worldproblem and that some countries and cultures are many stepsaway from democratic institutions. We know there may betimes when other security needs or economic interests evenin the aftermath of the bipolar Cold War world willdiverge from our commitment to democracy and humanrights. We know we cannot support every group's hopes forself-determination. We know that the dissolution of oldand repressive empires will often be complex andcontentious.

"Moreover, we know there will always be those in theworld who pursue their goals through force and violence.But they should know that a Clinton administration willmaintain the military strength we need to defend our

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people, our vital interests and our values/'1

Marlin Fitzwatet, White House Press Secretary, Statementon free elections in Kuwait, October 7, 1992

"The president is pleased to note that this week Kuwaitheld free parliamentary elections. The United States hasbeen a strong supporter of this process since the amir'sdecision to hold elections was announced during the Iraqioccupation. We have also been encouraged by the statementby the crown prince that the Kuwaiti government will soonpropose legislation to amend the constitution to broaden theelectorate and specifically to give women the right to votein future elections. The amir and the Kuwaiti people are tobe congratulated on this latest stage in Kuwait's progresstoward full recovery and reconstruction.

"These elections reaffirm Kuwait's hard-wonindependence and the freedoms enjoyed by the Kuwaitipeople, in sharp contrast to the agony the Iraqi people stillendure from Saddam. The gulf between Kuwait'sdetermination to begin a democratic process and Saddam'sbrutalities against the Iraqi people is a vivid reminder ofwhy the coalition had no choice but to use force to liberateKuwait. The United States remains committed both tosupporting Kuwait in its physical and politicalreconstruction and to support the efforts of the Iraqiopposition toward building a democratic future for thepeople of Iraq."2

Warren Christopher, Senate Confirmation Hearing,January 13, 1993

"Not since the late 1940s has our nation faced thechallenge of shaking and shaping an entirely new foreignpolicy for a world that is fundamentally changed. Like ourcounterparts, we need to design a new strategy for protecting

1 As transcribed by FNS, October 1,1992.2 Presidential Documents, October 12, 1992.


American interests around the world by laying thefoundations for a more just and more stable world. Thatstrategy must take into account and reflect fundamentalchanges that have been made in the world in recent times.These include the surfacing of long-suppressed ethnic,religious and sectional conflicts (especially in the formerSoviet bloc), the globalization of commerce and capital, aworld-wide democratic revolution fueled by newinformation technologies that amplify the power of ideas,new and old human rights challenges (including protectingethnic minorities as well as political dissidents), the riseof new security threats especially terrorism and the spreadof advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction...

"To adapt our foreign policy and institution to thesechanges, President-elect Clinton has stressed that our effortmust rest on three pillars. First, we must elevate America'seconomic security as a primary goal of foreign policy.Second, we must preserve our military strength as we adaptour forces to new security challenges. And third, we mustorganize our foreign policy around the goal of promoting thespread of democracy and free markets abroad...

"Our new diplomacy will encourage the globalrevolution for democracy that is transforming the world.Promoting democracy, of course, does not imply a crusade tomake the world exactly in our image, rather, support fordemocracy and human rights abroad can and should be acentral tenet of our own efforts to improve our security.Democratic movements are not only more likely to protecthuman and minority rights, they are also much more likelyto resolve ethnic, religious and territorial disputes in apeaceful manner. And they are much more likely to bereliable partners in diplomacy, trade, arms accords andglobal environmental protection.

"A strategic approach to promoting democracy requiresthat we coordinate all of our leverage; such elements astrade, economic and security assistance and debt relief [mustall be used] in the promotion of democracy. By enlistinginternational and regional institutions in the work ofpromoting democracy, the U.S. can leverage its own limitedresources and avoid the appearance of trying to dominate

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others..."Democracy cannot be imposed from the top down, but

must be built from the bottom up. Our policy should be toencourage patient, sustained efforts to help build theinstitutions that make democracy possible: politicalparties, free media, laws that protect property andindividual rights, an impartial judiciary, labor unions andvoluntary associations that stand between the individualand the state...

"The three pillars of our foreign policy—economicgrowth, military strength and support for democracy—aremutually reinforcing. A vibrant economy will strengthenAmerica's hand abroad while permitting us to maintain astrong military without sacrificing domestic needs. Byhelping others forge democracy out of the ruins ofdictatorship, we can pacify old threats, prevent new onesand create new markets for U.S. trade and investment...

"In the Middle East... we must maintain the momentumbehind the current negotiations over peace and regionalissues. President Bush and Secretary Baker deserve greatcredit for bringing the Arabs and the Israelis to thebargaining table, and the Clinton administration iscommitted to carrying on these negotiations, takingadvantage of this historic breakthrough.

"Our democracy-centered policy underscores our specialrelationship with Israel, the region's only democracy, withwhom we are committed to maintain a strong and vibrantstrategic relationship. We also believe that America'sunswerving commitment to Israel and Israel's right to existbehind secure borders is essential to a just and lasting peace.We will continue our efforts with both Israel and our Arabfriends to address the full range of the region's challenge.

"Throughout the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, wewill work toward new arms control agreements,particularly concerning weapons of mass destruction. Wewill assume a vigilant stance toward both Iran and Iraq andeven beyond. In this region as well, we will championeconomic reform, more accountable governance and increasedrespect for human rights. Following a decade in which overa thousand Americans were killed, injured or kidnapped by


perpetrators of international terrorism, we will give noquarter to terrorists or the states that sponsor their crimesagainst humanity."1

Warren Christopher, Address to the Arab-American Anti-Discrimination Council Conference, Arlington, Virginia,April 23, 1993

"The promotion of democracy and respect for humanrights is one of the three pillars of President Clinton'sforeign policy. I know, however, that there is a concernboth within and outside the region over Islamicfundamentalism and its effect on the stability and policiesof many of these countries.

"Tonight, I would like to clearly tell you that Islam isnot our enemy. We do not consider Islam a threat to worldpeace or regional security. What we do oppose is extremismor fanaticism whether of religious or secular nature.

"We part company with those who preach intolerance,abuse human rights, or resort to violence in pursuit ofpolitical goals. While we certainly cannot impose our ownform of government on others, we strongly support thosewho share and seek to encourage democratic values in theircountries. As with the peace process, the United Statesstands ready to work with our friends in the region towardthe important goals of peace, stability and social justice.

"In the end, of course, it will be up to the people of theregion and the governments of the Middle East to shapetheir own future. If they are successful, the benefits of truepeace and prosperity will fall to future generations ofMuslims, Jews and Christians. It will be the first time thatit has done so in these ancient lands.

"I want you to know that the president and thissecretary of state intend to move the peace process forward.We intend to remain engaged and we hope to earn andretain the trust of all parties to this historic quest for

As transcribed by FNS, January 13,1993.

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peace. x

Richard Boucher, State Department Spokesman, Statementon Secretary Christopher's meeting with Iraqi oppositionleaders, April 27, 1993

"Secretary Christopher met today with a delegation ledby the Presidential Council of the Iraqi National Congress.

"The secretary emphasized the importance of Iraqcomplying fully with all UN Security Council resolutions,including those on ceasing repression of the Iraqi people. Headded that he found it inconceivable that Saddam Husseincould obey those resolutions and stay in power but hopedthat pressing the resolutions can ensure his departure frompower. The secretary stressed U.S. commitment to seeing afuture democratic, pluralistic government in Iraq which canlive in peace with its own people and respect its neighbors.He acknowledged the success of the INC in uniting thediverse religious and ethnic groups that make up Iraq.

"Highlighting the U.S. concern over the human rightssituation in Iraq, the secretary told them that the UnitedStates will propose that the Security Council consider thecreation of a commission to investigate Iraqi war crimes,crimes against humanity and genocide. He added that theUnited States also supported UN Special Rapporteur Maxvan der Stoel's call for the assigning of UN human rightsmonitors throughout Iraq...

"The secretary concluded by noting that only throughdemocracy, respect for human rights, equal treatment ofIraq's people and adherence to basic norms of internationalbehavior could Iraq be brought back into the community ofcivilized nations. The INC will have the support of theUnited States in achieving these goals."2

1 As transcribed by FNS, April 23,1993.2 U.S. Department of State Dispatch, May 3, 1993.


State Department Spokesman, U.S. Department of State,Statement on Yemeni elections, April 28, 1993

"The United States congratulates the people andgovernment of Yemen on the success of their first multipartyelections.

"On April 27, Yemen held free, multiparty,parliamentary elections, open to all adult citizens. Thesesuccessful elections were the culmination of a commendabledecision, made by the Yemenis themselves at the time ofthe unification of the two independent Yemeni states inMay 1990, to create a multiparty democracy in their newcountry.

"International election specialists, includingrepresentatives of non-governmental organizations from theUnited States and other nations, were invited in by Yemeniofficials both to observe the elections and to offer technicaladvice in developing electoral procedures. Yemenis at alllevels, public and private, took it upon themselves to createan electoral framework within which Yemen could begin itsmovement to democracy. We also note positively Yemen'sdeclared commitment to human rights and a marketeconomy.

"The United States looks forward to working with thegovernment to be formed as a result of these elections."1

Edward Djerejian, Testimony before House Foreign AffairsCommittee, May 12, 1993

"Like so much of the developing world these days, theMaghreb is a region being buffeted by the winds of change.There is a growing popular participation, for economicopportunity and social justice. The countries of the Maghrebare responding in different ways to these trends, which insome cases involve political, economic, social and evenviolent challenges to the governments involved.

"Secretary Christopher has made clear that the

US. Department of State Dispatch, May 3, 1993.

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promotion of democracy and respect for human rights formone of the major pillars of the Clinton administration'sforeign policy. Our policy towards the countries of theMaghreb reflect that reality.

"It also reflects the reality that Maghreb today is onthe cutting edge of a phenomenon affecting much of theMiddle East, a phenomenon known as political Islam...Experience suggests to us that political Islamic movementsare to an important degree rooted in worseningsocioeconomic conditions in individual countries. Whilepolitical Islam takes many forms, and varies considerablyfrom one country to another, our approach to thephenomenon can be outlined in a few basic points... First,Islam, one of the world's great religions, is not our enemy.

"Second, what we do oppose is extremism andfanaticism, whether of religious or secular nature. We partcompany with those who preach intolerance, abuse humanrights or resort to violence in pursuit of their goals.

"And, third, while we cannot impose our own form ofgovernment on others, or wish to do so, we strongly supportthose who share and seek to encourage democratic values intheir own countries... The United States stands ready towork with our friends in the region toward the importantgoals of peace, stability and social justice..."1

As transcribed by FNS, May 12,1993.

SECTION C: SELECTED DOCUMENTS ANDSTATEMENTS ON DEMOCRACY IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

ALGERIA

Sheikh Abdelkader Hachani, acting leader of the IslamicSalvation Front (FIS), Interview, November 20, 1991

Question: "What will happen if the elections are held andif the FIS remains outside the political institutions, i.e.,outside the next parliament?"Hachani: "As far as we [are] concerned, our presence invarious state institutions is not a goal. It is a means torealize other objectives. We want the religion of AlmightyGod to prevail and to mobilize all the nation for the causeof God so that God's will may be everything. As far as weare concerned, our political exercise is not... [changesthought] It would be interesting for us to be present in theseinstitutions, and participating in the elections would be afundamental thing, but if we do not participate in theelections we will continue our political activity, with thewill of Almighty God. Everything is with the permissionof God, and God knows better/'1

Prime Minister Sid Ahmed Ghozali, News conference,January 6, 1992

"Immediately after my appointment as head of thisgovernment, I made the following statement: I pledge to youthat I will do my utmost to provide the necessaryassurances for organizing free and clean elections.

"This is what the government has done... But when wetalk about the freedom of the elections and their cleanness,this freedom and this cleanness could not be achieved byone side only; in other words, one needs two hands to clap.In order to achieve this freedom and this cleanness, all the

1 Radio Algiers Network, November 20, 1991, as printed inForeign Broadcast Information Service [hereinafter cited asFBIS], November 21.

