Defence and Security of India - Dec 2012 issue

DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIA

DSIDECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 2 • ` 250

NEW LOOKINDIAN NAVY WITH FIVE SHIPS BEING DELIVERED ANNUALLY TO THE NAVY TILL 2020, THE FORCE SEEMS TO HAVE SETUP A SCORCHING PACE, WRITES VICE ADMIRAL (RETD.) ANUP SINGH

NETWORK CENTRICITYBATTLEFIELD OF 21ST CENTURYBattlefi eld Management System lifts the ‘fog of war’ to a signifi cant extent. | SHANKAR RAJAGOPALAN

CYBER WARFARE CHINA’S NEW ACUPUNCTURE WARFAREA new dimension of warfare has opened up in thecyber space | BRIG. (RETD.) GURMEET KANWAL

cover2nd time.indd 1cover2nd time.indd 1 03/01/13 10:00 AM03/01/13 10:00 AM

DECEMBER 2012

01

DSI

LETTER FROM THE

Pinaki Bhattacharya

editor

For the last three months, since the middle of September, the second sail ship of the Indian Navy, INS Sudarshini have been on a voyage to cement relationships and make new friends. For the fi rst time, the Indian government has explicitly and overtly used the Navy for what diplomats’ consider their own domain. Last month, was also when the Indian Navy turned 65 years since its inception as “Indian,” after independence. This is a Navy, once a fl edgling brown water tribune, now raising showers of surf as a blue water warrior. As the Defence Minister, AK Antony announced recently in Parliament, from now till 2020, the force would add fi ve ships of different classes every year. These include three aircraft carriers and at least a couple of nuclear energy propelled nuclear warhead carrying submarines. This is also a Navy that is seeking to make the Indian Ocean live up to its name in real terms. This is also a Navy that patrols the waters in the coast of East Africa right up to the Gulf of Aden, to deter the scourge of piracy that threatens the mercantile interests of the trading nations. It does not guard just the Indian fl agged ships, but have actually undertaken more voyages for foreign fl agged ships to carry their cargo safely.

Two frigates of the Indian Navy alternately have been deployed permanently for this task. Clearly, their presence is having an impact, for the pirates, who had approached up to the 400 nautical miles of the Indian western coast on the Arabian Sea, have quickly gone back to the Somali waters. The Obama Administration is now urging the Indian government to let its Navy go further afi eld. Though Manmohan Singh government has shown some reticence on the issue, the US Administration’s calls have left a fairly deep imprint on the minds the Naval planners. In a conversation last week, a senior Naval offi cial told me that India could actually infl uence events at least in the Indian Ocean Rim by its ‘soft power’ elements of democracy, multi-culturism and maritime practices. Excepting, Indians had been loathe for long exporting democracy! New Delhi had told George W. Bush that, when he wanted the same out of India.

The Obama Administration is now urging the Indian government to let its Navy go further afi eld.

LETTER FROM EDITOR2nd time.indd 1LETTER FROM EDITOR2nd time.indd 1 03/01/13 10:07 AM03/01/13 10:07 AM

DECEMBER 2012

02 03

DSI

COVER STORY � 06 C

ON

TE

NT

S NEW LOOK INDIAN NAVY With fi ve ships being delivered to the Navy till 2020, the force seems to have set up a scorching pace. With that in mind, this article tells us how the tranformation is going to take place.

NETWORK CENTRICITY � 12

ANTI PIRACY � 30CYBER WARFARE � 24

CRISIS IN ARMY � 36

SHIPYARDS’ TURMOIL � 18

NEWS � 42

Battlefi eld Management System lifts the ‘fog of war’ to a signifi cant extent. This empowers the commanders in the rear to take strategic decisions and communicate them in real time, while the tactical commanders translate them at the tactical level.

The crisis of the Eastern African countries spilling on to the Indian Ocean created a major crisis for international trade and communication. India was dragged into play - not unwillingly - into keeping the high seas safe.

In the recent past, the world has seen three major examples of information technology being deployed as weapons of War. Though most of those cyber attacks originated in the USA and Israel, this article argues the 800 pound gorilla is China

Indian shipyards are full up on their order books. But are they ready to deliver on schedule and at cost? Not many are convinced they can.

India is the current hot favourite in the armaments trade lexicon. The country plans to spend at least $ 150 billion in war materiel, from now till th next decade.

NETWORKED BATTLEFIELD OF21ST CENTURY

SECURING THE SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATIONS

CHINA’S NEW ACUPUNCTURE WARFARE

OFFICERS FOR THEINDIAN ARMY:WHERE ARE THEY

INDIAN SHIPYARDS:DISTRESS AMONGLIMITED GAINS

DEFENCE BUZZ

With 2,100 offi cers required to be inducted into the Army for it to maintain its current 46,600 level of offi cers.

contents2nd time.indd 1-2contents2nd time.indd 1-2 03/01/13 10:15 AM03/01/13 10:15 AM

COMMANDERSARABJIT SINGH PARMAR

Sarabjit Singh Parmar, is an alumnus of National Defence

Academy (NDA) Kharakwasla and Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) Wellington

he was commissioned into the Indian Navy in 1987. The

offi cer is a Naval Aviator who fl ies helicopters. He has

commanded two ships and a frontline Indian Naval Air

Squadron. He has served as Joint Director Naval Plans

at the Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy) and also been Directing Staff at Defence

Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington. He was

member of the XI Indian antarctic Summer Expedition

in 1991.

VICE ADMIRAL (RETD) ANUP SINGH,

Anup Singh, served the Indian Navy till October 2011 during which he commanded

four Indian Naval warships. He was the Sailing Master

of the fi rst ever square-rigged Sail Training Vessel

in India, named ‘Varuna’, during 1980-82. He also

skippered the Naval Yacht ‘Samudra’ for her Pacifi c

crossing during the Tri Service round-the-world

voyage in 1989. He has also served as Director of

Naval Plans and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff in his

career. On his last sea going appointment he served as ‘Flag offi cer commanding

Western Fleet’ where he led operation Sukoon, the

evacuation of civilians from war-torn Lebanon in

July 2006. He also served as Flag Offi cer, Commanding-

in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command in last two

years of his career. He is a keen sportsman and an

adventurer.

BRIG (RETD)GURMEET KANWAL

DR LAXMAN KUMARBEHERA

Dr Laxman Kumar Behera, is a Research Fellow at

New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and

Analyses (IDSA), a premier think tank under India’s

Ministry of Defence (MoD). As a member of the IDSA’s

Cluster of Defence Economics and Industry, Dr Behera

has vertical specialisation on issues related to Arms

Procurement, Offsets, Defence Industry, Military Spending,

and Defence Cooperation. He was closely associated with

two high-level committees set up by Indian MoD on Defence

Acquisition and Defence Expenditure. Recently, he was the Consultant to the

Task Force on self-reliance and defence modernisation constituted by the National

Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), Government of India.

BRIGADIER (RETD)SK CHATTERJEE

SK Chatterjee, commanded a Brigade in deserts and also in areas with active

insurgency which was followed by handling the Army’s media

engagement operations. He has a written a book called

Vintage Guns of India, a Macmillan publication, which

is to be published and includes a chapter named Encyclopedia

of Indian Army. He headed the Corporate Social

Responsibility and Media Communication functions of a corporate group and has over

150 articles in various national and international newspapers

and journals to his credit.

RAJGOPALAN SHANKAR

Rajgopalan Shankar, An experienced scientist with a

consistent proven track record of successes in the R&D projects

for the Indian Armed Forces. He is also credited for formulation

of ‘National Mission for the Development of 1500 HP engine’,

defi ning of specs for the most compact & complex high specifi c

output engine for the Armoured Fighting Vehicles. He was involved

in the successful Development of AKASH (ground to air missile

system) missile vehicle which was based on tank T-72 aggregates. He was the Project Director for the Advanced Vehicle Electrical

Systems for MBT Arjun with embedded systems control.

CONTRIBUTORS DECEMBER 2012


EDITORPinaki BhattacharyaCREATIVE DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNERArijit Das ChoudhurySENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal Mehta (E-Mail: [email protected])DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETINGTarun Malviya (E-Mail: [email protected])SALES & MARKETING COORDINATORAtul Bali (E-Mail: [email protected])CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONSunil GujralPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMANJ. S. UberoiPRESIDENTXavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESFrance/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected] Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Latd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected]

Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited. Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and Printed at Aegean Offset Printers, 220B, Udyog Kendra - 1, Greater Noida (UP)-201306. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

DECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of India is obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact: [email protected]

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.htmlhttp://www.defencesecurityindia.com

DSI

Gurmeet Kanwal, has recently laid down offi ce as a director, Centre for Land

Warfare Studies, a think tank devoted to the Army.

He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation

Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-2003. A soldier

scholar, he has extensive work on the Indian nuclear

programme, authoring several books including Indian Army:

Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal.

He is a well-known columnist, besides being a well-known analyst on national security

issues.

contributors2nd time.indd 1-2contributors2nd time.indd 1-2 04/01/13 1:32 PM04/01/13 1:32 PM

COMMANDERSARABJIT SINGH PARMAR

Sarabjit Singh Parmar, is an alumnus of National Defence

Academy (NDA) Kharakwasla and Defence Services Staff College (DSSC) Wellington

he was commissioned into the Indian Navy in 1987. The

offi cer is a Naval Aviator who fl ies helicopters. He has

commanded two ships and a frontline Indian Naval Air

Squadron. He has served as Joint Director Naval Plans

at the Integrated HQ of MoD (Navy) and also been Directing Staff at Defence

Services Staff College (DSSC), Wellington. He was

member of the XI Indian antarctic Summer Expedition

in 1991.

VICE ADMIRAL (RETD) ANUP SINGH,

Anup Singh, served the Indian Navy till October 2011 during which he commanded

four Indian Naval warships. He was the Sailing Master

of the fi rst ever square-rigged Sail Training Vessel

in India, named ‘Varuna’, during 1980-82. He also

skippered the Naval Yacht ‘Samudra’ for her Pacifi c

crossing during the Tri Service round-the-world

voyage in 1989. He has also served as Director of

Naval Plans and Deputy Chief of Naval Staff in his

career. On his last sea going appointment he served as ‘Flag offi cer commanding

Western Fleet’ where he led operation Sukoon, the

evacuation of civilians from war-torn Lebanon in

July 2006. He also served as Flag Offi cer, Commanding-

in-Chief, Eastern Naval Command in last two

years of his career. He is a keen sportsman and an

adventurer.

BRIG (RETD)GURMEET KANWAL

DR LAXMAN KUMARBEHERA

Dr Laxman Kumar Behera, is a Research Fellow at

New Delhi-based Institute for Defence Studies and

Analyses (IDSA), a premier think tank under India’s

Ministry of Defence (MoD). As a member of the IDSA’s

Cluster of Defence Economics and Industry, Dr Behera

has vertical specialisation on issues related to Arms

Procurement, Offsets, Defence Industry, Military Spending,

and Defence Cooperation. He was closely associated with

two high-level committees set up by Indian MoD on Defence

Acquisition and Defence Expenditure. Recently, he was the Consultant to the

Task Force on self-reliance and defence modernisation constituted by the National

Security Council Secretariat (NSCS), Government of India.

BRIGADIER (RETD)SK CHATTERJEE

SK Chatterjee, commanded a Brigade in deserts and also in areas with active

insurgency which was followed by handling the Army’s media

engagement operations. He has a written a book called

Vintage Guns of India, a Macmillan publication, which

is to be published and includes a chapter named Encyclopedia

of Indian Army. He headed the Corporate Social

Responsibility and Media Communication functions of a corporate group and has over

150 articles in various national and international newspapers

and journals to his credit.

RAJGOPALAN SHANKAR

Rajgopalan Shankar, An experienced scientist with a

consistent proven track record of successes in the R&D projects

for the Indian Armed Forces. He is also credited for formulation

of ‘National Mission for the Development of 1500 HP engine’,

defi ning of specs for the most compact & complex high specifi c

output engine for the Armoured Fighting Vehicles. He was involved

in the successful Development of AKASH (ground to air missile

system) missile vehicle which was based on tank T-72 aggregates. He was the Project Director for the Advanced Vehicle Electrical

Systems for MBT Arjun with embedded systems control.

CONTRIBUTORS DECEMBER 2012


EDITORPinaki BhattacharyaCREATIVE DIRECTORBipin KumarDESIGNERArijit Das ChoudhurySENIOR MANAGER INTERNATIONAL MARKETINGVishal Mehta (E-Mail: [email protected])DEPUTY MANAGER MARKETINGTarun Malviya (E-Mail: [email protected])SALES & MARKETING COORDINATORAtul Bali (E-Mail: [email protected])CIRCULATION & DISTRIBUTIONSunil GujralPRODUCTION & PRE-PRESSSunil Dubey, Ritesh Roy, Devender Pandey MTC PUBLISHING LIMITED323, Udyog Vihar, Ph-IV, Gurgaon 122016Ph: +91 0124-4759500 Fax: +91 0124-4759550 CHAIRMANJ. S. UberoiPRESIDENTXavier Collaco FINANCIAL CONTROLLERPuneet Nanda

GLOBAL SALES REPRESENTATIVESFrance/SpainStephane de Remusat, REM InternationalTel: (33) 5 3427 0130Email: [email protected]/Austria/Switzerland/Italy/UKSam Baird, Whitehill MediaTel: (44-1883) 715 697 Mobile: (44-7770) 237 646E-Mail: [email protected] Heiblum, Oreet - International MediaTel: (97 2) 3 570 6527Email: [email protected] Butova, NOVO-Media Latd,Tel/Fax : (7 3832) 180 885 Mobile : (7 960) 783 6653Email :[email protected]/Benelux/South AfricaTony Kingham, KNM MediaTel: (44) 20 8144 5934 Mobile: (44) 7827 297 465E-Mail: [email protected] KoreaYoung Seoh Chinn, Jes Media Inc.Tel: (82-2) 481 3411/13E-Mail: [email protected] (East/South East)/CanadaMargie Brown, Margie Brown & Associates.Tel : (+1 540) 341 7581Email :[email protected] (West/South West)/BrazilDiane Obright, Blackrock Media Inc.Tel: +1 (858) 759 3557Email: [email protected]

Defence and Security of India is published and printed by Xavier Collaco on behalf of MTC Publishing Limited. Published at 323, Udyog Vihar, Ph- IV, Gurgaon 122016 and Printed at Aegean Offset Printers, 220B, Udyog Kendra - 1, Greater Noida (UP)-201306. Entire contents Copyright © 2008. All rights reserved. Reproduction and translation in any language in whole or in part without permission is prohibited. Requests for permission should be directed to MTC Publishing Limited. Opinions carried in the magazine are those of the writers’ and do not necessarily refl ect those of the editors or publishers. While the editors do their utmost to verify information published they do not accept responsibility for its absolute accuracy.The publisher assumes no responsibility for the return of unsolicited material or for material lost or damaged in transit. All correspondence should be addressed to MTC Publishing Limited.

DECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 5, NUMBER 2

SUBSCRIPTION INFORMATIONDefence and Security of India is obtained by subscription. For subscription enquiries, please contact: [email protected]

www.mediatransasia.in/defence.htmlhttp://www.defencesecurityindia.com

DSI

Gurmeet Kanwal, has recently laid down offi ce as a director, Centre for Land

Warfare Studies, a think tank devoted to the Army.

He commanded an infantry brigade during Operation

Parakram on the Line of Control in 2001-2003. A soldier

scholar, he has extensive work on the Indian nuclear

programme, authoring several books including Indian Army:

Vision 2020 and Nuclear Defence: Shaping the Arsenal.

He is a well-known columnist, besides being a well-known analyst on national security

issues.

contributors2nd time.indd 1-2contributors2nd time.indd 1-2 04/01/13 1:32 PM04/01/13 1:32 PM

MODERNAISATION

6

DECEMBER 2012

7

DSI

NEW LOOK IND IAN NAV Y

KEY POINTS � From modest beginnings of 30 odd ships of “poor architecture,” the Indian Navy is well into its role of a blue water that can often go on expeditions.

� Of a total of 44 ships on order, 42 of them are with Indian shipyards.

� India is on its way to vindicating the fact that it is a major power by modernising its armed forces, of which Navy is prime.

Anup Singh

With fi ve ships being delivered annually to the Navy till 2020, the force seems to have set up a scorching pace. With that in mind, this article tells us how the tranformation is going to take place.

Navies are known and proven to be effective instruments of state policy. They can be used to protect vital interests in the near

and far areas. They are used for bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. They are routinely used for diplomatic missions. They are most suited as fi rst responders in disasters, contingencies at home or

abroad and of course, for power projection. These attributes are over and above the fundamental roles of a Navy in protection of trade and territory. To ensure adequate capacities for these roles --- all of which are treated as basic roles --- a Navy must be contemporary and possess a ‘balanced’ fl eet.

From 1830 when it was fi rst constituted as “The Indian Navy”, the Service went

through a series of labels as: “Her Majesty’s Indian Navy”, “The Bombay Marine” (a title used in the early 17th century as well), “Her Majesty’s Indian Marine”, “The Royal Indian Marine”, “The Royal Indian Navy” and back to “The Indian Navy” on proclamation of Republic in 1950. With independence three years earlier, had come the painful division of the fl eet. India’s share, a motley bunch of

33 ships had an unimpressive architecture, comprising two frigates, four sloops, a Hydrographic survey vessel, a corvette and a score plus minesweepers/ harbor defence launches etc. This was nowhere near a fl otilla much less a potent maritime force. For a maritime nation with a prominent peninsular geography and island-chains on both fl anks, even basic functions of

maritime security and trade protection was not possible for that maritime force, with a handful of antiquities in its inventory.

To start with, credit must be given to the foresight of independent India’s very fi rst naval hierarchy whose fi rst Plan Paper had defi ned the need for not only a larger fl eet but also larger ships with the primary roles being protection of trade, ports and the

coast from interference by an enemy, and, support of the Army in any operation. The paper determined a force of two light aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines apart from some smaller ships essential for mundane tasks including training. It laid particular emphasis on the induction ofair and sub-surface (submarine) platforms. It also suggested such a force to be raised within a span of 10 years! The HMIS Delhi (later named INS Delhi), was the fi rst cruiser to be inducted under the plan, in 1948. Between 1948 and 1949, the Delhi was followed,in quick succession, by an amphibious ship Magar and three destroyers Rajput, Rana, Ranjit. A couple of frigates and the carrier Vikrant followed a decade later. But the entire plan never got implemented mainly due to a continental (land frontier) focus of the country. The next push came after the ’62 war when the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (1964) approved a force level of 138 ships. That fi gure, as a matter of record, has not been accomplished so far, unless the current fi gure of submarines is added to the existing number of ships.

Having missed the Industrial Revolution, being short on economic health till the late 90s and having been a victim of the “denial” regime for years, it was an uphill task to raise a proper force structure in India’s nascent years. The Navy’s current strength of 136 ships, 15 submarines, 216 aircraft and steadily expanding support infrastructure may seem impressive for a regional power; but it is never mere numbers that announce potential. What is of essence is capability which always hinges on technology and age. An important factor that remains submerged in force strength is the struggle to beat the rate of ‘attrition by age’ and succeed in growth rate (number of platforms). This struggle has its origins in the poor decade of the 90s. In the wake of the economic crisis of the late eighties, all approved projects suffered a serious setback and a full decade’s loss led to a cascade of repercussions. The fi rst of these were a huge void in the following decades as ships at the cusp of retirement had to be put through peripheral upgrades; those on the drawing board were returned to the closet; and those

To start with, credit must be given to the foresight

of independent Indiaʼs very fi rst naval hierarchy

whose fi rst Plan Paper had defi ned the need for

not only a larger fl eet but also larger ships with the

primary rolesbeing protection of

trade, ports and the coast from interference by an enemy, and, sup-

port of the Army i any operation. The

paper determined a force of two light aircraft

carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four

submarines

AFP

A warship being built at anIndian shipyard

06 07

Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 6-7Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 6-7 03/01/13 10:32 AM03/01/13 10:32 AM

MODERNAISATION

6

DECEMBER 2012

7

DSI

NEW LOOK IND IAN NAV Y

KEY POINTS � From modest beginnings of 30 odd ships of “poor architecture,” the Indian Navy is well into its role of a blue water that can often go on expeditions.

� Of a total of 44 ships on order, 42 of them are with Indian shipyards.

� India is on its way to vindicating the fact that it is a major power by modernising its armed forces, of which Navy is prime.

Anup Singh

With fi ve ships being delivered annually to the Navy till 2020, the force seems to have set up a scorching pace. With that in mind, this article tells us how the tranformation is going to take place.

Navies are known and proven to be effective instruments of state policy. They can be used to protect vital interests in the near

and far areas. They are used for bilateral and multilateral defence cooperation. They are routinely used for diplomatic missions. They are most suited as fi rst responders in disasters, contingencies at home or

abroad and of course, for power projection. These attributes are over and above the fundamental roles of a Navy in protection of trade and territory. To ensure adequate capacities for these roles --- all of which are treated as basic roles --- a Navy must be contemporary and possess a ‘balanced’ fl eet.

From 1830 when it was fi rst constituted as “The Indian Navy”, the Service went

through a series of labels as: “Her Majesty’s Indian Navy”, “The Bombay Marine” (a title used in the early 17th century as well), “Her Majesty’s Indian Marine”, “The Royal Indian Marine”, “The Royal Indian Navy” and back to “The Indian Navy” on proclamation of Republic in 1950. With independence three years earlier, had come the painful division of the fl eet. India’s share, a motley bunch of

33 ships had an unimpressive architecture, comprising two frigates, four sloops, a Hydrographic survey vessel, a corvette and a score plus minesweepers/ harbor defence launches etc. This was nowhere near a fl otilla much less a potent maritime force. For a maritime nation with a prominent peninsular geography and island-chains on both fl anks, even basic functions of

maritime security and trade protection was not possible for that maritime force, with a handful of antiquities in its inventory.

To start with, credit must be given to the foresight of independent India’s very fi rst naval hierarchy whose fi rst Plan Paper had defi ned the need for not only a larger fl eet but also larger ships with the primary roles being protection of trade, ports and the

coast from interference by an enemy, and, support of the Army in any operation. The paper determined a force of two light aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four submarines apart from some smaller ships essential for mundane tasks including training. It laid particular emphasis on the induction ofair and sub-surface (submarine) platforms. It also suggested such a force to be raised within a span of 10 years! The HMIS Delhi (later named INS Delhi), was the fi rst cruiser to be inducted under the plan, in 1948. Between 1948 and 1949, the Delhi was followed,in quick succession, by an amphibious ship Magar and three destroyers Rajput, Rana, Ranjit. A couple of frigates and the carrier Vikrant followed a decade later. But the entire plan never got implemented mainly due to a continental (land frontier) focus of the country. The next push came after the ’62 war when the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet (1964) approved a force level of 138 ships. That fi gure, as a matter of record, has not been accomplished so far, unless the current fi gure of submarines is added to the existing number of ships.

Having missed the Industrial Revolution, being short on economic health till the late 90s and having been a victim of the “denial” regime for years, it was an uphill task to raise a proper force structure in India’s nascent years. The Navy’s current strength of 136 ships, 15 submarines, 216 aircraft and steadily expanding support infrastructure may seem impressive for a regional power; but it is never mere numbers that announce potential. What is of essence is capability which always hinges on technology and age. An important factor that remains submerged in force strength is the struggle to beat the rate of ‘attrition by age’ and succeed in growth rate (number of platforms). This struggle has its origins in the poor decade of the 90s. In the wake of the economic crisis of the late eighties, all approved projects suffered a serious setback and a full decade’s loss led to a cascade of repercussions. The fi rst of these were a huge void in the following decades as ships at the cusp of retirement had to be put through peripheral upgrades; those on the drawing board were returned to the closet; and those

To start with, credit must be given to the foresight

of independent Indiaʼs very fi rst naval hierarchy

whose fi rst Plan Paper had defi ned the need for

not only a larger fl eet but also larger ships with the

primary rolesbeing protection of

trade, ports and the coast from interference by an enemy, and, sup-

port of the Army i any operation. The

paper determined a force of two light aircraft

carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four

submarines

AFP

A warship being built at anIndian shipyard

06 07


MODERNAISATION

8

DECEMBER 2012

9

DSI

under consideration were put on the back-burner. As if these adversities were not enough, the Navy’s destiny hit another cul-de-sac with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Weapon systems on order for ships under construction and those undergoing life extensions received an abrupt blow. It took a couple of years before newer systems were offered by the Russian Federation or other sources. All these factors led to a huge loss of time and force architecture. To clearly understand this effect, one has to remember that naval platforms have long gestation periods. A setback due to a combination of fi scal shortfalls and supply source disruptions spelt an irrecoverable situation in future force levels and force architecture.

