Defining Fellow Compatriots as ‘Others’ - National Identity in Hong Kong

499DEFINING FELLOW COMPATRIOTS AS ‘OTHERS’

Elaine Chan*

Defining Fellow Compatriots as ‘Others’ –National Identity in Hong Kong

RECENT THEORETICAL DISCUSSION AND EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE HAVE

shown that national identity is important at both collective andindividual levels. The issue of national identity is particularly relevantto the community of Hong Kong, which was reunited with thePeople’s Republic of China (PRC) on 1 July 1997. The fact that 97per cent of Hong Kong’s population is Chinese does not guaranteethe automatic development of a sense of national identity. Mutualunderstanding between the people of the two places is not as easyand natural as one might expect, for objective differences, such asthose found in the political, legal and economic systems, make the‘other’ more stranger than kin. Such difficulties were compoundedby the phenomenon that, unlike in many former colonies, the peopleof Hong Kong did not abhor their outgoing British rulers; in factmany were quite nostalgic about the colonial period.1

It is exactly because of this wide disparity that the continuationof the capitalist system and the present way of life until the year2047 had to be written into the Basic Law, the mini-constitutiongoverning the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).

*The author would like to acknowledge the funding support to the project of HongKong identity provided by the City University of Hong Kong. She would also like toextend her gratitude to the anonymous reviewers, and to Joseph Chan, Ian Holliday,James Lee and Sing Ming for their constructive and critical comments made on anearlier draft of the paper.

1 Unlike many other colonies, Hong Kong society was generally satisfied with itscolonial ruler. A poll found that 39.4 per cent of respondents had affectionatememories of the British administration, compared to 20.6 per cent who had negativefeelings (Apple Daily, 30 June 1997). Another poll reported that two-thirds ofrespondents believed that the British government had done more good than harm inthe development of Hong Kong (Pop Express, Social Science Research Centre, TheUniversity of Hong Kong, Special Release of 19 June 1998). See also Lau Siu-kai,‘The Rise and Decline of Political Support for the Hong Kong Special AdministrativeRegion Government’, Government and Opposition, 34:3 (Summer 1999), pp. 352–71.

GOVERNMENT AND OPPOSITION500

Whilst guaranteeing Hong Kong’s way of life for fifty years, theBasic Law does not allow Hong Kong to exist as a separate entityfrom the PRC. Indeed, the directors of the New China News Agency,the de facto PRC consulate before the transfer of sovereignty, haveon various occasions stressed the importance of cultivating a senseof patriotism in Hong Kong.2 This is a source of tension that theHKSAR government needs to deal with. On the one hand, thesovereign power of the PRC — the ‘one country’ — must be respected.On the other hand, the desire of the Hong Kong community toremain autonomous — the ‘two systems’ — must also be satisfied.

This article examines how the HKSAR authorities dismantledthe structure of national identity because of the perceived costsinvolved. It documents how the government prevented potentialmigrants from the mother country, the PRC, from entering theterritory. It argues that in protecting the HKSAR’s economicinterests, the government deepened the cleavage between the peopleof the two places, as well as creating significant internal disagree-ments within Hong Kong. The article begins by addressing thesignificance of national identity building, followed by a discussionof the few mechanisms effective for nation-building in the HKSAR.Finally it traces the process whereby the HKSAR governmentdismantled the already f limsy structure of national identity.

THE NATION AND NATIONAL IDENTITY

On 1 July 1997 Hong Kong was formally reunited with the PRCafter more than a century of British colonial rule. For the citizen ofHong Kong, becoming a PRC national meant taking on a newidentity, despite the fact that the people of the two places sharedthe same racial background and cultural heritage. The followingsection gives a brief introduction to what national identity is andhow it is constructed.

National identity cannot be presumed simply because a group ofpeople live in the same territory and are subject to the samejurisdiction. This is because the nation is, in Weber’s terms,

2 See Lau Chi-kuen, Hong Kong’s Colonial Legacy, Hong Kong, The ChineseUniversity Press, 1997, pp. 15–17.


essentially ‘a community of sentiment’.3 It is less objectivelyconstituted so much as subjectively felt.4 Undergoing similarexperiences and sharing a collective culture help develop a sense ofbelonging among members of the same nation.5 As new membersof the PRC, the people of Hong Kong lack such a collective memoryenabling them to identify with the Chinese nation. None the less,acquiring a sense of nationhood is important for in most cases it isthe nation, as distinct from the state,6 that supplies the backbonefor effective rule.7 A successful nation manifests itself in a strongsense of solidarity among its members, which makes massmobilization for political causes possible, and provides a basis forpolitical and social evaluation.

The Functions of the Nation and National Identity. It has been arguedthat the nation, nationalism and national identity are all necessaryand functional in the modern world. The nation and nationalismprovide a cultural historical context within which national identityis developed and political legitimacy built. Moreover, nationalidentity transcends individual and group differences by means of acommon national culture, resulting in social cohesion. It is ‘felt bymany people to satisfy their needs for cultural fulfilment, rootedness,security, and fraternity’.8 Sometimes, national identity is so stronglyfelt that it alone is enough to beget a sense of self-sacrifice for thecollective in times of need.

3 Max Weber, ‘The Nation’, in John Hutchinson and Anthony D. Smith (eds),Nationalism, Oxford and New York, Oxford University Press, 1994, p. 25.

4 Craig Calhoun, Nationalism, Milton Keynes, Open University Press, 1997, p. 5.5 Following Anthony D. Smith, the nation is ‘a named human population sharing

an historic territory, common myths and historical memories, a mass, public culture,a common economy and common legal rights and duties for all members’. SeeAnthony D. Smith, National Identity, London, Penguin, 1991, p. 4.

