Defending Negativity? Evidence from PresidentialCampaigns in Taiwan

Jonathan Sullivan

Received: 22 April 2009 /Accepted: 9 October 2009 /Published online: 10 November 2009# Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2009

Abstract This article presents an empirical analysis of TV and newspaperadvertising across four presidential election campaigns in Taiwan. The findingssuggest that although there are high levels of negativity, negative claims are apotential source of substantive information for voters. The findings supporttheoretical expectations derived from work in the US, and confirm that negativeadvertising can be a prevalent mode of campaign communication in non-western,newer democracies.

Keywords Campaigning . Negative advertising . Newspaper ads . Presidentialelections . Republic of China (Taiwan) . TV spots

Introduction

During the campaign for the first direct election of the President of the Republic ofChina on Taiwan (ROC; hereafter Taiwan) in 1996, Li Denghui ran a series ofpromotional TV ads in which he reminisced and ruminated on a series of topics suchas quitting smoking and courting his wife. Li, sitting in a comfortable armchairspoke endearingly about his personal experiences. And yet he barely mentioned hispolicies, those of his competitors or his seven year record as (unelected) President ofthe ROC. Indeed, Li’s ‘fire-side chat’-type ads gave little indication that he wasstanding for election to the highest office in the land. Li did not engage the radicalpro-independence message of the DPP’s Peng Mingmin or respond to the personalattacks launched against him by the New Party candidate Lin Yangkang. Li’s adsmay have been carefully and cleverly designed to show him as determined, calm

East Asia (2009) 26:305–320DOI 10.1007/s12140-009-9094-z

J. SullivanUniversity of Nottingham, Nottingham, UK

J. Sullivan (*)C104, School of Politics, University Park, Nottingham NG7 2RD, UKe-mail: jonlsullivan@gmail.com

under pressure and ‘just like you or me’ [35], but how did these ads help citizensvoting for their President for the first time make an informed decision about thecomparative merits of the candidates? In a watershed election at a critical juncture inTaiwan’s political development and faced with an ongoing national security crisis,Li’s ads contributed little of substance to the information environment.

These observations would not come as a surprise to many students of campaignadvertising. As Goldstein notes of campaigning in the US, ‘positive ads are a guy inkhakis walking on the beach with his dog or sitting in front of a fireplace in a fuzzysweater; and that simply doesn’t have a lot of information.’1 By contrast, anincreasing number of studies demonstrate that negative ads contain a comparativelyhigh level of information [14]. Indeed several political scientists argue that that thisis a systematic phenomenon [21]. Although negative advertising has long beencharacterized as representing the worst excesses of contemporary election campaignin democracies the world over, the tide of criticism has apparently turned. Recentwork by political scientists in the US suggests that negative ads make a useful, evencrucial, contribution to the information environment available to voters [11]. Simplyput, negative ads can provide a comparatively information-rich resource for citizensto base their vote choices on and should thus be valued as a beneficial feature ofdemocratic political competition. At least this is the argument in the context oftelevised advertising in American presidential campaigns [14]. Assessing whether ornot negative advertising is similarly ‘information-rich’ in a non-western democracy,in addition to providing a solid empirical basis for interpreting the tone and contentof campaign ads in Taiwan, is the major objective of this study.

Negative Advertising in a Non-western Democracy

Although the research literature is dominated by studies of campaigns in the US,negative advertising can be a prevalent campaign tool in newer, non-westerndemocracies [16], including Taiwan [27]. As Sigelman and Shiraev observe, ‘withcompetitive elections being held in nations where they were once unimaginable,going negative is now a worldwide phenomenon’ ([30]: 45). At the outset however,it would appear that the ‘defence of negativity’ [14] is on shaky ground when itcomes to campaigning in Taiwan. As the campaign environment in Taiwan hasevolved, TV and newspaper advertising have become increasingly prevalent ascampaign communication tools, raising concerns about the preponderance ofpersonality over substance and rampant negativity [23, 27]. In addition to theemergence of ‘tabloid journalism’ [1], ‘rampant instrumentalism’ [20] and‘hyperbolic rhetoric’ [8], negative advertising has been perceived as a damagingdevelopment for Taiwan’s democratic consolidation [27]. Many Taiwan scholarswould agree that ‘Taiwan’s campaign culture thrives on negativity’ where‘candidates engage in a style of personalized negative campaigning that would notbe allowed in other consolidated democracies’ ([25]: 5). Consider the Presidentialcampaign in 2004, where campaign messages included invented stories about crimeand social stability, conspiracy theories and alarmist rhetoric about coming war with

