Democracy, Market Economics, and Environmental Policy in Chile

Democracy, Market Economics, and Environmental Policy in ChileAuthor(s): Eduardo SilvaSource: Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter, 1996),pp. 1-33Published by: Center for Latin American Studies at the University of MiamiStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/166257 .

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Democracy, Market Economics, and Environmental Policy in Chile

Eduardo Silva

hile's return to democratic rule with sustained economic growth provided the opportunity for some much-welcomed political space

that, it was hoped, would permit the country to attend, at long last, to a number of pressing issues which had been long deferred, if not

ignored, by the previous military government. Some of those issues, such as the consolidation of democracy, poverty, and human rights, had been the subject of considerable study by scholars. Much less studied, however, although also on the agenda, was the promise to address Chile's environmental problems, which had become much exacerbated under the laissez-faire economic model favored by the military regime. Because the new democratic administrations have followed through on that promise, the Chilean example lends support to that hypothesis which holds that environmental concerns in developing countries can be addressed more effectively under economically stable democratic

regimes than by authoritarian political systems.

While Chile's recent environmental policy clearly offers hope for the future, it also presents a challenge. Policy debates on environmental

questions have been surprisingly sharp and bruising. The force and outcome of these debates give rise to two questions. First, can developing countries with neoliberal policy orientations consider a sufficiently

Eduardo Silva is Assistant Professor of Political Science and a Fellow of the Center for International Studies at the University of Missouri-St. Louis and Adjunct Senior Research Associate of the North-South Center, University of Miami, Florida. He is author of THE STATE AND CAPITAL IN CHILE: BUSINESS ELITES, TECHNO- CRATS, AND MARKET ECONOMICS IN CHILE (Westview, 1996). His articles on environment and development have appeared in Development and Change and in the Industrial and Environmental Crisis Quarterly. He is currently working on a book about the politics of conservation and sustainable development in the forests of Latin America.

Thanks to Patricio Silva, Frank Fischer, Patricio Rodrigo, and the Corporacion para la Preservacion y Conservacion del Medio Ambiante (Alejandra Aburto and Carola Urrutia). Research was supported by the North-South Center of the Univer- sity of Miami and by the United Nations World Institute for Economic Development Research (UN/WIDER). The paper was originally prepared for a comparative research project directed by UN/WIDER; a revised version is forthcoming in Martin Jinicke and Helmut Weidner, with HelgeJiorgens (eds.) NATIONAL ENVIRONMEN- TAL POLICIES: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF CAPACITY-BUILDING (Berlin, Ger- many: Springer Verlag).

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2 JOURNAL OF INERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

broad range of options, institutional structures, or degree of sociopolitical participation to move beyond present technological strategies (high- chimney, end-of-pipe) for controlling pollution in order to build environmental safeguards into agriculture and the extraction of renewable natural resources? Second, failing that, can such countries ensure any effective movement towards more intensive application of present (end- of-pipe) treatments in order to control pollution and induce large-scale industry to harvest, rather than mine, natural renewable resources?

The answer to the first question appears to be "no." In shifting from a dictatorship to a democracy, Chile appears to have missed the opportunity to build into its environmental policy sufficient incentives for the development of methods that would make it possible to address the causes of environmental degradation rather than concentrating primarily on the symptoms. Such approaches, in both industry and agriculture, tend to focus either on managing the input of materials in the production process or else work to replace highly toxic inputs with less toxic ones. This, of course, requires investing in (1) research and development (R&D) to come up with new technology and (2) changes in the processes concerning production and/or cultiva- tion. In extractive industries, such approaches would serve to support procedures that make possible a more ecologically friendly use of natural renewable resources.

The second question involves changes which are smaller in degree but are challenging nonetheless, especially in situations where governments look upon concern for the environment as inimical to rapid economic growth (Rosenberg, 1994). Given the military government's neglect of the environment, the democratic government that followed focused its attention, sensibly enough, on elemental questions. To its credit, it began by identifying and diagnosing major problems with the environment, by drawing up fundamental legislation to address those problems, and by either creating or strengthening public institutions to administer them. Unfortunately, it had become clear by 1994 that these initiatives were basically weak and inadequate to the task. They had been devised with only the smallest, most incremental gains in mind, rather than with the aim of developing intensive, end-of-pipe technology capable of controlling pollution. Legislation relegated resolution of the most pressing concerns - like establishing indicators and standards - to regulatory statutes. Those statutes, however, are to be adminis- tered by institutions that are themselves weak, and in which the industry to be regulated is closely involved as a collaborator and from



SILVA: DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN CHILE

which other social groups are essentially excluded. In addition to these

shortcomings, the extraction of natural renewable resources is not even under consideration. Environmental problems are dealt with in isola-

tion, as if they bore no relationship to other areas of government, such as the economy or social policy. Funding is largely contingent on

financing from the international community.

How did this situation originate? To gain a better understanding of the process, it is necessary to examine, among other things, the political accommodations regarding environmental policy within the context of Chile's transition to democracy, both historical and institutional. Two factors help to explain why environmental concerns, so long neglected, finally found a place on the policy agenda. The first factor was political. When General Pinochet went down to defeat in the general election of December 1989, his victorious opponents were at last given the chance to address some of the issues that had been ignored under the military government, as had been promised during the campaign; this opened up political opportunities for the environmental movement (Drake and

Jaksic, 1991; Oppenheim, 1993). The second factor was economic. Chile's desire to enter into an expanded North American Free Trade

Agreement (NAFTA), which carries an environmental impact compo- nent, also created pressures on the new democratic government of President Patricio Aylwin (1990-1994) to address environmental issues.

The shift to democracy opened political opportunities for the environmental movement to press its agenda because the newly-elected government had included this issue in the platform on which it had

campaigned.1 However, once the election was over, and some of the environmental leaders became involved in the policymaking process, friction arose between leaders of the movement and those of the new administration. The incoming government preferred to move slowly, deviating as little as possible from the status quo ante, since its leaders

agreed with the business community that the highest priority should be given to promoting economic growth as rapidly as possible. Thus, in order to keep its election promise vis-a-vis the environment and defuse the developing tensions, the government found it expedient to favor those environmental groups who were more amenable to its own

agenda. For this reason, any significant changes in environmental policy will probably have to wait upon future shifts in the political scene, meaning the electoral victory of a new government capable of distanc-

ing itself from, but not alienating, the business community. The

policymaking process might then become open to those environmental

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4 JOURNAL OF INTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

groups (and their political party allies) who advocate materials management, substitution, and changes in industrial processes, along with a demand for more careful attention to natural renewable resources.

