Deciphering North Korea's Provocations

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Wednesday, November 24, 2010 STRATFOR.COM Diary Archives

Deciphering North Korea's Provocations

North Korean artillery began shelling the island of Yeonpyeongdo in disputed waters Tuesdayafternoon (local time). The island is occupied by South Korea and located in the West (Yellow)

Sea south of the Northern Limit Line that South Korea claims as its territory, but north of theMilitary Demarcation Line that North Korea claims as its territory. Homes were destroyed and

at least two South Korean soldiers were killed. South Korean artillery responded in kind, andSouth Korean F-16 fighter jets were scrambled.

Looking back, in 1968, North Korean commandoes staged an attack on the Blue House, the

South Korean presidents office and residence, in an assassination attempt against SouthKorean President Park Chung Hee. In 1983, North Korean special agents killed four members

of the South Korean Cabinet on a visit to Myanmar, and in 1987 they caused an explosion on aSouth Korean airplane that killed 115 people. There were running gunbattles in the hills of

South Korea in 1996 as Koreans pursued commandoes that had infiltrated the South viasubmarine. Even today, small arms fire and even artillery fire are routinely exchanged betweenthe North and the South particularly in the disputed waters west of the Demilitarized Zone.

Naval skirmishes occurred there in 1999, 2002 and 2009, and it was in these same waters thatthe South Korean corvette ChonAn (772) sank in March.

The ChonAn sinking combined with the wider context really brings this recent incident into

relief. Despite what Seoul and its allies consider to be irrefutable proof of Pyongyangsculpability in the sinking of the ChonAn, there was no meaningful reprisal against the North

beyond posturing and rhetoric. Needless to say, international sanctions have not succeeded inchastening North Korea in recent years.

History is rife with examples of sunken warships that either served as a pretext for war or were

ignored in the name of larger geopolitical interests. But while the ChonAn sinking was notincomparable to other fatal incidents in North-South relations on the Korean Peninsula, it has

certainly been a new low-water mark for the last decade. And historical precedent or not, it is

generally worth taking note when one country does not respond to the aggression of anotherthat has committed an overt act of war by sinking a ship and taking dozens of sailors lives.Perhaps the most overt result of the ChonAn sinking other than some very serious internal

retrospection regarding South Koreas military and its defense posture was the tension betweenthe United States and South Korea over Washingtons hesitancy to deploy an American aircraft

carrier at Seouls request as a demonstration of the strength and resolve of the alliance (due toWashingtons sensitivity to Beijings opposition).


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Indeed, the subsequent compromise between Seoul and Washington was supposed to center onan enhanced schedule of military exercises over time including both new exercises and the

expansion of existing ones. Among these was supposed to be the Hoguk 2010 exercise thatbegan Monday and included some 70,000 South Korean troops conducting maneuvers

including on the very island shelled by North Korea, Yeonpyeongdo an annual exercise in

which the United States has often participated. Yet American participation was withdrawnearlier in the month at effectively the last minute over a scheduling conflict in reality onceagain likely due to American concerns about the broader regional dynamic, including Chinas

and Japans reaction (the drills would have involved U.S. Marines stationed in Okinawapartaking in an amphibious invasion of a small island, which would have been somewhat

provocative in the current tense atmosphere over island sovereignty in Northeast Asia). Whatsmore, the United States has little interest in seeing conflict flare up between the North and the

South, so its calculus may in fact be not only wider regional concerns but also specifically thetension on the Korean Peninsula. In other words, part of the American motivation to withdraw

its participation in Hoguk 2010 may very well have been to avoid provoking North Korea, evenat the expense of further disappointing its South Korean ally.

Even before the Hoguk 2010 withdrawal, the U.S. hesitancy had enormous impact on Seoul,

which, in the South Korean mind, was refused immediate and unhesitating reinforcement by itsmost important ally at the worst possible moment because of other American interests in the

region. The state of the alliance is still strong, and exercises at more convenient times can beexpected. But the course of events in 2010 in terms of the American commitment to the

alliance may well define South Korean strategic thinking for a decade.

For North Korea, on the other hand, it is hard to imagine a more successful course of events. Itstruck at its southern rival with impunity and, as a bonus, provoked potentially lasting tensions

in the military alliance arrayed against it. The North also wants to avoid all-out war, so

Pyongyang is not without its disincentives in terms of provoking Seoul. Note that NorthKoreas actions have been limited to disputed areas and of a nature that would be difficult tointerpret as a prelude to a larger, broader military assault (one to which the South Korean

military would be forced to respond). Instead Pyongyang appears to be calling attention to thedisputed maritime border, at least in part a bid to emphasize the need for a peace treaty or some

similar settlement that would resolve the disadvantageous status quo in the sea and givePyongyang the assurances of non-aggression from the United States that it desires.

Yet Pyongyang enjoys a significant trump card its nuclear option. By this, STRATFORdoes not mean North Koreas fledgling nuclear program, which may or may not include

workable atomic devices. We mean the legions of hardened conventional artillery positions

within range of downtown Seoul and able to rain down sustained fire upon the South Koreancapital, home to about 46 percent of the countrys population and source of about 24 percent ofits gross domestic product. Though North Koreas notoriously irrational behavior is actually

deliberate, carefully cultivated and purposeful, Seoul is still an enormous thing to gamble with,and South Korea and the United States, for that matter can hardly be faulted for not

wanting to gamble it on military reprisals in response to what amount to (admittedly lethal)shenanigans in outlying disputed areas.


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The problem that has emerged for the United States and its allies is that red lines exist only ifthey are enforced, and both Iran and North Korea have become expert at pushing and stretching

them as they see fit. Though (despite rhetoric and appearances) Pyongyang absolutely wants toavoid war, especially during the transition of power, it has now established considerable room

to maneuver and push aggressively against its southern rival.

So, what exactly is Pyongyang pushing for? What does it seek to achieve through the exertionof this pressure? Is it still within the realm of its behavior throughout most of the past decade,

in which provocations were intended to give it the upper hand in international negotiations, oris it now asking for something more? The North Korean regime has been extraordinarily

deliberate and calculating, and one would think it remains so. But is this ability to calculateweakening as a result of the internal strains of the power transition, or other unseen factors?

Finally, what is Pyongyang ultimately aiming at as it takes advantage of South Koreasinability to respond?

Documents

Deciphering North Korea's Provocations