1 Quoted in The Washington Post, November 3rd 2002.

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China and economic collapse [6]. These messages were accompanied by theseeming character assassination of incumbent President Chen Shuibian, who’sopponents likened him to dictators and terrorists, questioned his competence,integrity and loyalty, and generally ‘painted him as the scum of the nation inlanguage that was without doubt the worst ever found in any election held on theisland’ ([27]: 49). Not surprisingly given this state of affairs, Taiwan scholars havevoiced concerns about the potential effects of such messages on latent ethnic andsocio-political cleavages and public support for democracy [4, 6]. Currentlyhowever, our understanding of campaign advertising in Taiwan is restricted by alack of empirical research covering multiple campaigns and across different media.To further our understanding of campaign advertising in Taiwan, this article analyzesTV and newspaper advertisements across four presidential campaigns.

Selection of Campaigns and Ads

Officially endorsed television and newspaper ads were collected for candidates fromeach of the two main parties, i.e. the Kuomintang (Guomindang, KMT) andDemocratic Progressive Party (Minjindang, DPP).2 The data collection wasrestricted to official advertisements paid for by the party or the candidates.Unofficial ads such as those paid for by support and interest groups were excludedfrom the analysis. The timeframe for the data collection was limited to the officialcampaign period as stipulated by the Central Election Commission.3 This decisionfollows prior research (e.g. [10]) and covers the most intense period of the campaign.However, given the gradual lengthening of campaigns, perhaps even the evolution ofthe ‘permanent campaign’ in Taiwan, the official campaign period timeframe looksincreasingly artificial. Future research should extend this timeframe, which wouldallow a more thorough comparison of temporal variation within a single campaign.

The data collection includes all of the unique TV spots that aired during theofficial campaign period. Where identical ads were duplicated in multiple locallanguages (e.g. Hakka or Aboriginal languages) only one version (either Mandarinor Taiwanese) was included. The newspaper ads were collected from three majornational newspapers: Liberty Times (Ziyou Shibao), China Times (ZhongguoShibao) and United Daily News (Lianhebao). The newspaper sample representsthe total population of official ads published in the main editions of these threenewspapers during the official campaign period (Table 1).

Content Analysis

The data in this study were generated by quantitative content analysis, theparameters of which are described in more detail elsewhere [33]. The units of

2 Although Taiwan is arguably a multi-party democracy [10], the decision to limit the analysis to the twomain parties in Taiwanese politics was based on the electoral dominance of KMT and DPP candidates inthe elections covered.3 I.E. 28 days prior to Election Day.

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analysis are the textual or verbal claims contained within an advertisement,operationalised as words or phrases representing a reason to vote for the sponsor,i.e. a positive claim, or to vote against an opponent, i.e. a negative claim. The codescheme records claims in four categories; issues, ideology, traits and strategy. Inaddition to recording the policy area and tone, issue claims are further separated intogeneral statements, specific proposals and party or candidate records of policyperformance. The traits category records mentions of the personal characteristics ofthe candidates, such as leadership, competence, integrity, compassion and theirantonyms [12]. A distinction is made between personality traits (‘my opponent iscorrupt’) and policy performance (‘my opponent let corruption flourish during histime as mayor’). The ideology category records information on ideological themes,such as those pertaining to Taiwanese national identity and more universal valuessuch as progress, prosperity and human rights. A further category measures thestrategic appeals salient in Taiwanese campaigns related to the business of theelection and the campaign itself, e.g. appealing for votes, advocacy of strategicvoting etc [22]. Citations of evidence, operationalised as documented statistics,direct quotations and sourced reports, were recorded in the relevant claim categories.

Theoretical Expectations

Attempting to explain the strong empirical finding that negative ads arecomparatively information-rich, vis-à-vis positive ads, in US presidential campaigns,Geer argues that negative claims perceived as being unfair or incredible risk beingrejected by voters. By contrast, criticism that is perceived as having some basis infact is more likely to be accepted as a part of democratic competition [13]. To avoidnegative reactions to their ads, candidates can seek to make their negative claimsmore credible by providing supporting evidence ([14]: 51). As a bi-product of thisrequirement, Geer argues that attacking on ideological or diffuse valence issues isproblematic, because of the difficulty in marshalling evidence. Thus negative ads aremore likely to focus on specific policy issues, where sources of evidence are moreabundant. For example, in normal circumstances a candidate could not credibly

