Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy. Towards Supranational Intergovernmentalism?

8/22/2019 Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy. Towards Supranational Intergovernmentalism?

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Decision-Making inSecurity and Defence Policy

Tw S Ivmm?

J Hw

N. 25 | M 2011

WORKING PAPER


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2 | KFGWorking Paper No. 25| March 2011

KFG Working Paper Series

Edited by the Kolleg-Forschergruppe Th T P E

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m vb b b. I m m x w b

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Hw, J, 2011: D-M S D P: Tw S Ivmm?,

KFG W P S, N. 25, M 2011, K-F (KFG) T Tmv Pw E FUv B.

ISSN 1868-6834 (P)

ISSN 1868-7601 (I)

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P: +49 (0)30- 838 57033

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www.m.


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Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy | 3

Decision-Making in Security and Defence Policy

Towards Supranational Intergovernmentalism?

J Hh

Abstract

F E , bw m

vmm w b m. T v

E , j m E vm m-

mmb m . Nw b

m , w b w

vm mw P Tw M T , Lb T,

m bj m . A , mj -m

EU b b

m. T m , v v , v b

m v w-z mm m w

vm. T , w

b mmb vm, x b v

E C C M.

Th Ah

J Hh b -m V P P S Y

Uv (USA) 2002. H J M P m

P Em E P Uv B (UK). H

b xv E ,

, , m , S D

P E U, Pv 2007 (2 m 2011).

J Hw w S Fw KFG m J J 2010.

C: j.w@.


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Contents

1. I 5

2. W D L T U b D-S

D-T CSDP? 8

3. T R PSC CSDP P-S 17

4. C 23

L 25


5/28


1. I

T b w w w E U Cmm S D

P (CSDP) b b m w .1

W mmb CSDP, b w mb -

-m . T b m b w v

m , (b ) m (Sm

2003; Gv 2007, 2009); z (Smb 1965; C 2007); mm v

(Mj 1989; H 1999; C/K 2000); - w (S 2004;

T/B 2009; M . 2010); m mm (H 1992; R 1999; Hw

2004; C 2011); E m (A 1998; C 2007); CSDP (Hw

2000; Sm/S 2003; Dm . 2003; M 2008); (M 2006;

G 2006; Sj 2006) w mj (R 2000; D . 2010).

I , w v w m b b z m -

- CFSP2 CSDP: Cmm Pm Rv (COREPER) (N

1967; H-Rw 1990; B 2002; Lw 1998, 2002, 2003, 2007; C 2007, 2011); P

S Cmm (PSC ) (D 2005; M 2006; J/R 2007; C 2007, 2011; Hw

2010); E U M Cmm (EUMC) (C 2010, 2011); Cmm Cv C

Mm (CIVCOM) (C 2010, 2011); C S W G (CWG) (B/

Dx 1998; J/Pm 2006; B 2007; Wj 2010); E D A (EDA)

(Tb 2006; B 2009). T bv

q. W mb b w m b m

mb . A v m mm

w w b .

T w m CSDP w mj x. T

w b b w m E .

S b v. S E

j b v except .

P 1990, v mmb w m v v EU vv

m . T w -m J 1997 E C Amm,

w m Lb vm T B v m W E

U (WEU) EU (EU-WEU). Y, m 18 m , B S-M

D w Jq C w bm w E S

D P, vv m w E w

-m (Hw 2000). T x m m CFSP

CSDP v b P Tw M ( w Lb) T, w

1 I 2 m S D P E U, I v 1,000

b CSDP b 2006. T m CSDP w b Lb T.

P , b w E S D P (ESDP). F

m, I CSDP , v z.

2 T Cmm F S P (CFSP) m M T (1991). T, m

mw w w CSDP m z.


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vmm b F

M H S Gvm v; w, w ,

m mx. I w m CSDP vv mx -

vm . Ov , I w - w m b m I - -vmm

(Hw 2000: 36, 84). M bv

bw vm m CFSP CSDP. N,

w w b , bw m ,

w bw v mv, m

m - -m. B w v w x, v zz

v w m. I w, I

b w w w m m bw

vmm m.