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parties must work for that purpose..."Unfortunately, [I cannot] say in my capacity as prime

minister, that the elections in the first round werecharacterized by the required level of freedom andcleanness which we sought in erneast to achieve...

"These elections have brought to us all a strong, clearand loud message, one that comes equally from the citizenswho voted and those who did not participate. The messageis that the citizens are feeling great frustration, indeeddesperation. This message is, on the one hand, one ofcomplete rejection, and on the other hand, a demand forradical change...

"We now face a painful paradox for this government,which came with a pledge, committed and promised toprepare free and clean legislative elections in order toentrench democracy in this homeland. Now thisgovernment, along with the majority of its citizens, fearsthat this process could become merely a tool to eliminatedemocracy. Moreover, the Algerian government—and Iemphasize it—the majority of Algerian men and womennow fear for Algeria's fate itself. Thus, the Algerianpeople are once again at a crossroads. The dangers areserious, real and numerous. However, I am convinced thatthe Algerian people have sufficient material and humanpotential and moral capabilities to allow them to overcomethe ordeals, and to confront the challenges with brilliantsuccess/'1

President Chadli Bendjedid, Letter of resignation, January11,1992

"Brothers, sisters, citizens: No doubt you know that Iwas not desirous of being elected to the post of president ofthe republic in the aftermath of the death of the latePresident Houari Boumedienne. My acceptance of theelection was only to comply with the wish and persistenceof my comrades. Even at the time I knew that it was both a

1 ENTV Television Network, January 5,1993, as printed in FBIS,January 6.


heavy responsibility and a great honor. Since then, I havebeen trying to perform my tasks with the utmostconscientiousness and a sense of duty. My conviction hasbeen that the Algerian people should be given the means tofully express their will, especially because they alreadyonce before paid a high price for regaining their position onthe international scene. Therefore, as soon as conditionspermitted, I worked to open the democratic course necessaryfor the completion of the achievements of the liberationrevolution.

"Here we are today living a democratic and pluralisticexperiment, one characterized by many excesses, in themidst of an environment ^marked by extremely conflictingcurrents. Therefore, the measures taken and the systemsdemanded to resolve our problems have today reached apoint which cannot be overstepped without grave andimminent harm to national coherence and to thepreservation of public order and national unity.

"No doubt signs of this situation are no longer a secret. Inthe face of the extent Of this unexpected danger, I considerin the depth of my heart and consciousness that theinitiatives being taken are not likely to guarantee peaceand harmony among the citizens at this time.

"In the face of these grave developments, I havethought at great length about the critical situation andpossible solutions. The sole result that I arrived at is that Icannot continue performing my duties without harming thesacred pledge I made to the nation.

"Being aware of the responsibilities at this historicmoment that our nation has reached, I consider that theonly solution to the current crisis lies in my withdrawalfrom the political scene. For that reason, brothers, sistersand citizens, as of today I relinquish the duties of presidentof the republic.

"I ask each and every one of you to consider this decisiona sacrifice on my part in the nation's best interests."1

1 As read on ENTV Television Network, January 11, 1993, andprinted in FBIS, January 13.

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State Higher Security Council, Statement, January 12, 1992

"... Noting the state of a constitutional vacuum resultingfrom the coincidence of the vacancy in the presidency withthe resignation and the People's National Assemblythrough dissolution... the Higher Security Council hasdecided unanimously:

"First, it is noted that it is impossible to continue theelection process until the necessary conditions for thenormal functioning of institutions, as stipulated by theConstitutional Council, are fulfilled.

"Second, it decided temporarily to take over everymatter liable to infringe on public order and the security ofthe state.

"Third, it announces that it is in an open session and ismeeting without interruption to fulfill its obligations untila solution is found by the institutional bodies who arenotified of the vacancy in the presidency."1

Higher Security Council Blueprint for Transition toDemocracy, June 21,1993

• The Higher Security Council will step down by theend of this year at the latest and be replaced by a presidentand two vice presidents.

• Since presidential and legislative elections are notpossible now for known "technical and political reasons," atransitional period of at least two years and a maximum ofthree years is needed to ease the country into a democraticsystem that would restore the electoral process andconsolidate the republic's institutions. During this period,the Constitution of 1989, with the exception of theprovisions relating to the presidency and the legislativeauthority, will remain in force.

• During the transitional period, the constitution willbe reviewed and amended, with special attention paid tothe articles dealing with political parties and the media.

1 ENTV Television Network, January 12, 1992, as printed inFBIS, January 13.


The authority of the state will be restored, the electionlists will be reviewed, the local and centraladministrations will be reorganized and the legislativeauthority will be strengthened.

• The ultimate target of the transitional period is toeliminate the "three types of monopoly that characterizedpast practices:

"1. Political monopoly must give way to the principleof the alternation of power by democratic elections.

"2. The ideological monopoly must be replaced bypolitical pluralism, freedom of expression and thought.

"3. The state's monopoly on the economy must giveway to a market economy, the economy of [private]initiative, although the state will remain present as thedriving force of national economic life and also as operatorin certain strategic sectors." A change in the economicsystem is necessary, although it is bound to be sociallypainful.

• For the purposes of the transitional period, theadvisory council will be reconstituted, bringing into itrepresentatives of government agencies, political partiesand associations and giving it legislative powers. "Highercouncils" will also be formed to study the principalquestions of Islam, socioeconomic affairs, youth andeducation affairs.

• Islam will remain the state religion and "one of thebasic elements of society," but action must be undertaken tocorrect some of the misconceptions that have beenassociated with it.

• Arabic will be the official language of the Algeriannation, but the heritage of all sectors of the population willbe taken into consideration, with special reference to theBerbers.1

1 As reported in al-Sharq al-Awsat and Reuters and printed inMideast Mirror, June 23, 1993.

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EGYPT

President Hosni Mubarak, News conference, December 16,1992

Question: "One of the objectives of terrorism is obviously tostrike at the stability and great democracy we areexperiencing. At the same time, confronting terrorism couldharm democracy. This is usually a very difficult equationor process. To what extent can we balance confrontingterrorism and preserving democracy?"Mubarak: "We will not divert from democracy. Therefore,we will confront terrorism through legitimacy and the law.Other countries might cancel the law and constitution andtake very violent measures. I am not an advocate of suchmoves. I do not want the people of Egypt to enter a newphase of totalitarianism or violence. The objective of allthis terrorism is to force an undemocratic regime on thecountry. Those who like this type of talk... do not wantdemocracy, even though they might pretend to bedemocratic. These are totalitarian regimes. Under nocircumstances will we allow them to take over. We shouldnot fear this or fear dealing with terrorism legitimately.

"We will not divert from democracy. Democracy is veryharsh on those who divert from it... I am careful to keep allour measures [of confronting terrorism] within the limits oflegitimacy, so that we can all learn that the right roadruns through legitimate channels. Our democracy willcollapse if we resort to illegitimate methods.

"Does democracy mean letting things get out of handeven when I have authorities to rectify things that hurtthe country? If we had done that, things would have takenthe same course they have taken in other countries; wewould have lost our legitimacy. What could we do then?The country would have regressed. If tourism is decliningnow, it could have stopped completely. Investors wouldhave panicked and transferred their money abroad. Whowould have been hurt? The Egyptian citizen; he wouldhave failed to manage or to find a job. Unemploymentwould have increased. The world is trying to increase


production and open factories to create jobs for citizens. Ifwe do not use our authority within a democratic andlegitimate framework, it could lead to a serious setbackthat would affect the Egyptian citizen primarily. I amanxious to protect the Egyptian citizen with all means atmy disposal. I make every possible effort to promotedemocracy, which takes care of the citizen. If I have acertain authority and fail to use it, what will happen?...

"If these authorities are abused, be sure that no one inthe parties or the parliament would keep silent. We usethe authority at the proper time and place. Our goal is tosafeguard the Egyptian citizen's life and livelihood."1

Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, Interview in Uktubar,December 20, 1992

Question: "What are your demands?"Rahman: "Our main demands are to let God's sharia be thelaw, to rule according to God's book, to release thedetainees, and to free those who speak the truth fromoppression."

Q: "What is your relationship with the Islamic groups inEgypt?"Rahman: "My relationship with them is that of a defenderof the truth... I address my words to the government,because my objective is that the Egyptian government ruleby the word of God."

Q: "How do see you the application of the sharia inEgypt?"Rahman: "The regime must be removed and ulema shouldtake over and implement God's sharia."

Q: "How do you feel about democracy under an Islamicgovernment?"Rahman: "Islam calls for shura [rule by consultation],

1 ESC Television, January 16, 1992, as printed in FBIS,December 17, 1992.

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which is better than democracy. If democracy clearlyimplies shura, then Islam approves it. If democracy meansfreedom of movement and meeting, the existence of groups,such as parties that express what they want and elections,we, of course, have reservations. By the way, democracyhas not yet been implemented in Egypt."

Q: "You said before that Islam rejects democracy because itmeans the rule of the people by the people, and in Islamthe rule is by God alone. How can we imagine a shurasystem in the computer age? How can we apply such asystem in a country with a population of 56 millionpeople?"Rahman: "If democracy means freedom of opinion for all,we accept this. But the rule in an Islamic system is the ruleof God alone, according to sharia, the Koran, and theProphet's teachings. No one has the right to make a rulingexcept on the basis of what came from God/'1

President Hosni Mubarak, Interview in Der Spiegel,January 25,1993

"Former Algerian President Chadli Bendjedid told me atone time that he would give all parties, including thereligious parties, complete leeway because this wouldstrengthen his government. It did not work."Question: "Repression does not stop religious militancy.Wouldn't democracy be a better deterrent?"Mubarak: "Yes, democracy and openness are our sharpestweapons. We always tell our people the whole truth.

Q: "Do the Islamic extremists also enjoy freedom ofexpression?"Mubarak: "The Islamic politicians only want power. Oncethey are in power, the democratic liberties are forgotten. Ifwe tolerated an Islamic party, a Christian party would befounded soon after. Religion would be misused, and Muslims

1 Uktubar, December 22, 1992, as printed in FBIS, December22,1992.


and Christians would fight each other. That is why we donot permit religious parties in Egypt."

Q: "Could an Algerian situation develop on the Nile?"Mubarak: "I do not think that would be possible. If theAlgerians had kept to their constitution, which prohibitsthe forming of religious parties, developments would havebeen different."1

President Hosni Mubarak, Interview in al-Anba, March 17,1993

Question: "Do you attribute the Islamic upsurge in Egypt toeconomic conditions?"Mubarak: "First we must be specific about the concept sothat we will not be confused. If the talk is about Islamicupsurge, Egypt has been an Islamic state throughout itshistory and its people are Muslim. Egypt is the countrywhere al-Azhar, the beacon of Islam, is located. Withinal-Azhar, preachers and ulema live and move about withtheir genuine thought. They represent the mostpredominant and overwhelming trend for Muslims andIslam through moderation.

"As for the extremist upsurge meant by your question, itis not a proper Islamic upsurge. This extremist upsurge is justa tool used by some forces, whether abroad or within, thatseek through this trend to impose hegemony andguardianship in the name of Islam.

"The confrontation in Egypt is between a moderate Islamand intellectual extremism hiding behind the name ofIslam. This extremism will not survive in Egypt because thepeople are wary, comprehending and know the facts. Thata few terrorists could control all [of] our society isinconceivable. Thus, we are talking about terrorism,terrorists and outlaws. This breed of people is present [even]in rich countries..."

Der Spiegel, January 25, 1993, as printed in FBIS, January 28.

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Q: "Do you believe that the Islamic upsurge has been ableto project itself in this manner because of a politicalvacuum?"Mubarak: "Let us discuss the matter with a degree of logicand tolerance. You hear of an Islamic upsurge in Egyptbecause we are a democratic country that guarantees freepress and the right of expression and [we] live in a trulydemocratic atmosphere. On the contrary, had the regime inEgypt been dictatorial, no one would have heard of anIslamic upsurge.