Table 1 Data collection

Year Candidate Party Newspaper TV spots

1996 Li Denghui KMT 27 17

Peng Mingmin DPP 35 8

2000 Lian Zhan KMT 43 35

Chen Shuibian DPP 20 15

2004 Lian Zhan KMT 65 31

Chen Shuibian DPP 30 16

2008 Ma Yingjiu KMT 84 26

Xie Changting DPP 44 24

Total 348 172

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accuse an opponent of favouring higher unemployment, but she could criticize anopponent’s policies for reducing unemployment. Second, since presidentialcandidates’ past records invariably contain a rich seam of evidence, negative adsmay be more likely to focus on candidates’ previous experience of governance,failed policies, voting records, broken promises etc. To continue the unemploy-ment example, candidates could provide evidence of an opponent’s support for aparticular bill or, where an opponent is in an executive position, levels ofunemployment. In this way negative ads furnish voters with information aboutpast policy performance, thereby contributing to the kind of out-party criticismthat is necessary for holding office holders accountable [28]. Geer even goes so faras to claim that ‘negativity (and the threat of it) makes accountability possible’([14]: 13).

This argument gives rise to three specific expectations about negative claims.Compared to the positive claims that candidates make to promote themselves,negative claims that target an opponent are expected to be more frequently supportedwith evidence, more focused on the issues and to provide more information to voterson policy performance. In sum, negative claims are expected to be more specific,substantive and factual than positive claims, thereby providing a relatively high levelof information for voters to use in their decision-making.

How Negative is Campaign Advertising in Taiwan?

Before looking at the content of negative advertising, it is instructive to get an ideaof the extent of the phenomenon. Over all four campaigns, 2701 out of 7449 claimsin newspaper ads were negative (36.3%). In terms of TV ads, 701 out of 2056 claimswere negative (34.1%). Table 2 reports levels of negativity in each presidentialcampaign as a percentage of total claims. The first presidential campaign in 1996was anomalously positive, with just 13.3% of newspaper claims and 3.5% of TVclaims being negative. The campaign in 2000 was the most negative, although thislargely reflects the presence of a third competitive candidate, Song Chuyu.Notwithstanding scholarly accounts that described the 2004 campaign as beingoutstandingly negative (particularly [27]), levels of negativity in newspaper and TVadvertising were actually lower in 2004 than either 2000 or 2008. Indeed the level ofnegativity was 10% higher for newspaper ads in 2008: A campaign that did not

Table 2 Percentage of total claims that are negative by media type

Year Total number of claims:Newspaper

Proportion negative (%) Total numberof claims: TV

Proportion negative (%)

1996 1540 13.3 286 3.5

2000 1301 50.6 526 47.9

2004 2183 34.3 595 33.8

2008 2425 44.9 649 36.7

All 7449 36.3 2056 34.1

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strike Taiwan watchers as especially negative [9]. Moreover, because there were ahigher number of ads in 2008, the absolute number of negative claims was muchhigher than in 2004.

Variation in levels of negativity across campaigns and media types can besubstantial. There is further variation between parties during the same campaign,reported in Table 3 below. For instance in Chen’s re-election campaign in 2004,just 4.8% of claims in DPP newspaper ads were negative, compared to 43.1% ofclaims in Lian-Song’s newspaper ads. Similarly, in the same campaign the KMTTV ads were much more negative (40%) than Chen’s (24.3%). It is possible thatthis variation, and the contrast between a relatively positive DPP campaign andnegative KMT campaign, is responsible for the interpretations of this campaignmentioned above, perhaps in combination with other events (e.g. election ralliesorganized by both parties and the shooting incident on the final day ofcampaigning). Comparing the tone of party advertising across different media inthe same campaign reveals similar levels of negativity (e.g. Chen’s newspaper andTV ads in 2000 contained between 28 and 29% negative claims). There are threeexceptions: Peng Mingmin in 1996 and Ma Yingjiu in 2008 published newspaperads that were substantially more negative than their TV ads. In 2004 ChenShuibian ran predominantly positive newspaper ads (just 4.8% negative claims)and more negative TV ads (24.3%).

On average over the four campaigns, KMT newspaper ads are more negative(40.6%) than the DPP’s (27.6%). Overall, the two parties’ TV ads are similarlynegative (DPP 33%, KMT 34.5%). However, these figures tell us less thancomparing levels of negativity within the same campaign. The data reveal severalinteresting findings consistent with theoretical expectations [32]. First, ‘open’contests, where the incumbent President doesn’t run (2000 and 2008) are the mostnegative. In these contests neither candidate enjoys the agenda setting advantages ofincumbency and both candidates have motivation to attack their opponent in thebattle to define the campaign agenda [7]. Second, in contests where an incumbentPresident stood for re-election, challengers ran much more negative campaigns thanthe incumbent. This is evident in 1996 and 2004; although in different circum-stances. In 1996 Li Denghui enjoyed a high level of popularity and support as anincumbent who had overseen Taiwan’s rapid progress towards democratization. Hisearly and big lead over a radical DPP opponent was further bolstered by the crisissurrounding the PRC’s missile tests which allowed Li to appear statesmanlike and

Table 3 Negative claims as percentage of total claims, by party.

