Defense Programs - Strategic Vision for 2030, DOE/NA-0011 - BITS

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILE

The Inactive Nuclear Weapons Stockpile also includes the W84, designed byLawrence Livermore and Sandia National Laboratories.

i

DEFENSE PROGRAMS STRATEGIC VISION FOR 2030

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction from Dr. Beckner iii

Defense ProgramsStrategic Vision for 2030 1

Defense Programs Vision 1

Fundamental Assumptions 2

Ancillary Assumptions 2

Overarching Constraint 3

Transforming theNuclear Weapons Complex 11

Transforming the Stockpile 12

Risks 12

Planning Principles for the2030 Stockpile and

Associated Infrastructure 13

Acronyms 17


ii

iii


INTRODUCTION FROM DR. BECKNER

The U.S. nuclear weapons enterprise mustrapidly evolve to a more sustainable path. TheNational Nuclear Security Administration, inconcert with the Department of Defense, mustmove away from a Cold War deterrencestrategy and develop a new way of supportingthe national security requirements whichrequire a fully credible nuclear deterrentagainst all future threats, but within aconstrained resource envelope.

The U.S. is undergoing a fundamental shift innational security strategy to address therealities of the 21st century and, in accordancewith the Nuclear Posture Review, is placingmore reliance on conventional capabilities toassure our allies, dissuade competitors, deteraggressors, and defeat our enemies.Nonetheless, the Nation will continue to relyon nuclear weapons as a critical part of thestrategy to achieve that goal and, in an uncertain world, will place an increasedreliance on the ability to rapidly develop and field a response to emerging threatsrather than relying solely on operationally ready nuclear weapons. The Presidenthas directed us to initiate actions toward that goal.

Reexamination of the physical security requirements for nuclear weapon facilitiesdictates an increase in resources devoted to addressing potential threats. Also,the threat clearly includes malevolent acts using one of our weapons as well asthat posed by primitive weapons deployed by rogue nations or sub-national groups.Surety improvements within the weapons can help reduce the threat of malevolentacts, and implementing those changes is an important stockpile transformationparameter.

At the same time, in keeping with the reduced role of nuclear weapons in achievingour national security goals, the Nation is expecting a reduction in the cost of thenuclear enterprise and a return on the decade of investments in the Science-BasedStockpile Stewardship Program. Both Congress and the Administration have sentclear messages of this expectation and the nuclear weapons enterprise mustrespond. At the current budget levels, the enterprise has very little headroom todevelop the important, new responsive capabilities.

Defense Programs (DP) must choose a path between two extremes: optimizing astrategy that sustains the existing stockpile and enterprise but does not addresspotential new threats, or, focusing on preparing for a broad array of potentialnew threats. Choosing one extreme or the other is clearly unwise, and DP willcontinue to work with the Department of Defense and Congress to arrive at the

Dr. Everet H. BecknerDeputy Administrator for Defense

Programs


iv

proper nuclear weapon capability for the future, both in terms of the stockpileand the capabilities of the nuclear weapons complex. We must identify andexecute strategies that optimize cost versus acceptable risk while transformingthe stockpile and the supporting enterprise to better address nuclear deterrentrequirements within available resources. I am committed to working with theDepartment of Defense and Congress to pursue these strategies and meet ourobligations to the Nation.

Everet H. BecknerDeputy Administrator for Defense Programs

1


DEFENSE PROGRAMS

STRATEGIC VISION FOR 2030

Over the past two years, the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA)Office of Defense Programs (DP) has been developing a vision for the futurenuclear weapons stockpile and its supportingNNSA infrastructure. This vision was derivedfrom a number of sources, including the 2001Nuclear Posture Review, discussions at the 2003Stockpile Stewardship Conference held at U.S.STRATCOM, the Strategic Capabilities Assessment(SCA) and Administration guidance on theimplementation of the Treaty of Moscow. Theresult was the issuance of the DP Strategic Visionin May 2004. That document was a vehicle toengage a wider community of senior managerswithin the Nuclear Weapons Complex (NWC) tofurther refine this vision into a tool that can guidedecisions on future investments in the NWC. Tothis end, Strategic Management Retreats were heldon September 13-14, 2004, and again on November9, 2004, and the tasking coming out of thoseretreats was to take the ideas and discussions raisedthere and incorporate them into an updated vision, or planning scenario, thatcan be used to guide future DP plans. This document defines the future state tobe used for planning purposes.

