Defence Research and Development Canada Air S&T Overview

2016 Canadian Armed Forces Outlooks (Air Force)

Dale F. Reding Director General S&T Air Force and Navy April 7th 2016

DRDC Key Facts • 8 research centres located in 4 provinces • 1,400 employees • $275 million operating budget • 8 Research Portfolios

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Why Air Force S&T? “The RCAF requires a strong partnership with Science and Technology, both ADM S&T and the broader innovation system, to achieve: the right scientific and technological innovations, at the right time and the right place and to support evidence based decision making.” J.Y. Blondin, Lieutenant-General, COMD RCAF (2013)

Defence S&T Framework

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Partnerships and Opportunities http://www.drdc-rddc.gc.ca/en/partnerships.page

AIR FORCE

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Air Force S&T Issues • Minister’s Mandate Letter -

Priorities with an RCAF S&T Nexus – Maintain Canada’s strong

commitments to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) and to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

– Working with the Minister of Public Services and Procurement to launch an open and transparent competition to replace the CF-18 fighter aircraft, focusing on options that match Canada’s defence needs.

– Renew Canada’s focus on surveillance and control of Canadian territory and approaches, particularly our Arctic regions.

Emerging Technological Disruptors Upcoming (joint) BAA / DIRP calls

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Cyber and

Electronic Warfare (EW)

Quantum Science

Biotechnologies

Human Systems, Augmentation and Neuroscience

Autonomous Systems

Resilient Additive Manufacturing

Advanced Materials and Stealth Technologies

Big Data

Advanced Information Communication Technologies

Advanced Sensors and ISR

Advanced Weapons

Power and Energy

Emerging Strategic Concerns - Continental Surveillance

Technology New threat vectors: long range, precision, stealth, hypersonic speed, drones.

Environment Unique and changing geophysical conditions, particularly in Northern oceans.

Theater Greater accessibility to and economic activity in the North.

Geopolitics Strategic messaging. Very capable foreign military capabilities going beyond numbers.

The Government that has identified continental surveillance as a strategic priority for the Department of National Defence.

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All Domain Situational Awareness (ADSA) S&T Program: 1. Strategic surveillance of airborne traffic and aerospace warning;

2. Awareness of maritime traffic in Canadian approaches and Arctic littoral regions;

3. Awareness of sub-surface activity approaching or in Canada’s North;

4. Analysis of sensor mixes and information integration for domain awareness to detect threats beyond the threshold of current systems.

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S&T Informing Decision-Making: Continental Surveillance

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• ADSA (All Domain Situational Awareness) program – DND approved $133 million over five

years • ADSA inform decisions on future CAF

continental surveillance capabilities and enhanced domain awareness of air, surface and sub-surface approaches to Canada, especially in the Arctic.

• ADSA S&T will: – analyse stakeholder requirements; – work with innovation partners; – conduct R&D projects to de-risk and

test unproven technologies; – integrate and deliver advice; – provide information on technical

maturity, predicted operational performance, sustainability and risks.

• Feb 2016: – Space/TCPED Request for Proposals.

$7M total value, 50/50 cost shared, max $1M DRDC contribution, up to 50% done by allies.

• Feb 2016: – CSSP Request for Information (RFI). – Later date: CSSP Call for Proposals

(CFP). $5M total value (ADSA portion).

• Summer 2016: ADSA RFI. • Summer 2016: Stakeholder Days. • Fall 2016: ADSA CFP.

– Up to approx. $100M total value.

Aerospace Warning

Over-The-Horizon Radar (OTHR) use for northern surveillance

Active and passive ground, air and space-based radar

Hyperspectral, infrared, seismic, acoustic and other sensing

technologies

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Maritime Surface Surveillance

Compression of the intelligence cycle for satellite

Integration of Radarsat Constellation Mission (RCM)

with other assets

Future space-based wide area surveillance systems

Sub-surface Surveillance

Underwater and under-ice sensor network

Long-range, long-endurance Autonomous Underwater

Vehicles (AUV)

Underwater communications, docking stations and energy

generation

Exploring and De-risking Technologies Th

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Sen

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Aerospace Warning

• Outcome: DND to conduct and/or access timely and persistent surveillance of airborne traffic over Canadian sovereign territory and its approaches and extending north.