Year DPP Newspaper % KMT Newspaper % DPP TV % KMT TV (%)

1996 19 (796) 7.3 (744) 5.6 (72) 3.5 (214)

2000 28.3 (293) 57.1 (1008) 29.1 (165) 56.5 (361)

2004 4.8 (500) 43.1 (1683) 24.3 (235) 40 (360)

2008 47.5 (914) 43.3 (1511) 50.2 (271) 27 (278)

All 27.6 (2503) 40.6 (4946) 33 (743) 34.7 (1213)

Figures in brackets show total number of claims

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cast further doubt on the viability of his opponent’s independence platform. In short,Li had no need to engage his opponent and ran an almost entirely positive campaignthat emphasized his democratic credentials, competence in running the economy andstatesmanlike response to the missile crisis. Under different circumstances in 2004Chen Shuibian was not strongly favoured heading into his re-election campaign.Having been besieged by governance problems as a result of divided governmentand economic recession and having polarized society with his aggressive nationbuilding program, Chen was highly successful in using his incumbency advantage toset the campaign agenda, particularly through the promotion of a ‘defensivereferendum’ ([5, 18, 20]: 17). Chen relentlessly promoted his ‘Taiwan identity’agenda forcing his opponents to respond to him. Chen’s dominance of the campaignagenda and the failure of KMT issues (e.g. the economy) to gain traction arereflected in the lopsided tone of this race.

In terms of the absolute number of negative claims, campaign advertising isbecoming more negative in Taiwan, but that shouldn’t mask the fact that themajority of claims are still overwhelmingly positive. As a proportion of totalclaims, levels of negativity are variable across campaigns rather than increasinglinearly. The question of whether these levels are excessively negative ([27]: 49) issubjective, but we can compare the Taiwan findings with those in the US.Analyzing TV ads in ten US presidential campaigns Kaid and Johnston [17] reportan average of 40% negativity. Benoit’s [2] ‘functional analysis’ of TV ads over tenUS Presidential campaigns reveals an average of 37% negative claims. The bestpoint of reference is Geer’s [14] analysis of TV ads in US Presidential campaignsusing a similar research design to this study. Over twelve campaigns from 1962 to2004 Geer reports that an average 32% of total claims were negative ([14]: 35), i.e.marginally lower than the average for both TV ads (34.1%) and newspaper ads(36.3%) in Taiwan.

Are Negative Claims more Frequently Supported with Evidence?

Over all four campaigns, 0.9% of a total 4748 positive claims in newspaper ads wassupported with evidence, compared with 9.3% of a total 2701 negative claims.Similarly 0.8% of a total 1355 positive claims in TV ads was supported withevidence, while 6.8% of 701 negative claims supplied evidence. Thus, proportion-ally, negative claims were around ten times more frequently supported with evidencethan positive claims. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the vast majority ofnegative claims (some 90%) were not supported with evidence.

These differences hold over time, although there is variation across campaignsand across media types within the same campaign. For instance, in 1996 nearly aquarter (23.4%) of the 205 negative claims in newspaper ads were supported withevidence (mainly strategic appeals made by Li Denghui), but not a single claim wassupported in the TV ads. However, the exceptionally small number of claims for TVads in 1996 mitigates against making strong inferences. In 2000, just 0.6% of 642positive claims in newspaper ads were supported with evidence, compared to 13.6%of 659 negative claims. In the TV ads in 2000 3.3% of 274 positive claims weresupported, compared with 9.9% of 252 negative claims. Not one of the 394 positive

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claims in the TV ads in 2004 was supported with evidence, whilst 10% of the 201negative claims were. Curiously for two candidates with recent records of publicservice, neither Ma Yingjiu nor Xie Changting provided much evidence for theirown promotional claims in 2008; just one claim out of 1337 positive claims in thenewspaper ads. By contrast, 6% of 1088 negative claims in their newspaper adssupplied supporting evidence. This distinct contrast fits Geer’s [14] portrayal ofcandidates being more inclined to seek evidence for their attacks but taking a morerelaxed approach to supporting their promotional claims. Figure 1 shows theproportion of positive and negative claims supported with evidence as a percentageof the total number of positive or negative claims. The data are divided by mediatype and campaign.