"You do not hear about it in some countries although anIslamic upsurge exists in them. These countries deal withsuch currents with force and summary annihilation... Herein Egypt both the state and the people are against tradingin Islam and terrifying peaceful citizens in the name ofIslam/'i

Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, Interview in al-Hayat,March 18, 1993

"Democracy was not an option for the Islamists. Theexperiment has failed in Jordan, in Egypt and also inAlgeria, where it failed miserably/

"[Rahman] said what happened in Algeria 'proves ourpoint—that the rulers will not allow Islam to workfreely... Although we differed with our brothers in the FISover the utility of democracy and elections, we used toalways pray for their success.

"'We used to say that what is taken by democracy can be[lost] by democracy. Islam's coming to power will not bethrough democracy.'"2

Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, Interview in the NewYorker, April 11, 1993

Question: "Are Jama'at [the Islamic group] and al-Jihad

1 Al-Jumhuriyah, March 13, 1993, as printed in FBIS, March 17.2 Mideast Mirror, March 18, 1993.


religious movements or political movements?"Rahman: "In Christianity, you have a separation of churchand state. Because the church resisted the modernization ofEurope, it was pushed aside. But Islam is very different: itcovers every aspect of life—politics and economics, religionand social issues, science and knowledge. Therefore, it is notpossible to differentiate between religion and politics. InIslam, you cannot be a Muslim unless you know politics. Wedo not follow the axiom 'Leave what is for Caesar forCaesar and what is for God for God/"

Q: "At your trial in the Sadat assassination case, you toldthe judge that it was lawful to shed the blood of a rulerwho does not rule according to God's ordinances—"Rahman: "Yes. I testified for twelve hours before the judge,and I told him that whoever does not rule as God orders isan infidel. And if you apply that rule to Nasser, Sadat andMubarak, they are all infidels...

"It was Sadat himself who issued the fatwa to bekilled, by moving away from his religion and imprisoninghis people. And it was his own people who killed him, andthis will be Mubarak's fate as well..."

Q: "What kind of Islamic state do you want in Egypt?What is the role model? Iran? Saudi Arabia? Sudan?"Rahman: "It will be closer to the example of Sudan. SaudiArabia does not apply Islamic rules... They give theirpeople absolutely no freedoms. Their jails are full—full ofinnocent people. This is not Islam. Their Islam is cosmetic,with only one purpose in mind: to keep the ruling family onthe throne. What we want is a true Islamic state. We wanta state where there will be no poverty, where freedom isguaranteed. We will rule through a shura, or consultativecouncil, which in the West you call democracy."

Q: "What would the imposition of sharia mean for Egypt'snon-Muslims?"R a h m a n : "Islam guarantees the rights of Jews andChristians under Islamic law: let them practice theirreligion and protect their houses of worship. There will be

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no pressure to convert. But in the meantime it is very wellknown that no minority in any country has its own laws/1

IRAQ

Charter 91, a bill of rights for a free Iraq originally draftedby Kanan Makiya, has been signed by Iraqis of allpersuasions, Sunni, Shi'ite and Kurdish. Its name is areference to Charter 77, a Czech paper demanding humanrights in Eastern Europe.

Civil society in Iraq has been continuously violated bystate in the name of ideology. As a consequence thenetworks through which civility is normally produced andreproduced have been destroyed. A collapse of values inIraq has therefore coincided with the destruction of thepublic realm for uncoerced human association. In theseconditions, the first task of a new politics is to rejectbarbarism and reconstitute civility.

With this is mind, we the undersigned, a group of menand women from Iraq comprised of different nationalities,religious denominations, ideological and politicalconvictions, hereby declare:

1. People have rights for no other reason than that theyexist as individual human beings.

2. Freedom from fear is the essential prerequisite forrealizing the inherent dignity of the human person.

Specifically, freedom from fear requires that a new Iraqiconstitution provide that:• The quality of being an Iraqi shall never again be heldin doubt because of faith, belief or presumed loyalty.• Citizenship become the irrevocable right of everyindividual born in Iraq, or to an Iraqi parent or naturalizedby an Iraqi state.• No Iraqi be subjected to arbitrary arrest or detention or

1 Mary Anne Weaver, "The Trail of the Sheikh/' The NewYorker, April 12,1993.


deportation.• No Iraqi be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degradingtreatment or punishment.• No confession of guilt, however obtained, be consideredadmissible in an Iraqi court of law.• A moratorium on capital punishment be promulgated fora period of not less than ten years.• Liability for punishment be always individual, nevercollective.• Unrestricted freedom of travel within and outside theboundaries of Iraq be an absolute and inalienable right ofevery citizen.• The villages, towns, cities, water sources, forests andhistoric and religious sites of Iraq be declared a nationaltrust which no political authority can capriciously destroy,disfigure or relocate.• The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adoptedand proclaimed by the United Nations General Assemblyresolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948, be consideredbinding and constitutive of the legal system of Iraq.• Any Iraqi official found to have violated the above bedismissed and prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

3. Rebuilding civil society means elevating the principle oftoleration into a new public norm soaring above allideologies.

Toleration in matters of politics, religion and ethnicfeeling is the only true alternative to violence and the ruleof fear. The full creative potential of Iraqis, in which wedeeply believe, will only be realized when toleration burnsas fiercely in individual hearts and minds as it does in thenew constitution of Iraq...

4. Representative parliamentary democracy is the rule inthe Republic of Tolerance.

Democracy requires coordinating the representation ofdifferences among people on three levels: within civilsociety; between civil society and the state; and betweenthe executive, legislative and judicial realms ofgovernment. Democracy is not only ruling in the name of the

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people, nor is it simply majority rule. Central to democracyis the constitutionally guaranteed set of rights whichprotect the part from tyranny of the whole. Thefundamental idea is that the majority rules only because itis a majority, not because it has a monopoly on the truth...

5. The notion that strength resides in large standing armiesand up-to-date weapons of destruction has provedbankrupt

Real strength is always internal—in the creative,cultural and wealth-producing capabilities of a people. Itis found in civil society, not in the army or in the state.Armies often threaten democracy; the larger they grow themore they weaken civil society. This is what happened inIraq. Therefore, conditional upon international andregional guarantees which secure the territorial integrityof Iraq, preferably within the framework of an overallreduction in the levels of militarization of the wholeMiddle East, a new Iraqi constitution should:• Abolish conscription and reorganize the army into aprofessional, small and purely defensive force which willnever be used for internal repression.• Set an absolute upper limit on expenditure on this newforce equal to 2 percent of Iraqi national income.• Have as its first article the following: "aspiringsincerely to an international peace based on justice andorder, the Iraqi people forever renounce war as a sovereignright of the nation and the threat or use of force as a meansof settling international disputes. The right of belligerencyof the Iraqi state will not be recognized."1

Jalal Talabani, General Secretary of the Patriotic Union ofKurdistan (PUK), Address to Council on Foreign Relations,September 27, 1992

"Dictatorship, therefore, is truly a threat to Iraq'snational unity and integrity. It is a source of inter-ethnic

1 See Amity Shlaes, 'The Voice of Iraq's Democrats/' WallStreet Journal, October 8, 1991, for background on Charter 91.


and inter-religious conflicts in Iraq and a profound threat toregional and global security.

"Democracy represents a viable future for Iraq. The fearthat a democratic Iraq will be taken over by Islamicfundamentalists arises from a lack of understanding ofIraq's political realities and culture. A stable democraticorder can be established in Iraq, whose pillars are theSunni Arabs, Kurds, the significant secular section of theShi'i population, Christians and Turkomans. Democracy inIraq is a prerequisite to the rebuilding of the Iraqi economicinfrastructure which has been destroyed by decades ofeconomic mismanagement and by the recent conflict in theGulf. Democracy is needed to facilitate the return of multi-national and foreign companies and capital back into Iraq.

"Peace and security in the region require a peaceful anddemocratic Iraq. Democracy is an inevitable necessity formaintaining Iraq's integrity and to ensure peacefulcoexistence amongst Iraq's various nationalities andreligious sects. The new world order requires a democraticIraq, which can coexist with its neighbors in peace andhelp the process of economic development and integrationin the region.

"Further, the level of cultural and educationaldevelopment, as well as the devastating experiencesassociated with dictatorships, will enable Iraqis topractice democracy in a responsible manner. In this regard,Iraq is no less eligible than Jordan, Pakistan or Tunisia.

"However, these historical conditions do not necessarilybring about democracy in Iraq. This raises the question ofhow to proceed from this point.

"I believe that the Ba'athist dictatorship is notsustainable and is unable to last, owing to the very deepeconomic, domestic and international problems it is facing.More particularly:

"0 This dictatorship represents an affront to the newworld order;

"ii) It represents a major threat to regional peace andstability;

"iii) Most Iraqis are insistent on attaining democracy;"iv) There is a strong and relatively well-organized

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Kurdish movement which seeks democracy;"v) New democratic inclinations have emerged among

an increasing number of army officers, who hope to rid Iraqof the current predicament; and

"vi) the dictatorship has totally failed to realize anyof the social, economic or political aspirations of the Iraqipeople.

"The possibilities for democratic change are confined toany, or a combination, of the following three scenarios:

"1. A military coup which may well lead to a periodof instability, and perhaps to a succession of coups, butultimately lead to a democratic order.

"2. A popular uprising supported by some armydivisions and the city of Baghdad.

"3. Cooperation between the Iraqi opposition and theKurdish movement, with help from the internationalcommunity to utilize Kurdistan as a base for democracy inIraq. A possible scenario will be an armed insurrection withthe help of army divisions stationed in the north to helpestablish a provisional government which may seekinternational recognition and serve as a catalyst for a widerIraqi effort to undermine, and ultimately overthrow,dictatorship.

"The Kurdish movement, which is essentially secularand democratic, can play a pivotal role in underminingdictatorship and help formulate a political alternative tothe Ba'athist tyranny through cooperation with the Iraqiarmed forces and opposition. The Kurdish movement aimsat attaining a democratic order in Iraq within which theright of the Kurds to autonomy is recognized. Ourcommitment to democracy arises from the knowledge that itis the only guarantee for Kurdish rights and a safeguard toprevent a genocide of our people.

"Democracy to us is the panacea for all the problems inIraq, including the Kurdish problem, and will help usovercome the legacies of repression, deportation andgenocide. I can see no future for Iraq but democracy as aprerequisite for enhancing its integrity, unity and viabilityas a state.

"The Kurdish movement is struggling for such a


democratic order in Iraq and I believe it deserves the activesupport of the international community/'1

Dr. Laith Kubba, Executive Committee Member of the INC,Address to National Endowment for Democracy,Washington, July 30, 1992

"What do we propose for the future of Iraq in order tomake the democratic experience a success? First, I advocatea decentralization of power. This might weaken the statebut it will save the country. I do not advocatedecentralization of power based on ethnicity but on regions.I believe by decentralizing power we will reassure thoseparts of the country that have been repressed for so long.They have lost confidence in the central government andthe only way to bring them back into the fold is to allowthem to have their own local governments, full expressionof cultural rights and to manage their affairs in the waythey see fit. In the long run, this will enhance nationalunity rather than weaken it.

"A second important measure is that politicalrepresentation should be based on proportionalrepresentation and not on a simple majority domination. Athird measure is to engage the country immediately ineconomic reform. Investments need to be made in the parts ofthe country that have suffered the most. Without a broadeconomic base for the country, a democratic election alonewill not feed hungry stomachs or create stability.

