ASYMMETRY AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY:

DEFINITION, BACKGROUND, AND STRATEGIC

CONCEPTS

Steven Metz

and

Douglas V. Johnson II

January 2001

*****The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department ofthe Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Thisreport is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

*****The authors would like to thank Major General Robert Ivany,

Melissa Applegate, William Speer, Stewart Smith, Douglas Dearth,Rusty Miller, Gary Williams, Walter Anderson, Max Manwaring,Antulio Echevarria, Eric Kramer, Harry Frank, William Delaney,Robert Steele, Conrad Crane, John Martin, Douglas Lovelace, and EarlTilford for insightful comments on the briefings that preceded this study or on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Any errors or misinterpretationswhich remain do so despite their best efforts.

*****Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be

forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army WarCollege, 122 Forbes Ave., Carlisle, PA 17013-5244. Comments also maybe conveyed directly to the authors. Dr. Metz at can be contacted at (717) 245-3822, fax (717) 245-3820, or email at Steven.Metz@carlisle.army.mil. Dr. Johnson can be contacted at (717) 245-4057, fax(717) 245-3820, or email at Douglas.Johnson@carlisle.army.mil. Copiesof this report may be obtained from the Publications and ProductionOffice by calling commercial (717) 245-4133, FAX (717) 245-3820, or viathe Internet at rummelr@awc.carlisle.army.mil

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ISBN 1-58487-041-9

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FOREWORD

Following the May 2000 Army-Marine WarfighterTalks, the Army resolved to develop an Army-Marine Corpsview of a strategy for combating asymmetric threats. TheU.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute, in turn, set aboutdefining asymmetry within the context of military doctrine,assessing the implications of asymmetric militarycapabilities, and suggesting strategic concepts forcountering asymmetric threats.

This special report is the result of that tasking. In it, Dr.Steven Metz and Dr. Douglas Johnson recommend adefinition of strategic asymmetry that is both simple andcomprehensive, reflecting the need for military doctrinethat transcends the specific issues of today. They thenassess the strategic situation of the United States in termsof both positive asymmetry—that which gives U.S. forces an advantage over opponents—and negative asymmetry thatmight be used to counter U.S. forces. Finally, they offer fivestrategic concepts as part of the response to asymmetry:maximum conceptual and organizational adaptability,focused intelligence, minimal vulnerability, full spectrumprecision, and an integrated homeland security strategy.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer thisspecial report as part of the ongoing refinement of theArmy’s understanding of the strategic benefits andchallenges arising from asymmetry.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.DirectorStrategic Studies Institute

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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHESOF THE AUTHORS

STEVEN METZ became Acting Chairman, Strategy andPlanning Department, in September 2000. He has beenResearch Professor of National Security Affairs in theStrategic Studies Institute since 1993. Dr. Metz also hasheld the Henry L. Stimson Chair of Military Studies at theU.S. Army War College. Prior to that, he served on thefaculty of the Air War College, the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, and several universities. He has alsoserved as an advisor to U.S. political organizations andcampaigns, testified in the U.S. Senate and House ofRepresentatives, and spoken on military and securityissues around the world. He is author of more than 80articles, essays, and book chapters on such topics as nuclearwar, insurgency, U.S. policy in the Third World, militarystrategy, South African security policy, and U.N. peaceoperations. Dr. Metz’s current research deals with U.S.security policy toward Turkey and Pakistan. He holds a B.A. in Philosophy and a M.A. in International Studies from theUniversity of South Carolina, and a Ph.D. in PoliticalScience from the Johns Hopkins University.

DOUGLAS V. JOHNSON II has been with the StrategicStudies Institute since 1985, first as Strategic ResearchAnalyst and then as Associate Research Professor ofNational Security Affairs. His 30 years of service in the U.S.Army included two combat tours, a variety of troop and staffassignments, and instructor duty at the U.S. MilitaryAcademy and the School of Advanced Military Studies atFort Leavenworth. He is the principal author of both the1991 and 1994 versions of Field Manual 100-1, The Army.Dr. Johnson’s current research addresses Army AfterNext-2025. He holds a B.S. from the U.S. Military Academy,a M.A. in History from the University of Michigan, and aPh.D. in History from Temple University. He is also agraduate of the U.S. Army Command and General StaffCollege and holds a diploma from the U.S. Army WarCollege.

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ASYMMETRY AND U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY:DEFINITION, BACKGROUND,AND STRATEGIC CONCEPTS

Introduction.

In war, there are always differences between theopponents. At times these are insignificant, passingdisparities with no bearing on the outcome. At other times,the differences between opponents are important, placingone in a position of advantage, the other at a disadvantage.This is a very simple observation, but from it flows one of the pressing issues faced by the United States today: strategicasymmetry.

Strategic asymmetry is the use of some sort of differenceto gain an advantage over an adversary. It is an idea as oldas warfare itself, appearing under a number of guises.Among strategic theorists, Sun Tzu placed great stock inpsychological and informational asymmetry, writing that:

All warfare is based on deception. When confronted with anenemy one should offer the enemy a bait to lure him; feigndisorder and strike him. When he concentrates, prepareagainst him; where he is strong. avoid him.

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In the middle of the 20th century, the British strategictheorist B.H. Liddell Hart advocated “the indirectapproach” in strategy. The wisest strategy, he contended,avoids the enemy’s strength and probes for weakness.2

Edward Luttwak, who is one of the more astutecontemporary strategic theorists, has extrapolated ageneral rule from it. Strategy, Luttwak contends, involvesactual or possible armed conflict between thinking humansand thus is dominated by a “paradoxical logic” based on the“coming together and even the reversal of opposites.”3 Whatappears best, more effective, or most efficient, in otherwords, often is not.

