DEFENCE Force JOURNAL - Home : Department of …€¦ · Army Captain D. J. Murray, ARA, Captain ... retained, and effectively used ... 4 AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 154

NO.154

MAY/JUNE

2002

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DEFENCEForce

Australian Defence Force Journal

Board of ManagementAir Commodore John Blackburn (Chairman)Lieutenant Colonel Ian CampbellGroup Captain Ian MacFarlingColonel David McKaskillCaptain Richard Menhinick, RAN

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© Commonwealth of Australia 2002ISSN 1320-2545Published by the Department of DefenceCanberra 2002

NO. 154

MAY/JUNE

2002

DEFENCEForce

JOURNAL

Editor

Irene M. Coombes

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accuracy of the information contained in

their articles; the Board of Management

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Front Cover

RAAF Roulettes over Sydney Harbour.

Printed in Australia

by National Capital Printing,

Fyshwick, ACT 2609

A U S T R A L I A N

CONTENTS

13. Building Better Personnel Policyand Practice for the AustralianArmyCaptain D. J. Murray, ARA, CaptainL.T. Jones ARA, and Rev. AssociateProfessor P. A. McGavin

15. The Role of Defence Health inMilitary Operations Other thanWar – A Research ProposalBrigadier Rob Atkinson

25. The Transformation – StrategicChange within the South AfricanNational Defence ForceLieutenant Colonel Murray Davies

33. General Sir John Monash: WhatRelevance to Command in the21st Century?Major Dominic Nicholl

41. Reviews

Photograph by WO2 Gary Ramage

Soldiers from the Townsville based 1 RAR training at the Army’s Military Operations in Urban Terrain Facility(MOUT) at Townsville Field Training Area.

3

Introduction

Personnel issues are of fundamentalimportance to the Australian Army. This

article draws on concepts presented in Joneset al. (2000) to show how human resourceconcepts provide a cogent and coherentplatform for the development and leadershipmanagement of the Army’s greatest asset,Army personnel.

Reviews such as the 1995 Glenn Reviewand the 1997 Defence Review present wide-ranging critiques of Army performance withregards to human resource management.There is a need to sustain this momentum forchange, but, as we argue, change whichbuilds-up a distinctive Army organisation.Some words of critique are necessary as aprecursor to proposals for building betterArmy personnel policies.

Critique of Army Personnel PolicyThe Army has to reform organisation

culture in ways that address the balance ofstability and change in organisation culture;the re-building of trust and reputation in theorganisation; the strengthening of personnelmotivation; and tightening organisationalidentity with that of its people so that theybelieve they “belong” not just “occupy” aposition on an entitlement document. This

critique gives force and direction to theproposals for building better Army personnelpolicies as argued in the second part of thisarticle.

Stability and Instability in Army OrganisationCulture

As argued in Jones et al. (2000) andAlexander and McGavin (1989), the Armyoperates an “internal labour market” that isformed both in formal terms (e.g. DefenceForce Discipline Act) and informal terms (e.g.recognition given to members withoperational experience). Both formal andinformal elements form an organisationalculture that governs upward movement ofpersonnel from mainly base-level entrypoints. This culture has positive aspects offostering the development of skills that arespecific to the Army and fostering discipline,loyalty, morale, and espirit de corps that areessential for the Army core business ofdelivering combat capability. Nevertheless, anegative aspect of this inherited culture isorganisational resistance to changes thatbetter equip the organisation to fulfil itsmission.

Rapid changes over the last decade in anattempt to meet changing social, strategic andpolitical environments (Schmidtchen 2000)have weakened Army organisation culture.

Building Better Personnel Policy andPractice for the Australian Army

By Captain D. J. Murray, ARA, Captain L.T. Jones ARA, andRev. Associate Professor P. A. McGavin

There are many headings under which building better personnel policy and practice for theAustralian Army may be considered. In this article we argue for the building-up of trust amongService personnel in the Army organisation and Army objectives; the development of flexible serviceconditions that ensure that the Army remains competitive in attracting and retaining personnelwho strategically serve effective core product delivery; working at developing an organisationalculture that provides both stability and adaptability for the organisation; and the reconfiguration ofdistribution of costs and benefits from skills formation so that key skills are developed, retained,and effectively used for enhanced core product delivery.

AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE JOURNAL NO. 154 MAY / JUNE 20024

There has been a diminishment in assent byArmy personnel to the coherence andcredibility of the purpose and identity ofArmy outcomes (“core products”). There hasbeen a diminishment in trust (some would saya “breakdown”) between the organisation andits people (the Army and Service personnel).

Weakening Organisational TrustSchmidtchen (1999) argues that there has

been a breakdown in the “psychologicalcontract” between the Army and Servicepersonnel. This breakdown is not only in “re-writing of the rules”, but in the violation ofunwritten expectations and mutualobligations between Service personnel andthe organisation. This often has involved theintroduction of formal rule structures aimedat the diminishment (and in some casesreplacement) of a strong informal culturethat throughout our military history hasdeveloped to implicitly and at low-cost easecommand and operations transaction costs.Anecdotal evidence from areas as diverse asthe 1 Brigade Cos hours to the AustralianNewspaper (Devine 2001:15) suggests thatthis formal culture has low bottom-up assentand is relatively costly and inefficient inachieving command and operationaloutcomes. This weakening of identificationbetween the Army and its people has alsofostered an undesirable “what is in it forme?” attitude between the organisation andService personnel, and has reduced theconfidence of Army personnel in theirleaders.1

Weakening Organisational CoherenceA number of authors have highlighted a

weakening of organisational coherence andthe detrimental effects of vacillation instakeholder demands upon the organisation(e.g. Watson 1999, Garran and Emerson 2000,Barker 2000). There has been an increasedtendency for top-down change processes thathave reduced the autonomy of command atall levels in the organisation, and weakened

the assent of Army personnel to the directionof change. Underlying these changes has beena Defence Department driven by anexaggerated and at times immature fear ofthe media and, by corollary, a correspondingdesire to appease – which has contributed tocommanders at all levels regurgitating whatBarker (2000) calls “fatuous managementjargon” (i.e. “warm words” with weakoperational significance to the Army’s coremission and its personnel). There is a markedneed to regain Army organisationalcoherence.

Weakening Motivation for PersonnelThe weakening of trust and of

organisational coherence have combined witha weakening of the motivational package forService personnel. Warn (1994) argues thatthe Army has historically promoted anorganisational culture that emphasisesintrinsic rewards over extrinsic gain. In acontext where there has been erosion of theculture of intrinsic rewards, the deteriorationof extrinsic rewards has greater damagingimpact. There has been a deterioration inrelative pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewardsoffered by the Army to high-skilledpersonnel, and an imbalance in rewardsstructure between core combat skills and non-combat support skills. The present rewardstructure poorly matches rewards to thequality and quantity of skills as these relate tothe delivery of “core products”.

The limited flexibility of Army leaders toconstruct a competitive reward structure isbecoming more pressing. Army return onhuman capital formation is falling (Jones etal. 2000). Advancement in Army “knowledgeedge” is increasingly becoming hollowrhetoric with the loss of people with strongorganisation-specific skills and state-of-artknowledge. This combines with Army’sdiminishing share in defence capital budget(Watson 1999, Kelly 2000), and the generaldeterioration in organisation management

BUILDING BETTER PERSONNEL POLICY AND PRACTICE FOR THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY 5

(Schmidtchen 2000, Garren and Emerson2000).

Need for Army RegroupingSome cutting words have been said about

this “state of play”. The Executive Director ofthe Australian Defence Association hasargued, “Australia does not have a credibleArmy” (Michael O’Connor in Farouque 2000).Lieutenant General John Sanderson (retd), aformer Chief of Army Staff, said before theJoint Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs,“It may be satisfactory for Australia to lead orparticipate in an enforcement operationagainst a confused and lightly armed rabblelike the East Timorese militia, or even Somaliclans; it would require considerabledevelopment of the Army before it couldcontemplate playing a part in land operationsagainst a well and heavily armed force(Lieutenant General John Sanderson inGarran and Emerson 2000). The ResearchOfficer for the Army Officer ProfessionalEffectiveness Review has written, “… recentpublicity regarding sexual harassment, faultsin safety and poor leadership have sent theopposite message to the community—essentially, the Army, and Defence in general,are incompetent to the point of beingdangerous” (Schmidtchen 2000). This “state ofplay” indicates a pressing need to regroupskills formation and skills retention in theArmy. This calls for a rebuilding of Armyculture, and a rebuilding that stronglyreinforces personnel management andbottom-up leadership at all levels.

There has been an erosion of Armyculture away from vocational service andtoward “performance of a job” (Devine 2001);an erosion of the capacity for Army personnelto use initiative to achieve their commander’sintent; a growth in a slow, inflexible, andrisk-averse culture, and an increased focus onpolitical issues at the expense of combateffectiveness. These trends call for criticalreappraisal of the application of

“management mantras” such as“outsourcing”, “equity”, “occupational healthand safety” and a renewed emphasis on“know those under your command and lookafter their welfare”; a down-playing of undueattention to political issues and negativemedia reports; avoidance of micro-management that diminishes responsibleleadership at all levels; reduced centralisationof senior management and increased use ofchain of command and appropriatesubsidiarity in unit command; betterrecognition that core Army activity isinherently risky and that Army “corebusiness” involves risks (i.e. avoid adoption ofan imprudent risk-averse culture); and re-assessment of “positive discrimination” thatsuits political objectives but weakensachievement of core objectives.

The Australian Army has a long history ofbeing “home” to its Service personnel. Armypersonnel can be made “homeless” bydestroying the “homeliness” of theorganisation, and this can be achieved simplyby making the “home look and feel likeeverybody else’s home” (i.e. usinginappropriate civilian management models forthe organisation) (adapting Ezrahi, cited inFriedman 2000). Recent Army promotionseven give emphasis to parallels with civilianoccupation (e.g. latest newspaperadvertisements for the Royal Military Collegeranked the vague area of “combat” behindcommunications, aviation, transport, etc. aspossible areas open to recruits upongraduation). Building better Army personnelpolicies are at the forefront of making theArmy a “home” for people who perform inthe delivery of Army core products. To thisbuilding-up we now turn.

Building Better Army Personnel PoliciesBetter personnel policies for the Army

need first to target four areas: (1) buildingtrust, (2) increasing flexibility of serviceconditions, (3) developing organisation


culture, and (4) more flexible distribution ofcosts and returns from organisation humanresource development. These are nowexamined.

Building TrustTrust between Service personnel and the

Service organisation has to be built andconstantly re-built. This involves enhancing aforward-looking confidence in the Army byorganisation personnel, and coherence inobserved organisational behaviour. The trustliterature examines a number of strategies forbuilding trust between parties, this articleexamines processed-based strategies whichthe Army may build-up trust and focusesspecifically on increasing behaviouraltransparency between the Army and theService member, and extending the “shadowof the future” that exists in interactionsbetween the Army and it personnel.

Behavioural TransparencyImproving the level of behavioural

transparency that exists between the Armyand its personnel involves an increase in thequality and quantity of information that isexchanged between both parties, with theintent of creating an atmosphere of openness.Parkhe (1998a,b) proposes that alliancemembers can increase the level of behaviouraltransparency that exists in their relationshipby installing procedures for recognition,verification, and signalling betweenthemselves. Due to the dominance of theArmy in its relationship with its personnel itmust bear the costs of creating and installingthese procedures. Key areas for attention bysenior Army managers are as follows:

Recognition that the “psychologicalcontract” has been broken and that there is aneed to:• build a new contract that better suits the

needs of the Army and Army personnel; and• bring about greater congruency between

the thoughts and attitudes of Servicemembers and those of higher leaders.

Verification of changed circumstancesthrough formal and informal channels,particularly with regards to:• “issue spotting”—pro-actively bringing to

the attention of Service personnel thematters in which they have a directinterest; and

• being more open about intended reforms,reasons for change as well as the positiveand negative effects of such changes—forit is often perceptions and fears of adverseconsequences that are the major obstacleto establishing a more stable trustrelationship.Signalling of the new means of doing

business, particularly:• opportunities for Service members to be

involved and benefit from changes to theorganisational culture,

• instances where the Army has maintainedits “psychological contract” with itspeople, and

• measures that are being developed to copewith changing organisational,demographic and social expectations.

Extending the Shadow of the FutureThe “shadow of the future” refers to a

future period over which alliance membersare able to envisage, with a high degree ofprobability, mutual positive net returns fromtheir relationship. For the Army to extend theshadow of the future that exists between itselfand its personnel it must focus on increasing:• the level of behaviour transparency within

its organisation (see above); • the frequency of positive interactions it has

with its personnel, with particular emphasison providing organisational loyalty tothose who achieve organisation goals; and

• the length of the time horizon of therelationship between the organisation andits personnel.Although changes to workforce trends in

regards to organisational commitment andcareer expectations (see Schmidtchen 2000)


make any extension of the shadow of thefuture by these means difficult, the followingissues provide a starting point:• Clarifying Army’s future plans with a

particular emphasis on building andmaintaining a credible and more stablevision for the future.

• Introducing incremental contractnegotiation schemes that increase thecapacity and time period personnel areable to perceive mutual net benefitsarising from their service, whilst reducingthe time period members are required towait to receive significant service benefits.

• Securing Army loyalty to its performingpersonnel by specifying organisation on-going commitment to Service personnelwho perform, and reducing theprominence of provisions that reduceArmy commitment (e.g. clauses outliningcomplete dissolution of service contract,or requirements for medical dischargebrought about by workplace injury).

Flexible Service ConditionsA given internal labour market structure

can work for an organisation where givenorganisation-specific skills are formed in anupward movement from base-level entry toexit. Organisations that use mixes of generalskills as well as skills that are specific to theorganisation require more flexible internallabour market arrangements. Building anorganisation internal labour market that isresponsive to the mix of specific and generalskill requirements involves (1) on-goingreview of the competitiveness of organisationrewards for skills, and (2) levers for increasinginternal labour market flexibility.

Review of Competitive ConditionsHow rewards for Army personnel compare

with rewards available in the external labourmarket varies with changes in generalexternal labour market conditions and withchanges in the balance of supply and demandfor different general and specific skills mixes.

In order to be a credible competitor both inthe attraction and retainment of skills, theArmy needs on-going review of alternativesavailable to Service personnel or potentialService personnel. These alternatives need tobe assessed both in pecuniary and in non-pecuniary terms. Army leadership needsclearly to establish with the governmentstreamlined provision for flexibleorganisation response to evolving externalconditions so that competitive packages forthe attraction and retainment of organisationskills may be achieved. Table 1 outlines somenon-pecuniary aspects of flexibility in Serviceconditions, the costs and benefits of whichare amplified below.

Table 1 outlines a number of non-pecuniary measures that would providegreater flexibility and security to the existingconditions of Service packages. Seniormanagers need to recognise that eachmeasure offers a number of benefits and costsand that their main challenge is evaluatinghow to integrate these, or similar measures,into the existing Service package so that thehighest net benefit is gained for theorganisation over time. For example, suchevaluation would need to recognise that themain benefit of providing a more secureposting contract is that it acts to increasebehaviour transparency for personnel andutilises the different preferences individualshave for geographic location and jobcharacteristics as a motivation for their workperformance. The major costs of the measureare greater coordination in terms ofnegotiating future posting positions and thereduced flexibility the Army is provided inbeing able to use the member to meetorganisational needs. In some instancesmeasuring the costs and benefits of aparticular measure become less tangible andmore complicated to assess. For example, inthe case of greater use of overseas service themain benefits can be seen in terms ofproviding valuable experience to the


individual with regards to operating withforeign forces and interacting with othercultures, exposure to technologies andpractices not available in Australia and theflow on benefits to Australia from thisknowledge base. The most obvious cost of themeasure is the significant financial outlayrequired for moving, housing and paying theindividual (including the complication of anydependants). A less obvious cost, butpotentially of greater concern, is the politicalproblems generated if these Australianpersonnel deploy on operations with foreignforces and are unnecessarily endangered orare perceived to be acting in a positionoutside of Australia’s national interest.