DEFENSE PROGRAMS VISION

As stated in the current FY 2006 DefensePrograms Planning Guidance, the DPVision is:

“Provide the Nation with anintegrated nuclear securityenterprise, consisting of research,development, engineering, test,transportation, and productionfacilities that operate a responsive,efficient, secure, and safe NNSAcapability and that is recognized aspreeminent in personnel, technicalleadership, planning, and programmanagement.”

Test being run with a W80 System Tester thatwill be used at the Pantex Plant.

The May 2004 DP StrategicVision.


2

To accomplish this vision, the DP Strategic Vision for 2030is built around a small number of fundamentalassumptions that, once validated, logically drive thecomplex to a particular future state. These assumptionsare:

FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS

1. The U.S. is a nuclear weapons state, second to none.

2. U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities will support theNation’s defense policy goals to assure allies, deteraggressors, dissuade competitors, and defeatenemies.

3. Safety and security of the stockpile is of paramountimportance, and is a primary NNSA responsibility.

ANCILLARY ASSUMPTIONS

4. Well before 2030, the adequacy and sustainabilityof Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship will havebeen accepted by the U.S. government and thescience community as a working strategy toprovide assurance of the safety and reliability ofthe weapons in the stockpile.

5. The stockpile will be maintained and transformed consistent with DoDrequirements without requiring underground nuclear testing. However,NNSA will maintain a state of readiness in case testing becomes necessaryin the future.

6. Based on the DoD Transformation study, the future stockpile will likelycontain some replacements for today’s weapons and/or the Life ExtensionProgram (LEP) weapons. The future Responsive Infrastructure and theconcept of Reliable Replacement Warheads (RRWs) will make availableweapons with improved safety, security, reliability and performancemargins.

7. The U.S. weapons program will continue to have sufficient quantities ofplutonium and highly enriched uranium for its needs. The U.S. willproduce and process tritium as required to meet program needs.

8. Consistent with DoD requirements and to offset the risk implicit inreducing the U.S. nuclear stockpile significantly below current levels, aResponsive Infrastructure strategy will be implemented, as noted inAssumption 6 above.

A B61-4 trainer using an aircraft monitor andcontrol package that simulates the electronic

control system of several types of military aircraft.

3


9. NNSA will have responsibility for environmental restoration for thosesites where it has continuing operations, as well as responsibility for anynewly generated waste. The NNSA Office of Infrastructure and theEnvironment will be responsible for managing legacy waste andrestoration activities at NNSA sites. DP is responsible for management ofnewly generated waste at its sites.

OVERARCHING CONSTRAINT

The final assumption is also the over-arching constraint on the 2030 vision:

10. For purposes of planning, the budget for weapon activities will be assumedto remain level through completion of LEPs and the re-engineering of thecomplex. Beyond those events, the budget will likely decline. Shouldbudgets decline sooner, LEPs will be protected at the expense of schedule,scope, or increased risk, if necessary.

These assumptions will be used to define the magnitude and characteristics ofthe 2030 stockpile and the supporting NWC infrastructure.

These assumptions have a cascading set of implications that are developed below.

FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTION:

1. The U.S. is a nuclear weapons state, second to none.

This fundamental assumption underpins all our plans for the future. Thisassumption states that, in 2030, the U.S. has a nuclear weapons stockpile andDepartment of Defense (DoD) delivery systems sufficient to support Nationalpolicies and strategies. The existence of a stockpile implies the U.S. has a Research,Development, and Testing (RD&T) capability to support this stockpile as well asa production, transportation, and maintenance capability. This fundamentalassumption, by itself, does not dictate a stockpile of any particular size orcomposition, nor the size and capabilities of the NWC infrastructure, only thatthey must exist.


2. U.S. nuclear weapons capabilities will support the Nation’sdefense policy goals to assure allies, deter aggressors, dissuadecompetitors, and defeat enemies.

This assumption is codified in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review as it applies toNNSA and, through additional actions by the President, provides for sizing ofthe U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile and, ultimately, the DP laboratory and plantinfrastructure.


