Debureaucratization Failure in Post-Dictatorial Greece: A SociopoliticalControl Approach

Minas Samatas

Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Volume 11, Number 2, October 1993,pp. 187-217 (Article)

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Debureaucratization Failure inPost-Dictatorial Greece:

A Sociopolitical Control ApproachMinas Samatas

Abstract

Why has there been a perpetual debureaucratization failure in post-dicta-torial Greece and why have all prescriptions for rational administrativereform failed to date? This paper addresses these questions from a socio-political control perspective, examining the organized efforts of the post-dictatorial political forces in Greece to acquire, maintain, and reproducetheir established interests in the state apparatus and the wider public sector.Utilizing a comparative analysis of the attempts at administrative reformand exposing the similarities of the clientelutic politics of both governingparties, i.e., Néa Dimokratía and PASOK, the paper argues that theoverall performance of the Greek public administration is not pathologicalbut rather functional for the established sociopolitical control system of Greekbureaucratism—i.e., the particular organization and operation of the entirestate apparatus—imposed and perpetuated by the Greek ruling forces toserve their politicoeconomic interests. Debureaucratization goes against partyinterests; it L· pursued and implemented only to the extent that it does notinhibit—indeed, that it enhances—party control of the state and of patron-age.

Introduction: the problem

Modernization of the oversized and inefficient Greek bureaucracy,and even the administrative reform that this paper terms "debureau-cratization,"1 are constant problems in Modern Greek society. Just asall Greek governments since the establishment of the Modern Greekstate in 1830 have included in their program an attempt at admin-istrative reform (Mathioudaki and Andronopoulou 1980: 8, 12-21),so, too, each post-dictatorial government and each relevant minister—conservative and liberal alike—have loudly announced and initiated,but have blatantly failed to achieve, the debureaucratization of thesluggish public administration and the inflated public sector.Journal of Modern Greek Studies, Volume 11, 1993.

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There is a perpetual "crisis of the crisis management," as ClausOffe would say (1984: 35ff.), that raises basic questions such as: Whyhas there been such a perpetual failure to modernize in post-dictatorialGreece? Why have all prescriptions for rational administrative reformfailed to date? Who is to blame for this failure? Is the public bureau-cracy actually dysfunctional for the established politicoecononiic in-terests? What are the implications of this costly failure to debureau-cratize?

This paper addresses the above questions not from a narrowadministrative/technocratic point of view but from a sociopolitical con-trol perspective—that is, from the perspective of the organized effortsof the collective power forces of post-dictatorial Greece to acquire,maintain, and reproduce their established interests in the state andthe wider public sector. The paper attempts to diagnose the causesand to point out the subsequent effects of this failure at debureau-cratization; it relies upon a comparative analysis of the post-dictatorialattempts at administrative reform and takes into account the proposalsfor administrative reform, the relevant legislation, and the actual pol-itics of both governing parties, the "neo-liberal" Néa Dimokratía andthe "socialist" PASOK.

In short, each post-dictatorial attempt at governmental debu-reaucratization pursued a cosmetic modernization of the public ad-ministration—a modernization meant to obscure the real goals of eachgovernment, which were to subjugate the civil service and to controlthe patronage needed for reelection. So far, without exception, allreforms that actually or potentially inhibited the above objectives werecanceled or undermined during their implementation. Hence, as arule, the political cost that administrative reforms potentially entailfor any governing party always predominates over any modernizationplan.

First, I shall briefly review the post-dictatorial debureaucrati-zation attempts to date; then I shall compare the actual politics re-garding administrative reform of both governing parties, conservativeand socialist, in order to help substantiate the following basic argu-ments:

1. The Greek bureaucratic problem is not just a technico-administrative one—that is, an aberration of the ideotypical, rationalWeberian bureaucracy. Nor is it a mere management problem. Insteadit is a complex outcome of the conflicting power interests within andaround the state apparatus and the public sector, affected also by thestate's significant role in legitimation and welfare, particularly in itscapacity as emergency employer of the otherwise unemployed.

2. The state's overall administrative performance is directly af-

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fected by the sociopolitical control imperative, i.e., by the constanteffort of dominant forces to acquire, maintain, and reproduce theirexclusive control of the state and the wider public sector in order tosafeguard their own established power and economic interests.

3. Greece's bureaucratic public administration is not a patholog-ical mechanism but rather a functional one within the establishedsociopolitical control system that I have called Greek bureaucratism,i.e., the particular organization and functioning of the entire stateapparatus, which works primarily to serve the established politico-economic interests of the Greek ruling forces and secondarily to servethe corporatist interests of public personnel (Samatas 1986).

4. The oversized and sluggish bureaucracy is, to a large extent,a by-product of the domination of the state apparatus by the rulingpolitical parties. The principal problem, therefore, is the clientelistcharacter and the patronage politics of the parties, which deliberatelyuse and reinforce such an organization and functioning of the stateas bureaucratism, defending their representative politicoeconomic in-terests and neutralizing any substantial reform that could jeopardizethose interests.

Forty postwar years of state modernization attempts and of blatantdebureaucratization failure: a brief sociopolitical control assessment

Debureaucratization failure characterizes the entire postwar pe-riod in Greece, since the whole structure and performance of the stateapparatus in general, and of the public administration in particular,have been closely interrelated with the goals of the postwar socio-political control system. In fact, the overall state administrative per-formance has been directly affected by the sociopolitical control im-perative, i.e., the constant effort of Greece's insecure dominant forcesto control and contain the popular masses. Having won the civil waronly militarily and not ideologically, the conservative forces were con-stantly preoccupied by the fear of a popular threat "from below"against their reconstructed interests (Tsoucalas 1986a; Alivizatos1983; Mouzelis 1980). Thus the entire state apparatus was recon-structed to work primarily as an elaborate authoritarian control systemunder a parliamentary façade, a situation that I have called "repressiveparliamentary bureaucratism" (Samatas 1986: 124-127). In order toenforce (a) mass loyalty and conformity, (b) the reconstruction of loyalsupporting social groups within and around the public sector, and (c)the legitimation of the repressive anticommunist regime (Samatas1987), this post-civil-war sociopolitical control system preempted anymodernization and debureaucratization objectives that could under-

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mine the need to control the urban and rural working classes (Mouzelis1986).2

From this perspective, it is not surprising that none of the sig-nificant proposals for reform of the public administration achievedany modernization effect. In the fifties, the Economic CooperationAdministration of the Marshall Plan was disappointed because itssuggestions for "Some Basic Principles and Directions in the PublicAdministration" (1950) according to the American civil service modelwere impossible to enforce because they did not take into considerationthe specific post—civil war conditions in Greece. Even the reformsproposed by the well-known reports by Kyriakos Varvaressos on "TheGreek Economic Problem" (1952) and by Georges Langrod, the OECDexpert, on "The Reorganisation of Public Administration in Greece"(1964 and 1965) were not implemented owing to governmentalchanges, but also owing mainly to the effect that the proposed mod-ernization might have had on the sociopolitical control objectives ofthe repressive and discriminatory post—civil war police state (Vergo-poulos 1981; Tsoucalas 1981; Moschonas 1986). These reports werevery similar in their diagnoses of the inefficiency of Greek publicadministration as a barrier to economic development; they emphasizedthe negative effects of political domination and patronage, the needfor specific and continuous training of civil servants, and for a mer-itocratic reorganization of the whole public administration. The Var-varessos and Langrod reports have constituted points of referencefor all subsequent reforms (Mouzelis 1986: 233-245; Makridimitris1990: 229-230).