The real impetus towards transformation of the force came with the induction of the fi rst ever indigenously designed and indigenously built destroyer in 1997. This milestone announced two accomplishments: announcing that the Indian Navy had arrived on world stage as a builder’s Navy, and, that the force level equation was poised to reverse the growth trend with a positive graph. Yet, at the time, 75% of the fl eet was approaching

vintage status. Similarly, aircraft acquired from the Soviet Union and the West in the late eighties were already beginning to retire as spares supply had slowed down in the wake of disintegration of USSR in one case and the post ’98 Pokhran test in the other. Naval aviation also witnessed a serious serviceability void caused by the resource crunch of the early 90s.

The fi rst restoration of budgetary support in the late nineties helped recoup some platforms through “mid-life upgrades” during the last decade. Importantly, new projects started receiving fi nancial approvals and dormant ones were revived. Figures tell the story of revival. A total of 44 ships are currently on order --- 42 of them with Indian yards. In the recent past, a few ships were ordered from foreign yards. This was done in order to get quicker deliveries and gain easy access to contemporary technology. These include the three Talwar class, built to our specifi cations by Russia, in the early part of the last decade; two modern Fleet tankers built in Italy and three follow-on ships of the Talwar class currently being delivered by Russia. Our own shipyards

are a bit slow in production rate and have serious capacity constraints in the wake of a saturated order book. Apart from hastening the pace of induction (to fi ll shortfalls), parallel induction from foreign yards provides a much gainful benchmark for our own shipyards to compare build-periods and technologies. This practice should be continued.

The much awaited Vikramaditya (Gorshkov) should successfully complete her refi t and trials in Russia in a couple of months and be home sometime next year. Insofar as the indigenous aircraft carriers are concerned, the fi rst one (IAC1: Vikrant) should hopefully join the fl eet in a couple of years. Even if late in production, this is slated to be the biggest milestone announcing India’s arrival in the big league. After all, there are only nine maritime nations who can design and build aircraft carriers!

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the process of renewals (replacements/additions) fructifi ed in right earnest only with the induction of the three Delhi class destroyers (Project 15) commencing late 1997. Unlike the old days, these three

ships have not been treated as a “one off” design. Three follow-ons --- Kolkata, Kochi and Chennai (Project 15A) are likely to be delivered over the next couple of years and another four (Project 15B) are slated for induction with a gap of three or four years. Strictly speaking, while this pattern does not fall under “series production”, it has its own inherent advantages in being staggered. Firstly, ships will not get bunched up for de-induction. Secondly, series production of exactly the same model offers no respite for introduction of newer technology without time penalty between ships. Therefore, staggering batches permits remodelling features --- to incorporate the latest in stealth, introduce contemporary technology amongst weapons and control systems and most importantly, incorporate lessons learnt from a previous batch.

Amongst frigates -- work-horses of the navy – with all three ships of Project 17 (Shivalik, Satpura, Sahyadri) having been delivered, the navy has witnessed a paradigm shift from conventional designs to the truly contemporary ones, incorporating stealth, advanced weapons, sensors and control systems. These platforms should serve the nation well into the third/fourth decade of this century. Just like the Project 15 destroyers, these frigates too are likely to be followed by a batch of seven more ships (Project 17A), staggered in time. Once again, staggering of batches will have inherent advantages of newer technology infusion and continuity over longer time-frame.

In the smaller ship category, the four Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Corvettes currently under construction should supplement the much needed brown water ASW capability over the next two to three years. In so far as the seaward/inshore defence element is concerned, the Navy had assessed a renewed fl otilla after 26/11, in terms of Fast Attack Craft and Fast Interceptors. These have started getting inducted and when fully delivered, should make the near shore areas secure along with the Coast Guard’s efforts.

An area that suffered gaps till recently, were the Logistic Support vessels or Fleet Tankers. With two ultra-modern replenishment tankers having been

inducted over the last two years – made to our specifi cations by an Italian yard – the lifeblood of the navy’s Blue water capability has regained confi dence. Without doubt, a couple more will be needed over the next few years to ensure that independent Task Forces can be assured ‘sea legs’ even when more than one tanker is under maintenance.

Another category of work horses are the offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). There has

been renewed demand for such vessels by even smaller maritime nations as they are relatively cheap, can be built in smaller time frames and are best suited for low-end tasks like anti-piracy patrols and offshore protection missions. A large number are on order which should start getting inducted soon. These OPVs will begin to relieve frigates and destroyers currently employed for mundane patrols.

A surfaced Foxtrot-classsubmarine in high seas

AFP

Former navy chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma, taking a guard-of-honour aboard the INS

Satpura, a Shivalik class stealth frigate

AFP

AFP

INS Shahyadri at theMazagon dock.

08 09


MODERNAISATION

8

DECEMBER 2012

9

DSI

under consideration were put on the back-burner. As if these adversities were not enough, the Navy’s destiny hit another cul-de-sac with the breakup of the Soviet Union. Weapon systems on order for ships under construction and those undergoing life extensions received an abrupt blow. It took a couple of years before newer systems were offered by the Russian Federation or other sources. All these factors led to a huge loss of time and force architecture. To clearly understand this effect, one has to remember that naval platforms have long gestation periods. A setback due to a combination of fi scal shortfalls and supply source disruptions spelt an irrecoverable situation in future force levels and force architecture.

The real impetus towards transformation of the force came with the induction of the fi rst ever indigenously designed and indigenously built destroyer in 1997. This milestone announced two accomplishments: announcing that the Indian Navy had arrived on world stage as a builder’s Navy, and, that the force level equation was poised to reverse the growth trend with a positive graph. Yet, at the time, 75% of the fl eet was approaching

vintage status. Similarly, aircraft acquired from the Soviet Union and the West in the late eighties were already beginning to retire as spares supply had slowed down in the wake of disintegration of USSR in one case and the post ’98 Pokhran test in the other. Naval aviation also witnessed a serious serviceability void caused by the resource crunch of the early 90s.

The fi rst restoration of budgetary support in the late nineties helped recoup some platforms through “mid-life upgrades” during the last decade. Importantly, new projects started receiving fi nancial approvals and dormant ones were revived. Figures tell the story of revival. A total of 44 ships are currently on order --- 42 of them with Indian yards. In the recent past, a few ships were ordered from foreign yards. This was done in order to get quicker deliveries and gain easy access to contemporary technology. These include the three Talwar class, built to our specifi cations by Russia, in the early part of the last decade; two modern Fleet tankers built in Italy and three follow-on ships of the Talwar class currently being delivered by Russia. Our own shipyards

are a bit slow in production rate and have serious capacity constraints in the wake of a saturated order book. Apart from hastening the pace of induction (to fi ll shortfalls), parallel induction from foreign yards provides a much gainful benchmark for our own shipyards to compare build-periods and technologies. This practice should be continued.

The much awaited Vikramaditya (Gorshkov) should successfully complete her refi t and trials in Russia in a couple of months and be home sometime next year. Insofar as the indigenous aircraft carriers are concerned, the fi rst one (IAC1: Vikrant) should hopefully join the fl eet in a couple of years. Even if late in production, this is slated to be the biggest milestone announcing India’s arrival in the big league. After all, there are only nine maritime nations who can design and build aircraft carriers!

After the breakup of the Soviet Union, the process of renewals (replacements/additions) fructifi ed in right earnest only with the induction of the three Delhi class destroyers (Project 15) commencing late 1997. Unlike the old days, these three

ships have not been treated as a “one off” design. Three follow-ons --- Kolkata, Kochi and Chennai (Project 15A) are likely to be delivered over the next couple of years and another four (Project 15B) are slated for induction with a gap of three or four years. Strictly speaking, while this pattern does not fall under “series production”, it has its own inherent advantages in being staggered. Firstly, ships will not get bunched up for de-induction. Secondly, series production of exactly the same model offers no respite for introduction of newer technology without time penalty between ships. Therefore, staggering batches permits remodelling features --- to incorporate the latest in stealth, introduce contemporary technology amongst weapons and control systems and most importantly, incorporate lessons learnt from a previous batch.

Amongst frigates -- work-horses of the navy – with all three ships of Project 17 (Shivalik, Satpura, Sahyadri) having been delivered, the navy has witnessed a paradigm shift from conventional designs to the truly contemporary ones, incorporating stealth, advanced weapons, sensors and control systems. These platforms should serve the nation well into the third/fourth decade of this century. Just like the Project 15 destroyers, these frigates too are likely to be followed by a batch of seven more ships (Project 17A), staggered in time. Once again, staggering of batches will have inherent advantages of newer technology infusion and continuity over longer time-frame.

In the smaller ship category, the four Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW) Corvettes currently under construction should supplement the much needed brown water ASW capability over the next two to three years. In so far as the seaward/inshore defence element is concerned, the Navy had assessed a renewed fl otilla after 26/11, in terms of Fast Attack Craft and Fast Interceptors. These have started getting inducted and when fully delivered, should make the near shore areas secure along with the Coast Guard’s efforts.

An area that suffered gaps till recently, were the Logistic Support vessels or Fleet Tankers. With two ultra-modern replenishment tankers having been

inducted over the last two years – made to our specifi cations by an Italian yard – the lifeblood of the navy’s Blue water capability has regained confi dence. Without doubt, a couple more will be needed over the next few years to ensure that independent Task Forces can be assured ‘sea legs’ even when more than one tanker is under maintenance.

Another category of work horses are the offshore patrol vessels (OPVs). There has

been renewed demand for such vessels by even smaller maritime nations as they are relatively cheap, can be built in smaller time frames and are best suited for low-end tasks like anti-piracy patrols and offshore protection missions. A large number are on order which should start getting inducted soon. These OPVs will begin to relieve frigates and destroyers currently employed for mundane patrols.

A surfaced Foxtrot-classsubmarine in high seas

AFP

Former navy chief, Admiral Nirmal Verma, taking a guard-of-honour aboard the INS

Satpura, a Shivalik class stealth frigate

AFP

AFP

INS Shahyadri at theMazagon dock.

08 09


MODERNAISATION

10

There has been a huge shortfall in the minesweeping/minehunting category, shallow water survey vessels and shallow water ASW craft. These are also known to be round the corner.

Submarines form the backbone of a navy’s sea denial capability. The much delayed Scorpenes are just a couple of years from induction and promise to transform ‘submarining’. But six of them are not enough. The second (construction) line should get off the ground soon, to ensure force levels on de-induction of the present lot. By far, submarines are the most potent elements for a maritime nation. Their sea denial capability enables easier sea control; assist posturing and even affect the balance of power equation.

Amongst aviation acquisitions, the fi rst aircraft of the much awaited P-8 “I” Long Range Maritime Reconnaissance (LRMR) aircraft should be here early next year. This acquisition will be a game changer. Air platforms are the eyes and ears of the surface and the sub-surface navy. Coupled with weapons like missiles and torpedoes, they become exponential force multipliers. Intelligence gathering through them is expected to become superbly effective and effi cient.

In so far as integral aircraft are concerned,

the current lot of helicopters has been in dire need of replacement and some categories – for up-gradation, for a long time. Integral helicopters transform the character of a ship by extending surveillance and weapon reach, and, enabling stand-off targeting, enabling mother platforms to engage before the enemy.

Integral fi ghters for the Gorshkov are known to be already here and are doing a good turn in keeping the pilots tuned to the throttle. More should follow for the indigenous carrier under construction. A very important acquisition in naval aviation will be the indigenously developed Naval Light Combat Aircraft (Naval LCA) for future carriers. With the prototype already under trials, this machine should offer immense satisfaction on operationalization --- even if late and short on desirable capabilities, as it will be a watershed event in self-reliance.

With so much having been said about platforms, the navy has also been conscious of parallel development of infrastructure. Be it the Indian Naval Academy, addition of a large naval base and induction of maintenance facilities, foresight and timely planning are paying off.

India is claimed to be the fourth largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity. A study by the Carnegie Endowment

a couple of years ago had described us as one of the four ‘power centers’ in the world. Her geo-strategic location with her peninsular confi guration jutting out over a 1000 miles into the sea, places the country at the convergence of the most important shipping lanes of the world. These arteries of trade are the lifeblood of the entire world as millions of tons of Oil & Gas apart from commodities crossing between the Atlantic and the Pacifi c also pass through these routes. Given that 90% of her external trade by volume and over 75% by value is sea borne, protection of trade and offshore resources has been a non-negotiable imperative for India’s Navy, apart from many other functions that she is charged with. The list of inductions above, may seem impressive, but there is still some distance to be covered before legacy systems and platforms are replaced and more importantly, numbers are built up, as envisaged in the navy’s perspective plan. Today, numbers matter as much as infusion of technology, because the variety and number of tasks have suddenly seen a quantum jump be it in anti-piracy patrols, enhanced need for surveillance against terorrism, appearance of asymmetric threats, or, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. Modernisation is a continuous process and must receive adequate funding. DSI

An area that suff ered gaps till recently, were

the Logistic Supportvessels or Fleet Tankers.

With two ultra-modern replenishment tankers having been inducted

over the last twoyears – made to our specifi cations by an

Italian yard – thelifeblood of the navyʼs

Blue water capability

A naval corvette, INS Vibhuti fi ring fl ares in celebration as a part of the navy week

AFP

Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 10Navy Modernisation2nd time.indd 10 03/01/13 10:32 AM03/01/13 10:32 AM

IN QUEST OF UNIVERSAL WARRIOR

Media reports that the Indian Air Force (IAF) tender for the procurement of six versatile military transport/air refueling aircraft has been fi nalized are baseless. Such announcement has been made by a source close to the IAF command who disclaimed the reports published earlier.

“There are serious diff erences within the IAF today as to who will be the winner: the European Airbus A330MRTT or Rus-sian Il-78MK-90”, - he said.

According to this source, in spite of strong lobbying and active advertising pressure on the tender committee many pilots unoffi cially acknowledge that the Russian aircraft is not only more familiar to them but also satisfi es the IAF require-ments better than any other contender.

The scale of decision-making is still swaying, leaving the question “who wins” unanswered. It seems strange enough though, since the Russian aircraft Il-78MK-90 developed from the very be-ginning as a military transport has in-disputable technical advantages over its European competitor that has been derived from a commercial aircraft and, for that reason, not prepared to perform additional military, and especially mili-tary transportation tasks, all of which are vital for the Indian Armed Forces.

It makes no doubts that Airbus off ers good aircraft . But in this case it is a non-military design which is more fi t for Euro-pean customers with paved runways on each plot of land ready to accommodate heavy-weight airliners. But how many airfi elds of this kind has India? Not so many. Therefore it would be more wise to procure the Il-78MK-90 aircraft ca-pable of operating from both paved and unpaved runways. It means that the Rus-sian aircraft can operate from more than 80 percent of the runways available in India. The A330MRTT aircraft can be op-erated only from Class 1 paved runways at least 2.8 km long.

In this context the A330MRTT aircraft can be named for convenience “air refu-eling aircraft for peacetime tasks” since the possibility of dispersing these aircraft in the period of threat and during combat operations will be very limited. It should be noted that Class 1 airfi elds get under air attacks in the very fi rst hours of hos-tilities. The Russian air refuellers will cre-ate no problems with their dispersal over India’s aerodrome network since they can operate from airfi elds with unpaved runways. And this is the only way to en-sure survivability of a group of such air refueling aircraft .

At the same time the Il-78MK-90 can be quickly converted by technical personnel, or in case of necessity by its crew only,

into a full-size transport aircraft allowing rapid shipment of cargos, heavy-weight vehicles and assault troops. It must be noted that even without additional fuel tanks the Il-78MK-90 aircraft meets the

RFP requirement for refueling at set positions. The A330MRTT aircraft has no air drop capability, and requires costly dedicated loading/unloading equipment and ramps to be installed for carrying out cargo loading/unloading operations (armoured materiel is not included). All airfi elds planned for operations must be equipped with additional loading facili-ties which will increase direct aircraft pro-curement and life cycle costs. It should be noted that the equipment for the Air-bus aircraft may cost as much as tens, or even hundreds of thousand US dollars per unit.

In addition, the Russian aircraft is ca-pable of refueling with two types of fuel in one fl ight whereas the A330MRTT has no such capability. The Il-78MK-90 aircraft is also provided with a unique air tanker capability of dispensing fuel on ground at the rate of up to 1,500 l/min allowing fi lling up to four aircraft , trans-portation means and armoured vehicles at a time. The A330MRTT aircraft has no such capability either.

The Il-78MK-90 aircraft is checked for the ability to fuel all heavy-weight aircraft existing in the Indian Air Force inventory. The A330MRTT will have to be addition-ally tested for refueling the IAF airborne early warning aircraft : its engines are mounted much lower than those on the Il-78MK-90 aircraft and their air jets may aff ect fl ight controllability of the aircraft , and this is what must be tested. Besides, mid-air refueling systems are also to be

checked for the European contender’s compatibility as regards contact dynam-ics and fuel fl ow rates.

There are other factors of superiority. For instance, the Ilyushin’s power plant con-sists of four engines providing high level of combat survivability. Whereas the A330MRTT is powered by two engines only. If one of these engines is damaged in combat situation, where anything can happen, it may lead to aborted missions and possible loss of aircraft queued for refueling.

In general Ilyushin aircraft have proved to be reliable and simple to operate air vehicles. The newest Il-78MK-90 aircraft is a modernized version of the convert-ible Il-78MK air tanker. It features the new PS-90A-76 low fuel consumption engines and a modifi ed wing, an inte-grated digital avionics suite including a

“glass cabin” fi tted with multifunctional liquid-crystal colour displays and “smart” control panels. At the same time this aircraft will be able to fl y intercontinen-tal commercial shipping fl ights since it meets international ICAO noise and emissions standards.

The multifunctional Ilyushin platform allows conversion into fi re-fi ghting, con-vertible air refueling, military transport, fl ying hospital, air control post and air-borne early warning aircraft as well as others. In fact it is a universal warrior con-ceived by India when it has invited this tender. Frankly speaking, it is not clear then why some people assert that the victory has already gone to Airbus. Let us better wait for the offi cial announce-ment of the tender results.

Dominic Scogna

ROT.indd 36ROT.indd 36 02/01/13 10:52 AM02/01/13 10:52 AM

NETWORK CENTRICITY

12

DECEMBER 2012

13

DSI

KEY POINTS � A network centric battlefi eld removes substantially the ‘fog of war.’

� It empowers the local commanders to take time-critical decisions in the midst of attrition.

� The technology enabled infantryman increases his own survivability.

Shankar Rajagopalan

Battlefi eld Management Systems lift the ʻfog of warʼ to a signifi cant extent. This empowers the commanders in the rear to take strategic decisions andcommunicate them in real time, while the tactical commanders translate them at the ground level.

Introduction:

The ever evolving battlefi eld of the modern era is extremely chaotic and fast paced. The ‘fog of war’ befuddles

the observers and the participants alike. But technology now has made it possible for battlefi eld leadership to:

• ‘See’ their areas of responsibility in depth and in real time.

• Develop an accurate common picture of the battlespace and share it both horizontally and vertically.

• Precisely locate, identify, track and attack targets by appropriate means and monitor its effects

• Operate in a joint environment. Technology can support to achieve this

leadership in the battlefi eld by enabling • Rapid acquisition, processing and

transfer of information• Enhancing Situational awareness• Acquiring capability to react to

informationA system realized with the above

technology enablers integrated and bringing the force’s resources

• To the Right Place• At the Right Time• With the Right Lethality

is called the Battlefi eld Management System

What is BMS? Where is it required most? How can we describe or defi ne it?

Tactical C3I Systems do not proliferate below the unit HQs, so there is a requirement to provide an automated battle management system for the sub- units, detachments to have sensors, platforms, weapon systems integrated with individual soldiers, to enable them to optimally exploit assets below unit level and translate the plans made at higher level into well synchronized operations at the cutting edge. Moreover, due to the dynamic and mobile nature of ops and the unique requirement of automation for execution of operational tasks at the lower levels of military fi eld hierarchy, there is a need to have a separate system below unit levels.

Thus BMS in short is a command and control system providing real/ near real time situational awareness and information exchange for unit commanders and below and down to individual soldiers/platforms to enable optimal management of resources within the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).

What is the BMS system:BMS will be a highly mobile tactical

command and control information system, integrated with sensors, weapon platforms and decision making tools .

The system will provide common operating picture (COP)/Situational Awareness, to all entities in the Tactical Battle Area networked with secure, robust and reliable communication system

supporting voice, data and real time video services.

It will comprise of wearable/hand-held info systems with individual soldiers as well man portable and vehicle mounted information system, integrated through data enabled communication networks.

It will generate COP by integrating all entities within the TBA on a common Geographic Information System (GIS) reference frame network and provide Blue Force Tracking (BFT) using satellite- based navigation systems.

Basic Functionalities: • Communication• GIS, Navigation and Situational

Awareness.• Intelligence Systems• Target Management System• Decision Support System and Threat

Analysis• Mission Planning and Management.• Military Messaging • Operational Logistic Planning

Key Requirements: • The aim is to have the shortest OODA

(Observe, Orient, Decide & Act) loop • Flexible system architecture facilitating

quick attachments and detachments • Quick deployment capabilities• Scalability of the operating systems• Capability to disseminate position

reports in a GPS -disabled environment

Features: • Geo-Spatial Information

Management1. Navigation and ‘Blue-Force’ Tracking2. Continuous real-time location

of entities and their track data to include Latitude/Longitude/Military Grid Reference, course, speed, altitude, identifi cation, status (friendly, neutral, hostile, unknown) and mission status

3. Generation of Track History4. Geospatial analysis (2D & 3D),

fl y/walkthrough, and Geospatial computations like intervisibility, view shed analysis, distance between

NETWORKED BATTLEFIELDOF 21st CENTURY

Tactical C3I Systems do not proliferate

below the unit HQs, so there is a requirement to

provide an automated battle management sys-

tem for the sub- units, detachments to have sen-

sors, platforms, weapon systems integrated with

individual soldiers, to enable them to optimally

exploit assets

two points, shortest path and optimum path etc.

5. Multi-sensor data fusion.6. Image Processing (manipulation,

interpretation, and extraction of target parameters, compression/ decompression of images, integration of text, graphics and images).

7. Logic-based generation of Military Symbols and Attribute Generation for map objects.

• Application Utilities1. Messaging using free text and

formatted, encrypted text 2. Creation of Plans and Orders 3. Tactical Situation Management by

providing a Common Operational Picture (COP)

4. Data visualization 5. Logistics Management

• Networking and Communications1. Internet Protocol Radio supporting

high data, long ranges and non-line-of-sight conditions.

2. Support self confi guring and self healing network topology.

• Database Management. 1. Data base inter-operability between

army, navy and air force.2. Data Replication and building

redundancies3. Resource Management

An Indian Army soldier kitted up with elements of F-INSAS equipmentA

FP

Battlefeild2nd time.indd 12-13Battlefeild2nd time.indd 12-13 03/01/13 10:35 AM03/01/13 10:35 AM

NETWORK CENTRICITY

12

DECEMBER 2012

13

DSI

KEY POINTS � A network centric battlefi eld removes substantially the ‘fog of war.’

� It empowers the local commanders to take time-critical decisions in the midst of attrition.

� The technology enabled infantryman increases his own survivability.

Shankar Rajagopalan

Battlefi eld Management Systems lift the ʻfog of warʼ to a signifi cant extent. This empowers the commanders in the rear to take strategic decisions andcommunicate them in real time, while the tactical commanders translate them at the ground level.

Introduction:

The ever evolving battlefi eld of the modern era is extremely chaotic and fast paced. The ‘fog of war’ befuddles

the observers and the participants alike. But technology now has made it possible for battlefi eld leadership to:

• ‘See’ their areas of responsibility in depth and in real time.