"Lastly, we need to have organizations that will act aswatchdogs and observe the overall process and behavior ofthe government. There is no harm at all in those agenciesbeing international as well as local. I think their presencewill encourage democratic process in the country."2

1 Iraqi Issues, Vol. 1, No. 1, May 1992.2 Iraqi Issues, Vol. 1, No. 4, September 1992.

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Iraqi National Congress General Assembly, Final statementof meeting in Salahuddin, Iraq, October 27-32, 2992

"At the September meetings all parties agreed to uniteas a representative alternative for the expression of theIraqi people's will and to work together to eliminate thedictatorial and oppressive regime. All parties endorsed ademocratic, constitutional, parliamentary, federal andpluralist structure for Iraq to eliminate sectarian and racialoppression. All parties also reaffirmed their commitmentto the rule of law, human rights, basic freedoms and thefaith of the nation embodied in Islam, the state religion,which guides the people with its noble values offorgiveness and generosity.

"Against this background, the Iraqi National Congress[INC] National Assembly convened for five days to discussthe current political situation in Iraq and the region. Theystressed that Saddam Hussein's regime must be removed toend Iraq's national tragedy...

"The National Assembly reaffirmed the Kurdishpeople's right to self-determination within a united anddemocratic Iraq... The National Assembly discussed theformation of a constitutional federal union as a means ofensuring coexistence between the nationality groupingswithin the Iraqi homeland. The National Assemblyreaffirmed its unfailing commitment to the unity andterritorial integrity of Iraq and stressed that the truethreat to Iraq's unity comes from the dictatorial regime'sattempt to divide the people.

"The National Assembly discussed the democraticexperiment that took place in Iraqi Kurdistan andwelcomed the election of the Kurdish parliament andgovernment. The delegates considered this experience animportant step on the path to broadening and spreadingpolitical freedom and democratic processes throughout theIraqi homeland...

"The National Assembly committed the INC toremoving Saddam's regime and ending Iraq's nationaltragedy. The INC pledges to facilitate the return of allexiled Iraqis and to carry out free elections for a national


congress that will establish a permanent constitution, therule of law, justice and freedom."*

Hoshyar Zebari, Address to Center for Strategic andInternational Studies seminar, Washington, D.C., March17,1993

"In May 1992, the Kurdish people undertook tolegitimize their status by conducting what many observershave noted as the first free elections in the history of Iraq.I'm not suggesting here that the mere existence of multi-party elections or competition means that you can guaranteegenuine democracy. But this is the first step in the rightdirection which Kurdish people, who are part of the Iraqipeople, have taken. The May election proved to all thoseskeptics that democratic change is possible in Iraq ifcertain conditions are provided.

"Indeed, the Kurdish leadership took a historical stepon the 19th of May by holding free and general elections forthe regional constituent assembly and for regionalgovernment, filling the legal and administrative vacuumleft by the Iraqi government's withdrawal from the regionand also to administer the local affairs of the region. Thewithdrawal of the Iraqi administrative and security forcesfrom the region was followed by an internal economic andadministrative blockade to force the population intosubmission...

"Now, a 105-member Kurdish Assembly is in place, aswell as a local government...

"The elections were not only free, but the voting processwas unobstructed, orderly and peaceful, with enthusiasticparticipation by the people. The election campaign, aswitnessed by many observers, had the festive feeling of acarnival. It also established the freedom of the press andthe freedom of choice. In fact, the election process wascommended by human rights and electoral monitors fromthe United States and many others countries.

Iraqi Issues, Vol. 1, No. 5, December 1992.

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"Of course, this would not have happened without thecoalition's protection, without the security arrangementsprovided by the coalition forces. And for that, the Kurdishpeople will be grateful forever...

"The elections were an important step forward for theKurds, but they have caused no fundamental change and Ibelieve for the near future it will not change the basicparameters of our situation...

"In our view, the situation is only likely to change if ademocratic civilian government comes to power in Iraq.

"The single greatest threat to the unity and territorialintegrity of Iraq is the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein.Until Saddam's tyranny is replaced by a constitutional,parliamentary and democratic structure, Iraq and itsneighbors are at risk from factionalism, conflict and chaos.

"We believe that democracy is the only guarantor ofstability for a diverse nation in a volatile region. We arededicated to the institution of constitutional, democraticand pluralistic government in Iraq, expressed through afederal structure for the Kurdish people within Iraq. Wealso feel that a strong and democratic central governmentensuring essential regional, minority and individual rightswill ensure Iraq's internal stability and create unitythrough diversity. Saddam Hussein is destroying the Iraqination by division, oppression and aggression. Only throughplans for the implementation of the principles I havementioned will Iraq's unity and sovereignty be preserved...Ibelieve very strongly that the foreign policy objective ofthe U.S. toward Iraq should be geared to support democracyand human rights...

"We, in the opposition, have to prove that there is agenuine alternative, there is a democratic alternative tothis regime."1

Iraqi Issues, Vol. 1, No. 7, April, 1993.


JORDAN

Jordanian National Charter, June 1991

Chapter Two: State Governed by Law and PoliticalPluralismFirst: The State of Law and Political Pluralism1. The State of Law is a democratic state committed to theprinciple of the supremacy of the law and derives itslegitimacy, authority and effectiveness from the free willof the people and all authorities within it are committedto providing legal, judicial and administrative guaranteesto protect the rights, integrity and basic freedoms of theindividual which rules were laid down by Islam andconfirmed by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights...2. The Jordanian State is a State of Law in the modernsense of a democratic state. It is a state for all citizensregardless of any differences of opinion or any pluralism ofapproach. It derives its strength from an actual anddeclared application of the principles of equality, justiceand equal opportunities and from the provision of practicalmeans enabling the Jordanian people to participate in thedecisions affecting their lives and their affairs...

Second: Basic Pillars of a State of Law1. Adherence to the letter and spirit of the constitution bythe legislative, executive and judiciary authorities in alltheir actions, within a framework of priority of the right.2. Adherence to the principle of the supremacy of the law,within a framework of comprehensive review by anindependent judiciary.3. Adherence, in the exercise of democracy, to theprinciples and requisites of social justice.4. Ensuring that laws in general and laws pertaining topolitical parties, elections and publications in particularare dedicated to safeguarding the citizens' basic rights andpublic freedoms.5. Adoption of the democratic dialogue as the basis ofexpressing the views, free from any form of coercion orintellectual terrorism, at all official and public levels.

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6. Adherence by government institutions, in the exercise oftheir duties and services to the public and entities to theprinciple of complete equality...

Third: Guarantees of the Democratic ApproachThe most important guarantees of the democratic

approach and achievement of political pluralism are theadherence to the following principles:1. Respecting the fundamentals of democratic action byorganized political groups and parties in their generalconduct since it constitutes a guarantee to justice andstability.2. Strengthening the traits of tolerance and objectivity,[and] respect for the beliefs of others...3. Guaranteeing the basic freedoms of all citizens in such amanner as to protect the structure of a democratic society,preserve the rights of individuals and ensure full freedomof expression and its declaration with complete libertywithin the limits of the constitution.4. Attaining equality, justice and equal opportunities forall citizens, male and female, without discrimination.5. Preserving the civilian and democratic nature of thestate...

Fourth: Principles and Limitations Governing theEstablishment of Parties1. Jordanians enjoy the right to establish and belong topolitical parties and groupings provided that theirobjectives are legitimate, their methods are peaceful andtheir statutes do not violate the provisions of theconstitution. Laws regulating the operation of partiesshould not include any provisions which overtly orimplicitly call for abrogating the constitutional right toestablish political parties.2. Political and party work in Jordan is based on theprinciple of pluralism of thought, opinion and organizationand on securing the requisites of democratic competition andits legitimate means...4. The judiciary is solely empowered to decide on anyinfringement pertaining to the application of the Parties


Law...5. a. Parties must employ democratic methods in theirinternal workings, choice of leadership and in the exerciseof their activities within a framework of democraticdialogue and free competition among the political parties.The same shall apply to relations and dealings by anyparty with the other political parties and groupings aswell as with popular and constitutional institutions in aspirit of mutual respect for opposing views.

b. There shall be no structural or financial affiliationby the leadership or members of any party with any non-Jordanian. Also, no instructions or directions shall beconducted upon instructions or directions from any foreignstate or body... [Activities] of any licensed Jordanian partyserving Palestine, Arab unity or Islamic solidarity shall beregarded as a national Jordanian undertaking...

King Hussein bin Talal, Address to conference endorsing theJordanian National Charter, June 9, 1991

"It was clear to us from the beginning that for democracyto be truly democratic, it must fulfill all its own conditions.These are:

"First, separation of executive, legislative and judicialpowers. This is what we have sought, and will continue toseek to entrench in accordance with the regulations of theconstitution. Each of the three authorities has to know itslimits and not infringe on the domain of the others.

"Second, holding general legislative elections accordingto law. This is what we did in November 1989, whenelections took place in an atmosphere of honesty, freedomand respectable competition.

"Third, exercising national political activities on thebasis of pluralism, out of the principle of commitment toresponsible dialogue, which constitutes the distinctivecharacteristic of democratic life, and out of the principlethat in a democratic state, the truth is not monopolized byan individual or a group of individuals. In the end, it is theresult of national dialogue between the groups, which iscalled harmony.

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"To organize and protect political pluralism, thusprotecting democracy, a national charter had to be set to bethe intellectual document for reference on Jordanianpolitical activity.

"Therefore, the Royal Commission for Drafting theNational Charter was formed on April 9, 1990. The factthat this commission has concluded its work is anotherbroad step down the road of democracy and its goals.Today, we meet to place this draft in your hands; to be moreprecise, in the hands of our citizens whom you represent byvirtue of your positions, and by virtue of their choice of youfrom among various popular figures which our people areteeming with in all walks of life and on all levels. Ourconcern was deep and comprehensive that this commissioninclude all our people from the various intellectual andpolitical schools and trends; academic, social and economicfigures; nomadic and urban communities; Muslims andChristians; deputies and senate members; women and men...

"We are well advised, then, to make every effort tolearn from our experience and the experience of others. Wemust bear in mind that despotism, isolationism and discordamong the various sectors of the society cannot but bringmore backwardness, confusion and disintegration. Ifdemocracy is to be interpreted as irresponsible freedom orthe license to abuse, libel, do injustice, cross the linesseparating powers, or as a silk cloak concealing poisondaggers, or fishing in troubled waters and laying ambush tothe detriment of the general well-being of society, or anumbrella providing cover for intellectual terrorism or ameans whereby a larger sector dominates a smaller sector,this would, by God, be chaos, pure and simple, and thiswould be the Achilles' heel of democracy and the ruin ofsociety and the country.

"A democratic society is one which respects law andorder because it has made the law. A democratic society isa society of free but responsible dialogue. A democraticsociety is one which allows diversity of opinion, oncondition that counter-opinion is respected and as long asthere is commitment to the general interest. A democraticsociety is free of ideological terrorism, so that the essence


of creativity and invention is not dried up."A democratic society is remote from despotism, so that

it does not suffer from paralysis among its members. Ademocratic society is a competitive one; however, it is far-removed from violence, fanaticism, grudges, malice andaccount-settling.

"In order to protect democracy and political pluralism,and in order to avoid all the pitfalls I have alreadymentioned, we took this successful step, with God's help, offormulating a National Charter. Nevertheless, I hope wewill not cheat ourselves into believing that democracy willbe safe and sound as long as we finalize its institutions. Theconstitution and the National Charter, and the laws andlegislation that will emerge from them are all-importantpillars in the structure of the state of law and democraticsociety. However, what is no less important are the citizensthemselves in the various positions and institutions, sincethey are the ones who express democracy in word and deed.

"I have closely watched the course of democraticperformance since the 1989 elections. It has been generallysatisfactory. In my opinion, this was so because of thenovelty of the experiment. Therefore, we are allresponsible for rectifying the course until it becomes a partof our life. The responsibility of observing and rectifying isa general responsibility which includes the members of theexecutive and legislative power and free journalism inparticular.

"History tells us that democracy, saturated withgrudges, indignation, chaos, anger, almost destroyed its ownbirthplace, the ancient Greek state of Athens, during itsprime. This was the case when democracy was practiced inthe age of Pericles with predilections of grudges andaccount-settling rather than considering the generalinterest.