Leaving aside the administrative reforms that even the militarydictatorship failed to enforce,3 let us now focus on the post-dictatorialperiod, when the inevitable liberalization and opening up of the au-thoritarian, exclusivist system of political control jeopardized thepower monopoly of the Greek conservative forces. Under the char-ismatic leadership of Konstantinos Karamanlis, there was a gradualrestoration, consolidation, and even modernization of the pre-dicta-torial state, albeit with a new liberal face. Out of fear and insecuritythat the formerly excluded and outlawed Left, and especially the newlyemerged radical populist forces, could threaten not only right-wingpolitical ascendancy but the whole capitalist/democratic system, theconservative powers enforced a mixture of old and new political con-trol legislation, agencies, and state-organized mechanisms, renovatingthe entire sociopolitical control system that I have called "post-dic-tatorial conservative or neo-democratic bureaucratism" (Samatas1986: 231—237). The major weapons of that new political controlsystem, which was far less repressive and far more inclusivist than the

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old one, were (a) intensified domination by the party over the publicadministration and (b) large-scale patronage employment in the wholepublic sector.4 Under such liberal and pluralistic conditions, and inthe absence of open repression and fraud, there is no guarantee thatthe ruling party will be reelected. Thus the post-dictatorial bureau-cratism was, and still is, heavily based on the ruling party's capabilityof dominating the public administration and the whole public sectorfor party gain. Under these conditions, the public administration andthe wider public sector are transformed into areas of governmentalpatronage, with the result that the governing party's clientele elec-torate is built up and reproduced by means of the exchange of votesfor public employment and preferential access to public funds.

Under the specific conditions and problems of the immediatepost-dictatorial period's "dejuntaization" and democratization, thefirst Néa Dimokratía government announced in January 1975 an ad-ministrative reform, legislated by law 51/1975, "for the reorganizationof public civil services." This reform had the following aims: (1) The"sanitization of the institutional civil service orders" through the reës-tablishment of the 1951 Civil Servants' Code, so that public servantswould realize that they were "organs of the state and not of each. . . governing . . . party nor of some interdepartmental faction" (law51/1975 and presidential decree 93/1975); (2) the qualitative amelio-ration of the civil service "human factor" through the establishmentof the School of Public Administration, professional training schoolsfor certain civil servants like tariff- and tax-collectors, social workers,etc.; also training programs for newly appointed employees (law 232/1975);5 (3) the formation of an Interministry Body of Public Servants,tenured prefectural clerks, and powerful prefects (law 266/1975); (4)reorganization of the ministers' cabinet and of the central ministries(law 400/1975); reconstruction of the ministry of the presidency ofgovernment (presidential decree 770/1975); and (5) red tape simpli-fication (Zevgarides 1977: 42-44, 166-167; Pangakis 1988: 184ff.).

The implementation of this reform failed, mainly owing to theND governing party's clientelistic program, which totally politicizedthe civil service and transformed the ministries into party reelectioncenters by establishing the ministers' personal political bureaus insidethecentralministries(Floga'itis 1987: 76-83; Samatas 1986: 308-318).6

In 1979, under pressure from Greece's prospective entrance intothe EC, the ND government hired Arthur Young, Inc., an Americanconsulting firm, to introduce into Greece's public administration, statecorporations, and local government a zero-based budgeting systemtogether with a program to assess productivity. The firm's initial rec-ommendations were designed to increase civil service productivity,

192 Minas Samatas

which was then about half the EC average. The consultants proposedthat this could be done by means of a hiring freeze in which any postwould be filled only after a need for it had been established, and thenonly by transfer from other departments having surplus personnel,or by the creation of an interministerial post.7 Yet the ND governmentfailed to implement this proposal suggested by their expensive con-sultants,8 mainly because 1980—1981 was a crucial election time. Theprogram was canceled owing to the party's fear of the political costof a reform that would stop patronage appointments and thereforecause a crisis of uncertainty among a huge number of public personnel(Samatas 1986: 330). Thus, as former Prime Minister Rallis has ad-mitted in his memoirs, "the public administration was not significantlyimproved during the [first] seven years of New Democracy rule" ( 1983 :195).

The fact that politicization, overcentralization, overstaffing,clientelism, and even corruption (Koutsoukis 1989)9 persistently char-acterized the entire administrative system during the postwar periodup until 1981 necessitated a new attempt at administrative reform bythe PASOK-type socialists, who had promised to change Greek societyradically (Pollis 1985). When Andreas Papandreou's PASOK partywon the elections in 1981 in the name of "non-privileged Greeks,"they began to transform the right wing's authoritarian, oligarchic, andexclusivist sociopolitical control system, i.e., its conservative bureau-cratism, into an integrative, populist bureaucratism. The aim thatPASOK pursued by means of this extensive administrative reform wasnot to modernize public administration and make it more democratic,as had been proclaimed, but rather, having established control overthe right-wing state apparatus, to transform it into a populist instru-ment in order to serve PASOK's own sociopolitical and electoral goals.PASOK also aimed to break the conservative forces' monopolistic con-trol over the wider public sector and to include formerly excludedsocial strata in the PASOK party-state clientelistic network by meansof patronage, public employment, and the populist allocation of publicfunds and benefits (Charalambis 1989: 302-324).

Like other leftist parties that come to power and normally viewpublic administration as a reactionary apparatus resisting reform (Rid-ley 1979; Spourdalakis 1990: 145-154), PASOK introduced, withinits first year in power, a series of new laws whose goal was to "Hellenize"the Greek state—namely, the client, foreign-dependent "state of theright wing," as PASOK's founding charter expresses it.10 In otherwords, the actual aim of this administrative reform (Athanasopoulos1983) was to "PASOKize" the state by: (a) abolishing the civil serviceélite, i.e., the highest posts of directors-general and alternate directors-

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general (law 1232/1982) who were appointed by the previous conserv-ative government and were suspected of being "prospective saboteurs"of PASOK's administrative reform (Sotiropoulos 1991: 142)," andreplacing them a few years later with "special secretaries" who werepolitical appointees (law 1558/1985; Flogaïtis 1987: 266-267); (b) re-placing all ND-appointed prefects and CEOs of public corporationswith PASOK loyalists (law 1232/1982); (c) controlling all councilscharged with evaluating civil service personnel by having the majorityof their members appointed by PASOK ministers.

The second basic goal of PASOK's administrative reform was tostrengthen the powers of the party leader, Prime Minister AndreasPapandreou. Law 1266/1982 expanded the prime minister's decision-making powers and inflated the size of the cabinet even more by theaddition of new ministries and ministerial posts.12 Law 1299/1982established a number of prime minister's bureaus—economic, legal,security, etc.—all supervised by the prime minister's Political Bureau(Makridimitris 1992: 141-147). Furthermore, the administrative re-forms that increased the prime minister's powers were supplementedby the limited 1985 constitutional revision that gave the prime ministerpowers over the cabinet and the parliament that had formerly beenexercised by the president of the republic (Manesis 1989). Lastly, law1288/1982 enlarged the powers of the minister of the presidency ofthe government regarding issues of civil service personnel.13

This leads to PASOK's third goal, which was to modernize thesystem for filling positions in the civil service, doing so in a way thatfacilitated its own public employment policy based on patronage andwelfare. Law 1320/1983 abolished the traditional civil servants' en-trance examination as "rigged" and introduced instead the so-called"point system" by which "social criteria"—age, family, and economicstatus—counted more heavily than educational qualifications. Basedon welfare, this public employment system discriminated against moreeducated candidates in favor of socially disadvantaged ones, but it wassoon discredited owing to the demands of populist, party-organizedpatronage. Hence, law 1735/1987 replaced it with a new recruitmentsystem that gave higher scores to candidates with superior academicqualifications.14

The fourth goal of PASOK's reform was to level the civil servicehierarchy still further in the name of egalitarianism, which meantfavoring the crowded lower echelons of the civil service. Law 1505/1984 introduced the so-called ενιαίο μισθολόγιο (integrated salaryscale), which reduced the salary differences among the civil servants'ranks, abolished various privileged allowances, and provided for salaryincrease by seniority rather than promotion. Similarly, law 1586/1986

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introduced the ενιαίο βαθμολόγιο (integrated grade scale), which dis-sociated promotion from bureaucratic post and broke the link betweeneducational level and the four new grades. This populist breaking ofuniversity graduates' monopoly of top grades resulted, by 1989, in70% of all civil servants having escalated to grade A (Sotiropoulos1991: 181).