• Develop an accurate common picture of the battlespace and share it both horizontally and vertically.

• Precisely locate, identify, track and attack targets by appropriate means and monitor its effects

• Operate in a joint environment. Technology can support to achieve this

leadership in the battlefi eld by enabling • Rapid acquisition, processing and

transfer of information• Enhancing Situational awareness• Acquiring capability to react to

informationA system realized with the above

technology enablers integrated and bringing the force’s resources

• To the Right Place• At the Right Time• With the Right Lethality

is called the Battlefi eld Management System

What is BMS? Where is it required most? How can we describe or defi ne it?

Tactical C3I Systems do not proliferate below the unit HQs, so there is a requirement to provide an automated battle management system for the sub- units, detachments to have sensors, platforms, weapon systems integrated with individual soldiers, to enable them to optimally exploit assets below unit level and translate the plans made at higher level into well synchronized operations at the cutting edge. Moreover, due to the dynamic and mobile nature of ops and the unique requirement of automation for execution of operational tasks at the lower levels of military fi eld hierarchy, there is a need to have a separate system below unit levels.

Thus BMS in short is a command and control system providing real/ near real time situational awareness and information exchange for unit commanders and below and down to individual soldiers/platforms to enable optimal management of resources within the Tactical Battle Area (TBA).

What is the BMS system:BMS will be a highly mobile tactical

command and control information system, integrated with sensors, weapon platforms and decision making tools .

The system will provide common operating picture (COP)/Situational Awareness, to all entities in the Tactical Battle Area networked with secure, robust and reliable communication system

supporting voice, data and real time video services.

It will comprise of wearable/hand-held info systems with individual soldiers as well man portable and vehicle mounted information system, integrated through data enabled communication networks.

It will generate COP by integrating all entities within the TBA on a common Geographic Information System (GIS) reference frame network and provide Blue Force Tracking (BFT) using satellite- based navigation systems.

Basic Functionalities: • Communication• GIS, Navigation and Situational

Awareness.• Intelligence Systems• Target Management System• Decision Support System and Threat

Analysis• Mission Planning and Management.• Military Messaging • Operational Logistic Planning

Key Requirements: • The aim is to have the shortest OODA

(Observe, Orient, Decide & Act) loop • Flexible system architecture facilitating

quick attachments and detachments • Quick deployment capabilities• Scalability of the operating systems• Capability to disseminate position

reports in a GPS -disabled environment

Features: • Geo-Spatial Information

Management1. Navigation and ‘Blue-Force’ Tracking2. Continuous real-time location

of entities and their track data to include Latitude/Longitude/Military Grid Reference, course, speed, altitude, identifi cation, status (friendly, neutral, hostile, unknown) and mission status

3. Generation of Track History4. Geospatial analysis (2D & 3D),

fl y/walkthrough, and Geospatial computations like intervisibility, view shed analysis, distance between

NETWORKED BATTLEFIELDOF 21st CENTURY

Tactical C3I Systems do not proliferate

below the unit HQs, so there is a requirement to

provide an automated battle management sys-

tem for the sub- units, detachments to have sen-

sors, platforms, weapon systems integrated with

individual soldiers, to enable them to optimally

exploit assets

two points, shortest path and optimum path etc.

5. Multi-sensor data fusion.6. Image Processing (manipulation,

interpretation, and extraction of target parameters, compression/ decompression of images, integration of text, graphics and images).

7. Logic-based generation of Military Symbols and Attribute Generation for map objects.

• Application Utilities1. Messaging using free text and

formatted, encrypted text 2. Creation of Plans and Orders 3. Tactical Situation Management by

providing a Common Operational Picture (COP)

4. Data visualization 5. Logistics Management

• Networking and Communications1. Internet Protocol Radio supporting

high data, long ranges and non-line-of-sight conditions.

2. Support self confi guring and self healing network topology.

• Database Management. 1. Data base inter-operability between

army, navy and air force.2. Data Replication and building

redundancies3. Resource Management

An Indian Army soldier kitted up with elements of F-INSAS equipmentA

FP


NETWORK CENTRICITY

14

DECEMBER 2012

15

DSI

4. Library of Plans, orders and situation reactions

Building Blocks:BMS will constitute following sub-

systems.1. Infrastructure-less Communication

and networking system.2. Application server 3. Database server 4. Relational Database Management

System 5. Compute platforms (Different form

factors) embedded with GPS.6. Integrated GIS

In addition to all these building blocks the other important feature of BMS is the Battle Command.

Battle command (BC) is the art and science of visualising, describing, directing and leading forces in operations against a hostile, thinking and adoptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership to translate decision into actions by synchronising forces and war fi ghting functions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the missions.

The BC refers both processes triggered by commanders and executed by soldiers and to the system of systems that directly enables these processes. Process like Battle Command is clearly a human endeavor.

BC (Battle command) is defi ned as the art of battle decision-making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organisations into action to complete missions. BC includes visualising the current state and future state formulating concepts of operations at least cost. Assigning missions prioritising and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act and knowing how to make adjustments during a battle.

BC is the art and science of battle fi eld decision making and leading soldiers and units to successfully accomplish the mission. The BC elements constitute decision making, leading, and controlling. The BC system of systems at brigade level enables commanders to lead, prioritise, and allocate assets required to employ and sustain combat power. The brigade commander must see further, process

the information faster and strike more precisely and at a fast rate.

If information is the medium of the BC process, the BC system must provide the commander with timely and accurate information on which to base the commanders decision.

BC is also known by the following terms:• C4ISR as in, Command, control,

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Battle Management (BM) • Battle management is the management

of activities within the operational environment based on the commands, direction and guidance given by appropriate authority. BM is considered to be the subset of BC.

• Modern BC software/hardware exhibits all the traits/qualities of a System of Systems (SoS). It can be decomposed into systems such as manoeuvre, logistics, fi res and air-support, intelligence, surveillance, recognition,

terrain and weather. Among the many inputs of these systems is a plethora of sensors which undergo sensor fusion and are compiled into a common operational picture/local operational picture (LOP) that enable commanders to achieve situational awareness (SA)/situational understanding (SU). SA/SU is paramount for commanders to command and control modern military forces .

Battle command on the moveOne of the problems with BC SoS is that a

commander has little communication while in the battle fi eld. Command and control planning occurs at a command post (CP) or tactical operations centre (TOC). Once a battle begins a commander leaves the CP/TOC and moves forward to stay engaged. A commander has little communication possibilities while in the battlefi eld making it diffi cult to follow and control all events as they happen. Battle command on the move(BCOTM) is a capability that

A pictorial depiction of networked BMS items

AFP

BC (Battle command) is defi ned as the art of battle decision-making, leading

and motivating soldiers and their organisations into action to complete

missions. BC includesvisualising the current state and future state

formulating concepts of operations at least cost.


NETWORK CENTRICITY

14

DECEMBER 2012

15

DSI

4. Library of Plans, orders and situation reactions

Building Blocks:BMS will constitute following sub-

systems.1. Infrastructure-less Communication

and networking system.2. Application server 3. Database server 4. Relational Database Management

System 5. Compute platforms (Different form

factors) embedded with GPS.6. Integrated GIS

In addition to all these building blocks the other important feature of BMS is the Battle Command.

Battle command (BC) is the art and science of visualising, describing, directing and leading forces in operations against a hostile, thinking and adoptive enemy. Battle command applies leadership to translate decision into actions by synchronising forces and war fi ghting functions in time, space, and purpose to accomplish the missions.

The BC refers both processes triggered by commanders and executed by soldiers and to the system of systems that directly enables these processes. Process like Battle Command is clearly a human endeavor.

BC (Battle command) is defi ned as the art of battle decision-making, leading and motivating soldiers and their organisations into action to complete missions. BC includes visualising the current state and future state formulating concepts of operations at least cost. Assigning missions prioritising and allocating resources, selecting the critical time and place to act and knowing how to make adjustments during a battle.

BC is the art and science of battle fi eld decision making and leading soldiers and units to successfully accomplish the mission. The BC elements constitute decision making, leading, and controlling. The BC system of systems at brigade level enables commanders to lead, prioritise, and allocate assets required to employ and sustain combat power. The brigade commander must see further, process

the information faster and strike more precisely and at a fast rate.

If information is the medium of the BC process, the BC system must provide the commander with timely and accurate information on which to base the commanders decision.

BC is also known by the following terms:• C4ISR as in, Command, control,

communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.

• Battle Management (BM) • Battle management is the management

of activities within the operational environment based on the commands, direction and guidance given by appropriate authority. BM is considered to be the subset of BC.

• Modern BC software/hardware exhibits all the traits/qualities of a System of Systems (SoS). It can be decomposed into systems such as manoeuvre, logistics, fi res and air-support, intelligence, surveillance, recognition,

terrain and weather. Among the many inputs of these systems is a plethora of sensors which undergo sensor fusion and are compiled into a common operational picture/local operational picture (LOP) that enable commanders to achieve situational awareness (SA)/situational understanding (SU). SA/SU is paramount for commanders to command and control modern military forces .

Battle command on the moveOne of the problems with BC SoS is that a

commander has little communication while in the battle fi eld. Command and control planning occurs at a command post (CP) or tactical operations centre (TOC). Once a battle begins a commander leaves the CP/TOC and moves forward to stay engaged. A commander has little communication possibilities while in the battlefi eld making it diffi cult to follow and control all events as they happen. Battle command on the move(BCOTM) is a capability that

A pictorial depiction of networked BMS items

AFP

BC (Battle command) is defi ned as the art of battle decision-making, leading

and motivating soldiers and their organisations into action to complete

missions. BC includesvisualising the current state and future state

formulating concepts of operations at least cost.


NETWORK CENTRICITY

16

DSI

provides commanders all of the information resident in their CP/TOC and the required communication necessary to command and control on the move or at a short halt from any vantage point on the battle fi eld.

Intelligent Battle Management System:

Intelligent Battle Management System is a BMS for battalions and their subordinate battle echelons. IBMS is intended for installation in Combat Vehicles, Armoured Fighting Vehicles, amphibious fi ghting vehicles, reconnaissance vehicles, artillery vehicles, helicopters as well as Battalion and Brigade Command stations. The IBMS is integrated into the vehicle without infl uencing the operation of any other subsystem. It exchanges information with other vehicles IBMS through the available communication resources. IBMS information is presented both graphically and alpha-numerically. The system can be adopted to the operational needs and procedures of the particular user. There are six main areas of IBMS functionality: Situational Awareness (SA), situation update, tactical planning, tactical communications, logistics and administrative functions. SA comprises map navigation, zoom in/out and pan, friendly

‘blue force tracking’(BFT), enemy, neutral and unknown forces symbols according to NATO symbology, vehicle direction, and main line of sight of the Weapon (LOS), map features, and obstacle information, geographic distance measurements, layer control, and tools to minimise user workload.

Situation update encompasses current order of battle (ORBAT) of friendly and enemy units edited and displayed on the system map of identifi ed enemy positions with subsequent reporting to higher echelons, where data can be managed to refl ect the last updated situation, distribution of approved enemy positions to alternate detachment vehicles, with automatic update of each vehicle map and alerting vehicle commander by sound.

Battle Management systems of Israeli Army:

Israeli Army is a forerunner to introduce BMS. It is essentially an add-on to virtually any combat vehicle mounted sensor or weapon system forming coordinated battle teams that perform their tasks with optimum precision

It supports every requirement of battalion and below, tactical units meeting all their operational needs, including direct fi re engagement and manoeuvre, indirect fi re support, intelligence and logistics.

In addition to its combat networking capabilities this system of system provides commanders and crewmen with simplifi ed operational interface, enhanced situational awareness and data communication capabilities. Elbit system was chosen by the (I)sraeli (M)inistry (O)f (D)efence to serve as prime contractor for the IDF(Israeli Defence Forces) program of Battle Management Systems for Battalion Combat Teams.

BMS is a command and control system for units of battalion size or autonomous units of equivalent size.BMS provides a COP to its users. The COP provides near real time information about the situation in the area of operations and makes it possible to prepare and transmit plans. Commanders workstation and small BMS terminal operated by a vehicle commander

(the commanders workstation) is installed in vehicles. Operation is by touch screen. Information about the position of one’s own vehicle in relation to one`s own unit and other units is presented on an electronic map. Crew workstations one or two in number are installed in the vehicles. Crew workstations are also installed in permanent accommodations, such as buildings or bases. Communication between the BMS system in vehicles, communication between the vehicles is done via radio or other means of communication.

Because the BMS terminals are primarily installed in wheeled and tracked vehicles the equipment must be very robust.

Benefi ts of Battlefi eld Management System: 1. Will greatly improve the combat

effectiveness of the individual force commander by providing him the real time, accurate updated information integrated with available intelligence data regarding• Where am I?• Where are my friends? • Where are my enemies? • What is my mission?• What is my status?

of all fi ghting forces in the battlefi eld on a digital map.

2. Supports the decision making process as well as enables the commanders to plan effi ciently their activities.

3. Reduce time in the decision cycle through automation and digitisation

Conclusion:BMS is a force enabler providing ‘power

to the edge’ and will be the vital system in the spit-fi re battlefi eld environment of the futuristic information dominance warfare where information will no longer be an enabler but a core warfi ghting capability.

The increasing network-centricity of the battlefi eld management is creating opportunities of the higher command of the forces to have a clearer picture of the battle-space, thus enabling them to even indulge in strategic shifts, besides of course allocating resources at the tactical level almost in real time.

AFP

Hand-held receiverset with voice anddata capabilities

Battlefeild2nd time.indd 16Battlefeild2nd time.indd 16 03/01/13 10:35 AM03/01/13 10:35 AM

since it has lesser combat experience of operations in such demanding conditions. We speak here also of its superior safety parameters.

The fact that the Mi-26T2 helicopter is capable of transporting 82 troops with their equipment demonstrates its superior-ity over the CH-47F helicopter by 1.5 times since the US helicopter can carry only 55 troops inside cabin. Moreover, the Mi-26T2 helicopter accommodates 2.5 times great-er number of casualties laid on stretchers than the CH-47F helicopter. The Mi-26T2 has a large capacity cargo cabin allowing it to perform transportation missions with fewer helicopters than the CH-47Fs can. We speak nothing of the fact that the Rus-sian helicopter can quickly transport by air much greater variety of heavy-weight com-bat vehicles thanks to its unique load-lift ing capacity.

The Mi-26T2 is favourably positioned in comparison to its competitor thanks to the simplicity of operation provided by the installation of protection devices which, ac-cording to designers, do not diminish prac-tical service life of the engines and acces-sories when operating in dust formations. The Russian helicopter is favoured also by high repairability characteristics in combat conditions.

Finally, even if one presumes that ef-fectiveness of electronic equipment and onboard systems of both helicopters is approximately the same, generally it turns out that the Mi-26T2 helicopter consider-ably surpasses the CH-47F when judged by the total gamut of tasks solved. And it is off ered for almost the same price. This makes rumours about the Russian helicop-ter losing to the US competitor surprising at the least.

- Nick Patrow

A CASE FOR SURPRISE Moscow has been the main supplier of

helicopters to India and a number of other countries for over 40 years now. The main bulk of these supplies is made up of vari-ous modifi cations of the Mi-8/Mi-17 type military transport helicopters. As is known, in 2008 New Delhi and Moscow struck a contract for the supply of a big lot of the Mi-15V-5 advanced helicopters. Their in-duction into the combat fl eet of the Indian Air Force early this year made an important landmark in the relations of the two coun-tries.

Nowadays Russia is one of few countries capable of producing and exporting all types of helicopters. This allows Moscow to fi rmly hold leading positions in the inter-national helicopter market as a whole. Yet sometimes one may get an impression that in spite of all great and very positive history of the Indian-Russian cooperation in this area Moscow weakens its positions in the Indian arms market. For instance, media have recently circulated rumours about the Russian Mi-26T2 helicopter allegedly los-ing to the US CH-47F Chinook, even though no tender results are announced so far.

Journalists were surprised to see these ru-mours appear, judging them to be a provo-cation, since it has been clear from the very beginning that Russian positions in this tender for 15 helicopters are much stron-ger. Minor cost of the unique Mi-26T2 and a good, albeit not unique, CH-47F Chinook is named among reasons for this: the Rus-sian helicopter’s price is equal the Ameri-can’s, but at the same time it’s much more capable.

So all specialists were quite sure that no one in the Indian Air Force would refuse the payload lift ing capability of 20 tonnes that one Russian helicopter off ers and take instead 12 tonnes off ered by the US con-tender. Figuratively speaking, it is better to buy a good-quality heavy and big jeep than a much weaker vehicle, even though the price and operational cost of the former may be two rupees higher. Who can deny oneself such a bonus? No one. This is why

the rumour about the Indian Air Force mak-ing such surprise decision is rather dubi-ous.

Judge for yourself: India has a huge fl eet of the Mi-17V-5 helicopters capable of shipping four tones each, which allows them to perform missions not requiring very high lift ing capacity. The procure-ment of the CH-47F Chinook helicop-ters will not remedy the situation but rather bring disturbance into the Indian Air Force which will have to remake the infrastructure already created for the Mi-26 helicopters that have been long and successfully operated in India, as well as to retrain pilots and technicians for them.

Let us consider other aspects of this problem. The Mi-26T2 is an upgraded version of the Mi-26T helicopter with the pilot cabin information fi eld modifi ed by installing multifunctional displays of the

“glass cabin” type and engines electronic control system. At present the Mi-26 helicopters are world’s biggest-size he-licopters produced serially. This unique helicopter has lift ing capacity compa-rable to that of the C-130 Hercules trans-port aircraft .

On the other hand the CH-47F helicop-ter is the latest upgrade of the Chinook family helicopters that are the most aged helicopters in the US Air Force inventory. Of course, the CH-47F helicopter fea-tures new high-quality onboard equip-ment made by Rockwell Collins, upgrad-ed electronically controlled engines, and the airframe reinforced with composite materials. But that’s all.

At the same time the Mi-26T2 helicop-ter can perform both transport, assault, landing, search-and-rescue and special-purpose tasks within one fl ight. The Mi-26T2 outperforms the CH-47F helicopter in lift ing capacity by about 1.7 times. Ef-fective combat operations carried out in hot and high areas of Afghanistan and other regions testify to the Mi-26T2 superiority over the CH-47F helicopter

Mi-26T2 lift iing theCH-47F Chinook up

Mi-26T2 carrying the CH-47F Chinook

Review

ROT-1.indd 36ROT-1.indd 36 02/01/13 10:54 AM02/01/13 10:54 AM

SHIPYARDS’ TURMOIL DECEMBER 2012 DSI

1918

INDIAN SHIPYARDS: DISTRESS AMONG LIMITED GAINS

KEY POINTS � The navy’s modernisation plans are based on indigenous production of warships.

� But the existing shipyards fail invariably to meet delivery and cost schedules.

� There is an immediate need to step-up the indigenous effort at strengthening the existing shipyards, and adding more capacities.

Laxman Kumar Behera

Indian shipyards are full up on their order books. But are they ready to deliver on schedule and at cost? Not many are convinced they can. This article tells us that the shipyards have the potential and can undertake the operation.

Since the license production of fi rst major warship, INS Nilgiri in 1960s the Indian naval shipbuilding has come a long way, contributing much

of platform requirements of the maritime forces. India is one of the few countries in the world to have the capability to build all types of frontline warships – aircraft carrier, nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes among

others. Over 90 warships have so far been indigenously constructed, with over 40 more major ships being at the various stages of construction. However, beneath this healthy statistics lie some fundamental weaknesses, manifested in the form of huge project delays and cost overruns. The article takes a closer look at some of the weakness facing this vital segment of India’s defence industry and recommends few measures to revitalise it.

NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY: IIndia’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises of 27 shipyards, of which six are under central government, two under state government and 19 in the private sector domain. All these shipyards are however not responsible for naval construction. Of the six shipyards under the central government, four are dedicated defence Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shipyards – Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL), Garden Reach and Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL).

These shipyards come under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and are at the core of India naval construction. Few other shipyards, notably the government-owned Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL), and private-owned Pipavav and L&T are also involved in warship construction. Among all the shipyards, the MDL is by far the leading warship builder in India, having constructed all major types of naval ships excluding the aircraft carrier. The CSL, which comes under the Ministry of Shipping is presently building India’s fi rst ever indigenous aircraft carrier. Compared to the public sector shipyards, the private shipyards are relatively new to warship building, with the fi rst major contract for fi ve naval offshore patrol vessels (N-OPVs) being recently won by the Pipavav.

DEMAND-SUPPLY MISMATCHMaritime Perspective Plan, formulated

by the Navy in 2005, projects 160 ships including 90 frontline ships consisting of aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes. Similarly the Coast Guard’s plan

includes 154 ships and 93 boats/crafts. However the above force level is far from being achieved. By the end of 2010, Navy’s force level had decreased to 130 ships. In the case of Coast Guard, the present force level consists of around 45 ships only.

To address the depletion of force level, there have been frantic efforts to award major warship contracts to various shipyards. For the Navy, till mid-2012, 43 ships have been awarded for construction to various Indian shipyards. The above number is going to increase as two more projects – six submarines under P75 (I) project and seven stealth frigates of P17 (A) – are expected to be announced soon. For the Coast Guard, 131 surface platforms are already under construction in Indian yards and another 200 platforms are in the process of being contracted.

The above initiatives notwithstanding, there are still concerns that the maritime forces, particularly the Navy, may not get the projected force level in the near future. The concern is primarily because of various constraints of the Indian naval

shipbuilding industry, particularly the defence PSU shipyards which have got bulk of the contracts. The present capacity of three defence shipyards (MDL, GRSE and GSL) is roughly four ships per year, where as Navy alone requires induction of a minimum of eight ships per year to attain its force level of 160 ships. Moreover, as far as the construction of frontline warships (such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines) is concerned, the capability is mostly limited to MDL, which is already burdened with too many contracts, valued over Rupees One lakh crore.

So the challenge for the Navy is to get at least four more ships in a year from other shipyards some of which are preferably required to be able to construct frontline warships.

KEY GAPSThe key weakness of the Indian

shipbuilding industry is ineffi ciency and constraints of defence shipyards which constitute the backbone of the warship building. The ineffi ciency is due largely to the lack of competitive environment in which they operate. Like other production agencies under the MoD, PSU shipyards are treated as the captive production agencies to meet the requirements of the defence forces. The Department of Defence Production (DDP) of the MoD, which is the administrative head of the shipyard, takes a natural interest in ensuring orders to them, irrespective of their capacity, capability and at times, at the cost of timely delivery, developing alternative capacity and promoting competition within the large industry.

Some recent evidence in this regard is found in the CAG report which notes that the decision to award P15A project to MDL was “taken despite the inadequate infrastructure with the yard”. Similarly the decision to award P28 class of ships to the GRSE was “based not on the shipyard’s inherent advantage but because MDL was already over-loaded and GSL did not have adequate infrastructure to construct bigger warships.”

Because the shipyards are the nominated agencies and get orders in a non-competitive bidding process, they have little incentive to improve their effi ciency. The defence PSU

The discriminationtowards the privatesector shipyards is

amply evident from the recent decision of the

MoD to acquire sixsubmarines (under

P-75I programme) for the Indian Navy. As per

the MoDʼs plan, of the six submarines, two

submarines will beimported from the

foreign collaborator, and rest four to bebuilt at home

Indian workers build ships at the ABG Shipyard at Magdalla Port, India’s largest private sector shipyard.

AFP

Indian_shipyard2nd time.indd 36-37Indian_shipyard2nd time.indd 36-37 03/01/13 10:39 AM03/01/13 10:39 AM


1918

INDIAN SHIPYARDS: DISTRESS AMONG LIMITED GAINS

KEY POINTS � The navy’s modernisation plans are based on indigenous production of warships.

� But the existing shipyards fail invariably to meet delivery and cost schedules.

� There is an immediate need to step-up the indigenous effort at strengthening the existing shipyards, and adding more capacities.

Laxman Kumar Behera

Indian shipyards are full up on their order books. But are they ready to deliver on schedule and at cost? Not many are convinced they can. This article tells us that the shipyards have the potential and can undertake the operation.

