Deepwater Horizon Spill

8/7/2019 Deepwater Horizon Spill

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PROJECT 1: DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL

A project by

Anonymous


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GROUP PROJECT

(SEMESTER 1, SESSION 2010/2011)

CONTENTSCONTENTS............................................................................................................................................. I

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION............................... ...................... ................................ .................... - 1 -

1.1 Introduction.............................. ...................... ................................ ...................... ................ - 1 -

1.2 Objective............................. ....................... ................................ ...................... .................... - 1 -

1.3 Ethical Concerns ........................... ....................... ................................ ...................... ................ - 2 -

1.3.1 Universalizability (Reversibility) ............................ ...................... ................................ ....... - 2 -

1.3.2 Act Utilitarianism............................. ...................... ................................ ...................... ....... - 2 -

1.3.3 Rule Utilitarianism ................................ ...................... ................................ ...................... .. - 2 -

1.3.4 Cost Benefit Analysis ................................ ...................... ................................ .................... - 2 -

1.3.5 Respect for Individuals .............................. ...................... ................................ .................... - 2 -

1.3.6 Engineering Code of Ethics ................................ ...................... ................................ ........... - 3 -

1.4 Possible Conflicts of Interest ........................... ....................... ................................ .................... - 3 -

1.4.1 Public Interest ............................. ....................... ................................ ...................... ........... - 3 -

1.4.2 Self Interest ............................. ...................... ................................ ...................... ................ - 4 -

CHAPTER 2: COST & TIME vs. SAFETY ............................ ...................... ................................ ....... - 6 -

2.1 Well Design .............................. ....................... ................................ ...................... .................... - 6 -

2.2 Centralizers................................ ...................... ................................ ...................... .................... - 7 -

2.3 Cement Bond Log .............................. ....................... ................................ ...................... ........... - 7 -

2.4 Blowout Preventer (BOP)............................ ....................... ............................... ...................... ... - 8 -


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2.4 Theory of Ethics............................. ...................... ................................ ...................... ................ - 8 -

2.4.1 Reversibility............................ ...................... ................................ ...................... ................ - 8 -

2.4.2 Act Utilitarianism............................. ...................... ................................ ...................... ....... - 9 -

2.4.3 Cost Benefit Analysis ................................ ....................... ................................ ................... - 9 -

2.4.4 Code of Ethics ............................. ....................... ................................ ...................... ........... - 9 -

CHAPTER 3: THE 3Cs - Communication and Company Culture................................ ....................... - 11 -

3.1 Whistle Blowing ...................................................................................................................... - 11 -

3.1.1 Universalizability .............................................................................................................. - 11 -

3.1.2 Act Utilitarianism.............................................................................................................. - 11 -

3.1.3 Rule Utilitarianism ................................ ...................... ................................ ...................... - 11 -

3.1.4 Respect-For-Individual .............................. ...................... ................................ .................. - 12 -

3.1.5 Code of Ethics ................................................................................................................... - 12 -

3.2 Company Culture ..................................................................................................................... - 12 -

3.2.1 Reversibility...................................................................................................................... - 13 -

3.2.2 Act Utilitarianism.............................................................................................................. - 13 -

3.2.3 Rule Utilitarianism ................................ ...................... ................................ ...................... - 13 -

3.2.4 Respect for Individual ............................... ...................... ................................ .................. - 14 -

3.2.5 Code of Ethics ................................................................................................................... - 14 -

CHAPTER 4: INFORMATION MANIPULATION.............................. ...................... ....................... - 15 -

4.1 Background................................ ...................... ................................ ...................... .................. - 15 -

4.2 Theory of Ethics....................................................................................................................... - 15 -

4.2.1 Reversibility...................................................................................................................... - 15 -

4.2.2 Utilitarianism .................................................................................................................... - 16 -

4.2.3 Violation of Code of Ethics ............................................................................................... - 16 -

CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY ................................ ...................... ................................ ...................... - 19 -

5.1 Background................................ ...................... ................................ ...................... .................. - 19 -

5.2 Comparison with BP case............................ ...................... ................................ ....................... - 19 -

5.2.1 Violation of BPs own company polices and code of ethics ............................. ................... - 19 -

5.2.2 Trade-off between safety for lower costs and shorter time................................ .................. - 20 -

5.2.3 Silent culture.................................................................................................................. - 20 -

5.2.4 Management and Employees Differing Views on safety ............................ ...................... . - 20 -

5.3 BP fails to learn from past mistakes.......................................................................................... - 21 -


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CHAPTER 6: SOLUTIONS .............................................................................................................. - 22 -

6.1 Following Code of Ethics ............................ ...................... ................................ ....................... - 22 -

6.2 Finding the Best Compromise .................................................................................................. - 22 -

6.3 External Whistle-Blowing Agencies ......................................................................................... - 22 -

6.4 Respecting the Hierarchy of the Company .............................. ....................... ........................... - 22 -

6.5 Internal Task Force .................................................................................................................. - 23 -

CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION .............................. ....................... ................................ ...................... - 24 -

REFERENCES............................... ....................... ................................ ...................... ...................... - 25 -


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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1IntroductionEthical cases often go far beyond issues of public safety. Many involve bribery, environmental

damages, honesty, whistle-blowing and conflicts of interest. There are many rights and

responsibilities that engineers must exercise in their professional engineer careers. Often these

right and responsibilities overlap. When confronted by engineering ethical problems, how should

the engineers respond? Various ethical principles and codes of ethics are promulgated by

professional societies. These guidelines can help engineers in making decision about how to

conduct themselves and how to resolve the ethical issues.