Finally, PASOK's administration reform included (a) establish-ment of the National Center of Public Administration, composed ofthe National School of Public Administration and the Institute ofContinuing Training (law 1388/1983; Makridimitris 1990: 231); (b)red tape simplification and antibureaucratic processing of the variousbills before they become laws (law 1599/1986); (c) the ΕπιτϕοπήΚοινωνικοϕ Ελέγχου Δημόσιας Διοίκησης (EKEDD; Committee forthe Social Control of the Public Administration), meant to superviseand check, with the assistance of a corps of civil service inspectors,the civil service's overall behavior toward citizens (law 1735/1987); (d)protection of the civil servants' civil liberties, specifically their rightsto express political ideas freely and to participate in elections as can-didates of political parties—liberties that had been prohibited by the1951 civil service code (also law 1735/1987).

Former PASOK ministers have acknowledged that PASOK's ad-ministrative reform was undermined by its populist policy of staffingthe public sector (Arsenis 1987: 138; Lazaris 1989: 259) and by itsoverall "inability to cut the Gordian knots of centralization, patronagerelationships, and statism" (Papandreou 1990).15

In sum, PASOK's populist politico-ideological objectives and itsprimary interest in reelection prevailed over its promise to modernizethe state's public administration. Features of the party's populist bu-reaucratism that continued, in contrast to previous right-wing bur-eaucratism, are (a) the personalistic, centralized character of PASOKauthority in relation to a non-implemented decentralization programand to powerless local government; (b) the continuing decline of par-liament; (c) the subservience of the judiciary to the executive; (d) partyand governmental control of trade unionism; and (e) the state mo-nopoly of radio and TV (Pollis 1985).

The transient, caretaker coalition that came to power after thedefeat of PASOK in the elections of June 1989 formed a committeeof 92 experts charged with "the reform and modernization of publicadministration"; the committee's comprehensive report, publishedwhen the ND had finally formed its own government shortly afterthe elections of April 1990, became the basis of a new, ambitiousreform. ND's first priority, however, was not debureaucratization butrather "dePASOKization" of the state and the public sector. Just as

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PASOK had done, ND changed all prefects, regional governors, CEOsof public corporations, and the composition of administrative councils.It also reestablished the rank of director-general (article 78 of law1892/1990). Although it froze public appointments by the PASOK"point-system," it started its own patronage appointments for seasonaland exceptional needs in the wider public sector.

In law 1943/1991, the new government selectively adopted someof the proposals of the aforementioned report. This law was meantto be a basic reform aimed at "the modernization of the organizationand function of public administration and the upgrading of its per-sonnel." Well advertised by the governmental mass media, this reformlaw provided for (1) a central examination system for public appoint-ments based on written or oral exams, adding the candidate's gradefrom his or her educational degree, (2) a three-year modernizationplan for the civil service, (3) modernization committees in each unitof the wider public sector, (4) a continuous training program for publicpersonnel, (5) a new system for evaluating public personnel, linkedto bonuses and awards, (6) the hiring of occasional/temporary per-sonnel on an hourly salary basis, (7) personnel mobility through com-pulsory transfers determined by special councils, (8) a new committeeto draft a new civil service code, and (9), sanctions against maladmin-istration cases and monetary compensation to those harmed by theadministration, to be assessed by a special civil service board of au-ditors.

Soon after the first country-wide entry examination for publicappointments, many ND ministers and deputies protested the exclu-sion of «τα δικά μας παιδιά» ("our own kids") because of the merit-ocratic criteria used, causing first the resignation of the minister ofthe presidency of government, Miltiades Evert, as president of thecommittee composed of five ministers that approved public appoint-ments, and then, a few months later, his final resignation as ministerafter disagreements with the prime minister over general and civilservice policy issues. As usual the change of minister was followed bya change of policy as well; in this case the new minister of the pres-idency of government, Mr. Kouvelas, by law 2026/1992 overturnedmany provisions of the former ND law 1943/1991. In fact the so-called"de-Evertization" reform of the civil service (1) increased the hourlypaid appointments that could now be decided by each minister alone,(2) changed compulsory personnel transfers into voluntary ones, sincethe compulsory transfers had produced negative reactions by the pub-lic employees and their union, and (3) neutralized the public admin-istration "commandos," i.e., the auditors, who had caused a lot ofembarrassment in the ministries.

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The current ND government continues to announce new mea-sures of administrative reform16 in its effort to modernize public ad-ministration, make it more efficient, and shrink the public sector, agoal required by the EC. That this is merely a nominal goal, however,is proved by the everyday patronage politics of the governing party,which, like its predecessors, wants primarily to maintain its party cli-entele for reelection purposes. These contradictory goals are pursuedtogether with an enforced austerity and privatization policy that limitsthe welfare provisions of the state and transforms the sociopoliticalcontrol system from a populist to a "neo-liberal" type of authoritarianbureaucratism, an ongoing process that cannot be analyzed in thelimited space of this paper.

Correlation between the post-dictatorial administrative reform policies andpractices of the conservatives and the socialists

Following the above presentation of administrative proposals andreforms, we can now correlate the most characteristic similarities be-tween the proclaimed modernization attempts of the conservative andsocialist governing parties. Certain basic differences do exist—namely,PASOK's populist reforms and its inclusivist public employment policy,compared to New Democracy's policy of compulsory personnel trans-fers, retirements and lay-offs, a policy that implies exclusivist, au-thoritarian controls. For the purpose of analysis, however, we shallfocus on the similarities of the administrative reforms of the twoparties, to emphasize that both have canceled debureaucratization forbasically the same reasons, that is, control of the state and reelection.

The party-conquest of the state apparatus; political and bureaucratic centralism.Political control of the public administration by the ruling conservativeparty was an institutionalized tradition throughout the entire postwarera. During the post-dictatorial period, conservative rule was inter-rupted by the PASOK-type socialist administration, after which eachparty, as soon as it won the elections, pursued the conquest and ex-clusive control of the state by eliminating all remnants of the previousgovernment's power. The ruling party achieves this monopolistic con-trol of the state apparatus and the public sector by placing its ownappointees in all key public positions. Similarly, just as all key, high-ranking bureaucrats are replaced with each change of government,so, too, are the CEOs of public banks and corporations. Similar changesoccur in each ministry every time a minister changes.

Thus, based upon the system of two-party rule that has pre-

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dominated in post-dictatorial Greece, the state apparatus has beensuccessively dominated and politicized in a vicious circle starting withcontrol of the state by the New Democracy party in the name of"dejunta'ization" (1974-1981), moving to PASOK's conquest in thename of "Hellenization" (1981-1989), and then to the current neo-liberal domination by New Democracy in the name of "de-PASOK-ization." The prolonged domination of the state apparatus by conserv-ative political forces resulted in the identification of the public ad-ministration with those forces; this, in turn, made PASOK urgentlydesire to win control of the right-wing state apparatus.17 In the re-sulting "PASOKization" of the state, up to 4,000 PASOK memberswere hired in the public sector during the first two years of PASOK'sadministration, and 66% of the 140 party members of the PASOKCentral Committee—elected at the first PASOK congress, in May1984-occupied public office (Kouloglou 1986: 63, 135). It shouldalso be noted that 70% of the approximately 250,000 party membersin 1984 had joined the party after its electoral victory in 1981, andthat 89% of these new members enjoyed some kind of monetarybenefit from the state (Spourdalakis 1988: 245, 314).