Given this framework for Chile's environmental policy, the first section is devoted to the period of the military government, briefly describing its economic model with a focus upon the major environmental problems that developed. The second section examines how the subsequent democratic governments have responded to these issues, paying particular attention to the basic legal and institutional arrangements which these administrations have fashioned to address the issue of the environment. The final section discusses these political accommodations and the policymaking styles they represent to show how they have influenced not only the recent legislation on the environment but also the institutions charged with its implementation as well.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY OF MTARY RULE, 1973-1989

hile emerged from military rule as a leading example of successful, market-oriented, economic restructuring among the developing

nations of South America. Its economic model emphasized exports based on extractive activity in agriculture, fishing, and lumber, as well as in minerals (principally copper). Chile privatized the financial sector, shrank manufacturing, and encouraged the import-export trade. In order to spur restructuring of the economy, the military regime had instituted drastic cutbacks in state-owned enterprises and reduced government regulation of the economy. Ministries and agencies found themselves cut to the bone in terms of both function and staff. Whether or not one approves of this neoliberal model, Chile's economy, after a rocky start, has done quite well within its confines. From the mid-1980s onwards, Chile has sustained a positive rate of growth in its gross domestic product (GDP) and kept its fiscal accounts in order. The country also enjoys low inflation, rising rates of investment, a sound financial system (able to export capital to neighboring countries), while a vigorous export trade - mainly in extractive activities - helps to

keep its external accounts in order (Hojman, 1993). Yet sustaining this economic growth - born in the heady,

freewheeling days of neoliberalism installed by the military dictatorship - came at a significant cost to the environment, among its other negative effects. The impact of rapid, unregulated development, based




on intensive agriculture and extraction of natural resources, contributed to the depletion of fisheries, destruction of natural forests, soil erosion and desertification, as well as pollution of water sources. Mining of nonrenewable natural resources polluted both the air and water of

nearby towns and coastal areas. By the same token, poor air quality and

inadequate treatment of sewage remain among the principal environmental problems of Chile's capital city, Santiago, and other major urban areas. Let us take a closer look at some of these environmental problems, the military government's response to them, and the early development of the environmental movement in Chile in order to gain the perspective needed for understanding the policy responses of the democratic

period, inaugurated in 1990.

Chile's Main Environmental Problems

The Fishing Industry. Chile possesses a coastline of 6,435 kilometers (km.) that is extremely rich in marine resources. During the

period of military government (1973-90), Chile's fishing industry ex-

panded dramatically from a catch of about 1.5 million metric tons in 1971 to 2.5 million in 1979, and just above 6 million tons in 1989. From 1989 to 1991, the catch averaged about 5.9 million metric tons per year, almost double that of the 1979-81 period. Over 90% of the fish caught were exported, either as fishmeal or products that were frozen or canned. While this was good for industry and the balance of payments, it did not bode well for the long-term prospects of Chilean fisheries.

According to the World Bank, 3.5 million tons constitutes the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) that can be harvested from Chilean coastal waters without depleting the fisheries. The current size and age of the catch suggests a current overfishing of these stocks and conse-

quent decline of fisheries (Arsenberg, Higgins, and Asenjo, 1989; Cardenas, 1985; G6mez-Lobo, 1991).

The Forestry Sector. The forestry sector was another industry that grew at spectacular rates during the military regime (Gwynne, 1993). From 1974 to 1990, this sector expanded from 4.8% of GDP to 7.5% and accounted for $750 million dollars worth of exports in 1991 (World Resources Institute, 1994). Typical products include wood

chips, wood pulp for paper, paper, whole logs, plywood, and planks. Development of the forestry sector has had environmental effects both

benign and deleterious. Most of the lumber industry is based on

plantations of exotic species, predominately pine with some eucalyp-

5




tus. On the positive side, the original plantations were established in south-central Chile, either on land that had been abandoned or suffered from soil erosion. As a result, the forests established helped to restore land that had been degraded either through agricultural or ranching use

(CONAMA, 1992). On the negative side, the lumber industry's emphasis on plantations tended to devalue the native species. As a result, natural forests are now being cleared to make room for plantations of more

commercially desirable wood; and the growing international demand for short-fiber wood chips abroad has also led to the wholesale clear-

cutting of natural forests (Silva, forthcoming).

The Mining Industry. Mining remains Chile's leading export- earning industry and accounts for nearly half of the nation's hard-

currency earnings (US$4.4 billion in 1991). Although the industry has diversified into the mining of other metals (gold, silver, and molybde- num) in recent years, copper continues to dominate the field. Chile is the second largest producer of copper in the world, and the state- owned company called Corporaci6n del Cobre (CODELCO) owns a

quarter of all the country's mines and is responsible for at least three-

quarters of the industry's output. Between 1980 and 1990, CODELCO doubled its production from 600,000 metric tons to 1,200,000 metric tons (World Resources Institute, 1994). Located in the deserts of northern Chile, the mining industry there contributes substantially to the pollution, both rural and urban, of that region. Smelting, refining, and the extraction of commercial by-products account for the bulk of this pollution, which comes in the form of sulfur dioxide, fine particu- late matter, and arsenic. The resulting air pollution poses significant health risks for local populations, while the emission of toxic wastes, both liquid and solid, pose serious problems downstream in coastal waters and urban areas (Aburto, Urrutia, and Rodrigo, 1995; CONAMA, 1992: 70).

The Agricultural Sector.2 Chile's free-market model emphasizes agro-industrial exports, dominated by fruit from the fertile central

valley, which have expanded from constituting only 36% of the country's agricultural exports in 1970 to more than 70% after 1988 (World Resources Institute, 1994). However, the intensive use of agri- chemicals (in the form of fertilizers and insecticides) have sharply increased contamination of soil and water, posing serious health hazards for agricultural workers and their villages, as well as being responsible for the harmful effects downstream. There is presently a lively, but

unresolved, debate going on regarding their effects on consumers,




stimulated by outbreaks of gastric infections resulting from consumption of contaminated products, such as cured meats (CIPMA, 1991; CONAMA y Ministerio, 1994).

According to some accounts, the various problems of soil loss, erosion, desertification, sedimentation, and salinization are not considered serious for the modern, technology-intensive agricultural sector in the short term. However, failure to address these situations as they occur have the potential to develop into much graver problems down the line, like 20 years hence. On the other hand, these conditions already pose serious threats to the marginal lands being worked by impoverished peasants (CIPMA, 1991). Desertification and salinization are particularly serious in the northern part of Chile, where almost 60% of the lands so affected are located. The situation dates back well before 1970 and is

largely the result of careless, indiscriminate use of native vegetation by the mining industry and rural populations (CONAMA, 1992).

The Urban Environment. The urban-industrial areas of Chile suffer from a myriad of problems, of which air pollution and sewage are

among the most pressing. For example, in metropolitan Santiago, the

capital city, home to almost a quarter of the nation's population, air

pollution has reached alarming levels, largely from emissions that come from point and non-point sources. The effect of this pollution on the health of its inhabitants include a drastic increase in the prevalence of

respiratory diseases (CONAMA, 1992).

Similar problems afflict urban areas in the rest of the country as well. In the north, cities suffer particularly from fallout from the mining industry, whose uncontrolled smelting and refining processes produce intolerably high emissions of arsenic, sulfur dioxide, nitrous oxide, and

copper particulates. In most urban areas, including many of the port cities, inadequate treatment of sewage and industrial wastes discharged from industrial activities - like mining, manufacturing, food processing, fish plants, and the pulp and paper industry - contaminate the water supply. These toxic, unsanitary wastes are frequently discharged into open canals that then serve as the source of water used to irrigate truck farms (CONAMA, 1992). As a result, unless treated by the individual family household, the consumption of raw vegetables routinely causes outbreaks of typhus, hepatitis, and, until recently, cholera.

Water Resources. The uncontrolled nature of Chile's economic

development (in mining, manufacturing, fish processing, the pulp and

paper industry, intensive agriculture, and timber) has resulted in placing great stress on the country's water resources, both fresh water

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8 JOURNAL OF INTERAMECAN SUDIES AND WORLD AAIRS

inland and salt water along the coast. First of all, the increased production, both industrial and agricultural, plus the rising populations of the nation's cities have led to a water shortage (World Resources Institute, 1994). By one estimate, agriculture consumes 89% of the country's fresh water, industry (of various kinds) uses 5%, and domestic sources the other 6%. Uncontrolled economic development and urban growth have also exacerbated pollution of Chile's rivers and coast. Areas with a high population density, in particular, find themselves under great pressure from the deteriorating watershed which has come about due to the felling of natural forests, pollution from industrial wastes, the runoff from

agricultural chemicals, and inadequate (if not altogether lacking) treatment of sewage. Contamination of rivers has led to rising, and dangerous, levels of pollution in such port cities as Valparaiso-Vifia del Mar, Concepci6n-Talcahuano (in central Chile), and Bahia Chaniaral in the north (Eco-XXI, 1993; CONAMA, 1992; World Resources Institute, 1994).