This report will cover a recent incident, Deepwater Horizon oil spill,which is rather controversial

for itsethical problems, and a few related case studies. Nature of the accident and decisions taken

by parties involved will be analyzed and discussed according to the relevant ethical principles.

1.1.1 BackgroundDeepwater Horizon oil spill is a catastrophic oil disaster in the Gulf of Mexico which is the

largest of offshore spill in U.S. history. On the April 20th, 2010, a BP drilling oil-rig suffered an

explosion, spilling 42000 gallons of oil everyday straight to the ocean. Eleven platform workers

died and 17 others were injured in the disaster. Despite the mammoth clean-up operations, BP

still failed to stem the oil spill six days after the explosion. On July 15, BP said the leak had been

stopped by capping the gushing oil wellhead, though there is a new leak emerging on the sea

floor. The actions taken by BP and its engineers have raised questions and public outrage.

Lawmakers also raised the ethical concerns about how decisions are made by BP and the health

impact on those who live in the affected region, fishermen, marine lives and the environment.

1.2ObjectiveThe aim of the report is to investigate what actions and how decisions are taken by BP

management and engineers and Halliburton before and after the explosion of oil rig occurs.

Based on the Professional Code of Ethics, it is going to be discussed whether the actions taken

by all the parties involved are appropriate. The controversial actions that will be the focus of this

report include compromise between safety and cost, communication problem regarding safety,


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and information manipulation undertaken by BP. These discussions will be based on the relevant

Code of Ethics for both the engineer and management side. And, its influences on all parties

involved in this oil disaster will be further elaborated on. This report also aims to learn more

about the company, BP, itself and make comparisons with previous accidents that they had.

Lastly, this report seeks to discuss several recommendations which might be useful in future

cases.

1.3 Ethical Concerns

In this project, several theories of ethics will be used to discuss the ethical concerns

involved.Below are descriptions of the theories that will be used.In subsequent chapters, they

will be applied to the issue of concern.

1.3.1 Universalizability (Reversibility)

Universalisability is a general principal which demands consistency in human beings moral

thinking. Reversibility is a special case of universalizability. Someonewho holds the principle of

reversibility will weighan action after considering what if he is at other partys shoe.

1.3.2 Act Utilitarianism

Act utilitarianism attempts to determine which cause of action produces maximum happiness

orthe greatest benefits as consequences. Rules must be broken, if necessary, to achieve this.

1.3.3 RuleUtilitarianism

Rule Utilitarianism asks the following two questions:What general rule would one be

following? and Does itmaximize benefits by following this rule?

1.3.4 CostBenefit Analysis

Cost Benefit Analysis is often used in engineering; especially in large projects. This method

reduces every factor andconsequence of an action into its monetary value and whether the action

is acceptable or not isbased on the cost/benefit ratio.

1.3.5 Respectfor Individuals

This approach holds the rights of individuals of groups paramount to any overall benefits

thatwould be caused by an action. The highest right of an individual is his/her own life.


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1.3.6 Engineering CodeofEthics

In this case study,several codes of ethics that are frequently used in engineering field will be

used. Relevant clauses will be extracted and applied to the ethical evaluation. Below are the

codes of ethics which referred to later in the report:

y ASME Fundamental Canonsy BPs own Code of Conducty IEEE Code of Ethicsy Instituto De Consejeros- Administradores (Spain), Code of Ethics for Companiesy NSPE Code of Ethics

1.4 Possible ConflictsofInterest

Conflict of interest is a conflict between one's obligation to the public good and one's self-

interest. The purpose of this section is to highlight the possible conflicts of interest between the

various parties involved, namely BP Engineers, BP management and Halliburton. Knowing these

conflicts of interest will give better understanding why and how the parties involved make

decisions. It also helps to examine whether the parties involved are biased and are neglecting

ethics at the expense of personal interest.

According to the American Society of Civil Engineers Code of Ethics Canon 1.d, 1.e,

Engineers should seek opportunities to be of constructive service in civic affairs and work for

the advancement of the safety, health and well-being of their communities, and the protection of

the environment through the practice of sustainable development. and Engineers should be

committed to improving the environment by adherence to the principles of sustainable

development so as to enhance the quality of life of the general public.

As mentioned in the aforementioned code of ethics, BP, as well as Halliburton, have obligation

to preserve the environment health and well-being of their community, which in this case refers

to people living nearby and those whose business are affected.