6 Adopting Mann’s Weberian understanding, the state is defined as ‘a differentiatedset of institutions and personnel embodying centrality, in the sense that politicalrelations radiate outward to cover a territorially demarcated area, over which it claimsa monopoly of binding and permanent rule-making, backed up by physical violence’.Michael Mann, The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1: A History of Power from the Beginningto A.D. 1760, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1986, p. 37.

7 The nation and the state may work closely together, but one does not dominatethe other. There are cases when the nation rises up against the state.

8 Anthony D. Smith, Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge, PolityPress, 1995, p. 159.


In addition to the role which national identity plays at thecollective level, it has implications for people at the individual levelas well. Although adopting a certain national identity does notpreclude one from taking up other identities, it is part and parcelof an individual’s personal identity.9 Hence, the statement ‘I amChinese’ or for that matter, ‘I am American’ or ‘I am British’, meansmore than just a legal status; it implies a certain commonality amongall those who make the same claim.

Indeed, as a subjective phenomenon, the nation and nationalidentity do not develop automatically after a state is legallyproclaimed. An identity problem occurs when ‘some members ofthe populace do not consider themselves as appropriately fallingwithin the domain of the government or conversely, feel that someother group not within that domain falls within it’.10 This identityproblem seems to be particularly prevalent in places wheremembership in a state is involuntary. In the most serious cases, thiscan lead to bloody clashes between the dominant group andminorities, such as Tibetans in China, Chechens in Russia, and EastTimorese in Indonesia. The reunification of Hong Kong with thePRC was not voluntary for Hongkongers. The political future ofHongkongers was determined solely by the PRC and Great Britain;they themselves took no part in the negotiations about their ownfuture. Realizing that no other political arrangement was acceptableto the two sovereign powers, many sought escape throughemigration11 or withdrawal from politics. The emigration problemwas particularly serious after the bloody crackdown on studentprotestors in Beijing in 1989. Fearing a ‘brain drain’, the Britishgovernment offered the right of abode to 50,000 Hong Kong familiesin the United Kingdom, most of whom came from middle-class,professional backgrounds.

Constructing National Identity. Defining one’s national identity is

9 David Miller, On Nationality, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995.10 Sidney Verba, ‘Sequences and Development’ in Leonard Binder (ed.), Crisis and

Sequences in Political Development, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1970,p. 299.

11 The official emigration estimates showed an overall upward trend since the1980s. The out-migration estimates in 1980 were 22,400 and peaked at 62,000 in1994. See Ronald Skeldon, ‘Emigration from Hong Kong, 1945–1994’ in RonaldSkeldon (ed.), Emigration from Hong Kong: Tendencies and Impacts, Hong Kong, ChineseUniversity of Hong Kong Press, 1995, p. 57.


essentially a process of nurturing a sense of ‘we-ness’ amongmembers of the same nation. In the process, one has to know whatmembers of one’s nation have in common, and in what ways thisparticular nation differs from others. Commonality among membersof the same nation is shaped by many factors; chief among theseare language, tradition, myth, symbols, rituals, history, commemora-tions and collective memory. It has been shown that traditions areinvented to justify certain rules.12 National symbols such as f lagsand anthems are considered sacred totems.13 They render seeingand hearing the nation possible,14 and thus help to legitimize thestate in an inconspicuous way.15 Rituals connect the present to thepast, and thereby encourage a sense of ‘rootedness’ in thecommunity.16 In addition, by way of building solidarity withoutachieving any kind of consensus, rituals can aptly inspire politicalaction. Common myths and memories link the present with thepast and assure the community its place in history.17 Myths alsoserve to remind the community of the virtues of its ancestors andmotivate the community to live up to such standards.18 Evencommemorative activities have been shown to produce and reinforcenational identity,19 not to mention language policy, education andthe media, which have always worked effectively to crystallize a

12 Eric Hobsbawm, ‘Introduction: Inventing Traditions’, in Eric Hobsbawn andTerence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1983.

13 Karen A. Cerulo, ‘Symbols and the World Systems: National Anthems and Flags’,Sociological Forum, 8:2 (1993), pp. 243–71.

14 Karen A. Cerulo, Identity Designs: The Sights and Sounds of a Nation, NewBrunswick, NJ, Rutgers University Press, 1995.

15 Michael Billig, Banal Nationalism, London, Thousand Oaks, Cal. and New Delhi,Sage, 1995.

16 Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, op. cit.;and Janet Siskind, ‘The Invention of Thanksgiving: A Ritual of American Nationality’,Critique of Anthropology, 12:2 (1992), pp. 167–91.

17 Anthony D. Smith, National Identity, London, Penguin, 1991; Prys Morgan, ‘Froma Death to a View: The Hunt for the Welsh Past in the Romantic Period’, in Hobsbawnand Ranger (eds), The Invention of Tradition, op. cit.

18 David Miller, On Nationality, op. cit.19 John R. Gillis (ed.), Commemorations: The Politics of National Identity, Princeton,

Princeton University Press, 1994; Lyn Spillman, Nation and Commemoration: CreatingNational Identities in the United States and Australia, Cambridge, Cambridge UniversityPress, 1997.


common national identity.20 In short, these elements make up acultural repertoire that fosters solidarity and provides a commonground for mobilization.