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Asymmetry is certainly not limited to strategic theory.Many of history’s greatest generals also had an instinctivefeel for it. Like the U.S. military in the Gulf War, theMongols under Genghis Khan and his successors often usedsuperior mobility, operational speed, intelligence,synchronization, training, and morale to crush enemies inlightning campaigns. When necessary, the Mongols usedthe superior technology of Chinese engineers to undertakesuccessful sieges. Other conquerors, whether Romans,Europeans, Aztecs, or Zulus, brought superior technology,discipline, training, and leadership to the battlefield. Rebels in anti-colonial wars also relied on asymmetry, weavingguerrilla operations, protracted warfare, political warfare,and a willingness to sacrifice into Maoist “People’s War,” the Intifada, and the “Troubles” of Northern Ireland. Asym-metry is as old as warfare itself.

Throughout the Cold War, asymmetry was an important element of U.S. strategic thinking, but was seldom called bythat name. Matching Soviet quantitative advantages inEurope with American and NATO qualitative superioritywas integral to U.S. strategy. Other concepts such asMassive Retaliation of the 1950s or the Maritime Strategyof the 1980s elevated asymmetry to an even higher plane.4

Beginning in the 1990s, thinking within the Department ofDefense (DoD) began to shift with growing recognition of the potential for asymmetric threats to the United States. Thiswas part of DOD’s increasingly sophisticated under-standing of the post-Cold War security environment. Sincethe global distribution of power was asymmetric, it followedthat asymmetric strategies would be a natural evolution.

Explicit mention of asymmetry first appeared in JointDoctrine in 1995.5 The concept, though, was used in a verysimplistic and limited sense. The doctrine definedasymmetric engagements as those between dissimilarforces, specifically air versus land, air versus sea, and soforth.6 This very narrow concept of asymmetry had limitedutility. The 1995 National Military Strategy approached the issue somewhat more broadly, listing terrorism, the use or

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threatened use of weapons of mass destruction, andinformation warfare as asymmetric challenges. In 1997, theconcept of asymmetric threat began to receive greaterattention. The Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review(QDR) stated,

U.S. dominance in the conventional military arena mayencourage adversaries to use . . . asymmetric means to attackour forces and interests overseas and Americans at home.

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The National Defense Panel (NDP), a senior level groupcommissioned by Congress to provide an assessment of thelong-term defense issues the United States faced, was evenmore explicit. The Panel’s report stated:

We can assume that our enemies and future adversaries havelearned from the Gulf War. They are unlikely to confront usconventionally with mass armor formations, air superiorityforces, and deep-water naval fleets of their own, all areas ofoverwhelming U.S. strength today. Instead, they may findnew ways to attack our interests, our forces, and our citizens.They will look for ways to match their strengths against ourweaknesses.

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The NDP specifically mentioned the danger from enemyactions that might cause greater than expected U.S.casualties, the use of weapons of mass destruction to delayor complicate U.S. access to a region and inflict casualties,attacks on U.S. electronic and computer-based informationsystems, the use of mines and missiles along straits andlittorals, terrorism, and similar threats.

Following this, there was a flurry of activity to flesh outthe meaning and implications of strategic asymmetry,particularly within the intelligence community and theJoint Staff.9 The most important single study was the 1999Joint Strategic Review, Asymmetric Approaches to Warfare.This provided a conceptual framework of asymmetricthreats, and a number of recommendations. Joint Vision2010, a 1995 document prepared by the Chairman that wasto provide a conceptual template for the future development

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of the U.S. armed forces, did not mention asymmetry butJoint Vision 2020, the follow-on document released in 2000,did, labeling asymmetric approaches like long rangeballistic missiles “perhaps the most serious danger theUnited States faces in the immediate future.”10 Finally, theSecretary of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress in 1998and 1999 noted that U.S. dominance in the conventionalmilitary arena encourages adversaries to seek asymmetricmeans of attacking U.S. military forces, U.S. interests, andAmericans. The 2000 Annual Report, while retaining thedescription of asymmetric threats used in the previousreports, dropped the word “asymmetric.”

This treatment of asymmetry in official strategydocuments indicates that the concept is an important onethat, according to most experts, may grow even moresignificant. Yet the development of strategy and doctrine toboth deal with asymmetric threats and take advantage ofthe U.S.’ own asymmetric capabilities requires greaterconceptual rigor. Phrased differently, asymmetry isimportant to strategy, but not everything is asymmetry.Strategic leaders and thinkers must be clear on whatasymmetry is and what it is not. This special report seeks tohelp clarify this with an eye toward doctrinal clarity bysuggesting a definition and conceptual foundation forthinking about strategic asymmetry. It will then provide anoverview of the U.S. situation in terms of strategicasymmetry, and propose some strategic concepts dealingwith asymmetry.

Definition and Conceptual Foundation.

Clear thinking begins with simple yet comprehensivedefinitions. This way those involved can have someassurance that they are speaking of the same thing. Whileseveral definitions of strategic asymmetry have appeared in Department of Defense documents, most have simplycodified the specific security problems or threats faced bythe United States today or have reflected such an

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“American-centrism” that their analytical use is limited. A1998 report from the National Defense University, forinstance, defined asymmetry as not “fighting fair.”11 Sincefairness is subjective and fluid, definitions of this sort makelittle contribution to rigorous strategic thinking. Doctrineand strategic clarity demand a simple and comprehensivedefinition.