While the proportional breakdown of claims supported with evidence isremarkably similar for both parties, these aggregate data mask the fact that, in thecase of the newspaper ads, the majority of claims supported with evidence in 1996,2000 and 2004 (196 out of 229) were provided by KMT candidates. However thissituation was reversed in 2008, where the DPP candidate, Xie Changting, accountedfor 51 out of the total 66 claims in newspaper ads supported with evidence, despitehim running many fewer ads and making fewer claims than his KMT opponent. Themajority of Xie’s claims that provided supporting evidence was an attack on hisopponent, many of them personal attacks on Ma’s integrity. That Ma, thoughembroiled in a mini-scandal relating to the uncertain status of a US Green Card,enjoyed a strong reputation for integrity and an attractive personal image offers apotential explanation as to why Xie felt compelled to supply evidence for his attacks.Exceptionally, Chen Shuibian’s newspaper ads in 2004 contained no negative claimssupported with evidence, but 15 positive claims were. These pieces of evidence wereall in support of promotional claims made by Chen about policy performance in hisfirst term, particularly on the economy and social issues. Although contrary to theargument that negative claims are more frequently supplied with evidence, thisfinding supports the more general idea that candidates seek credibility by providingevidence. That Chen would seek additional credibility for his claims to havegoverned well is understandable when one considers the economic and governanceproblems experienced during his tenure and the volume and intensity of attacks byhis opponents on this theme.

In terms of the TV ads, I have noted above that neither the DPP or KMTcandidates supported any of their, admittedly relatively small, number of claims withevidence in 1996. The context of this campaign offers a potential explanation.Incumbent president Li Denghui enjoyed a high level of public support and a biglead in the polls from the outset. He benefited from strong associations withdemocratization and a booming economy and his native Taiwanese backgroundinoculated him against ethnic-based criticisms. Because Li was already highlycredible (especially on the socio-economic issues and democratic reform which werehighly salient in 1996) his self-promotional claims did not require much evidence tomake them believable. One would imagine that Peng would need high levels ofevidence to make any attack on Li stick. However, Peng’s strategy was to emphasizeTaiwanese ‘self determination’ as a means to combat Li’s popularity rather thanattack him directly. As the ‘father’ of the independence movement and lifelongadvocate of self determination, Peng required little evidence to make these claims

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credible. A further factor in 1996 was the effect of the PRC’s missile exercises,which directed the candidates’ attention away from each other towards another actornot involved in the election (i.e. the PRC). Whilst Peng’s response was to intensifyhis call for independence (with the rather illogical claim that ‘the only way thatTaiwan can be safe from China’s military threat is to declare independence’), Li, asis the privilege of incumbents, propagated the image of a calm and decisivestatesman, appearing in ads alongside images of Kennedy and other successful‘crisis managers.’ These conditions created a situation where neither candidateengaged his opponent very much nor, it seems, felt much need to make his ownclaims more credible with evidence.4

Are Negative Claims Comparatively Issue-Focused?

Dealing with the newspaper ads first, of a total 4748 positive claims, ideologyconstituted the highest proportion (39.1%) followed by claims on the issues(35.9%). The highest proportion of the 2701 negative claims was on the issues(57.1%), followed by personal traits (18.1%). Thus when candidates attack theiropponents in Taiwan, a combined three quarters of their claims are either issue ortrait based, suggesting that negative advertising is both policy focused andpersonal. On the other hand, when they promote themselves Taiwanese candidatesdo so predominantly in terms of ideology and issues (combined 75%). Theproportional distribution of claims in newspaper ads in each campaign is set out inTable 4.

The data reveal some interesting trends over time. For instance, candidates arepromoting themselves and attacking their opponents more on the issues with eachcampaign. From 34.6% of negative claims attacking on the issues in 1996 to 68.8%of negative claims in 2008, candidates in each successive election have targeted theiropponent on the issues more than in the previous campaign. Proportionally, both thepromotion of candidates’ own ideology (49.5%) and attacking opponents’ ideology(27.8%) were substantially higher in the first presidential campaign than any

Fig. 1 Percentage of total claims with evidence

4 In short, this campaign was largely fought on issues and ideological themes that were ‘owned’ by thetwo parties. The evidence that Li provided in his newspaper ads was predominantly used in support ofstrategic appeals related to the state of the race, not issues or ideology.