1.4.1 Public Interest

1.4.1.1 Environment Health

Oil spills present high risk for enormous harm to marine life and ecosystem. In the short-run,

toxic and smothering oil waste instigates mass mortality and contamination of fish and other


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food species. And, in the long-run, it triggers long-term ecological effects that may be even

detrimental to the environment, compared to its short-run effect. Oil waste poisons the sensitive

marine substrate, on which fish and sea creatures feed on. This will interrupt the food chain of

the marine ecosystem, and is harmful to the existence of certain species in the marine life.

Furthermore, other wildlife including mammals, reptiles, amphibians, and birds that live in or

near the ocean, will also be poisoned by oil waste and may lose their source of food.

1.4.1.2 Community Interest

Oil spills can also have devastating short-term and long-term effects on the local economy and

society. Oil waste invades and pollutes the coastal areas, which would drive tourists away from

these places.People who are depending on recreational attractions and related facilities that have

been developed for fishing, scuba diving, swimming, nature parks and preserves, beaches, and

other resident and tourist attractions, for source of income will lose their means of living. These

people will not only lose their source of income, but the property values for housing will tend to

decrease, regional business activity declines, inhibiting future investment around the area.

1.4.2 SelfInterest

1.4.2.1 BP Engineers

The engineers have put forward their concern over the lack of safety design to the

management.However, they still go for the riskier safety option, as suggested by the managers,

because of self-interest in securing their jobs. As employees, they may fear of losing their job if

they go head-on with the company or higher level management. As such, they did not whistle-

blow and continued doing the improper safety measures. The engineers concern for protecting

their job has outweighed the public safety and environmental damage.

1.4.2.2 BP Management

As managers, they have responsibility to ensure the company is running at minimal cost and

maximum profit. They usually work under specific time constraints and budgeted expenses to

achieve their target performance. When they reach the target, they can get bonuses/incentives or

be promoted to higher level position. This self-interest may motivate managers to opt for the less

costly design at the expense of the safety.


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1.4.2.3 Halliburton

Halliburton tends to follow BP instructions for the oil well design to ensure the customer (BP) is

satisfied although Halliburton knew that the failure probability was very high. If Halliburton

insisted on BP to use the better oil well design, BP might disagree with Halliburton and find

another oil rig operator. Halliburton might then lose its valuable customer. Moreover, its

reputation on customer satisfactory would be damaged and Halliburton may lose possible future

contracts with other customers. Hence, Halliburton, for its self-interest, has foregone their

responsibility towards the public interest.


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CHAPTER 2: COST & TIME vs. SAFETY

2.1 Well Design

Firstly, Halliburton proposed two primary options of well design to BP. One option involves two

steel tubes, the liner and tieback. The liner tube is hanging from the liner hanger at the bottom of

the casing already in. The tieback tube is inserted on top of the liner hanger. In this liner/tieback

option, not only are four barriers for annular flow provided, but liner hanger also acts as second

barrier for Hydro Carbon in annulus (BP, 2010). Furthermore, it has higher chance to succeed in

cement lift. It is easier to remedy the cement job even if it is required. However, liner/tieback

option has its drawbacks. It takes more time and cost to build as compared to the second option,

long string casing.

On the other hand, long string casing involves running only one string of steel tube from the

seafloor all the way to the bottom of the well. String option only provides two barriers for

annular flow (BP, 2010). Moreover, it is indicated by cement simulation that cement job will be

likely unsuccessful because of formation breakdown. In addition, it would violate MMS

regulations of 500 feet of cement above the top Hydro Carbon zone, and it is required bond log

to be verified. In spite of the aforementioned risks, long string casing installation is less time

consuming and less costly than liner/tieback which in turn influenced BPs decision to use the

latter.


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For economic reason, BP decided to use the long string casing option despite its possible

drawbacks. Liner/tieback option was rejected even though it will be safer option as

recommended by Halliburton. On March 25, in his email for Allison Crane, Materials

Management Coordinator of BP, Morel mentioned that long casing string will save at least 3

days (Watson, 2010). In the following week, he emailed BP Completion Engineer and Drilling

Engineer that it is better not to choose the tieback as it saves a lot of money and time.

2.2 Centralizers

Secondly, BP used an insufficient number of centralizers, 6 centralizers that are attached around

the casings to keep the casing in the centre of the well. It is important to keep the casing in the

centre of the well because there is increased risk of gas flowing up the annular space around the

casing due to formation of channels in the cement. To achieve only a minor gas flow problem, 21

centralizers are required to install according to Mr. Gagliano modelling. Mr. Gagliano has

informed to BP engineer that modelling resulted in moderate gas flow problem with 10

centralizers (Watson, 2010). However, BP engineer, Mr Morel, emailed back that it is hoped that

the pipe stays at the centre due to gravity as it is a vertical hole, and as far as changes are

concerned, it is too late to get any more product on the rig, our only option is to arrange

placement of these centralizers (Watson, 2010).