"I only say this to assert that we might have to fear fordemocracy from those who live under its canopy and harmit in the name of democracy itself, wittingly or unwittingly.Democracy is not a mere institution but, rather, a cultureand way of life that characterizes a certain human society.This clear reference of mine is to assert that the homeland

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must come first. Every party that is established under thecanopy of democracy and in its name is necessarily anational [watani] party in terms of its bases, objectives,means, funding and connections. Any departure from thisreality is not only a departure from democracy but also adeparture from the homeland."1

King Hussein bin Talal, Interview, May 2, 1993

Question: "Many people still see [Iraq] as a potentiallydestabilizing factor in this region. What role do you see forIraq and for Saddam Hussein?"Hussein: "...I wish for [Iraq] to remain together. Itsintegrity is important but beyond that I wish for it nationalreconciliation, real movement towards democracy,pluralism, respect for human rights and hopefully an end tothis nightmare of suffering of the Iraqi peoplethemselves..."

Q: "Do you feel democracy is now at the stage it should beat in Jordan?"Hussein: "Yes, I feel it is despite enormous difficulties,suspicions, hostility by some in the region to the veryconcept. But it has to happen, it is going to happeneverywhere sooner or later.

"The clock cannot be turned nor can we have a situationwhere people are denied their basic rights and, thank God,here in Jordan these rights were given because we believedin them and recognized them as such and I would hopecertainly that our other brethren in the Arab world canlook at this example as a serious and worldly one to look atin terms of shaping the future."

Q: "There seem to be people in Jordan who fear democracy,who worry that the Jordan they know will becomefundamentally different. Is democracy irreversible now?"Hussein: "I believe it is irreversible and obviously there is

1 Radio Jordan Network, June 9, 1991, as printed in FBIS, June10.


a danger that democracy will be a threatened democraticprocess] but I don't think this will happen here and myefforts will go towards sharing... the responsibility [theindividual voter] has towards himself, towards his countryand beyond that to the region itself/'1

KUWAIT

Prime Minister Abdullah al-Salim al-Sabah, Interview inSawt al-Kuwait, September 19, 1992

"Any Kuwaiti who finds the capability in himself andwho meets the conditions for candidacy will find the dooropen to him to serve his homeland. In this connection we donot differentiate among them or set conditions other thanthose known to everyone. The arena is open to all. Itconcerns me as a citizen and official that the upcomingelections should be held in a friendly and brotherlyatmosphere and that everyone should adopt the slogan'always in the service of Kuwait/...

"Everyone must fight the election process in accordancewith the stipulations of the election law. I realize that anumber of observers and reporters from all over the worldwill be coming to Kuwait to cover the election process. And Ihope that the candidates in particular and citizens ingeneral will ensure that this process, which we care about,is conducted in an atmosphere of security and that a spiritof brotherhood and sound democratic competitiveness willprevail among all, as we have always experienced inKuwait."2

Prime Minister Abdullah al-Sulim uUSubuh, Interview,October 3, 1992

Question: "Does Your Highness think the realization of the

1 Jordan Times, May 2,1993, as printed in FBIS, May 3.2 Sawt al-Kuwayt al-Duwali, September 19, 1992, as printed inFBIS, September 23.

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democratic process in Kuwait warrants the widening of theelectorate and popular participation through theparticipation of many Kuwaitis who are not allowed at themoment to vote? If so, what is the government's [view] onthose problems facing the realization of such an aim,particularly today when there is so much talk about thewoman's right to vote, the right of naturalized people tovote and the lowering of the legal age to vote to eighteen ina bid to broaden popular participation in Kuwait?"Al-Sabah: "I am for this idea that is aimed at wideningthe participation of the electorate. Everybody who hasbeen following the amir's speeches, may God protect him,before and after the liberation can see that His Highnesshad pointed out clearly and unequivocally the need forwidening popular participation, particularly the role ofthe Kuwaiti sister, who stood by the side of her brother,condemned the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait, rejectedand denounced the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait andcooperated with her brother in all fields, subjecting herselfto investigation, torture, violence and death. Despite allthis, she, the Kuwaiti sister—the sister, the mother, thewife and the daughter—stood fast. And we are allappreciative of her role, which was a loyal and heroic one.

"Therefore, the subject of giving her the right topolitical participation is in my opinion a matter—notwithstanding the various opinions that I have heardduring the election campaign, some of which were for, someof which had reservations and others thought despite theimportance of such a matter it should be contemplated indue course in the future...However, this matter should beabove all that. I am certain that this matter will bediscussed by brother members of the next National Council.It is my opinion, however, that the next National Councilwill give full consideration to all factors as well as fullappreciation and recognition of women's role."1

1 KSC Television, October 3, 1992, as printed in FBIS, October5.


Jasim Hamad al-Saqr, National Assembly member,Address, October 20, 1992

"National unity prevails as a result of justice; itflourishes as a result of equality and equal opportunities; itbecomes stronger as a result of the expansion and deepeningof popular participation. It ultimately imposes on therepresentatives of the people that they be a model inoverlooking personal interests and political gain, and to bean example in discarding tribal fanaticism and sectarianfavoritism so that the interests of Kuwait alone will be thebasis of their debate and the aim of their decision. Thepolitical mission of our assembly is manifested in itshistoric responsibility for spreading true democracy and forencouraging everyone to practice it, and to remove fearsthat this true democracy may stumble throughout our Araband Islamic nation, because in democracy lies the strengthand success of this nation and the correctness of its course.

"In popular participation and consultation lies whatprevents the adventures of tyrants who violate the dignityof peoples, shed their blood and destroy the edifices ofstates and their values. In order that our assembly maycarry out its mission, it should prove the ability ofconsultation and popular participation to build homelandsand deal with the problems of citizens. It should alsoreaffirm that democracy bolsters national unity and doesnot weaken it, and guarantees the correctness of decisionsand does not misinterpret them, and balances betweenaspirations and capabilities and does not leap over them."1

LEBANON

The Ta'if Accords (The Lebanese National Accord), October23,1989

I. General PrinciplesA. Lebanon is sovereign, free and independent country and

1 Radio Kuwait, October 20, 1992, as printed in FBIS, October21.

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a final homeland for all its citizens.

B. Lebanon is Arab in belonging and identity. It is anactive and founding member of the Arab League and iscommitted to the league's charters. It is an active andfounding member of the United Nations Organization and iscommitted to its charters. Lebanon is a member of thenonaligned movement. The state of Lebanon shall embodythese principles in all areas and spheres, withoutexception.

C. Lebanon is democratic parliamentary republic foundedon respect for public liberties, especially the freedom ofexpression and belief, on social justice and on equality inrights and duties among all citizens, withoutdiscrimination or preference.

D. The people are the source of authority. They aresovereign and they shall exercise their sovereigntythrough the constitutional institutions.

E. The economic system is a free system that guaranteesindividual initiative and private ownership.

E. (sic)Culturally, socially and economically-balanceddevelopment is a mainstay of the state's unity and of thesystem's stability.

F. Efforts to achieve comprehensive social justicethrough fiscal, economic and social reform.

G. Lebanon's soil is united and it belongs to all theLebanese. Every Lebanese is entitled to live in and enjoyany part of the country under the supremacy of the law. Thepeople may not be categorized on the basis of anyaffiliation whatsoever and there shall be nofragmentation, no partition and no repatriation [ofPalestinians in Lebanon].

H. No authority violating the common coexistence


charter shall be legitimate.

II. Political ReformsA. Chamber of Deputies: The Chamber of Deputies is thelegislative authority which exercises full control overgovernment policy and activities...

6. The number of members of the Chamber of Deputiesshall be increased to 108, shared equally by Christians andMuslims. As for the districts created on the basis of thisdocument and the districts whose seats became vacant priorto the proclamation of this document, their seats shall befilled only once on an emergency basis through appointmentby the national accord government that is planned to beformed.

7. With the election of the first Chamber of Deputieson a national, not sectarian, basis, a senate shall be formedand all the spiritual families shall be represented in it.The senate powers shall be confined to crucial issues...

B. President of Republic: The president of the republic isthe head of state and the symbol of the country's unity. Heshall contribute to enhancing the constitution and topreserving Lebanon's independence, unity and territorialintegrity in accordance with the provisions of theconstitution. He is the supreme commander of the armedforces which are subject to the power of the cabinet. Thepresident shall exercise the following powers.

1. Head the cabinet [meeting] whenever he wishes, butwithout voting.

2. Head the Supreme Defense Council.3. Issue decrees and demand their publication. He

shall also be entitled to ask the cabinet to reconsider anyresolution it makes within fifteen days of the date ofdeposition of the resolution with the presidential office...

G. Abolition of Political Sectarianism: Abolishingpolitical sectarianism is a fundamental national objective.To achieve it, it is required that efforts be made inaccordance with a phased plan. The Chamber of Deputieselected on the basis of equal sharing by Christians and

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Muslims shall adopt the proper measures to achieve thisobjective and to form a national council which is headed bythe president of the republic and which includes, inaddition to the prime minister and the Chamber ofDeputies speaker, political, intellectual and socialnotables. The council's task will be to examine and proposethe means capable of abolishing sectarianism, to presentthem to the Chamber of Deputies and the cabinet and toobserve implementation of the phased plan. The followingshall be done in the interim period:

a. Abolish the sectarian representation base and relyon capability and specialization in public jobs, thejudiciary, the military, security, public and jointinstitutions, and in the independent agencies in accordancewith the dictates of national accord, excluding the top-level jobs and equivalent jobs which shall be sharedequally by Christians and Muslims without allocating anyparticular job to any sect.

b. Abolish the mention of sect and denomination on theidentity card.

III. Other ReformsA. Administrative Decentralism:

1. The state of Lebanon shall be single and united statewith a strong central authority.

2. The powers of the governors and districtadministrative officers shall be expanded and all stateadministrations shall be represented in the administrativeprovinces at the highest level possible so as to facilitateserving the citizens and meeting their needs locally.

3. The administrative division shall be reconsidered ina manner that emphasizes national fusion within theframework of preserving common coexistence and unity ofthe soil, people and institutions.

4. Expanded administrative decentralism shall beadopted at the level of the smaller administrative units(district and smaller units) through the election of acouncil, headed by the district officer, in every district, toinsure local participation.

5. A comprehensive and unified development plan


capable of developing the provinces economically andsocially shall be adopted and the resources of themunicipalities, unified municipalities and municipalunions shall be reinforced with the necessary financialresources...

B. Spreading the sovereignty of the state of Lebanon overall Lebanese territories: Considering that all Lebanesefactions have agreed to the establishment of a strong statefounded on the basis of national accord, the national accordgovernment shall draft a detailed one-year plan whoseobjective is to spread the sovereignty of the state ofLebanon over all Lebanese territories gradually with thestate's own forces. The broad lines of the plan shall be asfollows:

1. Disbanding of all Lebanese and non-Lebanesemilitias shall be announced, the militias' weapons shallbe delivered to the state of Lebanon within a period of sixmonths, beginning with the approval of the nationalaccord charter; the president of the republic shall beelected; a national accord cabinet shall be formed; and thepolitical reforms shall be approved constitutionally.

2. The internal security forces shall be strengthenedthrough:

a. Opening the door of voluntarism to all the Lebanesewithout exception, beginning the training of volunteerscentrally, distributing the volunteers to the units in thegovernorates and subjecting them to organized periodictraining courses.

b. Strengthening the security agency to insure controlover the entry and departure of individuals into and out ofthe country by land, air and sea.

3. Strengthening the armed forces:a. The fundamental task of the armed forces is to

defend the homeland, and if necessary, protect public orderwhen the danger exceeds the capability of the internalsecurity forces to deal with such a danger on their own.

b. The armed forces shall be used to support theinternal security forces in preserving security underconditions determined by the cabinet.

