8/11/2019 Dedel vs CA
1/1
DAVID B. DEDEL, petitioner, vs. CA & SHARON L. CORPUZ-DEDEL,
respondents
January 29, 2004
FACTS:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996
and May 20, 1967 in a civil and church wedding,
respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case
for the nullity of their marriage on account of Sharons
psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations.
He claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several
men
including a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant in the Preisdential
Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite the
treatment by a clinical psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her
illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she married and
with
whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national left the
country, Sharon returned to David bringing along her two
children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and
even considered the illegitimate children as his own. However,
Sharon abandoned David to join the Jordanian national with her
two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the
country on special occasions.
Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a
psychological evaluation of David and found him to be
conscientious,
hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and
projects completed up to the final detail and who exerts his
best
in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that
Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder
exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity; that she
committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse,
even
bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live with
David. Such immaturity and irresponsibility in handling themarriage
like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her family
are indications of the said disorder amounting to
psychological incapacity to perform the essential obligations of
marriage.
The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the
ground of the psychological incapacity of Sharon to perform the
essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals
set aside the trial courts judgement and ordered the dismissal
of
the petition. Davids motion for reconsideration was denied.
Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharons infidelity is equivalent to
psychologically incapacity.
RULING:
No. Sharons infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically
incapacity.As held in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, psychological
incapacity should refer to no less than a mental, not physical,
incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital
covenants that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article
68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live
together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and
support. The law intended to confine the meaning of
psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity of
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Sharons sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not
by themselves constitute psychological incapacity within the
contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility be equated with psychological
incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are manifestations
of a disordered personality, which make the respondent
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of the
marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or
sexual
promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for
legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code not for
declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation,
which need not be rooted in psychological incapacity, include
physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and
the
like. Decision affirmed. Petition denied.
