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Debt Constraints and Employment∗
Patrick Kehoe† Virgiliu Midrigan‡ Elena Pastorino§
September 2016
Abstract
During the Great Recession, regions of the United States that experienced the largest
declines in household debt also experienced the largest drops in consumption, employ-
ment, and wages. Employment declines were larger in the nontradable sector and for
firms that were facing the worst credit conditions. Motivated by these findings, we
develop a search and matching model with credit frictions that affect both consumers
and firms. In the model, tighter debt constraints raise the cost of investing in new
job vacancies and thus reduce worker job finding rates and employment. Two key fea-
tures of our model, on-the-job human capital accumulation and consumer-side credit
frictions, are critical to generating sizable drops in employment. On-the-job human
capital accumulation makes the flows of benefits from posting vacancies long-lived and
so greatly amplifies the sensitivity of such investments to credit frictions. Consumer-
side credit frictions further magnify these effects by leading wages to fall only modestly.
We show that the model reproduces well the salient cross-regional features of the U.S.
data during the Great Recession.
Keywords: Search and Matching, Employment, Debt Constraints, Human Capital.
JEL classifications: E21, E24, E32, J21, J64.
∗We thank Eugenia Gonzalez Aguado, Julio Andres Blanco, Sonia Gilbukh, and Sergio Salgado Ibanez forexcellent research assistance. Kehoe thanks the National Science Foundation for financial support.†Stanford University, UCL, and University of Minnesota, [email protected].‡New York University, [email protected].§Stanford University, UCL, and University of Minnesota, [email protected].
A popular view of the 2007-2009 Great Recession in the United States is that large
disruptions in the credit market played a critical role in generating the observed drop in
output and employment. This view is motivated in part by the regional patterns documented
in recent work by several authors. Mian and Sufi (2011, 2014) showed that regions of the
Unites States with the largest declines in household debt and housing prices also experienced
the largest declines in consumption and employment, especially nontradable employment.
Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016) showed that wages were moderately flexible in that they fell
across regions almost as much as employment did. Finally, Giroud and Mueller (forthcoming)
showed that employment fell the most in firms that were facing the worst credit conditions.
Motivated by these facts, we investigate the interplay between credit and labor market
frictions, and how this interplay may have accounted for the Great Recession, by developing
a version of the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides (DMP, henceforth) model with risk-averse
agents, borrowing constraints, and human capital accumulation.
In the DMP model, hiring workers is an investment activity in that costs are paid up
front, whereas benefits accrue gradually. As with any investment activity, the amount of such
investments falls after a credit tightening, leading to a drop in employment. Although this
force is present in any dynamic search model, the drop in employment following a tightening
of credit is minuscule in the textbook version of the DMP model without human capital
accumulation. This result is driven by the feature of the textbook DMP model that the flows
of benefits from forming a match are very short-lived, with a (Macaulay) duration of two to
three months, and is reminiscent of standard results in corporate finance that a tightening of
credit has little impact on short-lived investments. (See, for example, Eisfeldt and Rampini
(2007) and the references therein.)
The flows of benefits from forming a match are, in contrast, much longer-lived in the
presence of on-the-job human capital accumulation, once this accumulation is calibrated so
as to reproduce the evidence on how wages grow on the job and over the life cycle. With
such human capital accumulation, a match not only produces current output but also raises
a worker’s human capital, an increase that persists far off into the future. In our model
with human capital accumulation, the flows of benefits from a match are, therefore, longer-
lived with a duration on the order of 10 years and, hence, are much more sensitive to a
credit tightening. We show that in the resulting model, the drop in employment following
a tightening of credit is greatly amplified, and so the model accounts well for the regional
patterns documented for the Great Recession.