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c. The armed forces shall be unified, prepared andtrained in order that they may be able to shoulder theirnational responsibilities in confronting Israeli aggression.

d. When the internal security forces become ready toassume their security tasks, the armed forces shall return totheir barracks.

e. The armed forces intelligence shall be reorganizedto serve military objectives exclusively.

4. The problem of the Lebanese evacuees shall besolved fundamentally, and the right of every Lebaneseevicted since 1975 to return to the place from which he wasevicted shall be established. Legislation to guarantee thisright and to insure the means of reconstruction shall beissued. Considering that the objective of the state ofLebanon is to spread its authority over all the Lebaneseterritories through its own forces, represented primarily bythe internal security forces, and in view of the fraternalrelations binding Syria to Lebanon, the Syrian forces shallthankfully assist the forces of the legitimate Lebanesegovernment to spread the authority of the state of Lebanonwithin a set period of no more than two years, beginningwith ratification of the national accord charter, election ofthe president of the republic, formation of the nationalaccord cabinet, and approval of the political reformsconstitutionally. At the end of this period, the twogovernments—the Syrian Government and the Lebanesenational accord government—shall decide to redeploy theSyrian forces in al-Biqa' area from Dahr al-Baydar to theHammana-al-Judayriy-'Ayn Darah line, and if necessary,at other points to be determined by a joint Lebanese-Syrianmilitary committee. An agreement shall also be concludedby the two governments to determine the strength andduration of the presence of Syrian forces in the above-mentioned areas and to define these forces' relationshipwith the Lebanese state authorities where the forces exist.The Arab Tripartite Committee is prepared to assist thetwo states, if they so wish, to develop this agreement...

3. Liberating Lebanon from the Israeli occupation:Regaining state authority over the territories extending to


the internationally-recognized Lebanese borders requiresthe following:

A. Efforts to implement resolution 425 and the otherUN Security Council resolution calling for fully eliminatingthe Israeli occupation.

B. Adherence to the truce agreement concluded onMarch 23, 1949.

C. Taking all the steps necessary to liberate allLebanese territories from the Israeli occupation, to spreadstate sovereignty over all the territories, and to deploy theLebanese army in the border area adjacent to Israel; andmaking efforts to reinforce the presence of the UN forces inSouth Lebanon to insure the Israeli withdrawal and toprovide the opportunity for the return of security andstability to the border area.

4. Lebanese-Syrian Relations: Lebanon, with its Arabidentity, is tied to all the Arab countries by true fraternalrelations. Between Lebanon and Syria there is a specialrelationship that derives its strength from the roots ofblood relationships, history and joint fraternal interests.This is the concept on which the countries' coordination andcooperation is founded, and which will be embodied by theagreements between the two countries in all areas, in amanner that accomplishes the two fraternal countries'interests within the framework of the sovereignty andindependence of each of them. Therefore, and becausestrengthening the bases of security creates the climateneeded to develop these special bonds, Lebanon should notbe allowed to constitute a source of threat to Syria'ssecurity, and Syria should not be allowed to constitute asource of threat to Lebanon's security under anycircumstances. Consequently, Lebanon should not allowitself to become a pathway or a base for any force, state ororganization seeking to undermine its security or Syria'ssecurity. Syria, which is eager for Lebanon's security,independence, and unity, and for harmony among itscitizens, should not permit any act that poses a threat to

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Lebanon's security, independence and sovereignty.1

Lebanese-Syrian Treaty of Brotherhood, Cooperation AndCoordination, May 23,1991

The Lebanese Republic and the Syrian Arab Republic, onthe basis of the distinguished brotherly relations betweenthem which derive their strength from the roots ofkinship, history, common affiliation, common destiny andjoint strategic interests; out of their belief that theachievement of the broadest cooperation and coordinationbetween them will serve their strategic interests andprovide the means for ensuring their development andprogress and for defending their pan-Arab and nationalsecurity, be a source of prosperity and stability, enablethem to face all regional and international developments,and meet the aspirations of the peoples of the twocountries; and in implementation of the Lebanese nationalaccord which was ratified by the Lebanese Chamber ofDeputies on November 5, 1989, have agreed on thefollowing:

Article 1The two states will work to achieve the highest level ofcooperation and coordination in all political, economic,security, cultural, scientific and other fields in a mannerthat will realize the interests of the two fraternalcountries within the framework of respect for theirindividual sovereignty and independence and will enablethe two countries to use their political, economic andsecurity resources to provide prosperity and stability,ensure their pan-Arab and national security and expandand strengthen their common interests, as an affirmation ofthe brotherly relations and guarantee of their commondestiny.

1 Riyadh Domestic Service, October 22, 1989, as printed inFBIS, October 24.


Article 2The two states will work to achieve cooperation andcoordination in the economic, agricultural, industrial andcommercial fields, as well as in the fields oftransportation, communications, customs, the establishmentof joint projects and coordination of development plans.

Article 3The connection between the security of the two countriesrequires that Lebanon not become a threat to Syria'ssecurity and vice versa under any circumstances. Therefore,Lebanon will not allow itself to become a transit point orbase for any force, state or organization that seeks toundermine its security, independence and unity, and theagreement among its people, will not allow any action thatthreatens Lebanon's security, independence andsovereignty.

Article 4After the political reforms are approved in a constitutionalmanner, as stipulated in the Lebanese national accord, andafter the deadlines specified in this accord have expired,the Syrian and Lebanese Governments will decide on theredeployment of the Syrian forces in the al-Biqa' area andthe entrance to western al-Biqa' in Dahr al-Baydar up toHammanah-al-Mudayrij-'Ayn Dara line, and if necessaryin other points to be specified by a joint Lebanese-Syrianmilitary committee. The two governments will conclude anagreement specifying the size and duration of the Syrianforces' presence in these areas and the relationship of theseforces with the authorities of the Lebanese state.

Article 5The two states' Arab and international foreign policiesshall be based on the following principles:

1. Lebanon and Syria are Arab states which arecommitted to the Arab League Charter, the Arab defensepact and joint economic cooperation, and all agreementsratified within the framework of the Arab League. Theyare members of the United Nations and are committed to its

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charter. They are also members of the NonalignedMovement.

2. The two countries share a common destiny andcommon interests.

3. Each country supports the other in issues related toits security and national interests in accordance of thecontents of this treaty. Therefore, the governments of thetwo countries shall coordinate their Arab and internationalpolicies, cooperate to the fullest extent possible in Arab andinternational institutions and organizations and coordinatetheir stands on regional and international issues.

Article 6The following bodies shall be formed to achieve the goalsof this treaty. Other bodies can be established by a decisionfrom the Supreme Council.1. The Supreme Council:

A. The Supreme Council will consist of the presidents ofthe two contracting countries and a number of other membersfrom both countries.

B. The Supreme Council will meet at least once a year,and more often when necessary, at a venue to be agreedupon.

C. The Supreme Council charts the general policy forcoordination and cooperation between the two states in thepolitical, economic, security, military and other fields. Italso supervises the implementation of this policy andadopts the plans and decisions that are made by theexecutive body, the foreign affairs committee, the economicand social affairs committee, the defense and securityaffairs committee or any committee that is established inthe future, provided that the constitutional provisions ofthe two countries are respected.

D. The Supreme Council's decisions are binding andeffective within the framework of the constitutional lawsand rules of the two countries, except for those decisionswhich require the approval of the executive or legislativeauthority in the two countries under their constitutionalprovisions.

E. The Supreme Council defines the subjects on which


the committees concerned have the right to make decisions.Once they are issued, these decisions assume an executivenature within the framework of the constitutional laws andrules of the two countries, except for those decisions whichrequire the approval of the executive or legislativeauthorities in the two countries under their constitutionalprovisions...1

Draft Electoral Law (summary), June 16,1992

The following are the bill's most important points:1. There are 128 deputies.2. Electoral constituencies: The Governorates in Beirut,

the south, and the north. In al-Biqa' and the mountain, theDistrict.

3. The sectarian and factional distribution of seats:Some 27 for the Sunni, 27 for the Shi'a, 34 for theMaronites, 8 for the Druze, 8 for the Greek Catholics, 14 forthe Greek Orthodox, 2 for the Alawites, 1 for theAnglicans, 1 for the Armenian Catholics, 5 for theArmenian Orthodox and 1 for the other Christianminorities.2

General Hasan Nasrallah, Secretary General ofHezbollah, News conference, June 30, 1992

"We fully support holding parliamentary elections assoon as possible so that the Lebanese people will be able tofreely choose their representatives. Second, in view of thefact that Hezbollah represents a popular support and asurging element of motivation; in an endeavor to benefitfrom all positions to channel the political arena towardactivating the resistance option; to promote our contributionto the defense of the oppressed and the deprived and to

1 Voice of Lebanon Radio, May 17, 1991, as printed in FBIS,May 20,1991.2 al-Safir, July 17,1992, as printed in FBIS, July 23,1992. The fulltext, including the breakdown of parliamentary districts by sect, isreproduced in al-Safir, June 16,1992, and printed in FBIS, July 16.

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adopt their causes; to contribute towards the seriousendeavor to eliminate political sectarianism, the root ofevil and corruption in this country; and to get a Chamber ofDeputies that can deal with this stage and its greatchallenges: We declare that we decided to participate inthe upcoming electoral process. We do this with the hopethat the active and good forces will have a chance toexpress themselves and the extent of their support freelyand honestly/'1

General Hasan Nasrallah, Secretary General ofHezbollah, Interview in al-Nahar, September 3, 2992

Question: "Don't you fear a repetition of the Algerianexperience here?"Nasrallah: "There is a great difference between Lebanonand Algeria. The Algerian regime's problem was theIslamists' sweep of the parliament. They got more thantwo-thirds of the seats, which would have enabled them tochange the nation's character. The structure in Lebanon, thevariety here and the distribution of parliamentary seatsmeans that the situation is not comparable. Consequently, Ido not believe that our party's entry into the Chamber ofDeputies, regardless of the numbers, should create fearssimilar to those of the Algerian regime... Our presence inthe Chamber of Deputies will give it an additional boostthat will enable it to assume its important and pivotal rolein Lebanon's political life. There is no need to deal withHezbollah's victory in the same way the Islamists' victoryin Algeria was dealt with...

"Our election program... is one of action, not ofpropaganda... We have never been a military party or amilitia. We presented ourselves as a jihad movement toconfront the continued occupation and aggression against ourpeople and our territories. Our participation in theChamber of Deputies absolutely does not negate the factthat we are a resistance movement. The reasons and

1 Voice of Lebanon Radio, June 30, 1992, as printed in FBIS,June 30.


motives that move people, or an entire people, to engage inresistance activity still exist; that is, the continuedoccupation."1

General Hasan Nasrallah, Secretary General ofHezbollah, Interview in Resalat, October 13, 1992

Quest ion: "Why did you decide to start politicalactivities?"Nasrallah: "Since its formation, Hezbollah has beeninvolved in political activities... Our participation inparliament is new... That Hezbollah participated in theelections and entered parliament can be said to be a newissue, but we should not forget that for the past twentyyears, parliamentary elections were not held in Lebanon.Had these elections been held five years ago, we wouldalso have participated then. In short, we do not accept thebelief that our military struggle has entered a politicalphase. From the start we had political activities, but themajor part of our activities is and will be the jihadmovement... This is our principle and we will not retreatfrom it..."

Q: "Now that Hezbollah deputies have entered theLebanese Parliament, what is your future strategy in thecountry?"Nasrallah: "The deputies must operate on three pivots.The first is resistance, political effort, propaganda andassisting the government in every field, especially inhelping the people who are living in war-stricken areas...Another political mission for our deputies is to confront theidea of talks with Israel and we should strive so that theother deputies will also be convinced these talks are wrong.Peace with this cancerous tumor is wrong and dangerous andwe should say that the threat of peace is more than thethreat of war with the Zionists. In parliament we willchallenge the talks with Israel.

Al-Nahar, August 25, 1992, as printed in FBIS, September 3.