B , I m m v. I I m , m,

EU foreign and security policy(CFSP / CSDP) wv na-

onal mmb m v. Pw

. T , wv, w m

w-v mmb b v

w x m b w mm b. Am , m w

b . F U Km (UK) v b

; P S x m m L Am A; Gm

w E E w R. F m m mmb

, wv, m mv w b mxmz

w EU (T/Wv 2006; R 2008). Mv,

there was no EU foreign or( ) security policy worthy of the name. T EU (b

w ) mm w w

m ( ) v mmb . CFSP

CSDP x. T w mm EU b, B,

M, A M E. N, P F w

bv ( v ) ( ) Lb v

S; UK Pm M w B I b- m

v EU ; Gm b m

m w mm E (G 2010).

B EU mm v b . O ,

v. I , v EU mm

b m v . T mm

mm m v (M/Lb 2008). I commonali-

es w I w CSDP w b q b m

vmm. T , mm mb w v,

, v w. B b b

v vm v w vm


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m CSDP w v v

.

Hw CSDP? I m w, I m ( b ). Fm, w

m, b 27 F M w m Foreign

Aairs Council(FAC) , - , b H S Gvm

mv, E C. E mmb v v v .

T vmm b , w

mmb w w w b

(Mv 1993, 1998). I , q m

m w - m

w b w- w b m b. I ,

v b v. M H vm

mx b b b mm m w vb

. T m b w mm b-

w C S, Cmm . T mm b

x v m EUMC CIVCOM. T mm b

PSC COREPER, w m m b, v mj ,

bb-m b . M v m w w mm

mv b m .

S -m m, m w, m mz

b E Cmm E C B. A b

v m mmb , m b m

, , x w m v ,

m bw B x

v v . W mb w b bw

-m w m, bw b

v m .

I w , I , , x w CSDP

b vmm v m.

I , I m w vb PSC. T

CSDP , A 25 T N, , m b, w m

, v C x

mm . I w m

m m bw w m m

.


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2. Wh D h L T U b D-Sh D-T

CSDP?

O j w EU x socializaon w . Wv m w vm

, vv w w b m b, raonal

bargaining bm vz. J C (2007) w m b

q z w z bw

: (vm ), (m-) m-

v ( ). H w mv m

w , Type I socializaon . W

b v m , v

xb Type II internalizaon. H m b mm -

w z . I , w

w v z m m . F, w

w , ; , w v x-

b . O mm esprit de corps;

mm x; bw (C

2010).

A q w m w Council

Secretariat. I b , m, v x, m

b v m mmb vm m.

Sv v m mb w z

v, W (1991) 80 , H-Rw/W (1995)

70 . R b - b J B G

Dx m Uv Aw. I (B/Dx 1998) b

- mm (xm w m w

), w bv m -

-vm . T b mm-

mb wb b w b ,

m. Hwv, z mv w

b w w w, -

v m w v x [] v v

w m q mj v b w (B/Dx

1998: 314). F vm QMV Lb,

mb CSDP.

A b A J (B Uv) K Pm (M Uv)

(2006) x w mmb CWG x

-b . T w m w b -

b m -m v (J/

Pm 2006: 1). T w z m , , b .


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Hwv, w z , , mmb CWG m m v m-

, w v b -

b xb, m w w m.

I w m mb ( x w m

bw E ), B v v

mmb v mm

w C Type I socializaon (B 2007: 131). B

B v m -

bv, b m j bm v m

CWG (B 2007: 131). I , v -

bv w b mmb . Hwv, -

b bw m w m Type

II internalizaon (, ) bv w m b

. I , v m v. T w , v

-m C (Wj 2010) w m b -

b w .