4

Predicting twenty-five years into the futureis filled with uncertainty. It is unlikely thatanyone twenty-five years ago would havepredicted the current geopoliticalenvironment. It is conceivable in the futurethat one or more nuclear weapon states willtry to challenge U.S. leadership in variousarenas. Against this possibility the mostconservative approach to sizing the stockpileof 2030 requires that the U.S. be able torapidly respond to a near-peer adversary, orsome combination of adversaries. Themagnitude of potential threats and the paceof our production capability largely specifythe size of the operationally-ready U.S.

stockpile. For the U.S. to deter or dissuade all potential nuclear enemies, the totalU.S. stockpile will probably remain in the range of a few thousand (vicesignificantly less than 1,000 weapons). The NWC (production and R&D) mustbe sized and maintained to support this stockpile.


3. Safety and security of the stockpile is of paramount importance,and is a primary NNSA responsibility.

The NNSA must begin an evolutionary transformation of the stockpile toincorporate improved security and safety. Much of the Cold War-optimizedstockpile will become increasingly unsuited to meet the safety and securitychallenges of the coming decades.

The current nuclear weapons stockpile was designed and manufactured primarilyin the 1970 –1990 timeframe and optimized to parameters consistent with theCold War constraints and objectives. While built to the safety and securitystandards of the era, those standards have,and will continue to evolve in the face ofnew threats, new capabilities, and therecognition that some of the previous designconstraints can be relaxed. For example, theneed to maximize the yield to weight ratioon some weapons led to the decision toretain conventional high explosive (CHE) insome designs even though insensitive highexplosives (IHE) were coming into generaluse in other designs. The intrinsic safetyimprovements that IHE provides arguesstrongly for upgrading the CHE systems,particularly in light of the fact that theweight and volume constraints that led toselection of CHE in the first place may nolonger be as applicable. Fire-resistant pits

W87 Peacekeeper warheads.

Sandia National Laboratories employees involved in designing andbuilding testers that will be used at the new Weapons Evaluation

Test Lab at the Pantex Plant.

5


are another technology that has been onlypartially deployed into the current stockpile butcould offer additional safety margins in someaccident scenarios.

U.S. weapons must be secure against arecognized credible threat that has changedradically, particularly since September 11, 2001.Some have postulated that the greatest nuclearthreat to the American public may be amalevolent act using stolen weapons. TheNNSA has been developing surety technologiesfor several decades and it may now be possibleto field weapons that are intrinsically secure,i.e. weapons designed such that even if we lostphysical control of a warhead, a technologicallysophisticated adversary could not use it

immediately against us. These technologies can be made available and we mustpress forward with the development efforts needed to deploy them.

Changing the characteristics of the stockpile will take a long time, and may notbe complete by 2030. Nonetheless, the NNSA would be remiss in its responsibilitiesif it were not implementing a plan to bring the stockpile up to the next level ofsafety and security standards. In order to do so, the NNSA and DoD may needto reexamine the required military characteristics for the deployed stockpile.Because of the need to support on-going work, including dismantling thousandsof Cold War-era weapons, and other constraints delineated below, the NNSA,with DoD, will probably not be able to start significant transformation of thecurrent stockpile until around 2015.

The following assumptions do not help define a specific future state but do helpdefine the environment in which the transformation will occur.

ANCILLARY ASSUMPTION:

4. Well before 2030, the adequacy and sustainability of Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship will have been accepted by theU.S. government and the science community as a workingstrategy to provide assurance of the safety and reliability ofthe weapons in the stockpile.

Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship has been underway for almost a decadenow, and has enjoyed many successes. Many of the tools and capabilities plannedfor development are either now online or will be within the next decade. Currentcapabilities include the ability to conduct sub-critical experiments at Nevada TestSite (NTS), a high-performance plutonium gas gun (JASPER), the first arm of theDual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility, initial experimentalcapabilities at NIF, and access to 100 TeraOp computing platforms. The plan is

A Federal Officer training with a firearm.


6

underway to develop fusion ignition atNIF to provide nuclear burn forvalidation of weapons simulations.Within the next decade, the programshould be increasingly able to providedefinitive answers to current stockpileissues, including the life expectancy ofplutonium components and the impactof process changes on dynamic materialproperties. It will also provide thecapability to model the effects ofengineering changes in 3-D weapon codesto support certification and assessment.However, success is not assured since itrequires fusion ignition and high fidelitycomputer simulations that have never beenachieved.

