Deescualtion very interesting

8/7/2019 Deescualtion very interesting

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IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOL. 58, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2011 109

Transition to IS Project De-Escalation:An Exploration Into ManagementExecutives Inuence Behaviors

Gary Pan and Shan Ling Pan

Abstract This paper seeks to understand the factors that shapemanagement executives inuence behaviors and the inuence tac-tics that may be utilized during de-escalation of commitment toinformation systems (IS) projects. De-escalation is potentially amore important issue than escalation because de-escalation pro-vides remediesfor theills of escalation. Therefore, it is important tounderstand how project stakeholders commitment to troubled ISprojects may be transformed under management executives inu-ence, hence allowing project teams to carry out their de-escalationactivities. Here, we adopt theories of leadership, politics, and inter-

personal inuence, as our lenses to examine the management ex-ecutives inuence behaviors during the transition from escalationto de-escalation of a failing electronic procurement project at UKBorough Council. Based on the case analysis, we presented threekey factors that shaped the inuence behaviors and six inuencetactics utilized separately or collectively by the management exec-utive in the unfreezing, changing, and refreezing phases of projectde-escalation. Through the ndings, researchers may develop adeeper understanding of how project stakeholders may surrenderprevious failing courses of action and accept alternative courses of action. Practitioners may also devise useful inuence tactics whende-escalating troubled IS projects.

Index Terms Case study, de-escalation of commitment, inu-ence behaviors, information systems (IS) project.

I. INTRODUCTION

T HERE is a signicant body of evidence that many in-formation systems (IS) development projects end in fail-ure. While some attribute the alarming rate of failure to the in-creasing complexity of information technology, others believethese troubled IS projects are entrapped within cycles of com-mitment escalation [41], [46]. Accordingly, only 29% of ISprojects are completed within time and budget, the rests ex-hibit some degree of escalation [51]. Experts have suggestedthe most effective way to eradicate the escalation phenomenon

is through de-escalation of commitment to prior failing courseof action [16], [29]. Montealegre and Keil [33] consider projectde-escalation reduction in commitment to a failing course of action that manifests itself as project abandonment or redirec-

Manuscript received February 26, 2009; revised July 31, 2009 and December10, 2009; accepted February 4, 2010. Date of publication May 18, 2010; dateof current version January 19, 2011. Review of this manuscript was arrangedby Department Editor J. K. Pinto.

G. Pan is with the Singapore Management University, Singapore 188065(e-mail: [email protected]).

S. L. Pan is with the Department of Information Systems, School of Comput-ing, National University of Singapore, Singapore 119613.

Digital Object Identier 10.1109/TEM.2010.2048908

tion. De-escalation is usually triggered when negative feedback indicates that future investment is unlikely to result in positivereturns and perceived to be endogenous to the failing courseof action [52]. Thereafter, implementing effective de-escalationstrategiesefcientlybecomescritical, sincetroubledprojects areusually characterizedby severe timepressure,unclear project di-rection, and low project-team morale, and without resolving thedire situations quickly, these projects may continue to consume

valuable resources without achieving their original objectives.It is believed the success of de-escalation process largely de-pends on the role of project team leaders in inuencing projectteam members willingness to cooperate and participate in thede-escalation efforts. While a few IS project management stud-ies have examined the project de-escalation process [29], [41],no study that we are aware of has explored how project stake-holders may be inuenced to switch from escalation to de-escalation of commitment during the commitment change tran-sition. We aim to examine this important topic by applying lead-ership, politics, and interpersonal inuence theories as lensesto examine the inuence behaviors during de-escalation, sincemanagementexecutiveslateral inuence is consideredas a formof project political behavior, and separate leadership style maydetermine the selection of inuence tactics. Against such back-drop, this paper focuses on British Metropolitan Borough Coun-cil(BMBC)s (apseudonym) effort in turning aroundits troubledelectronic procurement (e-procurement) project. Specically,the main research questions are: 1) what are the key factorsthat shape the process of how management executives inuenceproject stakeholders to overcome their previous failing coursesof action and accept alternative courses of action? and 2) whatare the inuence tactics utilized either separately or collectivelyduring the de-escalation process?

The paper is structured as follows. We will rst review past

literature on IS project escalation and de-escalation, leadership,politics, and interpersonal inuence. This is followed by a dis-cussion on the research approach adopted in this study. Next,we present our case study and discuss the factors that shapemanagement executives inuence behaviors and the inuencetactics adopted in various phases of the de-escalation process.Finally, we present the implications and conclusion.

II. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

A. IS Project Escalation and De-Escalation

The escalation phenomenon has been observed in many IS

projects [35], [41]. One reason why IS projects often fall prey to0018-9391/$26.00 2010 IEEE


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110 IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON ENGINEERING MANAGEMENT, VOL. 58, NO. 1, FEBRUARY 2011

escalating commitment behaviors is due to the intangible natureof software that makes it difcult to obtain accurate estimates of the proportion of work completed, and as a result, giving a falseperception that proximity to project completion is close [5].Interestingly, such misconception seldom occurs in other non-IS projects, such as construction, where physical structure ismore visible and allows better gauge of project progress [47].Besides, IS projects are generally complex and tend to haveerratic requirements [34] that cause project scope to changefrequently. Projects that exhibit such volatility are especiallydifcult to manage [29], and likely to result in commitmentescalation. 1 Therefore, implementing effective de-escalation of commitment to prior failing courseof actionefciently is crucialin mitigating the escalation problem [16], [29].

In general, de-escalation is triggered when continued in-vestment into a project is going to achieve negative return ora project is discontinuing due to ambiguity in the probabil-ity of success of continued investment [19]. Table I summa-rizes 21 de-escalation triggering activities or conditions and

their respective descriptions in both IS and non-IS literature.Here, a condition that triggers de-escalation is considered de-terminant of de-escalation activities. A de-escalation activity isviewed actions that reduce commitment to a failing course of action.