• Requirement: DND requires the capability to detect, track, and identify all airborne objects, across a broad range of possible sizes, altitudes and speeds.

• ADSA S&T will explore both mature and emerging technologies, including: – Over-The-Horizon Radar use for northern surveillance;

– Active and passive ground, air and space-based microwave and high frequency radar; and

– Hyperspectral, infrared, seismic, acoustic and other sensing technologies.

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Sustaining/Replacing the North Warning System (NWS) Capability

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Evolutionary Approach • System Centric • Lower Technical Risk • Higher Operational Risk • (e.g. Radar)

Revolutionary Approach • Network Centric • Higher Technical Risk • Lower Operational Risk • (e.g. Post Industrial System of Systems)

Time

Over-The-Horizon Radar (OTHR) Technology

• Enduring capability gaps – Replacing the North Warning System one-for-one would be ineffective against new threat vectors.

• ADSA S&T will identify and assess candidate technologies with partners.

• ADSA S&T will de-risk and predict the performance of Over-The-Horizon Radar (OTHR) technology when aimed to the North:

– Operational availability

– Range

– Estimated readiness

– Risks

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Maritime Surface Surveillance

• Outcome: DND outcome to conduct and/or access timely and persistent surveillance of maritime surface objects of interest in Canadian approaches and Arctic littoral regions.

• Requirement: DND requires the capability, through new sensors and creative use of existing technologies, to detect, distinguish, characterize, identify and track man-made objects, and to monitor and maintain accurate awareness of the atmosphere, ocean, ice, and littoral environment.

• ADSA S&T will assess concepts and technologies, including: – Acquisition and exploitation of maritime detections through a compression of the

intelligence cycle for satellite imagery;

– Autonomous systems

– Integration of Radarsat Constellation Mission (RCM) with other surveillance assets; and

– Concepts for future space-based wide area surveillance systems.

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Density Plot of All AIS Contacts Recorded in the Arctic (DRDC)

1 Jan 2014 – 31 Dec 2014

5 4 6 5 3 4 5 5 9

13 12 15

22 21

13 15

0

10

20

30

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

Transits of the Canadian Northwest Passage since 2000

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Compress the Task, Collect, Process, Exploit, Disseminate (TCPED) cycle for post-RADARSAT Constellation Mission (RCM)

• Proactively strengthen Canada’s niche role as a provider of intelligence derived from wide-area post-RCM surveillance data for tipping and cueing other assets: – Develop cueing role and automated tasking

– Radar concepts

– On-board processing

– AIS antenna and receiver concepts

– Maritime surveillance tools

– Land surveillance tools

• Collaboration opportunities: – FVEYs industry can bid on RFP (CAN lead, minimum 50% value of contract)

– Input to requirements; Joint evaluation and integration of products (concepts, technical reports, software, etc.); Annual workshops

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Summary

• Changing technology, environment, theater and geopolitics have increased the need for evidence based decision making

– Advice on enhanced S&T supporting current and future CAF and RCAF activities (especially continental surveillance) is critical

– In particular, DND/CAF seeks ADM(S&T) advice on the development of options for enhanced domain awareness of approaches to Canada, and in particular those in the Arctic. • Surveillance solutions explored will support the Government of

Canada’s ability to exercise sovereignty in the North, and will provide a greater whole-of-government awareness of safety and security issues, transportation and commercial activity in Canada’s Arctic.

• ADM S&T relies on partnerships with Other Government Departments (OGDs), academia, industry and allies to deliver the best possible S&T advice to the RCN and CAF as a whole.

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