Both PASOK and ND have reinforced the excessive political andbureaucratic centralization that characterizes Greece's authoritarianpostwar politico-administrative system (Manesis 1986; Alivizatos 1983:45 Iff.). The predominance of the executive branch over the legislativeand judicial has paralyzed the whole administration, transforming thewider public sector into a party reelection domain. In this context, wecan consider the following three points:

(1) Post-dictatorial political centralization has been personalizedby the man at the top of the executive branch—initially the presidentof the republic (during the first ND administration), then the primeminister (during the PASOK administration and the second ND ad-ministration that succeeded it).18 Both "personalized presidentialism"(Poulantzas 1980: 228) and "personalized prime-ministerialism" haveimplications of a significantly despotic character for the whole politico-administrative system. Although extraordinary presidential powerswere not implemented during the joint Karamanlis presidency andPapandreou premiership, ever since the constitutional reform of 1985the premier has enjoyed (a) all decisive power as omnipotent governor(Manesis 1989: 121; Loverdos 1991), (b) absolute personal control ofthe governing party, the structure and functions of which are becom-ing ever more oligarchic and authoritarian (Lyrintzis 1984; Feather-stone 1990), (c) control over strictly-disciplined pro-government dep-uties who, fearing expulsion from the party, passively ratify theabsolute will of the personalized executive and thereby transform

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parliament into a Karagiozis shadow-theater (Samatas 1986: 243-249),(d) absolute control over the government-appointed leadership of thepublic administration, whose structure is deeply permeated by thegoverning party and whose functions are sapped by inertia since cen-tralization of power in the premier's hands inhibits any decentral-ization (Makridimitris 1992: 30-37).

(2) Both the conservative and the socialist governing parties havechanged the rank-and-file of the civil service in order to facilitate theirpolitical domination over it. Besides the fact that they both placedtheir political appointees at the top of the civil service ladder, namelyas secretaries-general, they have tried to rule the bureaucratic élitepolitically. Thus the first ND government, in an effort to control thepost of director-general, introduced the post of assistant director-general (law 22/1975). Chosen by party criteria and appointed viacabinet decisions, these top executives of both ranks, who receivedsalary raises and bonuses conspicuously higher than did the imme-diately lower ranks of directors and who had the privilege of remainingin service longer than 35 years, were dependent upon and subservientto the government (Samatas 1986: 313).19 The severe politicization ofthe civil service is also indicated by the fact that the majority of mem-bers of the various important administrative councils made responsiblefor the evaluation of civil servants either by the provisions of the civilservice code (presidential decree 611/1977) or by subsequent expe-dient legislation by each party (law 1586/1986 and law 1892/1990)were appointed by the minister of the presidency of government(Makridimitris 1992: 67-71).

(3) Both ruling parties continued the tradition of transformingeach ministry into a reelection center for its minister. First the NDgovernment, by the aforementioned law 400/1976, legislated the rightof cabinet officers to set up their personal political bureaus within theministries, staffing them with persons chosen by themselves alone.The prime concern of all these ιδιαίτεϕοι (close associates) of eachminister, the total number of whom exceeded the ministry's line-personnel in many cases, was their chief's reelection campaign, whichthey abetted by distributing all sorts of spoils to the minister's ημέτεϕοι(political clients), who were recommended by regional party baronsacting as middlemen (μεσάζοντες) between the minister and his cli-entele (Samatas 1986: 309-311). PASOK modernized the arbitraryorganization and functioning of the cabinet officers' political bureausby law 1558/1985, which determined the exact staffing of each cabinetofficer's bureau according to the minister's rank. Nevertheless, con-sidering the very low qualifications required of the staff of these po-litical bureaus,20 they had nothing to do with the French cabinet min-

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istériel. Under the current ND administration, in turn, Mr. Evert, inhis roles as minister of presidency of government and preacher ofpublic administration modernization, introduced a legislative amend-ment during the discussion of law 1943 on 28 March 1991, accordingto which ministers and deputies acquired the right to appoint theirpersonal assistants, who are mostly close relatives and friends, to ten-ured public posts after they have served for at least two years in theappointer's personal political bureau. The amendment was acceptedby almost all members of parliament present.21 Furthermore, the of-ficials who contributed conspicuously to the political subjugation ofthe public administration under both governing parties were the po-litical advisers or counselors, who are usually party appointees in theministers' offices. Although the appointment of political advisers wasstarted by ND (laws 50/1975 and 993/1979), the number of politicaladvisers per minister was tripled by PASOK (reform law 1262/1982).22

This suffocating domination of the Greek civil service by the tworuling parties reproduces all the features of "authoritarian statism"that inhibit decentralization and curtail civil liberties (Poulantzas 1980:203ff.). One could argue that, under such "authoritarian statism," theconstitutional provision (article 103, paragraph 1) that public servantsare "the executives of the will of the state and servants of the people"is interpreted by each government as meaning that public servantsare hired by the governing party to execute, as party servants, thepredetermined goals of the prime minister.23

Bureaucratic clientelism, patronage public employment, and the formation ofparty-dependent irregular public personnel. In most European states, pub-lic employment is based on rational criteria and merit (Rose 1985);in post-dictatorial Greece, contrariwise, public employment constitutesthe major instrument of patronage enabling each party to stay in powerand assure reelection. Although the traditional reciprocal exchangecharacter of individual patron-client relations, dominant in the pre-dictatorial period, has subsequently been maintained, the party baronshave been gradually replaced by regional party organizations thatfunction as collective patrons. This was brought about by PASOK'ssuccessfully populist organization that, while the party was in oppo-sition and also during its period of rule, was based not upon thetraditional patron-client network employed by the conservative partybut rather on "bureaucratic clientelism," i.e., regional party organi-zations acting as collective patrons in terms of organized patronagewith individual party clients, appointing them to, or promising them,jobs in the state bureaucracy (Lyrintzis 1984; Sotiropoulos 1991: 401).Bureaucratic clientelism now characterizes the politicoeconomic re-

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lations of both parties, since ND-in opposition after 1981 and rulingsince 1989—has taken lessons from PASOK on populist patronage,and has set up its own party organizations for the recruitment ofpatronage clientele, though most of these organizations are still con-trolled by powerful party barons.

Patronage public employment was extensively used by both par-ties especially during the pre-election years, regardless of the factsthat the public administration was already overstaffed and that publicsalaries were an excessive burden on the state budget.24 During thesix months before the general elections of June 1989, for example,PASOK hired 96,800 new public emloyees, 85,716 of whom wereunder contract for a limited period.25 Although all government-spon-sored proposals for administrative reform have suggested that publicappointments be banned in the already overly large public sector,there seems no way for a Greek government to avoid public appoint-ments—unless it chooses not to pursue reelection. Thus preferentialpatronage public employment for "our own kids"26 characterizes theactual politics of both ruling parties, both of which work basically as"party employment agencies" exchanging public jobs for votes. In-deed, each party has established a so-called party "solidarity bureau"which—using almost identical party membership certificates (see ex-hibits 1 and 2, below) issued by the local party organization, and lettersof recommendation written by the local deputies—presses the gov-ernment for all kinds of public employment.27 Both parties have dis-tributed patronage public appointments in a way that satisfies boththe regional party organizations and the local barons but that alsokeeps a big slice of the pie for the central party apparatus, whichserves the party leadership. According to journalistic reports, whilePASOK distributed one-third of its appointments to regional partyorganizations, one-third to ministers, and one-third to the prime min-ister's bureau, ND allotted half of all appointments to its députéesafter they protested, gave only one-tenth to the party barons, andreserved 40% for the central party headquarters.28

It is clear that both parties, for purposes of reelection, haveexploited the serious unemployment problem in Greece and the ex-pectation of most Greeks that they will find employment security inthe public sector.29 Indicative enough is the fact that the first favorasked of candidates and elected representatives by most Greek votersis to find them public employment. According to estimates by the ND'sdirector-general, 80% of requests by party members are for publicemployment, while only 20% are for other benefits such as transfers,loans, and so forth.30 In 1985, in the European Community, only 26%of first-time employment seekers up to the age of 24 stated a pref-

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Exhibit 1 Exhibit 2

These are photocopies of almost identical party certificates issued for purposes ofpublic employment.

Exhibit 1 is a ND certificate, issued on 5 November 1990, certifying that theperson in question (name and address) is a member of the local party organizationwith register number such-and-such, and that he demonstrated ένεϕγόν δϕασινκατά τάς πϕοεκλογικός πεϕιόδους (energetic activity during the preelection peri-ods). (Source: Ta Ma, 30 November 1990.)