To date, even though Montealegre and Keil [33] have devel-oped a prescriptive framework to examine the de-escalation pro-cess, the transition from escalation to de-escalation still needsmuch work [16], [29]. In particular, the process of how projectstakeholders may be inuenced to switch from escalation tode-escalation of commitment during the commitment changetransition remains unknown and deserves more attention. This

is an important topic, since there are many challenges facingproject teams during commitment change transition, such assevere time pressure, unclear project direction, and low project-team morale when projects have already exceeded deadline andplanned budget without achieving original objectives. As a con-sequence, project management strategies may differ consider-ably during de-escalation compared to other stages of projectdevelopment [20]. For instance, project teams may have to re-structure theiractivities, rapidly coordinateactions of the projectteam members, and apply appropriate response strategies whenprojects have gone bad. The success of de-escalation largely de-pends upon the role of project leaders in inuencing the projectteam members in engaging cumulative sense-making and col-laborative [12] de-escalation activities. The selection of inu-ence tactics may vary according to individual leadership style.In addition, since management executives lateral inuence isa form of project political behavior and to understand its dy-namics, a review of the leadership, politics, and interpersonal

1In terms of de-escalation, the issues of raising negative feedbacks on fail-ing project status and whether management is receptive towards the feedback apply to both IT and non-IT projects. Nevertheless, since the initial phase of de-escalation involves problem recognition, which in the case of constructionprojects, problems tend to be more visible as compared to IT projects, as aresult warning signals from non-IT projects could be detected and potentially

triggering the de-escalation process earlier.

inuence literature could be useful in understanding the funda-mental role of inuence behaviors in the de-escalation process.

B. Project Leadership, Politics, and Interpersonal Inuence

A review of the leadership literature suggests that there aretwo main categories of leadership styles: transformational andtransactional. Transformational leadership style that comprisestraits of charisma, individual consideration, and intellectualstimulation tends to inspire followers to exceed their own self-interest for the good of the team [3]. It strives to improve thecondence and motivation of followers to obtain performancebeyond expectations. Transactional leadership style that com-prises traits of contingentreward andmanagementby exceptionsis based on a series of exchange between leader and follow-ers [3]. Transactional leaders clarify followers role and thingsto be done to obtain designated outcomes. Behaviors and traitsof followers are inuenced by incentives offered by leaders.

Table II provides a summary of leadership styles, and their re-spective traits and descriptions.

In project context, project leaders inuence team effective-ness by motivating team members to collaborate and engage inproblem solving [28]. It is believed that different types of projectleadership styles may have varying inuence on the IS projectteam performance [12]. It is common for project team leadersto resort to political behaviors other than authority [25] duringproject development. This is because projects often exist outsideof the traditional line structure, and as a result, project leadershave to negotiate and bargain for resources to fund the projects.Furthermore,project leaders lack the authority to reward or pun-

ish project team members; therefore, utilizing inuence for thebenet of projects becomes common and relevant [44], [53]. Itis through such use of political behaviors that project leadersput themselves in the position to most effectively inuence thesuccessful development of the projects [43].

Inuence is the process by which people successfully per-suade others to follow their advice, suggestion, or order [25]. Itis common for organizations to adopt inuence tactics in theirdaily activities [23]. These tactics may include rational per-suasion, consultation, ingratiation, personal appeals, exchange,coalition tactics, and pressure. Yukl and Falbe [60] and Falbeand Yukl [11] further rened these tactics and showed how andwhy certain inuence tactics are more often used in certainsituations. These renements were subsequently adapted by agroup of IS scholars to examine how chief information ofcersshould effectively inuence their peers in achieving IS projectsuccess (see [8]). For example, during IS project development,projects that are aligned with the overall strategic direction of the organization tend to be more readily accepted than thosethat are not [9]. For those that are not aligned but still relevantto the organization, getting buy-in through enacting inuencebehaviors may prove useful in overcoming user resistance [18].

In summary, our reviews of the project escalation and de-escalation, leadership, politics, and interpersonal inuence lit-erature have failed to identify any research that examines the

process of management executives inuence during project


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PAN AND PAN: TRANSITION TO IS PROJECT DE-ESCALATION 111

TABLE ITRIGGERING ACTIVITIES AND CONDITIONS THAT PROMOTE DE-ESCALATION


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TABLE IISUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP STYLES , AND THEIR RESPECTIVE TRAITS AND DESCRIPTIONS (ADOPTED FROM [25])

de-escalation situations. It is this knowledge gap that servedas the main motivation of the study.

III. RESEARCH APPROACH

A. Research Strategy

This study aimed to undertakea qualitative case research [24]of an e-procurement project conducted in BMBC. The casestudy method was particularly appropriate for our study, sinceit allowed us to better capture and explain the managementexecutives inuence behaviors during the transition to de-escalation [33]. From the site-selection standpoint, BMBC hasproven to be an interesting case to study. Basically, BMBC isa UK municipal borough with an elected council that serves alocal population of 221 000 residents and provides a large rangeof services. The idea of electronic government originates fromthe UK central governments 1999 white paper, ModernizingGovernment , which challenged all public sector organizationsto achieve citizen-centered services, by integrating policiesand programs, joining-up delivery, harnessing the power of IT, and getting the best out of staff. The overall champion forthe electronic government initiative was the cabinet deputy of the council, who was assigned a special post known as theE-envoy. His main responsibility was to propel the electronicgovernment initiativewithinBMBC.In UK,anE-envoy hassev-eral key responsibilities that include dening and implementing

a government-wide IS strategy to support the public sector re-form agenda and also providing leadership and guidance onthe electronic government initiatives. The project we studiedformed part of BMBCs ambitious plan to purchase its suppliesusing an e-procurement system.