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''The second pivot is based of denominationalismexisting in the Lebanese system and government positionsbeing distributed on its basis. For example, the presidentshould be Christian, the prime minister Sunni, and thespeaker Shi'i. Based on the constitution, parliament hasthe right to cancel this denominationalism. We areseriously pursuing this issue, because the main reasonbehind the political, social and economic corruption inLebanon is this political denominationalism that we aretrying to end.

"The third pivot is that our efforts aim to make laws toserve the oppressed and the deprived, confronting lawsthat are against the interests of the oppressed, especiallysince laws have been approved in Lebanon that support thecapitalists' interests. Generally speaking, we are trying toimprove the people's economic and social situation."1

Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Address, November 2, 1992

"Every member of this government is a minister for all ofLebanon, not for a sect or an area. We want this to be a newstage in the life of the country and the people. We want thecoming period to witness years of hope, reassurance andstability, leading to self-sufficiency and prosperity. Wewant to see every displaced person return to his house andland. We want to see our emigrant brothers and sons returnto their homeland to participate in its building.

"Much has been achieved through the nationalreconciliation agreement. We want this government tofollow the same course, reinforcing what has been achievedand developing the Lebanese democratic system and thefree Lebanese economy. We want the national march toproceed with a spirit of reconciliation acceptable to thecitizens and supported by the great majority of them. Thismajority should be vocal, active and demonstrateinitiative, directing our march in the right way to help us

Resalat, October 13,1992, as printed in FBIS, October 28.


overcome the years of strife."1

SAUDI ARABIA

The "Secular" Petition, December 1990. Drafted in the fallof 1990, this petition, signed by forty-three public figures,including cabinet ministers, businessmen and professors,was a moderate call for reform that sought to avoidassociation with any radical political groups.

1. A systematic framework for fatwa. It must take intoconsideration the sharia, which is infallible andunchangeable, as represented in the unequivocal texts of theKoran and the Hadith. But jurisprudence commentaries,Koran interpreters' views and the opinions of shariaexperts that are derived from divergent scholarly doctrinesare all human attempts to comprehend the sharia texts.These views are affected by their authors' ability tounderstand, given their level of knowledge and skill..Shaped by the circumstances of time and place, these viewsare liable to be wrong as well as right, and should be subjectto debate. Indeed, there has been a consensus amongscholars that no one may ever claim the sole right todetermine the meaning of the Koran or the Hadith ormonopolize the right to decide sharia rules. It is thereforeessential that we clearly and forcefully make a distinctionbetween what is divine and what is human. The revealedand unambiguous texts must be accepted and obeyed. Butscholarly opinions may be freely examined and questionedwithout any limits.2. Consider issuing a basic law of government in light ofthe statements and declarations made by the rulers of thecountry at various times.

3. Formation of a consultative council comprising the elitefrom among the qualified and knowledgeable opinionmakers known for their honesty, forthrightness,

1 Radio Lebanon, November 2, 1992, as printed in FBIS,November 2.

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impartiality, morality and public service, representing allregions of the kingdom. The council must have among itsresponsibilities the study, development and adoption oflaws and rules related to all economic, political,educational and other issues and should exercise effectivescrutiny of all executive agencies.

4. The revival of municipal councils; the implementationof the Law of Provinces; and the generalization of thechamber of commerce experience as a model for all othertrades.

5. The investigation of all aspects of the judicial system,in all its degrees, types and areas of competence, for thepurpose of modernizing its laws and evaluating the processof preparing judges and their assistants. Every stepnecessary must be taken to guarantee independence of thejudiciary, to assure its effectiveness and fairness, spread itsauthority and strengthen its foundations. Schools thattrain for this important field must be open to all citizens,not reserved to one group over the others in violation of thesharia-based principle of equality of opportunity.

6. Commitment to total equality among all citizens in allaspects of their life, without distinction based on ethnic,tribal, sectarian or social origins. The principle ofprotecting citizens against interference in their lives exceptby a court order must be firmly established.

7. Media policy must be reviewed and set according to acomprehensive and precise law reflecting the mostadvanced legislation in other countries. This law mustenable all Saudi media to exercise their freedom inpreaching good over evil, calling for virtue and shunningvice, enabling dialogue in an open Muslim society.

8. Comprehensive reform of the Associations for thePropagation of Virtue and the Deterrence of Vice. A preciselaw must be adopted specifying their functions and themethod they must follow, and setting strict rules for hiring


chiefs and members of precincts, to ensure judicious andtactful preaching.

9. Although we believe that nurturing the new generationis the highest duty of Muslim women, we neverthelessbelieve that there are numerous fields of public life wherewomen can be allowed to participate—within the scope ofthe sharia—thus honoring them and acknowledging theirrole in building society.

10. God revealed His holy books, and sent His prophets, toeducate and nurture humanity, proving that education isthe foremost important basis for the renaissance andprogress of nations. We believe that our country'seducational system is in need of comprehensive andfundamental reform to enable it to graduate faithfulgenerations that are qualified to contribute positively andeffectively in building the present and the future of thecountry, and to face the challenges of the age, enabling us tocatch up with the caravan of nations that have vastlysurpassed us in every field.1

The ''Religious" Petition, February 1991. This petition, aresponse to the popularity of the "secular" petition, wassigned by many top members of the religious establishmentin Saudi Arabia.

"In this critical period, everybody has recognized theneed for change. We therefore find that the most requisiteduty is to reform our present conditions that have caused usto suffer these tribulations. Consequently, we ask that theruler of the nation check the deterioration of theseconditions, which need reform in the following areas:

1 Aziz Abu-Hamad, Empty Reforms: Saudi Arabia's New BasicLaws (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Watch, 1992). In thepreamble, the forty-three signatories, both secular and religious,declared their devotion to the king and "the present system ofgovernment, and to preserving the cherished royal family" beforelisting their proposed reforms.

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1. The formation of a consultative council to decideinternal and external issues on the basis of the sharia. Itsmembers must be honest, straightforward and representingall fields of expertise. They must be totally independentand not be subject to any pressure that may affect theauthority of the council.

2. All laws and regulations of political, economic,administrative or other nature must be reconciled with theprinciples of the sharia. Trusted committees with expertisein sharia should be authorized to repeal legislation notconforming to sharia principles.

3. In addition to possessing specialized expertise,dedication and honesty, government officials and theiroverseas representatives must be unswervingly moral.Failing any one of these requirements for any reason is anabuse of public trust and a fundamental cause of injury to thenational interest and reputation.

4. Justice must be applied, rights granted and dutiesassigned in full equality among all citizens, not favoringthe nobles or begrudging the weak. Abuse of authority byanyone whether by shirking obligations or denying peoplewhat is their right is a cause for the breakup andannihilation of society.

5. All government officials, especially those occupyingthe highest positions, must be diligently scrutinized andmust be made accountable with no exceptions. Governmentagencies must be cleansed of anyone whose corruption ordereliction is proven, regardless of any other consideration.

6. Public wealth must be distributed fairly among allclasses and groups. Taxes must be eliminated and fees thathave overburdened citizens must be reduced. Governmentrevenues must be protected from exploitation and abuse;priority in expenditure must be given to the most urgentnecessities. All forms of monopoly or illegitimateownership must be eliminated. Restrictions imposed on


Islamic banks must be lifted. Public and private bankinginstitutions must be cleansed of usury, which is an affront toGod and His Prophet, and a cause for stunting the growth ofwealth.

7. A strong and fully-integrated army must be built andfully-equipped with weapons of all kinds, from any source.Attention must be given to manufacturing and developingarms. The goal of the army must be to protect the countryand the holy sites.

8. Information media must be remodeled according to theadopted media policy of the kingdom. The goals must be toeducate, serve Islam and express the morals of society. Themedia must be purged of anything conflicting with theseobjectives. Its freedom to spread awareness throughtruthful reporting and constructive criticism must besafeguarded within the confines of Islam.

9. Foreign policy must be based on national interestwithout relying on alliances not sanctioned by the sharia.It must also embrace Muslim causes. The kingdom'sembassies must be reformed to enable them to reflect theIslamic nature of the country.

10. Religious and proselytizing institutions must bedeveloped and strengthened with financial and humanresources. All obstacles preventing them from fully carryingout their objectives must be removed.

11. Judicial institutions must be unified and granted fulland effective independence. Juridical authority must applyto all. It is necessary to establish an independent bodywhose function is to ensure carrying out judicial orders.

12. The rights of individuals and society must beguaranteed. Every restriction on people's rights and theirwill must be removed, to ensure the enjoyment of human

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dignity, within the acceptable religious safeguards.1

King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, Interview in al-Siyassah,March 30,1992

Question: "What about the new laws of government whichwere announced in... the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. It issaid that they were formulated late and were promulgatedunder international pressure."Fahd: "These laws could have come earlier, and I spokeabout them to the Saudi people. But the events in theregion led to the delay in issuing them. They stem from theIslamic sharia, which is the original source. To say thatthey are the result of pressure from this or that side isnothing but hearsay and has no basis in truth or reality.Those who say such a thing know nothing about the realityand genuineness of the Saudi people and know nothingabout the true character of this society and its structure,roots and traditions. The Saudi people are capable ofrespecting their traditions and conventions and Arab roots...

"Saudi Arabia and its people are not things which learnlessons or submit to pressure from anyone [as received]. Thisis because we respect the affairs of others and do notinterfere with them; likewise, we expect others to respectus as we respect them. The three laws stem from a Saudivisualization and from our true traditions/'

Q: "What do you think of the democratic systems whichprevail in the world? Is the system of free electionssuitable for our peoples here?"Fahd: 'The prevailing democratic system in the world isnot suitable for us in this region, for our peoples'composition and traits are different from the traits of thatworld. We cannot import the way in which other peoplesdeal (with their own affairs) in order to apply it on ourpeople; we have our own Muslim faith which is a completesystem and a complete religion.

1 Aziz Abu-Hamad, Empty Reforms: Saudi Arabia's New BasicLaws (Washington, D.C.: Middle East Watch, 1992).


"Elections do no fall within the sphere of the Muslimreligion, which believes in the al-shurah (consultative)system and openness between ruler and his subjects andwhich makes whoever is in charge fully answerable to hispeople. This does not mean, however, that we should notbenefit from the realities brought about by socialtransformations and any other developments*Nevertheless, any change must (conform) with theteachings of our Muslim faith. Free elections are notsuitable for our country, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Ourcountry is a special one, a matter which one shouldunderstand; it is the country which is in charge of the twoholy mosques on behalf of the Islamic world. This is acountry whose political life has been characterized bystability and safety, and by the application of theteachings of Islam. It is therefore a special country."

Q: "You have asserted that free elections are not suitablefor your country and the fact that democracy as it isunderstood in the West also is not suitable."Fahd: "Of course, we do not interfere in others' internalaffairs; the kingdom has been from the outset eager not tointerfere in others' (internal affairs) and in their politicalpractices.

"Of course, in my opinion Western democracies could besuitable in their countries but they are not suitable for allthe peoples of the world. As I have said, there is no harmin benefiting from some of the good aspects on the conditionthat those do not disagree with the teachings of ourreligion."

Q: "Do you think that the Saudi system is suitable forother countries in the region and that they can benefit fromit?"Fahd: "The system of government here has become publicand anyone can observe its effectiveness."1

1 Saudi Press Agency (SPA), March 28,1992, as printed in FBIS,March 30.

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Basic Law of Government, March 1992

Chapter One: General PrinciplesArticle 1

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a sovereign ArabIslamic state with Islam as its religion; God's book, and theSunna of his Prophet, God's prayers and peace be upon him,are its constitution; Arabic is its language; and Riyadh isits capital.

Chapter Two: Law of GovernmentArticle 5a. The law of government in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabiais monarchy.c. The king chooses the heir apparent and relieves him byroyal order.e. The heir apparent assumes the powers of the king on thelatter's death until the act of allegiance has been carriedout.Article 6

Citizens are to pay allegiance to the king in accordancewith the holy Koran and the Prophet's tradition, insubmission and obedience and in times of ease anddifficulty, fortune and adversity.Article 8

The Government of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia standson the bases of justice, shura [consultation] and equality inaccordance with the Islamic sharia.