Exhibit 2 is a PASOK certificate issued on 26 January 1989. Addressed to theΕπιτϕοπή Αλληλεγγϕης (Solidarity Committee), it certifies that the person in ques-tion (name, family status, age, education, residence, telephone) is a member τουΚινήματος (of the Movement) and that she is recommended by the Local PartyCommittee to be hired by Ο.Σ.Ε. (the Greek Railway Organization) as an admin-istrative clerk. (Source: I Próti, 18 February 1989.)

erence for public jobs, whereas in Greece the comparable percentagewas 64% (Tsoucalas 1986a: 260).S1

Each party, citing its own figures in parliamentary debates, ac-cuses the other of overstaffing the civil service. Although these figuresare very difficult to verify, they demonstrate the magnitude of patron-age employment by both parties. According to ND estimates, theapproximately 511,000 public servants of all types in 1981 escalatedto more than 660,000 in 1989, which means that around 149,000public employees of all types were appointed during the PASOK ad-ministration—an increase of 29.15%. According to PASOK estimates,on the other hand, 228,600 persons had already been appointed dur-ing the last two years of the current ND administration, before thepreelection year of 1993.32

202 Minas Samatas

Despite the continuation of the officially imposed freeze on pub-lic appointments by both parties, both have hired thousands of "ir-regular" temporary employees through the "back door" or "throughthe window," keeping them insecure and dependent by linking theiracquisition of tenure to the party's reelection. Hence the public em-ployment freeze has been effectively neutralized by the invention ofthe informal practice of hiring "irregular" or temporary public per-sonnel on definite or indefinite private contracts. During all preelec-tion periods, "irregular" temporary appointments have always in-creased more than 50%, without any publicity. At the same time, thegoverning party, in order to obtain votes, also usually grants tenureto many temporaries; this happened, for example, just before the1984 elections for the European Parliament, when PASOK, by law1476/1984, granted tenure to 8,000 temporary employees (Spanou1990: 171-179). 75% to 80% of these clientelistic, irregular appoint-ments are not made at the central ministries; they derive from thewider public sector and from local governments as well. According tothe aforementioned opposition party estimates, during the 1975-1981period the New Democracy governments appointed approximately120,000 irregular employees, 50,000 of them during the 1981 pre-election year, while during PASOK's 1981-1989 period close to140,000 irregulars signed long- and short-term contracts, 90,000 ofthem during the 1989 preelection year alone. In both periods, as aresult, there were more than twice as many temporary, irregular per-sonnel as regular, permanent employees in many public organiza-tions.33

The situation becomes a vicious circle because, on the one hand,each new governing party refuses to give tenure to the irregularemployees hired by the defeated party, fires many of them, and intheir place apppoints its own client temporaries, while, on the otherhand, each party in the opposition makes lists of public personnelwho, for political reasons, have been persecuted (actually or allegedly)and promises to reinstate them when it wins the elections.34

Deliberate legislative loopholes and exemptions. Both ruling parties haveinvented and practiced all sorts of legal and illegal manipulations inorder to appoint «τα δικά τους παιδιά». It is amazing how many legalloopholes exist in all the legislation that officially pursues debureau-cratization. Any analysis of both parties' legislation instituting eitherappointment freezes or rationalization measures easily reveals overtor covert "windows" that give arbitrary employment powers to min-isters and public corporation executives. Most of these "windows" allowpatronage employment for "special reasons," for persons with "specialneeds," or for persons of "heroic past." For example, PASOK's law1648/1986, applying patronage welfare policy, enables disabled per-

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sons to be appointed in the wider public sector after they undergo aphysical examination and their disability is confirmed by OAED (theEmployment Organization of the Work Force). The current ND gov-ernment amended that PASOK law by law 1943/1991, replacing O AE Dby party-controlled regional health committees whose decisions ondisability have caused front-page scandals; they are accused of fab-ricating a whole industry of fake disabled persons through which morethan 5,000 relatively healthy persons were hired in the wider publicsector, many of them in the post office, as "individuals with specialneeds."39

Another populist case for preferential treatment regardingpatronage employment was based on the past political activities of thecandidates or their parents—activities such as resistance against theNazis or against the military dictatorship, especially when that pastresistance was supplemented by continuing "democratic ethos," i.e.,active participation by the candidate or his relatives in the party'spreelection campaign. It was on the basis of this "democratic ethos"that the local PASOK party committees issued the certificates of partyloyalty and membership illustrated in exhibit 2. This policy certainlycontributed to the aforementioned increase in PASOK membership,namely from 110,000 members in 1981 to more than 250,000 in 1984(Kouloglou 1986: 135; Spourdalakis 1988: 314). Copying this policyand aspiring to the same results, the ND local party committees havebeen issuing their own certificates on the basis of the "neo-democratic"ethos, i.e., active participation in New Democracy's campaign for re-election (see exhibit 1).

Deliberate loopholes can easily be found in PASOK's basic civilservice reform legislation (law 1232/1982 and subsequent laws). Inspite of its 1982 promise to abolish, within two months, a plethora ofcostly consultative councils and committees that, owing to their ques-tionable utility and conspicuously high cost, had been called "the pira-nhas of the state budget,"36 the party allowed its ministers to decideto retain many councils or to postpone their abolition (Samatas 1986:350—351). Indeed, the number of new bureaucratic councils and com-mittees mushroomed under the PASOK régime, not only to supplytechnical expertise but also, as Sotiropoulos points out (1991: 146),to supply "additional salaries for PASOK cadres . . . [because of] thetendency of PASOK to replicate its organizational structure, repletewith party committees of all sorts, on the canvas of the state bureauc-racy."

Similarily, when, by law 1258/1982, PASOK prohibited moon-lighting or multiple public appointments—i.e., the established prac-tices (despite the provisions in article 104, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the1975 constitution) of civil servants simultaneously occupying multiple

204 Minas Samatas

public posts, and also of extensive feather-bedding throughout thewider public sector (Samatas 1986: 315ff.)—the party continued thepractice of exemptions favoring certain categories of public personnelover others. For instance, it allowed academics, political advisers, andlow-income public pensioners the privilege of being multiple appoin-tees simultaneously occupying several public posts (Sotiropoulos 1991 :148). One of the exemptions of the current ND government is asignificant raise in compensation for judges despite a salary freezecovering the entire civil service. Arbitrary executive decrees charac-terize both administrations. For instance, according to the 1990 AuditCouncil report, over 50 ministerial rulings during the election year1989 provided various allotments to civil service and military person-nel without any ratification by subsequent law, as is required by article25 of the constitution (Spanou 1990: 179).

Another manipulation by the current ND government is law1892/1990, by which many financial institutions and corporations ofthe wider public sector are no longer treated as public entities in orderto shrink the public sector in accordance with requirements for ECloans.37 By article 51 of that law, however, the government gave thepresidents of those former public entities—presidents appointed byND-the right to hire personnel preferentially, without any restric-tions or special approval by the ministers' recruitment committee. Thatis why the 1991 report of the European Community, based on mon-itoring of the Greek economy, was so pessimistic about the Greekgovernment's ability to implement the 15 conditions for EC loans.38

The abolition, neutralization, and discrediting of significant administrativeinstitutions. In the name of debureaucratization, both governing partieshave abolished significant administrative institutions that inhibitedtheir patronage politics in the field of public administration. An ex-ample is the Supreme Council for Public Services (ASDY), abolishedby the N D government in 197 5. The duties of ASD Y—a central agencysupervising the recruitment and selection of civil service personnel,protecting them "against arbitrary encroachments," and safeguarding"the impartiality of the selection process" (Argyriades 1970: 188,204)—were assumed by the ministry of the presidency of governmentand the cabinet itself. As for PASOK, its law 1256/1982 abolished theΕομικό Συμβοϕλιο του Κϕάτους (Law Council of the State), whichdefended the state's interests in the courts and acted as a consultantregarding the legality of public administrative actions. Denounced byPASOK as a costly bureaucratic institution, the Law Council of theState was replaced by individual attorneys and legal consultants as-

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signed to each minister. The same PASOK law removed the AuditOffice, the agency that controls public expenditure, from the financeministry and placed it under the prime minister's direct supervision(Sotiropoulos 1991: 149-150).