B. Data Collection

The case illustrates an organizations commitment evolutioncycle from escalation to de-escalation of commitment to a newe-procurement system. Field research (on-site observations, in-terviews, and documentation reviews) was conducted over eightmonths (January 2002 to August 2002). A total of 17 inter-

views were conducted with 17 interviewees; as summarized inAppendix A (see Table VII), each session lasted one and a half hours. When we began our eld research in January 2002, thecouncil had just decided to continue and turn around the failinge-procurement project. It wasin themidstof preparingits projectturnaround strategies. Therefore, we were able to clearly capturethe management executives inuence tactics utilized during thetransition to de-escalation. Data were collected mainly throughpersonal interviews with several senior executives, IS person-nel, and users. Personal interviews were supplemented by directobservations and documents that include organization charts,articles in the business press, and internal documentation. In-terviews were based on topic guides, which indicated relevantprobes at suitable junctures. Topic guides were customized for

each interview. The list of sampled interview questions is shownin the Appendix A. In terms of meeting observations, the re-searcher took as many relevant notes as possible and addedcomments for clarication and completeness immediately after.These notes were also compared with the meetings agenda andminutes.

The interviews were retrospective and semi-structured innature. The interviewees were asked to describe the IS de-velopment and specic comments for illustrating generalobservations were sought, but they were not asked to forcetheir experiences into any pre-established categories. Particu-larly, subjects were encouraged to focus on critical events [35].

Historical reconstruction of event was subsequently performedby the eld researcher. All interviews were tape-recorded andtranscribed.These texts became themain corpusof thedata usedfor subsequentanalysis. Intersubject reliabilitywas increased byusing the narratives from one subject to conrm or contradictothers in social triangulation [58]. But, there was no attempt toprivilege oneaccount over another. Overall, we judged that therewas no overt attempt by the subjects to systematically concealdetails or distort their stories. Where possible, we also tried togather other documentary evidence to supplement the evidencegather from interviews. The use of documents alongside obser-vational data enabled a comparison between the researchersobservation of events and other informed accounts. These


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documents played a crucial role in establishing triangulationand in maintaining the chain of evidence [58].

C. Data Analysis

This study sought to use the rich insights available in the case.For any case, insights into the de-escalation process can only be

obtained from thorough immersion into the transcripts for thecase. We used the texts for preparing a detailed case descriptionof events of the IS development process. This was done soonafter completing the case study. The focus was on critical eventsthat occurred during the project development. In order to reduceresearcher bias and also to validate that no important event hadbeen overlooked in the case summaries, a colleague was askedto take part in early analysis of some of the data. The colleaguewas uninvolved in the eldwork and was therefore unfamiliarwith the case. The role of this colleague was to establish objec-tivity [24]. The information he received did not include the eldresearchers list of critical events and decisions. Next, the col-league developed his own list of events. A senior IS researcherwas also involved in commenting at later stages on the eldresearchers list of events. The purpose of this was to detect anybias in the research approach. Data from various sources coa-lesced and built a specic narrative that explained the processoutcomes. We went through the interview transcripts severaltimes and made changes where necessary. The next step of theanalysis was to determine the factors that shape the E-envoysinuence behaviors and the inuence tactics he adopted at sev-eral critical junctures of the de-escalation process. We identiedsentences that implied some degrees of inuence have been ap-plied. For example, sentences like we had to make it happen.The E-envoy was monitoring the progress constantly , we had to do it this time to secure our good relationship with the coun-cil ,and but I had to do whatever the E-envoy wanted . Besidesthe critical events, key decisions and respective decision makerswere also identied. The key factors and inuence tactics iden-tied were compared and contrasted against the de-escalationliterature. The entire data-analysis process went through nu-merous iterations [24] to formulate a coherent and consistentoverview of the case organization.

D. General Structure of the Process Model That Shapes theInuence Process During Project Development

In general, there are three factors that may shape the in-uence process during project development. These factors areantecedent conditions, leadership style, and project politics dy-namics. Antecedent conditions may play an important role inshaping management executives lateral inuence behaviors,since patterns of past interaction between project leaders andtheir subordinates tend to reproduce [36]. These conditions areessentially the outcomes of a whole history of prior interactionsthrough projects, meetings, and communication activities, andmost importantly, they may affect project leaders in interpretinginformation and decision-making [40].

Leadership styles play an important role in determiningproject development processes and outcomes. Whether it is

transformational or transactional, the style of project leader-

ship has varying inuence on the project team performance.This issue is particularly prominent during project crisis situ-ations, where time is tight and project direction is ambiguous,an effective leader with appropriate leadership style may steerthe project team clear of troubled waters. Project politics canbe broadly dened as actions taken outside the formal powerstructure on an individual that are designed to inuence others,especially those at higher levels, to promote or maintain onesvital interests [38]. It is imperative that there must be mu-tual trust and common interest among project stakeholders withcompatible goals [4]. Politicaldistrust among project stakehold-ers is likely to lead to stakeholders suspecting one another of ulterior political motives [44]. With political awareness, projectmanagers can effectively remove conicts among project teammembers and utilize incentive schemes to solicit buy-in fromproject stakeholders. Therefore, one can assume that the dy-namics of project politics, indeed, plays a pivotal role in projectdevelopment and implementation. In the subsequent analysissection, we will be applying these factors to our case in this

study. We aim to examine their roles in the de-escalation inu-ence process and identify several inuence tactics used in theprocess. Fig. 1 shows a process model of factors that determineproject managers inuence behaviors during project develop-ment. Before the analysis, we will rst present the BMBC casein the following section.

IV. CASE STUDY DATA: THE E-PROCUREMENTSYSTEM AT BMBC

This section presents background information about BMBCand its e-procurement system. The case data are presented in

various phases to provide a better understanding of the projectstakeholders, and sequence of actions/decisions associated withde-escalation [33]. The phases are: 1) problem recognition; 2)reexamination of prior course of action; 3) search for alternativecourse of action; and 4) implementing an exit strategy.