To illustrate the workings of our mechanism, we first consider a one-good model. We
then extend it to include tradable and nontradable goods in order to study its ability to
account for the regional patterns just discussed. Specifically, we use the one-good model to
1
show that allowing for human capital accumulation is critical for a tightening of credit to
lead to a large reduction in employment. To build some intuition, consider a firm’s incentives
to post vacancies after a credit tightening. In response to such a tightening, consumption
initially falls and then recovers, so that the marginal valuation of goods is especially high
right after the shock but less so as time passes. That is, after a tightening, the shadow price
of goods increases and then mean reverts. This increase in the shadow price of goods has two
countervailing effects. First, it increases the effective cost of posting vacancies by raising the
shadow value of the goods used in this investment. Second, it increases the benefits of doing
so by raising the shadow value of the increased flow in output produced by consumers who
switch from nonemployment to employment. Since the cost of posting vacancies is incurred
immediately when goods are especially valuable, whereas the benefits accrue gradually in the
future, the present value of the cost of posting vacancies rises by more than the present value
of the benefits after a credit tightening. As a result, firms post fewer vacancies and thus
employment falls.
This drop in vacancies is larger the longer the horizon over which the flow of benefits
accrues. In the textbook DMP model without human capital accumulation, these benefits
accrue quickly, because separation and job-finding rates are very high and, hence, an employed
consumer produces more output than a nonemployed consumer for only a short period of
time—a few months on average. Hence, a temporary increase in the shadow price of goods
from a credit tightening increases the present value of benefits about as much as the costs,
which has only a small negative effect on vacancy creation.
In our model with on-the-job human capital accumulation, in contrast, the benefits of
posting vacancies accrue gradually over time. The reason is that human capital is partially
transferable across matches so that its accumulation in a given match increases the output
a consumer can produce in all future matches. Thus, in this model, a temporary increase in
the shadow price of goods increases the present value of benefits of posting vacancies much
less than their costs, and so it has a large negative effect on vacancy creation.
In sum, the textbook model is essentially static, so credit frictions have little effect. Adding
human capital makes matches dynamic, so credit frictions can have large effects. Indeed, for
the same tightening of credit, the model with human capital accumulation predicts a drop in
employment that is 10 times larger than in the textbook model.
This discussion makes it clear that the amount of human capital acquired on the job
and the extent to which human capital is transferable across matches are important deter-
minants of the model’s implications for how much employment drops following a tightening
of credit. We allow human capital to be partially transferable across matches by assuming
that consumers accumulate two types of human capital: general human capital that is fully
2
transferable across matches and firm-specific human capital that fully depreciates when a
match dissolves. We carefully parameterize each of these two components by requiring the
model to be consistent with the existing evidence on how wages increase both on the job and
over the life cycle.
In our baseline model, we quantify these parameters governing human capital accumula-
tion by using moments derived from two sources of data: cross-sectional data from Elsby and
Shapiro (2012) on how wages increase with experience and longitudinal data from Buchinsky
et al. (2010) on how wages grow over an employment spell.
We show that our results are robust to using a range of estimates of wage growth in the
literature, including estimates of how wages increase with experience from Rubinstein and
Weiss (2006) and estimates of how wages grow over an employment spell from Altonji and
Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991). More generally, we find that in our model, the employment
response to a credit tightening is determined almost entirely by the amount of overall life-
cycle wage growth and is highly nonlinear. In particular, as long as life-cycle wage growth
exceeds a threshold of about 1.5% per year, further increasing the amount of life-cycle wage
growth has little effect on how employment responds to a credit tightening. In contrast, if
life-cycle wage growth is below this threshold, further reducing the amount of life-cycle wage
growth greatly diminishes the employment response to a credit tightening.
This nonlinearity stems from two of our model’s implications. One, the duration of the
flows of benefits from a match is a concave function of the rate of human capital accumulation.
Two, a credit tightening leads to a transitory drop in consumption, so that flows received
after some date in the future do not experience a large increase in their valuation, regardless
of how distant they are. Because of this nonlinearity, our results are robust not only to
estimates from the studies cited earlier, but also to any estimate of life-cyle wage growth
above our 1.5% threshold—a threshold consistent with estimates in the literature. (See the
survey by Rubinstein and Weiss (2006).)