Quantification of Margins andUncertainties (QMU) is a science-based

methodology that has been developed at the NNSA weapons laboratories as away to determine the sensitivity of particular designs to various physicalparameters, including manufacturing variations and maintenance intervals. Theoverarching goal is that QMU, together with other Science-Based stockpilestewardship capabilities, will be sufficient to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrentinto the indefinite future. As QMU matures, it enhances the possibility ofanalytically evaluating design changes and quantifying the impact. QMU, inconjunction with other stockpile stewardship tools, will allow the NNSA weaponslaboratories to confidently design and produce new weapons that are intrinsicallysafer and more secure without the need to return to underground nuclear testing.

As the stockpile stewardship tools are completed and brought into operationaluse, program investments are expected to shift from RD&T to productionand support activities.Maintenance of an RD&Tcapability will always berequired, but the magnitude ofthe investment as a percentageof the total program shoulddecrease. Another possibleimplication of the successfulimplementation of Science-Based stockpile stewardship isthat by 2030, the nuclear testreadiness posture that needs tobe maintained for technicalreasons could be relaxed, ifpolitical imperatives are alsoreduced.

Computer simulations provide vitalinformation about the

design of nuclear weapon systems.

The Advanced Simulation and Computing Campaign is developing some of theworld’s largest high-end computers, needed to satisfy the unique simulation

requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program.

7



5. The stockpile will bemaintained and transformedconsistent with DoDrequirements withoutrequiring undergroundnuclear testing. However,NNSA will maintain a stateof readiness in case testingbecomes necessary in thefuture.

As discussed in the preceding section,successful implementation of QMU mayenable the U.S. to maintain and transformthe stockpile without resorting tounderground nuclear testing. As safetyand security improvements areintroduced into the stockpile, designs thatminimize or avoid the need forunderground nuclear testing will be givenpriority. At the 2003 StockpileStewardship Conference, the Risk Panelexplored the utility of returning to testing and concluded that testing could be auseful adjunct to the Stockpile Stewardship Program, but there was no compellingreason to return to testing at that time. Further, as QMU and StockpileStewardship continue to mature, it will become increasingly less likely that testingwill be required for technical reasons. Nevertheless, the Panel could not guaranteethat a stockpile issue requiring testing for resolution will not arise, and, hence,maintaining a test readiness posture is a prudent precaution.


6. Based on the DoD Transformation study, the future stockpilewill likely contain some replacements for today’s weaponsand/or the LEP weapons. The future Responsive Infrastructureand the concept of RRWs will make available weapons withimproved safety, security, reliability and performance margins.

The transformation of the nuclear arsenal will occur over an extended period oftime, and may not be complete by 2030. Indeed, it may never be complete, assafety and security criteria continue to evolve. There will always be a mix ofweapons in the stockpile, and by 2030 we should be in a mode of continuouslychanging out the very oldest weapons with weapons that have improved safetyand security features (Assumption 3) incorporated into them. Maintaining a“warm” production with a relatively low annual throughput, but with thecapability to “surge” if necessary, will be a key aspect of the NNSA’s Responsive

The Test Readiness Program maintains theassets and capabilities needed to conduct an

underground nuclear test.


8

Infrastructure strategy discussed later. A key driver for the transformation of thestockpile will be to improve safety, security, and reliability. At the same time, ifrequested by DoD and authorized by Congress, the NWC will be able to designand field weapons with new capabilities. The RRW program is to demonstratethe feasibility of developing reliable replacement components that are producableand certifiable for the existing stockpile. The RRW program will help focus NNSA’stransformation to a Responsive Infrastructure.


7. The U.S. weapons program will continue to have sufficientquantities of plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU)for its needs. The U.S. will produce and process tritium asrequired to meet program needs.

The current U.S. stockpile was designed in an era when plutonium and HEUwere in limited supply. These limitations, together with the need to optimize thedesigns around yield to weight ratio, were major design constraints. Thoseoptimizations, and the extent to which they pervade the full-scale test databases,are now the source of many of the uncertainties and concerns with maintainingthe current and future stockpile. A future stockpile significantly smaller thanCold War levels means that for the foreseeable future the U.S. will not need toproduce new plutonium or HEU. Our tritium production strategy using TennesseeValley Authority reactors allows surge production if needed.