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subsequent one. Positive ideological claims have stabilized at around one third oftotal positive claims in the subsequent three campaigns, indicating that ideologicalthemes, particularly national identity, are a consistently salient feature of Taiwaneseelections (e.g. [15]). However, the proportion of negative claims in the ideologycategory has declined with each campaign, reaching a low of 11.8% in 2008. Whilstit is tempting to infer that ideological attacks have declined as a result of theemergence of what Schubert [29] calls an ‘overarching consensus’ on Taiwan’snational status, such an interpretation is contrary to many commentaries on theideological polarization induced by Chen Shuibian’s aggressive nation building[4, 19]. More pertinent to the argument in this article however is that the decline inthe proportion of negative claims on ideology is consistent with theoreticalexpectations [14]. A final contextual note concerns the fluctuations in the proportionof trait claims, both positive and negative. The overall mean proportion of self-promotional trait claims is around 10% of total positive claims. However in 2000 anexceptionally high 27.6% of positive claims sought to promote the sponsor’scharacteristics. Much of this is explained by the concerted, and some would saymisguided (e.g. [25]) attempt to develop the image of the dour KMT candidate LianZhan, in the face of charismatic (Song Chuyu) and dynamic (Chen Shuibian)opponents. Personal attacks also constituted a high proportion of negative claims in2000 (23.2% of total negative claims), with Song’s integrity bearing the brunt ofattacks from both of his opponents. Consistent with accounts of the 2004 campaign[27] trait attacks made up 23% of negative claims. That these personal attacks werealmost exclusively directed against incumbent Chen Shuibian, give some weight toSchafferer’s observation that the KMT/PFP had no other strategy than to discreditChen’s character and integrity ([27]: 49).

Turning to the TV ads, of the total 1355 positive claims, ideology againconstituted the highest proportion (46.8%) followed by claims on the issues(30.6%). The highest proportion of the total of 701 negative claims was in theissue category (55.2%), followed by personal traits (26.5%). This pattern mirrorsthat observed in the newspaper ads described above: In both TV and newspaper

Table 4 Proportion of negative and positive claims in each category (Newspaper)

Tonea Year Issue (%) Ideology (%) Traits (%) Strategy (%) Total claims

+ 1996 26.4 49.5 8.8 15.2 1335

2000 23.5 35.2 27.6 13.7 642

2004 41.1 34.5 6.6 17.8 1434

2008 45.6 35.4 5.4 13.5 1337

All 35.9 39.1 9.7 15.3 4748

− 1996 34.6 27.8 16.6 21 205

2000 42.9 20.2 23.2 13.7 659

2004 58.7 14.8 23 3.5 749

2008 68.8 11.8 14 5.5 1088

All 57.1 15.9 18.9 8.1 2701

a In the following tables a plus sign denotes positive claims and a minus sign denotes negative claims.

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ads, negative claims are proportionally more issue-focused than positive claims.The proportional distribution of claims in TV ads in each campaign is set out inTable 5.

The data for each campaign again reveal some interesting variation. Unlike thenewspaper ads discussed above, the trend towards more issue-based and lessideological advertising is not so clear in the TV ads. Issue claims constituted morethan half of positive claims in 2008 (50.6%), but considering the much lower levelof positive issue claims in preceding campaigns, it is unclear that this represents anew resting level. Again in 2008, negative claims were exceptionally issue-focused(80.7%). Although the proportion of negative issue claims increases over time (thelow number of negative claims in 1996 makes it impossible to draw anyconclusions), the high level of issue focus in 2008 seems to be anomalously high.Whilst it is tempting to accept Xie and Ma at their word that they would runrespectful, issue-based campaigns, the context of the campaign offers a moreconvincing explanation. Following the heavily ideological tenor of Chen’s secondterm, Ma was successful early in the campaign in making the economy the mostsalient campaign issue. This was an issue on which the KMT enjoyed a strongreputation (having overseen Taiwan’s ‘economic miracle’) and a comparativeadvantage over the DPP, particularly given the impression that Chen had donebadly on the economy in his 8 years. The traditional DPP response to the KMT’sclaims to superiority on the economy had been to raise the issue of social welfareand to fall back on ideological appeals to ‘Taiwan identity’ [10]. However, thisoption was less amenable to Xie; given the general ‘national identity fatigue,’ acampaign built on Taiwan identity, as Chen’s re-election campaign in 2004 was,would not have served Xie as well. Seeking to distance himself from theincreasingly unpopular and discredited Chen, Xie had no choice but to focus onthe issues; only to discover that the issue space was already occupied by Ma’sstrong and popular ‘economy and improved relations with China’ message. Amiddle-roader, seemingly without a strong policy agenda of his own, Xie wasforced to attack Ma’s issues, particularly the ‘common Chinese economicmarket’ proposal.