We then use the model to examine the relative importance of consumer-side and firm-side
credit frictions in accounting for movements in employment following a credit tightening.
In our model, a tightening of credit to families effectively acts like a worsening of credit
conditions faced by both consumers and firms. The reason is that we assume that consumers
and firms belong to large families and that the credit tightening reduces a family’s ability to
borrow, thus raising both consumers’ and firms’ marginal valuation of goods.
If we assume, instead, that a credit tightening raises firms’ valuations of goods, but not
those of consumers, so that the latter are implicitly insulated from the credit crunch, we find
that the responses of employment to the credit tightening are very modest. The reason is
that following a tightening of credit that affects only firms’ valuations, wages (counterfactu-
3
ally) fall sharply. This drop in wages insulates firms from adverse credit conditions, giving
them incentives to post almost as many vacancies as they did before the credit tightening.
In contrast, when a credit tightening raises consumers’ valuations as well, wages fall only
modestly so that a firm’s incentives to post vacancies are greatly reduced. Our model thus
captures the idea that firms are unable to substantially lower the wages of their workers in
the middle of a recession in which consumers are credit constrained.
We illustrate our results in a particularly simple model of credit frictions. We show,
however, that for a large class of models, if shocks produce the same paths for consumption
and, hence, the shadow prices of goods, then the models produce the same paths for labor
market variables. To illustrate this point, we first show that our model has implications
for employment and wages that are identical to those of an economy with housing in which
debt is collateralized by the value of a house. This result allows us to rationalize the drop
in employment as driven by a tightening of collateral constraints arising from a fall in the
price of housing. We then show that our model has implications for employment and wages
that are also identical to those of an economy with illiquid assets in which, as in Kaplan and
Violante (2014), a tightening of debt constraints reduces the consumption of even wealthy
households. This result allows us to think of our model as applying to (wealthy) net savers
rather than only to net borrowers.
Taken together, these equivalence results show that the robust link across models is the
link between consumption and labor market outcomes rather than the link between either
house prices or levels of net assets and labor market outcomes. Motivated by these results,
we focus our quantitative work on the link between consumption and labor market outcomes.
To confront the regional patterns discussed earlier that motivate our work, we extend our
economy to include a large number of islands, each of which produces a nontradable good
that is only consumed on the island and a tradable good that is consumed everywhere in the
world. Each worker is endowed with one of two types of skills that are used with different
intensities in the tradable and nontradable goods sectors. Labor is immobile across islands
but can switch between sectors. This differential intensity of the use of skills across sectors
generates a cost of reallocating workers between sectors.
In this economy, an island-specific debt tightening has two effects. The first, the invest-
ment effect, is similar to that in the one-good model: the cost of posting vacancies increases
by more than the benefits, leading to a reduction in the number of vacancies and, hence, to
a drop in overall employment on that island.
The second effect, the relative demand effect, is due to the reduction in the demand for the
nontradable goods produced on the island. This drop in the demand for nontradable goods,
in turn, leads to a drop in the demand for workers by that sector, which leads those workers
4
to reallocate to the tradable goods sector. The smaller is the cost of reallocating workers,
the larger is the reallocation and, thus, the larger is the drop in nontradable employment and
the smaller is the drop in tradable employment.
We find that our model reproduces well the regional patterns during the Great Recession
discussed earlier. In particular, a credit tightening that leads to a 10% fall in consumption
across U.S. states between 2007 and 2009 is associated with a fall in nontradable employment
of 5.5% and a negligible increase in tradable employment of 0.3%. Our model has similar
predictions: the same fall in consumption is associated with a fall in nontradable employment
of 5.7% and a negligible increase in tradable employment of 0.3% across states. Our model also
accounts for most of the resulting change in overall employment: such a drop in consumption
is associated with a 3.8% drop in employment in the data and a 3.3% drop in the model
across states.
Critically, our model is consistent with the Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016) observation
that in the cross section of U.S. states, wages are moderately flexible: a 10% drop in employ-
ment is associated with a fall in wages of 7.8% in both the data and the model. Thus, our
model predicts sizable employment changes even though wages are as flexible as they are in
the data.