T mw b- - w,

C S w z,

- bv. O m w vw w C m ,

w CWG CSDP: w B xm

w. COWEB [Cmm W B] m v m w . T m-

v m PSC COREPER. Mv, CWG v

w m j w w w mm mmb, b

w m Cmm:

The sta to sta contacts are so frequent that we dont need special meengs. We are meeng every

day anyway. Meengs are focused on a dossier rather than being general. This reects over the last

few years a big improvement in sta to sta contacts. This is due to demand but also because people

have learned to work together. The Commission has realized that it is a lot beer not to have the Council

against it and vice versa.3

T vw w b mmb COWEB:

The main WG in DGVI is COWEB. We have two formal meengs per week, Mondays and Thursdays. We

also have -m. The respecve desks will meet the Presidency in advance of the PSC meeng in

order to discuss what exactly will be discussed, what the taccs should be, what is really the outcome

that we seek from that parcular meeng []. In most cases we dra the outcome of proceedings even

3 Ivw w C DA, B, 14 A 2007.


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the meeng in order to discuss it with the Presidency. We know what kind of conclusions we

need to reach in order to make them operaonal for the PSC to take acon.4

T m v (wv m b). T m m v

-, b E.

T ( w ), w xm w

w b EUMC CIVCOM b M K. Dv C Uv

S C (C 2010, 2011). T w b b v vw w m

b m m (Cm . 1994). H

b m m, m vv-

w-vw w mm b w b

m w w b (C 2010: 9). H w

EUMC v qv. T mm w x, m

-x mm m mm ,

m ( m m), m b

wm EU x. C v m - -

w m m m (EUFOR C NAVFOR A), m w esprit de

corps m v EUMC b m m b

vm b mm m (C 2010: 22). T m m-

m v (m-) B m m w, ,

m b C D S (CHOD). T , mm

b, m- b m

EU . C

since their primary goal is to execute successful ESDP operaons, and provide for the common security

of EU cizens, they realize that working together will be necessary for the EU to have ecient and eec-

ve planning and procurement, parcularly in the light of declining populaons and defence budgets

(Cross 2010: 23).

I (C 2011),

despite the fact that EU military power is sll a relavely new aspect of EU security integraon, the

impact of the military epistemic community on the trajectory of security integraon has been quite5

strong, and is likely to grow. The professional norms, culture, and worldview of the military epistemic

community indicate that it is a highly cohesive transnaonal network of experts. In parcular, their

taccal experse is for all intents and purposes the same, and this enables them to come to agreement

very quickly(C 2011: 257-258).

4 Ivw w R O, B, 14 A 2007.

5 N Am E q m v.


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T b wv m mm x m

CSDP. I vm w m b-

w.

CIVCOM, v qv EUMC, mw , mb .

F, mmb mm w m w v m b

v m w z m. S, m

m q m q m (w z -

b w b P 2003; Lw 2010). T, b v , w CIVCOM

v w xm b b m mm

. Hwv, C m CIVCOM v v , j

EUMC , vm

. T z w v w. F, CIVCOM mmb (

PSC mb) b m w -m

. T b esprit de corps. S, mm

mv EU w (C 2010: 28) w b m w

m. T, v CIVCOM b mm -

x m w .

A , b z bv, w CIVCOM v-

w - - . C v x m-

b m v b m -

m (C 2010: 30). T v v v

, w, , v v w , v w

m v mx . C v v w

w mm v mx EULEX m Kv,

w w v v v w v

Kv. H mm x m -

b b v v m m

w m . T bm v j b PSC,

b v mm b m

(C 2010: 30-35). H , bw vm

-b bm b b v m.

R v b b w European Defence Agency.

I w m w b b, M Tb, m

Uv Bmm Lw S, (2006) European

Defence Communitys 1950 w m, w m vm-

v EDA. N m

z b mmb w E EU

v b- US , E Cmm

mb m Ez qm m,

vm m EDA


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w qm m z. F m w

v, Cmm w v m w v v

vm . (Tb 2006: 682) H A -

x x bjv m Cmm , b m b . H bm w vm/-

m m mv w bw w m w

xb ( xm, F UK w) w

b v EU ( m v). A

-bw b . Tb bm mmb

EDA w - vmm, w m

.

I m m vv EDA x w,

Jz B, m Cm Uv, Bv, (2009) w A w vv

w w m v b CSDP. E Tb w

bw m vm EDA 6 -

v v mb, B -

w EDA: bw v ;

bw E E-A ; bw bz

Ez m. H v EDA b m

v b

Code of Conduct on Defence Procurementw w, , v

m . W , A

b v bw E E-A v mmb

, m x w mmb

w m. O bz

v Ez , EDA m b b w m

mm -b . T m

b m b [] -

b (EDA 2007: 1). Y, bz mm E

, EDA b b v .