A. Project Development Process

The role of the IS department within the council was to pro-vide general guidance on information technology issues for thewhole organization. The council had a history of poor projectdevelopment success. According to the IS strategic project man-ager: There had been very low success rates in terms of hittingthe target dates and cost. Below 70 percent of our projectswere completed on time. Probably , less than 60 percent com-pleted within the original budget. In terms of how many of these projects actually delivered benets, it was only around 40percent. Besides, we also had 15 to 20 percent of abandoned projects . When asked why the council had achieved so littlesuccess in project development, the IS strategic manager ex-plained: Basically, a local government could be very different in its working culture from private sector companies. The cul-ture here had been more laid back and less deadline-driven.Furthermore, project failure was viewed by the senior manage-ment as unavoidable, and had gradually become an acceptable

norm .


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Fig. 1. Process model of determinants of project managers inuence behaviors.

In 2000, there was a need to revamp the existing purchasingfunction in order to meet the target set within the e-governmentstrategy plan that 100% of the supplies purchased by the coun-cil had to be purchased electronically by 2005. Besides that,there were other considerations for the BMBC to implementthe e-procurement system. These reasons included improvingpurchasing efciency, setting up a cost-control mechanism, anda strong desire to be the rst local council in the UK to purchasegoods and services electronically. The council head gave fullsupport for the project and the 12-month project was launchedin January 2001 with an initial estimated cost of 150 000. Theproject was headed by the IS manager, who was supervisedby an e-procurement committee formed by a group of seniormanagers within the council. An external software vendor, se-lected through a bidding system, helped to develop the software.Other key stakeholders include the internal users of the system,such as the chief procurement ofcer, corporate service man-ager, corporate affairs manager, technical service manager, andthe e-business manager. External users would include the goodsand services suppliers.

The project faced several problems during its early stage of development. The main problem concerned conicts among theIS project manager, the users, and the IS contractor over de-sign issues. On the one hand, internal users complained about

the low quality of the software prototype and the failure of thecontractor to understand their requirements. On the other hand,the IS project manager and the IS contractor were dissatisedwith the indecisiveness of the users and pinpointed their fre-quent requests for design change as the main reason for delay-ing project development. The project is initially stalled due to adisagreement between the users and the IS contractor. It startedwhen the IS contractor demanded an additional 150 000 forredesigning the software again . Their reason was that sincethe contract price was xed, any changes to the software afterthe users signed off the earlier versions of software prototypeswere chargeable. The reason why the IS contractor asked for100% of the original cost for the cost of redesign, was because

it had anticipated the users to make many more rounds of modi-cations to the requirements. However, the users disagreed withtheir claim because they viewed these changes as alterationsresulting from the contractors mistakes, rather than additionsrequested by them. Eventually, thee-procurement steering com-mittee intervened and agreed to make the additional payment.

After the committees intervention, the project continued foranother two months before it nally collapsed. The same prob-lems resurfaced and the users refused to continue participationin project development. Instead, they proposed the purchaseof e-procurement packaged software. At the same time, the ISproject manager seemed to lose control of the project and wasbusy haggling with the IS contractor over the issue of what re-quests were categorized as additions or alterations. Despitethis dire situation, the e-procurement committee did not inter-vene directly, except for insisting to the users that the projecthad to be continued. However, they did promise more resources.While the users were resolute about project abandonment, theIS project manager insisted that they should continue. He ex-plained: Howcould we give up? With all the resources invested,the option of reverting back to buying packaged software wasunimaginable . At this stage, the project had already exceeded300 000 and was six months behind schedule. Apparently, theIS contractor was billing for changes made on an on-going basis

plus the fees for engaging a subcontractor, who specialized insystem integration.

B. De-Escalation Process

1) Phase 1 (Problem Recognition): With both camps debat-ing on whether the project should continue, the corporate affairsmanager decided to blow the whistle on the failing project byreporting to the E-envoy regarding the stalled project situation.She explained her whistle-blowing decision, I strongly felt that the involvement of the E-envoy would shake things up. Besides,we had a very open culture, I was condent by blowing the whis-tle would not cost anyone his/her job . The IS project manager

was asked to comment on the corporate affairs managers act


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of whistle blowing, It came as a relief for me. Seriously, I wassurprised by her action, but I was not offended at all. It might well offer a solution for this entanglement. At that point, it wasreally beyond my level of authority to make the major decisionon the project direction . In late December 2001, the E-envoywas informed of the project problems and was surprised at thegravity of the problems. He explained why the news came asa surprise to him, I had delegated the e-procurement steeringcommittee to lead the project. Besides, even at the bimonthlymanagement meetings over the past few months, the committeemembers did not inform me of any problems arising . Imme-diately, he delayed the development project indenitely, until adecision had been made. Clearly, the prototype had not met therequirements of the users. It would be better to stop the project temporarily than to rush to launch it and having it shut downlater .

Decision 1 (Reafrm the E-envoys Commitment ): To resolvethe problems, the E-envoy gathered all internal and externalstakeholders, including representatives from the IS contractor

andthe goodsandservices suppliers, to reafrm hiscommitmentto the project. He commented, It was important for everyone tounderstand my standpoint, especially in that state of confusion.Besides, we needed everyones effort to turn the failing project around . The E-envoy had stated a strong desire for the projectto be continued, promising full support for three reasons. First,the savings that could amount to several million pounds everyyear. Second, a successful implementation of the e-procurementsystem would enable itself as a role model among local coun-cils. Third, lucrative returns from selling the software to othercouncils whom were interested to follow suit in implementingthe system. The E-envoy spoke of his determinations to proceed

with the project development, The project had to go on, and it was denitely in the right direction for the council. At that time, I had strong belief that we could still succeed by makingsome changes . When asked for his reaction after the meeting,the chief procurement ofcer replied, We had to follow theE-envoys decision. But, it would be interesting to see how wecould turn it around after so many attempts . The IS contractoralso supported the E-envoys decision, This time we would re-ally like to put things right. It was important for us to leave apositive impression for future business with the council .