Apart from promoting commonality, national identity isreinforced through defining what one is not — a process ofdistinguishing ‘us’ from ‘others’. Since identity implies differences,contrasting with other nations can effectively throw one’s ownidentity into sharper relief.21 For reasons of security, identity,solidarity, interests and the like, it has always been difficult for anoutside group to gain acceptance by an established group. Britonsin the 1700s described Catholics as ‘outlandish’ and used them asscapegoats to vent their fear and anger.22 In addition, defining agroup as ‘others’ fosters group cohesion. Keeping an outside groupat bay holds the established group together. However, when a groupcan no longer be excluded physically from one’s own community,members of this ‘intruded’ group are often legally separated fromthe dominant group and discriminated against.23 Exclusion andstigmatization of outsiders are two strategies which can effectivelymaintain an established group’s identity, and assert its power overoutsiders.24

Triandafyllidou applies the concept of ‘significant other’ in herstudy of Greek national identity.25 Significant other is a group or a

20 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, London and New York, Verso, 1991;Ernest Gellner, Nations and Nationalism, Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1983;Eric Hobsbawn, Nations and Nationalism Since 1789: Programme, Myth, Reality, 2ndedn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1990; Michael Schudson, ‘Culture andthe Integration of National Societies’, International Social Science Journal, 46:1–2 (1994),pp. 63–81.

21 Seymour Martin Lipset, Continental Divide: The Values and Institutions of the UnitedStates and Canada, New York and London, Routledge, 1990, for example, comparesthe United States with Canada. By comparing two similar nations, the uniqueness ofeach can be better captured.

22 Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837, New Haven and London,Yale University Press, 1992, p. 23.

23 Bernhard Giessen, Intellectuals and the National Collective Identity in a GermanAxial Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

24 Norbert Elias and John L. Scotson, The Established and the Outsiders: A SociologicalEnquiry into Community Problems, 2nd edn, London and Thousand Oaks, New Delhi,Sage Publications, 1994.

25 Anna Triandafyllidou, ‘National Identity and the “Other” ’, Ethnic and RacialStudies, 21:4 (July 1998), pp. 593–612.


nation that is perceived to be a threat to the nation which onebelongs to. There are internal as well as external significant others.Internal signif icant others can be an ethnic minority or animmigrant community residing inside one’s nation. Externalsignificant other usually refers to a rival nation. In any case, whenthe significant other is perceived as a threat, the dominant groupor the nation will initiate a process to reaffirm or redefine its ownidentity so as to highlight its own uniqueness. Significant othersbecome salient when the nation is suffering from crises because,invariably, the significant other is conveniently used as the scapegoatfor bringing about or intensifying the crisis. The presence of asignificant other thereby serves as a unifying force, for we — thenation — should stick together to do battle with ‘them’.

Recent work reveals that political identity is constructed (by meansof the cultural repertoire available to the community at a particularhistorical juncture), and is a source, rather than a consequence, ofmobilization.26 In the latter part of this article, it will be shown thatthe HKSAR government has used a court ruling to define potentialMainland immigrants as significant others. In doing so, the HKSARgovernment is actively engaging in an act to keep Hong Kong andthe PRC as two separate communities. In fact, a higher number ofHong Kong citizens still claim a Hong Kong identity rather than aChinese identity.27 In respect of the objective of nation-building,action to label potential PRC immigrants as significant others iscounterproductive.

26 For a recent review of the overall development in research in the area of identity,see Karen A. Cerulo, ‘Identity Construction: New Issues, New Directions’, AnnualReview of Sociology, 23 (1997), pp. 385–409.

27 Polling data from the Hong Kong Transition Project show that there have beena consistently higher percentage of respondents identifying themselves as Hong Kongpeople rather than Chinese. In February 1993, 19 per cent of respondents calledthemselves ‘Chinese’, 36 per cent ‘Hong Kong Chinese’, and 37 per cent ‘Hong Kongpeople’. The corresponding figures in January 1998 were 25 per cent, 27 per cent and39 per cent. For a longitudinal comparison, see Michael E. DeGolyer, ‘Tomorrow HasNot Died’, pp. 21–2, Table 25.


THE CULTURAL REPERTOIRE FOR DEFINING NATIONAL IDENTITYIN HONG KONG

As we have seen, national identity is built with the aid of culture.The cultural repertoire on which the HKSAR government can drawto build a sense of national identity is very limited. Many of theelements which have been shown to be effective in building nationalidentity are simply absent or were instituted only after Hong Kongreunited with China in 1997. Spoken language, for example, differsbetween Hong Kong and the PRC. While many provinces have theirown dialects, all Mainlanders speak Putonghua — the nationallanguage. However, not only is Putonghua not spoken amongHongkongers: many simply do not understand it. To have tocommunicate in a third language, such as English, creates animportant barrier between Hongkongers and Mainlanders. Evenwritten Chinese is not the same in the two places. Simplif iedcharacters are used in the PRC, but Hong Kong continues to usetraditional characters.

Hongkongers and Mainlanders do not share very many collectivememories. In cases where they do, negative experiences surpasspositive ones. Older generations of Hong Kong residents werebasically refugees f leeing from political turmoil in China. Manycame to Hong Kong after the communists seized power in 1949,during the famine caused by the Great Leap Forward in the late1950s, or during the chaos of the Cultural Revolution ten yearslater. Younger generations may not have felt the pain of oldergenerations, but more recent experiences have worked to shatterany illusions they may have had about China. When Deng Xiaoping,architect of the Open Door Policy, released China from thestraitjacket of communism, China enjoyed a period of rapideconomic growth and improved living conditions in the 1980s. Thisperiod of hope and euphoria abruptly ended with the militarycrackdown on student protesters in Tiananmen Square on 4 June1989. Hong Kong society was quite united in its support for thestudent protestors. It was estimated that one in six Hongkongerstook part in public rallies to show their support. The bloodycrackdown gave rise to extensive public fear, causing the stock marketto plummet and a rush to obtain a second passport.