Biodiversity. All these problems taken together - soil erosion and salinization (in the north and along the coast of central Chile), deforestation, plantations, extensive grazing of cattle and sheep (further south), pollution - have had a pernicious effect upon the habitats of flora and fauna. By 1985, 69 species of Chilean flora were in danger of extinction: 11 of these were classified as endangered, 26 were placed in the vulnerable category, and 31 were considered rare. At least six

species of mammals and birds also were considered in danger of

extinction, with an additional two species of mammals and six of birds

placed in the vulnerable category (CONAMA, 1992).

Response to Environmental Problems During the Military Government; Genesis of the Environmental Movement

Chile's environmental movement began in 1963 with the found-

ing of the Comit6 de Defensa de la Fauna y Flora (CODEFF), which remains one of the most important nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in Chile to deal with the environment. However, at the time of its inception, this group of ecologists dedicated to the preservation of

biodiversity was largely ignored. During those years, politics centered on the crucial issues of "reform or revolution" (Rojas, 1994), although the Stockholm conference on the environment, held in 1972, and the creation of the United Nations Environmental Programme helped to

give the movement in Chile further impetus. Then, in 1974, shortly after installation of the military government, a group of ecologists banded

together to found the Instituto de Ecologia. Throughout the reign of the



SILVA: DEMOCRACY AND TEENVIRONMENT IN CHILE

military government, this organization actively lobbied the authorities to create a legal and administrative framework which could address Chile's environmental problems (Grau, 1995).

Starting in the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, many more environmental NGOs sprang up, largely as a result of the political repression which purged centrist and Left-leaning academics from the universities. The Centro de Investigaci6n y Planificaci6n para el Medio Ambiente (CIPMA), another one of Chile's leading environmental NGOs, was founded in the early 1980s, as was the Grupo de

Investigaciones Agrarias (GIA), the Centro de Estudiosy Tecnologfa (CET), El Canelo de Nos, and the Instituto de Ecologza Politica (IEP). The staffs of these organizations were concerned with a wide range of issues. Rather than taking a strict preservationist stance, they linked their concern for the environment with a number of other issues as well, like development and social justice (Rojas, 1994). Of all these NGOs, CIPMA remained in the political center and, via a series of congresses held over the years, played an important role in building consensus

among the different groups and in setting the political agendas. The GIA and CET tended to be more on the Left, while the IEP, Canelo de Nos, and CODEFF took more radical ecological stances along the lines of the New Left.

During this time, in which civil society was cautiously organizing to respond to the increasing degradation of the environment, the

military government basically either ignored the environmental impact of its development model or, when pressure mounted, gave it very low

priority. The main goal of the government was to promote economic

growth as rapidly as possible, at any and all costs, and with minimum intervention by the government. As a result, the country's environmental problems worsened significantly between 1973 and 1984 but received little or no attention, as evidenced by the lack of any effort to

develop laws or institutions to deal with it. To the contrary, the various ministries, already much weakened as institutions, were supposed to enforce a welter of existing, often conflicting regulations of the environment without the help of any coordinating mechanism. The most

important ministries involved were those of Health, Agriculture, Economy, Public Works, Defense, Housing and Urban Affairs, Trans-

port, Mines, and Interior (Grau, 1989). The Corporaci6n Nacional Forestal (CONAF), a semiautonomous government agency, was in

charge of managing forests and national parks. With a few additions, as will be seen, these continue to be the most significant government agencies involved in looking after the environment today.

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Nevertheless, a combination offactors - growing world attention to environmental issues, limited lobbying, and the expansion of Chile's environmental movement during a period of political upheaval - induced the military government to respond in two ways, although in typical minimalist fashion. First, in answer to the strenuous efforts of

key individuals in the Instituto de Ecologia, the military government recognized the issue of the environment in the Constitution of 1980, which gave it legal standing and is still the law of the land today. This

constitution, passed at the height of the military government's popular- ity, stipulated that citizens have the right to live in an environment free of contamination, and that it is the duty of the government both to ensure that right and to watch over the preservation of nature (Republica de Chile, 1980). Although these were only pretty words during the

dictatorship, they gained new meaning in democracy.

Then, in 1983, CIPMA organized the first Scientific Congress for the Environment. The event brought together 377 scientists and academics (a good turnout for the time, given the lack of political freedom in Chile) to diagnose the country's main environmental problems and offer policy recommendations. Despite government control of the

media, the latter was able to report to the nation that the scientific

community had expressed its grave concern, bolstered by solid technical data, regarding the critical state of Chile's environment. In short, the environmental movement had begun to flex its muscle, albeit cau-

tiously, in an attempt to gauge its own strength.

In response to this event, the military government created the National Commission for Ecology in 1984. Its main task: to establish a national environmental policy. That goal, however, remained unreal- ized despite the best efforts of its well-intentioned staff (Grau, 1989; Rojas, 1994). No doubt the fact that General Pinochet's rule was coming under increasing attack at the time contributed to the dictator's decision to make a minor concession to the environmental movement. Early in

1983, severe economic crisis provided the spark that led to formation of an enduring, mass mobilization movement demanding a quick return to democratic rule. To buy time and defuse the burgeoning political opposition, the military government granted small concessions to a number of groups in 1983 and 1984, the environmentalists, apparently, among them (Drake and Jaksic, 1991; Oppenheim, 1993).3

Despite the Pinochet government's generally dismal record on the

environment, it did pursue one issue aggressively. Though Chile is a

contracting party or signatory to most global environmental conven-



SILVA: DEMOCRACY AND TIE ENVIRONMENT IN CmILE

tions (World Resources Institute, 1994), there was one treaty in particular to which the military government devoted a lot of energy: the ozone

layer convention of 1985 and the CFC control convention of 1987. A

large "ozone hole" over Antarctica, which Chile had virtually no role in

creating, was perceived as a very real hazard. In addition to any adverse health effects this might have for humans, Chileans worried about the effects that higher doses of ultraviolet radiation might have on fish, timber, and fruit, the mainstays of the national economy. Consequently, Chile's diplomats worked hard for the success of the Montreal Protocol and follow-up meetings (White, 1993; Brafies 1991; Silva, 1995).

There are several reasons why the military government responded so readily to this particular problem. First, since the treaty postponed action for developing countries, active engagement had little immediate cost. Second, Chile anticipated that there would be considerable assistance in the form of technology transfer in order to implement the

agreement. Third, Chile's repressive dictatorship was virtually an international pariah at the time, and this issue not only raised its visibility but offered the opportunity to gain favorable publicity in international fora.

Fourth, and finally, the political negotiations took place outside of Chile.