2) Phase 2 (Reexaminationof Prior Course of Action): Oncethe decision to continue the troubled project had been de-cided, the E-envoy organized a focus group meeting with thee-procurement steering committee, the IS project manager, theuser managers, and the IS contractor to reexamine their previ-ous problems for the rst time. With the E-envoys presence andparticipation, everyoneshowed great enthusiasm in the meeting.At the beginning of the meeting, the E-envoy delivered a speechto explain the signicance of the meeting. When asked aboutthe speech, the E-envoy commented, I simply assured themthat no individuals would be punished in this project. I alsostressed that turning around the failing project was our utmost priority in order to salvage our reputation and the condencethe external constituencies had in us . The assurance from theE-envoy was well received by everyone present in that meeting

as they began to discuss their differences openly. They were

unafraid of highlighting their own mistakes and were focusedon problem solving. In that meeting, several problems wereidentied.

Decision 2 (Invite External Observers to Scrutinize theProject Turnaround): In January 2002, after having consultedtheE-envoy, thestrategicdirector accepted ourproposal to studytheir e-procurement project development and implementationprocess. When asked why we were allowed to be involved atthat sensitive stage, theE-envoy replied, I wanted this project tobe a learning lessonfor everyone in this council. Furthermore, it would keep everyone on their toes, since we were going to haveoutsiders monitoring our turnaround effort. I was very sure thiswould have positive efforts on them . When asked whether ourpresence altered any of their decisions, the IS project managercommented, I had to admit that it did make several of us work-ing under pressure. We had to make sure that the turnaround was a success .

3) Phase 3 (Search for Alternative Courses of Action): Hav-ing identied the problems, the whole team started to explore

alternative courses of action. For the rst time, with the partic-ipations of the E-envoy and the e-steering committee, the threegroups (the user managers, the IS project manager, and the IScontractor) started to cooperate and work toward a commongoal. They began to look for solutions to rectify their problemsfound in the earlier development process. In order to preventa full-blown project failure, the E-envoy intended to salvagesome project development costs by suggesting the adoption of apartial abandonment strategy. The plan was to reduce the orig-inal scope of the project without causing signicant changes tothe projects original specication. For this reason, three userdepartments were shortlisted as the pilot sites, hence allowing

the IS project manager to deal with the needs of only three userdepartments, rather than eight departments formerly.Furthermore, the project had been separated in three stages.

Instead of implementing full-scale procurement functions all atone go, the rst stage would now focus on the front purchas-ing process, which included only ordering, issuing of purchaseorders, and delivery of items. The e-envoy concluded, By re-ducing the scope, certainly enhanced our chances of success.Adopting partial abandonment was better than having a full-blown escalation or a total abandonment with zero return .Sensing the E-envoys determination to succeed, all relevantparties arrived at a multilateral consensus to draw up a list of turnaround plans. The list is summarized in Table III.

Decision 3 (Gather stakeholders commitment): In February2002, the E-envoy ordered a stakeholder scanning before carry-ing out the action plans. The purpose was to nd out whetherall internal and external constituencies fully supported the de-vised turnaround strategies. The E-envoy reckoned that a newstakeholder analysis must be performed, since actors involvedin the development process could still be strongly committedto prior course of action. The e-procurement steering commit-tee members carried out the stakeholder analysis. The reactionsfrom various stakeholders were summarized in Table IV.

The e-procurement steering committee members spent con-siderable time in convincing those actors, who still seemed to

be doubtful to accept the new plans.


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TABLE IIILIST OF PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED IN THE EARLIER DEVELOPMENT PROCESS AND REMEDIES PLANNED AS PART OF THE TURNAROUND STRATEGIES

TABLE IVSTAKEHOLDERS REACTIONS TO THE NEW COURSE OF ACTION

4) Phase 4 (Implementing an Exit Strategy): By late Febru-ary 2002, the E-envoy ordered the implementation of theturnaround tactics. The turnaround required all project stake-holders cooperation and support. The E-business manager wasasked how she managed to reassure the suppliers, In order

to gain their support , we announced that the priority of our

allocation of future businesses would be given to suppliers par-ticipating in our e-procurement system. With the guarantee of more business, many suppliers expressed their support toward the project completion . The chief procurement ofcer and hisdepartment were relieved that the suppliers were fully behind

the e-procurement project again. When asked whether faced


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TABLE VSUMMARY OF THE PROJECT PHASES , DECISIONS AND CHANGE PROCESSES IDENTIFIED IN THE E-PROCUREMENT PROJECT AT BMBC,

AND THE RESPECTIVE ACTIONS TAKEN

with any problem during the strategy implementation, he com-mented, We were able to directly clarify the problems with theIS contractor, which was so much easier. Everyone also seemed to be more committed. It used to be at least two people missingfrom project meetings, but not anymore . The IS project man-ager also commentedon the implementation of thede-escalationplans, The team members seemed to work for one another. Thenew team sent by the contractor also impressed me. They cameat least twice a week to discuss the changes. This really saved us a lot of time and enhanced the communication process .

Decision 4 (Pulling the Plug on the Escalating Contract Pric-ing): The council had the option to hire new IT consultants.Much to everyones surprise, the E-envoy struck a deal withthe same contractor to replace the previous team with a teamof senior consultants. To repay the councils trust in them, thecontractor had offered a no further charge deal for subsequentchanges made to the prototype. Under the new arrangement, thecontractor would not charge the council any further cost untilthe project completion. Furthermore, a senior director from thecontractor was put in charge of the e-procurement project andhad assured the E-envoy of a turnaround success.

C. Consequence: The End of Crisis

When the e-procurement system nally went live in

August 2002, it was eight months behind schedule and 500 000

over original budget. The relatively smooth implementation af-ter the adoption of the turnaround tactics meant that the crisisconcerning the e-procurement project was over.

D. Case Analysis

De-escalation is a complex and gradual process, and manage-ment executives play key roles in facilitating the de-escalationstrategy [16], [46]. Therefore, understanding the process of howmanagement executives inuence project stakeholders to sur-render their commitment to previous failing courses of action,and subsequently, jointly agreeing to an exit strategy becomescritical in the de-escalation process. Simply put, an actors

change in commitment may involve three phases [27]: un-freezing, changing, and refreezing. Commitment change maybe viewed as a multistage process, and all stages must be nego-tiatedbeforea stablechange can besaid to havetaken place [55].Table V summarizes the project phases, decisions, and changeprocesses identied in the e-procurement project at BMBC andthe respective actions taken.