Levers for Achieving FlexibilityIncreasing the flexibility of Army internal

labour markets involves a variety of leversthat are summarised in Table 2. These rangeacross contract engagement, direct placement,upward placement, limited-term promotions,retention bonuses, part-time engagement,career breaks, long-distance commuting, etc.

2

These should be designed to allow flexibilityat whole-organisation level and atorganisation-unit levels, so that organisationleaders at the top and at different levels can

respond with competitive Service conditionsthat attract and retain Service skills that arenecessary to the performance of theorganisation overall and its component parts.For some organisation components and someskills within organisation components,market-like contract models of personnelengagement are inappropriate. But allpersonnel are able to assess alternatives, andthe attraction and retention of personnelwhose skills are more specific to Army coreproduct delivery need clearly to becompetitive against the alternatives.

The Glenn Review (1995) argued againstperformance-based rewards on the groundsthat they undermine the team-oriented natureof Service work. Stakeholders may howevergive rank values to Service delivery byorganisation components and may identifykey performance indicators by organisationcomponent. Organisation units that meetperformance objectives can then be rewarded,with performance-based bonuses distributedon the basis of personnel rank. Thereby, unitperformance and unit cohesion would beenhanced, with units more directly involvedin core product delivery being given priorityranking.

Table 1. Non-pecuniary rewards and personnel motivation

Non-pecuniary General descriptionrewardPostings Posting positions could be more clearly and securely offered to individuals

on the basis of performance or as a trade-off for present job attributes,using a formal contract system

Leave Additional leave may be offered as a reward to individuals whoconsistently provide service beyond that of their peers or who undertakeadditional hardships as a result of posting locality or job requirements

Awards Make greater use of service medals and awards whilst being careful toavoid their inflation

Skill development Certain courses could be offered to individuals on the basis of theirperformance during a particular tasking or posting

Travel The individual or unit could be sent on some form of base tour or trainingexercise in different parts of Australia or overseas

Overseas service Individuals would be posted overseas to operational areas as part ofAustralian, international or on detachment to the Defence Force of anothernation

Table 1. Non-pecuniary rewards and personnel motivation

Lever General description Positive aspects Negative aspects


Contractserviceengagement

Directplacement

Upwardplacement

Limitedtenurepromotions

Management initiated earlyretirement

Retentionbonuses

Part timeserviceengagement

Home basedwork

The use of flyin/fly out workpractices

Flexible hoursschemes

Contracts would be used to employindividuals to perform a specific orfinite task, over specific time periods,under an agreed set of conditions

• useful for hiring specific technical skillswhen a presence in uniform is required

• provide managers with definite periods ofpersonnel availability and provides adefinite focus for retention programs

• enables incentives to be structured into thecontract that extend beyond existingservice conditions

• creates legal problems for thestipulation of all contractualterms required for combat andmilitary related duties

• already in part covered byphased careers

Personnel are recruited from outsidethe full-time Army to fulfil existinguniformed positions on short-termcontracts

Involves allocation of personnel topositions of responsibility within theAustralian Army structure whereshortages are present. May also bereferred to as ‘accelerated promotion’as it ignores the rigidity ofpromotion parameters of time inrank

Individuals would be promoted forspecific skills, and once their skillshad been utilised in this capacitythey would retire or return to earlierrank

Individuals are offered financialincentives to retire before theypreviously planned

• has historical precedence in rapidpromotion experienced during times of war

• provides an incentive for junior ranks toseek and accept additional responsibility.

• provides a good separation mechanism• acknowledges and makes use of specific

skills individuals may possess• potential to reward superior service

• enables specific promotion channels to beopened up and in this manner ensures thatstagnation does not occur

• provides a direct signal to the individualthat their services are no longer desired

• suited for recruiting personnel from thefollowing sources

• the part-time Australian Army, with aparticular focus on previous full-timeemployees

• other Armies within our region (eg, NewZealand) or the rest of the world (eg, ABCAnations)

• other ADF services or organisations with asimilar structure to the Army (eg, the policeforce or the fire brigade)

• retired full-time personnel

• organisational specificknowledge barriers preventdirect recruitment of personnelwith no previous militaryexperience

• may lead to inefficiencies whereindividual fill positions they arenot capable of completing torequired job standards

• would also need to beimplemented so the bestqualified person is placed intothe job and not just the ‘neareston hand’

• may be seen as being an optionfor all personnel and, therefore,discourage voluntary separation

• potential for unfair treatment

• may also be seen as being anoption for all personnel and,therefore, discourage voluntaryseparation

Table 2. Levers for increasing the flexibility of Army internal labour market*

Payments to individuals who arecritical to the operationaleffectiveness of the Army and whobut for the application of the bonuswould leave

• useful for retaining specific skills but shouldbe paid over an extended period to ensurethe skills remain in the Army for a setperiod of time

• very difficult to determine anappropriate level of bonus tocompensate the individualwishing to exit

• reliance on part-time personnelcould create problems in time ofdeployment or changes in thestate of readiness

• increases the level of transactioncosts involved in management ofpersonnel

• may interfere with the ‘team’nature of the Army

• is not suitable for commandpositions

• high pecuniary travel andseparation allowance costs

• could not be applied toenvironments where teamparticipation was required

• low applicability for commandpositions

* Note: This table was developed with reference to Glenn Review (1995).

Individuals would enter in and out ofthe full time Army and the part timeArmy (the Reserves) depending onthe individual’s preferences andservice needs

An individual would be able to workfrom home and enter the workplaceonly when required

Instead of long-term postings toremote areas, individuals fly to andfrom their work location, on a workto leave ratio (eg, two months on,two weeks off) (McGavin, Jones &Imbun 2001).

Individuals would have greaterchoice over when they completetheir work

• increases the pool of human capital theArmy has access to

• extends the pay-off period of skillsformation and thereby increases thecapability of the Army to gain a return onits human capital investments

• provides the individual with greaterflexibility and security of employmentcould occur in periods of days per week,months per year

• very useful in situations such as maternityleave and child rearing

• applicable to staff or project activity• makes use of changing technology

• removes the need for constant familymovement and enables families to reside inareas where they are able to satisfy theirpreferences for accommodation, siblingeducation and spouse work opportunities.

• enables an individual to increase thedomain separation between their work andpersonal life

• applicable to routine administration andpaper tasks

• reduces the constraints on peoples freedom


Developing Organisation CultureThe Army has been through a process of

continuous change that has disturbed itsorganisation culture. These changes haveoften been pursued without a soberassessment of the net benefits from changefor Service personnel and for theorganisation. A perception that costs exceedbenefits saps an organisation and aperception of deterioration in Serviceconditions leads to loss of valuable Servicepersonnel and increases difficulty inrecruitment of desirable personnel. Successfulchange requires a critical mass of bottom-uprecognition of the need for change andcommitment to the change process. Wheretop-down changes are necessary, they mustbe driven by a credible and coherent vision ofthe net benefits for the organisation andorganisation personnel.

This critique and advocacy of changeneeds to be directed towards Army politicalstakeholders, as well as Army organisation.Organisation changes need first to beevaluated in terms of net contributions toArmy core product—the delivery of aneffective combat force. A cost-cuttingperspective does not serve this purpose.Legitimisation of reforms involves showinghow changes are value-adding for theachievement of Army mission, and buildingcollective recognition through repetitivesocial interactions that work to buildorganisation culture for the achievement oforganisation objectives.

Distribution of Costs and Benefits of ArmySkills Development

A sharp-line distinction between skillsthat are exchanged in the external labourmarket (“general skills”) and skills that arespecific to the Army (“specific skills”) is ofcourse simplistic. Service personnel havecomplex mixes of both general and specificskills. Nevertheless, the balance betweengeneral and specific skills mixes vary—so that

some personnel categories can be attractedfrom the external labour market with some“top-up” of organisation-specific skills—whileother Service personnel may haveorganisation-specific skills that take muchtime and resources to form within theorganisation and whose loss to the externallabour market impacts more heavily uponArmy performance. Where the skills balanceis toward general skills, there is less pressingneed for the Army to assume the costs ofskills formation, and rewards need onlybalance the external labour marketopportunities in order to achieve Armycompetitiveness. Where the skills balance istoward specific skills, it is more pressing forthe Army to assume the costs of skillsformation, and rewards need to exceedexternal labour market alternatives forpersonnel who demonstrate needed specificskills performance.

This calls for a prudent flexibledistribution of costs and benefits of skillsformation between personnel and theorganisation. This prudent distribution ofcosts and benefits of human resourcedevelopment needs also to be viewed overtime, in order that career paths are mappedout—particularly for personnel whodemonstrate performance in Army specificskills that are essential for core-productdelivery. This of course links with our earlierobservations on building trust and extendingthe “future shadow”. Unless these issues areaddressed, the Army will continue to have the“worst of both worlds” (Alexander andMcGavin 1989), because it will continue tomake large investments by assuming the costsof skills formation of people attracted fromthe external labour market, and lose thosepeople to the external labour market withoutachieving an adequate return on Armyinvestment and without a stable building-upof Army skills. A simplified discussion ofoptions available to Army managers forincreasing flexibility in the distribution of


costs and benefits of skills developmentwithin general service officers is providedbelow. The discussion examines specificinitial military skills formation, generalundergraduate tertiary skills formation andgeneral post-graduate study and is dividedbetween the following assessment topics:• skill requirement and option for the

payment of skills formation;• division of rewards relative to opportunity

costs over time; and• policy applications for ensuring the

highest return to the Army frominvestments.

A Simplified Assessment of Options for ArmyOfficer Skills Formation

Specific military skills formationThe specialists skills provided by the

Army training are relatively unique andlargely non-transferable, resulting in theorganisation bearing the cost of skillsformation.3 This occurs primarily through acommissioning process that sees indirectentrants, through the Australian DefenceForce Academy (ADFA), and direct entrants,graduate from the Royal Military College(RMC) after four and one and a half yeartraining periods respectively.

Specific skills formation prior tocommissioning is largely non-transferable,with returns being biased towards the Army.Nevertheless, specific skills formationundertaken post-commissioning does begin togenerate a more equal sharing of rewardsbetween the Service member and the Army.This is especially relevant to non-arms corpsofficers (e.g. Signals officers trained in themanagement of communications resources).There does not appear to be significant scopefor reallocating the specific skills formationconducted prior to commissioning. Keyinsights here appear to be assessing themanner and time period during whichtraining is provided, with particular emphasison eliminating duplication and redundant

skills formation. By reducing pre-commissioning skills formation costs, whilstproducing a product that is acceptable tostakeholders, additions to the value-addedreturn from specific skills formation appear tobe possible. Where post-commissioningcourses appear to generate a significant returnto the individual, there also appears to bescope for reassessing the distribution of costsof skills formation. Alternately, the Army maywish to capitalise on the general skillsformation undertaken by its part-timepersonnel.

General Skills Formation-undergraduate4

Cost of skills formation funded by a partyexternal to the Army. The main advantages ofthis option are that it:• enables access to a diverse range of

intellectual and cultural experiences; and• enables capitalisation on economies of

scale in the external schooling market andtrend towards higher educationalexpectations in the wider external labourmarket.The main disadvantages of this option are

that it:• requires competition to gain access to

potential entrants, with significantpossibility of not being able to competefor higher quality graduates; and

• reduces the scope for networking betweenjunior officers in all Services.Costs of skills formation funded by the

Army through ADFA and existingundergraduate schemes. The main advantagesof this option are that it:• ensures a minimum standard of education

and provides access to relatively highquality graduates;

• acts to ensure a minimum input of trainedpersonnel, particularly engineers; and

• enables early socialisation of membersinto the organisational culture andextensive inter-Service and intra-Servicenetworking.


The main disadvantages of this option arethat it:• does not capitalise on economies of scale

in the external education market; and• reduces educational and lifestyle diversity

of applicants.Regardless of which party bears the costs

of skills formation, rewards predominantlyflow to the individual, although theorganisation does benefit from highertechnical and conceptual capacities. Theextent of benefits the organisation receives, ofcourse, depends on the type of skills formedand the job categories into which personnelwith specific skills are placed.

There appear to be significant net benefitsfrom structuring incentives so that the load ofinvestment for general undergraduate skillsformation is more borne by the individual,while post-skills-formation rewards forindividuals are increased. This does not implythat ADFA and existing undergraduateschemes should be terminated. Rather, itindicates that the investment load in theseprograms should be shifted to the individual,with the incentive for skills formation beingpostponed to rewards received aftercommissioning. Alternately, if the Armywishes to maintain its present investmentload, it should develop strategies for jobplacement and contract negotiations whichensure its return on investments inundergraduate skills are maximised.

General skills formation–post graduate andnon-tertiary

Cost of skills formation funded by partyexternal to the Army.

The main advantage of this option is thatit enables capitalisation on educationalexpectations in the wider external labourmarket. The main disadvantage is that itprovides little incentive to the Servicemember to undertake skills formationspecifically for enhancing their capacity tocontribute to the Army, with the greatest

motivation for the individual to invest inskills that increase their competitiveness inthe external labour market.

Costs of skills formation funded by theArmy through ADFA and existingpostgraduate schemes. The main advantagesof this option are that it:• acts as an incentive to Service members to

continue skills formation;• provides a possible means of enhancing

separation of personnel from theorganisation; and

• it provides the Army access to the skillsthat senior officers will increasinglyrequire effectively to manage Armyresources.The main disadvantages of this option are

that it:• can be directed towards the formation of

skills that appear to have little directrelevance to enhancing Army core productdelivery; and

• can generate very low returns to the Armyif the trained Service member is notemployed in a job category where the skillis used most effectively.Again regardless of which party bears the

load of investment, rewards predominantlyflow to the individual. The extent to whichthe organisation benefits from the skillsformation process depends specifically onhow the Army uses these skills. This form ofskills formation can also be used to achieveother human resource management objectivesand, therefore, should be examined from astrategic perspective (e.g. rewarding personnelor bringing about separation).

Due to the bias of returns towards theindividual, they should be expected to bear asignificant cost in relation to general skillsformation. Nevertheless, the organisationalrequirement for such skills suggests thatadequate incentives be provided for theindividual to undertake such investments.There is a definite need for returns oninvestments of this nature to be generated as


quickly as possible after the investmentoutlay.

ConclusionsPeople are the first asset of the Army, and

building better personnel policies is the firstpriority for better achievement of Armystrategic objectives. The reform of Armypersonnel policies needs to be conductedwithin an overall framework that provides acoherent and cogent basis for Armypersonnel policies that improve core-productdelivery. There are many headings underwhich this reform may be considered. Wehave chosen the building-up of trust amongService personnel in Army organisation andArmy objectives; the development of flexibleservice conditions that ensure that the Armyremains competitive in attracting andretaining personnel who strategically serveeffective core product delivery; working atdeveloping an organisational culture thatprovides both stability and adaptability forthe organisation; and the reconfiguration ofdistribution of costs and benefits of skillsformation so that key skills are developed,retained, and effectively used for enhancedcore product delivery. These reforms need tobe pursed in a coherent and stable way thatover time builds and re-builds the credibilityof the Army for its personnel and itsstakeholders.

This is a follow-up to the article“Improving the Development and Use ofHuman Resources in the Australian DefenceForce: Key Concepts for StrategicManagement” published in the AustralianDefence Force Journal No.142 May/June2000.

NOTES1. For the concept of “trust" we draw upon

Parkhe 1998a,b, but also on Sabel 1993,Thompson 1995, Klein 1997, and Nooteboomet al. 1997; for “reputation", see also Dasgupta1988, Landa 1996, and Kumar 1996.

2. On long-distance commuting, see McGavin etal. (2001).

3. Although there appears to be scope for out-sourcing of some of the specific skillsformation undertaken by non-combat corps(e.g. transport and ordnance), the scope of thearticle precludes investigation of theseoptions.

4. Similar reasoning can be applied to theformation of tertiary entrance qualifications.

REFERENCESAlexander, M. J. and McGavin, P. A. (1989)

“Officer training and retention in theAustralian Defence Force: Lessons fromhuman capital theory", Australian DefenceForce Journal (79) 21-23.