8. Consistent with DoD requirements to offset the risk implicit inreducing the U.S. nuclear stockpile significantly below currentlevels, a Responsive Infrastructure strategy will beimplemented, as noted in Assumption 6.

The 2001 Nuclear Posture Review has articulated goalsfor a “responsive nuclear weapons complex” that willprovide an appropriate balance between research anddevelopment (R&D) and production capabilities to beable to meet a range of future eventualities. Theweapons complex still needs substantial change inorder to fulfill its role in a “Responsive Infrastructure”that can both support an aging and evolving stockpileand also provide an agile response to unforeseendevelopments and/or potential new requirements fornuclear warheads.

“Responsive” refers to the ability of the nuclearweapons enterprise to anticipate stockpile surprisesor innovations by an adversary and to counter thembefore our deterrent is degraded. These programactivities are required while continuing to carry out

Adjustments being made at a high vacuum neutron tubebake station at the neutron generator facility.

9


the day-to-day activities in support of the stockpile. Unanticipated events couldinclude catastrophic failure of a deployed warhead type. Emerging threats couldcall for new warhead development or support to DoD in force augmentation.

A key measure of “responsiveness” is how long it would take to complete certainactivities to address stockpile “surprise” or deal with new or emerging threats(see Figure 1). Properly implemented, a Responsive Infrastructure strategy willreduce the overall costs of the nuclear weapons complex. DP will implement aResponsive Infrastructure strategy as a series of projects and initiatives, eachwith the goal of reducing RD&T and production costs and significantly reducingthe timeframe to design and field new capabilities.


9. NNSA will have responsibility for environmental restorationfor those sites where it has continuing operations, as well asresponsibility for any newly generated waste. The NNSA Officeof Infrastructure and the Environment will be responsible formanaging the legacy waste and restoration activities at NNSAsites. DP is responsible for management of newly generatedwaste at its sites.

NNSA will assume responsibility for environmental restoration of its sites beginningin FY 2006. The environmental restoration activities include legacy wastetreatment, storage, and disposal and environmental remediation for sites whereNNSA will have continuing operations, as well as newly generated waste at theLawrence Livermore National Laboratory and the Y-12 National SecurityComplex. Responsibility for newly generated waste at other NNSA sites wastransferred by prior agreements. Additionally, the realignment includes the wastedisposal facilities at the Nevada Test Site. Excess contaminated facilities will bescheduled for demolition, and will be subject to continued surveillance andmaintenance to minimize environmental risk. As environmental restorationcompletes, long-term stewardship will be managed by NNSA. Within the NNSA,


10

responsibility for environmental restoration and newly generated waste resideswith the Associate Administrator for Infrastructure and the Environment.

BUDGET PROJECTIONS ESTABLISHES BOUNDARIES ON THE 2030 VISION:

10. For planning purposes, we assume the budget for nuclearweapon activities will remain level through completion of LEPsand re-engineering of the complex. Beyond those events thebudget should decline.

For the past several years, the nuclear weapons budget has grown, but in thefuture is expected to at best remain relatively constant when adjusted forinflation (Figure 2). In defining a vision for 2030, the assumption that thebudget will remain relatively flat will be the key constraint. Building on thefirst three fundamental assumptions, this assumption will drive the pace atwhich we can transform both the complex and the 2030 stockpile.

Under the assumption of a constant budget, a number of implications arise.First and foremost, pressure to improve security at nuclear weapon complexsites will increase the need for the NWC to become smaller, more productive,and efficient. If we are to identify funds for transformation of the NWC aswell as to fully support the stockpile, DP must begin to develop strategies forproductivity gains now.

11


TRANSFORMING THE NUCLEAR

WEAPONS COMPLEX

The NWC must evolve into a moresustainable complex. Several factors willdrive the complex in this direction, withsecurity costs likely to be the mostsignificant. Currently, the NWC consistsof three national laboratories (two withproduction missions), four productionfacilities, and the Nevada Test Site (NTS).The philosophy to date has been todownsize in place. This philosophyrequires maintaining eight guard forces,multiple security areas, and significantlevel of secure transportation to move parts,material, and weapon componentsbetween sites. Without significant budgetincreases, this approach is probably notsustainable in the long term.