The 1999 Joint Strategy Review provided the broadestofficial treatment of asymmetry. It states:

Asymmetric approaches are attempts to circumvent orundermine US strengths while exploiting US weaknessesusing methods that differ significantly from the United States’ expected method of operations. [Asymmetric approaches]generally seek a major psychological impact, such as shock orconfusion that affects an opponent’s initiative, freedom ofaction, or will. Asymmetric methods require an appreciation of an opponent’s vulnerabilities. Asymmetric approaches oftenemploy innovative, nontraditional tactics, weapons, ortechnologies, and can be applied at all levels of warfare—strategic, operational, and tactical—and across the spectrumof military operations.

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This definition expanded official thinking but has twoshortcomings: it remains specific to the current strategicenvironment and American security situation; and it dealsprimarily with what might be called “negative” asymmetry—what an opponent might do to the United States—rather thangiving equal weight to how the U.S. military might useasymmetry against its opponents.

A more general and complete definition of strategicasymmetry would be:

In the realm of military affairs and national security,asymmetry is acting, organizing, and thinkingdifferently than opponents in order to maximizeone’s own advantages, exploit an opponent’sweaknesses, attain the initiative, or gain greaterfreedom of action. It can be political-strategic,military-strategic, operational, or a combination of

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these. It can entail different methods, technologies,values, organizations, time perspectives, or somecombination of these. It can be short-term orlong-term. It can be deliberate or by default. It can bediscrete or pursued in conjunction with symmetricapproaches. It can have both psychological andphysical dimensions.

While the key is the idea that significant differences of somekind exist, there are several elements of this definition thatwarrant elaboration.

Dimensions of Asymmetry. Strategic asymmetry can bepositive or negative. Positive asymmetry entails usingdifferences to gain an advantage. U.S. military strategy, forinstance, places great value on superior training,leadership, and technology. This strategy seeks to bothsustain this superiority and make use of it. Negativeasymmetry is a difference that an opponent might use totake advantage of one’s weaknesses or vulnerabilities. It is,in other words, a form of threat. Most of DOD’s thinkingabout asymmetry focuses on its negative form.

Strategic asymmetry can also be short-term orlong-term. As military history shows, many if not mosttypes of strategic asymmetry are short-term. Sooner or later the enemy adjusts. In World War II, for instance, blitzkriegsucceeded for a year or two until the Soviets found ways tocounter it. It took longer, but Third World governments andtheir militaries eventually found counters to MaoistPeople’s War. The 1999 air campaign against Serbiasuggests that enemies may find ways to counter the U.S.advantages in airpower by camouflage, dispersion, anddense but relatively unsophisticated air defense systems.Long-term asymmetry is rarer. The United States willprobably be able to sustain its asymmetric advantage overcertain types of enemies for a fairly long time, in large partbecause it is able and willing to devote more resources tomaintaining military superiority than potential enemiesare able and willing to devote to overcoming the American

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advantage. Sustaining an asymmetric advantage, though,does require constant effort and adaptation: any militaryforce that stands pat during a time of strategic change willdecline in effectiveness.

Strategic asymmetry can be deliberate or by default.The United States is relatively rare in that its strategistsactively think about asymmetry and how best to use it orcontrol it. More often, antagonists in a conflict or war simply use what they have and do what they know how to do. Thatthe outcome is asymmetric is more accidental than planned. For instance, when untrained military forces use irregularmethods as when a combined force of French and Indiansdefeated the British General Edward Braddock near FortDuquesne in 1775, or a group of American mountaineersdefeated a loyalist force commanded by Major PatrickFerguson at King’s Mountain in 1780, victory came becausethe Indians or the American mountaineers fought in a waythey understood, not because they analyzed the weakness of the somewhat more conventional Loyalist forces anddesigned ways to take advantage of them. In mostanti-colonial wars or insurgencies the “less advanced” forces preferred to emulate the “advanced” ones. Mao held thatguerrilla war was seldom decisive but should be used as apreface for large scale mobile war.13 After all, it was not theViet Cong that overthrew the government of SouthVietnam, but a conventional combined arms force fromNorth Vietnam. When countering asymmetric threats,understanding whether the asymmetry is deliberate or bydefault is important since an enemy using deliberateasymmetry is likely to make more adjustments and thusrequires a more flexible strategy to counter.

Strategic asymmetry can be low risk or high risk.Some forms of asymmetry such as superior training orleadership are time tested. They may entail costs to developand maintain, but seldom increase strategic or operationalrisk. The high cost of having a fully trained, equipped, readyforce reduces risk even though it may not fully protectagainst all asymmetric actions as seen recently in Aden. In

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another sense, that assault, though a tactical action of verylimited investment and very high risk to those undertakingit, may have disproportionate consequences like removingthe U.S. naval presence from that key port (and others aswell). Other forms of asymmetry are experimental oruntested, and thus entail significant risk. Terrorism, forinstance, may be a low cost but high risk approach since itcan generate a backlash against those who use it or steelrather than erode the resolve of the target. Just as mostmutations in nature prove dysfunctional or, at best,insignificant, many forms of strategic asymmetry are acts of desperation that do not work or only work for a limitedperiod of time.

Strategic asymmetry can be discrete or integratedwith other, symmetric techniques. Generally only the mostdesperate antagonists in a conflict would rely solely onasymmetric methods. Those who are able integrateasymmetric and symmetric methods. As Joint Vision 2020notes, “our adversaries may pursue a combination ofasymmetries, or the United States may face a number ofadversaries who, in combination, create an asymmetricthreat.”14 Generally, such integrated approaches are morepowerful than strategies that rely solely on eithersymmetric or asymmetric methods.