ENVRONMENTAL POLICY AND INSTTIUIONS IN DEMOCRATIC RULE

Chile's military government officially ended in March 1990, with

inauguration of Patricio Aylwin as head of the new democratic

government. Aylwin, a Christian Democrat, was the leader of a broad Center-Left coalition of political parties known as the Concertaci6n de

Partidospor la Democracia (CPD), which had made up the moderate, reformist opposition to General Augusto Pinochet ever since 1983 (Drake and Jaksic, 1991; Oppenheim, 1993). The centrist Christian Democratic party (PDC) dominated the Concertaci6n (CPD) and strongly influenced its programmatic platform. Nevertheless, the CPD also included the interests of non-revolutionary parties on the Left, principally the Partido por la Democracia (PPD) and reformed socialists, or Partido Socialista (PS). As a result, the CPD program championed virtually all of the socio-economic and political issues that the dictatorship had either exacerbated, ignored, or repressed. Accordingly, environmental problems received their share of attention along with the issues of political democracy and social equity (CPD, 1989). At the same time, and underlying this programmatic thrust, there was a also a

11




strong commitment to retaining the basic socio-economic model

implanted by the military government. This implied that any changes that took place would be at the margin only, mild, and very gradual. This

arrangement not only persisted for the duration of the Aylwin administration, but also continued under the second CPD administration of his successor, the Christian Democratic President Eduardo Frei, Jr., who took office in March of 1994.

Chile's return to a democratic form of government clearly opened up the political space to address a much broader range of problems than had hitherto been allowed. Yet domestic forces were not the only ones

giving urgency to environmental concerns. External actors also were

making demands and pressuring the Aylwin administration to develop an environmental policy. First, given the advanced state of Chile's market-oriented economy, the country was among a select group of candidates considered for inclusion in an expanded North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The debate in the US Congress over inclusion of Mexico in the NAFTA had signalled that entering into any such agreement with the United States would require attention to environmental issues. Policymakers and government consultants alike

repeatedly referred to the pressure they felt to develop an environmental framework law lest Chile jeopardize its chances of joining the NAFTA

(Rodrigo, 1993; Zunfiga, 1993; Vial, 1993). News stories also under- scored this fact. Second, the World Bank, active in shaping the environmental agendas of developing countries, also conditioned environmental policy in Chile by contributing advisors to what ultimately became the government's main organization charged with formulating national environmental policy. It also provided funds for institutional development, mainly for the training of professional staff and for equipment.

The military government's lack of attention to the environment meant that the Aylwin government had to begin at the beginning. It had to establish the general legal and institutional framework for addressing the problem and set priorities. Consequently, the next section first

analyzes Chile's Environmental Framework Law, then discusses the environmental problems of the different sectors, which the democratic

governments have attempted to address, with varying degrees of success. The concluding section shows the effect that politics have had in accommodating the forces organized around environmental issues. This accommodation was largely responsible for the bias of the institutions created to deal with the environment, and the principles on which

they are based, so as to favor the sociopolitical forces desirous of

preserving the status quo.



SILVA: DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN CLE

The Environmental Framework Law: Norms, Principles, and Institutions

The Aylwin administration (1990-94) faced a formidable challenge on the environmental issue. In 1990, Chile lacked the most basic legal and institutional instruments for dealing with the problem on the one hand, while facing serious hazards regarding pollution, not to mention depletion of natural resources and threats to the nation's biodiversity on the other. To the administration's credit, it did establish the legal and institutional foundations for coming to grips with the environmental legacy of the military government that resulted from single-minded pursuit of unchecked, rapid, economic growth. Yet even these achieve- ments have serious shortcomings: their rules are weak, they place too much faith in the price system and the private sector, and they postpone the hard decisions far into the future.

Norms and Principles. In order to establish the legal and institutional basis for environmental policymaking, the Aylwin administration introduced an Environmental Framework Law to congress in 1992, which, after long and often heated debate, passed into law in March 1994 (Silva, 1995).4 In addition to laying the foundation needed for environmental policymaking, the law also instituted a few basic instruments with which to carry out that policy and ensured that any subsequent laws would offer a framework for action applicable to distinct economic sectors (Aburto, Urrutia, and Rodrigo, 1995; World Resources Institute, 1994). The Framework Law was based on four major principles: preven- tion, the polluter pays, gradualism, and participation.

The heart of the law is based upon preventing any further degradation of the environment by means of environmental impact reports (EIR), which have been made mandatory. The legislation makes the EIR its principal instrument of environmental policy and, to that end, devotes its most detailed section to spelling out its provisions. One of the most important of these is that all new investment projects, both national and foreign, are forced to shoulder the cost of complying with environmental standards (which, however, have not yet been set). In addition to improving the quality of the investment projects themselves, it is expected that the reports will also generate valuable data on the environment and increase the fund of applied knowledge. This is key to the whole legislative effort since Chilean policymakers still lack much fundamental information on which to base policy. Given the growing environmental protectionism in developed nations, policymakers also hope that, by investing in environmental safeguards,

13




Chile will be able to maintain its comparative and competitive advan-

tages in world markets (Repuiblica de Chile, 1994a; Aburto, Urrutia, Rodrigo, 1995). This means that, while the present emphasis on new

projects may limit the impact of the EIR on the country's present environmental problems in the immediate future, the EIR has the

potential to make a significant impact over the long term.

In addition to these features, the EIR requirement is neutral with

respect to the type of technology it encourages: i.e., whether this is to be end-of-pipe versus change in production processes, by means of materials management or substitution. This fits well with Chile's focus on neoliberal economics because it leaves those decisions to the price system. There is an implicit faith that firms will use the least expensive means. Given the general perception that international corporations realize that improvements in process might be less expensive than end-

of-pipe technology, there is an expectation that new projects in devel-

oping countries will follow that trend.

This may, however, turn out to be an unrealistic expectation. In

developing countries, the prices of industrial inputs plus tougher environmental regulations, which make changes in process more attractive in developed nations, may not be in place. These include the

price of labor (which also entails benefits and protective labor legislation), construction and real estate costs, energy costs, taxes, the cost of

complying with environmental regulations, and the expense of litigation - to mention a few. The fact that all of these tend to be lower (or laxer) than in more developed countries could make end-of-pipe tech-

nology cost-competitive. Thus, companies would have an incentive to extend the product cycle of old technology, unless additional incen-

tives, beyond the EIR, are offered.

Moreover, the Framework Law appears rather myopic in placing the burden of gathering data on the environment, via the EIR, in the hands of the private sector. The type and timing of the data will depend on what the new investment projects choose to present. Furthermore, the various firms and industrial sectors will have an incentive to massage the data and to manipulate the choice of indicators in order either to shift blame onto others, or to boost sales, because their products are more "environmentally friendly." In short, the data can quickly become

contradictory, confusing, and/or unreliable.

The "polluter pays" principle of the Environmental Framework Law is the second instrument which is designed to force compliance. This principle places the costs of non-compliance on the perpetrator,



SILVA: DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMNT IN CHIE

rather than on the state, a proviso that is clearly designed to force

companies to absorb the costs of pollution. In essence, the norm is quite simple: any legal person, public or private, that is responsible for

polluting the environment beyond certain prescribed limits must bear the cost of remedying the situation. Only in exceptional cases will the

government provide the funds for such an effort. The "polluter pays" section of the law suggests two additional instruments of environmental policy: (1) traditional practices of command-and-control, and

(2) market-based incentives, such as tradable pollution permits (Republica de Chile, 1994a).

In practice, however, the rule that the "polluter pays" is much weaker than would appear at first glance because the wording of the relevant clauses actually place the burden of proof on the prosecution, rather than on the polluter, thus making it easier for the latter to shirk

responsibility. It also reduces the cost of litigation significantly. Hence, the "polluter pays" requirement may not prove to be the instrument for

compliance, or for technological change, that it is assumed to be. It

simply lacks the teeth for raising the costs of noncompliance sufficiently to make it worth the polluter's while.