Other Related Literature. In incorporating human capital accumulation into a search
model, we build on the work of Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998, 2008). They extend McCall’s
(1970) model to include stochastic human capital accumulation on the job and depreciation
off the job. Since they retain key features of the McCall model, such as linear preferences and
an exogenous distribution of wages, the forces that drive our results are not present in their
model. Instead, the forces that drive our results arise from embedding a related model of
human capital accumulation into a general equilibrium DMP model with risk averse agents,
endogenous wages, and endogenous vacancy creation.
Our work is complementary to that of Hall (2014), who studies the effects of changes in
the discount rate in a search model. Hall’s model features no human capital accumulation,
and as such, implies short durations of the flows of benefits from matches. In contrast to our
model, which assumes wages are determined through Nash bargaining, Hall (2014) assumes
the bargaining protocol in Hall and Milgrom (2008), which implies that wages do not fall
much in response to shocks. In our model, wages do not fall much in response to a credit
tightening even with the standard Nash bargaining protocol. In this sense, our mechanism is
complementary to that in Hall’s work.
Our work is also closely related to that of Krusell et al. (2010) on the interaction between
labor market frictions and asset market incompleteness. Their work focuses on an economy’s
5
response to aggregate productivity shocks but abstracts from human capital accumulation,
whereas we focus on an economy’s response to credit shocks in a model in which human
capital accumulation plays a critical role.
Our work is related to a burgeoning literature that links a worsening of financial frictions
on the consumer side to economic downturns. In particular, Guerrieri and Lorenzoni (2015),
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012), and Midrigan and Philippon (2016) study macroeconomic
responses to a household-side credit crunch. All three of these papers find that a credit
crunch has only a minor, if any, negative impact on employment unless wages are sticky. Our
analysis complements this work by studying a mechanism that does not impose sticky wages,
but rather generates the downturn in employment within a search model in which wages are
renegotiated every period through Nash bargaining.
Our model is also related to the work of Itskhoki and Helpman (2015), who study sectoral
reallocations in an open economy model with search frictions in the labor market, as well as
the work on house prices, credit, and business cycles comprehensively surveyed by Davis and
Van Nieuwerburgh (2014).
Finally, our work is related to the large literature on financial intermediation, dating back
at least to Bernanke and Gertler (1989), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), and Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (1999). More recent work includes Mendoza (2010), Gertler and Karadi (2011),
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2012). This literature focuses on
how credit frictions amplify the response of physical capital investment to shocks. Our work,
instead, focuses on how credit shocks amplify employment responses in a model with labor
market frictions and human capital. Moreover, this literature studies the overall effects of
aggregate shocks, whereas we focus on the effects of regional shocks.
1 A One-Good Economy
We consider a small open economy, one-good DMP model. The economy consists of a contin-
uum of firms and a continuum of consumers with stochastic lifetimes. Each consumer survives
from one period to the next with probability φ, and in each period a measure 1 − φ of new
consumers is born, so that there is a constant measure 1 of consumers. Individual consumers
accumulate general and firm-specific human capital and are subject to idiosyncratic shocks.
Firms post vacancies in markets indexed by a consumer’s human capital. Consumers are
organized in families that insure idiosyncratic risks and own firms. Each family is subject to
time-varying debt constraints.
6
1.1 Technologies
Consumers are indexed by two state variables that summarize their ability to produce output.
The variable zt, referred to as general human capital, captures returns to experience and stays
with the worker even after a job spell ends. The variable ht, referred to as firm-specific human
capital, captures returns to tenure and is reset every time a job spell ends. A consumer with
state variables (zt, ht) produces ztht when employed and b(zt) when not employed. General
human capital thus affects a consumer’s productivity both on the job and off the job.