Finally, asymmetry can be material or psychological.The two concepts are interrelated: a material asymmetricadvantage often generates psychological advantages. Butthere have been states and militaries throughout historythat were particularly adept at manipulating psychologicalasymmetry, often by propagating an image of fierceness.The Mongols, Assyrians, Aztecs, and Zulus are examples.These great conquerors found a combination of material and psychological asymmetry most effective. While they tendedto be superior to their enemies in training, leadership anddoctrine, the image of fierceness augmented this advantage. Often psychological asymmetry is cheaper than thematerial variant, but is harder to sustain.

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Levels of Asymmetry. The most common form ofasymmetry resides at the operational level of war. Thehistory of warfare is replete with operational levelasymmetry such as the German use of submarine warfare to counterbalance the British advantage in capital ships;urban operations to counterbalance a military force withsuperior mobility and long-range fires such as the battles for Stalingrad or Hue; guerrilla operations in an enemy’s reararea as an adjunct to conventional operations;operational-level deception such as Operation BODY-GUARD, the deception plan to support the Allied invasion of Normandy; and, anti-access or counter-deploymenttechniques using missiles, mines, terrorism, and otherweapons. Military-strategic asymmetry is an integratedmilitary strategy based on asymmetry rather than using itas an adjunct to symmetric methods. Examples includeMaoist People’s War, blitzkrieg, and Massive Retaliation,the strategic concept created during the Eisenhoweradministration that stated that aggression by the SovietUnion would lead to an American strategic nuclear strike on the Soviet homeland. Political-strategic asymmetry is theuse of nonmilitary means to gain a military advantage. Forinstance, attempts have been made in recent years to havecertain forms of military technology banned, includinginformation warfare. If this succeeds, it would be more of ahindrance on the United States, with its extensive capacityfor information warfare, than for a less developed state.Similarly, one opponent in a conflict might be able to gain an advantage by painting themselves as a victim and gainingthe “moral high ground.” To some extent the NorthVietnamese were able to do this against the United States.Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein both attempted itbut failed. In any case, political-strategic asymmetry islikely to become increasingly significant as the informationrevolution and globalization link the world more closely andmake states more susceptible to external political pressure.

Forms of Asymmetry. At least six forms of asymmetryare relevant in the realm of national security and warfare.

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An asymmetry of method entails using differentoperational concepts or tactical doctrines than the enemy.Examples include guerrilla war and other kinds ofnonlinear concepts. Many of the operational concepts thatthe Army anticipates using in the future such as advancedvertical envelopment with mobile, protected forces (asopposed to air assaults or air drops using simple foot-mobileinfantry) would entail an asymmetry of operational concept.

Asymmetries of technology have been common inmilitary history, particularly in wars that pitted anindustrially advanced state against a backward one, such as Europe’s imperial wars of the 19th and 20th centuries.While the Europeans brought a wide array of militaryadvantages to bear in their colonial wars, Hillaire Belloccaptured their enduring trust in technological asymmetrywhen he wrote, “Whatever happens, we have got the Maximgun and they have not.” This was not an empty claim. Inconflicts where the lesser developed antagonist does nothave the time or the ability to adapt to advanced technology, it can be decisive. The Maxim gun, for instance, was firstused by Britain’s colonial forces in the Matabele war in1893-94. In one engagement, 50 soldiers fought off 5,000Matabele warriors with just four Maxim guns. Cleverenemies, though, tend to find counters to asymmetries oftechnology during protracted wars. Vietnam provides theclearest example of this.

Asymmetries of will are important when one antagonistsees its survival or vital interest at stake, and the other isprotecting or promoting less-than-vital interests. This typeof asymmetry, particularly relevant to the United Statestoday, played a role in earlier conflicts in Vietnam, Somalia,and Iraq. An asymmetry of will leads the antagonist withthe higher stake to be willing to bear greater costs, acceptgreater risk, and undertake actions which the lesscommitted antagonist might eschew on moral or legalgrounds. Asymmetries of will are most relevant at the levelof grand strategy. At the operational and tactical level, theequivalent of an asymmetry of will is an asymmetry of

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morale. This can be crucial, often even decisive since, asNapoleon held, “In war the moral is to the material as threeto one.” Asymmetries of will are closely related tonormative asymmetries which come into play when aconflict involves antagonists with different ethical or legalstandards. This becomes increasingly important in thecontemporary security environment as the United Statesfaces enemies willing to use terrorism, ethnic cleansing,human shields, and the like. In the long term such actionsmay be self-defeating since they alienate potentialsupporters, but they can generate desired results in theshort term, particularly as they highlight any asymmetry ofwill.