National symbols, such as the PRC f lag, the national anthemand state emblems do not receive due respect from Hong Kong


people. In the majority of cases, it was only after reunification thatschoolchildren were taught to sing the national anthem. Most peoplewho left school before 1997 do not to know the words at all. Asurvey conducted three months after reunification found that manymore Hongkongers were more proud of the Great Wall (78.8 percent) than either the PRC f lag (30.1 per cent) or the national anthem(40.1 per cent).28 In another survey, respondents rated strengtheningstudents’ understanding of liberty and human rights as the mostimportant aspect of civic education, whilst raising the PRC f lagand teaching students the national anthem were regarded as theleast important.29 Patriotism is indeed quite foreign to the HongKong community. PRC National Day on 1 October has not beencelebrated enthusiastically since the Handover. In fact, a largeproportion of Hongkongers did not greet reunification with themotherland with joy or excitement. On the night of reunification,when patriotism should have been at its peak, only about one-third(35.1 per cent) of respondents questioned had positive feelings aboutthe Handover. Close to half of the respondents (47.7 per cent)reported no special feelings at all, and less than half (46.4 per cent)were proud to become Chinese nationals. Within a year of theHandover, the ‘patriotic’ responses declined rather than increased.Those with no special feelings about reunification increased to 62.4per cent and those who described it in a positive way dropped to amere 9.2 per cent. Close to two-thirds of the respondents were notproud of, or just did not care about, formally becoming Chinesenationals.30

National symbols are unable either to foster national identity, orovercome disaffection between the people of the two communities.Studies of the general Hong Kong population showed that a higherproportion of respondents had a negative (28.8 per cent) than apositive (18.2 per cent) impression of Mainlanders.31 In a focus groupstudy, participants alluded to negative images of Mainlanders, whowere usually perceived as poorly educated, autocratic and corrupt.32

28 Ming Pao [Chinese language Hong Kong newspaper], 4 February 1998.29 Ibid., 20 August 1998.30 Pop Express, Social Science Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong,

Special Release of 25 June 1998.31 Pop Express, Social Science Research Centre, The University of Hong Kong,

Special Release of 30 June 1998.32 Ming Pao, 2 June 1998.


Another survey asked respondents to compare Hongkongers andMainlanders in four broad categories: manifestation of traditionalvalues, possession of characteristics of a commercial city, politicalattributes and degree of Westernization. Hongkongers wereperceived to be significantly different from Mainlanders in all itemssave one (modesty). Moreover, except for patriotism, Hongkongerswere inevitably rated in a more positive manner than Mainlanderswere.33 Younger Hongkongers held similar views.34

It has only been three years since Hong Kong’s reunificationwith China, and the limited cultural repertoire is only at thepreliminary stages of development. It will take time for Hongkongersto accept a new set of symbols, to discover commonality and buildaffinity with their fellow citizens from the Mainland. Unfortunately,the Hong Kong government does not seem to realize the importanceof developing a sense of national identity. While the culturalrepertoire is slowly developing, the government had chosen to makepotential Mainland immigrants ‘significant others’, thereby furtherwidening the gap between the two groups.

MANUFACTURING ‘OTHERS’35

At the time of the Handover, the HKSAR government inheritedonly a few cultural materials with which to build a national identity.There was, moreover, a general feeling of affection towards theformer colonial administration, and uneasiness about the newsovereign communist power. Given these handicaps, and the

33 Hongkongers were perceived to be more moral, friendly, sophisticated, optimistic,disciplined, sympathetic, tolerant, adaptive, sharp, pragmatic, and more willing tospeak out, care about society, and Westernized. Anthony Fung and Eric Ma, ‘Summaryfindings of Hongkongers’ cultural identifications’, Department of Journalism andCommunication, The Chinese University of Hong Kong, 3 February 1998.

34 Shui-fong Lam, Chi-yue Chiu, Ivy Lau and Ying-yi Hong, ‘Social Identity of HongKong Adolescents Before 1997’. Unpublished manuscript, 1996.

35 The process of labelling Mainlanders as ‘others’ did not begin with this CFAruling. As Ma has demonstrated persuasively, Mainlanders were portrayed as outsidersin popular television serials in the 1970s and 1980s. See Eric Kit-wai Ma, Culture,Politics, and Television in Hong Kong, London, Routledge, 1999. It seems that the right-of-abode issue was the first large-scale stigmatization of Mainlanders carried out bythe government, and ironically this took place after Hong Kong had become part ofthe PRC.


importance of nation-building, one would have expected the HKSARgovernment to step up its efforts in promoting the ‘one country’theme. The Chief Executive of the HKSAR, Tung Chee-hwa, hadalluded to the need for developing patriotism. However, as will beshown in the following sections, when nation-building came intoconf lict with local economic interests, the latter took precedenceover the former.

It was not only the classic case of inclusion that was significant,but also the role which the government played in labelling fellowcountrymen. In a landmark decision made on 29 January 1999, theHong Kong Court of Final Appeal (CFA) ruled, inter alia, that onthe principle of equality, children born to permanent residents ofHong Kong had the right of abode in the HKSAR. The question ofwhether these children were born in or out of wedlock wasconsidered irrelevant. The court also ruled that children whoseMainland parents did not have Hong Kong permanent residency atthe time of birth, but obtained residency subsequently, were entitledto right of abode in Hong Kong. In fact, immigration restrictionsbetween the Mainland and Hong Kong had been in place since theoutbreak of the Sino-Japanese war in the late 1930s.36 However, itwas not the restrictions that were at issue, but rather the labellingof potential immigrants by the HKSAR government.