E. Factors That Shape Management Executives InuenceBehaviors in BMBC

Our case analysis suggests the three key factors: antecedentconditions, leadership style, and project politics dynamics, in-

deed, played an important role in the de-escalation inuence


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process of our case study. The role of antecedent conditions wasdemonstrated through the open corporate culture and the hightolerance toward IS project failure, as suggested in previousproject experiences, which all could explain why the E-envoyat BMBC adopted supportive and reassurance strategies towardthe project team despite the failing project situation. This is asharp contrast with many organizations, where threats and re-taliations are often initiated when dealing with failing projectsthat left ill feelings and fear among project team members [10].Such behaviors may hurt project team members morale andit is unsurprising many of such projects are eventually aban-doned [40]. Therefore, it is important to cultivate appropriateculture, develop acceptable project expectations, and overcomeprevious conicts or differences among project team membersbefore de-escalation can succeed [36].

The role of leadership style was demonstrated throughE-envoys swift and decisive action in promoting the de-escalation effort, which proved to be catalytic in improving theunity and cohesion of the project team during the de-escalation

process. The nding is in accordance to Augustines [1] recom-mendation that it is useful to rapidly dispatch the managementexecutive to the crisis scene because the involvement of se-nior management adds weight to the signicance of a crisisresponse operation. In our view, the E-envoy had adopted ahybrid leadership approach that comprises some characteristicsof both transformational and transactional leadership styles [3].For example, in the initial phases of de-escalation, the E-envoyencouraged the project team to reconsider the problems andcome up with alternatives. This behavior reects the intellectualstimulation trait of a transformational leader that emphasizesproblem solving and new way of thinking [25]. At the same

time, the E-envoy agreed to grant the suppliers priority statuswhen allocating future business contracts in exchange for theircontinued support in the de-escalation process. Such reassur-ance was instrumental in gaining overwhelming support fromthe suppliers for the new course of action. Here, the E-envoyclearly demonstrated contingent reward trait of a transactionalleader [3]. Overall, the hybrid leadership style prompted andimproved the efciency and interoperability of the deploymentof de-escalation activities.

Finally, the role of project politics dynamics was also provenimportant in our case. Apparently, the E-envoy was explicitabout why the troubled project had to be turned around, and alsoreiterated thebenets of project success, hence removingprojectteam members doubts on his commitment toward de-escalatingthe troubled project. This commitment reassurance was crucialas failure to fulll this part is likely to lead to disintegratedefforts for the project team and endangered the de-escalationeffort. Furthermore, the expectations of stakeholders are estab-lished based on early impressions they form about the goals of a change initiative and by their initial understanding of how theproposed changes are to be achieved [13]. Therefore, projectleaders may consider actively promoting change initiative, of-fering incentives, and in return, garnering as much support fromthestakeholders aspossible. In ourcase,the new courseof actionwas promoted as a winwin situation, where all related parties

stand to benet by supporting the project turnaround [31]. Be-

ing politically sensitive, the E-envoy acquired and retained theproject stakeholders support by minimizing their antagonismtoward the troubled project andconicts among theproject teammembers. He considered various stakeholders perspectives byconducting a stakeholder assessment before implementing thede-escalation strategies. This tactic proved to be crucial in un-derstanding and getting buy-in from the project stakeholdersduring project turnaround.

F. Management Executives Lateral Inuence Tactics

An analysis of our case suggests the adoption of six majorde-escalation inuence tactics in the unfreezing, changing, andfreezing phases of de-escalation either separatelyor collectively.They are agile mobilizing, provision of psychological safety,consultation, personal appeals, reestablishing legitimacy andstakeholder commitment, and continuous empowerment. Theseinuence tactics, their respective de-escalation phases and thesupporting case evidence are shown in Table VI and discussed

in the following sections.Our case analysis indicated the presence of the inuence

tactics in various phases of the de-escalation process. We willnext discuss the six de-escalation inuence tactics in detail.

1) Agile Mobilizing: Once a project crisis is identied, if intervention is the only solution, it must be executed in an un-wavering and timely fashion, since the longer decision makersare engaged in searching for optimality, the larger the risk thatcrisis events will spiral out of control [1]. Furthermore, by notresponding rapidly to address the project problems, mobilizingproject teams to involve in any project turnaround effort is goingto be increasingly difcult, since there will be growing frustra-

tion and declining morale among the project stakeholders [40].For agile mobilization to takeplace, rst it is important to under-take the task of resolute informing. In ourcase when theE-envoywas informed of theproject escalation situation, he immediatelycalled a timeout on the project development. He communicatedto the project team to investigate the problems and seek theirsupport in turning around the project. Throughout this transi-tion period, project team members are continuously engaged inacquiring and exchanging information related to implementingthe de-escalation activities. The outcome proved that resoluteinforming is one of the key success factors in responding to theproject crisis effectively [1]. In addition, it is important to notethat the project team members previous collaborative workingrelationships had signicantly enhanced the mobilization effort,since the preexisting project coordination structure and proto-col had provided the stability necessary for rapid mobilizationto occur [29].

2) Provision of Psychological Safety: The creation of psy-chological safety, either by removing barriers to change or byeliminating the threat inherent in past failures, can motivatechange [48]. Weick and Quinn [56] suggest that a change agentplays a crucial role in providing actors a sense of security. Thisis important since actors are willing to surrender their priorfailing courses of action and accept alternative course of ac-tion only if strong sense of security is present. As such, it is

vital for project leaders to provide psychological safety when


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TABLE VILIST OF DE-ESCALATION INFLUENCE TACTICS ADOPTED IN VARIOUS DE-ESCALATION PHASES AND THE RESPECTIVE SUPPORTING EVIDENCE

FROM THE BMBC C ASE


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handling project failing situations.Oneway maybe to reducetheseverity of penalties or remove punishment completely owingto failure. This is to mitigate continued commitment to failingcourse of action [21], [35] and encourage early introduction of de-escalation strategies.