Barker, T. (February 15, 2000) “Title unknown",The Australian Financial Review, p.14.

Dasgupta, P. (1988) “Trust as a commodity", inGambetta, D. ed., Trust: making and breakingcooperative relations (Oxford: BasilBlackwell), pp. 49-72.

Department of Defence (1995), Serving Australia:the Australian Defence Force in the TwentiethCentury (Canberra, Department of Defence).

Department of Defence (1997) Future directionsfor the management of Australia’s defenceVolumes 1 & 2 (Canberra, Department ofDefence).

Devine, F. (February 8, 2001) “Trained killers, butthey must be nice to each other”, TheAustralian, p.15.

Farouque, F. (February 23, 2000) “Troops lucky inTimor: inquiry”, The Age, p.8.

Friedman,T.L., (2000) The Lexus and the OliveTree, (London: Harper Collins Publishers).

Garran, R. & Emerson, S. (February 19-20, 2000)“Strategy the weakest link for defence", inThe Weekend Australian, p.7.

Glenn Review (see Department of Defence (1995)).Goyne, A.N., (1999) “Allocation and Retention in

the Australian Regular Army", AustralianDefence Force Journal (134), 17-23.

Jones, L.T., Murray, D. McGavin, P.A. (2000)“Improving the Development and Use ofHuman Resources in the Australian DefenceForce: Key concepts for strategicmanagement", Australian Defence ForceJournal (142), 11-20.

Kelley, P. (February 23, 2000) “All quiet on thespending front”, The Australian, p.15.

Klein, D. (1997) Reputation (Michigan: Ann AnborPress, University of Michigan), pp. 97-133.

Kumar, N. (1996) “The power of trust inmanufacturer-retailer relationships", HarvardBusiness Review (Novemebr-December), pp.92-106.


Landa, J. (1996) “Doing the economics of trust andinformal institutions", in Medema, S. &Samuels, W. eds., Foundations of research ineconomics: how do economists do economics,(Cheltenham: Edward Elgar), pp. 142-162.

McGavin, P. A., Jones, L. T. and Imbun, B. Y.(2001), “Long distance commuting andnational human resources development:evidence from Papua New Guinea, AsiaPacific Journal of Human Resources, in press,pp.20.

Nooteboom, B. Berger, H. & Noorderhaven, N.(1997) “Effects of trust and governance onrelational risk", Academy of ManagementJournal, 40 (2), pp. 308-338.

Parkhe, A. (1998a) “Understanding trust ininternational alliances", Journal of WorldBusiness, 33 (3): 219-240.

Parkhe, A. (1998b) “Building trust in internationalalliances", Journal of World Business, 33 (4):417-437.

Sabel, C. (1993) “Studied trust: building new formsof cooperation in a volatile economy",Human Relations, 46: 1133-1170.

Schmidtchen, D. (1999) “Re-thinking thePsychological Contract between Army and itsPeople”, Australian Defence Force Journal(137) 5-8.

Schmidtchen, D. (2000) “Australian Populationand Workforce Trends: the strategic HRchallenges and opportunities for Army”,Australian Defence Force Journal (140) 17-24.

Sloper, G. (1994) The decision to enlist, in Whowill join? ADF Recruitment Policy to the Year2000 (Canberra: Australian Defence StudiesCentre University College, Australian DefenceForce Academy).

Thompson, A. (1995) Compliance with agreementsin cross-cultural transactions: some analyticalissues (Melbourne: University of Melbourne).

Warn, J. R. (1994) “Factors influencing theturnover of skilled personnel: a case study”,Asia Pacific Journal of Human Resources32(1) 29-39.

Watson, M. A. J. (1999) “What Has GoneWrong?", Australian Defence Force Journal(136) 5-12.

Captain Luke Trebor Jones and Captain Daniel Jeffrey Murray entered the Australian Defence ForceAcademy and graduated in the 1997 class. After a year at the Royal Australian Military College theywere commissioned at end-1998 to the Signals Corps, and returned to undertake Honours at UniversityCollege ADFA in 1999, graduating with BA (Hons.) UNSW in Economics.

Captains Jones and Murray are at present respectively posted to Darwin and Canberra. In September2002, Captain Jones, with Army support, is to commence doctoral studies at the University of Oxford oninternational peacekeeping forces as a Rhodes Scholar for Australia.

Reverend Associate Professor Paul Anthony McGavin was appointed to the School of Economics andManagement in 1986 and has been Head of School and Presiding Member of the University CollegeAcademic Board. Father McGavin is at present working as a priest in a Catholic parish and maintains aresearch association with the School.

15

Humanity has trod a long and difficult pathin regard to International Humanitarian

Law and the Laws of Armed Conflict,particularly in the 20th century.1

The foundation of InternationalHumanitarian Law (IHL) is in history andcomes from religion, chivalry, morality and allaspect of human endeavour that leads tohonour in dealings.2 The landmarkcontribution was by Henry Dunant in 1859,noting the appalling carnage at the battle ofSolferino and the subsequent suffering of thewounded in his book, A Memory of Solferino.

Nations, in general terms, are progressingfrom chaos to order in their relationships andin regard to modern conflict,3 and InternationalHumanitarian Law is a facet of this behaviour.

From the 1864 “Geneva Convention”, 16countries agreed to the non-discriminatorymanagement of the wounded and theneutrality of those who rendered aid. TheInternational Committee of the Red Crossevolved and expanded the terms to include notonly war but also disaster relief in its broadersense to bring aid and relief from humansuffering. The Red Crescent was used inMuslim countries, bringing a non-sectariandimension, and this was demonstrated inMuslim religious writings and contributions toInternational Humanitarian Law.4

The 20th century subsequently had anelement of discipline in armed conflict bythose combatants who had been givenlegitimate and lethal force by their sovereigngovernments. The Red Cross gave a degree ofprotection for the neutrality of those deliveringcare.

What was the bigger picture in armedconflict? Not all countries and not all soldiers,“played the game”, respecting IHL (e.g. theJapanese “Bushidb” code).5

Was a fluke of historical evolution inhuman behaviour occurring or wascommunication in the democracies regardinghuman rights making steady progress? Ottovon Bismarck (1898) was quoted as saying that“the most decisive event – in modern historywas the fact that North Americans spokeEnglish”. Not all North Americans are fromEnglish-speaking origins!

Was the continuance of developingdemocratic structures in the English-speakingand associated world empowering ordinarypeople to develop their economic muscle inline with individual human rights and valuesto win in war?

“Remember the Alamo” was the battle crywhen Sam Houston defeated the Mexicandictator, General Santa Anna, in 1836 andTexas became an independent republic before

The Role of Defence Health in MilitaryOperations Other than War -

A Research Proposal.By Brigadier Rob Atkinson

This research proposal is to consider mutual support between humanitarian aid and legitimatemilitary force and its place in the escalation along the path to conflict. The issue to be explored isthe mechanism by which humanity and legitimate force can be applied in obedience withinternational humanitarian law as a preventative measure. How can this be achieved in a mannerthat is in accordance with sovereignty but still be applicable to intra-state conflict? How can this beapplied in a timely manner with lasting benefit? The 1994 genocide in Rwanda will be the centraltheme, with a proposal to develop a mechanism that is universally applicable.


joining the United States. Previously that year,189 men died at the Alamo, including an ex-US Senator (Davy Crockett) who ostensibly hadcome down from Tennessee to fight for“liberty”. The defenders of the Alamo camefrom all parts of the world, in fact; mostlyEnglish-speaking and most having lived lessthan seven years in the area that was tobecome Texas.6

The battle cry was for “liberty or death” atthe Alamo, from dictator Santa Anna. Fromthe French and American revolutions that cryhas echoed through to the 20th century – inTiananmen Square and in East Timor! Peopleseemed to want liberty, democratic values andrule of law.

Thus with roots in history and in the 18thand 19th centuries, “democracy” in all itsforms has been the success story for the 20thcentury. It seems to have provided theeconomic muscle and the human motivation towin the major conflicts of World War I andWorld War II. This form of governmentenabled the most powerful democracy to leavethe conflict in South Vietnam by 1975.

Against this background of people givingtheir rights over to democratic government, theability to wage war with rules – that is,International Humanitarian Law – hasdeveloped. Treaties and agreements werebetween states; that is, people with rights indemocracies but also between governmentswho had taken rights from people to controlthe state.8

The winning of World War II led to theNuremberg trials. The appalling revelations ofthe Holocaust demonstrated the total abuse ofone section of the community by the sovereignNazi Government. Article 6(c) of theNuremberg Charter defined “crimes againsthumanity” as opposed to “war crimes”committed against serving members of theAllied armed forces.

This progressed to Genocide Law whichtheoretically allowed for the trial andpunishment of the perpetuators of such crimes,

notwithstanding their position in a sovereignstate. Individual human rights were beginningto be seen to be above sovereign state rights.9

Catching criminals in civilised societyrequires the police and the cooperation of law-abiding citizens. Countries, in essence, wouldseem to be no different, and unless they abideby International Humanitarian Law andcooperate, this law cannot be enforced. The“Cold War” prevented progress, with diplomatspaying lip service to the law to achieve theirown political ends.

Nonetheless, with the breaches ofInternational Humanitarian Law highlighted bythe media, the US was obliged to commit totrial, with success, its own serving members ofthe armed forces (Lieutenant William Calley,South Vietnam, 1968).10

In 1989 the Cold War was won, essentiallyin favour of democracies, and this process ofdemocracy and human rights gainedmomentum in Eastern Europe and the formerUSSR, when human rights in Western Europe,as extrapolated by the European Conventionand its Strasbourg Court, were transported.11

Following the Gulf War in 1991, PresidentGeorge Bush of the US proclaimed, “a NewWorld Order” and in 1993 all 185 membercountries of the United Nations (UN) signed onto ratify the United Nations Covenant of Civiland Political Rights and accepted thejurisdiction of the UN Human RightsCommittee, a fledgling body with nosignificant authority but which wasnonetheless a step forward.12

There had been little progress from 1948,when Dr H.V. Evatt – President of the UnitedNations General Assembly and AustralianForeign Affairs Minister at the time - hadannounced the new international law onhuman rights, to 1993. Here was, at last, thelegal structure and political will to apply thislaw.

International tribunals were set up in TheHague for crimes against humanity inYugoslavia and in Arusha to try and punish

17

those responsible for genocide in Rwanda in1994. In 1998, 20 nations in Rome voted tosupport a statute establishing an InternationalCriminal Court,13 which has proved to haveproblems which may be helped by cooperatingwith National bodies.14 Now almost 130countries have signed up, with 27 havingratified the treaty – the US President havingjust signed although ratification by the Senatewill take time because of US misgivings inregard to “a profound distrust of the abuse ofpower” (Senator Helms).15 Remember theAlamo! The US will have a profound influenceon the effectiveness of the Court.

On 24 March 1999 the English Law Lordsruled that the Torture Convention hadoverruled General Pinochet of Chile’s sovereignimmunity. On the same day, the NATO air waragainst the sovereign state of Yugoslaviabegan in response to allegations of atrocitiesby the Serbs against the Muslim Kosovars. Awar against human rights violation seemed tobe the main driver, as opposed to oil, land or aperceived threat, which have been majorhistorical reasons for going to war.

The media had played a significant role (the“CNN factor”),16 raising public awareness andopinion to a level where democratically electedgovernments were under considerable pressureto act.

So now the picture of suffering humanityon television screens was a major motivator,with the appropriate legal structures in place toattempt to prosecute and punish the guilty.Enforcement of International HumanitarianLaw by a legitimate military, under ademocratic government, seemed to be themeans of catching the alleged criminals,particularly if their bank balances were nolonger sacrosanct, e.g. President Estrada of thePhilippines.17

This recent use of force, ostensibly forhuman rights, sends a clear message that itmay well be used again. Does this have apreventative value in regard to conflict?18

This is very hard to measure at this stage.Does the capture and punishment of so-calledwar criminals, or those guilty of crimes againsthumanity, have a deterrent effect? Time willtell.

What we do know, however, from recentexperience in Rwanda particularly, is that largenumbers of people have died before aninternational response occurred. Interventionhas in fact been too late many times.19 Rwandaas a case history demonstrates a number ofthese points.

Rwanda has historically been populated bytwo major ethnic groups. Essentially, theminority Tutsis, the cattle herders, made up theruling caste; and the majority Hutus, thecultivators of the fields, were the great bulk ofthe population.20 The Colonial powers ofGermany and Belgium used this ethnic divisionfor political control, enhancing traditionalanimosities; and on independence, when themajority of the Hutus gained power, the exiledTutsis (the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPFI))pursued a guerrilla war mainly from Uganda.

From 1990 onwards the UN sought tofacilitate and broker a solution, leading to theArusha Peace Talks, with progress on anintermittent basis leading to the deployment ofUNAMIR I (United Nations Assistance Missionin Rwanda) under the command of CanadianBrigadier General Romeo A. Dallaire. In spiteof good intelligence information predicting amajor conflict, presented to the UN in early1994,21 the assassination of the presidents ofBurundi and Rwanda occurred in a plane crashon 6 April 1994. A massacre of 800,000 Tutsisand sympathetic Hutus ensued.

Considerable vacillation by the UN and theinternational community occurred. Africanstates wished to intervene but were preventedby the lack of heavy military equipment andUS support, which was probably influenced bythe 18 Ranger (US military) deaths thatoccurred in Somalia in the previous year.France was significantly involved as a previoussupporter of the Hutu regime and, given her

THE ROLE OF DEFENCE HEALTH IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

18

national interest in Francophone Africa,became militarily involved with a UN Mandateprotecting a safe area in the south-west ofRwanda. This was after the massacres.

The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) attackedfrom Uganda and was spectacularly successfulin defeating the majority government andarmed forces of the Hutus. A massive refugeeproblem arose as the perpetuators of thegenocide moved their population and powerahead of the successful RPF, with the Frenchessentially providing sanctuary for them.22 On13 May 1994 the UN Secretary-Generalrecommended a new mandate for UNAMIR IIto include 5000 troops and this proposal wasendorsed by the Security Council on 8 June1994, with deployment on approximately 10August.

The Australian contingent advance partyarrived in Kigali on 7 August and formallytook over and utilised the section of the KigaliCentral Hospital. They provided medicalsupport to the UN force and NGO (Non-Government Organisation) groups, with a largeeffort directed towards humanitarian relief.

Gradually stability was returned toRwanda, with the people returning to thetowns and a vestige of normal life returning.An element of goodwill and cooperation wasdeveloped between the UN and the RPF, whichhad now become the Rwandan Patriotic Army(RPA) although distrust remained because ofthe delayed response at the time of themassacres. This new climate, with the UNpresent, enabled normal life to evolve in asteady but not problem-free manner (personalexperience 1994).

On initial deployment the RPA, manningthe roadblocks throughout the country,particularly in Kigali, presented an aggressivestance, sighting their weapons on theAustralian LIN personnel present. In a matterof days following the surgical management byAustralians of injured RPA soldiers, theattitude changed at the roadblocks, with theweapons pointed up and ready smiles and the

occasional wave. In a microcosm, this changein behaviour so quickly was most noticeable.

Prizing impartiality, the UN had managedto gain approval from the General Assemblyand the legitimate Government of Rwanda todeploy UNAMIR I under Brigadier GeneralRomeo Dallaire. There was a window ofopportunity to “spotlight” the encroachingmassacre. The UN forces had no legitimateright to intervene politically and subsequentlydid not. Citizens of Rwanda were killed in frontof UN soldiers, leaving a personal burden forthem to carry all their lives, particularly theirBrigadier General.23, 24

The UN Brigadier “on the spot” had goodand timely intelligence but no enforcementoccurred as he had no force or power inInternational Humanitarian Law. Nobody couldhave believed what could and subsequently didhappen.25

International Humanitarian Law providedno deterrent. The UN forces provided noprotection or sanctuary. The rules ofengagement changed with the UNAMIR II asUN forces now could use legitimate lethal forceto protect citizens and themselves26 – a lessonnot lost on Major General Peter Cosgrove, theCommander of INTERFET (International Forcein East Timor) with a UN mandate in 1999.