In the near-term, consolidating Manufacturing and Operating (M&O) contractsmay provide improved efficiencies and, hence, savings by implementation ofstandardized accounting, human resources, information technology, andprocurement activities, as well as allowing increased flexibility to shift personnelbetween sites, to address short-term issues.

Another area with the potential of near-term savings within the NWC is theelimination of duplicate capabilities. For example, high explosives research isconducted at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Lawrence Livermore NationalLaboratory, and NTS. Similarly, hydrotesting is performed at multiple locations.All three weapon laboratories have significant computing capabilities, even thoughsecure computing at remote locations has been demonstrated and is in use. Analternative near-term strategy may be to designate centers of excellence. Forinstance, centers of excellence could be designated for: hydrotesting, computing,high-energy density physics, high-explosive manufacturing, plutonium R&D, andnon-nuclear design and manufacturing, among others.

Reducing the number of sites that DP operates would obviously reduce securitycosts. In the long-term, the ability of the NNSA to accomplish its mission withina fixed budget may require closing sites and/or consolidating activities. Wherepossible, non-nuclear manufacturing or material supply chains will be outsourced.Consolidation of the NWC will have to be managed very carefully, because theComplex will have to continue to operate throughout this consolidation in orderto meet the immediate needs of the stockpile. The nature and recommendationsfor the consolidation of the NWC will be developed in a study that the Secretaryof Energy has directed for completion in FY 2005.

The Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research facility atthe Nevada Test Site is home to the two-stage gas gun, a 30-meter-

long, two-stage device to strengthen scientists’ ability to ensure thatthe Nation’s nuclear stockpile is safe and reliable.


12

If we can consolidate activities into fewer sites and smaller footprints, securityrisks, as an example, can be reduced leading to lower costs and improved security.Carefully choosing a consolidation path that leads to reduced risks and costs cansubstantially add efficiencies. Each site will likely be affected and an integrated,enterprise approach must be pursued to achieve maximum cost savings.

TRANSFORMING THE STOCKPILE

The other way that the NNSA can free up the funds needed to transform to asafer, more secure stockpile is by ensuring that future nuclear weapons will bedesigned with life-cycle cost as a major design criterion, after safety and security.The design will enable reduced total life-cycle costs, including the cost tomanufacture the weapon, the cost to maintain the weapon by both DoD andNNSA, and, the cost to dismantle the weapon. Assuming a total U.S. stockpile ofthousands of weapons (Assumption 2), the 2030 NWC should have the capabilityto produce on the order of 100 weapons per year. This is in addition torefurbishment, dismantlements, and surveillance.

The ability of the weapons design community to assess and implement designenabling changes such as IHE and the elimination of hazardous, difficult to processmaterials now designed into weapons will be an important aspect of improvingsafety, security, and cost effectiveness. The security aspects alone warrant thesechanges.

By 2030, there may be fewer warhead types than are currently present in thestockpile. Any required future weapons will, to the extent practical, be builtaround a limited number of modular components including standardized newpit and secondary designs. The concept is to have a few pre-qualified designs ofeach functional subsystem to be used in future warheads designs, i.e., a couple ofpit designs, secondary designs, gas transfer systems, and firesets incorporatingadvanced use-control and safety features. Robust manufacturing andperformance margins can be incorporated into these subsystems. Ease ofmanufacturing, inherent safety and use control, designed-in longevity, andcertification without underground nuclear testing will be major design goals forthese future systems. Development of the RRW in concert with implementationof Responsive Infrastructure will start the NWC moving in this direction.

RISKS

Funding: The transformation of the Complex to a smaller, more cost-effectivesize will require redirection of fiscal resources. Budget cuts may result ininsufficient funds to accomplish the end goal.

Deterrent Requirements: The approach envisioned by this document maynot meet DoD deterrence needs. As the Complex is in the midst of itstransformation, the international environment could rapidly turn for the worsewhich would dictate the reestablishment of a larger nuclear deterrent thanwould be possible to achieve.

13


Leadership: Several decisions must bemade almost immediately to realizesubstantial cost savings. Failure to makethese decisions or delaying these decisionswill be, in effect, decisions to continue thestatus quo and the opportunities for thesavings will be lost.