In the case of BMBC, the E-envoy adopted a proactive col-lective approach of resolving the crisis. His main emphasis wason restoring the cohesion of the project team. His assurance thatno individuals would be punished for earlier problems came as asignicant relief for project team members, hence encouragingthem to openly discuss their shortcomings in the earlier projectdevelopment process. It was only then the project team mem-bers started to cooperate and work toward turning around thetroubled project. However, it must be pointed out that it was dif-cult for the project members to balance painful disconrmingmessages with the reassurance that change was possible; as ourinterviewdata indicate: It also tookseveral of usquite a while torestore our condence that a turnaround was indeed possible .Clearly, this resembles Montealegre and Keils [33] description

of a gradual consensus-building process. This is also consistentwith Heng et al.s [16, p. 108] suggestion that superiors and peers may play a role (by providing assurance) to help indi-viduals de-escalate their commitment to software development projects that have poor prospects for success .

3) Consultation: Yukl [59] denes consultation as the agentseeking target participation in planning a strategy, activity, orchange for which target support and assistance are desired, oris willing to modify a proposal to deal with target concernsand suggestions. By consultation, it means broader cooperationbetween stakeholders engaged to achieve jointly agreed out-comes, which includes a broader range of stakeholders and far

greater exibility. This also implies a commitment to proac-tive partnering that goes beyond ne words and good intentionsand implies a willingness to risk sharing. In the BMBC case,consultation tactic was adopted in the unfreezing and changingphases of de-escalation in which all project team members wereinvolved in jointly reviewing project problems and identifyingthe alternative course of actions [30].

The E-envoy encouraged a cohesive culture by gathering allproject stakeholders andconsulted their opinions on prior courseof action. With an open andforgiving culture, project team mem-bers were open about their mistakes.The E-envoy also promotedteamwork by gathering the entire project team to brainstorm forturnaround strategies. By adopting a consultative approach, ithelped to legitimize the new course of action, since it was ajoint decision among the project stakeholders. From the de-escalation literature, we are aware that consensus building canplay a role in promoting de-escalation of commitment. For ex-ample, in the Denver International Airport case, Montealegreand Keil [33] have shown that engaging in a consensus-buildingprocess with the various internal and external project stakehold-ers of the project is an important factor when implementingan exit strategy. Interestingly, the BMBC case differs from theDenver International Airport case on the timing of consensusbuilding, since it started the consultation at the beginning of the de-escalation phase when project stakeholders were asked

to reexamine the prior course of action, rather than at later

implementation phases, as in the case of Denver InternationalAirport.

4) Personal Appeals: Large IS projects may involve bothinternal and external project stakeholders, who could presentgreat obstacles to de-escalation [33]. For example, in the case of CONFIG, Keil [21] highlighted that thecompanyCompuSysap-pealed to external constituencies, such as customers and share-holders, to convince them that CONFIG was a successful lead-ing edge system to improve customer service. Keils ndingsfrom his escalation study indicate that appealing or justifying toexternal project stakeholders is likely to increase the commit-ment to a failing course of action. Similarly at BMBC, personalappeal was also enacted. Nevertheless, it was utilized in thechanging phase of de-escalation, instead of the escalation pro-cess in Keils study. During the commitment change transition,much persuasion had to be initiated to aggressively win over theproject stakeholders to commit to the new course of action. Inour case, the E-envoy appealed to feelings of loyalty from theIS contractor and the suppliers toward the council, by promis-

ing them a larger portion of future business opportunities. Bothexternal parties responded to his appeal by fully cooperatingin carrying out the de-escalation strategies. E-envoys behav-ior was consistent with Montealegre and Keils [33, p. 438]de-escalation study, which suggested a de-escalation tactic of making direct appeals to internal and external constituenciesin order to negotiate and implement an exit strategy with theirhelp, if possible [45]. Overall, our nding reafrms the impor-tant role played by personal appeals in both project escalationand de-escalation situations.

5) Reestablish Legitimacy and Stakeholder Commitment:Legitimacy is dened as a psychological property of an au-

thority or institution that leads those connected to it to believethat it is appropriate and proper [54]. With legitimacy, peoplefollow the rules voluntarily out of obligation rather than out of fear of punishment, which increases the effectiveness of projectcrisis containment. Durand and Mcguire [7] argue for the needto maintain legitimacy among existing constituents and estab-lishing legitimacy in a change initiative. Augustine [1] suggeststhat such legitimacy may bring about stakeholder support dur-ing project crisis mitigation. In the case of BMBC, reestablishedlegitimacy wasadopted in thechangingrefreezing phasesof de-escalation. Here, the focus was to reinforce the importance of changing commitment and institutionalizing the new course of action. TheE-envoys resolute informing strategy during the de-escalation process was the rst step toward legitimizing the newcourse of action. By having an open and direct communication,the project stakeholders were made aware of the gravity of theproject situations. The E-envoysdeclarationof his commitmentin rescuing the troubled project further enhanced buy-in fromproject stakeholders in the project turnaround effort.

In addition, the E-envoy was able to put together a recov-ery plan within a short time, which helped to restore some of the lost credibility, rebuilt trust in the teams ability to com-plete the project, and obtained renewed legitimacy from projectstakeholders. Overall, reestablishing legitimacy and stakeholdersupport quickly during de-escalation have proven to be impor-

tant, since mishandling the troubled situations is likely to turn


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into a legitimacy crisis, where existing stakeholders with-draw support and loyalty to project leaders [37]. Interestingly,reestablishing legitimacy has not been discussed in existing de-escalation literature and our nding has certainly suggested itsimportance, which probably deserves more research attentionin future.