The French became involved after themassacres in Rwanda, and the driver thereseemed to be the resuscitation of as muchFrench influence in Africa as possible; thedriver was national will and not human rightsabuses.

The UNAMIR II finally provided a calmafter the event to enable nation-building – notenough strength to prevent the massacre atKibeyo in 1995 although the UN military andmedical elements prevented an escalation ofthe deaths from 5,000 to 50,000. The RPAattempted to hide a large number of the bodies,even then, down to an “acceptable” 300!demonstrating their sensitivity to internationalopinion.27


19

So how could the UN present legitimateforce early in a potential conflict in a mannerthat was non-threatening – relatively – to asovereign state such as Rwanda? What newInternational Humanitarian Law could bedeveloped to enable this acceptance,encouraging deterrence, enforcement of lawand the collection of evidence for futureTribunals and Courts? The UN military medicalassets seemed to have been effective inpreventing escalation.

International Humanitarian Law needs toadvance to facilitate proper policing in anacceptable manner. In the end, the idea is toprevent war. Thus war on war is the strategy.Clausewitz said that “war was diplomacycarried on by other means”. Maybe the reverseis true, and if International Humanitarian Lawfacilitates this diplomacy, could that bepreventative? “Walk softly and carry a bigstick” Theodore Roosevelt. The “Conventions”are silent on weapons and it thus appears to beno proscription to the type held by militarymedical personnel as long as the intent is toprotect their patients and themselves.28 Thisapplies in a declared war and so there maybemore possibility for appropriate weapons incommunal conflict such as Rwanda or EastTimor.

The final key to success is deceiving theenemy.29 We need thus to see what isacceptable to the perpetrators of the violationsof human rights without them realising the fullimplications. The NGO groups have beenaccepted but they are obliged to comply withthe force on the ground and may become partof the problem30,31 – but they get in and provideinformation.

What about the drivers on the UN’sinterventionist side? Even if the UN is in alegal position to intervene in a preventative orearly reactive way, it still requires force toachieve this “Coalition of the Willing”32. Thisfalls back on national interest and whatenergises this; plus the question of UNimpartiality is raised, with a subsequent

alteration of the original political balance.33 Toprize this impartiality as a unique feature ofthe UN leads to the concept of a UNindependent force or “fire brigade”.34 Much talkbut it has not happened!

History may provide a lesson – as in thedays of the Crusades, Christians and Muslimswere enemies and the countries of Europeunited, as did the Arab world. This was atrans-national conflict, and the Crusadersdeveloped Orders of Knights, with differentareas of expertise. Of particular relevance arethe Knights Hospitaller.35

This military Order, as far as is known,began as a force to protect pilgrims as well asto provide for their sustenance and medicalcare. From their inception in the 12th centurythe Order became a fighting force in the HolyLand and in the Mediterranean. These wereinitially known as the Hospitallers ofJerusalem, then as the Knights of Rhodes and,after 1530, the direct Order of St John ofJerusalem is now called the Knights of Maltaand is based in Rome and enjoysambassadorial status. There are a number ofderivatives, however, with similar claims tothis heritage with similar prestige. They lastbore arms in the early 18th century and noware prestigious non-government organisations(NGOs) devoted to humanitarian causes.

To modernise the concept of a super-national force, the “‘UN Protectors” need to bea non-sectarian, non-religious force, beholdingto no nation, ethnic group or race. They wouldhave no geographical bounds or territorialambitions,36 and would have to be an elite,technically advanced military forceemphasising defence more than attack in orderto prize impartiality. Should they be police orcombat troops? – bearing in mind pastfailures.37

Under the Geneva Conventions, legitimatemilitary medical assets can bear arms toprotect themselves and those under their care.The type of weapon is not prescriptive as longas the intent is defensive, and therein lies a

THE ROLE OF DEFENCE HEALTH IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

Photograph by Darren Hilder

A nurse with 1 Field Hospital, Holsworthy (NSW) checks on an antibiotic drip for a burns victim at the militaryhospital in Dili, East Timor, which was part of INTERFET’s presence in the region.

THE ROLE OF DEFENCE HEALTH IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 21

way forward for the development of anindependent force. The defence could focus onsafe areas for the protection of civilians.38 Theycould use this protection for the media,allowing full development of the “CNN factor”and galvanising world opinion.39 Using newtechnology for example video surveillancecould be developed as a larger version of anysecurity system, gathering evidence. Evengiving “handy cams” to civilians with theability to record and transmit real-timeviolence and intimidation,40 would add anotherdimension to documenting evidence for theprosecution of crimes against humanity later.(“This is me getting killed!”).

Military medical assets present a uniquecombination of legitimate force and humanity.They could be “lead-in” or “ice-breaker” forconflict intervention. New InternationalHumanitarian Law is required to provide theframework for their deployment. InternationalHumanitarian Law is steadily moving forwardbut still seems to be behind the play, asevidenced by the fact that human rights abusesin Rwanda, Kosovo and East Timor etc. haveoccurred and that the law is trying to prosecutethe perpetrators. Catching criminals after theevent is good but to facilitate prevention isbetter. A new law - a new InternationalHumanitarian Law - a convention on militarymedical intervention, could possibly achievethis.

Ostensibly non-threatening to thesovereign state involved and palatable to thestates delivering the asset – a good “CNNfactor” – encouraging for political will indemocracies and building on existingInternational Humanitarian Law. Medicalteams gather evidence both from patients andforensic examination. They provide healthcare, which gains them support from thepersecuted and persecutors. As a combinationof legitimate lethal or non-lethal force andhumanity, military medical assets are not a softtarget, such as NGO groups that are anintimate part of the problem.41 The asset could

be national or supernational under thelegitimacy of the UN. It could utilise newtechnology as part of the Revolution inMilitary Affairs (RMA) in communications,surveillance, active and passive defenceincluding stand-off and guided non-lethalweapons systems used in accordance withIHL.42

In his book On Killing, Lieutenant ColonelDavid Grossman considers there are peoplewho are like wolves, they run countries andperpetuate violence that kills ordinary people,who are like sheep. He emphasises the conceptthat we require sheepdogs, who are just likewolves but in fact look after the sheep andprotect them against wolves. Here are newsheepdogs.

In conclusion, with due regard for thehistorical evolution of individual liberty,human and sovereign state rights interwovenwith International Humanitarian Law, the timewould seem ripe for a new law to facilitatetimely and appropriate intervention inhumanitarian disaster.

As an “ice-breaker or lead-in” the newdoctor-soldiers, like the Knights Hospitaller ofold, could rise again, armed with newInternational Humanitarian Law in a non-sectarian campaign against conflict itself.

There are wolves out there,That kill and make wars,And we need sheepdogs for the good cause.

History implores,Strengthen their paws, claws and jawsAnd provide them with good laws,To prevent new wars!

NOTES1. G. Kewley, (1993) Humanitarian Law and

Armed Conflicts, Australian Red Cross,Melbourne, section 1, pp. 2-14.

2. H. Grotius (1646), “The Law of War and Peace”DeJure Belli, Ac Pacis Libri Tres.

3. V.H. Wallace (ed) (1957) Paths to Peace: Astudy of war, its causes and prevention,Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, chap.16, pp. 317-335.


4. S. El-Dakkak (1990) “InternationalHumanitarian Law lies between the Islamicconcept and positive international law”International Review of the Red Cross, no. 275,pp. 101-114.

5. E.E. Dunlop, (1986) The War Diaries of WearyDunlop, Nelson Publishers, Melbourne, p. 18.

6. The Alamo Museum, San Antonio, Texas, USA,witnessed in 2000.

7. “Inventing East Timor”, Foreign Affairs,July/August 2000, p. 77.

8. G. Robertson, QC (1999) Crimes AgainstHumanity: The struggle for global justice,Penguin Books, England, p.xiii.

9. J. Dacyl (l966), “Sovereignty versus HumanRights: From Past Discourses to ContemporaryDilemmas”. Journal of Refugee Studies, vol. 9,no.2, pp. 136-65.

10. G. Kewley, (1993) Humanitarian Law andArmed Conflicts, Australian Red Cross,Melbourne, p.51.

11 Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, p.xv.12. Robertson, Crimes Against Humanity, p.xv. 13. M. Tate Rev Professor AO, Plenary-Address,

Australian Orthopaedic Association, 9 Oct2000.

14. “Annals of Justice in What Court?”, TimeMagazine, 16 Oct 2000, p.32.

15. R. Eccleston, The Australian, 2 Jan 2001, p.8. 16. P.V. Jacobsen, “National Interest,

Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UNPeace Enforcement After the Cold War?”Journal of Peace Research, vol.33, no.2, 1996,pp. 205-216.

17. The Australian, 22.12.00.18. G, Evans, (1998) “Preventative Action and

Conflict Resolution” in Otunnu O.A and Doyle,M.W. (eds), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping forthe New Century, Roman & LittlefieldPublishers Inc, p.61.

19. M. O’Kane “Eyewitness” in Dili, The GuardianWeekly, Sept 23-29, 2000, p. l.

20. Australian Peacekeeper, vol.2, issue 3, Sept 99.21. P. Gourevitch (1998) “We wish to inform you

that tomorrow we will be killed with ourfamilies Stories from Rwanda,” Picador, USA,p.103.

22. The Blue Helmets: a review of UNpeacekeeping, 3rd edn, UN, 1996, chap. 16.

23. Personal communication from an associate.24. “Rwanda’s Hell still haunts UN envoy”, The

Australian, July 6, 2000, p.9.25. W. Shawcross (2000) Deliver Us from Evil:

warlords & peacekeepers in a world of endlessconflict, Bloomsbury, London, chap. 5.

26. P. McIntosh, Brigadier, “Experiences of

Command in UN Operations”, Journal of theRoyal United Services Institute of Australia, Dec1999.

27. P. Warfe (2000) “Post-traumatic stress and theAustralian Defence Forces: lessons from peaceoperations in Rwanda and Lebanon” in EvansM & Ryan A (eds) The Human Face OfWarfare: killing, fear & chaos in battle, Allen &Unwin, St Leonards.

28. Australian Land Command, legal opinion onthe Geneva Conventions, LTCOL Roy AbbottHealth Conference, Dec 1999.

29. Sun Tzu (1998) The Art of War: The Book ofLord Shang, Wordsworth Editions, UK, p. 15.

30. J. Herbst (1996) “Somalia and the Future ofHumanitarian Intervention”, Foreign Affairs,vol. 75, no. 2 pp.70-85.

31. T. Wright, “In Aid of Evil”, The Bulletin, 3 Oct2000, P. 67.

32. Roper, The Secretary-General’s paper “Anagenda for peace”, para 62, p.262.

33. P.V. Jacobsen, “National Interest”.34. B. Urquhart, (1998) “Prospects for a Rapid

Response Capability: a dialogue”, in Otunnu,O.A. and Doyle M.W. (eds) Peacemaking andPeacekeeping in the New Century, Roman &Littlefield Publishers, UK pp. 189-195.

35. website http:www.gocities.com\A\O\olympus\-9767\hospitallers.html.

36. F. Heisbourg (1998) “Prospects for rapidresponse capability: a dialogue”, in Otunnu O.Aand Doyle, M.W. (eds), Peacemaking andPeacekeeping for the New Century, Roman &Littlefield Publishers, p.196.

37. “Middle March”, Congressional Watch, ArmedForces Journal International, Aug 2000, p.6.

38. S. Ogata (c l998) “Humanitarian responses tointernational emergencies” in Otunnu andDoyle, Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, p.223.

39. P. Jacobsen, “National Interest”.40. Personal communication, Andrew Mail, ABC

reporter, Oct 1999.41. W. Demars, “Waiting for early warning

humanitarian action after the Cold War”,Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.8, no.4, 1995,pp.390-410.

42. RMA, Australian Defence Force Journal No. 144.

BIBLIOGRAPHYAbbot, LTCOL Roy, Australian Land Command, legal

opinion on the Geneva Conventions, LTCOLRoy Abbott, Health Conference, Dec 1999.

“Annals of Justice in What Court?” Time Magazine,16 Oct 2000.

“Inventing East Timor”, Foreign Affairs, p.77,July/August 2000.

THE ROLE OF DEFENCE HEALTH IN MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR 23

“Rwanda’s hell still haunts UN envoy”, TheAustralian, July 6, 2000.

Dacyl J. (1 966), “Sovereignty versus Human Rights:From Past Discourses to ContemporaryDilemmas”, Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.9,no.2.

Demars W., “Waiting for early warninghumanitarian action after the Cold War”,Journal of Refugee Studies, vol.8, no.4, 1995.

Dunlop E.E. (1986). The War Diaries of WearyDunlop, Nelson Publishers, Melbourne.

Eccleston R., The Australian, 2 Jan, 2001.EI-Dakkak S. (1990). “International Humanitarian

Law lies between the Islamic concept andpositive international law”, InternationalReview of the Red Cross, no. 275.

Evans G. (1998) “Preventative Action and ConflictResolution” in Otunnu O.A. and Doyle, M.W.(eds), Peacemaking and Peacekeeping for the NewCentury, Roman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.

Gourevitch P. (1998) “We wish to inform you thattomorrow we will be killed with our families –Stories from Rwanda”, Picador, USA.

Grotius H. (1646) “The Law of War and Peace”,DeJure Belli, Ac Pacis Libri Tres.

Herbst J. (1996) “Somalia and the Future ofHumanitarian Intervention”, Foreign Affairs,vol. 75, no. 2, pp.70-85.

Jacobsen P.V. (1966) “National Interest,Humanitarianism or CNN: What Triggers UNPeace Enforcement After the Cold War?”,Journal of Peace Research, vol.33, no.2.

Kewley G. (1993) Humanitarian Law and ArmedConflicts, Australian Red Cross, Melbourne.

Kewley G. (1993) Humanitarian Law and ArmedConflicts, Australian Red Cross, Melbourne.

McIntosh, Brigadier P., “Experiences of Command inUN Operations”, Journal of the Royal UnitedServices Institute of Australia, December 1999.

Ogata S. (c l998) “Humanitarian responses tointernational emergencies” in Otunnu, O.A. andDoyle M.W. (eds) Peacemaking andPeacekeeping in the new century, Roman &Littlefield Publishers, UK.

O’Kane M. “Eyewitness” in Dili, The GuardianWeekly, Sept 23-29, 2000.

Urquhart B. & Heisbourg F. (1998) “Prospects for aRapid Response Capability: a dialogue”, inOtunnu, O.A. and Doyle M.W. (eds)Peacemaking and Peacekeeping in the NewCentury, Roman & Littlefield Publishers, UK.

RMA, Australian Defence Force Journal, No. 144.Robertson G., OC (1999) Crimes Against Humanity:

The struggle for global justice, Penguin Books,England.

Shawcross W. (2000) Deliver Us from Evil: warlords& peacekeepers in a world of endless conflict,Bloomsbury, London,

Sun Tzu (1998) The Art of War: The Book of LordShang, Wordsworth Editions, UK.

Tate M., Rev Professor AO, Plenary Address,Australian Orthopaedic Association, 9 Oct2000.

The Alamo Museum, San Antonio, Texas, USA.The Blue Helmets: a review of UN peacekeeping, 3rd

edn, UN, 1996, chap. 16.Wallace V.H. (ed) (1957) Paths to Peace: A study of

war, its causes and prevention, MelbourneUniversity Press, Melbourne.

Warfe P. (2000) “Post-traumatic stress and theAustralian Defence Forces: lessons from peaceoperations in Rwanda and Lebanon” in EvansM & Ryan A (eds) The Human Face OfWarfare: killing, fear chaos in battle, Allen &Unwin, St Leonards.

Wright T., “In Aid of Evil”, The Bulletin, 3 Oct 2000.