Asymmetries of organization have also been important in the history of warfare. At times, organizationalinnovations gave great advantage to a state even when it did not have a technological advantage or any other kind.Examples include the Macedonian phalanx, the formationsof Swiss pikemen which dominated European battlefieldsduring the Renaissance, the “nation in arms” that helpedFrench Revolutionaries stave off a number of professionalEuropean armies, the system of independent but mutuallysupporting corps created by Napoleon, and insurgentundergrounds. In the future, state militaries may facenonstate enemies organized as networks rather thanhierarchies, again leading to organizational asymmetry.15

Finally, asymmetries of patience or time perspectivecan be significant. These are conceptually linked to anasymmetry of will, but more often operate in cross-culturalconflicts. Specifically, an asymmetry of time perspectivemay occur when one antagonist enters a war willing to see itcontinue for a long period of time while their opponent isonly able to sustain their will for a short war. For a variety of reasons, the United States prefers the quick resolution ofarmed conflict. There is a sense on the part of Americanleaders that the congressional and public support for anyuse of force that does not involve vital national interest hasa limited life span. Furthermore, many of the advanced

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weapons and systems used by the U.S. military such asprecision bombs and missiles are in limited supply.Restocking requires starting up dormant production lines.Because of America’s global security commitments,involvement of the U.S. military in a protracted conflictmight encourage other enemies to undertake aggression,believing U.S. resources are spread too thin. The U.S.advantage in strategic mobility may produce a “quick win”which is the preferred operational style. Knowing thispreference and knowing or suspecting the limited Americanstockpile of precision weapons, an adversary might seek toextend a conflict. In addition to putting a strain on the“quick win” preference, if the weapons become blunter,collateral casualties will rise and the enemy may gain aposition of some moral advantage. This means that theshorter a conflict involving the U.S. military, the greater the American advantage. Asymmetries of patience have acultural component as well. Americans are instinctivelyimpatient, seeking fast resolution of any problem. Duringthe Vietnam War the point was often made that this stood in stark contrast to the “Asian” perspective on time with itsgreater patience and willingness to prevail in a conflict thatlasts for years or decades. While sweeping culturalgeneralizations are fraught with danger, there is at least akernel of truth in this one. Somewhere, the U.S. military islikely to face an enemy attempting to take advantage of anasymmetry of patience.

The American Situation.

A number of things makes the United States potentiallyvulnerable to negative asymmetry. The American economy,society, national security organization, and infrastructureare all complex, creating many schisms and seams which anenemy might attack. American values, particularly respectfor due process of law, adherence to the law of armedconflict, and the accompanying desire to minimize collateral damage and noncombatant casualties, can create strategicvulnerabilities or military risks. The openness of the

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American political system and the need for consensus whenusing force slow the decisionmaking process. This also cancreate vulnerabilities and increase risk.

American military strategy, with its stress on globalengagement, long-range power projection, advancedtechnology, cooperation with allies and coalition partners,and complex processes for force and doctrine development,likewise poses potential vulnerabilities. As the Americanmilitary moves toward greater reliance on informationsuperiority, as an example, the loss or compromise of thatimportant capability could have serious operational andstrategic effects including a loss of confidence. The fact thatthe United States is often engaged in actions that do notinvolve vital national interests, in obscure places, wheresuccess is hard to define establishes the conditions for anasymmetry of will. And elements of the American strategicculture, especially the lingering fear of “another Vietnam,” a narrowly bounded notion of security which tends to createbarriers between the military and other securityorganizations like the police, and the tendency to see war asepisodic and abnormal, add further vulnerabilities.

Yet even given these potential vulnerabilities, theUnited States also has a number of strengths that prepare it to deal with asymmetric challenges and to take advantageof positive asymmetries. The U.S. military has some of thebest personnel, leadership, equipment, and training in theworld. No other military spends more time, money, andeffort on assessing emerging threats and undertakinganalysis and experimentation. In all operating environ-ments, the U.S. military has clear superiority over anyexisting enemy. In the information operating environment,the U.S. military can probably attain and hold dominance(although this has not been proven). The U.S. military isunsurpassed in strategic agility due to its ability to projectand sustain combat power around the world; it is moreadept at joint and combined activities than any other majorpower. The geographic isolation of the United States frommost areas of armed conflict is an advantage. In an even

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broader sense, the wide web of partners and allies that theUnited States has built, the nation’s scientific andtechnological base, its wealth, and, perhaps most of all, thecultural affinity for innovation, adaptability, andtransformation all augment the ability to meet asymmetricchallenges and make use of asymmetric advantages. Thenews, then, is both bad and good.

Traditionally, as American strategic thinkers haveassessed the nation’s vulnerability to asymmetric threats,they focused on operational level challenges. They gavetheir greatest attention to terrorism, particularly attacksagainst the American homeland; the use of complex terrainlike urban areas; anti-access strategies using missiles andmines; and political activities designed to dissuadepotential partners. These will pose serious problems incoming years, but are amenable to solutions that combineimproved organization, operational concepts, doctrine,training, and technology. The military, DoD, and otheragencies of the government have ongoing programs toexplore and respond to all of these. Less attention has beengiven to other, equally feasible asymmetric challenges,especially protracted warfare, political constriction, andorganizational asymmetry based on the emergence ofnetworked enemies. In a sense, the United States is in thefirst stages of understanding asymmetry, of using itspositive form and countering its negative form. Much workremains to be done.

Strategic Concepts.

The operational concepts that form the basis of the JointVision—full spectrum dominance derived from dominantmaneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and fulldimensional protection—are designed to take advantage ofpositive asymmetry, but are also relevant to counteringnegative asymmetry. To best meet asymmetric challenges,though, the U.S. military should adopt and develop fivestrategic concepts that build on the Joint Vision operational

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concepts. These could serve as the components or buildingblocks of a comprehensive strategy to make better use ofpositive asymmetry and counter negative asymmetry. Assuch they could also be integrated into the National Military Strategy and National Security Strategy.