Human capital evolves as follows. When the consumer is employed, general human capital
evolves according to
log zt+1 = (1− ρ) log ze + ρ log zt + σzεt+1, (1)
where εt+1 is distributed normally with mean zero and variance 1, whereas when the consumer
is not employed, it evolves according to
log zt+1 = (1− ρ) log zu + ρ log zt + σzεt+1. (2)
We assume that zu < ze. Newborn consumers start nonemployed with general human capital
z, where log z is drawn from N(log zu, σ2z/(1− ρ2z)). This specification of human capital is in
the spirit of that in Ljungqvist and Sargent (1998). We denote the Markov processes in (1)
and (2) as Fe(zt+1|zt) and Fu(zt+1|zt) in what follows. The consumer’s firm-specific human
capital starts at ht = 1 whenever a job spell begins and then evolves on the job according to
log ht+1 = (1− ρ) log h+ ρ log ht, (3)
with h > 1. Both human capital components increase on average when a consumer is em-
ployed. The assumption that zu < ze implies that when a consumer is employed, on average,
the variable zt drifts up toward a high level of productivity ze from the low average level
of productivity zu of newborn workers. Similarly, when the consumer is not employed, on
average, the variable zt depreciates and hence drifts down toward a low level of productivity,
zu, which we normalize to 1. The assumption that h > 1 implies that when the consumer is
employed, firm-specific human capital increases from h = 1 toward h over time.
The parameter ρ governs the rate at which general and firm-specific human capital con-
verge toward their means. For simplicity, we assume that these rates are the same for all
three laws of motion mentioned earlier. Allowing for idiosyncratic shocks εt+1 to general
human capital allows the model to reproduce the dispersion in wage growth rates observed
in the data. For simplicity only, we assume that the process for accumulating firm-specific
capital is deterministic.
We represent the insurance arrangements in the economy by imagining that each consumer
belongs to one of a large number of identical families, each of which has a continuum of
7
household members who experience idiosyncratic shocks. The family as a whole receives a
deterministic amount of income in each period from the income generated by its working and
nonworking members. Risk sharing within the family implies that at date t, each household
member consumes the same amount of consumption goods, ct, regardless of the idiosyncratic
shocks that such a member experiences. (This type of risk-sharing arrangement is familiar
from the work of Merz (1995) and Andolfatto (1996).) The family as a whole is subject to
time-varying debt constraints that limit the total amount of borrowing by the family.1
Given this setup, we can separate the problem of the family into two parts. The first part
determines the common consumption level of every family member. The second part consists
of the vacancy creation problem of each firm owned by the family.
1.2 Consumption Choices
We purposely consider a particularly simple model of a family’s consumption-savings choice
in order to focus attention on the interaction between credit and labor market frictions. In
this model, the family trades a single risk-free security and faces exogenously-varying debt
constraints. We later show that the model’s implications for consumption, employment, and
wages are equivalent to those of richer models in which debt is collateralized by housing, debt
constraints tighten as house prices fall, and families are debt constrained even though they
have savings in an illiquid asset.
Consider the consumption allocation problem of a family in the simple version of our
model given by
maxct,at+1
∞∑t=0
βtu (ct) (4)
subject to a budget constraint
ct + qat+1 = yt + dt + at (5)
and a debt constraint
at+1 > −χt. (6)
Here β is the discount factor of the family, ct is consumption, at+1 are savings, yt represents
the total income from the wages of the employed members of the family and home production
of its nonemployed members, and dt are the profits from the firms the family owns. The family
1We also solved a version of the model similar to that in Krusell et al. (2010) in which consumers canonly save with uncontingent bonds. This model has an unappealing feature. Because of human capitalaccumulation, the wage that solves the Nash bargaining problem is nonmonotonic in individual assets. Inparticular, there is a region of the parameter space in which higher assets reduce wages. Anticipating thiseffect, some consumers are deterred from saving because greater savings decrease their wages. This featureleads to odd patterns of wages and savings, and sometimes to the nonexistence of equilibrium.
8
saves or borrows at a constant world bond price q > β subject to an exogenous deterministic
sequence {χt} of borrowing limits. Because the bond price and debt limits are deterministic,
and there is a continuum of family members who face only idiosyncratic risk, the family’s
problem is deterministic.