Brigadier Robert Neville Atkinson graduated in Medicine from University of Adelaide in 1970, completed his residencyin Adelaide, and then saw active service with the Australian Regular Army in South Vietnam. He trained inOrthopaedics in Adelaide, completing this in 1980 with a Fellowship overseas in the United Kingdom including aTrauma Fellowship in Germany. His military service continued with Command of two units and active service in the Gulf War, Rwanda, Bougainville,and recently East Timor. He has completed the position of Assistant Surgeon General and is now Emeritus Consultantin Military Surgery. He is a Councillor of the Royal Australasian College of Surgeons and Asia-Pacific Orthopaedic Association and gaineda Master of Defence Studies in 2001. He has just completed three years as Chairman of the Military Section of theCollege.He is the Head of the Department of Orthopaedics and Trauma at the Modbury Public Teaching Hospital, holdingVisiting positions at the Royal Adelaide Hospital and Adelaide Women’s and Children’s Hospital as part of theDepartment of Orthopaedic Surgery of the University of Adelaide. His particular civilian area of interest is knee andshoulder surgery as well as joint arthroplasty work for both hip and knee.

The Australian Armyand the Vietnam War

1962-1972

The 2002 Chief of Army'sMilitary History Conference

3-4 October 2002National Convention Centre,

Canberra

Conference Enquiry Line Phone: (02) 6266 2744

25

This is exactly the situation faced by theSouth African Defence Force (SADF) during

its Transformation into the South AfricanNational Defence Force (SANDF) during theperiod 1990-2000. Do not be tempted toassume that this was merely a simple namechange. This process of Transformation as itwas called was a “fundamental, complete anddrastic make-over of the process” and the veryfabric of South Africa’s military organisation.1

As such, it is a very good example of strategicorganisational change. To examine this processof Transformation this article will consider theevents in South Africa in terms of theTransition Path Change Model developed inCommanding Change – War WinningStrategies for Managing OrganizationalChange.2 Essentially the model plots thepositions, progress and future of change in anorganisation by examining its previous andcurrent change waves.

While it is unlikely that Australia’s defenceorganisations will ever undergo change quiteat this scale, the events in South Africa

between 1990 and 2000 provide importantinsights into how a defence organisationpasses through such a dramatic and all-encompassing strategic change. As such, theseinsights are valuable lessons for Australia’sDefence Organisation to understand in terms ofits own change management planning for thefuture.

Background to TransformationThe first Change Point for South Africa’s

current Revolutionary Change Wave was therelease of Nelson Mandela in 1990. With hisrelease the way was opened for multi-party,all-race elections in 1994. Between 1993 and1994 a series of constitutional conventionswere held at the World Trade Centre inKempton Park near Pretoria to produce aninterim constitution and discuss the broaderchanges that were anticipated as a result of theelection process. There were also committeesand groups meeting to discuss the future ofSouth Africa’s military organisation. Inparticular, a Joint Military Coordination

The Transformation – Strategic Changewithin the South AfricanNational Defence Force

By Lieutenant Colonel Murray Davies

Once We Were EnemiesAt the best of times major structural change within any large organisation is difficult if not

traumatic. Picture, however, a circumstance where an entire defence force must undergo majorstrategic, structural, and cultural change as a result of a shift in the political make-up of thecountry. From the highest to the lowest levels of the force new leadership structures and approachesmust be accommodated and new teams built within units. Men and women, who only a few shortyears before were literally facing each other with weapons as enemies, must be blended together andmust be taught to replace long standing hatreds with trust and cooperation. Because this blendedforce is too big for the economic and financial constraints of the newly re-emerged country it mustbe pared back, however, this must be done in such a way as to still be reflective of the socialcircumstances of the new environment. Of course this organisation is a defence force not a socialexperiment and as such, at the end of this period of change it must still be a capable and dynamicforce able to protect the country and foster its continued security.


Committee (JMCC) conducted a series ofmeetings to determine the future of SADF, itsformer enemies including the military arm ofthe African National Congress, the MK(Umkhonto we Sizwe), APLA (Azanian PeoplesLiberation Army) and the smaller homelandforces that had been established by the SADFduring the apartheid era.3

The meetings at Kempton Park determinedthat Transformation had an overall aim ofproviding “appropriate, adequate, affordableand accountable defence for the RSA”.4 Thisaim translated into five main goals. The first,and perhaps most overwhelming was theintegration of the SADF, the MK, the APLAand five homeland forces into one unifiednational defence force. The second goal wasthe stabilisation of the country’s civil andmilitary relations, in particular the passing ofinternal security duties to the South AfricanPolice. The development of defence policy wasalso to be made more open and consultativeand the SANDF was to be made “right sizedand cost effective”. Finally a “new” Ministry ofDefence comprising both military and civilianpersonnel had to be established and theconcept of civilian oversight of the militaryintroduced and embedded.5

Although the integration of the forces wasonly one of five Transformation goals, it hasbeen the most demanding and complex. Itcommenced on 27 April 1994 and was initiallythought to have created an integrated SANDFof some 139,000 personnel. This was based onan assessment that saw approximately 90,000former SADF, 32,000 former MK, 6,000 formerAPLA and 11,000 former members of thehomeland armies being brought into the force.At the height of process, however, only101,000 were actually integrated as only15,000 former MK and APLA members choseto make the transition.6 Integration was notsimply a matter of absorbing extra personnelbut rather establishing accepted competenciesand standards of training, equivalencies ofrank and a balance of conditions of service.

Against all of this there was also a clearexpectation that South Africa neither needednor could maintain a defence force of this sizeand as such there would inevitably have to bea program of demobilisation or downsizing. In2001 the SANDF had a total strength ofapproximately 78,000 although the targetfigure still to be reached by 2002 is between65,000 and 70,000.7

Change Management PlanningThere were a number of areas of the

SANDF’s change management planning thatwere highly effective. The first was theestablishment of a special staff within theSANDF to manage the process. In July 1995,Major General Oelschig was appointed as theChief Director of Transformation Management.Oelschig’s task was to get the Transformationprocess “irreversibly on track by 31 May1999”.8 The directorate was responsible formanaging the structure and conduct of theTransformation process initially within SANDF,although its role was eventually broadened toinclude the Defence Secretariat and aspects ofthe wider Department of Defence. Thedirectorate existed under various names andcommand arrangements until 1 April 1999when the Directorate of IntegratedManagement Systems absorbed its functions.9

Another of the great strengths of theTransformation process was that its goals,directions and objectives were communicatedto all members of the new SANDF. Thiscommunication involved a range of changemanagement activities to encourage andsupport personnel and make them more awareor “sensitised” to the new environment.“Critical Mass Training” was also provided tothose members of the organisation who wouldlead the change and was designed to orientateleaders to the aim and goals of theTransformation.10

Critically, there was also a clear breakbetween the end of the SADF and the start ofthe SANDF. On 27 April 1994 the SADF ceased

THE TRANSFORMATION – STRATEGIC CHANGE WITHIN SANDF 27

to exist. At that time all members of the SADF,APLA, MK, and the homeland forces wereawarded a medal to recognise their service todate and formally brought into the newSANDF. The medal they were issued was thelast of the old series of medals. From that dateonward only SANDF medals would be issued.Likewise this date also saw the introduction ofnew elements to SANDF uniforms such as anew rank badges.11 Within any organisationsuch “rituals of transition” are very importantas they mark the passing of an event or achange in an organisation and provide atangible demonstration of the continuity ofvalues within the organisation as it movesbetween states.12 The US Army recentlyunderwent a similar process when it adoptedthe black beret as its universal headdress as itwas intended that the beret would be thesymbol of “the Army’s commitment totransforming itself into the Objective Force”.13

Finally, the approach taken duringTransformation to dealing with potentialsources of resistance to change is worth noting.While there were some notable and isolatedincidents of resistance to change at unit or

base level where former “enemies” sought tocontinue the fight or settle old scores, theprocess of Transformation was widelyaccepted. Part of the reason for this is that theTransformation process was a consultativeprocess from the very beginning. Althoughmulti-racial democratic rule was inevitable forSouth Africa, all of the key players and majorgroups were not only consulted but also givenan opportunity to contribute to the shape ofthe new SANDF. Another reason is that veryearly in the integration process there was aprogram of voluntary redundancies for allmembers of the SADF, MK, APLA and thesmaller homeland forces. Between May 1996and 1 April 1998 over 7,238 former membersof the SADF, MK, and APLA took thisvoluntary retirement package at a total cost tothe Government of 168 million Rand.14

Interestingly, the highest pay out figures wereallocated to those senior members of the forces(between 18 to 23 years of service) who it wasthought may have had the greatest difficultieswith the new environment.15 Although avoluntary redundancy package of this sizewould have been a significant hit to any

Figure 1. Transition Path Change Model – SANDF. Source: Commanding Change.

1st ChangePoint 1990Release ofMandela

Prechange Wave 1990-94Constitutional

Conventions/JMCC

Planned WavePeak 2002

2nd Change PointApril 1994 Integrationof all military forcesinto SANDF

Last Revolutionary Change Wave1960s expansion in SADF to meet

internal security tasks

CurrentRevolutionaryChange Wave

The Next WaveConfidence Building/

Peacekeeping?

Time

Intensity


defence budget, it helped to “removepainlessly” personnel in any of the militaryorganisations who may have been pronetoward opposing or resisting the change.

Perhaps the greatest weakness in theplanning and conduct of the Transformationcan be seen in the failure to plan throughchange rather than to change. Certainly therewas a very clear sense that the SADF had to bechanged. Likewise, the areas of this changewere well recognised and the goals ofTransformation widely stated. What wasmissing, however, was a common or evenstated understanding of what the SANDFwould look like once it had completed theTransformation process. In other words theparamount goal was to create the SANDFalthough there was no clear view of what theSANDF would look like or what it would beable to do when it was finished. It is importantto understand that for many South Africansthe single most important issue was that theSANDF would not be the SADF of theapartheid era. While this is understandablesuch sentiment does not provide a pathwaythrough the change to develop a well-balancedand flexible force able to meet South Africa’sstrategic needs.

Transformation – Success or Failure?Can we say that Transformation achieved

its stated aim of providing “appropriate,adequate, affordable and accountable defencefor the RSA”(my italics)”?16 It is certainly truethat the SANDF’s command structure andethos and manning is more appropriate to theracial, ethnic, cultural and politicalcircumstances of the new South Africa. Theadequacy of the force is, however, a difficultissue to judge. There were claims by some thatthe SANDF’s deployment to Lesotho inSeptember 1998 was nothing more than ademonstration of its weakness post-Transformation. At the same time, however,there is equally valid criticism that the SouthAfrican Department of Foreign Affairs and

intelligence services failed to provide anaccurate view of the situation and theopposition to the SANDF and this contributedto a below average showing.17 Whether or notthe force is adequate to meet South Africa’sbroader or future needs is not clear as there hasbeen limited strategic or force structureconsideration in this area as Transformationplanning occurred to and not through theSADF to SANDF change.

It is unlikely that the SANDF could beconsidered affordable yet although steps arebeing taken to reduce its size throughcontinued demobilisation steps and with therationalisation of logistic and materialprocesses. As to the accountability of the forcesthere are undoubtedly some problems relatingto change fatigue although the SANDF is nowfirmly under civilian oversight and its planningand acquisition processes are subject to a highdegree of oversight.

How effectively this aim is fixed within theSANDF will depend on how they deal withtensions about the process of Transformationthat are starting to develop. One recent studyhas pointed to a growing sense of tensionbetween the “technocrats” who introduced andare seeking to maintain accounting,management and control procedures andbehaviouralists who are more concerned withbehavioural change issues related to theintegration process such as the introductionand implementation of equality policies andprocedures.18 At the same time the increasing“jointness” of the SANDF remains a sense oftension for some Army, Navy, Air Force andMedical Service personnel.

Another concern is a growing sense ofchange fatigue that is becoming apparentwithin the uniformed and civilian members ofthe Department of Defence and the SANDF.This is now starting to be reflected in areas ofdiscipline, morale, performance and quality ofwork life. An internal SANDF review of theTransformation process in June 2001summarised this by saying that, “Too many


changes in concept without realigning internalcontrol measures have also seen the increase ofreported fraudulent and criminal behaviourscosting the DOD valuable capital”.19 Notsurprisingly then, this same report also noted“implementation thereof proved far moredifficult due to different perceptions, valuesystems, cultural diversity and languagepreferences.” It also noted, however, that “Thesigning of new codes (of conduct) for militaryas well as civilian personnel made the road toa transformed DOD much easier to travel.”20

Strategic Change Lessons While it seems unlikely that Australia’s

Defence Organisation will ever experience achange process as extensive or dramatic as theSANDF, it is nevertheless a valuable exercise todraw some lessons from the South Africanexperience. This is principally because strategicchange of this scope and over such a periodtouches every aspect of the structure,philosophy, personnel and materiel issues of anorganisation. The strengths and weakness ofthe SANDF approach can provide examples ofsuccessful and unsuccessful change approachesand pathways that other organisations mayconsider in the implementation of their moremodest change agendas. To that end there arefour lessons we can take from the SADF toSANDF Transformation.

Lesson 1 – Communications; One of thegreat strengths of the Transformation processwas that its goals, directions and objectiveswere communicated to all members of the newSANDF. This communication involved a rangeof change management activities, including“Critical Mass Training”, that were designed toencourage and support personnel and makethem more aware or “sensitised” to the newenvironment. Also by communicating thereasons for a change to personnel it headed offsome unsubstantiated criticisms, reduced theimpact of rumours, educated participants, andcreated a sense of ownership of the changewithin the organisation.

Lesson 2 – Through and Not To Change;A very common failing of much militarychange management planning is aconvergence on the immediate changeobjective. This occurs when the dates andtargets of a plan take on an unnecessary andunrealistic importance all of their own. Thiswas perhaps the greatest weakness in theplanning and conduct of the Transformation.Although there was a very clear sense that theSADF had to be changed and the areas of thischange were well recognised and widely stated,there was no common or even statedunderstanding of what the SANDF would belike once it had completed the Transformationprocess. Many of the misinterpretations,tensions and resistance to Transformation werea direct result of this. Likewise, much of thechange fatigue being experience by themembers of the South African Department ofDefence in general can be linked back to this.The important thing for change leaders toremember is that they must look forward to theshape or state they want the organisation to bein the future after the change. They must selectan aim that sees through turmoil andconfusion of the impending or current wave tothe time after the wave.

Lesson 3 – Dealing with Opposing orResisting Forces; In any change environmentthere will always be groups or individuals,both inside and outside the organisation, thatwill seek to delay, impede, or even attempt tostop the process of change. In the case ofTransformation we have seen that there weretensions between “technocrats” andbehaviouralists, military and civilian personneland between the four Services that has and arelikely to continue to influence the conduct ofchange processes. There were some isolatedincidents of a more extreme nature althoughthese were local and small scale in nature. Thefact that there were not more significantsources or incidents of opposition is acompliment to the success of Transformation.Clearly there were two factors that contributed


to this success. The first was communication,as discussed previously goals, directions andobjectives were communicated to all membersof the new SANDF. The second was a programof well-managed redundancies that offeredpotential sources of resistance or opposition tothe change to depart the Service.

Lesson 4 – Military Uniqueness; There issometimes a danger within militaryorganisations that the uniqueness of theircircumstances is not recognised and thatchange procedures, often imperfectly copiedfrom the civilian world, are applied arbitrarily.In doing so many important aspects of militaryculture, issues of tradition and the rituals andfamiliar facets of military life are sacrificed tomeet the “business plan” or the “customer”needs. The inherent danger in this is thataspects of internal culture which show criticalparameters and lines of persuasion that themilitary change management planner will needwhen implementing the change will be lost.Despite the broad nature of the South Africanchange they recognised the importance of suchissues. As we saw between the end of theSADF and the start of the SANDF there was ineffect a military “ritual of transition” that sawthe SADF, MK, APLA and the homeland armiesbeing awarded a medal to recognise theirservice to date and formally brought into thenew SANDF. The medal they were issued wasthe last of the old series of medals. From thatdate onward only SANDF medals as well asother accoutrements would be issued. Such“rituals of transition” for military organisationsare very important as they mark the passing ofan event or a change in an organisation andprovide a tangible demonstration of thecontinuity of values within the organisation asit moves between states.