Maximum Conceptual and Organizational Adaptability.Two characteristics of asymmetric threats are particularlyimportant: American defense planners today cannot knowprecisely what sort of asymmetric threats will emerge andwhat types will prove effective; and, the effectiveness ofasymmetric threats which do have an impact will sooner orlater decline as the enemy adjusts. By maximizingconceptual and organizational adaptability and flexibility,the U.S. military can assure that it will rapidly counteremerging asymmetric threats, and speed the process bywhich an asymmetric threat becomes insignificant orineffective. Phrased differently, in a time of strategicfluidity and asymmetry like the current one, the militarythat develops new concepts and organizations more quicklythan its opponents has a decided advantage.

For the U.S. military, the process of adaptation andtransformation must become both continuous and rapid.DoD and the Services must institutionalize ways to do this.Part of the solution involves shifting attitudes. Innovationand creativity must be nurtured and valued throughoutboth the uniformed and DoD civilian ranks. Whileiconoclasts and nonconformists should not rule the military, they should be valued, preserved and heard. Experi-mentation and research should focus on strategic andoperational adaptability. For instance, experiments shouldbe run to create new types of organizations for dealing withnew types of enemies. If networked nonstate enemiesbecome a major threat to American security, how quicklycould the nation form an effective organization to deal withthem? Probably not quickly at all but, with rigorous studyand experimentation, this would be possible. In alllikelihood, components of the future U.S. military must take

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on some characteristics of networks if networked enemiesare to be countered.

DoD experimentation should focus more on potentialasymmetric challenges. Today the enemy in most Serviceand DoD experiments or wargames remains a traditionalmechanized, state military which has invaded a neigh-boring state. While some asymmetric wargames have beenconducted, they should form a greater proportion of thetotal. Rather than seeking to confirm or endorse existingtransformation and modernization programs, jointwargames should a robust test of them. The red team insuch wargames, whether composed of contractors, members of the military, or DoD civilians, should be encouraged towin, thus testing blue team organizations and concepts. Atthe National Training Center, the Army has learned thevalue to the blue team of defeat at the hands of a highlyskilled red team. For some reason, this same process isseldom applied to strategic wargames. But to make thiswork, national political leaders, whether in DoD orCongress, must recognize that a blue team “defeat” in awargame does not invalidate a transformation ormodernization program, but simply provides a means ofadjustment and refinement.

The process of focusing more analysis andexperimentation on asymmetric challenges would bestrengthened if it had an institutional focus. DoD shouldconsider the creation of something like a center for the study of emerging threats closely linked to the Joint community,the combatant commands, and the Services butindependent enough to be imbued with creativity andinnovative thinking. This center should be tied to the JointExperimentation Process at Joint Forces Command, thePentagon’s Office of Net Assessment, the DefenseIntelligence Agency’s futures programs, and the serviceexperimentation programs, concept development centers,and battle labs. It should, in addition, have stronginteragency and multinational connections.

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At a somewhat different level, the U.S. military shouldprepare for asymmetric challenges by making modularity acentral criterion in the force development process. Thiswould apply to both systems and units. Versatility andagility are the touchstones. The Services and the Jointcommunity should undertake extensive experimentation inthe process of rapidly building task-specific organizationsfrom the ground up. There is a sound base of experience andknowledge given the U.S. military’s experiences at formingjoint task forces. This simply needs to be driven further toexplore how future task-specific organizations would buildinteragency and multinational ties. Modularity should alsobe a criterion for the development and procurement ofsystems. Multipurpose systems like the Blackhawk andHUMVEE set the stage for this. The logical follow-on wouldbe mobility systems that could do an even wider array oftasks and be reconfigured according to the mission. Thiswould give the Army an added degree of flexibility andbetter prepare it for asymmetric challenges. Whilemultipurpose systems are seldom as effective as singlepurpose ones, in an age of strategic uncertainty where thesingle purpose that should be focused on is not clear,multipurpose systems might make the most sense (andcould serve as a foundation for single purpose systems when or if the strategic environment becomes clearer).

Focused Intelligence. There is growing agreement in thedefense and intelligence communities that U.S. intelligenceefforts need to be at least partially refocused onnontraditional threats, including asymmetric ones. Thiswill be most effective if the intelligence collection, analysisand dissemination process becomes increasingly inter-agency, breaking down divisions and barriers between thevarious components of the intelligence community. Inaddition, intelligence focused on asymmetric threats should make greater use of open sources—publicly availableinformation appearing in print or electronic form.16 As the1999 Joint Strategy Review suggested, the United Statesshould immediately undertake a multiagency, holistic

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assessment of its vulnerability to asymmetric threats. Theintelligence community should also be intimately involvedin the process of maximizing adaptability and flexibility,particularly by strengthening the red teams in wargamesand experimentation.

The Joint Strategy Review emphasizes the need forimproved human intelligence (HUMINT) to counterasymmetric threats.17 But while improved HUMINT couldbe useful, new technology for the collection, assessment,fusion, and dissemination of intelligence would also behelpful. Human intelligence has very finite limitations.Sources are not always available or reliable. Rather thanrelying solely on overhead imagery and signals intercepts,nanotechnology and robotics could be combined into newintelligence systems that surpass both past technicalcollection systems and HUMINT in some types of tasks.Defending against asymmetric challenges, then, demandsbold new thinking on methods of intelligence collection.