Mr Waltz, BPs Drilling Engineering Team Leader explained to Mr Guide, BPs Well Team

Leader that he wanted to make sure the centralizers were working well unlike their previous

Atlantis job, and "I do not like or want to disrupt your operations I know the planning has

been lagging behind the operations and I have to turn that around.(Watson, 2010). Mr. Guide

responded that "it will take 10 hrs to install them. ... I do not like this and ... I am very concerned

about using them. From these evidences, it can be gatheredBPrather focus on getting the job

done faster rather than solving the problem despite being fully aware of the risks involved.

2.3 CementBond Log

Lastly, BP has skipped cement bond log test which determines whether the cement has bonded to

the casing and surrounding formation. By performing the test, even if there is any channel in the


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cement for the gas flow, repairing the cementing job can be done by injecting additional cement

to block any channel for the gas flow.

Mr. Roth, Halliburton Vice President of Cementing, said that the cement evaluation should be

performed as a part of comprehensive system integrity test if the cement is to be relied upon asan effective barrier (Watson, 2010). Moreover, a cement bond log test was required if there is an

inadequate cementing job according to Minerals Management Service (MMS) regulations. Mr.

Gaglianos simulation result showed that cementing job on Macondo well is inadequate cement

job.

On April 18, BP has contracted Schlumberger for the cement bond log test if BP has requested

those services (Watson, 2010). On April 20, the Schlumberger crew was told that cement bond

log test is not required to perform. The cement bond log test will cost over $128,000 to complete.

On the other hand, cancelling it will cost only $10,000. Furthermore, it would take additional 9

to 12 hours to perform the test. It would take more time if cement repairing job was required.

2.4 Blowout Preventer (BOP)

Blowout preventer is a device that automatically cuts the pipe and seals the well to prevent the

oil leaking from the well if any failure in system is occurred. Hence, it is very important to have

blowout preventer in a very risky operation like drilling of deep water oil welland to ensure the

integrity of blowout preventer. Although blowout preventer had been fitted to BP wellhead, therewas a failure in blowout preventer as the oil had leaked from the well and the reason for the

failure remains unknown (Russell, 2010). Moreover, it is indicated in documents discussed

during congressional hearings June17,2010 that there were modifications made to BOP for the

Macondo site which increased the risk of BOP failure.

2.4 Theory ofEthics

In this chapter, we will attempt to use several theories of ethics to discern whether or not the

company was doing the right thing ethically.

2.4.1 Reversibility

If BP engineers are required to operate on the oil rig platform, BP engineers would choose

line/tie back casing, more centralizers installation as it concerns for their lives according to


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reversibility. Moreover, cement bond log test is going to be performed to make sure it is safe to

operate.


By choosing long string casing, the operating cost and time will be reduced which could result inreducing the price that the public are required to pay. If there were no explosion of oil rig,

choosing long string casing was good in act utilitarianism approach. However, there was

explosion and oil leakage affects the marine lives and publics livelihood. Moreover, due to BP

negligence, they were fined. Hence, according to Act Utilitarianism, choosing the long string

casing, operation with just 6 centralizers and failure to perform cement bond log test should not

be done.

2.4.3 CostBenefit Analysis

BP has chosen the cheaper and less time consuming option. Hence, BP has done the right things

in terms of cost benefit analysis. However, cost benefit analysis should not be used here because

it concerned lives of the workers on the oil rig platform and the marine lives.

However, due to explosion and oil leakage, BP has to pay out more than the amount they should

spend on well design, centralizers and cement bond log. Hence, they have under estimated the

amount of money needed to pay if there is any accident occurred.

2.4.4 CodeofEthics

According to IEEEs code of ethic, engineer shall accept responsibility in making decision

consistent with the safety health and welfare of the public.

According to National Society of Professional Engineers (NSPE) code of ethics, Engineer shall

hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public.

Engineers are encouraged to adhere to the principles of sustainable development in order to

protect the environment for future generations

Hence, BP was unethical to choose the cheaper and less time consuming option according to the

above approaches. Moreover, BP has violated the codes of ethic because it has neglected the

safety of public and environment. If BP had chosen safer options rather than cheaper options,

this tragic accident could have been prevented.


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CHAPTER 3: THE 3Cs - Communication and Company Culture

3.1 Whistle Blowing

When interviewed by CNN, a survivor from the BPs Deepwater Horizon, Daniel Barron III,mentioned that on the morning of the explosion, there was an argument regarding the decision to

replace the heavy mud, which is used to keep the wells pressure down, with lighter seawater.

BPs management decided to proceed with seawater to speed up the process. After the argument,

Baron mentioned that chief driller Dewey Revette expressed concern and opposition regarding

the decision made (Bloxham, 2010).

Similar to Dewey Revette, there are many other Deepwater Horizon rig personnels who had

concerns regarding the safety of the rig, which had they been heard and heeded, could haveaverted the tragedy. However, sadly, these concerns had not been voiced out properly and

heeded. The workers have fulfilled their duty to whistle blow safety issues that might have led to

the accident.