In addition, the authoritarian, clientelistic traditions of the pasthave caused citizens to distrust any new, rational measures of reformenacted by the opposing political party. For instance, when by law1599/1986 the PASOK government established a single, computerized,register number for every Greek citizen—the so-called EKAM sys-tem—in an effort to modernize public administration, the Greek state'sauthoritarian past and the consequent fears of potential political sur-veillance caused many citizens, who could not accept such a systemno matter how rational it was administratively, to oppose it with pas-sion. Similarly, in the case of entry exams for appointment, the longtradition of rigged exams in the authoritarian past has discredited anyobjective exam system offered in the present. Moreover, any rational,justified transfer of surplus personnel to understaffed regional de-partments is considered to be political persecution of the opposingparty's loyal servants. Even the new institution of civil service auditorshas been discredited and undermined both by the bureaucrats them-selves, who liken the auditors to police inspectors, and by the politicalleadership, which is not at all interested in a "transparent" adminis-tration that exposes political intervention and favoritism contrary tothe interests of the average citizen. Last but not least, parliament'scontrol over public employment, established by law 1943/1991, isscorned by the very ND government that established it, since thatgovernment has neglected so far to inform parliament of the totalamount of public employment, as that law requires.

The sociopolitical control imperative versus modernizationWhat are the implications of the above analysis of the actual

politics of Greek governing parties vis-à-vis state modernization ingeneral and debureaucratization in particular?

Debureaucratization is against the interests of the party in powersince modernization of the Greek public administration entails a greatrisk of disrupting the governing party's patronage influence and itscontrol of the state. Therefore, debureaucratization is pursued andimplemented only insofar as it enhances the governing party's chancesfor reelection and does not inhibit its control of the state.

The above analysis exposes the hypocrisy of the post-dictatorialgoverning parties regarding debureaucratization. Although both theND and the PASOK governments have announced and pursued ad-

206 Minas Samatas

ministrative reforms supposedly meant to modernize the obsolete,sluggish, clientelistic, hypertrophied, and inefficient state bureauc-racy, both have shown themselves to be incapable of staking theirparty interests on administrative modernization; indeed, their actualpolicies have reinforced these negative characteristics because theprincipal objective of both parties has been to assume and maintainexclusive control of the state, mainly for electoral purposes.

In the period after the war, a threat from leftist forces—first realand then perceived—convinced Greece's conservative powers that so-ciopolitical control was more important than modernization; yet inthe post-dictatorial period the same imperative for sociopolitical con-trol, albeit with a different content, still seems to prevail. Under theliberal parliamentary régime of a party-dominated democracy com-posed of powerful personalistic, clientelist parties and a very weakcivil society, the imperative for sociopolitical control entails, as notedabove, a constant effort by each ruling party to achieve exclusivecontrol of the state and the wider public sector in order to protect itspoliticoeconomic interests and to insure its reelection. The essence ofthe post-dictatorial sociopolitical control imperative—namely, partycompetition—reinforces a specific type of state organization and func-tioning, a bureacratism that, whether it be "neo-democratic" or "so-cialist," is incompatible with any plan for rationalization or modern-ization that could undermine the governing party's goals and interests.

From this sociopolitical control perspective, although adminis-trative reform is incompatible with real party interests, phenomenasuch as authoritarianism (surveillance, repression, etc.), corruption(electoral, administrative, or financial), bureaucratic clientelism, andoverall bureaucratic irrationality are by no means considered dys-functional; on the contrary, they are seen as integral mechanisms ofbureaucratism's sociopolitical control system (Samatas 1986: 37-38).39

In contrast with the "bureaupathological" approach, which di-agnoses pathological dysfunctions of administrative structure and per-formance, compares them with formal ideotypical Weberian ration-ality, and prescribes formal rationalization and modern management,the sociopolitical control approach reveals the administrative system's"functional rationality" and prescribes modernization of the admin-istration's social and politicoeconomic environment. What it reveals,in other words, is that the Greek administration responds to the willof its political masters but not to the concrete needs of society at large,thereby violating its formal-legal rules, which in any case are politicallypredestined to be violated.40 In fact, the Greek administration hasproved to be congruent with, and "eminently functional to[,] the taskswhich [the state] was asked to fulfil . . . either as a massive employer

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of unemployed semi-educated personnel or as the main instrumentfor stabilizing the middle classes and for reproducing a coherent andstable patronage network channeling influence and consolidating thepolitical and class structure" (Tsoucalas 1986b: 29).41

The sociopolitical control approach also helps us to point outthe real elements responsible for the failure of debureaucratization—namely, the governing parties and the politicians in general, insteadof the bureaucrats themselves, as the public believes. Research hasshown that 80.7% of Greek citizens are highly dissatisfied with theperformance of Greek civil servants and that 61.8% of them wouldfavor the abolition of their tenure.42 Yet, although certain categoriesof public personnel of the wider public sector do have conspicuouslycorporatist interests,43 the Greek civil service in general is by no meansself-directed or autonomous (Timsit 1989: 138ff.); on the contrary,it remains politically dependent upon and subjugated to its politicalmasters. "The Greek higher civil service was not and still is not apower élite; nor did it possess any resources like tradition, organi-zational coherence, status, class assets or expertise that could help itresist the organized conquest of the state" (Sotiropoulos 1991: 402).44

Nevertheless, the modernization goal has to be societal and notjust administrative. As Offe argues (1985: 303), "For it could easilybe the case that the incongruity between the internal modes of op-eration and external functional demands on the state administrationhave their basis in the quality of the socio-economic environment, ratherthan in 'deficient' bureaucracies." By no means can this incongruitybe solved by an administrative reform alone; a reform of the wholesocioeconomic environment is required, since that exposes, in Offe'swords, "the contradiction between the structure and performancecapacity of the state administration."

Concluding remarL·Instead of a definitive conclusion, I shall offer some tentative

concluding remarks that will of course require further analysis:1. A rational public administration is incompatible with Greek

bureaucratism—namely, the Greek politico-administrative control sys-tem that is reproduced by clientelistic political parties to serve thevested politicoeconomic interests of social strata dependent upon thestate.

2. As the lesson of administrative reform in other developingcountries teaches us, success cannot be expected for any program ofreform that threatens the established interests and destabilizes thepolitical division of labor in the public sector and the subsequentpolitical division of power (Hammergren 1983).

208 Minas Samatas

3. Any administrative governmental reform is really a façade tolegitimize party patronage and expedient reelection politics. The onlyreforms that are actually implemented are cosmetic ones, and thosethat reinforce the socioeconomic roles of the Greek state and the socialinterests that these roles serve.

4. As long as the Greek educational system produces chiefly greatnumbers of civil servant candidates, i.e., individuals who cannot findbetter jobs in the weak private economy, there will be constant pressurefor public employment—a situation welcomed by the clientelistic par-ties. So far, two-thirds of all Greek university graduates are initiallyoriented toward the public sector and gradually absorbed into it, whileone-third of all public servants are university graduates (Pesmazoglou1987: 395ff.; Psacharopoulos and Kazamias 1985; Tsoucalas 1986a:128).

5. The modernization of the socioeconomic, political, and cul-tural institutions (Diamandouros 1983; Demertzis 1990) is a prereq-uisite for the rationalization and debureaucratization of the state ap-paratus. In other words, modernization of the state cannot be achievedapart from a parallel modernization of society. Moreover, moderni-zation of the state is more difficult in societies like Greece, wherebureaucratic dysfunction is actually functional for the established in-terests of financially and political insecure social forces that are there-fore dependent upon the state.

6. Modernization of state and society in Greece is even moreurgent today, when geopolitical upheavals and momentous integrationprocesses leading to a new Europe are taking place (Gonod and Saus-say 1991). If Greece wishes to play a relatively autonomous role inthe EC, it must achieve a "drastic rationalization of public adminis-tration and ... a radical change of the relations of domination, i.e.,the way the state apparatus is controlled, in order to stop the sacrificeof economic and societal modernization to statism and party rule"(Mouzelis 1990: A7). Unfortunately, since party control of the stateis essential for the existence of the clientelistic and personalistic Greekpolitical parties, and since Greek civil society is flimsy and disorganized,there is little hope for a rational civil service, a fact that will negativelyaffect Greece's future not only within the EC but also within the newunited Europe and the new worldwide division of labor and powerthat ensues (Kazakos 1988; Ioakeimidis 1990: 103-109).