Table 5 Proportion of negative and positive claims in each category (TV)

Tone Year Issue (%) Ideology (%) Traits (%) Strategy (%) Total claims

+ 1996 27.2 54 10.5 8.3 276

2000 19.7 37.2 32.1 10.9 274

2004 19.5 60.9 7.6 11.9 394

2008 50.6 34.8 8.5 6.1 411

All 30.6 46.8 13.4 9.2 1355

− 1996 50 10 40 0 10

2000 31.7 17.1 47.2 4 252

2004 54.7 10.4 30.3 4.5 201

2008 80.7 5.5 0.8 13 238

All 55.2 11.1 26.5 7.1 701

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Having discussed differences in the focus of advertising across campaigns, I nowcompare the positive and negative claims of the two parties. Table 6 below showsthe distribution of positive and negative claims. The distinction between positive andnegative claims is more strongly supported in the DPP’s ads, where 61.3% ofnegative claims focus on the issues compared to just 26.2% of positive claims. DPPcandidates do not attack their opponents as frequently as the KMT, but when they doso it is predominantly on the issues. DPP candidates’ self-promotional claims containa strong ideological component (49.8%), consistent with accounts of the parties’developmental trajectory and close association with Taiwan independence prior to1999 and Taiwan identity thereafter [5, 26]. It is perhaps surprising to note thatnearly a third of KMT candidates’ positive claims were also ideological (32.5%).This figure includes both the promotion of traditional KMT values such asstability, progress and prosperity and, in 2004 and 2008, an increasing focus onTaiwan identity appeals. Lian-Song’s emphasis on Taiwan identity can beinterpreted primarily as a response to the political agenda that Chen skilfully setin the run up to the 2004 election and intensified in the campaign proper. In 2008it was arguably more a case of Ma seeking to deflect questions about his ‘Taiwancredentials’ and the mainstreaming of Taiwan identity [10]. The distribution ofpositive and negative claims shown in Table 6 reveals a similar picture to thenewspaper ads.

Do Negative Claims Focus More on Policy Performance?

Over all four campaigns 45.9% of 1703 positive issue claims targeted performance,compared with 68.3% of 1542 negative issue claims. A similar proportion ofpositive (19.7%) and negative (17.8%) issue claims were coded as vague generalstatements. A much higher proportion of positive issue claims were policy proposals(34.4%) than negative issue claims (13.9%). This last finding is expected– proposalsare future oriented and thus less amenable to supporting with evidence. It is alsoconsistent with issue ownership models that predict that candidates avoid engagingtheir opponent’s proposals (e.g. [31]). Taken together, the finding that candidatesseldom engage their opponents’ policy proposals but often question their policy

Table 6 Distribution of claims by tone and party

Party Tone Issue (%) Ideology (%) Traits (%) Strategy (%) Total claims

Newspaper DPP + 26.2 49.8 8.9 15.1 1811

− 61.3 15 17.5 6.2 692

KMT + 41.8 32.5 10.2 15.4 2937

− 55.6 16.2 19.4 8.8 2009

TV DPP + 24.5 53.6 12.4 9.4 498

− 69 9.8 14.7 6.5 245

KMT + 34.1 42.8 14 9.1 857

− 47.8 11.8 32.9 7.5 456

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performance reinforces the point that if negative advertising does have a role indemocratic campaigns, it is probably restricted to retrospective voting [14]. Thisinterpretation is exemplified by the newspaper ads in the 2004 campaign, where79.1% of negative claims targeted performance, but only 0.7% of negative claimsengaged opponents’ policy proposals. However, the figures for 2000 and 2008confound this observation, with 17.3% and 21.4% of negative claims targetingopponents’ policy proposals. Once again it appears that strategic and contextualconditions have an impact on the content of candidates’ advertising. Namely, in2004 the incumbent Chen Shuibian made very few policy proposals in his ads(1.4% of positive claims in newspaper ads—see below), in a campaign dominated,on his side, by identity appeals. For his part, Chen adopted a common strategy foran incumbent with agenda setting power, essentially ignoring his opponents’proposals and sticking to his ‘Taiwan identity’ message. Chen’s dual strategy(pursuing his ideological message and ignoring his opponents) was so successfulthat in the latter stages of the campaign Lian-Song abandoned their economicproposals for personal attacks on Chen’s character and mobilized to boycott the‘defensive referendum’ held concurrent with the presidential election. Lian andSong, life-long KMT officials with fewer apparent ‘Taiwan identity’ credentials,even tried to muscle in on Chen’s Taiwan identity theme.5 Table 7 sets out acomparison of issue claims, reporting the proportion of general statements,performance claims and policy proposals as a percentage of total positive ornegative issue claims.

The breakdown of issue claims in the TV ads shows similarities and differenceswith the newspaper ads. Overall, negative claims (57.1% of 387) are moreperformance based than positive claims (43.4% of 414). The TV ads generally arevaguer than the newspaper ads, with positive claims vaguer (32.9%) than negativeclaims (22.7%). This finding is consistent with accounts of televised advertising

5 In one of the memorable images of the 2004 campaign, Lian and Song prostrated themselves and kissedthe ground to show their love for Taiwan.