3.1.1 Universalizability

Workers should have whistle blew. If everyone abandoned their responsibility to whistle blow,

no action would be taken by the company to rectify the problem.


Again, whistle blowing should have been done. Whistle blowing on safety issue promotes

greater good of the society. While running the oil rig in the manner it was run saved cost, the

benefit is not distributed equally and it may not even be comparable to the long term effects it

caused. Only few BP officials get most of the monetary benefit, while the cost is irreversible and

is spread among people across countries.


As to follow what the BP Code of Conduct dictates, workers should have whistle blew against

the safety issue.


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3.1.4 Respect-For-Individual

Workers have to balance his respect for company and his respect for their colleagues lives and

publics health and survival. Obviously, the latter outweigh the respect for the company. Thus

workers took the wrong decision under this rule.

3.1.5 CodeofEthics

According to BPs own Code of Conduct, "If you are unsure of what to do in particular

circumstances or concerned that the code is being broken, you have a responsibility to speak up.

The code explains the mechanisms to do this . . . and the protections to ensure that retaliation

against those who do speak up will not be tolerated.....Always... Stop any work that becomes

unsafe."

Workers should have reported the safety issues and if necessary stopped all works on the site.

According to NPSEs Code of Conduct, Engineers shall be guided in all their relations by the

highest standards of honesty and integrity. Engineers shall advise their clients or employers

when they believe a project will not be successful. Engineers shall not promote their own interest

at the expense of the dignity and integrity of the profession.

Workers should have persisted in advising BP management that if they continue their practice,

accident is bound to happen. They should not try to promote their own self-interest of keeping

their job at the expense of their colleagues lives, public lives, and marine lives.

3.2 Company Culture

It is true that some workers are partly to blame for not reporting what they know is wrong.

However, looking back at the very essence why they dare not to speak up, it would be due to

BPs culture. In June 2010, a Deepwater Horizons rig survivor interviewed by CNN mentioned

that it was understood that the act of raising safety concerns that might delay drilling schedule

could cause them losing their job (Bloxham, 2010). Employees and ex-BP-employees described

how the management overlooked safety by neglecting aging equipment, pressured or harassed

employees not to report problems, and cut short or delayed inspections in order to reduce

production costs (Lustgarten, 2010). Beyond harassment, some workers were even fired. Sneed,

a former technician at Purdhoe Bay, one of BP oil field, was fired for attempting to stop work


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upon discovery of a crack in the steel skin of an oil transit line that may ignite stray gases

(Lustgarten, 2010).

Not only the workers, subcontractors have also faced similar problem of not being able to force

their concern regarding safety due to BPs company culture that prioritizes speed and profits ontop of safety. Halliburton may fear that they face the same fate as BPs subcontractor. For

instance, in 2008, Kenneth Abbott noticed that Atlantis was operating with incomplete and

inaccurate engineering documents. In his email, Abbott notified and/or warned a BP manager

about the incomplete design specifications given to platform operators which violated federal

laws and BP's own safety regulations. Abbot was then fired when he tried to reveal these

information regarding safety concerns to BP officials (Blizzard, 2010). Therefore, it is evident

that BP is not willing to comply with the safety standards as they have fired both the workers and

subcontractors.

3.2.1 Reversibility

The company would not have fired whistle blowers if they are ones of higher rank, such as

director or shareholders. Hence, the act of firing employees cannot be justified.


By firing these workers, BP eliminated threat of internal information leaking by setting these

cases as example. However, on the other hand, workers may be discouragedfrom speaking outbecause they know the consequence of getting fired if they talked about the companys

wrongdoings even if it involves human lives. Moreover, BP can enjoy longer period of large

profit and good reputation by hiding their safety inadequacies. However, the cost if this

information is finally uncovered will be larger than the benefit it reaped. Not only workers lost

their lives, enormous number of marine lives perished and billions of dollars are pumped into

cleaning up the oil spill and compensating affected civilians. Hence, BPs action is not justified.


BP has to follow their own rules to protect those who speak up in matters regarding safety - in

this case whistle blowing workers. Hence, their action of firing workers cannot be justified.


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3.2.4 Respectfor Individual

The company has to balance between the respect for the workers and the respect for the whole

company. The company might have fired these workers to protect the companys image and

respect the company. However, they have neglected respect for individual workers honesty and

dignity. Hence, they should not have fired these workers.

3.2.5 CodeofEthics

According to Instituto De Consejeros- Administradores (Spain), Code of Ethics for Companies,

Carry out their activities in a professional, ethical and responsible manner.

According to this code, BP managers should do things in an ethical and responsible way.

Although the management was being informed by workers about the possible harm of the

compromises on safety done on the rig, they did not take proper action to investigate and rectify

the problems. Furthermore, they fired these people for raising the issue. In this case, BP had not

been acting in accordance to the aforementioned code of ethics.