7. Although the pressure for modernization imposed uponGreece by the EC has had only a limited impact so far, sooner or laterboth the social strata that are dependent upon the state and the in-secure, near-sighted, acquisitive politicoeconomic forces that ruleGreece will be forced by the EC to accept substantial supranational

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administrative reforms. It remains to be seen whether this enforcedsuprastate modernization will shake up the structures of the clientel-istic and formalistic Greek politico-administrative system sufficientlyto liberate new, modernizing sociopolitical forces and to generate thenecessary consensus for cooperative, merit-driven relations betweensociety and state administration. Otherwise, the severe cost of the newEuropean division of labor and power will push Greece far behind,leaving it without any bargaining power in the transnational Europeanintegration process.

UNIVERSITY OF CRETE

NOTES

1 If by "debureaucratization" we mean here simply the rationalization/moderni-zation of a dysfunctional bureaucracy, and in this case the reform of public adminis-tration, the term will have various significations. For example, Argyriades defines it as"a general term that is used to describe a complex trend of change, decentralization,and differentiation in the transformation of closed systems of administration into opensystems. It has to do with a universal trend with obviously common elements, eventhough with differences from country to country" (1990: 22). But the same term, forEisenstadt, means "the subversion of the goals and activities of the bureaucracy in theinterests of different groups with which it is in close interaction (clients, patrons, in-terested parties)." Obviously Eisenstadt has in mind the ideotypical rational bureaucracy,the specific characteristics of which "in terms both of its autonomy and its specific rulesand goals are minimized, even up to the point where its very functions and activitiesare taken over by other groups or organizations" (1969: 306-307).

2 The "repressive parliamentary bureaucratism" that responded to anticommunistideology was based upon (a) the institutionalized penetration of the United States,leading to overall military and economic dependence upon America, (b) a parliamentaryfaçade that obscured a constitutional dictatorship, (c) a repressive state apparatus withexpanded surveillance of the entire population, and (d) a state network of economicdistribution that was wholly clientelistic and discriminatory (Samatas 1986: 206-208).

s The military junta's five-year development plan included an ambitious admin-istrative reform program that aimed, among other things, to achieve organizationalchanges (Argyriades 1970: 256-261) and also to develop "kindly relations between theadministration and citizens . . . When that program was completed, the deficiencies ofpublic administration continued to exist and to inhibit national development" (Zev-garidis 1977: 36). According to an administrative official quoted by Sotiropoulos (1991 :58), the civil servants resisted the "military-style manner of fighting red tape" by passingthe buck.

4 In addition, post-dictatorial bureaucratism includes the following mechanisms:(a) reinforcement of executive power, degradation of parliament, subservience of the

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judiciary, and top-down control of local government and trade unions, (b) a whole bodyof old and new authoritarian legislation, (c) various political control duties by the armedforces and the security forces (Samatas 1986: 235-237).

5 The establishment of the School of Public Administration was canceled at that

time after demonstrations against it by students in the law school and other universitydepartments. Yet the training schools for civil servants gradually faded away owing tothe inadequate infrastructure that prevented them from accommodating large numbersof students (Makridimitris 1990: 233).

6On 15 December 1975, Yeoryios Rallis, then minister of the presidency of gov-ernment responsible for public administration issues, and subsequently prime minister,did not blame his party and governmental patronage politics but rather the publicservants, reminding them of Prime Minister Karamanlis's decree issued in 1958 inorder to illustrate to them that, unfortunately, nothing had changed in 17 years (Zev-garidis 1977: 43).

7 The consultants' report showed that on the basis of 72,000 employees there wasno need to hire more personnel since 4,000 positions, out of the 7,571 surplus poststhat had been identified, could be abolished without any effect on function. The re-organization of 90 divisions and services by means of the reallocation of personnelwould eliminate quite a lot of red tape and save at least $175 million of an estimatedtotal annual expense of $1,190 million (Eleftherotipia, 24 January 1981).

8 The ND government spent $2.8 million in consulting fees and 100 million drach-mas for the members of the Budget Assessment Council (SAP) (Ta Néa, 24 August1982).

9 As K. Stefanopoulos, the then minister of the presidency of government, statedin parliament on 31 March 1981: "At present, in my view, the major drawback, themajor sin of public administration is bribery ... I don't hesitate to state that I knowadministrative departments—without being able to prove it—where bribery is an es-tablished common practice . . . [Although this great sin is continuing to expand evenin previously uncontaminated branches, nobody can do anything because nothing canbe proved ... I have sent hundreds of [civil] servants to disciplinary councils, but Iknow that nobody has been punished" (Samatas 1986: 345, citing Greek ParliamentRecords, 31 March 1981: 5115).

10 The "Declaration of 3 September [1974]" states (as translated in Clogg [1987:218]) that the "state apparatus, the armed forces, the parties, the trade unions, thepolitical leadership of the country have been undermined so as to make possible theimposition of a foreign-inspired military dictatorship, when it was judged that thiswould serve the interests of Washington." Also, PASOK's "Proclamation of Govern-mental Policy" states that the "public administration and generally the public sectorreflect the anxiety and the decline of the right-wing state. This has transformed publicadministration from an organ of service to the citizen, as it should be, to an organ ofexchange, and to a brake rather than to an engine of economic development" (PASOK1981:99).

11 These top executive bureaucrats were accused of having conspicuously highsalaries, indemnities, and bonuses, receiving in 1980 alone around 350 million drach-mas. The rank of alternate director-general was introduced by the ND government in1975 by law 51/1975 to limit the power of directors-general and to control the ad-vancement of the lower ranks (Samatas 1986: 348 and Parliament Records, 20 January1982: 697ff., where pertinent data from PASOK minister Koutsoyiorgas's testimony inparliament is quoted).

12 As early as the summer of 1982 the size of PASOK's cabinet—52 ministers,alternate ministers, and junior ministers—was twice that of Western European cabinets.

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Premier Papandreou used to "shuffle and reshuffle his cabinet as a means of sanctioninghis own ministers" (Sotiropoulos 1991: 151-152).

13 Defending the minister's extended competence regarding civil servant transfers,new appointments, and salary increases for political advisors, Koutsoyiorgas stated inAugust 1982 in parliament, "The ND party is mistaken in believing that PASOK wouldrely on such a state totally eroded by the right wing" (Parliament Records, 31 August1982: 916, cited in Sotiropoulos 1991: 153).

14Law 1320/1983 was implemented only once, in 1984, when 125,000 candidatesapplied for 8,500 jobs. Its amending law 1735/1987 was never implemented (Sotiro-poulos 1991: 159-160, 162).

15 Compare Simitis ( 1990: 7): "The electoral failure of PASOK certifies the deadlockof a policy that did not dispute the existing social structure of the country and thatexercised authority in a way that has been established by the Greek Right since thepostwar period, namely by politically expedient state provisions."

16 The "de-Evertization" reform by Kouvelas is integrated into the draft of a newcivil service reform law that has recently been announced. According to this law, theprime minister himself, together with the minister of the presidency of government,will decide upon public personnel transfers. In addition, the law requires that newlyhired personnel serve a five-year compulsory tour of duty away from the big urbancenters, transfer from which will be decided by the ministry, based upon certain socialcriteria. Interministry civil servants and a new promotion system will be introduced,as well as large cuts in vacation time and a change of the integrated four grade scalesystem into a ten grade system (see G. Lakopoulos's pertinent report in To Vima, 30August 1992 : A24-25).

17 That need was explicitly expressed by the PASOK leader and former primeminister Andreas Papandreou himself as early as 11 February 1982, when he stated inhis central committee address that "it is impossible to implement [our] policy withouthaving in the key posts of the entire state apparatus people who not only will betechnocrats but who will also believe in the goals, the program, and the vision of PASOK"(Elefantis 1991: 212).