The third principle of the Framework Law - gradualism- operates to support the law's bias in favor of those sociopolitical forces that favor small, incremental change. On the one hand, the principle of

gradualism acknowledges the need to ascribe certain priorities to the various environmental problems in order to tackle the most urgent ones first. This is sensible enough. On the other hand, however, the principle of gradualism has a deeply political content. It prescribes extreme

political caution; measures perceived as conducive to conflict are to be avoided at all costs.

This principle appeals to the pragmatism on which many policymakers (and their advisors) so pride themselves. In this view, strong measures are apt to generate conflict, to the point that they produce legislative gridlock rather than solutions (CIPMA, 1992). Con-

sequently, it is this aspect of the Framework Law which explains why the hard-core policy issues have been left for future debate. It also illuminates why the law shifts the resolution of intensely politicized issues, such as setting standards, to its regulatory body; these will be drafted by sectorial ministries, with minimum guidance on procedure from the law itself, and well out of the public eye. This explains, at least in part, why the environmental impact report is the focus of so much attention - it involves future investments related to standards that have not yet been set.

15




The narrowness and timidity of the Environmental Framework Law is further revealed by the absence of attention to the problem of sustainable development, beyond some obligatory lip service of course. A more explicit treatment of this new concept - how to make economic development compatible with environmental integrity -

might have allowed Chilean policymakers to develop somewhat different norms and principles. At the very least, it would have provided an

opportunity to explore how economic and social policy affect environmental problems. This would have furnished an opportunity to devise a long-term strategy for economic development that would, at the same

time, also be environmentally friendly. Not that such a strategy would necessitate some form of shock treatment. That would not be possible. It, too, would have to be carried out slowly, in incremental fashion, but illuminated by a better understanding of the relationship between the economic model and the environment and the effect that each may have on the other. Hence, one might expect that policymakers would make a greater effort to introduce incentives for industry and agriculture either to develop less-toxic inputs or make an effort to substitute highly toxic inputs and processes with cleaner ones, and/or to focus more on materials management. As things stand now, the approach is on a

piecemeal basis, with each problem considered in careful isolation, separated from others, treated individually, and in a highly post hoc manner (Garret6n, 1993). There are no efforts at linkage. Thus Chile, which is in the forefront of traditional economic development in Latin

America, ceded the opportunity to lead the region in forging an

operational definition of new approaches to development and environment to other countries, such as Costa Rica.

It is worth noting, however, that the Framework Law does take

cognizance of Chile's biodiversity and, in a very brief section, establishes the legal basis for its protection and preservation. This section reaffirms the state's commitment to maintain and expand its National System of Protected Areas, which covered about 18.8 million hectares (18.5% of the national territory) in 1991. The bulk of the territory actually covered

by these protected areas lies in the sparsely populated, extreme south of Chile (regions XI and XII).5 The law also gives the state responsibility for

classifying species according to their degree of endangerment. How-

ever, it says nothing about a commitment to the sustainable development, and use, of natural renewable resources.

Institutional Framework. In addition to establishing norms and sanctions, the Framework Law also created an institutional foundation




for the making of policy, the Comisi6n Nacional de Medio Ambiente (CONAMA), a decentralized national commission to oversee issues related to the environment. CONAMA is basically set up to serve as a

coordinating committee for 10 state ministries with environmental functions - Economy, Public Works, Agriculture, National Properties, Health, Mines, Housing and Urban Affairs, Transportation, and Planning - and is chaired by the Minister of the General Secretariat of the

Presidency (SEGPRES). That SEGPRES functions as the strategic and tactical nerve center of the presidency is an indication of how sensitive and politicized environmental issues have become in Chile. The Minis-

try of Planning serves as the link to international cooperation. Each

ministry retains its full range of rights and responsibilities with respect to those environmental issues that fall under its jurisdiction. As a result, and for most practical purposes, environmental policy will be left to individual ministries and to consultants from the private sector. This is

especially true for the law's regulatory body, to which the crucial issue of standards was deferred (Republica de Chile, 1994a; PD/PS, 1992).

The problem, from the perspective of environmental policy, is that these ministries seem to be dominated by "iron triangles" of

policymakers, businessmen, and elected officials who favor economic

growth and view concern for the environment as inherently inimical to that goal. As a result, it is unlikely that they will set standards and

technological policies that will (1) offer positive incentives to comply and, at the same time, (2) raise the cost of doing business in Chile

sufficiently so that firms can invest in changes in industrial processes (via materials management and substitution) as the basis for compliance with environmental regulation. Older, cheaper processes, with

end-of-pipe technology added, will suffice. Moreover, countries that have already invested heavily in such technologies (likeJapan) may offer incentives and mandates in their bilateral cooperation agreements to

buy their pollution control devices over other solutions.

On the positive side, CONAMA does have a central office - the technical secretariat - with some independent and coordinating functions of its own. In keeping with the liberal ideal of a small, lean state and to devolve most environmental functions to line ministries, the technical secretariat is a small institution with a staff limited, by law, to 62 persons, and with relatively few responsibilities (Republica de Chile, 1994a). One of its principal functions is to oversee implementation of the EIR reports; it also bears responsibility for developing national-level guidelines for the EIR process, which have thus far been limited mostly

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18 JOURNAL OF INTRAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

to pollution control, more than anything else. In addition, the technical secretariat has the important function of arbitrating any disputes that may arise between line ministries, or between CONAMA's view of a problem and that of the sectorial ministry. Finally, CONAMA will probably assume an active role in environmental education, as well as manage funds for specific projects.

The technical secretariat is largely funded by multilateral and bilateral development organizations. Those loans and donations focus on building up the secretariat's institutional capacity. In 1992, the World Bank opened a tranche of US$11.5 million for the institutional development of CONAMA's predecessor, which was recently renewed for the present incarnation of CONAMA. The loan strengthens the technical secretariat, funds research to gather data, provides training in environmental assessment, and supports projects for decontamination in mining and industry. The US Agency for International Development (AID) has also provided funds to establish a database, which can then be used to monitor pollution trends. These projects should help Chile to acquire the know-how which will enable it to overcome some major institutional obstacles in managing the environment, including a shortage of environmental professionals, insufficient information, and the lack of a clear institution for monitoring and controlling pollution (Rodrigo, 1994; World Resources Institute, 1994).

In addition to these arrangements, CONAMA also harbors a consultative council which provides an opportunity for members of the society at large to have some part in formulating environmental policy. The consultative council is headed by the president of CONAMA (the Minister Secretary of the Presidency) and its members are chosen from various sub-groups of society. Not only does the president of the republic have a representative on the council, but he also appoints two representatives from the following communities (chosen from a list of five candidates submitted by each community): two scientists from universities, two representatives from the business community, and two from labor. Non- governmental organizations (NGOs) may also have two members on the council, as may the community ofnon-university academic organizations. Each of the Regional Commissions for the Environment will also have a consultative board, made up of two scientists, two representatives of NGOs, two each from business and labor, and one representative of the Intendente, the political head of the region.

As will be discussed later, this structural arrangement tends to slant the institutional power towards those sociopolitical forces desir-



SILVA: DEMOCRACYAND THE ENVIRONMENT IN CHIJLE

ous of as little change as possible from business as usual. There is, however, one avenue open to those who might prefer to see greater departures from the status quo: because environmental impact reports for new projects must be made public (safeguarding sensitive commercial and proprietal information), citizens and organizations are given the

opportunity to present challenges to it for a period of 60 days (Repuiblica de Chile, 1994a).

Other Environmental Measures

In addition to drawing up and promoting the Environmental Framework Law, the Aylwin administration addressed a number of critical environmental problems inherited from the dictatorship. In accordance with the principle of gradualism, these problems were

mainly concerned with air pollution produced by the state mining companies. While the problem is serious, the solutions are well-known:

they focus on end-of-pipe technology and apply, in the first instance, to firms over which the government exercises control.