Since the license production of fi rst major warship, INS Nilgiri in 1960s the Indian naval shipbuilding has come a long way, contributing much

of platform requirements of the maritime forces. India is one of the few countries in the world to have the capability to build all types of frontline warships – aircraft carrier, nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes among

others. Over 90 warships have so far been indigenously constructed, with over 40 more major ships being at the various stages of construction. However, beneath this healthy statistics lie some fundamental weaknesses, manifested in the form of huge project delays and cost overruns. The article takes a closer look at some of the weakness facing this vital segment of India’s defence industry and recommends few measures to revitalise it.

NAVAL SHIPBUILDING INDUSTRY: IIndia’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises of 27 shipyards, of which six are under central government, two under state government and 19 in the private sector domain. All these shipyards are however not responsible for naval construction. Of the six shipyards under the central government, four are dedicated defence Public Sector Undertaking (PSU) shipyards – Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL), Garden Reach and Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL).

These shipyards come under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and are at the core of India naval construction. Few other shipyards, notably the government-owned Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL), and private-owned Pipavav and L&T are also involved in warship construction. Among all the shipyards, the MDL is by far the leading warship builder in India, having constructed all major types of naval ships excluding the aircraft carrier. The CSL, which comes under the Ministry of Shipping is presently building India’s fi rst ever indigenous aircraft carrier. Compared to the public sector shipyards, the private shipyards are relatively new to warship building, with the fi rst major contract for fi ve naval offshore patrol vessels (N-OPVs) being recently won by the Pipavav.

DEMAND-SUPPLY MISMATCHMaritime Perspective Plan, formulated

by the Navy in 2005, projects 160 ships including 90 frontline ships consisting of aircraft carriers, destroyers, frigates and corvettes. Similarly the Coast Guard’s plan

includes 154 ships and 93 boats/crafts. However the above force level is far from being achieved. By the end of 2010, Navy’s force level had decreased to 130 ships. In the case of Coast Guard, the present force level consists of around 45 ships only.

To address the depletion of force level, there have been frantic efforts to award major warship contracts to various shipyards. For the Navy, till mid-2012, 43 ships have been awarded for construction to various Indian shipyards. The above number is going to increase as two more projects – six submarines under P75 (I) project and seven stealth frigates of P17 (A) – are expected to be announced soon. For the Coast Guard, 131 surface platforms are already under construction in Indian yards and another 200 platforms are in the process of being contracted.

The above initiatives notwithstanding, there are still concerns that the maritime forces, particularly the Navy, may not get the projected force level in the near future. The concern is primarily because of various constraints of the Indian naval

shipbuilding industry, particularly the defence PSU shipyards which have got bulk of the contracts. The present capacity of three defence shipyards (MDL, GRSE and GSL) is roughly four ships per year, where as Navy alone requires induction of a minimum of eight ships per year to attain its force level of 160 ships. Moreover, as far as the construction of frontline warships (such as frigates, destroyers, and submarines) is concerned, the capability is mostly limited to MDL, which is already burdened with too many contracts, valued over Rupees One lakh crore.

So the challenge for the Navy is to get at least four more ships in a year from other shipyards some of which are preferably required to be able to construct frontline warships.

KEY GAPSThe key weakness of the Indian

shipbuilding industry is ineffi ciency and constraints of defence shipyards which constitute the backbone of the warship building. The ineffi ciency is due largely to the lack of competitive environment in which they operate. Like other production agencies under the MoD, PSU shipyards are treated as the captive production agencies to meet the requirements of the defence forces. The Department of Defence Production (DDP) of the MoD, which is the administrative head of the shipyard, takes a natural interest in ensuring orders to them, irrespective of their capacity, capability and at times, at the cost of timely delivery, developing alternative capacity and promoting competition within the large industry.

Some recent evidence in this regard is found in the CAG report which notes that the decision to award P15A project to MDL was “taken despite the inadequate infrastructure with the yard”. Similarly the decision to award P28 class of ships to the GRSE was “based not on the shipyard’s inherent advantage but because MDL was already over-loaded and GSL did not have adequate infrastructure to construct bigger warships.”

Because the shipyards are the nominated agencies and get orders in a non-competitive bidding process, they have little incentive to improve their effi ciency. The defence PSU

The discriminationtowards the privatesector shipyards is

amply evident from the recent decision of the

MoD to acquire sixsubmarines (under

P-75I programme) for the Indian Navy. As per

the MoDʼs plan, of the six submarines, two

submarines will beimported from the

foreign collaborator, and rest four to bebuilt at home

Indian workers build ships at the ABG Shipyard at Magdalla Port, India’s largest private sector shipyard.

AFP



2120

shipyards are often found lacking in the areas of build period, inventory management, labour utilization, costing and procurement among others. The ineffi ciency has not only contributed to slow pace of construction, but has led to higher cost of production.

A part of the reason for ineffi ciency in the PSU shipyards is due to the way the shipyards are allowed to function. Being the government-owned enterprises, the PSU shipyards have limited operational and fi nancial decision making powers. In addition, they are also required to follow the strict government procurement rules which sometimes delay their modernisation programme.

For instance, MDL has to retender a procurement contract of a Goliath crane three times and in the process lost three years before it could fi nally sign the contract.

The most crucial operational limitation of the shipyards perhaps lies in actual warship building of large design. For the large warship projects, the shipyards do not have complete control over the ships they are supposed to build. It is primarily because of Indian Navy’s deeper involvement in crucial decision making in the shipbuilding process.

In case of major warships, the Navy prefers telescopic method of construction in which the design parameters are kept open for a long time. This often impinges upon the

schedule and cost of warship construction. Moreover, many a times the Navy brings in major changes in the design parameters midway through the construction process which necessitate modifi cation and cause further delays and cost overrun. Similarly, since the Navy nominates the key equipments and their sources of procurement, the shipyards fi nd it diffi cult to adhere to those decisions, for the reasons of higher cost, lack of competition and timely delivery. As a result, the normal construction schedule gets affected with due impact on the cost.

Above background, the most crucial parameter of performance of the shipyard in terms of cost and build period have taken a back seat. The cost escalation in two crucial projects such as P-15A and P-17 has been 225 per cent and 260 per cent, respectively. The time overrun is also quite signifi cant and higher than the average international standard. As the CAG noted, “As against the international timelines [for construction of a 1st ship of a class] ranging from 66-84 months, the indigenous construction of P-15 by MDL and P-16A by GRSE took 116 and 120 months respectively.”

Lack of Level-Playing Field One of the reasons why India’s warship

building is not at a pace with the induction requirement is because the private yards

are out of ambit of the major shipbuilding projects. Historically the defence production, including naval shipbuilding has been retained in the exclusive domain of the public sector enterprises. This continues to be so even though the 2001 reform measures have allowed 100 per cent private participation in defence production. The biggest obstacle for private yards is MoD’s shipbuilding procedures, which favour the public sector enterprises over the private yards.

The discrimination against the private sector shipyards is amply evident from the recent decision of the MoD to acquire six submarines (under P-75I programme) for the Indian Navy. As per the MoD’s plan, of the six submarines, two submarines will be imported from the foreign collaborator, and rest four to be constructed in two defence shipyards: three at MDL and one at HSL. From the private sector’s perspective what is worrisome is the decision to involve HSL, which has no prior experience in submarine construction. Compared to that some of the private yards, particularly the L&T, has experience in the India’s nuclear submarine construction.

Lack of Design Capability of Shipyards

Historically Indian shipyards are dependent on foreign sources for ship design, because of a lack of investments on R&D and shortage of qualifi ed naval architects and engineers. This has been a major factor why the majority of the Indian shipyards, especially the private yards, are constrained to participate in major naval shipbuilding projects, which involves more complex design compared to commercial shipbuilding. Among the defence PSU shipyards, except for the MDL, no other yards have full design capability to undertake construction of bigger and complex warships. Even MDL’s design capability is not comprehensive. Like other shipyards it is also dependent on the Navy which is the overall nodal agency for design activities pertaining to warship building.

However, this arrangement has not helped the Indian shipyards, including the MDL to become independent for the entire spectrum

of shipbuilding, besides creating some other peculiar problems. As one general manager of MDL noted, “Dependence on the Navy’s design has over the years proven to be detrimental to the shipyards …which do not get direct exposure to any new design concept and have stopped thinking about generating their own designs.”

Commercial Shipbuilding Industry Weak

Despite noticeable differences, a strong and competitive commercial shipbuilding industry has a positive impact on warship building. This is clearly evident from China where expansion and modernisation of commercial shipbuilding has vastly benefi ted all types of warship construction, in terms of quality, effi ciency and output. In India however this correlation is absent since the commercial shipbuilding industry is weak and ineffi cient. Compared to China, Japan and South Korea which are the global leaders in commercial shipbuilding with an individual share of more than 25 per cent each, Indian shipbuilding industry accounts for less than one per cent of the global share.

Need for a strong and competitive shipbuilding industry has been felt by many in India not only for employment generation and revenue earning potential, but also for strategic reasons. This has been highlighted by the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council (NMCC), a group constituted under the Prime Minister. The NMCC has identifi ed shipbuilding industry as one of the fi ve strategic sectors which needs to be strengthened to build national capabilities in the long-run.

To provide an impetus to the Indian shipbuilding industry the Maritime Agenda 2010-2020, announced by the Ministry of Shipping has laid emphasis to overcome the current weakness; and increase India’s share in global shipbuilding to fi ve per cent by 2020. According to the Agenda paper of the Commission the Indian shipbuilding industry is fraught with four key gaps. These are: manufacturing gap (mostly due to unfavorable taxation policy in comparison to foreign shipyards); technology gap; resource gap; and skill development gap.

To overcome these gaps, the Agenda

paper has given a number of policy recommendations, including tax incentive to domestic shipyards, capital subsidy to shipyards for acquisition of modern technology, formulation of maritime clusters for holistic growth of shipbuilding industry, enunciation of an offset policy in government procurement, and greater focus on ship design and R&D, among others.

Absence of a Strong Ancillary Industry

Like in any other sector ancillary industry plays a vital role in shipbuilding in general and warship building in particular. In India the general ancillary industry for shipbuilding is vastly underdeveloped. Given the poor state of ancillary industry, it is not surprising that India’s defence PSU shipyards also spend a vast amount of their resources in importing key raw materials, parts, components from foreign sources. The import dependency which is over Rs. 4,300 crore in past fi ve years for three key PSU shipyards (MDL, GRSE and GSL) has also a strategic underpinning and an impact on build period of naval ships. For example, in the case of P-17 ships, which are powered by the General Electric engine, the construction of ship was halted as the Obama administration stopped – although briefl y- “all work on the gas turbine engines.”

Given that external dependency has a strategic consequence apart from its bearing upon self-reliance, the Indian Navy has on its part formulated a long term indigenisation plan. The current plan, which caters to the period 2008-2022, provides some key details to domestic industry so that the industry could take up for indigenisation. However, given the capital and technology-intensive nature of naval machinery and equipment and low volume of business, few Indian companies have come forward.

One of the problems faced by the industry is the lack of hand-holding either by the MoD or the Navy to protect against failures, and long-term commitment from the government to safeguard business interests of the companies interested in manufacturing of such items.

Lack of Synergy between Public and Private Yards

A key weakness in India’s naval shipbuilding is lack of synergy between public and private shipyards. Till now both of those shipyards are operating separately without combining their respective strengths. It is however noteworthy that each sector has a unique set of advantage. While the pubic sector has long exposure to naval shipbuilding, the private yards have greater fl exibility and operational autonomy, in addition to the vast infrastructure they have created in recent years.

Given that the PSU shipyards, particularly the MDL and GRSE, alone are not in a position to meet the warship requirement in the required time-frame (given their huge order book, and slow execution rate) there is scope to partner with private yards to reduce the build period. In this regard, recently, joint venture (JV) policy announced by the MoD is a welcome step.

CONCLUSIONIndia has a huge industrial base for naval

warship construction. The growing capability of the industry is evident from its ability to construct major warships, including aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates and submarines. This positive feature of the industry notwithstanding, there are certain weaknesses in the naval shipbuilding industry, which prohibit it from meeting the vast requirement of the maritime forces in the required timeframe and cost effi ciently. Among others, the industry as a whole does not operate in a competitive environment; lacks the crucial capability in warship design; and lacks civil-military integration for naval construction.

Overcoming these challenges will be critical for creating a strong and vibrant naval shipbuilding industry in India. Among others, there is a need to completely open India’s warship building to private shipyards and providing them a level-playing fi led vis-à-vis PSU shipyards to bid for all types of naval contracts; delegate key responsibility, including warship design, to the shipyards to ensure accountability in naval construction; build a strong ancillary industry for shipbuilding; and promote close civil-military integration in warship building. DSI

AFP

Indian naval shipcome out of the dry dock



2120

shipyards are often found lacking in the areas of build period, inventory management, labour utilization, costing and procurement among others. The ineffi ciency has not only contributed to slow pace of construction, but has led to higher cost of production.

A part of the reason for ineffi ciency in the PSU shipyards is due to the way the shipyards are allowed to function. Being the government-owned enterprises, the PSU shipyards have limited operational and fi nancial decision making powers. In addition, they are also required to follow the strict government procurement rules which sometimes delay their modernisation programme.

For instance, MDL has to retender a procurement contract of a Goliath crane three times and in the process lost three years before it could fi nally sign the contract.

The most crucial operational limitation of the shipyards perhaps lies in actual warship building of large design. For the large warship projects, the shipyards do not have complete control over the ships they are supposed to build. It is primarily because of Indian Navy’s deeper involvement in crucial decision making in the shipbuilding process.

In case of major warships, the Navy prefers telescopic method of construction in which the design parameters are kept open for a long time. This often impinges upon the

schedule and cost of warship construction. Moreover, many a times the Navy brings in major changes in the design parameters midway through the construction process which necessitate modifi cation and cause further delays and cost overrun. Similarly, since the Navy nominates the key equipments and their sources of procurement, the shipyards fi nd it diffi cult to adhere to those decisions, for the reasons of higher cost, lack of competition and timely delivery. As a result, the normal construction schedule gets affected with due impact on the cost.

Above background, the most crucial parameter of performance of the shipyard in terms of cost and build period have taken a back seat. The cost escalation in two crucial projects such as P-15A and P-17 has been 225 per cent and 260 per cent, respectively. The time overrun is also quite signifi cant and higher than the average international standard. As the CAG noted, “As against the international timelines [for construction of a 1st ship of a class] ranging from 66-84 months, the indigenous construction of P-15 by MDL and P-16A by GRSE took 116 and 120 months respectively.”

Lack of Level-Playing Field One of the reasons why India’s warship

building is not at a pace with the induction requirement is because the private yards

are out of ambit of the major shipbuilding projects. Historically the defence production, including naval shipbuilding has been retained in the exclusive domain of the public sector enterprises. This continues to be so even though the 2001 reform measures have allowed 100 per cent private participation in defence production. The biggest obstacle for private yards is MoD’s shipbuilding procedures, which favour the public sector enterprises over the private yards.

The discrimination against the private sector shipyards is amply evident from the recent decision of the MoD to acquire six submarines (under P-75I programme) for the Indian Navy. As per the MoD’s plan, of the six submarines, two submarines will be imported from the foreign collaborator, and rest four to be constructed in two defence shipyards: three at MDL and one at HSL. From the private sector’s perspective what is worrisome is the decision to involve HSL, which has no prior experience in submarine construction. Compared to that some of the private yards, particularly the L&T, has experience in the India’s nuclear submarine construction.

Lack of Design Capability of Shipyards

Historically Indian shipyards are dependent on foreign sources for ship design, because of a lack of investments on R&D and shortage of qualifi ed naval architects and engineers. This has been a major factor why the majority of the Indian shipyards, especially the private yards, are constrained to participate in major naval shipbuilding projects, which involves more complex design compared to commercial shipbuilding. Among the defence PSU shipyards, except for the MDL, no other yards have full design capability to undertake construction of bigger and complex warships. Even MDL’s design capability is not comprehensive. Like other shipyards it is also dependent on the Navy which is the overall nodal agency for design activities pertaining to warship building.

However, this arrangement has not helped the Indian shipyards, including the MDL to become independent for the entire spectrum

of shipbuilding, besides creating some other peculiar problems. As one general manager of MDL noted, “Dependence on the Navy’s design has over the years proven to be detrimental to the shipyards …which do not get direct exposure to any new design concept and have stopped thinking about generating their own designs.”

Commercial Shipbuilding Industry Weak

Despite noticeable differences, a strong and competitive commercial shipbuilding industry has a positive impact on warship building. This is clearly evident from China where expansion and modernisation of commercial shipbuilding has vastly benefi ted all types of warship construction, in terms of quality, effi ciency and output. In India however this correlation is absent since the commercial shipbuilding industry is weak and ineffi cient. Compared to China, Japan and South Korea which are the global leaders in commercial shipbuilding with an individual share of more than 25 per cent each, Indian shipbuilding industry accounts for less than one per cent of the global share.

Need for a strong and competitive shipbuilding industry has been felt by many in India not only for employment generation and revenue earning potential, but also for strategic reasons. This has been highlighted by the National Manufacturing Competitiveness Council (NMCC), a group constituted under the Prime Minister. The NMCC has identifi ed shipbuilding industry as one of the fi ve strategic sectors which needs to be strengthened to build national capabilities in the long-run.

To provide an impetus to the Indian shipbuilding industry the Maritime Agenda 2010-2020, announced by the Ministry of Shipping has laid emphasis to overcome the current weakness; and increase India’s share in global shipbuilding to fi ve per cent by 2020. According to the Agenda paper of the Commission the Indian shipbuilding industry is fraught with four key gaps. These are: manufacturing gap (mostly due to unfavorable taxation policy in comparison to foreign shipyards); technology gap; resource gap; and skill development gap.

To overcome these gaps, the Agenda

paper has given a number of policy recommendations, including tax incentive to domestic shipyards, capital subsidy to shipyards for acquisition of modern technology, formulation of maritime clusters for holistic growth of shipbuilding industry, enunciation of an offset policy in government procurement, and greater focus on ship design and R&D, among others.

Absence of a Strong Ancillary Industry

Like in any other sector ancillary industry plays a vital role in shipbuilding in general and warship building in particular. In India the general ancillary industry for shipbuilding is vastly underdeveloped. Given the poor state of ancillary industry, it is not surprising that India’s defence PSU shipyards also spend a vast amount of their resources in importing key raw materials, parts, components from foreign sources. The import dependency which is over Rs. 4,300 crore in past fi ve years for three key PSU shipyards (MDL, GRSE and GSL) has also a strategic underpinning and an impact on build period of naval ships. For example, in the case of P-17 ships, which are powered by the General Electric engine, the construction of ship was halted as the Obama administration stopped – although briefl y- “all work on the gas turbine engines.”

Given that external dependency has a strategic consequence apart from its bearing upon self-reliance, the Indian Navy has on its part formulated a long term indigenisation plan. The current plan, which caters to the period 2008-2022, provides some key details to domestic industry so that the industry could take up for indigenisation. However, given the capital and technology-intensive nature of naval machinery and equipment and low volume of business, few Indian companies have come forward.

One of the problems faced by the industry is the lack of hand-holding either by the MoD or the Navy to protect against failures, and long-term commitment from the government to safeguard business interests of the companies interested in manufacturing of such items.

Lack of Synergy between Public and Private Yards

A key weakness in India’s naval shipbuilding is lack of synergy between public and private shipyards. Till now both of those shipyards are operating separately without combining their respective strengths. It is however noteworthy that each sector has a unique set of advantage. While the pubic sector has long exposure to naval shipbuilding, the private yards have greater fl exibility and operational autonomy, in addition to the vast infrastructure they have created in recent years.

Given that the PSU shipyards, particularly the MDL and GRSE, alone are not in a position to meet the warship requirement in the required time-frame (given their huge order book, and slow execution rate) there is scope to partner with private yards to reduce the build period. In this regard, recently, joint venture (JV) policy announced by the MoD is a welcome step.

CONCLUSIONIndia has a huge industrial base for naval

warship construction. The growing capability of the industry is evident from its ability to construct major warships, including aircraft carrier, destroyers, frigates and submarines. This positive feature of the industry notwithstanding, there are certain weaknesses in the naval shipbuilding industry, which prohibit it from meeting the vast requirement of the maritime forces in the required timeframe and cost effi ciently. Among others, the industry as a whole does not operate in a competitive environment; lacks the crucial capability in warship design; and lacks civil-military integration for naval construction.

Overcoming these challenges will be critical for creating a strong and vibrant naval shipbuilding industry in India. Among others, there is a need to completely open India’s warship building to private shipyards and providing them a level-playing fi led vis-à-vis PSU shipyards to bid for all types of naval contracts; delegate key responsibility, including warship design, to the shipyards to ensure accountability in naval construction; build a strong ancillary industry for shipbuilding; and promote close civil-military integration in warship building. DSI

AFP

Indian naval shipcome out of the dry dock


THE BACKBONE OF NAVAL POWER

Many states see the problem of reli-ably monitoring exclusive economic zones and defending national inter-ests at sea as one of the top priorities. Its military, economic and political as-pects are equally important. This is the reason why experts forecast steady de-mand in the global market for combat ships of main types, especially for frig-ates and corvettes making up the core of modern navies.

Russian shipbuilding enterprises are traditional leaders in this technology segment, and Rosoboronexport, the sole state arms exporter, promotes their products to the international mar-ket.

Rosoboronexport pursues an active marketing policy based on the analy-sis of real needs of potential custom-ers and off ers a wide range of subma-rines, combat ships and boats. In many cases off ers include not only delivery of fi nished items but also joint design and production either in customer ship-yards.

It is worthy of noting that Russia is among a few countries capable of building practically all types and class-es of ships, including nuclear-powered submarines. This fact is a clear illustra-tion of a high level of Russian science, design and shipbuilding technologies.

Project 21632 Tornado small mis-sile/gun ship is one of prospective articles of trade in the international naval systems market. Two ships of this project have been successfully commissioned by the Russian Navy. A number of foreign customers are also showing interest in such ships.

Rosoboronexport is ready to supply three modifi cations of the Tornado ship based on a common platform displacing 560 tons. The fi rst one is a gunship. Its main attack weapon is the 122-mm Grad rocket system designed to defeat coastal area tar-gets. The second Tornado version is a missile ship armed with the Uran-E antiship missile system having the launch range of 130 km. Each ver-sion is armed also with one 100-mm A-190E artillery gun mount, two 30-mm AK-630/AK-306 automatic six-barrel artillery gun mounts, 14.7-mm and 7.62-mm large-calibre machine guns, one 3M-47 Gibka pedestal mount with Igla type missiles. The third Tornado version is a patrol

ship armed with less powerful artil-lery systems and a helipad for opera-tions of helicopters with up to 4-tons gross weight.

The ship powered by the CODAD engines can develop a speed of up to 26 knots, and has high manoeu-

vrability in shallow waters thanks to its waterjet propulsors enabling op-erations even in navigable rivers and their estuaries.

The adaptable architecture of the Tornado ship makes it possible to modify composition not only of its weapon set but also machinery plant, as well as to fulfi l other specifi c cus-tomer’s requirements.

Rosoboronexport also off ers for-eign customers the Gepard 3.9 frig-ate derived from Project 11661 patrol ship. The frigate is in service with the Russian Navy since 2003. In recent years ships of this project have been actively procured in the international market.The 2,100-ton Gepard 3.9 frigate develops a speed of up to 28 knots. The ship has high combat and operational capabilities allowing it to navigate for a long time (its sea en-durance is 20 days) and control vast sea areas. The Gepard 3.9 frigate can operate autonomously or within a task force, perform escort and patrol missions, protect maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. The frigate is designed to search for and defeat surface, underwater and air-borne targets, and has a balanced and diversifi ed dedicated weapons set. It includes the Uran-E antiship missile system or unique Club-N in-

DSI Marketing Promotion

Gepard 3.9 frigate

Project 20382 Tigr corvette

tegrated missile system, 76.2-mm A-190E/AK-176 universal artillery mount and Palma air defence mis-sile/gun system with the Sosna-R missiles. The ship is armed with anti-submarine weapons including two 533-mm twin torpedo tubes. All types of weapons can be employed in Sea States up to 5. In addition, to enhance its attack and antisubma-rine warfare capabilities the ship car-ries one helicopter with up to 12-ton gross weight.