B m v, b

w bm EDA m m. I w,

vm m -. H z

EU , A m v m m

. A

6 W m EU , v vm , b w S B m-

mx mmb v, Cmm, x, z

v , EDA B m 27 M D. Sm, w m

A D m b Cmm, EDA D b S B.

T vm b x - (B 2009: 1083-1084).


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the rules and norms set up by the EDA in its eort to bring about greater coordinaon and cohesion

in the eld of defense provide a framework for trans-governmental regulaon and socializaon among

parcipang member states andb b -vm

(B 2009: 1092-1094, m ).

N q m m, b, v -

vm A, vm v -

v , v b v ( -

m) -b-.

T v m bw

N W, CEO A. W /w -

, .. w mm mm m b

m . Hwv, b w w

whether whatever was under discussion risked resulng in acon or incurring cost, or was just hot air. In

the laer case e.g. agreeing strategies then prey much all member states (Cyprus of course always

excepted) cooperated dufully to nd the middle ground, the European answer. But were there a risk

of anybody being required to do anything, or pay for anything, then naonal interest was unashamedly

to the fore.7

T mm w m bv. W m

mb b b m z v-

m EDA (W 2008: 32-35). A w b (D Nv 2010) xm w b

mb EDA w x

-vm -. A m b Kj S m B Uv

2010 P.D. . S EDA b b b

vm -j m b mmb ,

mm m bb EDA .

While the EDA is careful not to tread on the sovereignty of naonal governments and defense ministries

to procure a secure defense supply chain, they also see their mission as breaking up the relaonship

between defense ministries and their naonal industry champions, whom they see as the ones holding

up the integraon process.(S 2010: 324)

Fm, x CFSP/CSDP -m COREPER. T b b b-

j v . I 1958, w Cmm w , m v

mmb w b v, vm (N 1967: 223).

Hwv, , Cmm w b xv, w

-m w b C Cmm. W

w m b Em N, v z

7 E-m bw N W, Nvmb 2010.


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Pm Rv Cmm v w b -

, Cmm x, b , I (N

1967: 249-251). F H-Rw (1990: 179-180), b v mm,

mmb b b w m v m- v , m- m b v w.

S m z b w z .

Dv B, m E C A m m Pm Rv,

b 2002 w COREPER w m - (-

w E Pm). H m m w

mm m b -. O -, w -

COREPER b b m v w E

Pm M S mm w bw

w , C Cmm. H z x w COREPER

b ,

mm w mmb E Pm (MEP), m m

bw C M Pm Rv, w w

m w w x . C-, , xm

- b v v-

m (B 2002: 220-221). I b z COREPER J- , w

v w b C Cmm. B -

w ( w Pm) w . Hwv, B w

x - m COREPER. N b

w b EU, bv m v, v-

m b vm , w b w

vm mm m bz -

. C mm v w b -

v mx, m m , M, m

q m m C [w] v w mm (EMU, CFSP/CSDP,

JHA ). B m b x -

w m vm mm w w b -

m w w v v b w U (B

2002: 232-233).

T m - w COREPER b b J Lw

m Cv S Uv b v - . I 2007 ,

w b xm w COREPER mb xm

w mv b

q (Lw 2007: 138) w, w m v

mb vm b z -m .

W b b w Lw x v

x w v m m m v

bw w m. H v v x


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z w m b mb w m w m. T -

w COREPER : , z

m v, / m m

(Lw 2007: 144), w m , , mv (-w C ); Lw COREPER b xm

1994 L E Dv w w EU z v EU mmb

w .

H m w b-

w . COREPER m v w

q , w

bm mx w (Lw 2007: 164). I v

m v -xv mv

/ w COREPER v b

b bw E (Lw 2007: 165), m

b v b b , , m m -

v, w bm m. A Lw v Type II internalizaon,

w w v w mb v m

, v j z w COREPER m

w -w mm vb. U , ,

z mm b v. Nv, v b -

, vv vw w m 118 mmb m , w

mb COREPER w m mm w

mm E w . T bm COREPER

m v EU , CFSP CSDP, b

m C v.