One major effort centers on a series of decontamination programs for several of the state's mining companies. For example, Supreme Decree No. 132 (1993) outlines a plan to decontaminate the world's

largest open-pit copper mine, Chuquicamata, and mandates drastic reductions in the emission of sulphur, particulates, and arsenic. Both

Supreme Decree 180 (1994) and Supreme Decree 252 (1992) mandate drastic reductions in those same airborne toxic wastes by other state- owned mines. While Supreme Decree No. 185 (1991) set the guidelines for emissions of those substances for the entire nation, it primarily affected the mining sector (public and private) because smelters and refineries are the principal sources of those emissions (Repuiblica de

Chile, 1992a and 1992b, 1993, 1994b). In some instances, the government reportedly released funds to implement the decontamination

plans. For example, in 1992, CODELCO and ENAMI (EmpresaNacional de Mineria), the two state-owned companies, allocated a total of about US$ 300 million each to comply with Decree 185 by 1999 (La Naci6n, 1992; El Mercurio, 1992).

Drawing on the state's vast institutional capacity in the mining sector, Chile's democratic governments are relying on their experi- ence there to advance the effort at building institutions in the environmental area. To this end, the executive has encouraged creation of an Environmental Unit in the Ministry of Mines, whose primary mission

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20 JOURNAL OF INERAMRICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFAIRS

will be managing the mining environment. This Unit has already started a pilot program to design environmental impact reports and will oversee the decontamination programs (Repuiblica de Chile, 1994c; InduAmbiente, 1994).

The nature of the mining sector, and the fact that the Environmen- tal Unit draws heavily on consultants from the private sector to carry out its task, appears to reinforce the prevailing tendency in Chile to concentrate on end-of-pipe technology as the preferred method of

pollution control. To the extent that the Unit is involved in design of the

EIRs, the latter are vulnerable to having that approach incorporated into their reports. Since the EIRs form the backbone of the Framework Law, it follows that this approach could well begin to dominate the methods

adopted by other sectors of the economy as well. It also seems likely that

techniques developed by, and applicable to, the mining sector will have little to offer other sectors of the economy, such as agriculture or extraction of renewable natural resources, which are some of the

country's most dynamic sectors.

In addition to these efforts, and given the importance and political visibility of the nation's capital, the democratic governments have been forced to address the issue of air pollution and sewage treatment in

Santiago. With respect to the former, the main actions have centered on

pulling nearly 3,000 aging buses off the streets and closing especially problematic industries on so-called "emergency days" (i.e., when pollution indicators are at their worst, in winter). According to one source, air quality in non-winter months was "acceptable" in 1994, although the measures taken so far are not up to the task of further, much-needed

improvement (Ibacache, 1995). Meanwhile, the Inter-American

Development Bank (IDB) has provided loans to help in overcoming the sewage problems. Overall, spending on the environment quin- tupled during the Aylwin administration over that of his predecessor, the military government. By one estimate, it spent approximately US$33 million on CONAMA and specific decontamination projects (World Resources Institute, 1994).

Although the focus has clearly been on pollution abatement, the democratic governments have made modest efforts to control the

depletion of renewable natural resources as well. The most widely publicized, and perhaps most successful, venture has been its approach to desertification. In the early 1990s, the Corporaci6n Nacional For- estal (CONAF), with financing from the United Nations Environmental

Programme, started a National Desertification Plan (Chile Forestal,




1993). Because desertification is a problem more common to marginal lands with high incidences of rural poverty, the plan emphasizes the links between economic development and the environment. In its first

phase, the plan involves assembling data on Chile's regions I through IV in order to come to a proper understanding, and diagnosis, of its extent and causes before attempting to prescribe remedies (Lagos, 1993; Torrico, 1994).6 In addition to initiating research into the problem, CONAF has also taken some action in the form of reforestation projects. At the same time, CONAMA, in conjunction with the Ministry of

Agriculture, has proposed a National Plan for Soil Conservation, which, again, is involved, as its first step, in gathering the information needed to establish a database on degrees of degradation and their causes, as a

prelude to making policy recommendations (CONAMA y Ministerio, 1994). It is to be noted that neither of these areas infringe upon the interests of the business community nor interfere with the government's overall commitment to rapid economic development - thereby again reflecting the principle of gradualism at work.

THE POLTICS OF THE ENVIRONMET: FROM CONFLICr TO ACCOMMODATION

t is generally believed that democratization in developing countries will be beneficial for the environment. This hypothesis rests on the

assumption that interest groups will find more channels open to influence

policymakers in democracies than would be the case in more authoritarian

systems, if only for the simple reason that elections necessarily render those in government more responsive to civil society (World Bank, 1992). The Chilean case offers partial confirmation of this hypothesis, where the transition from military government to democracy clearly opened political opportunity structures to Chile's environmental movement.

Yet this optimistic, pluralist interpretation of democracy must be

tempered by several, related considerations. First, the character of broad movements tends to change as their leaders have more exposure to, and contact with, government policymakers (i.e., the influence can work both ways). Second, those changes may also reflect, and respond to, the tendency of policymakers and political leaders alike to use the

power of the state to offer access to some groups while denying it to others (Tarrow, 1994). Third, the determination as to which groups will obtain access to the policymaking process (and the extent of that

access) is generally dependent upon the usefulness of that group to the overall political goals and purposes of the administration.

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22 JOURNAL OF INTERMERCAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFARS

The fact that the Concertaci6n's leadership placed the environment on the agenda of the new government clearly opened political opportunities for the environmental movement to have a hand in

shaping policy. Professionals from Chile's environmental NGOs helped to draw up the issues to be placed on that agenda in the technical commissions of the Concertaci6n de Partidos por la Democracia

(CPD) and many also took staff positions with the new government, serving in both a technical and political capacity on issues related to the environment after the CPD victory of December 1989. The second CPD

administration, which took office in March 1994 under Christian Democrat President Eduardo Frei, Jr., continued to address these concerns (CPD, 1994). Yet the advent of democracy also revealed deep fissures within the environmental movement: some factions appeared quite comfortable with the cautious approach of the Concertaci6n, others less so. This suggests that the weakness and conservative bias of Chile's environmental initiatives originated in sociopolitical forces within the Concertaci6n being willing to come to an accommodation over its environmental policy.

Compared to other issues (the economy, consolidation of democratic institutions, and human rights), the environment ranked lower on the roster of priorities (Rosenberg, 1994). It is also unlikely that few officials at the top of the administration understood much about it, and, to the extent that they did recognize its salience, probably imagined that its substance was highly technical in nature and that it would provoke little disagreement as to proper courses of action. Moreover, because the Concertaci6n government consisted of a broad coalition (of political parties, individual parties, and party factions), these various ele- ments all had to be rewarded with administrative positions. Accord-

ingly, officials high in the administration initially entrusted the bulk of environmental policymaking to factions of two Center-Left parties of the CPD: the Partido Socialista (PS) and the Partidoporla Democracia

(PPD); environmentalists from both of these parties had a strong hand in framing the environmental part of the CPD's government program.