18 The concentration of power in the hands of the prime minister and in particularin those of the prime minister's political bureau was started by law 3925/1959 and wasstrengthened further by post-dictatorial ND laws 217/1974 and 400/1974 and by PASOKlaw 1558/1986 (Flogaïtis 1987: 76-83).

19 As has already been mentioned, PASOK abolished these two top ranks since itconsidered them to be political conservative props in the civil service. By article 28 oflaw 1558/1985, PASOK replaced directors-general with special secretaries, who wereactually political appointees, too. In turn, secretaries-general were reestablished by NDthrough article 78 of law 1892/1990 (Flogaïtis 1987: 243-246).

20As Flogaïtis points out (1987: 112), although the bureau director had to be atleast a high school graduate, for the special assistants there was no requirement evenfor literacy, provided they could claim special expertise for their post.

21 After the general outcry against those "national spoils," as they were called, bywhich every four years 648 individuals up to 50 years old can have tenured civil servicejobs, Evert withdrew the provision for appointing close relatives but of course not thatfor appointing friends (Eleftherotipfa, 29-30 March 1991).

22 Before 1981, there were 71 ND political advisers. In 1983, under PASOK, therewere 218 (Sotiropoulos 1991: 144).

23 This "translation" is borrowed from P. Efthimiou, "A Step Forward, 45 YearsBackward!" To Vima, 12 July 1992: AlO.

24 It is estimated that one-third of the active population is employed in the wider

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public sector and that salaries for state personnel during the 1980s exceeded one-thirdof the total public expenditures of the state budget (Makridimitris 1990: 222).

25 That was anounced by A. Kanellopoulos, the then coalition minister of thepresidency of government (/ Próti, 25 August 1989).

26 In his 1989 preelection speeches, Prime Minister Mitsotakis explicitly mentionedthat "our kids have been excluded from public jobs by the eight-year PASOK admin-istration." Many ND deputies and political barons constantly claim that they are cor-recting this discriminatory policy against "our kids" (see pertinent reports in To Vima,9 December 1990, 23 December 1990, 3 March 1991, 21 April 1991, 29 September1991).

27 The following is typical of such patronage claims by the ND deputy F. Tsangaris:"Mr. Prefect, I call your personal attention to person X's claim. He or she is my fanand a fighter for the ND party" (Lakopoulos 1991).

28 The PASOK data are taken from Eleftherotipia, 17 May 1989, the ND data fromTa Néa, 20 November 1991. The ND deputies were required to declare to party head-quarters by 19 December 1990 how many public employees—up to a maximum of 156for each M.P.—they would like to hire, without examinations, for special service needs(A. Kosonas's report in I Kathimerini, 23 December 1990: 12).

29 The traditional overdemand for secure public jobs is illustrated any time thatthe government announces appointments for new positions. In August 1984, for ex-ample, more than 125,000 applied for 8,500 public jobs and in 1989 the applicants for7980 public jobs numbered more than 140,000, most of whom were young, first-timejob seekers (see Georgakis 1989).

80 See N. Marakis's report on the ND employment agency (To Vima, 9 December1990: A7). Similar estimates by the newly elected ND deputy G. Voulgarakis showedthat out of all the various favors that his constituents had asked of him during the firstthree months following his election—e.g., requests for military transfer, telephones,air tickets, hospital admission, and so forth—67.2% were for some kind of employment,92% of which were for public employment (Oikonomikós Tahidrómos, 22 November 1990:70-71).

31 This percentage is declining but is still very high. According to a 1989 surveyby the Greek Workers' Confederation, 43% of the young unemployed who were sur-veyed preferred a job in the public sector, compared to only 19% who preferred onein the private sector, while 32% wanted to have their own business (ΓΣΕΕ, SurveyResults, 1990: 190).

32 The ND estimates against PASOK were announced by Evert, the then NDminister (see Eleftherotipia, 21 June 1990); the PASOK estimates against ND were pre-sented by the députée A. Kaklamanis during the parliamentary session of 23 September1992 (see Eleftherotipia, 24 September 1992). Nevertheless, quite aside from this partywar of figures, the EC report on the status of the Greek economy for the year 1991points out that public employment increased by 4.4% (Eleftherotipia, 1 August 1992).This is also substantiated by the statement to parliament by Evert, who was then theminister, that, up to October 1991, 67,000 employees were hired on hourly-wage con-tracts. Regarding mass appointments on hourly-wage contracts based on the manip-ulation of this new employment system, it is noteworthy that, during 1992, hourly-wage contracts were signed for a total of 20 million hours (see To Vima, 20 September1992: A44).

33 According to data supplied by the ministry of the presidency of the government,on 31 Decemberl989, out of a total of 504,208 public servants, only 221,858 heldregular, permanent status, while 259,983 were "irregulars" hired by private contractfor an indefinite period (see Ta Néa, 31 July 1992).

34 During the last two years there have been many court rulings canceling as illegal

Debureaucratization Failure 213

the transfer of civil servants and also lay-offs occasioned by an employee's involvementin the union or his or her overall political activity (see documented reports by H.Georgakis in Ta Néa, 16 March 1991, and G. Lakopoulos in To Vima, 28 April 1991).

35 See repeated reports in Ta Néa, 11 and 12 September 1991, and in To Vima, 16June 1991 and 15 September 1991, about the scandalous mass appointments of fakedisabled persons to positions in the post office.

36 Each of these councils and committees was composed of five to nine top civilservants, pensioners, and private professional loyalists of the ND party; their exact totalwas unknown but it was estimated at close to 50,000, with a total annual operating costof over 3 billion drachmas (Samatas 1986: 315, 349-351).

37 One of the 15 terms of the first EC loan installment to Greece is a 10% reductionof public personnel by the end of 1992 and a 30% reduction by 1994.

38 The EC report entitled "Macroeconomic Policy and Structural Reform inGreece" (August 1991) pointed out: "The prospects of Greece covering the economicgap with the Community and proceeding to an actual economic convergence are dis-appointing . . . There is no political will to shrink the public sector—and the prospectsare gloomy—unless there is a change of this régime."

39 As Tsoucalas points out, "The [Greek] civil service has been unanimously de-scribed as corrupt, ineffective, immobile, and lagging in all respects. This is only natural:Greek administration never aimed to rationalize state intervention . . . [T]he stateapparatus was seldom called up to act in a consciously positive or reformist way. Thishowever does not imply that it has been dysfunctional. On the contrary, up to veryrecently Greek administration can be thought of as eminently functional in respect tothe tasks which it was asked to fulfil . . ." (Tsoucalas 1986b: 29).

40 According to Offe (1985: 302-303), the state administrative action of developedwelfare-state capitalism is characterized by "divergent rationalities," i.e., the "organi-zational" formal rationality of bureaucratic action, which means rationality that con-forms to politically preëstablished, formal, legal rules, and that conflicts with the "sys-temic" rationality referring to the bureaucratic fulfillment of the functionalrequirements of the societal environment.

41 Although Tsoucalas makes these remarks concerning the "long conservativerule," it is indicative that PASOK achieved the conquest of the state very quickly, withoutresistance from the civil service élite (Sotiropoulos 1991).

42 73% believe that the public sector is oversized, owing to many useless appoint-ments; 66.4% believe that public appointments are made through political patronage(A. Makridimitris and I. Nicolacopoulos, directors, "Survey on the Greek PoliticalBehavior," Εθνικό Κέντϕο Κοινωνικών Εϕευνών [EKKE], March 1990).

43 For example, Greek Electric Corporation personnel get a certain amount ofelectricity free; similarly the personnel of the Greek Telecommunications Organization,Olympic Airways, etc. supplement their salary with free access to some of their organiza-tion's services. However, the most conspicuous privilege of certain public corporationemployees is the preferential appointment of their children, particularly in the publicbanks.

44 According to another empirical research study, while only 17% of Greek highercivil servants are active members of a political party, 60% of them belong to the civilservice union; this suggests that "careerism rather than politics constitutes the foremostpreoccupation of higher civil servants" (Vernardakis and Papastathopoulou 1990: 25).

214 Minas Samatas

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