Project 20382 Tigr corvette un-veiled in 2007 is also designed to defend economic zones and mari-time state borders, and eff ectively struggle against submarines, surface ships and air attack weapons. The third such corvette intended for the Russian Navy was launched last June.

The Tigr corvette boasts a totally new design. It features a fl ush-deck hull and a superstructure made of glass fi bre and carbon fi bre materials which greatly reduce its radar signa-ture.

Thanks to innovative technological solutions implemented in its design the Tigr corvette has only a 2,220-ton displacement, which is small for its type, and boasts high seagoing characteristics (its speed attains 30 knots). As a result, thanks to the new underwater hull lines ship’s wa-ter drag is substantially reduced and required power of its main machinery plant is less by approximately 25 per-cent.

The corvette is armed with a pow-erful arsenal including the Uran-E antiship missile system (two other options are the Club-N integrated missile system or Yakhont missile system with the launch range of 300 km), 100-mm A-190E or AK-176M artillery gun mount, 30-mm AK-630M automatic artillery gun mount, Kashtan-M air defence missile/gun system, Paket small-size antisub-marine torpedo system, all operable at Sea States up to 5. In addition, the corvette can carry one helicopter.

Project 22356 multi-purpose frig-ate is designed to perform a wide range of missions in off -shore mari-

time zone. The 4,750-ton ship can develop a speed of up to 29.5 knots and navigate at a range of up to 4,500 n.miles with 30-days endur-ance. The fi rst frigate of this type was built for the Russian Navy and set afl oat in 2010.

The frigate’s main weapon is the Club-N integrated missile system ca-pable of launching both antiship and antisubmarine missiles. The frigate can eff ectively carry out all assigned missions thanks to a diversifi ed weapons set including artillery, air defence and antisubmarine systems as well as Ka-28 or Ka-31 ship-based helicopters. Thanks to the optimised hull shape, sharp-rising stem and double bottom in the greater part of the hull the ship has excellent sea-going and protection qualities, while the application of advanced ship stabilisers with non-retractable fi ns allows unrestricted weapons em-ployment at Sea States up to 5.

The above mentioned ships off ered by Rosoboronexport fully correspond to latest trends in shipbuilding, and can enhance combat capabilities of any country’s navy by many times. They are fi tted with most advanced combat information management systems and underwater, maritime and airspace situation awareness systems; their designs incorporate stealth technologies to the full ex-tent. In addition, all of them possess large upgrading potentials.

Tornado

Ship_ad.indd 30-31Ship_ad.indd 30-31 02/01/13 10:53 AM02/01/13 10:53 AM

THE BACKBONE OF NAVAL POWER

Many states see the problem of reli-ably monitoring exclusive economic zones and defending national inter-ests at sea as one of the top priorities. Its military, economic and political as-pects are equally important. This is the reason why experts forecast steady de-mand in the global market for combat ships of main types, especially for frig-ates and corvettes making up the core of modern navies.

Russian shipbuilding enterprises are traditional leaders in this technology segment, and Rosoboronexport, the sole state arms exporter, promotes their products to the international mar-ket.

Rosoboronexport pursues an active marketing policy based on the analy-sis of real needs of potential custom-ers and off ers a wide range of subma-rines, combat ships and boats. In many cases off ers include not only delivery of fi nished items but also joint design and production either in customer ship-yards.

It is worthy of noting that Russia is among a few countries capable of building practically all types and class-es of ships, including nuclear-powered submarines. This fact is a clear illustra-tion of a high level of Russian science, design and shipbuilding technologies.

Project 21632 Tornado small mis-sile/gun ship is one of prospective articles of trade in the international naval systems market. Two ships of this project have been successfully commissioned by the Russian Navy. A number of foreign customers are also showing interest in such ships.

Rosoboronexport is ready to supply three modifi cations of the Tornado ship based on a common platform displacing 560 tons. The fi rst one is a gunship. Its main attack weapon is the 122-mm Grad rocket system designed to defeat coastal area tar-gets. The second Tornado version is a missile ship armed with the Uran-E antiship missile system having the launch range of 130 km. Each ver-sion is armed also with one 100-mm A-190E artillery gun mount, two 30-mm AK-630/AK-306 automatic six-barrel artillery gun mounts, 14.7-mm and 7.62-mm large-calibre machine guns, one 3M-47 Gibka pedestal mount with Igla type missiles. The third Tornado version is a patrol

ship armed with less powerful artil-lery systems and a helipad for opera-tions of helicopters with up to 4-tons gross weight.

The ship powered by the CODAD engines can develop a speed of up to 26 knots, and has high manoeu-

vrability in shallow waters thanks to its waterjet propulsors enabling op-erations even in navigable rivers and their estuaries.

The adaptable architecture of the Tornado ship makes it possible to modify composition not only of its weapon set but also machinery plant, as well as to fulfi l other specifi c cus-tomer’s requirements.

Rosoboronexport also off ers for-eign customers the Gepard 3.9 frig-ate derived from Project 11661 patrol ship. The frigate is in service with the Russian Navy since 2003. In recent years ships of this project have been actively procured in the international market.The 2,100-ton Gepard 3.9 frigate develops a speed of up to 28 knots. The ship has high combat and operational capabilities allowing it to navigate for a long time (its sea en-durance is 20 days) and control vast sea areas. The Gepard 3.9 frigate can operate autonomously or within a task force, perform escort and patrol missions, protect maritime borders and exclusive economic zones. The frigate is designed to search for and defeat surface, underwater and air-borne targets, and has a balanced and diversifi ed dedicated weapons set. It includes the Uran-E antiship missile system or unique Club-N in-

DSI Marketing Promotion

Gepard 3.9 frigate

Project 20382 Tigr corvette

tegrated missile system, 76.2-mm A-190E/AK-176 universal artillery mount and Palma air defence mis-sile/gun system with the Sosna-R missiles. The ship is armed with anti-submarine weapons including two 533-mm twin torpedo tubes. All types of weapons can be employed in Sea States up to 5. In addition, to enhance its attack and antisubma-rine warfare capabilities the ship car-ries one helicopter with up to 12-ton gross weight.

Project 20382 Tigr corvette un-veiled in 2007 is also designed to defend economic zones and mari-time state borders, and eff ectively struggle against submarines, surface ships and air attack weapons. The third such corvette intended for the Russian Navy was launched last June.

The Tigr corvette boasts a totally new design. It features a fl ush-deck hull and a superstructure made of glass fi bre and carbon fi bre materials which greatly reduce its radar signa-ture.

Thanks to innovative technological solutions implemented in its design the Tigr corvette has only a 2,220-ton displacement, which is small for its type, and boasts high seagoing characteristics (its speed attains 30 knots). As a result, thanks to the new underwater hull lines ship’s wa-ter drag is substantially reduced and required power of its main machinery plant is less by approximately 25 per-cent.

The corvette is armed with a pow-erful arsenal including the Uran-E antiship missile system (two other options are the Club-N integrated missile system or Yakhont missile system with the launch range of 300 km), 100-mm A-190E or AK-176M artillery gun mount, 30-mm AK-630M automatic artillery gun mount, Kashtan-M air defence missile/gun system, Paket small-size antisub-marine torpedo system, all operable at Sea States up to 5. In addition, the corvette can carry one helicopter.

Project 22356 multi-purpose frig-ate is designed to perform a wide range of missions in off -shore mari-

time zone. The 4,750-ton ship can develop a speed of up to 29.5 knots and navigate at a range of up to 4,500 n.miles with 30-days endur-ance. The fi rst frigate of this type was built for the Russian Navy and set afl oat in 2010.

The frigate’s main weapon is the Club-N integrated missile system ca-pable of launching both antiship and antisubmarine missiles. The frigate can eff ectively carry out all assigned missions thanks to a diversifi ed weapons set including artillery, air defence and antisubmarine systems as well as Ka-28 or Ka-31 ship-based helicopters. Thanks to the optimised hull shape, sharp-rising stem and double bottom in the greater part of the hull the ship has excellent sea-going and protection qualities, while the application of advanced ship stabilisers with non-retractable fi ns allows unrestricted weapons em-ployment at Sea States up to 5.

The above mentioned ships off ered by Rosoboronexport fully correspond to latest trends in shipbuilding, and can enhance combat capabilities of any country’s navy by many times. They are fi tted with most advanced combat information management systems and underwater, maritime and airspace situation awareness systems; their designs incorporate stealth technologies to the full ex-tent. In addition, all of them possess large upgrading potentials.

Tornado

Ship_ad.indd 30-31Ship_ad.indd 30-31 02/01/13 10:53 AM02/01/13 10:53 AM

CYBER WARFARE

24

DECEMBER 2012

25

DSI

KEY POINTS � The Stuxnet worm was the most lethal use of cyber weapons ever made till now.

� The Chinese have an elaborate plan for cyber warfare based on the concept of peoples’ war, thought up by Mao.

� ‘Acupuncture’ warfare is strategic use of cyber weapons to hit the central controlling authority of the opposition.

Gurmeet Kanwal

In the recent past, the world has seen three major examples of information technology being deployed as weapons of War. Though most of those cyber attacks originated in the USA and Israel, this article argues the 800 pound gorilla in the fi eld is China

Cyber-attack: Stuxnet and other worms

Space has been called the new high ground in war, but cyber

space is truly the new frontier that has made boundaries irrelevant. War can now be waged against a military adversary from any computer on earth. Recent events highlight how this has been happening with increasing frequency.

On June 23, 2009, Robert Gates, the US Secretary of Defence, authorised the creation of a new US military command that will develop offensive cyber-weapons and defend command and control networks against computer attacks. In January 2010, senior Pentagon leaders attended a simulation exercise on how the Pentagon would respond to a sophisticated cyber-attack aimed at paralysing power grids, communications systems and fi nancial networks across the country.

Shortly after this wargame, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had said, “States, terrorists and those who would act as their

proxies must know that the United States will protect our networks… Those who disrupt the free fl ow of information in our society or any other pose a threat to our economy, our government and our civil society.” Clearly, the US has adopted a pro-active cyberwar strategy. This was evident in the Stuxnet virus attack on the Iranian nuclear facility near Natanz reportedly launched jointly by the US and Israel in June 2010. Approximately 10 per cent of the centrifuges being used for the enrichment of uranium were destroyed through a worm that infected the computers controlling the facility.

India, with its growing economy and infrastructure and a military increasingly more dependent on computers for command, control, communications and surveillance, is equally vulnerable. In alarming front page news reports published by several Indian newspapers in 2010, Chinese cyber spies were reported to have hacked into computers and stolen documents from hundreds of government and private offi ces around the world, including those of the Indian embassy

in the US. More recently, it was reported that during the Israel-Hamas rocket attack stand-off in November 2012, the Israelis successfully targeted the command and control network of the Hamas.

While the emerging cyber threats originate from various sources including non-state actors, among nation states the Chinese are suspected to be the leading purveyors of offensive cyber strategies and Pakistan is working hard to play catch up. Though information about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) cyber warriors has begun to appear in the public domain only recently, PLA watchers across the world have known for long about China’s well conceived doctrine on information operations and cyberwar.

China’s cyberwar doctrine is designed to level the playing fi eld in a future war with better equipped Western armed forces that rely on Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies and enjoy immense superiority in terms of weapon platforms and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control networks.


In Chinese thinking, IW presents a level playing

fi eld for projectingpower and prevailing

upon the adversary infuture wars. However, it

has not been possible toascertain from open

public sources whether IW is fully integrated with

the doctrine of peopleʼs war under modern

conditions

The Chinese army uses more than 10,000 cyber warriors with degrees in information technology to maintain an e-vigil on China’s borders. “Chinese soldiers now swipe cards and work on laptops as they monitor the border with great effi ciency, electronic sentinels functioning 24 hours a day.” Parallel to this effort, China is also engaged in raising a private army of hackers who will wage cyber-war against the state’s enemies from their laptops at home.

Informationisation as a backdrop for cyberwar

Early in the fi rst decade of the new century, the Central Military Commission (CMC) called for a detailed study of the concept of people’s war under conditions of informationisation. Since then China has spent a lot of time and effort in assessing the implications of information technology and knowledge-based warfare on future confl ict and to applying the lessons to its own war concepts.

The PLA expects to fi ght the next war under conditions of what it calls “informationisation”

AFP

Cyber-warfare.indd 24-25Cyber-warfare.indd 24-25 28/12/12 10:52 AM28/12/12 10:52 AM

CYBER WARFARE

24

DECEMBER 2012

25

DSI

KEY POINTS � The Stuxnet worm was the most lethal use of cyber weapons ever made till now.

� The Chinese have an elaborate plan for cyber warfare based on the concept of peoples’ war, thought up by Mao.

� ‘Acupuncture’ warfare is strategic use of cyber weapons to hit the central controlling authority of the opposition.

Gurmeet Kanwal

In the recent past, the world has seen three major examples of information technology being deployed as weapons of War. Though most of those cyber attacks originated in the USA and Israel, this article argues the 800 pound gorilla in the fi eld is China

Cyber-attack: Stuxnet and other worms

Space has been called the new high ground in war, but cyber

space is truly the new frontier that has made boundaries irrelevant. War can now be waged against a military adversary from any computer on earth. Recent events highlight how this has been happening with increasing frequency.

On June 23, 2009, Robert Gates, the US Secretary of Defence, authorised the creation of a new US military command that will develop offensive cyber-weapons and defend command and control networks against computer attacks. In January 2010, senior Pentagon leaders attended a simulation exercise on how the Pentagon would respond to a sophisticated cyber-attack aimed at paralysing power grids, communications systems and fi nancial networks across the country.

Shortly after this wargame, US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had said, “States, terrorists and those who would act as their

proxies must know that the United States will protect our networks… Those who disrupt the free fl ow of information in our society or any other pose a threat to our economy, our government and our civil society.” Clearly, the US has adopted a pro-active cyberwar strategy. This was evident in the Stuxnet virus attack on the Iranian nuclear facility near Natanz reportedly launched jointly by the US and Israel in June 2010. Approximately 10 per cent of the centrifuges being used for the enrichment of uranium were destroyed through a worm that infected the computers controlling the facility.

India, with its growing economy and infrastructure and a military increasingly more dependent on computers for command, control, communications and surveillance, is equally vulnerable. In alarming front page news reports published by several Indian newspapers in 2010, Chinese cyber spies were reported to have hacked into computers and stolen documents from hundreds of government and private offi ces around the world, including those of the Indian embassy

in the US. More recently, it was reported that during the Israel-Hamas rocket attack stand-off in November 2012, the Israelis successfully targeted the command and control network of the Hamas.

While the emerging cyber threats originate from various sources including non-state actors, among nation states the Chinese are suspected to be the leading purveyors of offensive cyber strategies and Pakistan is working hard to play catch up. Though information about the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) cyber warriors has begun to appear in the public domain only recently, PLA watchers across the world have known for long about China’s well conceived doctrine on information operations and cyberwar.

China’s cyberwar doctrine is designed to level the playing fi eld in a future war with better equipped Western armed forces that rely on Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) technologies and enjoy immense superiority in terms of weapon platforms and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control networks.


In Chinese thinking, IW presents a level playing

fi eld for projectingpower and prevailing

upon the adversary infuture wars. However, it

has not been possible toascertain from open

public sources whether IW is fully integrated with

the doctrine of peopleʼs war under modern

conditions

The Chinese army uses more than 10,000 cyber warriors with degrees in information technology to maintain an e-vigil on China’s borders. “Chinese soldiers now swipe cards and work on laptops as they monitor the border with great effi ciency, electronic sentinels functioning 24 hours a day.” Parallel to this effort, China is also engaged in raising a private army of hackers who will wage cyber-war against the state’s enemies from their laptops at home.

Informationisation as a backdrop for cyberwar

Early in the fi rst decade of the new century, the Central Military Commission (CMC) called for a detailed study of the concept of people’s war under conditions of informationisation. Since then China has spent a lot of time and effort in assessing the implications of information technology and knowledge-based warfare on future confl ict and to applying the lessons to its own war concepts.

The PLA expects to fi ght the next war under conditions of what it calls “informationisation”

AFP


CYBER WARFARE

26

DECEMBER 2012

27

DSI

or “informationalisation”. In the White Paper on National Defence issued in 2004, informationisation was explained in general terms for the fi rst time: “To adapt itself to the changes both in the international strategic situation and the national security environment and rise to the challenges presented by the RMA worldwide, China adheres to the military strategy of active defense and works to speed up the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

PLA analysts have called the ongoing RMA an “informationised military revolution”. Informationisation “clearly relates to the PLA’s ability to adopt information technologies to command, intelligence, training and weapon systems. This would include broad investment in new automatic command systems linked by fi bre-optic Internet, satellite and new high-frequency digital radio systems. The PLA can also contest the information battle space with its new space-based, airborne, naval and ground-based surveillance and intelligence gathering systems and its new anti-satellite, anti-radar, electronic warfare and information warfare system, there is increasing ‘information content’ for new PLA weapons as it moves to link new space,

airborne and ELINT sensors to missile, air, naval and ground-based ‘shooters’ to enable all its services to better use new precision-strike weapons.” According to the 2004 White Paper, “In its modernisation drive, the PLA takes informationalisation as its orientation and strategic focus.” The PLA has adopted what it calls a “double historical mission” and a “leapfrog development strategy” – accelerating military informationisation while undergoing mechanisation.

Information Operations – Acupuncture Warfare

The denial of information, strategic deception and the achievement of psychological surprise have for long been an integral part of Chinese military doctrine. The Chinese fi nd information warfare (IW) extremely attractive as they view it as an asymmetric tool that will enable them to overcome their relative backwardness in kinetic military hardware. The Chinese are devoting considerable time and energy to perfecting the techniques of IW to target the rapidly modernising Western armed forces that are becoming increasingly more dependent on the software that

runs computer networks and modern communications.

In Chinese thinking, IW presents a level playing fi eld for projecting power and prevailing upon the adversary in future wars. However, it has not been possible to ascertain from open public sources whether IW is fully integrated with the doctrine of people’s war under modern conditions or if it is still treated as a separate but complementary pattern of war (zhanzheng xingtai). There is also some confusion created by the use of the term informationised warfare (xinxihua zhanzheng) instead of IW (xinxi zhanzheng). However, there is no ambiguity in the manner in which the Chinese view information operations:• Intelligence operations, which include

intelligence reconnaissance and protection.• Command and control operations to

disrupt enemy information fl ow and weaken his C2 capability while protecting one’s own.

• Electronic warfare by seizing the electromagnetic initiative through electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.

• Targeting enemy computer systems and

networks to damage and destroy critical machines and networks and the data stored on them.

• Physical destruction of enemy sources like information infrastructure such as C4ISR through the application of fi repower.

The Chinese call their pursuit of information warfare and other hi-tech means to counter Washington’s overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities. “Acupuncture warfare” is a term that fi rst surfaced in a 1997 PLA National Defence University publication entitled “On Commanding Warfi ghting under High-Tech Conditions”. Acupuncture warfare (also called “paralysis warfare”) was described as “Paralysing the enemy by attacking the weak link of his command, control, communications and information as if hitting his acupuncture point in kung fu combat.” Acupuncture warfare is a form of asymmetrical warfare dating back to the teachings of Sun Tzu, China’s pre-eminent military strategist from the 5th century BC. For quite some time now the PLA has been simulating computer virus attacks in its military exercises.

According to a US Congressional Research Service report entitled “Cyberwarfare”,

authored by Steve Hildreth, China is developing a strategic information warfare unit called “Net Force” to neutralise the military capabilities of technologically superior adversaries. This new information warfare unit will “wage combat through computer networks to manipulate enemy information systems spanning spare parts deliveries to fi re control and guidance systems.” Though the PLA’s research into the theoretical aspects of information warfare is fairly advanced, it does not appear to have developed a coordinated and integrated information warfare doctrine as yet.

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, says Beijing is re-directing its emphasis away from nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical strategy and its “overarching purpose is to deter the United States from intervening around China’s peripheries and to seize Taiwan with minimum bloodshed and destruction.” In another fi ve to 10 years China will develop depth and sophistication in its understanding and handling of information warfare techniques and information operations.

With Indian society becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, India has become extremely vulnerable to such information warfare techniques. The fact that it can be practiced from virtually any place on the earth even during peacetime makes acupuncture warfare even more diabolical. India can ill-afford to ignore this new challenge to its security.

Defence analysts Timperlake and Triplett have written that economic, political and social systems are essentially unprotected against

Chinese information warfare attack. In their view, China has adopted a comprehensive strategy to further its information warfare plans: Information warfare has the support of the top PLA brass; the PLA’s best strategists and defence scientists have had extensive open discussions about information warfare; the PLA is conducting military exercises in information warfare; it is expanding its already strong signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability in Cuba; and, the PLA is buying the hardware necessary. As supercomputers require huge capital investments, a strong political and fi nancial commitment is implied. The Chinese are recruiting scientists and technicians and are building related weapons such as high-powered microwave weapons.

The PLA is acutely conscious of its continuing relative backwardness in information technologies. To prepare itself for a confl ict with an RMA-ready opponent, China’s military thinkers recommend that China must close the information gap; network all forces; attack the enemy’s C3I to paralyse it; use directed energy weapons; and computer viruses. Physical measures include the use of submarine-launched munitions; anti-satellite weapons; forces to prevent a logistics build-up; and special operations raids. Timothy Thomas, of the Foreign Military Studies Offi ce at Fort Leavenworth, has written about a 1999 “network battle” fought between Chinese and American “hackers after the US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade”.

In fact, efforts to inculcate an IT culture are being extended all the way down to the troops deployed to guard China’s borders: “With a vast pool of IT-trained offi cers in place, China’s border vigil is turning electronic. Sentries

AFP

A cyber security specialist speaks at a

cybersecurity and communication centre in the USA

AFP

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwanʼs

Mainland Aff airsCouncil, says Beijing is

re-directing itsemphasis away from

nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical

strategy and its“overarching purpose is

to deter the United States from intervening

around Chinaʼsperipheries and to seize

Taiwan


CYBER WARFARE

26

DECEMBER 2012

27

DSI

or “informationalisation”. In the White Paper on National Defence issued in 2004, informationisation was explained in general terms for the fi rst time: “To adapt itself to the changes both in the international strategic situation and the national security environment and rise to the challenges presented by the RMA worldwide, China adheres to the military strategy of active defense and works to speed up the RMA with Chinese characteristics.

PLA analysts have called the ongoing RMA an “informationised military revolution”. Informationisation “clearly relates to the PLA’s ability to adopt information technologies to command, intelligence, training and weapon systems. This would include broad investment in new automatic command systems linked by fi bre-optic Internet, satellite and new high-frequency digital radio systems. The PLA can also contest the information battle space with its new space-based, airborne, naval and ground-based surveillance and intelligence gathering systems and its new anti-satellite, anti-radar, electronic warfare and information warfare system, there is increasing ‘information content’ for new PLA weapons as it moves to link new space,

airborne and ELINT sensors to missile, air, naval and ground-based ‘shooters’ to enable all its services to better use new precision-strike weapons.” According to the 2004 White Paper, “In its modernisation drive, the PLA takes informationalisation as its orientation and strategic focus.” The PLA has adopted what it calls a “double historical mission” and a “leapfrog development strategy” – accelerating military informationisation while undergoing mechanisation.

Information Operations – Acupuncture Warfare

The denial of information, strategic deception and the achievement of psychological surprise have for long been an integral part of Chinese military doctrine. The Chinese fi nd information warfare (IW) extremely attractive as they view it as an asymmetric tool that will enable them to overcome their relative backwardness in kinetic military hardware. The Chinese are devoting considerable time and energy to perfecting the techniques of IW to target the rapidly modernising Western armed forces that are becoming increasingly more dependent on the software that

runs computer networks and modern communications.

In Chinese thinking, IW presents a level playing fi eld for projecting power and prevailing upon the adversary in future wars. However, it has not been possible to ascertain from open public sources whether IW is fully integrated with the doctrine of people’s war under modern conditions or if it is still treated as a separate but complementary pattern of war (zhanzheng xingtai). There is also some confusion created by the use of the term informationised warfare (xinxihua zhanzheng) instead of IW (xinxi zhanzheng). However, there is no ambiguity in the manner in which the Chinese view information operations:• Intelligence operations, which include

intelligence reconnaissance and protection.• Command and control operations to

disrupt enemy information fl ow and weaken his C2 capability while protecting one’s own.