Minimal Vulnerability. The Joint Vision concept of fulldimensional protection applies as well to asymmetricthreats. In the realm of force protection, current efforts,augmented by developments in robotics and nonlethalweapons, can help counter terrorism and other attempts toerode American will by causing casualties. Minimalvulnerability would also require resiliancy or nondepend-ence on systems that are susceptible to attack. Singlesources of anything, whether information systems, spaceassets, port facilities, or some other part of the logistics andsupport systems, invite asymmetric attacks. With somesystems, redundancy may be so expensive that the risk ofasymmetric attack is worth running but, hopefully, suchcases will be rare. By the same token, all reasonable stepsshould be taken to avoid dependency on any one method ofoperation or system. For instance, if the U.S. militarybecomes so dependent on information superiority that itcannot function without it, asymmetric attacks againstinformation systems could be devastating, perhaps evendecisive. This implies that even as the U.S. military makes

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greater use of digital technology, it should sustain someskill at older, low-tech methods. Even if one owns acomputer, it is still useful to know how to performmathematics with a pencil and paper.

Finding ways to project power against an enemy whoemploys an access denial strategy and to sustain projectedforces without forward bases would be an important part ofminimizing vulnerability. Since the campaigns of UlyssesGrant and William Sherman, the “American way of war”has called for the build-up of massive amounts of materieland supplies in a theater of operations, and then the use ofthis material advantage to attain decisive victory through astrategy of annihilation. This is contingent on the enemy’sabsence of effective power projection to strike at the rearbases. In the American Civil War, the Confederacy simplydid not have the force necessary to capture Union depots atplaces like City Point, Virginia. In the European theater ofWorld War II, the English Channel, the Royal Air Force, and the Royal Navy kept the rear bases safe until adequateAmerican forces were deployed. And, in the Gulf War,American military power protected the massive supplybases. But in a future where enemies often have someprecision guided munitions and weapons of massdestruction (along with delivery systems), in-theatersanctuaries may not exist. Even air superiority and theatermissile defense would be inadequate against anuclear-armed enemy, since they cannot assure the sort of100 percent effectiveness that is necessary. Given this, thefuture American military may confront an enemy using acounter-deployment strategy in which sabotage or precision guided munitions and ballistic missiles, whether withnuclear, biological, and chemical warheads or conventionalones, are used to attack U.S. bases and staging areas both inthe United States and in a theater of operations, andthreaten states that provide support, bases, staging areas,or overflight rights to the United States.

An enemy using a counter-deployment strategy wouldhave to be met with a combination of long-range precision

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strikes, special operations, theater air superiority, theatermissile defense, focused logistics, strategic deception,information assurance, and anti-terrorism. The more thatU.S. forces can limit the need for a lengthy build-up offorces, equipment, and supplies, the less risk posed by acounter-deployment strategy. As the 1997 National Defense Panel wrote,

The days of the six-month build-up and secure, large, rear-areabases are almost certainly gone forever. WMD [weapons of mass destruction] will require us to increase dramatically the meansto project lethal power from extended ranges.

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The capacity to deploy forces and resupply them from thecontinental United States directly into a theater ofoperations could prove invaluable, minimizing the chancesthat states in the theater of operations could be intimidatedto the point that they deny the United States forward basesor staging areas.

An enemy using a counter-deployment strategy could beblunted in several interrelated ways. One would be throughgreater intra-theater mobility via lighter forces andsystems such as high-speed, shallow draft sealift vessels.Another would be through use of what might be called“theater reconfiguration areas” rather than traditionalfixed bases. Such theater reconfiguration areas could belocated in remote areas of nations which agree to host them,with a landing strip as the only fixed part of the base. All ofthe other things needed to prepare equipment and troops for combat could be mobile, concentrating just before aninbound aerial convoy arrived and dispersing as soon as itleft. The inventory of supplies at a theater reconfigurationarea would be kept to a minimum, and replenished only asnecessary. Repair and hospital facilities would also bemobile and dispersed. Theater reconfiguration areas couldbe protected by conventional concealment methods,electronic masking, and a laser-based missile andair-defense web combining ground-based fire platforms,long-loiter and quick-launch unmanned aerial vehicle

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(UAV) fire platforms, and space-based sensor and fireplatforms. Autonomous sentry systems which fallsomewhere between a full-fledged robot and a 21st centurymobile, smart mine could provide local security.Host-nation support would be kept to a minimum to protectoperational security. To complicate targeting by enemies,several decoy theater reconfiguration areas could be set upin each country that allowed them. Such a “shell game”could provide effective deception and thus complicate anyattempts to strike at the theater reconfiguration areas withmissiles.

Full Dimensional Precision. The American military willremain vulnerable to normative and political asymmetries.The more that operations can limit collateral damage andreach a speedy resolution, the less likely these challengeswill prove important. One way of doing that is with evengreater, full dimensional precision. A component of this isphysical precision—the ability to hit targets with greataccuracy from great distances with precisely the desiredphysical effect. Physical precision derives from improvedintelligence, guidance systems and, increasingly, from theability to adjust or “tune” the effects of a particular weapon.A proposed electro-magnetic gun, for instance, could beadjusted from a non-lethal setting to an extremely lethalone.19 But there is more to precision than simply hitting theright target. Military strategists and commanders mustthink in terms of psychological precision as well—shaping amilitary operation to attain the desired attitudes, beliefs,and perceptions on the part of both the enemy and otherobservers, whether noncombatants in the area of operations or global audiences. How might future militaries attaingreater psychological precision? To some extent, technologycan help. It is vital to have a very wide range of militarycapabilities—a “rheostatic” capability—to assure that anoperation has the desired psychological affect. Thissuggests a growing need for effective nonlethal weapons,particularly when the psychological objective is todemonstrate the futility of opposition without killing so

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many of the enemy or noncombatants that the enemy’s willis steeled rather than broken or that public opposition ismobilized. Some advocates of nonlethal weapons go so far asto see them as the central element in future armedconflict.20 While this is probably an overstatement, suchweapons will be integral to psychological precision.