6) Continuous Empowerment: To sustain any change initia-tive, empowerment is useful in developing and communicatinga coherent and shared vision throughout the organization [3].Similarly in the case of BMBC, continuous empowerment wasevident in the refreezing phase of de-escalation. By empoweringthe appropriate project stakeholders, it showed complete man-agement support in the new course of action. The E-envoy keptfaith with the same team of project members and IS contrac-tors, and empowered them with autonomy to make decisions inthe project turnaround. This has helped the project team signi-cantly in regaining condence, determination, and commitmentto rectify the original project problems and achieve its originalgoal of developing the rst e-procurement system in the UK

public sector at that time. Overall, continuous empowermentfostered commitment and resulted in better coordination andfewer execution difculties in the turnaround process.

V. IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The ndings of this study have several research and practi-cal implications. For research, this study answers the call byearlier de-escalation scholars (i.e., [33]) to examine cases onIS project turnaroundespecially those that involve in-depthcase studiesare clearly called for, so that the IS research com-munity may have a deeper understanding of the de-escalation

phenomenon in various contexts. Furthermore, most of the pre-vious case studies on escalation found continual escalation untilthe eventual cancellation of the project. In this paper, we haveshown that organizations may respond differently to project es-calation by adopting a project recovery approach. In addition,this paper makes a major contribution by providing a processperspective to examine commitment transformation during thetransition from escalation to de-escalation. Particularly, we haveidentied three key factors that may shape management exec-utives inuence behaviors and six relevant inuence tacticsin a de-escalation process. In this study, we adopted leader-ship, politics, and interpersonal inuence theories as theoreticallenses. By applying these theories to examine the de-escalationphenomenon, we extended existing de-escalation literature byincluding new theoretical angles to explore the de-escalationphenomenon. Our inuence tactics may encourage more or-ganizations to consider redirecting troubled projects in future,hence reducing thecost of failurean area which hasbeen iden-tied important, but remained largely unaddressed in the projectescalation literature.

The de-escalation inuence process and the inuence tac-tics presented in this paper are grounded in the process thatunfolded at BMBC and we believe that our ndings can begeneralized to other similar public sector organizations. Never-theless, a limitation of this study perhaps is the failure to apply

our constructs to similar de-escalation scenarios in private sec-

tor setting. This is due to limited-access opportunity in theseorganizations, especially when the study centers on troubled ITprojects. Further studies are clearly needed to apply the inu-ence tactics to other project de-escalation contexts, especiallyin private sector organizations. It will be interesting to ndout if there is any difference between public and private sec-tor organizations in deploying these inuence tactics in similarsituations. Future research should also seek to formulate moregeneralizable explanations as to why certain inuence tacticslead to certain outcomes at various de-escalation stages, or whycertain interventions lead either to success or further projectescalations.

For practice, the BMBC case underscores the need for projectleaders to be aware of the important roles played by projectstakeholders in de-escalation and ways of gaining their commit-ment toward thenew courseof action. First,partial abandonmentemerges to be a very useful turnaround strategy for avoidingproject failure. Partial abandonment helps to salvage some in-vestmentcostsand avoids theembarrassment of a project failure.

There is absolutely no reason forproject leaders to consider onlyall-or-nothing decisions. Partial abandonment offers a compro-mise between abandonment and project continuation. Second,management executives should closely monitor the progressof the de-escalation efforts. Such close monitoring of the de-escalation phases would act as an early detecting mechanismand reduce the risks associated with failure. This also formspart of a pressure tactic to inuence project team members to befully committed to the de-escalation strategies. Third, manage-ment executives should explicitly motivate project stakeholdersto support the project turnaround. This is important since theinitial enthusiasms and condence in the project may have been

exhausted by the earlier failure; therefore, more efforts mustbe made to restore the project executives and other stakehold-ers condence and interest in the project. Finally, the studydemonstrates that emphasizing the values of persistence and de-termination help in obtaining a project turnaround success. Un-doubtedly, it might be exposed to further risks associated withescalation. But without total commitment from relevant projectstakeholders in carrying out effective de-escalation strategies,project failure becomes inevitable.

Given that escalation is a common problem among ISprojects, it is therefore important to understand how projectleaders can redirect troubled IS projects in entrapment situa-tions. The BMBC case underscores the need for project leadersto be aware of barriers threatening the commitment transfor-mation from failing course of action to an alternative course of action. Overall, this study provides a much-needed empiricalinsights into the formation and execution of a project stakehold-ers inuence strategy in an IS project de-escalation context. Inparticular, the development of a set of effective de-escalationinuence tactics that could help to extricate themselves fromfuture escalation predicaments.

APPENDIX A

See Table VII.


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TABLE VIIINTERVIEW SCHEDULE FOR THE CASE OF BMBC

A. Sampled Interview Questions

1) Please provide the background information of the project(who initiated the project, its objective, who was involved,the budgeted project cost and estimated completion dead-line, and the project scope?). Who made the decision toadopt in-house developed software rather than packagedsoftware?

2) How did you identify your project stakeholders? Under-standproject stakeholders varying perceptions toward thenew system. Identify any difference in the level of com-mitment.

3) What were the antecedent conditions? Assess the projectmanagement history within the organization. Assess thereward and punishment structure of the organization.Did the team have adequate access to organizationalresources?

4) Discuss various critical incidents that affect the progressof the project and how it went into trouble. Was the projectwell managed? Why did the decision maker continue theproject despite the problems? Explain the meaning of es-calation to interviewees. Did anyone observe the cycles

of escalation during the project development? If yes, wasanything done to stop the escalation cycle?5) Did everyone agree to continue with the project? Was

project status accurately and consistently fed back to se-nior management? Was there any project audit during thedevelopment process?

6) The troubled project had to continue. Why? What wasthe project groups initial reaction? Were they supportive?Was there any departure of the project members or keystakeholders during the project? Identify the commitmentdifferentials among the project group members.

7) How did the management convince the project stakehold-ers to surrender the commitment to previous failing courseof action, change and accept the new course of action?

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Documents

Deescualtion very interesting