ConclusionThere can be few harder circumstances

under which to manage a major strategicchange than those faced by the SADF, MK,APLA and the homeland armies in their

Transformation into the SANDF. As we haveseen this was clearly far more significant thanjust a simple name change, rather it was amajor strategic realignment of forces, agenciesand people that completely renewed andreorganised that very fabric of the SouthAfrican military apparatus. It seems a fairassessment to say that Transformationachieved its stated goal of providing“appropriate, adequate, affordable andaccountable defence for the RSA”. In doing sothe SANDF was a good example of “bestpractice” strategic change management withina large organisation. I am not suggesting thatit was perfect, rather that it demonstrated allthe components of a cogent change strategy.Their strategy for change was based on a clearunderstanding of where the organisation waswithin its change environment. This superiorsituational awareness gave the organisation agood opportunity to plan change within theirspecific circumstances. The level ofconsultation and communication was also veryhigh and this contributed to the effectiveimplementation of the plans. Although few“civilian” change circumstances are ever likelyto be as dramatic, there are a number ofvaluable lessons in areas of communication,looking through change, and managing thoseelements of the organisation who seek todisrupt or resist change that should beremembered.

This article is a condensed version of aworking paper produced while the authorwas Chief of Defence Force Scholar at theAustralian Defence Studies Centre.

NOTES1. Transformation Briefing Package No. 3. p. 2.

Information provided by Captain Maré, ChiefDirector Foreign Relations SANDF, November1997. Copy of package held by author.

2. M.J. Davies, Commanding Change – WarWinning Strategies for ManagingOrganizational Change, Praeger Press, WestportConnecticut, 2001,

3. Wessels interview. Dr Wessels was a partner fora three-year project to re-engineer the South


African DoD. This was an extremely complexproject dealing with many change imperatives,such as the new constitutional dispensation andsevere cuts in the defence budget (60% in realterms since 1989).

4. Transformation Briefing Package No. 2, p. 7.Information provided by Captain Maré, ChiefDirector Foreign Relations SANDF, November1997. Copy of package held by author.

5. Integration Briefing, Rear Admiral J.G. LukasM. Bakkes, given at HQ SANDF Pretoria, 16 Oct01. Copies of notes held by author.

6. G. Shelton, D. Monyue, A. Pullinger, M.Simmonds, and R. Williams, Demobilisationand its Aftermath I, Institute for SecurityStudies Monograph Series, No. 59, August2001, Institute for Security Studies Pretoria,2001.

7. I. Lienbenberg, and M. Roefs, Demobilisationand its Aftermath II, Institute for SecurityStudies Monograph Series, No. 61, August2001, Institute for Security Studies Pretoria,2001.

8. Information provided by Captain T. Maré in afax (SDFR/327/29 June 1999) on 29 Jun 99.Copy of package held by author.

9. Integration Briefing, Rear Admiral J.G. LukasM. Bakkes, given at HQ SANDF Pretoria, 16 Oct01. Copies of notes held by author.

10. Transformation Briefing Package No.2, op. cit.,p. 13.

11. Wessels interview.12. B. Clemson, “The Deep Barriers to Change and

How to Overcome Them.” Old DominionUniversity/Clemson Consulting Group, NorfolkVA, http://www.odu .edu/~bac/pDeepBarriers.-html, p. 6.

13. “The Black Beret,” http://www.army.mil/beret/.14. “Defence in Democracy”, South African White

Paper on Defence 1996/South African DefenceReview 1998. April 1998, pp. 72–73.

15. “Defence in Democracy”, South African WhitePaper on Defence 1996/South African DefenceReview 1998. April 1998, pp. 72–73.

16. Transformation Briefing Package No. 2, op. cit.,p. 7.

17. H. Heitman, “SANDF Blunder Means LongerStay in Lesotho”, Jane’s Defence Weekly. 30September 1998, p. 5.

18. Policy and Planning Division Paper, ChangeManagement and Managerial Behaviour withinthe DOD, Staff paper prepared for Secretary ofDefence by D.J. Ehlers Acting Chief DirectorStrategic Management, Policy and PlanningDivision DOD RSA, 11 Jun 2000, p. 5., p. 7-9.

19. ibid., pp 7-9.20. ibid.

Murray Davies joined the Australian Army in 1981 through the Royal Military College (RMC) Duntroonand has served in a number of communications and intelligence related postings Lieutenant Colonel Murray Davies has written widely on military affairs, international relations andorganisational management subjects. His articles have been published in the Australian Defence ForceJournal, the British Army Review, the Combat Arms Journal and others. His first book, CommandingChange a study of change management practices in military organisations, was published by PraegerPublishing USA in 2001. He has just completed a second book, A Souvenir from Sebastopol a historicalnarrative surrounding the Crimean War.

“A sound approach to training”Troops training in the Shoalwater Bay Training Area.

Photograph by Corporal R. Donahoo

33

Background

John Monash was a part-time citizen soldierprior to the First World War. He was a civil

engineer by profession but held other degreesin the Arts and Law. Monash was widely readand had an ability to grasp the essence of awide range of issues. He was not only:

a great soldier and a masterly engineer, butalso a tireless student in many branches ofknowledge… (He) could have sustained anargument with any musical expert on theinterpretation of the symphonies ofBeethoven, but he knew those works as wellas he knew the strategic doctrines of

Gneisenau or the tactical methods ofMoltke.3

Monash’s pre-war military experienceincluded service in the Artillery, Intelligenceand Infantry. Soon after the outbreak of theFirst World War, he was appointed tocommand the 4th Brigade and departed forEgypt. After training in Egypt, Monashdeployed with his brigade to Gallipoli. C.E.W.Bean, the Australian official historian, recordedthat the holding of Monash’s Valley was “oneof the finest feats of the war”.4

After the withdrawal from Gallipoli,Monash’s 4th Brigade underwent training and

General Sir John Monash:What Relevance to Command in

the 21st Century?By Major Dominic Nicholl

I would name Sir John Monash as the best general on the western front in Europe; he possessedreal creative originality …

Field Marshal Montgomery1

Throughout the last two centuries Australia frequently contributed forces to allied war efforts.While these contributions were nationally significant, they were generally small in relation to thesize of the combined allied forces.2 However, Australian forces have engendered a reputation far inexcess of their numbers in many theatres of war. While the characteristics of the individuals whocomprised Australia’s soldiery were important factors in the development of this reputation, thequalities of their commanders were of greater significance. The effective command of all resources,including personnel, is paramount to the successful conduct of war. Australia has produced anumber of outstanding commanders who have led her forces to success in a wide range ofoperational theatres.

General Sir John Monash was one such commander. He came from obscurity at the beginningof the First World War to reach the appointment of commander of the Australian Corps in Europeless than four years later. What qualities of command did this Australian commander display thatidentified him for such rapid advancement, and are there lessons that can be learnt from hisperformance that are appropriate to command in the 21st century?

This article will analyse General Monash’s command performance with a view to relevance tomodern day command. Firstly, Monash’s development and career will be briefly described afterwhich a number of factors for success will be developed. These factors will then be used to analyseMonash’s performance as a senior commander. Discussion will then identify lessons that may beapplicable to the conduct of command in the 21st century.


reconstitution in Egypt in preparation fordeployment to the Western Front. Soon afterhis arrival in France, Monash was appointedGeneral Officer Commanding (GOC) 3rdDivision. He trained his new formation inEngland prior to deploying to the WesternFront in late 1916. During his command, the3rd Division was involved in a number ofmajor battles including the Third Battle ofYpres in August 1917 and the great Ludendorfoffensive of March 1918. In June (May) 1918,Monash was appointed commander of theAustralian Corps. His significant successes inthis appointment included the Battle of Hameland the offensive on the Hindenburg Line.

Command FactorsAny lessons learnt from the analysis of a

commander’s performance will be relative tohis success. Success, put simply, is theaccomplishment of the commander’s aim orobjective. In the case of military commanders,success could be considered to be the effectivecompletion of their mission or achievement ofthe desired end-state.

What then is the essence of the success ofgreat military commanders? Dunnigan andMasterson,5 in their study of 12 of history’sgreatest generals, argue that the basictechniques of successful commanders havebeen essentially the same throughout history.They further explain the interrelated nature ofmanagement and leadership in the successfulconduct of campaigns. This view is supportedby Australian military doctrine whereleadership and management can be seen to besub-sets of the function of command.6

Command, therefore, includes application of arational process that involves analysis of theenvironment, formulation of strategies,development of structures and processes, andsubsequent implementation and control.

These stages of the management processform the factors by which a militarycommander’s performance may be analysed.While success is not assured, it is more likely

when there is alignment between theseinterrelated elements. Therefore, effectivecommand involves four broad stages withoutwhich the opportunity for success issignificantly reduced. These stages are, in amilitary sense:

1. situational awareness2. planning3. organisation and doctrine, and 4. execution. They will be used as the framework to

analyse General Sir John Monash’sperformance as a military commander.

Analysis of Command PerformanceSituational Awareness

Success in battle is dependent on theexploitation of information and knowledge-in-general to gain a decisive advantage over theenemy. Situational awareness is the processwhereby commanders develop as complete anunderstanding as possible of their operationalenvironment in order to achieve theirobjectives. This involves not only obtainingoperational information but also informationabout developments and technologicaladvances relative to the mission.

Monash generally did not attempt to gainmuch information about his operationalsituation. While Monash undertook to observefrom the sea the country through which histroops would move for the attack on Sari Bair,he failed to conduct a more detailed routereconnaissance.7 This contributed to the failureof the battle with significant losses to theAustralian force. As one of his officers at thetime observed, it was an “object lesson on thenecessity for personal reconnaissance”.8 Duringthe same battle, Monash delegated commandof his brigade to one of the battalioncommanders while he remained to the rear ofthe force with no communications.9 Heconsequently lost situational awareness and,subsequently, control of his brigade.

On the Western Front, as GOC 3rd Division,General Monash rarely made an effort to

GENERAL SIR JOHN MONASH: WHAT RELEVANCE TO COMMAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY? 35

reconnoitre the battlefield and often ignoredpatrol reports.10 This resulted in an incompleteunderstanding of the battlefield thatcontributed to massive casualties during theFirst Battle of Passchendale. Again during theBattle of the Hindenburg Line, at GillemontFarm, Monash failed to ensure he had areasonable picture of the situation beforeordering an attack.11 It failed with heavycasualties.

While the use of reconnaissance was asignificant limitation in Monash’s method ofcommand, one of his greatest strengths was anawareness of developments in doctrine andtechnology that could be utilised to enhancethe success of his battles.12 During the Battle ofHamel he employed radios to enhancecommunications, and aircraft to providereconnaissance reports.13 Consequently,Monash and his commanders maintained goodsituational awareness during the battle givingthem a decisive advantage over the enemy.

PlanningThe decisive advantage that is offered by

development of sound situational awareness isof little effect if it is not used to developstrategies and plans to solve problems, or toexploit opportunities on the battlefield. Theeffectiveness of those plans, and thecommunication of them to subordinates, willhave a profound influence on the outcome ofplanned activities. Monash’s greatest strengthlay in his ability to produce effective andcomprehensive plans. By painstaking analysesof problems he reduced the probabilities oferror. In contrast to the “romantic” views of hispeers, Monash saw the conduct of war as abusiness, “differing in no way from theproblems of a civil life, except that they aregoverned by a special technique”.14

A particular technique used by GeneralMonash was that of “conferencing”. In theseconferences he drew on the combinedknowledge of his subordinate commanders.They analysed his plans in conference “so that

all possible problems could be foreseen and allpossible solutions considered.”15 Everyonepresent was encouraged to give their opinion.16

Monash explained every detail of his plans andensured that all participants applied anidentical interpretation as himself. Further,once the plans had been disseminated hewould allow no fundamental alterations as hesaw that this only served to introduce anelement of confusion that “sapped theconfidence of subordinates”.17

While planning was one of Monash’sgreatest strengths, it was also one of hisgreatest weaknesses. He often overreachedhimself by performing tasks moreappropriately undertaken by his staff and oftenencroached on the responsibilities of hissubordinate commanders.18 As a divisionalcommander he told his brigade commandershow they were to employ their battalionsrather than allowing them to prepare their ownplans within the divisional concept.19

Interestingly, this was at odds with his ownguidance in “100 Hints for CompanyCommanders” that advised superiors not toimpinge on their subordinates’responsibilities.20

Organisation and DoctrineEffective planning alone will not bring

about a successful outcome. Sound plans mustbe backed by appropriate organisationalstructures, training, doctrine, and qualityresources. In this area Monash again excelled.As a militia brigade commander prior to thewar he was complimented for his soundapproach to training. This experience stoodhim well when appointed GOC 3rd Division.General Monash was responsible for thetraining of his new division. This he did withgreat effectiveness. To ensure that his troopswere trained for the task that was expected ofthem, he had a trench system dug and rotatedthe training force through this to acclimatisethem to the rigours of trench life. Further, heensured that the best NCOs and officers, with


battle experience, were allocated to theAustralian training units.21 Through this heensured the quality of Australian soldierdeployed to the front.

As a corps commander, Monash conductedfortnightly conferences with his divisionalcommanders to create “a unity of thought andpolicy and a unity of tactical methodsthroughout the whole corps”.22 He ensured theinteroperability of forces assigned to him bystandardising training and doctrine. WhenUnited States forces were allocated to hiscommand, General Monash assignedAustralians to conduct their training.23

Similarly, prior to the Battle of Hamel, Monashhad the men from different tank and infantryunits mix and form friendships. Familiarisationtraining was conducted at all levels.24

During his most well known action atHamel, Monash developed the concept foremployment of firepower in place ofmanpower. He reduced the number of infantryand incorporated the use of combined arms inhis battle plan. By employing new technologyand by synthesising into a cohesive plan battlemethods used previously by othercommanders, General Monash produced anoverwhelming victory. His use of tanks,infantry, artillery and aviation in thepreliminary actions and in the attack broughtabout a synergy of effort previously not seenon the battlefield. It became the model offuture British battle plans.25 By developing awell trained force, formulating sound doctrineand organising his force to make best use ofresources, Monash established the foundationfor the sound execution of his plans.

ExecutionWhile commanders may have well trained

and organised forces and a plan to committhem to battle, it should be remembered thatno plan survives h-hour. Good commanderswill be able to execute their plan, maintainsound awareness of the situation, and controltheir forces so that they can react as changes

develop. More particularly, good commanderswill plan their operations so that there issufficient capacity in their forces to react tounforeseen situations. Monash consistentlyensured that his troops were as well rested ashe could achieve by rotating them betweenpositions. This worked well in Gallipoli with anunder strength brigade and formed the basis ofhis plans on the Western Front. By settinglimited objectives and by “leap-frogging” hisformations, he husbanded the strength of theinfantry for future action.26

During the Battle of Hamel and insubsequent actions, General Monash usedaerial observation fitted with radios to keepabreast of the battle and issued radios down tobattalion and some company headquarters.Further, he developed the use of standardmessage formats for runners to “produceclarity of communication”.27 These measuresassisted Monash in maintaining control of hisforces and provided him a decisive edge overthe enemy. During the Battle of theHindenburg Line, General Monash clearlydemonstrated his ability to control his forcesand achieve his aim. C.E.W. Bean observed thatthe operation stood out “as one of movementrather than set-piece … in which quick, free,manoeuvre played a decisive part”.28

However, it is in the area of control thatGeneral Monash again shows a significantlimitation in his method of command. In anissue related to maintenance of situationalawareness, he often made poor decisions orvacillated before making decisions.29 AsMonash never went forward to the trenches,nor conducted ground reconnaissance, he wasoften unaware of the true nature of theoperational situation. He often rejected thesituational advice of his subordinatecommanders.30 This attitude towards situationalawareness often limited the success of hisoperations. However, Monash suffered fewlosses in battles that he planned and executed.While he could have achieved greatersuccesses, his achievements were the result of


detailed planning and the use of controlmeasures such as limited objectives. In thisway he was better able to control his forcesand react to unforeseen situations.