• Electronic warfare by seizing the electromagnetic initiative through electronic attack, electronic protection and electronic warfare support.

• Targeting enemy computer systems and

networks to damage and destroy critical machines and networks and the data stored on them.

• Physical destruction of enemy sources like information infrastructure such as C4ISR through the application of fi repower.

The Chinese call their pursuit of information warfare and other hi-tech means to counter Washington’s overwhelmingly superior conventional military capabilities. “Acupuncture warfare” is a term that fi rst surfaced in a 1997 PLA National Defence University publication entitled “On Commanding Warfi ghting under High-Tech Conditions”. Acupuncture warfare (also called “paralysis warfare”) was described as “Paralysing the enemy by attacking the weak link of his command, control, communications and information as if hitting his acupuncture point in kung fu combat.” Acupuncture warfare is a form of asymmetrical warfare dating back to the teachings of Sun Tzu, China’s pre-eminent military strategist from the 5th century BC. For quite some time now the PLA has been simulating computer virus attacks in its military exercises.

According to a US Congressional Research Service report entitled “Cyberwarfare”,

authored by Steve Hildreth, China is developing a strategic information warfare unit called “Net Force” to neutralise the military capabilities of technologically superior adversaries. This new information warfare unit will “wage combat through computer networks to manipulate enemy information systems spanning spare parts deliveries to fi re control and guidance systems.” Though the PLA’s research into the theoretical aspects of information warfare is fairly advanced, it does not appear to have developed a coordinated and integrated information warfare doctrine as yet.

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, says Beijing is re-directing its emphasis away from nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical strategy and its “overarching purpose is to deter the United States from intervening around China’s peripheries and to seize Taiwan with minimum bloodshed and destruction.” In another fi ve to 10 years China will develop depth and sophistication in its understanding and handling of information warfare techniques and information operations.

With Indian society becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, India has become extremely vulnerable to such information warfare techniques. The fact that it can be practiced from virtually any place on the earth even during peacetime makes acupuncture warfare even more diabolical. India can ill-afford to ignore this new challenge to its security.

Defence analysts Timperlake and Triplett have written that economic, political and social systems are essentially unprotected against

Chinese information warfare attack. In their view, China has adopted a comprehensive strategy to further its information warfare plans: Information warfare has the support of the top PLA brass; the PLA’s best strategists and defence scientists have had extensive open discussions about information warfare; the PLA is conducting military exercises in information warfare; it is expanding its already strong signals intelligence (SIGINT) capability in Cuba; and, the PLA is buying the hardware necessary. As supercomputers require huge capital investments, a strong political and fi nancial commitment is implied. The Chinese are recruiting scientists and technicians and are building related weapons such as high-powered microwave weapons.

The PLA is acutely conscious of its continuing relative backwardness in information technologies. To prepare itself for a confl ict with an RMA-ready opponent, China’s military thinkers recommend that China must close the information gap; network all forces; attack the enemy’s C3I to paralyse it; use directed energy weapons; and computer viruses. Physical measures include the use of submarine-launched munitions; anti-satellite weapons; forces to prevent a logistics build-up; and special operations raids. Timothy Thomas, of the Foreign Military Studies Offi ce at Fort Leavenworth, has written about a 1999 “network battle” fought between Chinese and American “hackers after the US bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade”.

In fact, efforts to inculcate an IT culture are being extended all the way down to the troops deployed to guard China’s borders: “With a vast pool of IT-trained offi cers in place, China’s border vigil is turning electronic. Sentries

AFP

A cyber security specialist speaks at a

cybersecurity and communication centre in the USA

AFP

Chong-Pin Lee, Vice Chairman of Taiwanʼs

Mainland Aff airsCouncil, says Beijing is

re-directing itsemphasis away from

nuclear deterrence to this new asymmetrical

strategy and its“overarching purpose is

to deter the United States from intervening

around Chinaʼsperipheries and to seize

Taiwan


CYBER WARFARE

28

work with IC cards and other sophisticated equipment. The use of electronic devices has enhanced the army’s ability to deal with emergencies quickly and effi ciently, according to sources…”

Developing cyberwarfare capabilities is seen in presenting a level playing fi eld in an otherwise David versus Goliath scenario as Chinese hardware is no match for the weapons technology fi elded today by the US and its allies. Recent cyber attacks directed against Taiwan and the US are indicative of the efforts to develop new techniques, viruses and logic bombs. Information warfare will be crucial in the opening phases of a war aimed at the re-unifi cation of Taiwan or a border confl ict with India as it will be important to knock out the adversary’s communications infrastructure by cyber as well as physical means.

Compared with China’s historically reactive stance of luring the enemy in deep and destroying him through strategic defence, the country’s cyber strategy is essentially pro-active and seeks to take the battle into enemy territory. It also strives to achieve surprise in a pro-active manner that is demonstrated by new “quick-strike” tactics. The aim is to catch the enemy unprepared in order to infl ict substantial damage on strategic targets and disrupt logistics to gain psychological ascendancy. While the land frontier is DSI

expected to continue to generate some local tensions, the CMC has identifi ed space and the oceans as the new areas where future confl ict might take place.

Cyber Pearl Harbour: Increasing Indian Vulnerabilities

In another fi ve to 10 years China will develop much greater depth and sophistication in its understanding and handling of information warfare techniques and information operations. With Indian society becoming increasingly dependent on automated data processing and vast computer networks, India will also become extremely vulnerable to such information warfare techniques. Major infrastructure like telecom, railways, air traffi c control, banks, stock exchanges, power grids and the C4I2SR systems of the armed forces are all dependent on computer networks, which are vulnerable to cyber attacks and cyber manipulation. The nothingness of cyberspace connects China’s laptop warriors directly with Delhi, Mumbai, Kolkata, Chennai, Bangalore and Hyderabad and other Indian cities, as also India’s strategic establishments. The fact that cyberwar can be launched from virtually any place on the earth even during peacetime makes acupuncture or paralysis warfare even more diabolical.

Cyber ‘soldiers’ (hackers)exchanging views

AFP

India can ill-afford to ignore this new challenge to its security. India should adopt an inter-ministerial, inter-departmental, inter-Services, multi-agency approach to dealing with emerging cyber warfare threats and must develop appropriate responses. No single agency in India is charged with ensuring cyber and IT security. A nodal agency must be created to spearhead India’s cyberwar efforts under a national cyber security advisor who should report directly to the NSA. The armed forces must be part of the overall national effort from the very beginning so that emerging tactics, techniques and procedures can be incorporated into doctrine and training. Hence, India too needs a Cyber Command to lead efforts within the military to safeguard computer networks from hackers and cyber attacks. The strategy must be defensive to guard India’s vulnerable assets, such as military command and control networks and civilian infrastructure dependent on the use of cyber space, as well as offensive to disrupt the adversary’s C4I2SR systems and develop leverages that can be exploited at the appropriate time. With some of the fi nest software brains in the world available to India, it should not prove to be an insurmountable challenge.

It is heartening to note that the Indian government has taken note of the seriousness of the threat and the Cabinet Committee on Security has initiated steps to evolve a comprehensive cyber security strategy. It was reported in November 2012 that Mr. Gulshan Rai, who presently heads the Indian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-IN), would be named the fi rst National Cyber Security Coordinator (NCSC). It is proposed to establish a National Critical Information Infrastructure Protection Centre (NCIPC). This will be a command and control nerve centre that will monitor protection of the critical infrastructure. The NCIPC will in all probability be managed by the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), India’s technical intelligence gathering agency. The NTRO and the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) are best suited to plan and execute offensive cyber operations. The NSA should be at the apex of India’s cyber security strategy as the chief planner and trouble shooter.

Cyber-warfare.indd 28Cyber-warfare.indd 28 28/12/12 10:52 AM28/12/12 10:52 AM

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DEFENCE and SECURITYof INDIAJULY 2012 DSIVOLUME 4 ISSUE 5 ` 250

SIACHEN GLACIERCONFLICT WITHOUT END The Siachen imbroglio has been misunderstood, even

mismanaged, by Indian policy makers I B.G. VERGHESE

INDO-EUROPEAN RELATIONSINCREASING TIESDefence relations between India and Europe are poised

to grow in the coming decade I KANWAL SIBAL

TAKING TOTHE SKIESTHE DEFENCE SERVICES ARE INDUCTING ROTARY WING

AIRCRAFT IN HUGE NUMBERS I AJAI SHUKLA

THE DEFENCE SERVICES ARE INDUCTING ROTARY WING

AIRCRAFT IN HUGE NUMBERS I AJAI SHUKLA

r feb3.qxd 20/07/12 1:55 PM Page 2

AIR DEFENCE

FUTURE PROMISINGTechnical solutions to air defence woes of

the Indian armed forces exist | PRAHALADA

LEFT WING EXTREMISM

NEEDS A NON-VIOLENT SOLUTION

The development agenda needs more

focus | BRIG (RETD) ARUN SAHGAL


DSISEPTEMBER 2012

VOLUME 4 • ISSUE 6 • ` 250

INDIA AND ISRAEL

TOGETHERIN DEFENCE

ISRAEL IS INDIA’S SECOND

LARGEST ARMS SUPPLIER

MAJ GEN (RETD) RAMESH C CHOPRA

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18/09/12 5:19 PM18/09/12


DSIDECEMBER 2012 VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 2 • ` 250

NEW LOOKINDIAN NAVY WITH FIVE SHIPS BEING DELIVERED ANNUALLY TO THE NAVY TILL 2020, THE FORCE SEEMS TO HAVE SETUP A SCORCHING PACE, WRITES VICE ADMIRAL (RETD.) ANUP SINGH

NETWORK CENTRICITYBATTLEFIELD OF 21ST CENTURYBattlefi eld Management System lifts the ‘fog of war’ to a signifi cant extent. | SHANKAR RAJAGOPALAN

CYBER WARFARE CHINA’S NEW ACUPUNCTURE WARFAREA new dimension of warfare has opened up in thecyber space | BRIG. (RETD.) GURMEET KANWAL

cover2nd time.indd 1 03/01/13 10:00 AM

NUCLEAR CBMs

NEED MORE INDIA, PAK NUKE TRUST

The trust defi cit between the two countries have to

go for CBMs to succeed | G BALACHANDRAN

INDIA’S SUBMARINE STORY

ENDEMIC SHORTAGES

Like artillery procurement, Indian Navy’s sub

woes continue | COMMODORE (RETD) ANIL JAI SINGH


DSIOCTOBER 2012

VOLUME 5 • ISSUE 1 • ` 250

RUSSIAN FGFA

PAK FA TAKING OFFINDIA’S GIANT LEAP OF FAITH, THE FGFA WILL BE A

QUANTUM JUMP IN TECHNOLOGICAL TERMS

AIR VICE MARSHALL (RETD) KAPIL KAK DISCUSSES

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ANTI PIRACY DECEMBER 2012 DSI

3130

KEY POINTS � The failure of the Somalian state and bloody tribal warfares have caused the Somalian fi shermen and others who lived off the sea, to turn into pirates.� The world reacted to the threat of Somali piracy in a delayed fashion. The delay was caused by the piracy lying below the threshold of pain of the maritime nations.� The United Nations Security Council Resolutions provide enough teeth to the anti-piracy operations that are truly multi-national

Sarabjeet Singh Parmar

The crisis of the Eastern African countries spilling over the Indian Ocean created a major problem for international trade and communication. India was dragged into play - not unwillingly - in keeping the high seas safe.

For centuries pirates have long been regarded as hostes humani generis, “common enemies of mankind.” In fact, piracy like

murder is one of the earliest of recorded human activities. This recognition of piracy as a universal crime resulted in nations as far back as the Roman Empire capturing and executing pirates. Notwithstanding the long standing fi ght against piracy down the ages crime still persists and has from time to time re-emerged to plague mankind. The reason is very simple – it is a lucrative business that can be called a cyclic enterprise that feeds itself. This is an aspect that arises from the fact that the initial inputs are comparatively minuscule when compared to the remunerations thereby permitting pirates to increase both their activities and area of operations. In addition, the increase in maritime trade over the centuries and non-recognition of piracy as a threat has aided in the fl ourishing of piracy. History

is testament that only when the maritime trade and the safety of a nation’s people have been threatened that action has been taken against it.

The last few decades has seen a rise in piracy, most signifi cantly, in the Malacca Straits, off Somalia and the western coast of Africa. Although the reasons are varied the main pillars that led to the rise are instability, geography, safe havens and economics. Captain Henry Kebbel the renowned nineteenth century hunter of oriental pirates, wrote – “As surely as spiders abound where there are nooks and crannies, so have pirates sprung up wherever there is a nest of islands offering creeks and shallows, headlands, rocks and reefs”.

Geographically this stood true for piracy in the Malacca Straits, however, due to stability in the region and a comprehensive understanding between nations, piracy has been effectively tackled and reduced to a

great extent. The issue of piracy off Somalia and the western coast of Africa, however, stems from the issue of instability, which is considered the greatest driver for piracy. In this regard piracy off Somalia makes an interesting case as it has seen a united global effort that is now making a difference and has resulted in a substantial decrease in piracy this year.

Growth of Somali PiracyThe advent of piracy from Somalia is a

classic case. Somalia was a failed state since the government collapsed in 2001. This failure led to a lack of governance and subsequent high scale poverty which in tandem with two activities that could be viewed as the catalysts opened the doors for the advent and rise in piracy. The fi rst activity was fi shing by outsiders in Somalian waters that destroyed the livelihood of the Somalian fi shermen; a community that was considered a richer sect in the nation.

However the collapse in governance and the subsequent inability to patrol the waters led to illegal fi shing by fi shing trawlers from other nations and the loss of a livelihood for the Somalian fi shermen amounting to $100 million in 2003-2004.

The second issue was the dumping of toxic waste like uranium radioactive waste, lead, cadmium and mercury in Somalian waters. This further depleted the fi sh in the waters surrounding Somalia.

The fi rst incidents of piracy occurred between 1995 and 2000 when the local fi shermen decided to take the law into their own hands and started boarding foreign fi shing vessels accusing them of fi shing illegally and sought compensation. In a nation with an estimated per capita income of $ 600 this method was seen as an easy and lucrative way of earning a livelihood. These actions occasionally took the form of efforts by local clan militias seeking to control their neighborhoods ashore and

SECURING THE SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATIONSGeographically this stood

true for piracy in theMalacca Straits, however,

due to stability in theregion and a

comprehensiveunderstanding between

nations, piracy has been eff ectively tackled and

reduced to a greatextent. The issue of

piracy off Somalia and the western coast of

Africa

AFP

AFP

Indian Navy offi cers withthe detained pirates

PLA (Navy) soldiers boarda pirate ship in the sea

to coordinate actions against the foreign interlopers at sea.

Many groups referred to themselves as a “coast guard,” protecting Somali waters and resources. In some cases vessels were taken to Somali ports and their cargoes and crews held for ransom.

These indications were largely ignored by the international community and therefore remained unchecked and paved the way for piracy to evolve and spread its tentacles over a large part of the Indian Ocean. By the time the global community started to take action, the price of piracy had already burgeoned. In 2011 the cost as per the study by One Earth Foundation had been estimated between $ 6.6 and $ 6.9 billion, of which the shipping industry bore over 80% of the cost, between $ 5.3 and $ 5.5 billion.

Global ActionsTwo reasons could be attributed to the

ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 18-19ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 18-19 03/01/13 10:44 AM03/01/13 10:44 AM


3130

KEY POINTS � The failure of the Somalian state and bloody tribal warfares have caused the Somalian fi shermen and others who lived off the sea, to turn into pirates.� The world reacted to the threat of Somali piracy in a delayed fashion. The delay was caused by the piracy lying below the threshold of pain of the maritime nations.� The United Nations Security Council Resolutions provide enough teeth to the anti-piracy operations that are truly multi-national

Sarabjeet Singh Parmar

The crisis of the Eastern African countries spilling over the Indian Ocean created a major problem for international trade and communication. India was dragged into play - not unwillingly - in keeping the high seas safe.

For centuries pirates have long been regarded as hostes humani generis, “common enemies of mankind.” In fact, piracy like

murder is one of the earliest of recorded human activities. This recognition of piracy as a universal crime resulted in nations as far back as the Roman Empire capturing and executing pirates. Notwithstanding the long standing fi ght against piracy down the ages crime still persists and has from time to time re-emerged to plague mankind. The reason is very simple – it is a lucrative business that can be called a cyclic enterprise that feeds itself. This is an aspect that arises from the fact that the initial inputs are comparatively minuscule when compared to the remunerations thereby permitting pirates to increase both their activities and area of operations. In addition, the increase in maritime trade over the centuries and non-recognition of piracy as a threat has aided in the fl ourishing of piracy. History

is testament that only when the maritime trade and the safety of a nation’s people have been threatened that action has been taken against it.

The last few decades has seen a rise in piracy, most signifi cantly, in the Malacca Straits, off Somalia and the western coast of Africa. Although the reasons are varied the main pillars that led to the rise are instability, geography, safe havens and economics. Captain Henry Kebbel the renowned nineteenth century hunter of oriental pirates, wrote – “As surely as spiders abound where there are nooks and crannies, so have pirates sprung up wherever there is a nest of islands offering creeks and shallows, headlands, rocks and reefs”.

Geographically this stood true for piracy in the Malacca Straits, however, due to stability in the region and a comprehensive understanding between nations, piracy has been effectively tackled and reduced to a

great extent. The issue of piracy off Somalia and the western coast of Africa, however, stems from the issue of instability, which is considered the greatest driver for piracy. In this regard piracy off Somalia makes an interesting case as it has seen a united global effort that is now making a difference and has resulted in a substantial decrease in piracy this year.

Growth of Somali PiracyThe advent of piracy from Somalia is a

classic case. Somalia was a failed state since the government collapsed in 2001. This failure led to a lack of governance and subsequent high scale poverty which in tandem with two activities that could be viewed as the catalysts opened the doors for the advent and rise in piracy. The fi rst activity was fi shing by outsiders in Somalian waters that destroyed the livelihood of the Somalian fi shermen; a community that was considered a richer sect in the nation.

However the collapse in governance and the subsequent inability to patrol the waters led to illegal fi shing by fi shing trawlers from other nations and the loss of a livelihood for the Somalian fi shermen amounting to $100 million in 2003-2004.

The second issue was the dumping of toxic waste like uranium radioactive waste, lead, cadmium and mercury in Somalian waters. This further depleted the fi sh in the waters surrounding Somalia.

The fi rst incidents of piracy occurred between 1995 and 2000 when the local fi shermen decided to take the law into their own hands and started boarding foreign fi shing vessels accusing them of fi shing illegally and sought compensation. In a nation with an estimated per capita income of $ 600 this method was seen as an easy and lucrative way of earning a livelihood. These actions occasionally took the form of efforts by local clan militias seeking to control their neighborhoods ashore and

SECURING THE SEA LANES OF COMMUNICATIONSGeographically this stood

true for piracy in theMalacca Straits, however,

due to stability in theregion and a

comprehensiveunderstanding between

nations, piracy has been eff ectively tackled and

reduced to a greatextent. The issue of

piracy off Somalia and the western coast of

Africa

AFP

AFP

Indian Navy offi cers withthe detained pirates

PLA (Navy) soldiers boarda pirate ship in the sea

to coordinate actions against the foreign interlopers at sea.

Many groups referred to themselves as a “coast guard,” protecting Somali waters and resources. In some cases vessels were taken to Somali ports and their cargoes and crews held for ransom.

These indications were largely ignored by the international community and therefore remained unchecked and paved the way for piracy to evolve and spread its tentacles over a large part of the Indian Ocean. By the time the global community started to take action, the price of piracy had already burgeoned. In 2011 the cost as per the study by One Earth Foundation had been estimated between $ 6.6 and $ 6.9 billion, of which the shipping industry bore over 80% of the cost, between $ 5.3 and $ 5.5 billion.

Global ActionsTwo reasons could be attributed to the



3332

delayed global response. Firstly, Somalia was of no ‘Strategic Interest’ to the international community. Secondly, the impact was felt by nations only when their maritime trade was affected and the hostage crisis reached a level of ‘unacceptability’ and action initiated when the magnitude of the threat breached the threshold of ‘acceptability’.

The United Nations Security Council adopted various resolutions commencing from UNSCR 1816 on 02 June 2008. UNSCR 1816 authorised states acting in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and authorised entry to the territorial waters of Somalia with prior notifi cation of the TFG. This mandate was extended by subsequent resolutions on an annual basis. UNSCR 1851 of December 2008 expanded the mandate of UNSCR 1816 by authorising land based operations which was repeated in subsequent resolutions.

This was an aspect long accepted that piracy had to be addressed on land. However, in the absence of a common understanding on the methodology to be adopted for such actions, the issue remained stagnant. The aspect of land based operations has recently been addressed with operations undertaken by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Kenyan and Ethiopian forces that have notably reduced piracy attacks in 2012.

The reduction in piracy, as per the International Maritime Bureau Report (01 January – 30 September 2012), is also due to maritime actions by the multinational forces present, preventive measures adopted by merchant shipping as per the Best Management Practices (BMP) and the recent phenomena of employing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) onboard ships.

In pursuance of the UNSCRs nations commenced deploying maritime assets with India deploying a ship from October 2008. The European Union (EU) deployed its naval force (EUNAVFOR) on December 8, 2008 as Operation Atalanta six days after UNSCR 1846 was passed on December 2, 2008. The UNSCR 1846 expanded the mandate of UNSCR 1816. Coalition Task

Force (CTF) 151 was established as part of the US-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF) structure on January 12, 2009, to conduct counter-piracy operations throughout the CMF area of responsibility, to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security, and secure freedom of navigation for the benefi t of all nations.

The NATO deployed its Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 to the region as part of its 2009 deployment to the Far East under Operation Pearl, before quickly establishing Operation Ocean Shield as a permanent counter-piracy task group. Apart from these task forces nations like Russia, China, Japan and South Korea also deployed ships that like India operate individually but in consonance with each other under the co-operative mechanism of Shared Awareness and De-confl iction (SHADE).

Under the auspices of SHADE, nations co-operate and escort ships and patrol areas to optimise usage of assets. For example India, Japan and China have established a mechanism by which ships are escorted

through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in a manner that ensures suffi cient gaps between convoys and avoids duplication of effort by the respective maritime assets deployed. The IRTC is a corridor established in the Gulf of Aden wherein merchant ships are escorted.

As easy as it may appear the coordination and cooperation did take some time in coming by. The main reason for this understanding arose from the fact that the number of maritime assets deployed was quite inadequate when compared to the area to be covered. Although the presence of maritime assets operating as part of the multinational forces and by individual nations resulted in a reduction in acts of piracy in the waters near Somalia, the spread of piracy to open ocean areas compounded the problem of forces providing assistance to ships in these open sea areas.

Major General Buster Howes, Operation Commander European Union Naval Force Somalia, while giving oral evidence before the US Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee in response to a question

regarding number of assets required stated that he would require 83 helicopter-equipped frigates or destroyers to manage a 30 minute-equivalent response time in the Indian Ocean.

A major issue faced by the forces was the legal angle. There are three clear aspects driving the legal factor. First, the internationally accepted defi nition of piracy. Secondly, the national laws and trans-border legal complexities thereon that govern the prosecution of pirates. Thirdly, the capacity of prisons and imprisonment cost. The defi nition of piracy as per Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) restricted piracy to the high seas.

This aspect has been overcome by the UNSCRs that permitted nations to enter the territorial waters of Somalia. The second and third issues brought about debates that identifi ed three main weak areas - mechanics of implementing judicial processes between nations, political will and national anti piracy laws. Cooperation amongst nations in working about a

methodology has resulted in some nations agreeing to prosecute and imprison pirates.

In 2008 Kenya opened a special court to try suspected pirates operating from Somalia in the Gulf of Aden. The court is a national court exercising universal jurisdiction on behalf of the international community and is funded by a number of international organizations and States including the UN, the EU, Australia and Canada. Other nations in the region that prosecute pirates are Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania. Such actions are signifi cant in the fi ght against piracy and promulgation of national anti piracy laws by nations would also augur well.