Table 7 Breakdown of issue claims by tone (Newspaper)

Year Tone Total issue claims General (%) Performance (%) Proposal (%)

1996 + 353 7.1 77.9 15

− 71 14.1 83.1 2.8

2000 + 151 4.6 80.8 14.6

− 283 21.2 61.5 17.3

2004 + 589 19.9 48.2 31.9

− 440 20.2 79.1 0.7

2008 + 610 30.5 16.6 53

− 748 15.5 63.1 21.4

All + 1703 19.7 45.9 34.4

− 1542 17.8 68.3 13.9

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‘lacking beef’ [24] and the greater image-construction function assigned to the TVmedium [34]. However, this shouldn’t be overstated; two thirds of positive claimspromote policy performance (43.4%) or make proposals (23.7%). And more thanthree quarters of negative claims in TV ads target opponents’ policy performance orengage their proposals.

The findings for each campaign again reveal substantial variation. Chen’sre-election campaign in 2004 stands out, with neither candidate putting forward apolicy proposal in their positive TV ads. Instead, both parties focused predominantlytheir on their own policy performance (75.3% of 77 positive claims). Negativeclaims were also dominated by performance claims (92.7% of 110 negative claims),mostly attacks by Lian-Song on the incumbent Chen. By contrast, candidates in2008 did not promote their own policy performance (26% of 208 positive claims) orattack their opponent’s (28.6% of 192 negative claims), despite both candidateshaving recent experience of holding public office, and in Xie’s case, the unavoidableassociation with his DPP colleague’s eight years of variable performance. Instead,the TV ads in 2008 were both much vaguer than the average (31.7% of positiveclaims, 40.1% negative claims), but also contained a much higher proportion ofpolicy proposals. 42.3% of positive claims were coded as policy proposals, and anexceptionally high 31.3% of negative claims engaged opponent’s proposals (Table 8).

Conclusion

Analysis of the tone and content of televised and newspaper advertising across fourpresidential campaigns in Taiwan suggest that although levels of negativity areincreasing, negative claims are more likely than positive claims to be supported withevidence, to focus on the issues and to provide specific information on policyperformance. These findings are consistent with theoretical predictions derived fromthe analysis of campaign advertising in the US and lend some support to the‘defence of negativity.’ However these findings should not be interpreted as

Table 8 Breakdown of issue claims by tone (TV)

Year Tone Total issue claims General (%) Performance (%) Proposal (%)

1996 + 75 48 41.3 10.7

− 5 0 80 20

2000 + 54 27.8 68.5 3.7

− 80 10 75 15

2004 + 77 24.7 75.3 0

− 110 2.7 92.7 4.5

2008 + 208 31.7 26 42.3

− 192 40.1 28.6 31.3

All + 414 32.9 43.4 23.7

− 387 22.7 57.1 20.2

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advocacy of negative advertising. A voter’s decision-making calculus requires a mixof informational inputs [3] and a surfeit of advertising that targets opponentswould fail to clarify the sponsoring candidate’s own policy positions andqualifications for the job. There is no indication that this is happening in Taiwan;although negativity is increasing, the majority of claims are still self promotionalpositive ads.

Parties and candidates in Taiwan (as elsewhere) behave as though negativeadvertising is an effective way of generating support,6 and we are unlikely to see theuse of this campaign tool recede in future elections. Thus the finding that negativeclaims can constitute a form of potentially useful information for voters isheartening. However it is important to acknowledge that not all forms of negativeadvertising make potentially useful contributions to the information environment. Onaverage, negative claims are comparatively specific and substantive, but this is notuniformly the case. Some negative ads contain unsubstantiated attacks andtransparent attempts to instil ‘fear and loathing’ in voters. The possibility existsthat the damage done by such low quality negative ads negates the potentialinformational benefits of high quality negative claims. This question of voter levelexposure effects is a crucial one that needs to be addressed in future research oncampaigning in Taiwan.

Acknowledgements I would like to thank Cees van der Eijk, Phil Cowley, Will Lowe and Tim Veen fortheir comments. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Elections, Public Opinion andParties Conference in Manchester, 2008. I thank panel participants for their feedback.

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Jonathan Sullivan is a PhD student in the School of Politics and International Relations, University ofNottingham. His work on various aspects of political communication in Chinese contexts has beenpublished in The China Quarterly, Journal of Contemporary China and The Pacific Review amongst otherjournals. His current research project examines the link between online and offline environmental activismin China.

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