Lw b M K. Dv C, m m COREPER w

xv vw m m v (C 2007,

2011). C m v v w

( vw v x v b m b PSC 2001).

S COREPER v w x-v

b m. T, m mj

. (C 2011) T x esprit de corps m E m

b v (C 2007), b m z b

COREPER m x v. T , C,

w b mb m mm. F, m

, v m v m b x w E

m m w , x

-b. S, m m m

m, v mz v m. T v b v

v bm C M b, inter alia, bm vv -

m m w wm


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w m b v (C 2011). T m mmm

w v w x

m b . C m 90 95

E C mm m b COREPER GAC. T, w b v w mz v q v z

mmb . T bv m E

x b b -m. F,

COREPER mmb x v v b.

C mb mv w j m

b m mv. T j xb w -

v wm

v vw vm, w m mj vm

v w . S CORPER m

w C, m w taking over C w-b

w (C 2011: C 3, m ).

T mb m, m v J Hm

A (JHA) COREPER. I , x JHA

, E m x (M 2010). B C b

m w v w m v mj x b

v b COREPER. T xm w 2005 Strategy on Radicalisaon

and Recruitment EU. T , , w

v v mm v w, v

w - (C 2011). COREPER w b bv v

b m: 1) EU mv m ,

Mm E ; 2) v

b b m z;

3) m b EU w v -m

. A Ez S . C

m COREPER m vm

xm m. A v , w m

bw w m bv v m.

S 2001, m - -m CFSP CSDP v

w m COREPER w P S Cmm. I w mm

I w .


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3. Th R h PSC CSDP P-Sh

C w P S Cmm b x

w b mm xm - mmm. M w v z w mm

bv (D 2005; M 2006; J/R 2007;

Hw 2010). Px, C, w w v CFSP CSDP -

, w v , z m, m

PSC (C 2011).

T b PSC w b Sm D m E I Pb

Am, M, 2005, v PSC x. H m-

m x ( P Cmm PC) v

modus operandi. N PSC w b

mm b CFSP CSDP, w

mm m z v x w -

b w COREPER w . B , ,

w wv x (D 2005: 32).

C M, m K C, L Uv, w-

Cmm (M 2006: C 5). H b w x w-

PSC m m [] m

v mm w bjv

(M 2006: 112). H w b

, v m . F, PSC mb v

mv b v m , v m w -

, m w b . M PSC

v mm w b m, v

v b mm mmm w, b-v

v - (M 2006: 124). H - v -

w v v m mj

EU . A b P L m-m v,

ESDP b m w. T, w m

w b m w v m . F, v

mb, w v , v v b

b m, w v z m-

v mw. M v w v b qv: T PSC

has developed into a mulplier of social inuence, both through informaonal inuence as well as

peer pressure. It has managed to manufacture consent and broker compromises even in areas where

naonal strategic norms would inially indicate incompability. [It] remains one of the most important

ideaonal transmission belts of a gradual Europeanisaon of naonal foreign, security and defence

policies.(M 2006: 136-137)


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T m m v PSC w b A J

C R (2007). T mm w m

b bw m m (H/

T 1996; Sm 20108

). A b x mm, b m w vw w v

B ( m PSC mb ) . Rz

m PSC B,

vw

suggest that naonal representaves are expressly not in Brussels simply to represent and bargain over

rigid, predened naonal posions. Rather, they adopt a problem-solving approach [] and are there to

sound out other naonal posions, gain informaon and nd out what is and is not possible. (Juncos/

Reynolds 2007: 144)

T w v b vm v EU -m

, J R PSC mb ( m x mmb

) v b m mv - [ PSC]

q m . Fm:

we cannot understand the denion of naonal interest in the eld of foreign and security policy among

EU Member States without reference to instuonal environments in Brussels and the interacon that

takes place within them. From such a perspecve, the naonal interest is not dened in an isolated

manner in a naonal capital and brought to Brussels to be bargained over, as intergovernmentalist

approaches suggest. Instead, it is constructed in an instuonal context/space in which the naonal

cannot be easily separated from the internaonal, nor the self from the other.(J/R 2007:

145)

T J R mv b m v x .