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CHAPTER 4: INFORMATION MANIPULATION

BP has been accused of withholding vital information/manipulating information before releasing

them to public.

4.1 Background

On 19 May 2010, BP America president Lamar McKay reconfirmed that the damaged wells

maximum release rate hovered around 5,000 barrels a day. However, Associate Professor

Wereley of Purdue University, an established professor in his field, estimated the damaged well's

oil-release rate at a much higher figure, 95,000 barrels a day (Raloff, 2010).

Moreover, Purdues Wereley mentions that if longer streams of video were made available,

scientists can further check the gas-to-oil ratio emanating from the well to produce more accurate

estimate. BP management has those numbers but has not shared them yet. And the oil giant also

has not been sharing much video.On 19 August 2010, Transocean, the company that owned the

oil rig, also alleged that BP was refusing to hand over information it needs about the explosion

(BP rejects claims, 2010).

Lastly, shortly after the oil rig exploded, BP purchased sponsored links at the top of internet

search engines, Google and Yahoo to keep people from the real news. This raises the question:

If BP was not trying to influence information on the Gulf oil spill, why would they buy

sponsored links? BP spokesman Toby Odone told ABC News, We have bought search terms

on search engines to make it easier for people to find out more about our efforts in the Gulf and

make it easier for people to find key links to information on filing claims, reporting oil on the

beach and signing up to volunteer (Torbin, 2010). Nevertheless, the opponents argue that BP

was manipulating search results on Google to keep their company image safe.

4.2 Theory ofEthics

4.2.1 ReversibilityIf BP managers were public (i.e. fishermen and people who use or live by the coast), they may

want to know the actual oil spill amount so they can know how the oil spill will affect their

livelihood and health. The authority and environmentalists also need to know the actual data so

they can take the appropriate measures to solve the oil spill. Thus, BP should not underestimate

the spill rate.


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4.2.2 Utilitarianism

BP may think hiding the oil spill damage can help to mitigate the public panic, avoiding

unnecessary chaos. With less panic, BP can focus on their cleaning-up measures. Thus BP hid

information to bring maximum benefit to the public and themselves with the assumption that BP

quickly and diligently cleans up the oil spill.

However, it is most likely thatBP hid the information for hidden agenda: to evade penalty that

they have to pay to affected countries government and take less clean up measures.

Consequently, publics welfare will be compromised. Weighing both effects, BP should not have

underestimated the spill rate.

4.2.3 Violation of Code of Ethics

4.2.3.1 Underestimation of Spill Rate

According to IEEE Code of Ethics, To be honest and realistic in stating claims or estimates

based on the available data.

More than five independent engineers have pegged the spill rate at between 30,000 and 100,000

barrels a day (Raloff, 2010). This would suggest BPs number is an outlier, said House

Subcommittee on Energy and the Environment chairman Ed Markey. Wereley further assured

that all of these estimates from outside the industry are considerably higher than BPs. I dont

see any possibility any scenario under which their number is accurate, he said. Thus, BP

was neither honest nor realistic in stating estimates.

According to ASME Fundamental Canons, Engineers shall admit their own errors when

proven wrong and refrain from distorting or altering facts to justify their mistakes.

Responding to the public outrage and accusation, BP management defended themselves and said

that estimates were hard to make since there was no way to attach a flow meter to the top of the

gashes in the damaged pipe. However, Rachel Maddow (2010) disagreed with BP. She

mentioned that if BP is found guilty of gross negligence due to reported failure to repair the

damaged blow out preventer on the Deepwater Horizon, the penalty may rise to $4,300 per barrel.

At the estimated spill rate of 25,000 barrels a day beginning on April 20 until the completion of

relief wells in August, the fines from the EPA alone would be 10.7 billion dollars. As EPA oil

spill fines are well known throughout the industry, she commented that BP had a great deal of


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motivation to underestimate their original figures on the amount of oil being spilled. BP has

breached the ASME Fundamental Canons, underestimating figures for their own benefits. With

Utilitarian Theory, BP does not bring the maximum benefit to the public as they will pay fewer

penalties for the environmental damage.

4.2.3.2 Withholding crucial information

According to NSPE Code of Ethics, Engineers shall avoid the use of statements containing a

material misrepresentation of fact or omitting a material fact.

When subcommittee Markey formally requested BP to make live streaming video from its

wellhead available to the public, the video was compressed so that much of the fine detail was

missing (Raloff, 2010). He emphasized that original unadulterated footage is required for high-

quality flow analysis. Therefore, it is likely that BP has tried to omit relevant material facts fromthe public.

Steven L. Roberts, lawyer for Transocean, writes that BP has continued to demonstrate its

unwillingness, if not outright refusal, to deliver even the most basic information to Transocean.

"This is troubling, both in light of BP's frequently stated public commitment to openness and a

fair investigation and because it appears that BP is withholding evidence in an attempt to prevent

any other entity other than BP from investigating," he wrote (BP rejects claims, 2010). This

substantiates that BP has not released even the basic information to the related companies and

authorities.