Another important step to harmonise global efforts was the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) on 14 January 2009. This was based on UNSCR 1851 that encouraged all states and regional organisations fi ghting piracy and armed robbery at sea, off the coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and

among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somalian coast.

From the initial 24 nations and fi ve organisations (UN Secretariat, IMO, NATO, EU and the AU) this group now has more than 50 nations and organisations consisting of civilians, military and industry. A trust fund has been set up by the group to support interactional action against piracy particularly costs relating to prosecution and imprisonment.

The CGPCS started with four working groups and a fi fth group for looking into the fi nancial fl ow of piracy related money was set up when this aspect gained due global importance because of the large amounts involved. These fi ve working groups focus on six issues:

• Improving operational and information support to counter piracy operations.

• Establishing a counter piracy coordination mechanism.

• Strengthening judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates.

The reduction in piracy, as per the International

Maritime Bureau Report (01 January – 30

September 2012), is also due to maritime actions by

the multinational forces present, preventive

measures adopted bymerchant shipping as per

the Best ManagementPractices (BMP) and the

recent phenomena ofemploying PrivatelyContracted Armed

Security Personnel (PCASP) onboard ships.

AFP

AFP

PH

OTO

/ DU

TCH

NA

VY

Crew of the Dutch warship HNLMS Amsterdam approaching a suspect skiff

off the coast of Somalia.



3332

delayed global response. Firstly, Somalia was of no ‘Strategic Interest’ to the international community. Secondly, the impact was felt by nations only when their maritime trade was affected and the hostage crisis reached a level of ‘unacceptability’ and action initiated when the magnitude of the threat breached the threshold of ‘acceptability’.

The United Nations Security Council adopted various resolutions commencing from UNSCR 1816 on 02 June 2008. UNSCR 1816 authorised states acting in cooperation with the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia and authorised entry to the territorial waters of Somalia with prior notifi cation of the TFG. This mandate was extended by subsequent resolutions on an annual basis. UNSCR 1851 of December 2008 expanded the mandate of UNSCR 1816 by authorising land based operations which was repeated in subsequent resolutions.

This was an aspect long accepted that piracy had to be addressed on land. However, in the absence of a common understanding on the methodology to be adopted for such actions, the issue remained stagnant. The aspect of land based operations has recently been addressed with operations undertaken by the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Kenyan and Ethiopian forces that have notably reduced piracy attacks in 2012.

The reduction in piracy, as per the International Maritime Bureau Report (01 January – 30 September 2012), is also due to maritime actions by the multinational forces present, preventive measures adopted by merchant shipping as per the Best Management Practices (BMP) and the recent phenomena of employing Privately Contracted Armed Security Personnel (PCASP) onboard ships.

In pursuance of the UNSCRs nations commenced deploying maritime assets with India deploying a ship from October 2008. The European Union (EU) deployed its naval force (EUNAVFOR) on December 8, 2008 as Operation Atalanta six days after UNSCR 1846 was passed on December 2, 2008. The UNSCR 1846 expanded the mandate of UNSCR 1816. Coalition Task

Force (CTF) 151 was established as part of the US-led Combined Maritime Force (CMF) structure on January 12, 2009, to conduct counter-piracy operations throughout the CMF area of responsibility, to actively deter, disrupt and suppress piracy in order to protect global maritime security, and secure freedom of navigation for the benefi t of all nations.

The NATO deployed its Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 to the region as part of its 2009 deployment to the Far East under Operation Pearl, before quickly establishing Operation Ocean Shield as a permanent counter-piracy task group. Apart from these task forces nations like Russia, China, Japan and South Korea also deployed ships that like India operate individually but in consonance with each other under the co-operative mechanism of Shared Awareness and De-confl iction (SHADE).

Under the auspices of SHADE, nations co-operate and escort ships and patrol areas to optimise usage of assets. For example India, Japan and China have established a mechanism by which ships are escorted

through the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) in a manner that ensures suffi cient gaps between convoys and avoids duplication of effort by the respective maritime assets deployed. The IRTC is a corridor established in the Gulf of Aden wherein merchant ships are escorted.

As easy as it may appear the coordination and cooperation did take some time in coming by. The main reason for this understanding arose from the fact that the number of maritime assets deployed was quite inadequate when compared to the area to be covered. Although the presence of maritime assets operating as part of the multinational forces and by individual nations resulted in a reduction in acts of piracy in the waters near Somalia, the spread of piracy to open ocean areas compounded the problem of forces providing assistance to ships in these open sea areas.

Major General Buster Howes, Operation Commander European Union Naval Force Somalia, while giving oral evidence before the US Congressional Foreign Affairs Committee in response to a question

regarding number of assets required stated that he would require 83 helicopter-equipped frigates or destroyers to manage a 30 minute-equivalent response time in the Indian Ocean.

A major issue faced by the forces was the legal angle. There are three clear aspects driving the legal factor. First, the internationally accepted defi nition of piracy. Secondly, the national laws and trans-border legal complexities thereon that govern the prosecution of pirates. Thirdly, the capacity of prisons and imprisonment cost. The defi nition of piracy as per Article 101 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) restricted piracy to the high seas.

This aspect has been overcome by the UNSCRs that permitted nations to enter the territorial waters of Somalia. The second and third issues brought about debates that identifi ed three main weak areas - mechanics of implementing judicial processes between nations, political will and national anti piracy laws. Cooperation amongst nations in working about a

methodology has resulted in some nations agreeing to prosecute and imprison pirates.

In 2008 Kenya opened a special court to try suspected pirates operating from Somalia in the Gulf of Aden. The court is a national court exercising universal jurisdiction on behalf of the international community and is funded by a number of international organizations and States including the UN, the EU, Australia and Canada. Other nations in the region that prosecute pirates are Seychelles, Mauritius and Tanzania. Such actions are signifi cant in the fi ght against piracy and promulgation of national anti piracy laws by nations would also augur well.

Another important step to harmonise global efforts was the establishment of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia (CGPCS) on 14 January 2009. This was based on UNSCR 1851 that encouraged all states and regional organisations fi ghting piracy and armed robbery at sea, off the coast of Somalia to establish an international cooperation mechanism to act as a common point of contact between and

among states, regional and international organizations on all aspects of combating piracy and armed robbery at sea off the Somalian coast.

From the initial 24 nations and fi ve organisations (UN Secretariat, IMO, NATO, EU and the AU) this group now has more than 50 nations and organisations consisting of civilians, military and industry. A trust fund has been set up by the group to support interactional action against piracy particularly costs relating to prosecution and imprisonment.

The CGPCS started with four working groups and a fi fth group for looking into the fi nancial fl ow of piracy related money was set up when this aspect gained due global importance because of the large amounts involved. These fi ve working groups focus on six issues:

• Improving operational and information support to counter piracy operations.

• Establishing a counter piracy coordination mechanism.

• Strengthening judicial frameworks for arrest, prosecution and detention of pirates.

The reduction in piracy, as per the International

Maritime Bureau Report (01 January – 30

September 2012), is also due to maritime actions by

the multinational forces present, preventive

measures adopted bymerchant shipping as per

the Best ManagementPractices (BMP) and the

recent phenomena ofemploying PrivatelyContracted Armed

Security Personnel (PCASP) onboard ships.

AFP

AFP

PH

OTO

/ DU

TCH

NA

VY

Crew of the Dutch warship HNLMS Amsterdam approaching a suspect skiff

off the coast of Somalia.


ANTI PIRACY

34

• Strengthening commercial shipping self awareness and other capabilities.

• Pursuing improved diplomatic and public information efforts

• Tracking fi nancial fl ows related to piracy.Most recently on 21 February 2012 England

announced the setting up of a Regional Anti-Piracy Prosecution and Intelligence Coordination Centre (RAPPICC) in Seychelles that would be operational from January 2013. This centre would target the ‘kingpins’ of piracy, namely the leaders, fi nanciers and enablers by gathering evidence to prosecute them. RAPPICC has evinced the interest of a number of global players like the US, Seychelles, the Netherlands, Mauritius, Norway, Tanzania, Australia, UAE, EUNAVFOR and INTERPOL.

Indian EffortsThe Indian Navy commenced anti piracy

patrols in the Gulf of Aden from 23 October 2008. A total of 1104 ships (139 Indian fl agged and 965 foreign fl agged from 50 different countries) have been escorted by Indian Naval ships through the IRTC. In addition, due to the seaward spread of piracy the Indian Navy has been patrolling open ocean areas especially along major sea routes used by ships and has prevented 40 piracy attempts.

The biggest capture of 61 pirates in

March 2011 brought the number of pirates undergoing trial in India to around 100. The efforts of the Indian Navy have been well recognised and stem from the fact that piracy has been recognised as a threat to international and Indian shipping. In order to strengthen the fi ght against piracy the Cabinet Committee on Security in March 2011 considered proposals with regard to anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and off the Coast of Somalia and approved a series of measures to address the legal, administrative and operational aspects of combating piracy.

The legal dimension of combating piracy is a weak area. Piracy is dealt with under sections of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and antiquated Admiralty laws that are considered relatively ineffective to combat this menace. Therefore, in April 2012 an Anti-Piracy bill was introduced in Parliament that would address issues related to piracy and enable agencies and the judiciary to effectively handle such cases.

Director General (DG), Shipping has launched a web-based registration service (www.dgshipping.com) where merchant ships can register with DG Shipping in order to avail Anti-Piracy escort by Indian Naval ships in the Gulf of Aden. Through this service, the shipping industry can access the Anti-Piracy escort schedule of the Indian DSI

Navy and request for inclusion in a particular escort cycle.

India is a founder member of the CGPCS and has been taking up the various issues of piracy and pushing forth viable options. In January 2011 India proposed a fi ve point plan in the UN to strengthen international cooperation:

• Reinforcement of tracking the trail of ransom money to different parts of the world.

• Prosecution of the benefi ciaries of ransom money for abetting piracy.

• Consideration of the conduct of the naval operations under the UN as the preferred option.

• Sanitisation of the Somali coast line through identifi ed corridors and buffer zones and tracking of fi shing vessels around the Somali coast.

• Enactment of national laws on priority to criminalise piracy as defi ned in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the prosecution of suspected, and imprisonment of convicted, pirates apprehended off the coast of Somalia as required under UNSCR 1918 (2010).

Is the End in Sight?Although the number of piracy attacks has

reduced in 2012 as compared to earlier years there is still the fear of piracy increasing if the initiative gained so far is lost. There are concerns being raised about the long term effectiveness of actions being taken. The cost of deploying maritime assets by nations on their national budgets is being questioned. There is a debate that the cost of deployment should be borne by oil and shipping companies. The use of PCASP is being accepted, albeit slowly, and this issue raises questions on the carriage of arms and ammunition on merchant ships in relation to international and national laws. The recent incidents of fi ring on fi sher men off the coast of Kerala and Yemen raises judicial and diplomatic issues. The jury will be out for a long time on this aspect and it is highly unlikely that a consensus would be reached. The only general consensus on the issue of piracy is the restoration of stability and economic well being in Somalia. Until this is achieved piracy is likely to exist and the fi ght against piracy will continue.

AFP

French soldiers arresting presumed Somalian pirates in the Gulf of Aden

ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 22ANTI-PIRACY OPERATIONS 2nd time.indd 22 03/01/13 10:45 AM03/01/13 10:45 AM

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CRISIS IN ARMY DECEMBER 2012 DSI

3736

KEY POINTS � Almost a full quarter of the offi cer corps is absent from the Indian Army due to shortage of eligible men

� The continuous downgrading of the offi cer corps hurts the image of the Indian Army in the eye of the people

� The diminution of academic standards at the feeder schools’ level have caused a major harm

Brig SK Chatterji (Retd)

With 2,100 offi cers required to be inducted into the Army for it to maintain its current 46,600 level of offi cers, a 24 per cent shortage makes force underled and under the optimum level of effi ciency.

An army, it’s oft said, is as good as its offi cers’ corps. Perhaps, seasoned soldiers across all divides would converge in

supporting such an opinion. The art of war places a huge dividend on leadership in combat being a decisive factor in dictating the outcome of military engagements. The offi cers cadre provides this critical necessity.

Great Generals have turned the tide in operations to salvage situations and advance towards objectives even when faced with impossible situations. Rommel did it in Africa. Patton did it in Europe. Defi ciencies in terms of numbers in the offi cers cadre reduce the combat potential of a force, far more than defi ciencies in equipment or logistics support.

The Indian armed forces are faced with a situation now that is perilously close to criticality. The cadre that provides the leadership is simply not there in adequate numbers to ensure success in combat.

A 24 percent shortage in the offi cers’ corps in any Army would be the cause for concern in any country. When the shortage remains a persistent problem over a decade, it’s defi nitely time to take notice. When the army concerned is among the largest in the world that has continuously been fi ghting

insurgencies for the past few decades there is reason to study the whole system that allows an anomaly to become a deep seated malaise.

Induction of Offi cersThe authorized strength of offi cers in

the 1.3 million strong army works out to approximately 46,600. The Indian Army’s annual requirement of offi cer induction is approximately 2100 and the prime offi cer induction establishments include the National Defence Academy (NDA), Indian Military Academy (IMA), Offi cer Training Academies (OTA) at Chennai and Gaya. The NDA is a tri-service facility that provides the basic training for offi cer cadets of all the three services. On passing out successfully from the NDA, the cadets undergo specialised training in their respective service training institutes. For Army cadets, it is the IMA.

The current models of entry include the NDA stream where eligibility entails qualifying in the higher secondary exam. The training involves three years at the NDA, followed by a year in the IMA. A special entry for students who do well in Sciences in higher secondary and wish to become engineers in army has also been formalised.

The cadets undergo four years of Engineering Degree and six months of military training at IMA. Graduates can directly enter the IMA or opt for OTA, Chennai. A few more entries have been successfully put in practice. These are all focused on attracting NCC cadets with C certifi cate, law qualifi ed candidates and engineers into the army. All entries except for NDA, Graduate entry to IMA and Short Service Entry in OTA are non-UPSC, where the candidates are called for interview

directly based on their educational qualifi cation and cut-off marks.

The Army started inducting women candidates some years back. It is now recruiting women in Technical, Non-Technical and Legal cadres, also.

Sanction has also been accorded for the creation of a 6,000 strong support cadre of Special Commissioned Offi cers by eligible personnel below the offi cers’ rank, in age group of 30-35 years. Post qualifying in the Services Selection Boards (SSB), they will undergo a pre-commission training of one year and can earn promotions up to the rank of Colonel.

Identifi cation of Reasons for Shortage There are multiple reasons for offi cer

shortage. Perhaps, the foremost among these is the fact of erosion of the status of the offi cer in our society. In an increasingly materialistic society where fi nancial means

OFFICERS FOR THE INDIAN ARMY: WHERE ARE THEY

The Indian armed forces are faced with a

situation now that isperilously close to

criticality. The cadre that provides the leadership is

simply not there inadequate numbers to

ensure success in combat. A 24 percent shortage in the offi cers corps in any

Army would be cause for concern in any country.

Soldiers from the Indian Army march duringthe Republic Day Parade rehearsal

in New Delhi in January 2010

Officer Shortage2nd time.indd 30-31Officer Shortage2nd time.indd 30-31 03/01/13 10:49 AM03/01/13 10:49 AM


3736

KEY POINTS � Almost a full quarter of the offi cer corps is absent from the Indian Army due to shortage of eligible men

� The continuous downgrading of the offi cer corps hurts the image of the Indian Army in the eye of the people

� The diminution of academic standards at the feeder schools’ level have caused a major harm

Brig SK Chatterji (Retd)

With 2,100 offi cers required to be inducted into the Army for it to maintain its current 46,600 level of offi cers, a 24 per cent shortage makes force underled and under the optimum level of effi ciency.

An army, it’s oft said, is as good as its offi cers’ corps. Perhaps, seasoned soldiers across all divides would converge in

supporting such an opinion. The art of war places a huge dividend on leadership in combat being a decisive factor in dictating the outcome of military engagements. The offi cers cadre provides this critical necessity.

Great Generals have turned the tide in operations to salvage situations and advance towards objectives even when faced with impossible situations. Rommel did it in Africa. Patton did it in Europe. Defi ciencies in terms of numbers in the offi cers cadre reduce the combat potential of a force, far more than defi ciencies in equipment or logistics support.

The Indian armed forces are faced with a situation now that is perilously close to criticality. The cadre that provides the leadership is simply not there in adequate numbers to ensure success in combat.

A 24 percent shortage in the offi cers’ corps in any Army would be the cause for concern in any country. When the shortage remains a persistent problem over a decade, it’s defi nitely time to take notice. When the army concerned is among the largest in the world that has continuously been fi ghting

insurgencies for the past few decades there is reason to study the whole system that allows an anomaly to become a deep seated malaise.

Induction of Offi cersThe authorized strength of offi cers in

the 1.3 million strong army works out to approximately 46,600. The Indian Army’s annual requirement of offi cer induction is approximately 2100 and the prime offi cer induction establishments include the National Defence Academy (NDA), Indian Military Academy (IMA), Offi cer Training Academies (OTA) at Chennai and Gaya. The NDA is a tri-service facility that provides the basic training for offi cer cadets of all the three services. On passing out successfully from the NDA, the cadets undergo specialised training in their respective service training institutes. For Army cadets, it is the IMA.

The current models of entry include the NDA stream where eligibility entails qualifying in the higher secondary exam. The training involves three years at the NDA, followed by a year in the IMA. A special entry for students who do well in Sciences in higher secondary and wish to become engineers in army has also been formalised.

The cadets undergo four years of Engineering Degree and six months of military training at IMA. Graduates can directly enter the IMA or opt for OTA, Chennai. A few more entries have been successfully put in practice. These are all focused on attracting NCC cadets with C certifi cate, law qualifi ed candidates and engineers into the army. All entries except for NDA, Graduate entry to IMA and Short Service Entry in OTA are non-UPSC, where the candidates are called for interview

directly based on their educational qualifi cation and cut-off marks.

The Army started inducting women candidates some years back. It is now recruiting women in Technical, Non-Technical and Legal cadres, also.

Sanction has also been accorded for the creation of a 6,000 strong support cadre of Special Commissioned Offi cers by eligible personnel below the offi cers’ rank, in age group of 30-35 years. Post qualifying in the Services Selection Boards (SSB), they will undergo a pre-commission training of one year and can earn promotions up to the rank of Colonel.

Identifi cation of Reasons for Shortage There are multiple reasons for offi cer

shortage. Perhaps, the foremost among these is the fact of erosion of the status of the offi cer in our society. In an increasingly materialistic society where fi nancial means

OFFICERS FOR THE INDIAN ARMY: WHERE ARE THEY

The Indian armed forces are faced with a

situation now that isperilously close to

criticality. The cadre that provides the leadership is

simply not there inadequate numbers to

ensure success in combat. A 24 percent shortage in the offi cers corps in any

Army would be cause for concern in any country.

Soldiers from the Indian Army march duringthe Republic Day Parade rehearsal

in New Delhi in January 2010



3938

have become the predominant yardstick for deciding status of an individual, an indifferently paid offi cer no longer commands the same esteem. The fall from grace is further aggravated by large numbers of cases of misappropriation that are routinely coming to light.

In today’s world, no army will be able to attract and retain talent without adequate emoluments being offered. With pay and allowances in the private sector having risen steeply, a career in the army is no longer an attractive proposition. The situation cannot be eased by projecting the superior quality of life in cantonments, which is also far from being true with the average waiting period for a married offi cer to get accommodation being a minimum six to eight months in most stations. The stay in a peace station is further reduced due to regular training exercises and a multitude of events. The tenures in family stations barely range between two to three years, derogatorily affecting children schooling.

After entry into the army an offi cer’s release is a harrowing experience that can quite be compared to a bonded labour. Young men and women do not join a profession today for a lifetime. They job hop.

Inspite of a decision having been taken to increase the intake in the short service offi cers category, the entry fails to attract adequate talent. The induction of women entry offi cers has bridged the gap between demand and supply to a limited extent, however, their conservative utilisation potential envisaged by the armed forces disallows greater numbers being inducted and employed gainfully.

The opportunities of inducting more offi cers from the serving personnel below the offi cers’ ranks have been increased. However, the exacting standards of the Army, limit their numbers. Further, induction through this avenue entails drawing from a category that is older in age profi le. The attendant problems include their utilisation in combat arms where a higher degree of physical endurance is called for.

The army has stuck to its qualitative standards. In the bargain the rejection rates in services selection boards are extremely high. The options in battle are quite unlike that faced in the corporate world. In the corporate environment increasing market share from 10 to 15 percent may be considered as gains. In combat, there are no percentage

gains. Either you win or you lose. In such an environment the obsession with quality is defi nitely of overriding import and dilutions in leadership are defi nitely not justifi ed. But, the old argument resurfaces, i.e., quality calls for a costs.

The army’s attempts at wooing the youth to join its ranks through such advertisements as ‘Do you have it in you’, has either not struck a chord or not had enough evidence of signifi cant material gains in the proposal. The fact remains, the cash content in the job and a lack of liberty to decide on his termination of relationship with the army, are not comforting enough.

The feeder school like the Sainik and Military Schools have not been able to keep pace with public schools. Their reputations have gone down. Over the years, patronage and interference have led to questionable standards of faculty, facilities, teaching methodology and more importantly, reputation.

Effects of Shortage of Offi cersWith the quality of offi cers being identifi ed

as a core battle winning factor, the offi cer corps needs to be viewed as an army’s strategic asset; just as we view critical equipment or technology absorption. A

dilution of this strategic asset erodes the combat potential of the armed forces. The million plus Indian Army is bound to refl ect these defi ciencies in the combat zone and stressful, ‘no war no peace’ Cold War environment in counter-insurgency areas.

The defi ciency is primarily in the lower rungs, upto the rank of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. Thereafter, the selection system for higher ranks, based on a system of vacancies available, caters for promotion of adequate offi cers. Today, the primary combat involvement of the Army remains in counter insurgency environment. The employment of forces in this part of the spectrum of confl ict entails units and formations fi ghting at battalion and lower levels, aided by technology and intelligence, largely. The dearth of offi cers is to be found exactly at these levels.

Training of offi cers is also affected adversely. The battalions, already defi cient of offi cers, are unable to spare offi cers for professional courses. Notwithstanding the merits of distance education system, the reduction in course durations implemented by the army causes a downward slide in the knowledge absorption by offi cers. It needs to be understood that the offi cer lot

being asked to supplement knowledge by the distance education endeavour, are too stressed in their battalions to fi nd the time required for professional studies.

Stress levels also increase when a young offi cer fi nds himself leading a patrol or undertaking an operation too often in active insurgency areas. The problem is compounded by the army not being able to give its junior offi cers adequate tenures in peace stations after a tenure in insurgency areas.

The offi cer – men relationship is an important intangible infl uencing operational effi ciency of a combat unit. Fewer offi cers entail dilution of contact between offi cers and the men they lead in battle. The effects of diluted offi cer – men bonding have lead to problems in a few units, lately. Though the situation is not critical, prudence calls for immediate measures to ensure battalions are manned by adequate offi cers.

Recommendations: Initiatives required

Of late, the government has realised that shortages of offi cers is not merely an organisational issue for the armed forces, but of enough import to be a national concern. In a seminar a few years back, the Adjutant General outlined the fundamentals of the approach to the vexing issue. His strategy rested on the following pillars:• Increasing the strength of the Short

Service Offi cers Cadre and utilising this cadre as a large support base that would also be given a liberal choice of moving out. These offi cers would be given study leave for two years at the end of contractual service to enable them to enhance their employability prospects post-release from the army. Such facilities like Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Services will also be extended to them.

• Enhancing the career prospects of in-house intakes like the Special Commissioned offi cers and the Special List Offi cers to the rank of Colonels and Major Generals.

• Improve the scope of NDA entry by holding SSBs when the candidates are in Class XI and thereafter the medical

tests in Class XII. Such a philosophy is supported by the fact that as long as eligibility for joining the NDA was Class XI; the armed forces received far more applicants. After Class XII, the students have multiple choices available and the option of joining the army slips lower in their priorities. Today, though the vacancies in NDA are being fully subscribed, the best boys in school are keeping away.

