Decline of the Cabinet System

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Decline of the Cabinet system

By Anil Nauriya

[When the Cabinet system loses its sanctity, any coterie, political or non-political,can supersede it. This has implications for economic policy as well.]

ALL HAS not been well with the Cabinet system of Government since the death of

Jawaharlal Nehru in May 1964. The Indian public has got so used to the deterioration

in the system that it sees nothing amiss in what has happened since. Indeed, itseldom recognises this as a key problem. However, we now have irrefutable andauthoritative proof of at least one malaise. The proof has been provided unwittingly

because the high dignitary who has provided it himself seems hardly conscious of thefull significance either of what he has written or of the insight he has unintentionallygiven us. The position he held is such that the facts that emerge from what he has

said must now be taken as admitted.

The dignitary in question is P. C. Alexander, who served as Principal Secretary to

Indira Gandhi. During her tenure as Prime Minister there were five persons who heldoffice as Secretary to the Prime Minister at one time or another. Of these only twowere designated as Principal Secretary. First, P. N. Haksar and subsequently, during

Indira Gandhi's second tenure, Dr. Alexander.

In an article in The Asian Age on December 10, 2002, Dr. Alexander writes: "The

Prime Minister cannot always be expected to go through every document relevant toa decision or to discuss issues individually with the concerned ministers from whomthe proposals for decision would have emanated. It is the duty of the PM's secretary

to examine all important proposals on which the Prime Minister is to give his decisionand present either through brief notes on the file or personal discussions thedifferent options for consideration and recommend a definite line of action for the

Prime Minister's final orders."

It is understandable that the Secretary or Principal Secretary should help the Prime

Minister in administration. It is also true that the Prime Minister cannot be expectedto read "every document relevant to a decision". But the proposition that the PrimeMinister cannot be expected "to discuss issues individually with the concerned

ministers" lies at the heart of what has gone wrong in the post-Nehru era andparticularly since the Congress split in 1969.

If a Minister is unable to discuss an issue of concern to his Ministry individually withthe Prime Minister, such a Minister is perhaps not worth his salt. It is difficult then tounderstand why the Prime Minister should be Prime Minister in the first place and

why the Minister ought to be a Minister. This also means that a third person, usuallya bureaucrat, has interposed himself in the relationship between the Minister and thePrime Minister. The Minister is in effect being made to report to a bureaucrat. It is

improper for such a Minister to remain a Minister. To call a spade a spade, this is

subversion of the Cabinet system from within. Such Ministers are Ministers only inname. Their true position approximates to that of part-time Advisers or Assistants inthe Prime Minister's Secretariat or entourage. By June 1975 much of the Union

Cabinet fell in this category. In fact, such Ministers are remiss also in theirresponsibility to Parliament.


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It is significant that Dr. Alexander refers repeatedly to the Prime minister's "decision"

and "final orders". This seems to leave little space for the Cabinet. This phenomenon

is precisely what was reflected in the events of June 1975. The decision to imposeEmergency was taken first, Cabinet ratification came later. When the Cabinet systemloses its sanctity, any coterie, political or non-political, can supersede it. This hasimplications for economic policy as well.

Dr. Alexander's article, and the casual and taken-for-granted reference to the Prime

Minister being unable to have individual discussions with his Ministers means thatthis unavailability has settled into an acceptable practice. It means also that therewas substantial basis for the stories that used to circulate in the 1970s about

Ministers being made to wait upon bureaucrats in the Prime Minister's Secretariat.

The contrast with the days of Jawaharlal Nehru is patent. There was no question of aMinister or an MP not being able to have access to him. There were reports in his

time about M.O. Mathai, a relatively junior functionary, who tried to throw his weight

about. Before long, Mathai was put in his place, by Nehru and by Nehru's Ministers.Dr. Alexander has revealed that one of his tasks during his tenure was to deal with

"complaints from junior ministers that their seniors were not giving them adequateshare of work in the ministry". It is inconceivable that such a task could have been

handled by a bureaucrat in the Nehru era. It is extraordinary that a complaint byMinister J about Minister S should be taken for resolution ("dealing with") to a civil

servant! Presumably therefore civil servants, or some of them, have been placed in aposition to think, speak and act in such terms.

The system delineated by Dr. Alexander now has certain additional features with

which he is perhaps not sufficiently au fait. This involves the growth of the DeputyPrime Minister's Secretariat or Office. It is known that the new Deputy Prime Minister

(DPM) is keen on expanding his own role in government, or, as he put it soon after

being designated DPM, to formalise his existing role. What this implies for CabinetGovernment remains to be seen. One result not difficult to foresee is the growth of

factions in the Cabinet. Ministers would perhaps have to choose whether to wait

upon a bureaucrat in the Prime Minister's Office or to wait upon a flunkey in theDeputy Prime Minister's Office.

Pressure needs to be generated in Parliament to check the decline of the Cabinetsystem of government. To start with, all bureaucrats and senior functionaries in the

PMO and in the Deputy Prime Minister's office should be brought under parliamentaryscrutiny and be subject to some equivalent of confirmation hearings. A bureaucrat

who has Ministers reporting to him and considers this normal should be prepared toaccept at least this restraint upon himself. The Cabinet system had its checks and

balances. If that system has evolved over the years into another variant or system,fresh checks and balances need to be devised.

Dr. Alexander admits that there are "no office orders, rules of business or guidelines"about the duties of a Secretary to the Prime Minister. Obviously, this is also the

position with the staff of the newly designated Deputy Prime Minister. A Ministerneeds to be designated as being answerable in Parliament for all such senior

appointments. Such appointees should be expected to report to him and onlythrough him be designated to serve the Prime Minister or Deputy Prime Minister. This

is particularly important also in the context of the nuclear factor which has nowentered the subcontinental calculus. The people cannot afford to have any person,


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politician, bureaucrat or another who, while operating in a centre of power, is abovethe levers of democratic control and instead has such levers reporting to him.

Interestingly, the decline in the Cabinet system has not been significantly offset by

the increased incidence of coalition governments. Coalition governments could have

been expected to strengthen the Cabinet form of government by requiring many

issues to be resolved at the Cabinet-level. Why has this not happened? There may beno single answer. The experience at the Centre, and also to some extent in States

such as West Bengal, has been that where a large party forms a coalition with theinvolvement of many small parties, it is the former which really calls the shots. Thesmaller parties are unable clearly to decide whether it is in their interest to curry

favour with the larger party or to adopt a more assertive strategy. Usually they

adopt a mix of both. The larger party develops the manipulative skill and resourcesto take this in its stride, particularly where no small party is large enough to threaten

it on its own strength. The decline in the Cabinet system in fact reinforces the

vulnerability of the smaller parties. Their representatives in government haveresponsibility but only nominal power. They participate in the charade for limited,

local gain. Meanwhile executive power slips into hands little known and evenunknown.

[The Hindu, December 14, 2002]

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Decline of the Cabinet System