This is how it came about that the more progressive wing of the

environmentalists, who were centered in the Ministry of National

Properties, were initially able to play such an influential role in formu-

lating the Environmental Framework Law. It was also a group that advocated a far greater degree of change in the neoliberal economic model than was comfortable for those in the upper echelons of the

Aylwin administration. For starters, these progressive environmental-



SILVA: DEMOCRACY AND THE ENVIRONMENT IN CHI LE

ists pressed for the establishment of a separate Ministry of Environment, to make and carry out environmental policy, as a way of insulating that

policy from influence by the other line ministries and of limiting interference by business interests. The group also wanted to encourage research and development in technologies that would go beyond high- chimney strategies. They had a keen interest in the sustainable use of natural resources, which included proposals to promote grassroots development projects as a means of addressing both ecological concerns and poverty. To counteract the power of business further, they argued for strong citizen participation in both the policymaking process and decision-making about technological packages (Silva, 1995).

Given this approach, the environment turned out to be a highly sensitive issue, provoking much conflict and debate, in the first two

years of the Aylwin administration. This turn of events alarmed the

presidency because, in the interest of effecting a smooth transition to

democracy, the Christian Democratic-led Aylwin administration had

developed a policymaking style designed to rock as few boats as

possible by adhering to the basic, neoliberal, socio-economic model inherited from the Pinochet government. To do so, policymakers in the new government cooperated closely with the private sector, carefully limited the amount of attention allotted to the other social sectors, and exercised tight control over the latter's channels of participation.

This style of making policy had its origins in the very process by which the transition to democracy (1983-1989) took place and involved the negotiation of explicit bargains between the dictatorship's political opposition (the CPD), the business community, and the armed forces. The two latter sectors, in particular, wanted assurances that, if the CPD won the election, it would retain the neoliberal, socio-economic model. The CPD acquiesced, partly to ensure that the transition to democracy would take place, and partly out of the conviction that it was the only way to maintain economic stability. As a result, both CPD governments included representatives from the business sector in the policymaking process, whenever issues affecting those interests surfaced. To be sure, government policymakers were always aware of, and recognized, the interests of other social sectors (such as labor, peasants, and the middle

classes), as well as other, non-business-oriented views of societal

problems, but these were always subordinated to the interests of the

private business sector. Thus, other social sectors found their inputs into, and degree of participation in, the policymaking process to be more circumscribed and controlled than was true for the business

23




sector. In short, the government set the policy agenda and then kept in close touch with business groups in making, and carrying out, policy. While other social groups got a respectful hearing, their influence on outcomes was significantly less (Silva, 1996).

It was in the context of these bargains that the proposals of the progressive environmentalists in the Ministry of National Properties alarmed the presidency. The executive was committed to small, piecemeal, incremental changes on the margins of the neoliberal socio- economic model. It probably never imagined that a serious challenge to this agenda could originate from what they had mistakenly believed to be such an apolitical, purely technical and scientific issue area.

To defuse the heated debates that erupted over environmental policy between 1990 and 1991, and to calm the manifest displeasure of the business sector, top administration officials took the responsibility for making environmental policy away from the Ministry of National Properties and placed it under the aegis of the Secretariat General of the Presidency (SEGPRES). The significance of this action cannot be overem- phasized. SEGPRES, a cabinet rank agency, was the strategic and tactical nerve center of the presidency, as well as its principal troubleshooter. From this point on, SEGPRES worked closely with the Technical Secre- tariat of CONAMA's forerunner and essentially froze out the Ministry of National Property from the policymaking process. Instead, it relied almost exclusively on consultants from the private-sector mining industry, the Ministry of Mines itself, and from the Centro de Investigaciony Planificaci6n para el Medio Ambiente (CIPMA), which was closely entwined with those private-sector interests (Silva, 1995).

By this time, CIPMA had also embraced the philosophy of close collaboration with the business sector. It had turned the 4th Scientific Congress of 1993 into a forum for setting the terms of the debate over the Framework Law. The professionals who attended the congress were overwhelmingly from the business sector, Right-of-Center sectors of the academic community, and NGOs whose outlook was similar to that of CIPMA. It was this group who, in effect, worked out the principle of gradualism and applied it to environmental policy, who ensured the creation of CONAMA as a weak coordinating institution in which the maximum control over policy devolved upon the sectorial ministries, whose leaders responded primarily to the interests of the business community and in which the influence of capital carried more weight. The principle of taking a gradual approach to the resolution of environmental problems guaranteed that first priority would be given to those




problems, and solutions, that would generate the least conflict. It was understood that more difficult issues would be postponed, and it was expected that any regulations put in place would not be too onerous (CIPMA, 1992).

In this way, SEGPRES was able to carry out its two main functions in making policy: (1) it was able to put the interests and preferences of the business sector ahead of those of any groups; (2) it was able to limit the ability of other groups to present contrary views, or even to exclude their expression outright. Thus the institutional structure of CONAMA came about, in large part, as a result of (and way of resolving) the clash between the positions of the progressive environmentalists on the one hand and the pro-business forces, which dominated the government, on the other. That structure ensured that the ongoing collaboration between the state and business would henceforth apply to environmental issues as well. It privileged the interests of socio-political forces who sought to block any innovation in environmental policy out of fear that it might have a negative effect on rapid economic growth.

Two key features of CONAMA's structure safeguarded that strategy. One was the establishment of a weak central authority controlled by SEGPRES. Since the same minister who is the head of SEGPRES is also the president of CONAMA, he is able to ensure that the agency will enjoy a close working relationship with the business community, and that it will be able to screen out, or smooth over, any proposals that threaten to disrupt that arrangement. The second key feature was the decision to delegate most environmental policymaking to the line ministries, which also helped to protect the status quo. Not only was the environment only one of many concerns of the line ministries, but it was highly unlikely to be accorded a high priority. Because maintaining economic growth and boosting production received more attention, business interests tended to have greater influence. In fact, as mentioned earlier, the ministries are dominated by "iron triangles" of state policymakers, elected officials, and the very businesses that the ministries regulate. The situation was further aggravated by the fact that many of these ministries lack either the trained personnel, nor even departments, capable of taking on these new responsibilities. Yet it was to these same ministries that the Environmental Framework Law shifted the responsibility of developing environmental norms, standards, and regulations. This left the door wide open for consultants from the private sector, with connections to business, to serve as advisers.

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26 JOURNAL OF ITERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORLD AFFAIRS

The only body designed to allow for citizen participation is CONAMA's consultative council; yet, even here, the composition of that council reinforces official objectives, leaving little political space for alternative views, much less for their forceful, or binding, advocacy. To

begin with, SEGPRES not only chairs the Consultative Council, but the

president of the republic also appoints, directly, a second government representative. Moreover, of those representatives who do not come from the business community, the scientists are nominated by the rectors of their universities, notoriously sensitive political posts which are subject to approval by the president of Chile. Even the representatives of labor are subject to approval by the president. Although the NGOs are not subject to presidential approval, they are, despite their

great diversity, entitled to only two representatives, just like all other "interest groups" in the environmental issue area (Repuiblica de Chile, 1994a). For all intents and purposes, this almost guarantees that one of them will probably be business-oriented as well.

If the proponents of environmental measures that lead to greater change from the neoliberal socio-economic model have so few avenues of direct influence, what strategies are they likely to use to be heard? What are the implications of those strategies for the style of environmental policymaking in Chile? In all probability, they will follow a defensive

strategy, potentially conflictive, via the exercise of watchdog functions. Blocking new economic projects by challenging their environmental impact reports would be one likely path of action. As is already the case, causes of confrontation may range from trying to preserve biodiversity, to fighting pollution, to complaining of exclusion from

decision-making processes, to fighting the impacts of economic devel-

opment projects on the cultural identity and. life chances of native

peoples. Their most likely weapons may include (but are not limited to) demonstrations, exposes in the news media, civil disobedience, and resort to legal action. Thus Chile will probably be characterized by a kind of two-tier policy: an official one that privileges collaboration between business and government over the needs or preferences of other groups; and a conflictive one, in which various kinds of mobilization and legal action are used to challenge official decisions.