4.2.3.3 Buying online search engines and scientists

According to NSPE Code of Ethics, Engineers shall not offer or give, either directly or

indirectly, any contribution or gift to influence pubic authority or to secure work.

Critics have described BP's move as unethical. Maureen Mackey, a writer on the Fiscal Times,

an online news site, said: "What it effectively does is that it bumps down other legitimate news

and opinion pieces that are addressing the spill... and (BP are) paying big money for that." He

comments that BP is trying to salvage its battered image after the oil spill in the Gulf of

Mexico.This shows that BP may buy the mass media to manipulate information to rescue the

company image.


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In fact, BPs unethical acts are also evident as BP has been offering signing bonuses and

lucrative pay to prominent scientists from public universities around the Gulf Coast to aid its

defence against spill lawsuit. BP attempted to hire the entire marine sciences department at

Alabama University, according to scientists involved in discussions with the company's lawyers

(Raines, 2010). The university declined the offer because of confidentiality restrictions that the

company sought on any research and obligations to take orders from their attorneys.

More than one scientist interviewed by the Press-Register described being offered $250 an hour

through BP lawyers. For eight working hours a week, this amounts to $104,000 a year. "It makes

me feel like they were more interested in making sure we couldn't testify against them than in

having us testify for them," said George Crozier, head of the Dauphin Island Sea Lab, who was

approached by BP ((Raines, 2010). This shows that BP has done unethical acts as they offer gifts

and bonuses to buy scientists voice.


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CHAPTER 5: CASE STUDY

5.1Background

Judging from its past records, BP proves not to have a good track record in terms of oil spills.

They are no stranger to the world in several of the nations worst oil and gas related disasters.

In March 2005, a massive explosion ripped through a tower at BPs refinery in Texas City, Texas,

bringing the death toll to 15 workers and injuries to 170. Then, about a year later, at 5000km

away in Alaska, technicians discovered that about 4,800 barrels of oil (~200,000 gallons of crude

oil) had seeped into the Alaskan snow through a small hole in BPs pipeline in Prudhoe Bay.

More spills were discovered in subsequent years, and finally it happened again in the Deepwater

Horizon accident. According to Public Citizen, BP has paid more than $550 million in fines, but

it certainly seems that the money is not too much of deterrence to them.

5.2 Comparisonwith BP case

In this section, well draw some comparisons between several of BPs previous oil and gas

related accidents.

5.2.1 ViolationofBPsowncompany policesandcodeofethics

For the Texas City accident, the company actually ignored its own safety protocols on operating

the tower which was filled with gasoline, and disabled a warning system. BP pleaded guilty tofederal felony charges and was fined more than $50 million by the US EPA.

For the Alaska Oil Spill incident a year later, BP was actually warned in 2002 to check the

pipeline, but they decided to ignore the warning. BP had no choice but to temporarily shut down

its operations, causing large disruptions to US oil supplies. In addition, they were fined $12

million.

In addition, BPs own internal studies have also revealed that employees who work more than 16

hours during a 24 hours period can lack the mental capacity to make sound and timely decisions.

Yet, BP violated its own policies and internal BP documents have shown that 16 plus hour shifts

were routine, with 75% representing 18 hour work shifts. To meet targets established for external

commitments and performance, BP is willing to risk allowing workers who are already tired to

work more in a potentially very dangerous environment dealing with flammable items and heavy


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volume equipment, rather than spend more time and money to train and hire more people. This is

clearly a very unethical approach BP is taking.

This is similar to how in the current BPcase; BP chooses to overlook its own code of ethics

5.2.2 Trade-offbetweensafety forlowercostsandshorter time

Similarly, an oil spill was discovered in BPs Lisburne facility, where oil was pouring out from a

two foot long hole at the bottom of a 25-year-old pipeline. The bottom-line was, in an effort to

cut costs, BP left it to the operators to respond if anything happened to the pipeline, instead of

spending money to install freeze protection, which would have prevented the rupture of the

pipeline. In the same context in 2001, a similar incident happened, and BP told the State of

Alaska it would rectify the problem, but they never did.

This is exactly how our current stands in an effort to cut costs and save time, BP chose to

ignore certain critical designs of the well which eventually contributed to the disaster.

5.2.3 Silent culture

Just last November (2009), another serious oil spill occurred, and BP employees made a long list

of safety issues that have not been addressed properly, making the Prudhoe Bay oilfield a

potential for another great disaster. An employee who has worked there for 30 decades mentions

that they still have hundreds of miles of rotting pipe ready to break that needs to be replaced. A

lot of employees share the same sentiment, but theyre afraid to speak out, risking their jobs. BP

Alaska is literally following an operate to failure attitude, avoiding spending money on

maintenance and letting equipments to operate until they break down and then replacing them.

In our current case, similarly, several employees had noticed that there were certain things that

were not right/not in place which might lead to serious safety percussions. However, for one

reason or another, they did not voice it out to their superiors.