Different forms of psychotechnology might allow greaterpsychological precision. Conceivably, technology might bedeveloped to give militaries the ability to alter theperceptions of targets, perhaps causing intense fear, calm,or whatever reaction was required. But any state with thecapability and inclination to develop such technology should be extraordinarily careful because of the potential forviolations of basic human rights. In the vast majority ofcases, technology for psychological manipulation should beeschewed. Some state or organization unbounded by ethicaland legal constraints, though, eventually may field an array of psychotechnology weapons. Then the United States willhave to decide whether to respond in kind or seek othermeans of defense. The potential for a psychotechology armsrace is real.

Technology, though, is only part of psychologicalprecision. There is a vast body of psychological analysis,particularly dealing with anxiety and fear, not adequatelyintegrated into military planning. When the goal is to create fear and anxiety or collapse the will of an enemy, theoperation should be phased and shaped for maximumpsychological impact. Successful militaries must take stepsto assure that operational and strategic planning staffs arepsychologically astute, whether by educating the plannersthemselves or using information technology to provideaccess to psychologists, cultural psychologists, andmembers of other cultures. They should undertake crosscultural psychological studies aimed at building data basesand models which can help guide operational planning.

Integrated Homeland Security. Modern technology andglobalization have changed the nature of strategic

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geography. The United States can no longer assume thatconflict and warfare will only take place far from thehomeland. Future enemies will have the means to strike atthe American homeland, whether through missiles,information attacks, or terrorism. To defend against this,the United States needs to develop a robust and integratedhomeland security strategy and organization. Many effortsare already underway in this arena. In particular, gainshave been made in critical infrastructure protection and themilitary role in homeland defense. One of the big tasks forthe future, though, is to continue to seal the seams betweenthe array of agencies and organizations involved inhomeland defense since these are the things that createvulnerabilities that an enemy might take advantage of.

Recommendations.

Ultimately, negative asymmetry can be mitigated, butnot eliminated. That said, the United States is not on theverge of disaster. Existing U.S. military forces, organi-zations, technology, strategy, and doctrine can either dealwith most asymmetric threats or be quickly modified to doso. The more adaptable, flexible, and strategically agile theU.S. military is, the better it will be prepared to deal withasymmetry. Positive asymmetry will continue to providethe U.S. military with advantages over most enemies. Evenso, the U.S. military should continue to refine itsunderstanding of asymmetric challenges. Specifically, itshould:

• Adopt a more general and complete definition ofasymmetry and use this as a foundation for doctrine.

• Integrate the five strategic concepts, MaximumAdaptability and Flexibility, Focused Intelligence,Minimal Vulnerability, Full Dimensional Precision,and Integrated Homeland Security into Americannational security strategy.

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ENDNOTES

1. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith, trans., London:Oxford University Press, 1971, pp. 66-67.

2. B. H. Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2d revised edition, New York: Signet, 1974.

3. Edward N. Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace,Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1987, p. 5 and ff.

4. The most cogent expression of Massive Retaliation is in JohnFoster Dulles, “The Evolution of Foreign Policy,” Department of StateBulletin, Vol. 30, January 25, 1962, pp. 107-10.

5. Joint Publication (herafter Joint Pub) 1, Joint Warfare of theArmed Forces of the United States, January 10, 1995, pp. IV-10 throughIV-11.

6. The same discussion of symmetrical and asymmetrical actions isincluded in the Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia, July 16, 1997, pp. 668-670,and Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, February 1, 1995, p.III-10.

7. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, Section II.

8. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,Report of the National Defense Panel, Washington, DC, December 1997, p. 11.

9. For instance, in 1998 CENTRA Technologies formed a blue ribbon panel on asymmetric warfare on a contract from the intelligencecommunity. One workshop, held in December 1998, included Dr. JohnHillen, Mr. Richard Kerr, Dr. Steven Metz, Admiral William Small,USN (Ret.), Professor Martin van Creveld, and Lt. General Paul VanRiper, USMC (Ret.). The project seems to have been dropped after thismeeting.

10. Joint Vision 2020, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 2000, p. 5.

11. Institute for National Strategic Studies, Engaging Power forPeace: The 1998 Strategic Assessment, Washington, DC: NationalDefense University, 1998, chapter 11.

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12. Joint Strategy Review 1999, Washington, DC: The Joint Staff,1999, p. 2.

13. Mao Tse-Tung, “On Protracted War,” in Selected Works of MaoTse-Tung, Vol II, Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1967, p. 172.

14. Joint Vision 2020, p. 5.

15. For elaboration on this idea, see Steven Metz, Armed Conflict inthe 21st Century: The Information Revolution and Post-ModernWarfare, Carlisle: U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute,April 2000.

16. See Robert D. Steele, “Open Source Intelligence: What Is It? Why Is It Important to the Military?” reprinted at http://www.oss.net/Proceedings/95Vol1/aab0aw.html; and Robert D. Steele, OnIntelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World, Fairfax, VA: AFCEAInternational Press, 2000, pp. 105-126. Steele is one of the pioneers andmost ardent advocates of open source intelligence.

17. Joint Strategy Review 1999, pp. 31-32.

18. Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century,Report of the National Defense Panel, December 1997, p. 42.

19. U.S. Army Chief Scientist A. Michael Andrews, interviewed byRon Laurenzo, Defense Week, November 29, 1999, p. 6.

20. For example, John B. Alexander, Future War: Non-LethalWeapons in Twenty-First Century Warfare, New York: St. Martin’s,1999.

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