The HKSAR government did not welcome the ruling. The cruxof the matter was that it feared the entrance of a f lood of Mainlandimmigrants to Hong Kong within a relatively short period of time,thus placing enormous pressure on existing resources. Thegovernment soon launched an impact study to discover the numberof additional immigrants eligible to enter Hong Kong as a result ofthe ruling. This survey laid the groundwork for the government tolabel potential Mainland immigrants as ‘others’, a group thatseriously threatened the well-being of the Hong Kong community.

36 There was free f low of people between Hong Kong and the mainland until theSecond World War. From then on, restrictions were imposed because of a large inf luxof refugees from China. In 1980 the government decided that all illegal immigrantsfrom China would be repatriated. The Hong Kong and PRC governments then agreedon a daily quota of migrants from China who would be allowed to enter the territory.In 1983 the daily quota was 75; it was subsequently increased to 150 in 1995. See SiuYat-ming, ‘Population and Immigration: With A Special Account on ChineseImmigrants’ in Nyaw Mee-Kau and Li Si-ming (eds), The Other Hong Kong Report,1996, Hong Kong, The Chinese University of Hong Kong Press, 1996.


There were two stages of defining ‘others’. The first stagebegan when the Secretary for Security, Regina Ip, disclosed in aLegislative Council meeting that, based on the results of the study,the CFA ruling had in effect opened the door to 1.67 millionMainland immigrants.37 This figure included 692,000 Mainlanderswho were immediately eligible to take up residence in Hong Kongand 983,000 of their children who would gain eligibility when theirfirst generation parents become permanent residents after sevenyears. Among the first-generation Mainlanders, close to 70 per centwere said to be over twenty years old, and half of these had notreceived an education higher than secondary level. Less than10 per cent were said to be professionals. If Hong Kong societywere to receive all 1.67 million immigrants in 10–13 years, theseimmigrants would pose an ‘unbearable burden’ on the alreadyweakened economy. Ip warned that unemployment would worsen,welfare payments would shoot up, hillside squatter camps mightreappear, and the ecological balance would be seriously upset.

The ruling put the government in a difficult position. On theone hand, absorbing 1.67 million immigrants would, in its estimate,require additional resources beyond the capacity of the society. Onthe other hand, refusing entry to these immigrants would damagethe image of judicial independence in Hong Kong both locally andinternationally. Since the legitimacy of the Hong Kong governmentis largely built on administrative efficiency and economic success,it was unwilling to risk its legitimacy by asking its citizens to bearthe economic consequences of the CFA’s ruling. The governmentthus considered ways in which it could circumvent the CFA ruling.One option was to ask the Standing Committee of the People’sNational Congress in Beijing, which has the power to interpret theBasic Law, to clarify the meaning of the laws involved in the ruling.Alternatively, the Basic Law could be amended to make the rulesfor entitlement to the right of abode more stringent. At any rate,the government was committed to closing the door to these potentialimmigrants. As a result, the government started its propagandamachine to mobilize public opinion in its favour. Its aim was tomake the exclusion of potential Mainland immigrants a societalconsensus rather than a purely administrative decision. After

37 South China Morning Post [Hong Kong English language newspaper], hereaftercited as SCMP, 29 April 1999; Ming Pao, 29 April 1999.


announcing the alarming figures, Ip said that a detailed estimateof the impact of the inf lux of immigrants would be presented aweek later. Meanwhile, government off icials, politicians andacademics were approached by the news media to comment on theissue, and society was left to contemplate its dire future.

There was a lot of speculation in the week between theannouncement of potential immigrant figures and the results ofthe impact assessment. According to an unnamed source in thegovernment, if Hong Kong were to accept all first generationimmigrants, the unemployment rate could rise from its current rateof 6.2 per cent to 17.8 per cent in the worst case scenario.38 Housingproblems, which the government of Hong Kong had been strugglingto solve for many years, would be compounded. Both the chairwomanof the Hong Kong Housing Authority and the Deputy Secretaryfor Housing warned that housing shortages would become veryserious. The Federation of Hong Kong, Kowloon and NewTerritories Public Housing estimated that 40 per cent of the firstgeneration immigrants would apply for public rental housing,thereby further prolonging the average six-year waiting time anddisrupting the government’s present housing policy.39 The legislatorrepresenting teachers and educators argued that if additional schoolswere not opened before the immigrants arrived, class sizes wouldhave to increase to 45 students per class, whole-day schooling at theprimary level would be delayed and the overall quality of educationwould suffer.40 A similar message came from the Director ofEducation.41 Before the impact assessment was officially announced,another source close to the government revealed that approximatelyUS$13.8 billion would be needed to build 180,000 public rentalf lats, over a hundred schools, and five hospitals in the near future.42

As a result of these statements, negative images of potentialMainland immigrants filled the Hong Kong media. In general, theywere portrayed as a group of free-riders who wanted a share of HongKong’s prosperity without contributing anything. Considering thatHong Kong was already suffering from its worst recession ever, society

38 Ming Pao, 30 April 1999.39 SCMP, 29 April 1999.40 Sing Tao [Hong Kong Chinese language newspaper], 29 April 1999.41 Ming Pao, 2 May 1999.42 Ibid.


was naturally wary of any plan that might jeopardize its hard-wonprosperity. Emphasizing the burden imposed by potential immigrantshad the effect of deepening the gap between the two communities.