A mw mb vm w b

, b mmb PSC do take decisions

m vm m x , w, m

m. T mm, m m w m m

m w m , b v m-

v and to the actual substance of naonal foreign and security policies (J/R 2007: 147,

m ). O , w v bw vm-

m m m.

M w w PSC (Hw 2010) w J R. I b

bv vw w 28 mb mm, v ,

8 T b b H/T . Hwv, Vv Sm m

mv w v w v

x b PSC v m.


19/28


w w m - CSDP m G S C,

E Cmm, M F A (MFA) M

D (MOD) m v . T vw w m J Smb

2007. T w b q w vw w v .Sm q w b bj. T q-

v PSC mb w

CSDP , m x, w . I

, m vm m, b w b

b .

T PSC mb v x m b, v

(vwm) P S, H Lw, mj v m M

bj w v . A E F

v mb 3.7. I m , 53 v

EU m 47 9. T bv CSDP m

E , w, q, 80 bv

b necessary, 86.6 b desirable, 86.6 bv b likely.

A 27 mmb mb w PSC represenng

m , w m mb bw

E . W b mmb PSC, mj w b

v b , w 12 w . A

w PSC w , 63 v - w

37 w b.

M vw w mmb PSC v m , bv , Cmm

v . A mb PSC m w

b v. Amb w xm v b PSC w

b v , b w w tour de table -

v w v vw, w , v bw

B , w v v m.

T w v w, b v v . Bw m, mb

m v A m m, EUFOR-C m m, U-

Mv b m, w m Iq, A m w

. T , m , EU mmb v. B

vv -m v PSC m w b v

m. T w, , w deep w. B

m, q w b PSC

mmb.

T z w b w mm mj mm.

9 I w , m m m , 64 v , w

m 36 .


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T mmb w xm w. T v . O

w, xm, F mb w , , EU m-

A, w mm w , w w

w w v . T m - mutualtrust:

I think we all have a trust in each other that whatever compromise is possible we will nd it. [] And so,

even if you have instrucons where you have to cross your own red lines, you can then get back to capi-

tals. It is really true that there is a trust among colleagues that they try to nd wherever a common basis

is possible. It would be a dierent thing altogether if you always met 26 dierent colleagues. You simply

would not have that crucial element of personal trust that everybody is doing their utmost, whatever is

possible to nd the best compromise. That is the main element which helps.10

Sv mb b b

-b m b w b m v.

I m , mj mmb v v

v (, m ESDP m I C). I ,

w v . H w

v v w m w C

m Type I socializaon. F w v , bj

PSC x , mx , b b

m, w . A, w

m b mb v m MFA

P D v , v

b mv w . B q m

:

There is something which struck me when I rst came and it was rather unexpected. You have to defend

your case v w. The argument counts. The raonal discourse is very important, because there is a

clear dynamic. If you just have a certain posion and you say: Ah, but my minister wants this, and that

is that [], that, obviously, is not convincing. So you have to and you have to

w and then somemes a certain dynamic comes into play. Because countries come in which dont

necessarily have any interest in the case, and say: Yes, this seems a very good argument, a sensible line

to follow and then you see that a general mood arises. And then it is very dicult if you are against it.

If a wave of consensus starts and you are the only obstacle, then you have to have exceponally good

arguments to turn the de. Somemes, colleagues have to say: Yes I understand everybody else, and I

would love to agree but I simply have to call home. Then everybody will agree to let him/her call home.

V, v , I would say, it is also the case that the colleague will come back and say: Yes, OK we

agree! Because if there is a very strong sense of consensus, if common sense suggests that such and

such is a good compromise, so lets go for that, unless it is some absolutely essenal policy point for a

10 C vw w PSC mb, B, 24 A 2007.


21/28


minister, then colleagues can and do convince their capitals. So argument counts and you can create a

certain wave where opinions go.11

H w m mv w C w T II z.