Key Lessons While the methods and means of war have

changed since the trench warfare of Monash’sday, its general nature has remained the same.War and conflict continue to contain chaosand confusion that often obscure predictabilityand outcome.31 Successful commanders willattempt to reduce this uncertainty througheffective and comprehensive planning, andimplementation of control measures. GeneralMonash’s performance in command provides anumber of lessons that are applicable to theconduct of command in the modern era.

The overarching lesson that may beidentified is that military operations should beconducted as a business. This involves theapplication of a rational management processthat guides analysis of the environment,formulation of strategies, development ofstructures and processes, and subsequentimplementation and control. Monash achieveda higher level of success than many of hiscontemporaries, in part, because of his abilityto develop alignment between theseinterconnected factors. Applied effectively,adoption of such an approach will assistcommanders to identify changes in theoperating environment and developappropriate responses to them.

Implicit in a rational management processis the necessity for development andmaintenance of situational awareness in theconduct of planning, execution and control ofoperations. Monash’s ineffective decisions andunsuccessful operations were, in large measure,the result of poor reconnaissance and rejectionof advice from subordinates – overall,insufficient awareness of the operationalsituation. His most effective battles were thosewhere he obtained a sound understanding ofthe operational environment. Further,

awareness of the broader military environmentis essential to the maintenance of professionalmastery. By keeping abreast of technologicaladvances relevant to the conduct of militaryactivities, ensuring currency in doctrinaldevelopments, and incorporating these into theplanning process, greater opportunity will beprovided to commanders to more effectivelyplan and prosecute operations. Again,Monash’s most effective actions drew onadvances in military technology and doctrine,and inclusion of these into his plans.

This analysis of Monash’s commandperformance further illustrates the need foreffective planning and subsequentcommunication to force element commanders.His method of conferencing provided amechanism to develop and analyse proposedcourses of action and establish comprehensiveplans that incorporated input from specialistarms and services. It further ensured that hissubordinate commanders were aware of theconcept of operations and scheme ofmanoeuvre. Present day commanders willimprove the effectiveness of their plans andsubsequent execution by conducting planningin a multi-disciplinary environment and by“wargaming” courses of action to identifyopportunities for improvement. Subsequentawareness within the force of the concept ofoperations and intent will increase thelikelihood of success of the commander’smission.

As previously stated, General Monashmaintained sound awareness of newdevelopments in technology and doctrine.Similarly, he had a good understanding of thecapabilities of his force elements. Throughinfluencing the training of his personnel andby task organising his forces, Monash alignedthe available resources to effectivelyimplement his battle plans. A soundunderstanding of the capabilities and principlesof employment of assigned resources will allowcommanders to exploit synergies developedthrough the grouping of force elements for


particular tasks. Such considerations areessential to the effective conduct of militaryoperations.

ConclusionThis analysis of General Monash’s

performance in command provides an insightinto some of the personal qualities required toeffectively command military operations.While it has focussed on the managementaspects of command, the influence ofleadership qualities should not be discounted.Each of these two interrelated functions ofcommand, however, will be emphasised in acommander’s approach to dealing with thecircumstances of individual situations as theyarise. In Monash’s case, management qualitieswere pre-eminent in his approach tocommand. He illustrated the necessity of arational approach to planning and subsequentexecution that enhanced the probability of hissuccess on the battlefield.

Modern day commanders should seek todisperse the “fog of war” through, amongstother considerations, adherence to processesthat align force structure and doctrine withstrategies designed to deal with situationsarising in the operational environment. Criticalto this is comprehensive situational awarenessof all issues affecting the potential employmentof the force. This should include awareness ofthe operational and strategic geo-politicalenvironments as well as emerging technology,equipment and procedures that may enhanceforce capability through the innovative use ofresources to achieve mission success. Further,by conducting planning in a collaborative,multi-disciplinary environment, present daycommanders will reduce the risk associatedwith the execution of plans by ensuringconsideration of all relevant factors.Ultimately, only through maintaining a highlevel of professional mastery will militarycommanders be able to establish a decisiveadvantage over their enemy and thereby setthe formwork for their success.

General Sir John Monash was an effectiveand successful commander. While at times hedisplayed limitations in his method ofcommand that affected his operationalperformance, overall he used his civilianbusiness experience to effectively plan andconduct successful operations. By taking abusiness approach to the conduct of war,Monash applied a rational managementprocess that contributed to his commandsuccess. His performance provides a number oflessons relevant to commanders in the 21stcentury. For his overall achievements, GeneralSir John Monash deserves his reputation as agreat Australian commander. “He was lucky,he wasn’t infallible and he didn’t lead from thefront, but he was one of the most skilful andeffective commanders on the WesternFront…”32

NOTES1. Quoted in G. Serle, John Monash, A Biography,

Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1982, p.379.

2. P. Pedersen, “Master at Arms”, in TheAustralian Magazine, 1-8 Aug 1993, p. 40. In1918, Australians comprised 9% of the BritishExpeditionary Force.

3. Sir Ernest Scott quoted in M. Falkus, “GeneralSir John Monash”, in Carver, M. (ed), The WarLords, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1976,p. 135.

4. ibid., p. 415. J. Dunnigan & D. Masterson, The Way of the

Warrior, Business Tactics and Techniques fromHistory’s Twelve Greatest Generals, St Martin’sGriffin, New York, 1997, pp. 1-9.

6. Australian Defence Force Publication, ADFP101, Glossary, ed. 1, 1994, Director Publishing,Defence Centre – Canberra, p. C – 10.Command is “the authority which acommander in the military Service lawfullyexercises over subordinates by virtue of rank orassignment. Command includes the authorityand responsibility for effectively usingavailable resources and for planning theemployment of, organising, directing,coordinating and controlling military forces forthe accomplishment of assigned missions. Italso includes responsibility for health, welfare,morale and discipline of assigned personnel.”

7. ibid., p.232.


8. J. Crumlin, “In the steps of the 4th Brigade” inJournal of the Australian War Memorial, Apr1990, p. 42.

9. P. Pedersen, “General Sir John Monash: CorpsCommander on the Western Front”, in Horner,D.M. (ed), The Commanders, Allen & Unwin,Sydney, 1984, p. 96.

10. ibid., p.101.11. R. Prior & T. Wilson, Command on the Western

Front – The Military Career of Sir HenryRawlinson, 1914-18, Blackwell, Oxford, 1992,pp. 370-371.

12. E. Andrews & B.G. Jordan, “Hamel, winning abattle” in Journal of the Australian WarMemorial, Apr 1991, pp. 6-7.

13. Australian War Memorial, “1918 – Hamel”,[Online] Available http://www.awm.gov.au/-1918/battles/hamel.htm, retrieved 15 Feb 2001.

14. General Sir John Monash quoted in M. Falkus,op. cit., p.140.

15. E. Andrews & B.G. Jordan, op. cit., p. 6. 16. This “conferencing” produced similar outcomes

to those achieved through “wargaming”.17. “Sir John Monash – a great Australian general”

in Australia’s Heritage vol. 5, no. 11 (part 71),p. 1689.

18. P. Pedersen, 1984, op. cit., p. 122.19. ibid., p. 99.20. ibid., p. 189.21. ibid., p. 12422. ibid., p. 104.23. G. Searle, op. cit., p. 364.24. Australian War Memorial, loc. cit.25. E. Andrews & B.G. Jordan, op. cit., p. 7.26. P. Pedersen, 1993, pp. 41-42. See also P.

Pedersen, 1984, p. 114.27. E. Andrews & B.G. Jordan, loc. cit.28. P. Pedersen, 1984, p. 117.29. P. Pedersen, 1993, p. 42.30. ibid.31. Australian Defence Force Publication, 1998,

ADFP 6, Operations, ed. 2, Defence PublishingService, Canberra, p. 1-1.

32. P. Pedersen, 1993, p. 40.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Andrews, E, & Jordan, B.G. 1991, “Hamel, winninga battle” in Journal of the Australian WarMemorial, Apr, pp. 5-12.

Australian Defence Force Publication, 1994, ADFP101, Glossary, ed. 1, Defence PublishingService, Canberra.

Australian Defence Force Publication, 1998, ADFP6, Operations, ed. 2, Defence PublishingService, Canberra.

Australian War Memorial, 2001, “1918 – Hamel”,[Online] Available http://www.awm.gov.au/-1918/battles/hamel.htm, retrieved 15 Feb.

Crumlin, J. 1990, “In the steps of the 4th Brigade” inJournal of the Australian War Memorial, Apr,pp. 39-43.

Dunnigan, J. & Masterson, D. 1997, The Way of theWarrior, Business Tactics and Techniques fromHistory’s Twelve Greatest Generals, St Martin’sGriffin, New York.

Falkus, M. 1976, “General Sir John Monash”, inCarver, M. (ed), The War Lords, Weidenfeld &Nicolson, London, pp. 134-144.

Pedersen, P. 1984, “General Sir John Monash: CorpsCommander on the Western Front”, in Horner,D.M. (ed), The Commanders, Allen & Unwin,Sydney, pp. 85-125.

Pedersen, P. 1993, “Master at Arms”, in TheAustralian Magazine, 1-8 Aug, pp. 40-42.

Prior, R. & Wilson, T. 1992, Command on theWestern Front – The Military Career of SirHenry Rawlinson, 1914-18, Blackwell, Oxford.

Serle, G. 1982, John Monash, A Biography,Melbourne University Press, Carlton.

“Sir John Monash – a great Australian general” inAustralia’s Heritage vol. 5, no. 11 (part 71), p.1688-1691.

Major Dominic Nicholl is a graduate of the Royal Military College, Duntroon and the Australian Command and StaffCourse. He holds a Master of Management Defence Studies and a Graduate Certificate in Management with aspecialisation in Marketing. Dominic’s service has included a range of regimental and staff and command postings inthe areas of health support, combat service support, personnel and capability development. He is currently the J075(Health Plans) at the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (Land).

40

E D I T E D B Y M A R K K . W E L L S

41

Reviews

AIR POWER: PROMISE AND REALITY byMark K. Wells, Imprint Publications

Reviewed by Group Captain Mark Lax

There can be no denying that air powerhas changed the nature of modern militarywarfare. Its influence was first felt beforeWorld War I when an Italian aircraft wasused to bomb waring factions during theirLibyan campaign in 1911, 2lb grenadesthough these bombs were. Air power wasused throughout World War I and offered thepromise of a quick and painless victory –above the mire and stench of death that wasthe trenches. So too did that other newinvention, the tank. Outrageous claims weremade between the wars about air power’sutility and an almost religious fervour bytheorists and politicians for this newtechnology added fuel. The arguments overair power’s promises and its record ondelivery have continued unabated ever since.The aerial bombing of British, German andJapanese cities between 1939 and 1945 mayhave helped win the war but did little to bringthe belligerents to their knees as wasexpected. Morale of the populace may havebeen battered, but they never besieged theirgovernments to sue for peace – the firstpromise of air power remained unfulfilled.Why then should this of all new weaponscreate such acrimony and at times, continueto do so? Part of the answer lies in the selling,part in the way air power was used in warand the subsequent legal constraints placedupon it, and part because everyone wanted toown it and use it for their own purpose.

This book is sure to contribute to thedebate. Air Power: Promise and Reality is anedited collection of essays compiled by ColonelMark Wells of the USAF Academy. The 16

independent papers present the historicaldevelopment of air power over the last 100years in convenient if perhaps unusual blocks;1903-1941, World War II, 1945-53, and theCold War and beyond. However, only the lastfive essays are new. The remainder firstappeared in 1978 as the USAF Academy’sAnnual History Symposium proceedings. TheUS Armed Services found these essays souseful for education, this updated collectionhas been released to ensure the study of airpower remains contemporary and relevant. Thecontributors are all world-renowned expertsand hail from several Air Forces, the US Armyand academia. The book is a small paperbackwith 318 pages of text without illustrations,however, it is well endnoted and indexed. I amsure it will make the USAF Chief’s reading listfor air power studies.

While the overall thrust considers theglobal implications of air power and itsapplication, the papers are worthy ofconsideration here in Australia even though wemay not be a world air power as such. Thelessons remain universal and we, as theprofession of arms, must understand the USway of war if we are to interoperatesuccessfully. Nevertheless, the papers alsopresent a very strong US-NATO centric view,particularly in the last section, but arguablybeing the world’s superpower gives them thatprerogative. While Australia may not be anAmerica or Britain, we too make best use ofthe air medium when and where we can. Forthose who enjoy the study of strategy and theapplication of military power, this publicationprovides a good collection of essays worthy offurther consideration.


AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS:PRINCIPLES, PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTSby Alan Hinge, Australian Defence StudiesCentre, Canberra, 2000, 303pp.

Reviewed by Wing Commander John Steinbach

Alan Hinge has longbeen involved withDefence and Australiandefence studies, longenough to gain insightinto the way Defenceoperates, in this case,preparing for the varied

missions the Government could assign.Recent experience had shown the ADF notalways up to the task, so improvepreparedness, something no one could reallydisagree with. Australian DefencePreparedness is a definitive and muchexpanded statement of what the ADF shouldbe doing to be trained to undertake a rangeof missions in a spectrum of contingencies.These range from “Invasion of Australia” atthe very serious end; through to “CoalitionOperations (war fighting)”, “Harassment ofshipping, fishing, or off-shore assets”, in themiddle; down to “Sanctions againstAustralia” and “Economic/PoliticalCompetition” at the low end. The author’sapproach is encapsulated in a term of hismaking, ROMINS, (with allusions to theJewish historian Flavius Josephus’sdescriptions of how the Roman Army trainedto achieve excellence), a syllabic acronym for“Repertoire of Missions”.

ROMINS is stood up as a new strategicpreparedness concept simpler than existingarrangements, yet systematic and affordable,and most importantly, mission-oriented, tosharpen the capabilities the ADF really needs.The book is an elaboration of how to achievethat, begun by asking three basic questions:preparedness for what, preparedness forwhen and preparedness of what. Looking foranswers takes us down a path to just about

everything that has gone wrong (andoccasionally right) in the last few years forthe ADF.

ROMINS has been around for a few yearsand was the subject of a symposiumorganised by the Australian Defence StudiesCentre (ADSC) on the subject. This bookbrings together in detail, all the arguments,rationale and justification for the propositionthat the right training will give the ADF theedge, and an analysis of what is the rightway to go about it. Hinge has presented hisideas at three levels: the one-minute nutshell,the one-hour overview and the one-weekbrimming whole. A User’s Guide suggests thebook is not for defence professionals, yetunavoidably it is. The stylistics are not forthe general reader (it’s more like an extendedstaff paper) whereas books written byAmericans criticising the US military or outto promote reform, such as J.G. Burton withThe Pentagon Wars, which the authorfrequently cites, generally are. I even got theimpression Hinge might have wanted toemulate Burton, because there is a need for acritique of Defence, preferably by a journalistwith the skills to enliven the tribulations atRussell Hill, in scope well beyond what thisnation’s major dailies’ defence reporters pushout once a month or so. (In fact, I cannotrecall any credible full-length exposé ofDefence’s troubles written by a journalist—readability being the essence, recentlypublished that parallels Burton’s book in anAustralian context.) With a bit of editingDefence Preparedness could have been thatbook, had it been a bit less polemical.Whether or not a treatise about preparednessneeded to revisit all the procurement cock-ups is also debatable. These have previouslybeen well documented elsewhere, even by theauthor’s colleagues at the ADSC, and apartfrom reinforcing the point of a much broadermalaise of which poor preparedness may beonly one symptom, do not support thegeneral thrust of the book. Whilst on editing,

REVIEWS 43

and this is not one of ADSC publishing’sstrengths, it is inexcusable to misspell aformer Defence Minister’s name repeatedly,and also come up with “psuedo-honest”(p.228).

Apart from all that, Hinge has writtenquite passionately about a concept ofrefreshing originality. Whether his claimstands up, that had Defence adoptedROMINS a few years ago, the East Timordeployment may have run more smoothly, isarguable.