Parallel to this negative campaign was a drive to challenge thevalidity of the figures and question the government’s motives.Legislator Cyd Ho accused the government of scaremongering.43

Against the dominant view, Legislator Law Chi-kwong44 andExecutive Councillor Henry Tang 45 drew attention to the issues ofassimilation and the prevention of discrimination. At the same timethe validity of the survey began to be questioned. Hong Kong’sleading English language newspaper, the South China Morning Post,called it ‘a sorry survey’.46 It declared that the government wasmaking critically important assessments on the basis of a half-finished survey. Worse still, even those responsible for designingand conducting the survey admitted that they had run into seriousproblems. It transpired that the size of larger families was based onan estimate, that initial attempts to get data on children born outof wedlock had failed, and that the possibility of double countinghad not been eliminated.47 There was also the accusation that thegovernment was working on skewed statistics, as it concealed datashowing that 30 per cent of eligible immigrants might not claimtheir right of abode,48 and worked on the assumption that all thosewho were eligible would indeed settle in Hong Kong.49 Against theestimated double-digit unemployment rate, Professor P. W. Liu ofthe Chinese University of Hong Kong estimated that theunemployment rate might be pushed up by only 1–2 per cent.50

Despite these efforts to calm society down to allow for animpartial discourse to take place and result in a reasonable solution,the government embarked on a second round of manufacturing‘others’. On 6 May an impressive array of top government officials

43 SCMP, 29 April 1999.44 Ibid.45 Ibid., 30 April 1999.46 SCMP, 6 May 1999. For an interview with the Assistant Commissioner of the

Census and Statistics Department on how the survey was conducted, see Ming Pao, 2May 1999.

47 SCMP, 6 May 1999.48 ‘30 pc may not claim abode right’, SCMP, 6 May 1999.49 SCMP, 6 May 1999.50 Ming Pao, 30 April 1999.


appeared before the Legislative Council to report on the estimatedimpact of the 1.67 million potential immigrants.51 To magnify theseriousness of the issue, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa made arare appearance in a question-and-answer session in the LegislativeCouncil on the same afternoon. As expected, alarming figures wereannounced during the session. Accepting the 1.67 million potentialimmigrants would cost a total of US$91 billion over the next tenyears; thirteen large housing estates would have to be built eachyear, prolonging the waiting time for public housing from 3 to 10years. By 2009, 242 new schools would have to be built. Moreover,such immigration would also lead to bigger classes, and the shelvingof full-day primary education. Eleven new hospitals would haveto be built, together with more health centres, and dental clinics.Tens of thousands of training and retraining places would haveto be made available, and 22 employment centres opened. It wasalso estimated that the unemployment rate would rise to 12–13per cent in 2002, and 24–25 per cent by 2009. As far as welfarewas concerned, more family, elderly and child centres would beneeded, and social security payments would inevitably increase. Inaddition, the government would need to set aside resources forconstruction, land reclamation and the development of transportinfrastructure.52

What the government had done in the second round ofmanufacturing ‘others’ was to stir up fear and encourage discrimina-tion against potential immigrants. In emphasizing only the negativeimpact, it effectively created the image of Hong Kong’s Doomsday.Headlines in the South China Morning Post encouraged thisDoomsday scenario: ‘Budget deficit increase forecast’, ‘Inf lux maysend jobless rate spiralling to 25pc’, ‘Taxpayers face $28b bill toprovide new schools’, ‘Welfare: Handouts “likely to cost 60pc more” ’,‘Transport: $270b bill for new networks’, ‘Health: Return to badold days of hospital camp beds feared’.53

51 Altogether ten top officials attended the Legislative Council session. Theyincluded: the Acting Chief Secretary for Administration, the Secretary for Healthand Welfare, the Secretary for Security, the Secretary for Transport, the Secretary forPlanning, Environment and Lands, the Secretary for Education and Manpower, theCommissioner for Census and Statistics, the Director of Immigration and GovernmentEconomists. See SCMP, 6 May 1999.

52 SCMP, 7 May 1999.53 Ibid.


During the Legislative Council meeting held to discuss the impactof the potential immigrants, the HKSAR government invoked someof the worst fears of Hong Kong society. The Secretary for Housingwarned that to build the extra f lats needed to house these immigrants,huge sums of money would be required, and that public constructionwould not necessarily benefit the local labour market as massiveimports of labour would be necessary. The Secretary for Planning,Environment and Lands said that more reclamation would be neededto create enough land, which would lead to further environmentaldamage, including increased noise and air pollution. In the long run,according to a member of the Housing Authority, an inf lux ofimmigrants would cause the property market to slump becauseeconomic growth would be damaged. The Secretary for Educationwarned that more students would have to be squeezed into alreadyovercrowded classrooms, and taught by untrained teachers. TheSecretary for Health predicted that hospitals would quickly becomeovercrowded and that the waiting time for specialist consultationwould be more than doubled from 11 weeks to 25 weeks. To meet theextra public expenditure, taxation would have to increase.54 Thecommunity was told that these potential immigrants had already hadan adverse effect on negotiations with other countries on visa-freeaccess arrangements for HKSAR passport holders.55 Foreign countriesworried that Mainlander-cum-Hong Kong citizens would enter theircountries and not leave. On the basis of these gloomy figures andhopeless images, the Chief Executive was determined not to allowthe community’s past achievements ‘to dissipate or Hong Kong willgo downhill in the next millennium’.56

A responsible government has a duty to assess the impact ofimmigration, and members of the community have a right to knowthe costs, as they are the ones who will foot the bill. However, theHKSAR government misled the community into believing thatpotential immigrants would deplete society’s resources. Thegovernment simply evaded all the challenges to its estimatedfigures.57 An economist at the Chinese University of Hong Kong

54 Ming Pao, 7 May 1999.55 ‘Inf lux may hurt SAR visa status’, SCMP, 9 May 1999.56 ‘$710b for migrants in 10 years’, ibid., 7 May 1999.57 For challenges to various government estimates, see ‘Spending figures fail to

pass test’, SCMP, 9 May 1999; ‘Lee Cheuk-yan and Ho Hei-wah question Census’estimation formula’, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 11 May 1999.