5.2.4 Managementand Employees Differing Viewsonsafety

An act of whistle blowing was achieved by an employee who worked at the Lisburne Production

Centre, when he emailed Alaskan BP officials more than a dozen pieces of crucial production

equipment that he claims were not working or were out of service during the spill. He mentions

specifically that the management of our maintenance simply is not working to maintain a safe


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CHAPTER 6: SOLUTIONS

6.1 Following CodeofEthics

According to code of ethics, the liner/tieback option and 21 centralizers would be chosen in

operation. Cement bond log would also be performed. The first option would cost a lot of money

and time. However, it will provide very high safety option and it would sure prevent the tragedy.

6.2 Finding theBest Compromise

The full string casing option would reduce the cost and time compared to the liner/tieback option.

Although it would be less safe to operate, it would be a good option if the choice is done

properly. In this case, Liner/Tieback or Long String Casing, number of centralizers usage, and

cement bond log are to be chosen. Centralizers are very important for drilling oil wall in the sea.

Hence, it is important to have as many centralizers as possible. In this case, choosing 21

centralizers is essential. Moreover, cement bond log should be performed. By performing cement

bond log, it can be sure that the cementing is done properly or not. If there is any cementing

problem, remedial cementing can be done. However, it is thought that liner/tieback option is not

really essential to choose. Hence, this option is a compromise between safety and cost or time.

It is thought that Engineering is a compromise between cost and safety as no products can be

completely safe and affordable. Hence, choosing the second option is a compromise option

between cost and safety and a good middle way.

6.3 External Whistle-Blowing Agencies

Following trend that is undertaken by Singapore companies recently, BP could have engaged on

external auditing company to have a whistle-blowing hotline where employees can file

allegations against their own company anonymously. This would allow employees to be more

vocal about their concerns without having to worry about their employment. Moreover, since an

external auditing company is filtering the complaints, they could be more objective in viewing

the problem.

6.4 Respecting the Hierarchy ofthe Company

Employees could have averted risk of being fired by being more aware of the situation in the

company. Since he had known that he is risking his job by stopping his work, he should have


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consulted his colleagues and supervisor regarding the problem, instead of stopping his work right

away.

Another possible solution would be to approach the management by sending anonymous email to

the companys internal audit department with full detailed report of the problem faced.

6.5 Internal TaskForce

As discussed earlier, it can be seen that the root of the accident is the poor safety culture in the

company. BP has failed to learn from their mistakes in many past accidents. Our group believes

that what can be done to rectify this problem is to improve the companys safety culture.

However, attitude is not something that can be worked on easily since it is rather intangible.

Hence, a more feasible solution is to ensure critical equipments are always in good condition,

obsolete and old equipments to be eradicated or upgraded by stricter monitoring. One plausible

solution to carry this out is to improve enforcement of the Operation Integrity

Review1documentthat BP came up with in 2001, which identified safety and maintenance issues

the company needed to address to protect the welfare of its workers. To help in the

implementation, BP should consider setting up an internal task force, whose sole role is to take

corrective actions in improving BPs safety culture. BP always had a structure of monitoring

systems in place, and yet they have time and time again ignored such alarms with excuses, such

as the delay [of the improvements] is a conscious readjustment that we undertook as we learned

more about the scale and complexities [of the maintenance projects], and chose to make

decisions that were unethical, in their own interests. In this way, BP would no longer be able to

give any other excuses not to perform any improvement in the condition of its safety equipments.

1Report prepared by Kovac and several other BP employees and management officials in 2001to identify safety and maintenance

issues the company needed to address to protect the welfare of its workers.


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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION

In summary, while dealing with ethical cases, an engineer would find conflict between their

interest and public interest. It is generally agreed that human lives should never be compromised

even though sometimes that means sacrificing the engineers personal interest. As

aforementioned, BP management had failed to respect this principle by compromising condition

of the rigs safety gadgets, while BP engineers and Halliburton had put their self-interest, job-

security, before public interest, resulting in the unfortunate disaster. BP and Halliburton may

argue that they did so believing that nothing major would have happened. Had they known that

such a consequence would occur, they surely would have done otherwise. However, they would

never know, not in the past, not now, not in the future as well. Hence, BP and Halliburton had

still neglected to follow the least that they should have done, to follow the rig maintenance safety

guideline.

The line between right and wrong in any ethical problem is usually rather ambiguous. A solution

that can be accepted by one party may be disadvantageous and disagreed by another party. A

convenient gauge would be to satisfy all or most of the code of universally agreed engineering

ethics. However, professional ethical codes cannot cover all the possible situations that an

employee might encounter; there is no substitute for good judgment. Hence, in each case, an

engineer should consider all possible solution and make decision based on the most universally

agreed approach. Whistle-blowing should be placed as the last resort in any case, however,

should still be considered when all other alternatives fail.


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Documents

Deepwater Horizon Spill