One thing I liked about Preparedness wasthe many “lessons learnt” and “rules”peppered throughout. The list of invalidstrategic planning assumptions at p.153 ismy clear favourite, particularly the quip“Strategic Guidance guides”. Now well in thepost-DRP era, and with an increasinglyeffective system of governance introducedby Secretary Hawke, will Defence finallydeliver the level of preparedness expected inthe 2000 Defence White Paper? If not,ROMINS might be worth another look.

VIET NAM SHOTS by Gary McKay andElizabeth Stewart; Published by Allen andUnwin, 5 April 2002; 224 pp, 208 b & wphotographs, Hardcover, AUD$45.00.

Reviewed by Lieutenant Colonel Craig Johnston.

Viet Nam Shots is aphotographic coverage ofAustralia's involvementin the Viet Nam War, onthe battlefield and on thehome front, backed upby explanatory text andcaptions.

Thirty years after the last Australiantroops left Viet Nam, Viet Nam Shotsprovides a compelling and comprehensiveillustrated history of Australia's involvementin the war that divided a nation.

Featuring dramatic photographs, somenever before published, as well as detailed

text from one of Australia's leading writerson Viet Nam, this book covers all aspects ofthe war-from the battlefields to the homefront. These evocative and sometimesconfronting photographs portray the difficultconditions under which Australians servedand fought. And the images of moratoriums,the Welcome Parade and the unveiling of theViet Nam Forces Memorial also reflect thefeelings of everyday Australians in thiscontroversial and unpopular war.

Whilst some critics may consider this tobe McKay’s first venture into a more generalcoverage of Australia’s involvement in theViet Nam conflict, Viet Nam Shots continuesthis author’s portrayal of aspects of theconflict rarely found in Australian literature.McKay and Stewart have provided a uniqueinsight into a conflict often seen as divisive.They have selected a unique balance ofphotographs to portray Australianinvolvement, some rarely seen before andothers synonymous with the era.Accompanied by McKay’s compelling text,this book continues a first class series of “atthe coal-face” accounts of Australians at war.One of the most striking aspects of this bookis the significant effort that has gone intoproviding detailed captions for eachphotograph. Too often in military bookstoday the authors pay scant service torecording the details of the photographs theyselect to accompany their text.

Gary McKay’s second book VietnamFragments (re-released as Bullets, Beans &

Bandages) is still the largest and by allaccounts the most significant oral history ofthe Viet Nam War to be found in thesouthern hemisphere. Viet Nam Shots is alogical next-step for this author by taking theoral history medium into a pictorial regime.


ONE WAY FLIGHT TO MUNICH byAssheton F. Taylor in soft attractive colourof 270 pp plus general index and namesindex and available from The War BookShop, 13 Veronica Place, LOFTUS, 2332.Price $33.00 including postage.Reviewed by Flight Lieutenant H.S. Brennan(Retd).

This book is virtually the personalService history of the author who, after ashort spell in the Sydney UniversityRegiment, joined the RAAF and trained bothhere in Australia and England as aNavigator. His style of writing does notleave very much for the reader to imagine.Each section of the book is written in greatdetail from the time they left Australia byship and travelled across to Fremantle andon to South Africa. At this stage thetransport by ship was so poor that all themembers of the RAAF and others weretransferred to something better for their lastleg to England.

While being attached to various TrainingSchools it would appear that members ofthe RAAF could move about when on leave.In this way they met various civilianresidents who were only too pleased toshow the “Aussies” just what it was like inEngland during the war despite thedestruction of towns and buildings due toGerman air raids and the consequent loss oflife among residents.

After considerable training as individualmembers of bomber crews training becamemore specialised and the group of which theauthor was a member was transferred to 460RAAF Squadron flying Lancaster Bombers.It was on their first operational flight thattheir plane was shot down, hence the title ofthis book. They were fortunate to only losethe rear gunner who was trapped in theaircraft, the rest of the crew were takenprisoner by the Germans and afterconsiderable interrogation, were transferredto Stalag IVb, a POW Camp which at this

stage of the war contained not only Britishand Australians, but quite a lot of Russians.

The British and Australians managed tomaintain quite a high level of morale andwere largely responsible for their ownwelfare and entertainment. At infrequentintervals the POW’s received food parcelsfrom the Red Cross which helpedsupplement basic rations. It was not untilthe Americans took over the camp that foodwas always short.

On cessation of hostilities the RAAFmembers were initially returned to Englandand finally shipped to Australia via thePanama Canal and New Zealand. The bookcontains so much detail that it was difficultto condense for this review. I enjoyedreading about the exploits of the author andhis friends but it is not an easy read,however that may be the coming pattern,masses of detail but quite enjoyable. A wordof advice should you purchase the book,seek a quiet place to fully comprehend theauthor’s adventures.

BEHIND ENEMY LINES by TerryO’Farrell, Allen & Unwin 2001; 250pages; soft cover; photos; index; RRP$29.95Reviewed by Lex McAulay

This is another in thecontinuing contribution byAustralian publishers Allen& Unwin in placing onrecord Australian militaryhistory in a format readilyavailable to the public. Inthis instance, it is an

account by Terry O’Farrell of his Army careerfrom 1966 to 2001, much of it in the SASR orCommandos.

This is one of the all too few personalaccounts by Australians, regardless of rank,of their experiences and feelings in militaryservice in peace and war. One refreshingaspect of this book is that the author admits

REVIEWS 45

that in the SAS things did not always go asplanned, some people did not alwaysperform up to the expected standard, andthat mistakes were made. This is far morehonest than the unmarked-stainless-steelexterior, always-gold-medal-winning imageprojected by some other members of SASR –and other units, of course.

Terry O’Farrell also shows that someopinions of youth beloved of certain people inour society do not always apply. He had aless than happy childhood, narrowly escapedbeing murdered, spent time in a cheerlessorphanage, was not a good student, was aproduct of a broken home, and probablywould have been assumed to be headed for alife as an uneducated layabout and pettycriminal. But, sadly for the social workersand counsellors who plague the Westerndemocracies in these times, as soon as he wasold enough, he joined the Army and steadilyadvanced on merit through the ranks, endinghis service as a Major, with five overseasdeployments.

Private O’Farrell, not yet having joined abattalion, was called for an interview, much tohis mystification, and found it was forsomething called the Special Air Service, ofwhich he knew nothing, and later realised thathis name had been put on the orderly room listas a joke by a mate. So started a 35-yearcareer as a soldier, instructor and officer.

Terry O’Farrell writes simply and in theeasy to read style of, as he put it, “in a bar,perhaps with a few beers under the belt”. Thismakes for a flowing read and the pages go byunnoticed as we follow O’Farrell throughtraining, selection, training and operations,with service with some Allies thrown in. Ihave to say that I do not recall the constantabuse and swearing directed at recruits andtrainees which apparently was inflicted on theyoung O’Farrell. The SAS operations are welldescribed and give a clear image of the life andtimes of a member of a patrol at two stages ofthe war in Vietnam, 1968 and 1971. There is

little about the wider scene at troop, squadronor task force, but O’Farrell is writing at apersonal level.

This is a book that will sit well alongsidethose earlier accounts of the SAS by DavidHorner and Gary McKay and is well worth theprice.

THE STRATEGISTS by Hugh Smith (ed)published by Australian Defence StudiesCentreReviewed by Group Captain Mark Lax

How many StaffCollege students have hadto wade throughnumerous tomes to createa 20 minute presentationon a hitherto obscurestrategist from the annalsof history? How many

others wished there was a neat introduction tothe subject with enough intellectual rigor tomeet the needs of a serious researcher? If youhave had to rely on Parret’s Makers of ModernStrategy and found it heavy going, then thisbook may prove a Godsend. As its titlewould suggest, it is an introduction to themajor strategists divided into theirconventionally organised schools of thought –Classical, Modern (including theRevolutionary), and Contemporary. The lattersection also includes a chapter on the RMA.Rounding off the publication are anintroduction and an interesting conclusion byMartin van Creveld.

Hugh Smith introduces the subject asking:what is strategy? And why study what hasgone before? He attempts to place the subjectin broad context and introduces the mainstrategic streams, which later appear inessentially a chronological order. Strategy, hestates, “grew out of a single land construct”and is a “supremely practical activity”. It istherefore worthy of study by all professionalmilitary officer – no doubt the prime targetof this work.


Smith asserts the strategists are like “dramacritics” – they are troublesome characters thatbuck the system. They are proselytisers; theyoffer new and sometimes radical perspectiveson war. Those covered in later chapters areexample of this pronouncement. TheStrategists worthy of inclusion are a dozen orso in number. Sun Zi (deferring to the closerphonetic spelling of the more common “SunTsu”) and Clausewitz appear from the Classicalworld. The Moderns are the Maritimestrategists Mahan and Corbett, Fuller andLiddell Hart, Douhet and Mao. Contemporaryare the rising nuclear strategists (Brodie, Khan)and there are several who now preach theRMA.

The chapter on the nuclear strategists ispleasingly current – President George W.Bush’s National Missile Defence program beingthe latest move in this complex chess game.Paul Kal, the author of this chapter, arguesalthough the Cold War was won, nuclearstrategy and its inherent concept of deterrencehas continuing application. We cannot“unlearn” how to construct nuclear weapons,yet we are now faced the ultimate strategicdilemma – keep or dispose? What aboutproliferation? And how do we consider theother weapons of mass destruction? Allvexing issues.

The final chapter examines the Revolutionin Military Affairs or RMA. Steven Metz isforced to ask: is it a revolution or anevolution? Has warfare really changed or hastechnology made stealth, precision andlethality the more expedient means? Thegrowing number of RMA proponents nowinclude Lutwak, the Tofflers, Mazerr,Krepinevich and Libiki to name the moreprominent – notably, all are American. Havethings changed or is the RMA a newbandwagon? Readers will have to make uptheir own minds on this one, but where do wego from here? What of strategy post-ColdWar? Is terrorism a strategy? If the RMA

offers “war without fighting”, how do wedefine victory? What strategic theories comenext?

I do not intend to summarise the book’scontents further, nor consider the ideas eachstrategist developed, suffice to say that some ofthe more prominent and widely recognisedstrategic thinkers have been omitted – Jominiand Machiavelli are barely mentioned. VonMoltke, Trenchard and Mitchell and theirindependent thinking are not discussed at all.

Van Creveld’s endnote is not surprisingly acounter view about the relevance and nature ofstrategy. He is somewhat provocative anddeclares conventional strategy has “made noprogress and undergone no radical change”since 1945. Even the so-called RMA offersonly new ways of integrating new technologyand advanced weapons, and only strategicthough on the nuclear option continues todevelop. According to van Creveld, it is timeto go back to the drawing board if strategicstudies are to progress. He may well be right.Recommended.

D-DAY 1944: VOICES FROMNORMANDY by Robin Neillands andRoderick De Normann, published byCassell & Co. London: Price $19.95

Reviewed by Dr Hank Prunckun

D-Day 1944 is a bookabout the military eventsthat took place on thathistoric day almost sixtyyears ago – 6 June 1944– from the point of viewof the troops that “hit thebeach.”

The D-Day invasion isstill intensely interesting

despite occurring so long ago. Whether this isbecause readers had family or friends whofought along the French coast, or purely froman academic point of view – analysing thestrategy and logistics of mounting such a

REVIEWS 47

massive air and sea operation. So, it was withgreat expectation that I reviewed this book.

However, I found the book somewhatdisappointing but recommended it with acouple of caveats. As I rarely find myself inthis situation, I feel uncomfortable having tomake this finding. Nevertheless, after severalexaminations of the book I have come to thesame conclusion. I will be honest and outlinemy reasons, which are two-fold; firstly,because of the poor quality of the book’sphysical presentation; and the second, from thepresentation of the intellectual material by theauthors. Each of these points needs elaborationand I will start with the book’s appearance.

This is a re-release of Neillands and DeNormann’s first edition, which was publishedin 1993 by Weidenfeld & Nicholson, inhardbound format. This is however a softcoverversion published by Cassell MilitaryPaperbacks. Generally, I find softcover booksless attractive than hardbound versionsanyway, but I found this one particularlyuninspiring. It is a well-known fact thatpaperbacks are less expensive to produce thantheir hardcover cousins and therefore are moreaffordable to a majority of readers. However,some softcover publishers recognise thatdurability and robustness of a book’s bindingsuffers, and to compensate for this, they useother techniques to offset this draw back. Butsadly, this book did not receive this treatment.

As there is a direct relationship between theusefulness of the book’s intellectual contentand the way a book is bound, one would havethought that this would have been aconsideration before Cassell & Co went toprint. For instance, if a book is prone to haveits pages fall out because they were glued inrather than sewn in “signatures” and over timethe paper fades, yellows or becomes brittlebecause it is of inferior stock, it will be of littlevalue to a reader no matter how cheap its retailprice. This is what my view is of D-Day 1944.It presents as an inexpensive paperback,printed on an inferior paper stock and bound

in a very rudimentary way that will notwithstand the demands of a researcher,student, lecturer or library collection.

Secondly, I found the presentation of what Iexpected to be an astonishing collection ofVoices from Normandy below par. Unlike TomBrokaw’s wonderful collection of cameos aboutthe Second World War (The GreatestGeneration, New York: Random House, 1998)Neillands and De Dormann have fallen short ofthe mark. What they call “voices” are in factshort quotation by a (large) number ofparticipants of the invasion. On the surface onewould have to say, “so what’s wrong withthat?” And I agree. Nothing. But mydisappointment is in the way the authorsbrought these quotations together; it leaves thereader (this reader anyway) with a feeling thatthey were trying, with some difficulty, to createthe impression that their story had authenticity.For example I estimate on average there areabout three or four paragraphs to a page and ineach of these pages a reader will find referencesto around three or four (sometimes more)people who give short accounts (several lines toa few paragraphs) of their observations offeelings on the day. The effect of this is not todemonstrate that the authors have written froma position of authority (clearly they have), butthat they were lacking the confidence to write ahistory of the events without referring to thesource.

Compare Brokaw’s account of the War(including the Normandy invasion) to Neillandsand De Normann’s D-Day 1944 and one sees acompletely different picture. Brokaw’s use ofeyewitnesses was to talk at some length abouteach of them, and the historical events, in shortchapters – not a paragraph or two. Therefore,the choice of the subtitle, Voices fromNormandy, is a debatable point; I see D-Day1944 more as an historical account (using thestories of those who were there to add weight tothe account) rather than the personal accountsof the participants as Brokaw has.


In fairness to Neillands and Normann, theymay have inadvertently created thisexpectation by selecting this particular subtitle.Perhaps renaming the book might haveovercome the problem, but the issue ofchopping from one person’s recollection toanother’s so often, in my view, would remain.Having said that, one cannot dispute the factthat there is a wealth of interesting personalaccounts interspersed amongst the historicaldetail, but in either case (“voices” v history),the presentation form does not do the subjectjustice.

These are my chief concerns in making awholehearted recommendation. Nevertheless,as critical as my assessment might appear, Ineed to balance what I’ve said by pointing outthe good aspect of the book, and there areseveral. For example, the book is clearly theresult of years of painstaking work andresearch by two accomplished authors(Neillands has written eight military relatedtexts and De Normann has written two others).Hundreds of personal interviews took place inorder to deliver the rich anecdotal informationcontained in D-Day 1944.

As I have stated above, there is a richnessof information that the contributors haveshared with the reader. It captures details that

would have otherwise been lost with theeventual passing of these valiant warriors –people I believe the world still owes so much.As testimony to the hard work of the authors,there is an acknowledgement list that spans anumber of pages listing hundreds ofinterviewees. The book contains numerousmaps of the invasion, and these are first-class.There are also a number of pages containingphotographs of the invasion and of those whotook part – excellent. Finally, from a practicalpoint of view, there is a useful bibliography atthe end as well as a very handy subject index.

Overall, Niellands and De Normann’s bookD-Day 1944 is an above average book writtenby two talented authors, and as such, I wouldhave expected them to deliver far more.Unfortunately, it is presented in a softcoverbinding by the publisher which greatly detractsfrom the usefulness of the books’ intellectualcontent. Given these (correctable) drawbacks, Ifound it disappointing that so much work wentinto what could have been a sterling referencebook.

Regardless, I recommend the book as it hassome redeeming content.

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