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w w z mm . F,

mmb m - m,

w v v making CFSP and CSDP work. I bv ,

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PC. T, w , w w m

mv x w w b

b.

T, w mb vv European learning process -

w , m w

, mm v E PSC w w

b m v v :

We have a really good feeling of what the mood is in the naonal capitals. This helps m in the

decision-shaping process at home. There are a lot of policy elds where our policy is dened along

naonal lines. And there are a lot of others where we really have no naonal interest, where we just ask

ourselves: Is the best opon A, B, C or D? When we can see that the mood in PSC is moving towards B, we

can argue at home, OK lets go with B This is obviously the majority mood here. And one can convince

ones own capital readily easily, as long as there is no direct naonal core interest at stake.12

Tm m. T PSC , m w, m, w mb

v m b b q m j:

We can streamline things at an early stage. Because once you have ten foreign ministers and three have

publicly said we would like A and three have gone for B and three are backing C and one has said D, then

11 C vw w PSC mb, B, 16 A 2007.

12 C vw w PSC mb, B, 22 M 2007.


22/28


to bring them back to a common posion is very dicult. So early warning is very important early

signaling. They had beer not take too early a public posion. To be able to inform the capital that the

mood seems to be behind B, that helps. Ministers somemes come up with a posion simply because

some journalist happens to ask them a queson and then it is dicult to back-track. So that is also oneof the funcons we can full [].13

I w, PSC mb m v

M F A, b m B

b. A mb m x m mv w-w

mb, b . T vv , b

, E w m m m

w mm m EU mmb . T q .

T, , w , v v -

bw -m . T m m v

v m v; b vm b,

. Nw U S, F

UK. Ov , b sine qua non w m. A

, EU , v , leaderless (M 2007). I , m w, x

w USA. Um -m w vm

E C, b vm. T EU b

qm ( v m ) b bj m -

m bw w-v v . I , m vb

bjv. US w, m m, v ESDP

m b US, v m vv

-m EU (Hw/M 2009). B x w

w EU w I R b , x w x

CSDP , m w PSC b v.

I mw v PSC, ( ) M C. W

( b) b mm (C 2011: C 4)

PSC m mm, w z m w

m mmb , w m w,

w vw m w , , m b z. S

vw mm w m mm w mmb v v

m m v m m w b w m

x m m. S PSC bm b w m

mm (w , , m b) m b m

m m . C v mm, b

m v b m b m (w, , b m-

) w B-b COREPER.

I m, b m v w C , w ,

13 C vw w PSC mb, B, 22 M 2007.


23/28


wv m CSDP , PSC v m

w v b v - -

m B. Fm vm , PSC

.

4. C

I vm -m EU, J

Lw

variables that impact whether more compeve or more cooperave styles adhere include: insulaon;

issue scope; interacon intensity; and informal norms. Higher levels of [these variables] deepen the

mutual trust and introspecon that engenders more cooperave styles of negoaon to take hold and

become rounized(Lw 2010: 658).

M v v

w . EU w x-

w mb b E

(.. Iq 2003). B w w v v U

m w w mm w

m b mmb . T b m

v m b - bw m

v m.

T v mj w b m w , m-

m . A m, w x, m vm

m m v mmb . A b v-

m - -m w v

b b

m w b b. M

v m z -bjv w

vv CSDP - w -

m w q m w C Type I socializaon

Type II internalizaon. M vw , w v

, m m.

A v v m b w. W b , w

b, mm m , v x

w v b b m mv w

mv , b x m. I

CSDP w w m w - w


24/28


b w m m x m w m m

-m. U m, w bw -

vm , v ,

w . Ev b b - b vm EDA, v b mv w

w v v . U m, I m v

b m I w , , vm-

m. T m b m vm m.


25/28


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Th K-Fh - E A Exh

I Rh

T K-F (KFG) w mm -

b Gm R F 2008. I -

KFG v m vm

w vv b w b b w m j .

T K-F T Tmv Pw E

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m , z mm

x :

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Cm, C B

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Documents

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