Chapter Three: Constituents of the Saudi FamilyArticle 13

Education will aim at instilling the Islamic faith in theyoung generation, to provide them with knowledge andskills and to prepare them to become useful members in thebuilding of their society, members who love theirhomeland and are proud of its history.

Chapter Four: Economic PrinciplesArticle 18

The state protects the freedom of private property and


its sanctity. No one is to be stripped of his property exceptwhen this serves public interest, in which case faircompensation is due.

Chapter Five: Rights and DutiesArticle 23

The state protects Islam; it implements its sharia; itorders people to do right and to shun evil; it fulfills theduty regarding God's call.Article 25

The state strives to attain the hopes of the Arab andIslamic nation for solidarity and unity of word and toconsolidate its relations with friendly states.Article 26

The state protects human rights in accordance with theIslamic sharia.Article 27

The state guarantees the right of the citizen and hisfamily in cases of emergency, illness, disability and oldage. It supports the system of social security and encouragesinstitutions and persons to contribute acts of charity.Article 28

The state provides job opportunities to whomever iscapable of carrying out such jobs; it enacts laws that protectthe employee and the employer.Article 29

The state guards science, literature and culture; itencourages scientific research; it protects the Islamic andArab heritage and contributes to Arab, Islamic and humancivilization.Article 34

The defense of the Islamic religion, society and thecountry is the duty of each citizen. The regime explains theprovision of the military service.Article 36

...No one shall be arrested, imprisoned, or have hisactions restricted except in accordance with the provisionsof the law.

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Article 37Houses shall have their sanctity and shall not be

entered without the permission of their owners or besearched except in cases specified by statutes.Article 38

...There shall be no crime or penalty except in accordancewith religious law [sharia] or organizational law [nizami].

Chapter Six: Authorities of the StateArticle 44

The authorities of the state consist of the following:a. The judicial authorityb. The executive authorityc. The regulatory authorityThese authorities will cooperate with each other in theperformance of their duties in accordance with this andother laws. The king shall be the point of reference for allthese authorities.Article 46

The judiciary is an independent authority... there is nohegemony over judges in the dispensation of their judgmentexcept for that of the Islamic sharia.Article 47

The right to litigate is ensured for citizens and residentsin the kingdom on an equal basis. The law defines therequired procedures for this.Article 48

The courts will apply the rules of Islamic sharia to thecases that are brought before them...Article 55

The king carries out the policy of the nation, alegitimate policy in accordance with the provisions ofIslam; the king oversees the implementation of the Islamicsharia, the systems, the state's general policies and theprotection and defense of the country.Article 68

A consultative council is to be created. Its statute willshow how it is formed, how it exercises its powers and howits members are selected. The king has the right to dissolvethe consultative council and to reform it.


Chapter Nine: General ProvisionsArticle 82

Without violating the contents of Article 7 of this law,no provision of this law whatsoever can be suspended unlessit is temporary, such as in a period of war or during thedeclaration of a state of emergency. This will be inaccordance with the terms of the law.

Shura Council Statute, March 1992

Article 1...A shura (consultative) council shall be established

according to His law and in concordance with the Book ofGod and His Prophet, to retain ties of brotherhood,cooperation and faith.Article 3

The council will consist of sixty members and a president,chosen by the king, from among people of knowledge andexpertise and specialists. The duties, obligations and rightsof its members and all related matters will be set by a royalorder.Article 4

Each member of the council shall be:a) Saudi of nationality, birth and origin;b) Known to be a person of virtue and ability;c) Not younger than thirty years.

Article 6Should any member of the council neglect his duties, the

member shall be investigated and tried according to rules tobe issued by royal order.Article 7

If the post of a shura council member becomes vacant forany reason, the king chooses the person to replace him andissues a royal decree in this connection.Article 8

Members of the council are not entitled to use theirposition to their advantage.Article 9

It is not possible to retain membership in the council inconjunction with any government post or the management of

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any company unless the king sees a need for this.Article 13

The council's duration is four years starting with thedate of its formation by royal decree. The new council is tobe formed two months before the end of the current council.Upon the formation of a new council, it must be observedthat at least half of its members must be new members whohave not served in the previous council.Article 15

The council shall give its opinion in the general policiesof the states which are referred to it by the prime minister,The council's specific duties are:

a) To review the general plans for economic and socialdevelopment rendering its opinion about those plans;

b) To study laws, agreements, alliances, internationalaccords and concessions and to give its opinions concerningthem;

c) To debate annual reports submitted by ministries andother government organizations and to issue its opinionconcerning them.Article 16

A quorum of two-thirds of the membership, including thepresident or the deputy, is required to hold a meeting.Resolutions are only valid if passed by a majority.Article 17

Decisions of the council will be referred to the primeminister, who will transfer them to the Council ofMinisters. If the views of the council are in agreement withthe cabinet, the king shall approve of the decisions. Ifthere is disagreement, the king shall make the decision.Article 18

Laws, alliances, international agreements andconcessions will be issued by royal decree after their reviewby the shura council.Article 19

The council is empowered to form specialized committeesto carry out its functions and is entitled to look into anymatter that is on its agenda.Article 20

The council can engage the expertise of any person it


wishes after the agreement of the president of the council.Article 22

The president of the council is empowered to require fromthe prime minister the presence of any government officialat the council's meetings provided the council is lookinginto matters under the responsibility of that official. Thecouncil will allow the government to invite those officialsto participate in its deliberations but they shall have noright to vote.Article 23

Any ten members of the council have the right to suggestprojects for new laws or to amend existing laws and topresent them to the president of the council. The presidentwill refer these propositions to the king.Article 24

The president of the council has the right to ask theprime minister to make available to the council anydocuments, data or information in the possession of thegovernment that the council deems necessary to facilitateits work.Article 27

The council shall have its own budget approved by theking. The manner of spending these budgets will beundertaken according to royal decrees that will be issued.Article 30

This law cannot be amended except in the manner inwhich it was issued (i.e., by royal decree).1

King Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz, Address, December 22, 2992

"I do not object [to] who[ever] wants to say something ofbenefit to Islam, the Muslims or his country. But sometimesthere have been violations of this ancient code [thesharia], and I do not think this is useful... Clubs and pulpits

* The Saudi Basic Law of Government, Shura Council StatuteDecree, and the Decree on Regions Statute are available in theirentirety by the SPA, and printed in FBIS, March 2,1992. The ShuraCouncil Statute printed here is based on the translation in NewYork Times, March 2, 1992.

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must not be exploited by one person to attack another. Ibelieve this is absolutely unacceptable... If our doors wereclosed to the citizens, a person could say that he had nooption but to speak his mind in the street, the mosque oranywhere else. But our doors are open and our hearts areopen...

"Two years ago we began seeing things that wereunfamiliar to us and were completely non-existent here. Dowe accept that somebody comes to us from outside ourcountry to direct us? No. We have our faith, and we acceptdirections from no one but God...Forums are no longer beingused for revealing what has been established by theprophet and the book. They are now being used for worldly[i.e., political] purposes or for matters unrelated to publicinterest...

"I hope that efforts will be confined to giving advice forthe sake of God. If, however, someone has things to saythen he can always come to those in charge and speak tothem in any region, in any place. As advice, this is wantedand desired. What is not desired is to bring issues out intothe open. As far as bringing issues out into the open isconcerned, even though in the past we have turned a blindeye to it, naturally I want it to be understood clearly thatno blind eye will be turned to anything that causes damagefirst, to the creed, second, to the national interest andthird, to anything that changes the existing situation/'1

YEMEN

President AH Abdullah Salih, Interview, April 29, 1993

Question: "What is your comment on the atmosphere inwhich the elections were held and on the availableresults?"Salih: "What we are interested in is successful electionsirrespective of which party wins the majority or moreseats. All that the leadership was interested in has been

Mideast Mirror, December 21, 1992.


the soundness and success of this experience. As far as Iknow, all parties have obtained good quotas in parliament.We hope that every political organization will have agood quota in parliament. This is because we would like tohave all political forces in the new parliament, especiallythe effective political forces, which have a weight and apolitical status, and which have struggled in Yemen andachieved great things for the Yemeni people, such as therealization of the Yemeni unity on May 22nd. Those havestruggled until Yemen's great democratic happy day wasachieved on April 27th/7

Q: "The results of the elections will create a new balance atthe Council of Representatives. How will this balance bereflected on the formation of the new government and on thebilateral coalition which was set up during thetransitional period between the GPC [People's GeneralCongress] and the Yemeni Socialist party (YSP), especiallyif the al-Islah coalition leads the YSP in the elections?Salih: "First, as for the Council of Representatives or thenew government, we perceive that, irrespective of who winsthe majority, the government will be a national accordgovernment rather than a majority government. This isbecause the country needs that. I believe the newgovernment will bear major responsibilities and new tasks,especially with regard to eliminating the residue of thepartition and to exercising the transitional period."

Q: "The issue of merging the two parties [GPC and YSP] wasraised during the election campaign. Will this be followedup on after the announcement of the results of theelections?"Salih: "Of course. A merger or unity between the YSP andthe GPC was and continues to be raised. This will be startedwith the formation of a parliamentary bloc between thetwo parties within the framework of a future unity."1

Radio Monte Carlo, April 29,1993, as printed in FBIS, April 30.

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President Alt Abdullah Salih, Interview in al-Hayat,May 4,1993

"We view the success of the election process withadmiration and appreciation. It was a peaceful process,thanks to all [of] our people's sense of patriotism and theinteraction of all the influential political organizationsand parties which cooperated to ensure the success of theelections. The rivals in the elections also lived up to thetask of ensuring a sound and successful experiment. Therewere some violations, of course, but whatever negativeaspects or violations there were, they were outweighed bythe positive aspects. The negative aspects were a result ofsome organizational failures. There is also the question ofcomplaints... I said on Tuesday [polling day] that any partyor candidate who fails would try to contest the honesty ofthe elections, and that is what actually happened. I havelearned that there is more than one complaint by more thanone party. Every party hears that one party or another hascomplained, so they complain so as not to be themselvesblamed for any violations. I understand that there are nomore that seven main cases. The rest are all complaints bypolitical parties about political decisions. That is harmfulto the parties that complain because they blemish thesuccessful election experiment, which, as internationalorganizations and the press testify, was sound, successfuland honest...

Question: "Could you give us a general idea about theconstitutional reforms?"Salih: "Definition of the form of the state's presidency;ending the duplication in the work of the executive,judicial and legislative authorities; formation of a newconsultative council that would have an equal electednumber of representatives from the governorates as well assome efficient and influential appointees; and introductionof local government, which is one of the important tasksthat will make possible the election of governors and headsof directorates. These are some of the futures of theconstitutional amendments."


Q: "How do you envisage the peaceful exercise of power?Do you believe that there should be controls even for thepresidency?"Salih: "In our plan, we have limited the presidency to twoterms only so that the parties and the leaders wouldqualify to exercise power. [Each term will last] five years.

Q: "How do you interpret the U.S. interest in the Yemenielections and democratic experiment? Was it a pre-electioninterest or an encouragement surfacing after the electionsbecame a reality?"Salih: "There was unfair foreign media questioning of theYemenis' ability to hold such elections and achieve unity...

"As regards the Americans, they encouraged thedemocratic course in our country from the beginning andwelcomed the elections and their success. Their support forelections and democracy in our country was moral andinformational support, not material support. Generallyspeaking, we are satisfied and we are very proud of theinternational interest, including the American interest, inour democratic experiment. We feel that the world willreceive our country's successes in the democratic field withsatisfaction, and that will reflect on relations between ourcountry and many states in the world."1

1 Al-Hayat, May 4,1993, as printed in FBIS, May 7.

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