As currently structured, Chile's collaborative style of policymaking to curb urban-industrial pollution (of air and water) will most likely lead to combining two separate approaches: command-and-control on the one hand, with market incentives, probably through application of end-

of-pipe technology, on the other. This was clearly the pattern observed




in measures taken during Patricio Aylwin's administration, which took the path of least resistance by tackling state enterprises and services

first, and leaving the thornier issue of dealing with the private sector for later. Controls over extraction of renewable natural resources, includ-

ing intensive agriculture, have lagged. For example, while a fishing law was enacted in 1990, it left many loopholes for fishing industrialists; meanwhile, a natural forest law has remained blocked in congress ever since 1992 (Silva, forthcoming). The current Frei administration is

following more or less the same path.

Within these parameters, the Chilean government is serious about

addressing the nation's environmental problems. The issue is on the

policy agenda. Production (both public and private) and services

(utilities and waste) must respond. Fully congruent with the government's intentions, business has devised an aggressive strategy of collaboration to help define environmental policy, rather than defend itself against any and all measures. Key business organizations, such as the Society for Industrial Development and the National Mine Owners Society, have

organized environmental committees chaired by high-profile businessmen. Their task: to develop a private sector definition of environmen-

talism, one that fits best with their existing production processes, hence the stress on end-of-pipe technology. Their strategy is preemptive in the sense that they are developing their own diagnoses of the impact on the environment of their own industries, and trying to come up with a solution before the government does - thus they are shaping the

government's response. Moreover, they have publicized their commitment to the environment (as they define the problem) in high-visibility public fora. Their technical staff work with CIPMA and similar allied

organizations to provide the government with data and solutions.

According to their publicity, large-scale companies, who form part of Chile's most important conglomerates, are gearing up to invest in the latest technology for pollution abatement.

In conclusion, some of Chile's more pressing environmental

problems are receiving attention, albeit in a limited, incremental manner. Expanding the narrow, tightly controlled, and rather feeble approach to cleaning up the nation's environment, however, will require Chile to change its present political opportunity structure. Then it

might be possible to move, albeit slowly, beyond end-of-pipe technol-

ogy and the treatment of symptoms to substitution, changes in processes, and a broader focus on sustainable development, to include natural renewable resources. A political opportunity structure favor-

27




able to such changes would include, at a minimum, two factors. First, a shift in the balance of power within the Concertaci6n; or, failing that, a shift away from forces who fear that any change in the existing political arrangements will result in a decrease in economic growth. Second, those new political forces will need to find the solution to a

significant problem: they will need to discover (or uncover) the conditions under which business ceases to feel threatened by changes to

laissez-faire economics in the search for both ecological stewardship and a more equitable society. Fulfilling this condition probably requires a careful monitoring of shifts that take place not only in the present structure of the world economy, but also of the political configurations in the United States.

NOTES

1. In this context, "political opportunity structure" refers to consistent (formal and informal) dimensions of the polity that encourage or discourage social movements. The most obvious changes in opportunity structure are shifts in government that open or restrict access to power, alterations in ruling alignments, and the forging of new alliances. Social movements take advantage of changes in the political opportunity structure to press their agendas on public officials; but, at some point, members of the movement may join in the policy-formulation stage of the policymaking process. If they do, then the movement may be blunted in the wake of compromises. By the same token, movement solidarity may be broken as factions bicker over alternative policies; or movement sympathizers within the government may enter into conflict with movement leaders when confronted with hard policy choices (Tarrow, 1994).

2. Chile's agricultural sector has been subject to radical changes over the past 30 years. Up to the 1960s, traditional latifundia were mainly devoted to crops for domestic consumption, such as grains, vegetables, legumes, raising cattle, and dairy farming. In the early 1970s, the ill-fated socialist government of Salvador Allende expanded the previous administration's efforts at land reform, effectively breaking up the latifundia. The military government that followed did not reconstitute the latifundia, encouraging the formation of efficient agribusiness instead, to promote raising products for export, mainly fruits (fresh, canned, and concentrate), some vegetables, and lumber (Kay and Silva, 1992).

3. During the military government, the environmental movement's two most notable victories were the Lago Chungara and the Chafiaral cases (Hopkins, 1995). The controversy over Lago Chungara centered on water rights for the development of agriculture versus protection of a unique ecosystem




4,517 meters above sea level on the Chilean-Bolivian border. On one side of the

controversy was the Ministry of Public Works, which wanted to increase the

supply of water for irrigation to enable expansion of agricultural products for

export, drinking water for the city of Arica, and for hydroelectric power. The Comit de Defensa de la Fauna y Fora (CODEFF) and a local citizen's defense

group mounted a press campaign and legal suit against the government to

preserve the Lago Chungara area. After a protracted legal battle, which went all the way to the Supreme Court, CODEFF won the suit (over General Pinochet's

objections), setting an important legal precedent in favor of environmental

protection over economic development. Within the government, the

Corporacion Nacional Forestal (CONAF) and the Comisi6n Nacional de

Ecologza supported CODEFF's efforts. The Chaiiaral case was an example of the creative application of constitutional clauses to protect the environment. Chaiiaral is a fishing village in northern Chile where the state mining company CODELCO (Corporaci6n del Cobre) deposited copper tailing wastes directly onto beaches or into rivers that flow to the area. In 1987, a local citizen's group, in alliance with citizens' groups in Santiago, mounted a publicity campaign and filed a legal suit to halt CODELCO's blatant, unsound, environmental practices. When, in 1988, the appeals court of Copiapo enjoined CODELCO to cease and

desist, CODELCO took the matter to the Supreme Court, which proceeded to

uphold the lower court's decision.

4. Of course the Environmental Framework Law built upon a number of

existing institutions and legal statutes, some of which had been introduced before the dictatorship, some developed during the military government, and a few provisional ones created when the new democratic government took office (for further details, see Brafies, 1991).

5. The system consists ofnational parks (8.358 million hectares); national reserves (5.6 million ha); and natural monuments (14.5 thousand hectares).

6. In general, it is known that desertification in Chile is caused by overgrazing, inadequate agricultural methods, and deforestation due to fire. CODEFF has been doing the research for CONAF and, so far, has completed a

profile of the fourth region.

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30 JOURNAL OFINTERAMERICAN STUDIES AND WORD AFFAIRS

ACRONYMS

CET ....................... Centro de Estudios y Tecnologia CIPMA ................... Centro de Investigacion y Planificacion para el

Medio Ambiente CNE .................. Comision Nacional de Ecologia CODEFF ................. Comite de Defensa de la Fauna y Flora CODELCO .............. Corporacion del Cobre (state copper company) CONAF ............... Corporacion Nacional Forestal CONAMA .............. Comision Nacional de Medio Ambiente CPD ....................... Concertacion de Partidos por la Democracia EIR ......................... Environmental impact report ENAMI ............. Empresa Nacional de Mineria GIA ......................... Grupo de Investigaciones Agrarias IEP ............... Instituto de Ecologia Politica NAFTA ................... North American Free Trade Agreement NGO ............... Non-governmental organization PDC ....................... Partido Dem6crata Cristiano PS ...........................Partido Socialista PPD ..................... Partido por la Democracia SEGPRES ................. Secretaria General de la Presidencia

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SILVA: DEMOCRACYAND THE ENVIRONMENT IN CHILE

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Documents

Democracy, Market Economics, and Environmental Policy in Chile