Skills: The creation of “gaps” in designand production timing, while enabling atransformation of the Complexinfrastructure might not provide sufficientwork to maintain the skill sets of nuclearweapons designers and manufacturers.This would cause morale to decline and apossible loss of critical expertise.

Capabilities: Unless carefully plannedand executed, Complex capabilities could

be eliminated before sufficient assets (e.g., piece parts) are in place to “carrythe weapons program” through to the time new capabilities are on line (suchas the situation that occurred when Mound, Pinellas, and Rocky Flats wereclosed).

PLANNING PRINCIPLES FOR THE 2030 STOCKPILE AND ASSOCIATED

INFRASTRUCTURE:The following summarize the implications developed above:

The U.S. will maintain an RD&T and production infrastructure in supportof a nuclear stockpile that totals a few thousand weapons of various types.

If required by the DoD and authorized by Congress, the capability toincorporate special features for special targets will be included in specificwarheads to address emerging threats.

The NWC will have the capability to produce all nuclear components.

To hold down costs while significantly improving safety and security ofthe stockpile, beginning around the 2015 timeframe, some characteristicsof the weapons in the stockpile will begin to be transformed in comparisonto the current stockpile (improved manufacturability).

Modified warheads will include new technologies designed for security,manufacturability, ease of maintenance, increased performance margins,increased safety and use-control, improved longevity, and will minimizethe use of difficult to handle materials and processes that threaten theenvironment.

The National Ignition Facility, with its laser beamlines focused on atiny target, is the world’s largest laser project. Scientific experiments

are underway.


14

Environmental, safety, and health regulationswill continue to be stringent, but manageable.

The workforce will be highly trained, flexible,mobile, and smaller, consisting of federal andcontractor employees whose mix may changerapidly.

To achieve these characteristics of the long-termstockpile, the following will be a necessary but,perhaps, not sufficient set of achievements:

The planned Life Extension Programs for theW76, W80, and B61 will be completed, thoughprobably at lower numbers of refurbishedweapons than originally envisioned.

The Inertial Confinement Fusion and HighYield Campaign and the Science Campaignwill obtain the data and understanding neededto certify modified and new warheads.

The NNSA will develop and institute aResponsive Infrastructure strategy to providerapid deployment of modified or newwarheads to meet emerging threats.

The backlog of weapons to be dismantled anddisposed will be worked off, and excess andenduring nuclear materials will be storedsafely.

Surveillance of the stockpile will be thoroughly planned and executed,with the results analyzed to ensure safety, security, and reliability.

If required by DoD and authorized by Congress, advanced concepts willbe developed and fielded for future application.

Development, certification, and production tools will be established torealize desired stockpile attributes.

Certification capabilities, without using nuclear testing, will be establishedfor existing or modified warheads. Large, high-performance computingcapabilities will be a critical element of this strategy.

The Secure Transportation Asset fleet and agent force will be properlysized to meet mission requirements and will be responsive to the dynamicrequirements of the NWC.

A Sandia National Laboratories researcherdemonstrates the setup he and his team created to peerinto the center of Sandia’s Z machine at the moment of

firing. The crystal under his finger is attached toportions of a Z target configuration.

15


The NWC will seek to measurably improve efficiency by installing modernbusiness practices and designing easy-to-manufacture weaponcomponents.

In time, on a complex-wide basis, activities will be downsized and existingfacilities modernized or replaced. Inter- or intra-site consolidation ofmissions and functions may occur.


16

17


ACRONYMS

CHE Conventional High Explosive

DARHT Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test

DoD Department of Defense

DP Defense Programs

HEU Highly Enriched Uranium

IHE Insensitive High Explosive

JASPER Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental Research

LEP Life Extension Program

M&O Manufacturing and Operating

NIF National Ignition Facility

NNSA National Nuclear Security Administration

NTS Nevada Test Site

NWC Nuclear Weapons Complex

QMU Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties

R&D Research and Development

RD&T Research, Development, and Testing

RRW Reliable Replacement Warhead

SCA Strategic Capabilities Assessment

STRATCOM United States Strategic Command

U.S. United States

Documents

Defense Programs - Strategic Vision for 2030, DOE/NA-0011 - BITS