claimed that the assumption that all first generation immigrantswould need to be settled in Hong Kong in the first three years wasspurious. Another economist at the Hong Kong University ofScience and Technology rejected the notion that all immigrantswould be unemployed. The Democratic Party spokesperson onhousing affairs questioned the estimates on public rental housingneeds on the basis of fulfilment of current requirements.58 Unofficialsources estimated that additional resources required to absorb thepotential immigrants would be at a much lower level.59 Furthermore,the government totally excluded the advantages which an immigrantinf lux might bring, such as the creation of jobs and the rejuvenationof an aging society. In emphasizing their negative impact on thelocal community, the government successfully identified thepotential immigrants as the ‘others’ who jeopardized the economyand threatened the well-being of Hong Kong society.

Public opinion polls conducted after the impact assessment debateref lected the success of the government. According to a telephonesurvey carried out by the Chinese University of Hong Kong, about80 per cent of respondents thought that the CFA was wrong in itsruling concerning the right of abode issue. This figure was up by10 per cent on a survey conducted in March before the figures wereannounced. In handling this issue, respondents opined thatmaintaining societal interests (72.6 per cent) was more importantthan either upholding human rights (13.5 per cent) or the law (14.0).Close to 90 per cent of respondents believed that the social andliving conditions of Hong Kong would suffer if potential Mainlandimmigrants were allowed to settle in the HKSAR.60 Another surveyconducted by the University of Hong Kong’s Social Science ResearchCentre on the day that the government announced its estimates,revealed that 61 per cent of respondents objected to the inf lux of

58 Ming Pao, 7 May 1999.59 See ‘Figures based on too many assumptions’ and ‘Legislators urged for a review

of the validity of estimation’, ibid.; ‘Loopholes in the estimation of Mainlanderchildren’, ibid., 15 May 1999. A pressure group, The Human Rights Monitor, reportedthat the HKSAR government had overestimated the number of potential Mainlandimmigrants by more than 1 million. See Press Release, ‘New Survey on Right of AbodeCasts Doubt on Government’s “Taxi Method” Survey’, Human Rights Monitor, 18October 1999.

60 ‘Nearly 80 per cent thought that the ruling was wrong’, Wen Wei Pao [HongKong Chinese language newspaper], 8 May 1999.


immigrants. Respondents’ main worries associated with an inf luxof immigrants were an increase in unemployment (44 per cent),fears for public order (12 per cent), as well as concern for housingand education (11 per cent).61 Another poll found that 55 per centof respondents agreed with the suggestion that all 1.67 millionpotential immigrants should be excluded from entering Hong Kongaltogether. Over three-quarters did not think that Hong Kong shouldshoulder the financial burden needed to settle these immigrants.62

The government had clearly won the war in the identification ofpotential immigrants as ‘others’. After the second wave, societaldiscourse changed from the degree of negative societal impact tothe means of exclusion.63 On the level of resource allocation, thiscould be interpreted as an effort to protect the prosperity createdby Hong Kong people’s hard work. On the level of national identity,the whole episode deepened the cleavage between members of thetwo communities. In the process of making Mainlanders threatening‘others’, they were portrayed as lazy, unemployable, welfarescroungers, parasites feeding on societal resources and a menace tolaw and order. Because of them, society’s present living standardswould deteriorate, and past achievements at building up andimproving the community would have been in vain. The costs ofabsorbing these new immigrants would far outweigh the benefits.

61 ‘60 per cent object to arrivals: poll’, SCMP, 10 May 1999.62 The survey was commissioned by The Better Hong Kong Foundation and

conducted by Asia-Pacific Research Centre at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.It was a telephone survey carried out on the evenings of 9 and 10 May. See Wen WeiPao, 13 May 1999.

63 The Legislative Council, which is supposed to represent public opinion, resolvedto support the government’s request to get the Standing Committee of the People’sNational Congress to reinterpret the laws involved in the ruling. See Ming Pao, 20May 1999. The Standing Committee eventually overruled the decision of the CFA. Itruled that the CFA’s interpretation did not ref lect the ‘true legislative intent’, andthat children born before one of their parents had Hong Kong residency did not haveright of abode. The reinterpretation substantially reduced the number of potentialMainland immigrants. See SCMP, 27 June 1999.


CONCLUSION

In general, it is fair to say that in Hong Kong local identity triumphsover national identity. Although the Hong Kong identity was latein developing, and is still evolving, it certainly exists.64 Its uniquenessis unequivocal. It may share racial sameness and some culturalpractices with its motherland, the PRC, but differences out-numbersameness. Britain has left its imprint after more than a century ofcolonial rule. The British legacy of the legal system, education andgovernment bureaucracy still prevail. Impressive economic growthin the last thirty years has made Hong Kong a more ‘modern’ place.Greater exposure to the outside world, more freedom, high livingstandards, better public hygiene, and respect for law and order havegiven the Hong Kong community considerable advantages over themotherland. It is the sense of superiority this has engendered, andthe unenthusiastic response to reunification with the motherland,that sounded the alarm for nation-building in Hong Kong.

From Mao Zedong to Deng Xiaoping and now, Jiang Zemin,unification of the PRC has always been a national goal. Hong Kong,and recently Macau, have rejoined China. Taiwan is now the onlyplace left outside. Leaders in China appear to emphasize unificationas a legal process; they remain silent on the issue of nation-building.However, this does not imply that they regard nation-building asirrelevant. The PRC leaders understand better than anybody elsethe power of national identity and the force of nationalism. Thus,the fact that they said little about the need for nation-building inHong Kong could be a ref lection of their understanding that nation-building can neither be forced nor fabricated overnight. It is a longand gradual process.