Notwithstanding the strategy outlined by the Adjutant General, the fundamental issues on which the possibility of ameliorating the situation rests on two pillars; pay and perks, and status.

Even in the 6th Pay Commission there was no member of the army to project its case forcefully. It would be pertinent to have a look at the way the Americans went about deciding on pay and perks for their forces. A series of studies were conducted to arrive at the full import of life in the forces. Such studies included one on Army offi cers’ spouses to arrive at the lost opportunities and possible earnings on account of frequent move of their spouses. The recommendations of the studies were utilised in arriving at compensation packages of the armed forces. In our country there is an immediate requirement of a separate pay commission for the armed forces.

As of now, a Joint Secretary with approximately 18 years of service is being equated with a Major General with 35 years in the Army. The anomaly could not be more stark. Its affect on pay and perks is staggering. The erosion in status is also immense and defi nitely a demotivating factor. There is an urgent requirement to ensure that service offi cers in the same service bracket as IAS offi cers, draw the same pay and allowances and are also equated so in the order of precedence as their IAS counterparts.

The exit policy needs an overhaul. Offi cers should be permitted to leave after completion of contractual service. Should the Army want to retain them, a system of an attractive retention bonus needs to be implemented.

The reputation of feeder schools like Sainik Schools and the Military Schools requires immediate attention. The

Increasing the strength of the Short ServiceOffi cers Cadre and

utilising this cadre as a large support base that

would also be given a liberal choice of moving

out. These offi cers would be given study leave for two years at the end of

contractual service to enable them to enhance

their employabilityprospects

AFP

New Army Chief Gen. Bikram Singh meetsArmy Offi cers



3938

have become the predominant yardstick for deciding status of an individual, an indifferently paid offi cer no longer commands the same esteem. The fall from grace is further aggravated by large numbers of cases of misappropriation that are routinely coming to light.

In today’s world, no army will be able to attract and retain talent without adequate emoluments being offered. With pay and allowances in the private sector having risen steeply, a career in the army is no longer an attractive proposition. The situation cannot be eased by projecting the superior quality of life in cantonments, which is also far from being true with the average waiting period for a married offi cer to get accommodation being a minimum six to eight months in most stations. The stay in a peace station is further reduced due to regular training exercises and a multitude of events. The tenures in family stations barely range between two to three years, derogatorily affecting children schooling.

After entry into the army an offi cer’s release is a harrowing experience that can quite be compared to a bonded labour. Young men and women do not join a profession today for a lifetime. They job hop.

Inspite of a decision having been taken to increase the intake in the short service offi cers category, the entry fails to attract adequate talent. The induction of women entry offi cers has bridged the gap between demand and supply to a limited extent, however, their conservative utilisation potential envisaged by the armed forces disallows greater numbers being inducted and employed gainfully.

The opportunities of inducting more offi cers from the serving personnel below the offi cers’ ranks have been increased. However, the exacting standards of the Army, limit their numbers. Further, induction through this avenue entails drawing from a category that is older in age profi le. The attendant problems include their utilisation in combat arms where a higher degree of physical endurance is called for.

The army has stuck to its qualitative standards. In the bargain the rejection rates in services selection boards are extremely high. The options in battle are quite unlike that faced in the corporate world. In the corporate environment increasing market share from 10 to 15 percent may be considered as gains. In combat, there are no percentage

gains. Either you win or you lose. In such an environment the obsession with quality is defi nitely of overriding import and dilutions in leadership are defi nitely not justifi ed. But, the old argument resurfaces, i.e., quality calls for a costs.

The army’s attempts at wooing the youth to join its ranks through such advertisements as ‘Do you have it in you’, has either not struck a chord or not had enough evidence of signifi cant material gains in the proposal. The fact remains, the cash content in the job and a lack of liberty to decide on his termination of relationship with the army, are not comforting enough.

The feeder school like the Sainik and Military Schools have not been able to keep pace with public schools. Their reputations have gone down. Over the years, patronage and interference have led to questionable standards of faculty, facilities, teaching methodology and more importantly, reputation.

Effects of Shortage of Offi cersWith the quality of offi cers being identifi ed

as a core battle winning factor, the offi cer corps needs to be viewed as an army’s strategic asset; just as we view critical equipment or technology absorption. A

dilution of this strategic asset erodes the combat potential of the armed forces. The million plus Indian Army is bound to refl ect these defi ciencies in the combat zone and stressful, ‘no war no peace’ Cold War environment in counter-insurgency areas.

The defi ciency is primarily in the lower rungs, upto the rank of Majors and Lieutenant Colonels. Thereafter, the selection system for higher ranks, based on a system of vacancies available, caters for promotion of adequate offi cers. Today, the primary combat involvement of the Army remains in counter insurgency environment. The employment of forces in this part of the spectrum of confl ict entails units and formations fi ghting at battalion and lower levels, aided by technology and intelligence, largely. The dearth of offi cers is to be found exactly at these levels.

Training of offi cers is also affected adversely. The battalions, already defi cient of offi cers, are unable to spare offi cers for professional courses. Notwithstanding the merits of distance education system, the reduction in course durations implemented by the army causes a downward slide in the knowledge absorption by offi cers. It needs to be understood that the offi cer lot

being asked to supplement knowledge by the distance education endeavour, are too stressed in their battalions to fi nd the time required for professional studies.

Stress levels also increase when a young offi cer fi nds himself leading a patrol or undertaking an operation too often in active insurgency areas. The problem is compounded by the army not being able to give its junior offi cers adequate tenures in peace stations after a tenure in insurgency areas.

The offi cer – men relationship is an important intangible infl uencing operational effi ciency of a combat unit. Fewer offi cers entail dilution of contact between offi cers and the men they lead in battle. The effects of diluted offi cer – men bonding have lead to problems in a few units, lately. Though the situation is not critical, prudence calls for immediate measures to ensure battalions are manned by adequate offi cers.

Recommendations: Initiatives required

Of late, the government has realised that shortages of offi cers is not merely an organisational issue for the armed forces, but of enough import to be a national concern. In a seminar a few years back, the Adjutant General outlined the fundamentals of the approach to the vexing issue. His strategy rested on the following pillars:• Increasing the strength of the Short

Service Offi cers Cadre and utilising this cadre as a large support base that would also be given a liberal choice of moving out. These offi cers would be given study leave for two years at the end of contractual service to enable them to enhance their employability prospects post-release from the army. Such facilities like Ex-servicemen Contributory Health Services will also be extended to them.

• Enhancing the career prospects of in-house intakes like the Special Commissioned offi cers and the Special List Offi cers to the rank of Colonels and Major Generals.

• Improve the scope of NDA entry by holding SSBs when the candidates are in Class XI and thereafter the medical

tests in Class XII. Such a philosophy is supported by the fact that as long as eligibility for joining the NDA was Class XI; the armed forces received far more applicants. After Class XII, the students have multiple choices available and the option of joining the army slips lower in their priorities. Today, though the vacancies in NDA are being fully subscribed, the best boys in school are keeping away.

Notwithstanding the strategy outlined by the Adjutant General, the fundamental issues on which the possibility of ameliorating the situation rests on two pillars; pay and perks, and status.

Even in the 6th Pay Commission there was no member of the army to project its case forcefully. It would be pertinent to have a look at the way the Americans went about deciding on pay and perks for their forces. A series of studies were conducted to arrive at the full import of life in the forces. Such studies included one on Army offi cers’ spouses to arrive at the lost opportunities and possible earnings on account of frequent move of their spouses. The recommendations of the studies were utilised in arriving at compensation packages of the armed forces. In our country there is an immediate requirement of a separate pay commission for the armed forces.

As of now, a Joint Secretary with approximately 18 years of service is being equated with a Major General with 35 years in the Army. The anomaly could not be more stark. Its affect on pay and perks is staggering. The erosion in status is also immense and defi nitely a demotivating factor. There is an urgent requirement to ensure that service offi cers in the same service bracket as IAS offi cers, draw the same pay and allowances and are also equated so in the order of precedence as their IAS counterparts.

The exit policy needs an overhaul. Offi cers should be permitted to leave after completion of contractual service. Should the Army want to retain them, a system of an attractive retention bonus needs to be implemented.

The reputation of feeder schools like Sainik Schools and the Military Schools requires immediate attention. The

Increasing the strength of the Short ServiceOffi cers Cadre and

utilising this cadre as a large support base that

would also be given a liberal choice of moving

out. These offi cers would be given study leave for two years at the end of

contractual service to enable them to enhance

their employabilityprospects

AFP

New Army Chief Gen. Bikram Singh meetsArmy Offi cers


CRISIS IN ARMY

40

management of these institutions has to be far more professional. It would definitely be better if these schools could associate with premier educational groups and attempt to become institutions of excellence. Similarly, state governments need to open such feeder schools.

Keeping in view the pyramidal structure of the armed forces, there would be a large number of officers superseded at every stage. Further increase in number of vacancies in higher ranks would also be most detrimental for the organisation. In any case the AB Singh Committee’s implementation had no effect on the recruitment of officers. The only way out is to transfer officers to para military forces. If IPS officers with little experience of border management can provide the leadership positions in Border Security Forces, there is no reason why army officers cannot.

The current switchover to online application system has increased the number of applicants. This needs to be followed up with inducting better

of officers who decide to serve longer or have initially taken the route of permanent commission in the army. To transform this concept into a successful execution model requires making this cadre very attractive. Of import is the bouquet that needs to be offered at the end of the contractual service period. This should include a two year academic course at government expense along with a lump sum resettlement package. The possibility of pro-rata pension to officers doing 14 years, the max stipulated period, also deserves consideration.

Overall, the intake levels cannot increase till such time as pay and allowances are substantially enhanced and the anomalies vis-à-vis the IAS cadre, eliminated. The greater privations and risks faced by men in uniform needs to be compensated in addition by military service pay and other allowances.

If we want an intellectually superior lot to join the army it is essential to understand that intellect, like commodities, has a market price and has to be paid for at market rates.

techniques and technology in the selection system. The five day schedule at the Services Selection Board (SSB) for the entire selection procedure is cumbersome. Some of the tests conducted there could be accomplished online, thus reducing the load factor at SSBs, allowing the staff greater evaluation time per candidate.

Generating greater awareness among the student community of the advantages of opting for Army as a career needs more emphasis. Certain new initiatives like commanders visiting local colleges may have paid dividends. However, rather than tasking already harassed serving commanders, selection teams of retired or short service officers, released to undertake the task more intensively, could be better.

ConclusionThe concept of having a bigger pool

of short service, commissioned officers is an answer to both the problems of officer shortage in the junior ranks as also enhancing the career prospects DSI

If we want anintellectually superior

lot to join the army it is essential to understand

that intellect, likecommodities, has a

market price and has to be paid for at

market rates. The army has to have a more

rational exit policy that accommodates the

option an individualdecides to exercise.

A tri-service homage at Raj Ghat, the fi nal resting place of the Father of the Nation

AFP

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216X276.indd 1216X276.indd 1 6/13/11 4:00:36 PM6/13/11 4:00:36 PM

DEFENCE BUZZ

42

DEFENCE BUZZAn Update on Defence News

India Train 600 Afghan Soldiers Annually India will train about 600 Afghan soldier each year, according to local media reports. India and Afghanistan signed a pact in November, 2012 during President Hamid Karzai’s visit to New Delhi.

In 2011, Kabul and New Delhi signed the Strategic Partnership Agreement for military-to-military cooperation under which India agreed to train, equip and build the capacity of the Afghan forces.

According to reports, three areas of focus have been identifi ed -- increasing the intake of offi cers in India’s premier training institutes; providing specialized training to middle and higher level offi cers already operating in the Afghan National Army (ANA); and training soldiers in counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist operations.

Each year, the National Defence Academy, the Offi cers’ Training Academies and the Indian Military Academy will train over 200 Afghan cadets. And 600 Afghan National Army offi cers who will undergo a variety of other courses including four weeks at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJWS).

Russia Delivers IN 2nd Stealth Frigate

The Indian Navy early November, 2012, inducted the second of three stealth frigates built by Russia at the Yantar Shipyard in the Baltic enclave of Kaliningrad.

Sergei Mikhailov, a spokesman for the Yantar Shipyard, the solemn ceremony of delivering the warship will be held in Kaliningrad and be attended by high-ranking military offi cers both from Russia and India.

In 2006, the two countries signed a $ 1.6 billion contract for the construction of three modifi ed Krivak III class (also known as Talwar class) guided missile frigates for India. INS Teg, the fi rst frigate, was inducted earlier this year. And the last ship is currently undergoing trials and will join the navy in 2013.

The Russian-made frigates will be equipped with eight supersonic BrahMos cruise missiles, a 100-mm gun, a Shtil surface-to-air missile system, two Kashtan air-defense gun/missile systems, two twin 533-mm torpedo launchers, and an antisubmarine warfare (ASW) helicopter.

Russia previously built three Talwar class frigates for India - INS Talwar (Sword), INS Trishul (Trident), and INS Tabar (Axe).

Indian MoD Review Defence Budget

The Indian Defence Ministry will conduct a review of all the major modernisation programmes amid the possibility of a budget cut.

Defense Minister AK Antony and the three Service vice chiefs will review the expenditure made by the Armed Forces this year and their plans for the remaining part of the fiscal.

The meeting comes at a time when there is a possibility of a budget cut

in view of the economic slowdown, according to the Press Trust of India. The Defence Ministry has been allocated Rs 1.93 lakh crore for the current fiscal but it had made a demand for additional funds of more than Rs 40,000 crore for meeting its capital expenditure requirements, the report added.

Defence Ministry has undertaken a major project such as the purchase of 126 fighter aircraft, howitzers, heavy-lift aircraft and aircraft carriers. The Armed Forces will spend approximately $ 100 billion on procurement in the next 10 years.

Defence Minister AK Antony will review the expenditure made by the Armed Forces this year and their plans for the remaining part of the fiscal, ministry officials said.

defence_buzz2nd time.indd 40defence_buzz2nd time.indd 40 03/01/13 10:55 AM03/01/13 10:55 AM

Ad Size 216x276.indd 1Ad Size 216x276.indd 1 02/01/13 10:55 AM02/01/13 10:55 AM

DEFENCE BUZZ

44

India To Buy Russian Anti-Tank Missiles India and Russia recently fi nalised two defence deals including the supply of Russian anti-tank missiles. Russia will deliver 10,000 Konkurs-M and 10,000 Invar missiles in a deal estimated to be worth $ 240 million. The Konkurs-M anti-tank missiles will be supplied for India’s motorised troops and infantry, while the Invar missiles will be procured for India’s T-90 tanks supplied by Russia. According to reports, India will buy 10,000 Invar missiles from Russian manufacturers and that a further 15,000 missiles will be manufactured under license in India.

IN To Get Overhauled Kilo Class Sub From Russia This YearThe INS Sindhurakshak will begin a two-week sea trial followed by additional tests before being delivered.“The Indian submarine, which has been repaired and modernised at the Zvezdochka shipyard, sailed for sea trials “, the company said in a statement.The upgrade program, reported worth $80 million, included a complete overhaul of the submarine, including its hull structures, as well as improved control systems, electronic warfare systems, and an integrated weapon control system.

Boeing Clinches Indian Deal for ChinooksBoeing is all set to win a $ 2.5 billion helicopter contract from the Indian Air Force. A senior air force offi cial said recent that New Delhi has decided on the Chinook and Apache in the attack helicopter deal.Commercial negotiations will begin soon for the purchase of 15 Chinook CH-47F heavy-lift helicopters and 22 AH-64D Block III Apache helicopters, the offi cial was quoted as saying.Boeing’s twin-rotor Chinook was chosen as the preferred bidder over Russia-based MiL Moscow Helicopter Plant’s Mi-26, while the Apache was selected over the Mi-28.The Chinook CH47D emerged as the lowest bidder in the tender, Defence Ministry offi cials were quoted as saying. While the Apache won on technical grounds beating out the Mi-28.

Saab Invest In Offshore Pipavav CoSaab has signed a deal with Pipavav Offshore and Defence

Engineering Ltd (Pipavav), India, to invest about Rs 201.6 crore in the company. The investment is made in shares which will be issued through a directed share issue, which is dependent on approval from an extraordinary General Meeting held by Pipavav in the fourth quarter 2012. After the investment, Saab will hold approximately 3.5 per cent of the capital and votes in Pipavav.

The investment will be made through an issue of new shares issued to Saab. Finalisation of the investment is expected to be made within 3 months, under the condition it meets the necessary approval of the shareholders meeting of Pipavav and government approvals. After the investment, Saab will hold approximately 3.5 percent of the capital and votes in Pipavav.

The two companies earlier jointly formed the Combat System Engineering group, which analyses naval combat system design and architecture. The companies are also exploring next generation combat management systems for the Indian Navy and Coast Guard.


DEFENCE BUZZ

46

India And Indonesia Boost Maritime Security

The defense ministers of Indonesia and India are planning to jointly start training and possible co-production sale of military, defense equipment and increase maritime security.

Indian Defence Minister A.K Antony and Indonesia defense Minister Purnomo Yusgiantoro, also discussed about joint patrols of Indian and Indonesian warships in the Strait of Malacca, a vital waterway for sea traffi c, including petroleum shipments from the Arabian Gulf. The sale of the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile to Indonesia was also discussed.

The two countries exchanged views on issues relating to regional and global security, bilateral exercises, training, coproduction of defence equipment and ammunitions.

India’s Def Min Calls For Less ImportsIndia’s Defence Minister AK Antony has urged the Ordnance Factory Board (OFB) and Defence Public Sector Undertakings (DPSUs) to make sustained eff orts to reduce the dependence on imports to the maximum extent possible.Speaking at the Raksha Mantri’s awards for excellence ceremony, Antony said, “While in the era of globalisation, it is not possible to completely do away

with imports, particularly for a growing nation like ours, still the extent of our continuous dependence on foreign sources is not desirable and the situation must change. It can be achieved only by strengthening our research and development capabilities,” he said.Speaking about the recently revised defence off set guidelines, Antony said that “it recognizes Transfer of Technology and investment in kind as eligible for discharge of off set obligations”.He added that technology acquisition by the DRDO for specifi c technologies will be treated as an eligible off set.In the era of changing times and stiff competition from private sector, the time has come for OFB and Defence PSUs to shed their complacency, as their time of enjoying a monopoly in the market is over, Antony said.

Indian Govt Approves $1.5 Bn Russian DealThe Indian government has approved a $1.5 billion deal to buy 200 air-launched variants of the Russian-Indian BrahMos supersonic cruise missile and 10,000 Russian-made Invar anti-tank missiles.The Indo-Russian missile will be deployed on Su-30MKI strike aircraft. The fi rst test of the air-launched missile is due in December 2012.The Indian Air Force is expected to get about 200 of these missiles. The Su-30 MKI will have to be modifi ed to enable them to carry the air version of the BrahMos.The 10,000 Invar missiles for India’s T-90 tanks will be procured from a Russian manufacturer but in the future 15,000 will be

produced under license by India’s Bharat Technologies Ltd (BEL).BrahMos, a supersonic missile that can travel at about 3 mach speed, is already being used by the Indian Navy and the Indian Army.

India Cut Down FGFA OrderIndia’s Air Chief Marshal N A K Browne has announced that the country will be reducing its order for the fi fth-generation stealth fi ghter being developed jointly with Russia by a third.In 2011, the two countries signed an agreement to jointly build the aircraft. While Russia is testing prototypes of the T-50 aircraft (due to enter service with the Russian Air Force by 2017) and India’s Hindustan Aeronatics Limited (HAL) is to build the Fifth Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA), a derivative of the Sukhoi T-50.According to Browne, India will now order just 144 of the fi ghters - down from an originally-intended batch of around 200, including 48 two-seaters.India now wants to take on a greater share of development and produce the aircraft’s software, guidance systems which means pushing back the production date for the Indian variant, which now is likely to be ready by 2020.A total cost for the program has yet to be worked out, but could total around $ 30 billion including development costs, HAL sources said.The two countries are in talks on the fi rst research and development phase. After this agreement is signed, a fi rst prototype will likely be delivered to India in 2014, followed by two more in 2017 and 2019. Series production aircraft “will only be ordered based on the fi nal confi guration and performance of the third prototype,” Browne said.


AF_An_LAAD_2013_21,6x27,6cm_INGLES_DSI.pdf 1 25/09/2012 11:55:51

DEFENCE BUZZ

48

Indian Air Force, IAI To Upgrade 150 UAVsThe Indian Air Force and Israeli Aircraft Industries (IAI) will join hands to upgrade UAVs from all three services under a project worth $ 958 million.The country’s armed forces currently operate a fl eet of 150 UAVs procured from IAI.Under the Rs 5,000 crore projects, “We will upgrade the capabilities of the UAVs in all the three services with the help of the original equipment manufacturer IAI,” a senior IAF offi cial was quoted as saying.About 100 Searchers operate along the western, eastern and northern borders of India while the IAF operates Searcher II and Heron UAVs for recon and surveillance.Once the upgrades are complete, the air force will be able to use the aircraft for far-off missions and control them through satellite communication system.The Army, with a sizeable number of aircraft, began inducting the fi rst UAVs in the 90s, the IAF followed suit with the acquisition of the Searcher Mark I, Searcher Mark II and the Heron UAVs.The Navy has three UAV squadrons deployed along both the eastern and the western sea board.

IAF Rubbishes Bribery Charge, To Go Ahead with AgustaWest-land VVIP Helo DealThe Indian Air Force (IAF) intends to go ahead with the purchase of 12 AgustaWestland VVIP heli-copters despite the latest string of bribery and corruption allega-tions which have appeared in an Indian newspaper and had been reported by the Italian press also.The IAF has rubbished reports of its former pilots being involved in an alleged bribery scandal surrounding the procurement of VVIP helicopters from Agus-

taWestland.“The Air Force will go ahead with the deal. We have conducted the transaction with professionalism, procedurally and thoroughly. There is no basis to the media reports,” IAF spokesperson Wing Commander Gerard Galway held.The IAF is scheduled to receive its fi rst AW101 helicopter in VVIP passenger confi guration within the next 2-3 months.According to AgustaWestland, the fi rst of 12 choppers is being outfi tted as per the Indian order with delivery to be made within

agreed schedules.A section of the Indian media has been reporting on the Italian gov-ernment’s probe into AW’s parent company, Finmeccanica as part of which the allegation of money laundering in the $650 million Indian deal reportedly surfaced. The reports identifi ed Sanjeev Kumar Tyagi, whom it claimed was a former IAF pilot, as being involved in the deal, a claim de-nied by the IAF. “On checking our records, we have found no such person --either serving or retired,” the IAF spokesperson said.Italian police probe names at least 15 people including Guido Haschke and Christian Michel, Praveen Bakshi, the chief offi cer of Chandigarh-based fi rm Aero-matrix, Gautam Khaitan, a Delhi lawyer who represents Aeroma-trix, and Sanjeev Kumar Tyagi, a Delhi businessman and former air force pilot, as those being inves-tigated.Praveen Bakshi and Gautam Khai-tan have both denied having any knowledge about the deal in strongly worded press releases.The report adds that taped con-versations between the alleged middleman indicate that 10-15

million euros of the commission may have been routed to India.Following reports of bribery and kickbacks in the Indian VVIP he-licopter deal with Italian aircraft-maker AgustaWestland, India had requested information from the Italian government over the al-leged deals.Earlier in March, Defence Minister A K Antony informed Parliament that “no specifi c probe is being conducted about India-related transactions” by Italy.The 12 VVIP helicopter contract had been fi nalized in March 2010. AgustaWestland had said in statement after the award of the contract, “AgustaWestland, a Fin-meccanica company, is pleased to announce that a contract has been signed by the Government of India for the acquisition of twelve AW101 helicopters that will perform government trans-port duties. The contract, valued at around € 560 million, includes an extensive fi ve year logistic support service and initial aircrew and technician training”.

(Defence Buzz Courtsey:Mohd. Ahmedullah)


13473_Armada & DSI_276x216_FAP.ai 1 10/30/12 8:18 PM13473_Armada & DSI_276x216_FAP.ai 1 10/30/12 8:18 PM

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Documents

Defence and Security of India - Dec 2012 issue