On the right of abode issue, Chief Executive Tung Chee-hwa andhis government might have been successful in protecting ‘societalinterests’, but they have paid a heavy price. The sacrifice of theintegrity and the independence of the judicial system in exchange

64 See for example, Hugh Baker, ‘Life in the Cities: the Emergence of Hong KongMan’, The China Quarterly, 95 (1983), pp. 469–79; Lau Siu-kai and Kuan Hsin-chi,The Ethos of the Hong Kong Chinese, Hong Kong, The Chinese University Press, 1988;Helen Siu, ‘Remade in Hong Kong’, in Tao-tao Liu and David Faure (eds), Unity andDiversity, Hong Kong, University of Hong Kong Press, 1996; Choi Po-king, ‘FromDependence to Self-Sufficiency: Rise of the Indigenous Culture of Hong Kong, 1945–1989’, Asian Culture, 14 April 1990, pp. 161–77; Eric Kit-wai Ma, Culture, Politics andTelevision in Hong Kong, London and New York, Routledge, 1999.


for warding off potential immigrants has already been widely discussedin society. If this analysis is correct, then one would have to add thedivision between the people of the two communities to the pricepaid by the Hong Kong government. Survey data showed that morethan one-fifth of respondents (22.8 per cent) said that as a result ofthis issue, they were more resistant to new Mainland immigrants. Onthe whole, new immigrants were regarded as harming the localcommunity’s economic interests. The perception that Mainlandimmigrants would take away their jobs (58.3 per cent) or consumewelfare (79.5 per cent) was prevalent. Moreover, the social distancebetween the respondents and new Mainland immigrants was quitesubstantial. Willingness to be neighbours (70.9 per cent), colleagues(73.5 per cent) or friends (75 per cent) with new Mainland immigrantswas not automatic.65 The division between Hongkongers andMainlanders was heightened after the right-of-abode issue.

The outcome of the right-of-abode issue was actually a lose–losesituation for the HKSAR government. On the in-group out-grouplevel, it divided Hongkongers and Mainlanders in its effort to fend-off potential Mainland immigrants. It also lost in respect to solidaritybuilding within the community. Unlike in Triandafyllidou’s formula-tion, Hong Kong society was more separated than united in theprocess of defining ‘significant others’.66 For some, the disagreementwas on humanitarian grounds, as it could be argued that thesepotential immigrants were the children of Hongkongers. For others,overruling the decision of the Court of Final Appeal was regarded asheralding the death of judicial independence. For whatever reason,a fissure within the community was formed. The results of a surveyrecently released lent further support to this view. A majority of therespondents (62 per cent) thought that the conf licts created in theright-of-abode issue had divided Hong Kong society and that they(75.5 per cent) held the government responsible for this outcome.67

Previous studies have argued that national identity is part andparcel of an individual’s identity; and collectively, such awarenesshas been shown to contribute substantially to the legitimacy of thestate. Although the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ respects

65 ‘Polls show that abode right issue disintegrated Hong Kong society’, Hong KongEconomic Journal, 7 September 1999.

66 Anna Triandafyllidou, ‘National Identity and the “Other” ’, Ethnic and RacialStudies, 21:4 ( July 1988), pp. 593–612.

67 ‘Polls show’, Hong Kong Economic Journal, 7 September 1999.


the differences between Hong Kong and its motherland, it is under‘one country’ that the second system is allowed to function. Havinga local identity is not uncommon, nor is it always inimical to nation-state building. It is when the local identity rejects and overwhelmsthe national identity that a legitimacy crisis may emerge. As thecultural repertoire and the collective memories that the state candraw on to build a sense of ‘we-ness’ between Mainlanders and theHongkongers are scant, emphasizing the differences between themand making one group ‘significant others’ can only widen the gap.To the extent that one’s national identity is built on the process ofdifferentiating oneself from others, the others should not be one’sfellow countrymen. It was exactly this intangible price that the HongKong government paid in protecting its tangible interests.

POSTSCRIPT

The right-of-abode issue has not only deepened societal cleavages:unfortunately it led to an arson attack. On 2 August 2000 a groupof frustrated abode-seekers set fire to a packed 200-square-footreception room in the Hong Kong Immigration Tower, injuringfifty Immigration Department officers and abode-seekers. Nine dayslater, an immigration officer and an abode-seeker died on the sameday. Societal condemnation of the violent behaviour was unequivoc-ally loud and strong. While reproving their fellow abode-seekersfor engaging in an unlawful act, some abode-seekers none the lessput the blame on the SAR government for pushing them to resortto violence.68 Scholars warned that the incident might reinforce thenegative image of Mainlanders in Hong Kong, for now they wouldbe further associated with violence, barbaric behaviour and dis-regard for law and order.69 Their frustrations, however great, shouldbe downplayed. A weeping representative of the abode-seekerssummed up their feelings well: ‘We are not ruffians, the SAR govern-ment is. We hope the citizens of Hong Kong know that we are thechildren of Hong Kong citizens, we are all Hongkongers’, she said,after paying her last respects to the injured abode-seeker who hadjust died.70 The gap between Hongkongers and their fellow com-patriots has unfortunately broadened.

68 ‘Speed abode cases, says top official’, SCMP, 7 August 2000.69 ‘Mainlanders face backlash’, SCMP, 4 August 2000.70 Ming Pao, 12 August 2000.

Documents

Defining Fellow Compatriots as ‘Others’ - National Identity in Hong Kong