The family values one unit of goods at date t at the shadow price of Qt = βtu′(ct)/u′(c0)
units of date 0 goods. The Euler equation for consumption is
qQt = Qt+1 + θt,
where θt is the multiplier on the debt constraint. Hence, a tightening of debt constraints (a
fall in χt) raises the value of date t consumption goods by forcing the family to repay its debt
and thus cut consumption temporarily.
We next describe the second part of the family problem, which consists of firms’ choices
of vacancy creation and match creation and destruction, as well as consumers’ values of
employment and nonemployment.
1.3 An Individual Firm’s Problem
We posit and then later characterize the equilibrium wages as the outcome of a (generalized)
Nash bargaining problem that yields a wage w = ωt(z, h). For a given wage w, the present
value of profits earned by a firm matched with a worker with human capital levels z and h,
expressed in date 0 consumption units, is given by
Jt (w, z, h) = Qt(zh− w) + (1− σ)φ
∫max [Jt+1 (z′, h′) , 0] dFe (z′|z) . (7)
The flow profits are simply the difference between the amount zh the firm produces and the
wage w it pays the worker. Since the firm is owned by the family, it values date t profits
using the family’s shadow price Qt. Given the function w = ωt(z, h) from the Nash bargaining
problem, the firm’s value is defined as Jt(z, h) = Jt(ωt(z, h), z, h).
The max operator on the right side of (7) reflects the option to destroy an unprofitable
match. Let
ψt(z, h) = 1 if Jt(z, h) ≥ 0 (8)
denote matches that the firm chooses to continue and ψt(z, h) = 0 denote matches that it
chooses to destroy. Likewise, ψt(z, 1) indicates whether a firm chooses to employ a newly
matched worker.
9
1.4 An Individual Consumer’s Values
The consumer’s value in any date depends on whether the consumer is employed or not. The
present value of an employed consumer’s earnings, expressed in date 0 consumption units, is
Wt (w, z, h) = Qtw + φ (1− σ)
∫ψt+1 (z′, h′)Wt+1 (z′, h′) dFe (z′|z) (9)
+ φ
∫{(1− σ)[1− ψt+1 (z′, h′)] + σ}Ut+1 (z′) dFe (z′|z) ,
where general human capital evolves according to the law of motion Fe(z′|z) in (1) and firm-
specific human capital evolves according to the law of motion in (3). The continuation value
reflects the consumer’s survival probability φ, the exogenous separation probability σ, as well
as the firm’s choice of whether to continue a match next period, ψt+1(z′, h′). If the match is
dissolved for exogenous reasons or by the firm, the consumer enters the nonemployment state
with a value of Ut+1(z′). Given the function w = ωt(z, h) from the Nash bargaining problem,
the consumer’s value of working is defined as Wt(z, h) = Wt(ωt(z, h), z, h).
The present value of a nonemployed consumer’s earnings, expressed in date 0 consumption
units, is
Ut (z) = Qtb(z) + φλwt(z)
∫ψt+1 (z′, 1)Wt+1 (z′, 1) dFu (z′|z) (10)
+ φ
∫{λwt(z) [1− ψt+1 (z′, 1)] + 1− λwt(z)}Ut+1 (z′) dFu (z′|z) .
Here λwt(z), described further later, is the probability that a consumer with general human
capital z is matched with a firm at date t, in which case the consumer’s state at t+1 consists
of general human capital z′ and firm-specific human capital h′ = 1.
In both (9) and (10), we have used the implication of Nash bargaining that a firm em-
ploys a worker if, and only if, the worker prefers employment to nonemployment, that is,
ψt+1 (z′, h′) = 1 if, and only if, Wt+1 (z′, h′) ≥ Ut+1 (z′). The continuation value reflects
the consumer’s survival probability φ, the consumer’s matching rate λwt(z), as well as the
firm’s choice of whether to not accept the match and employ the workers in the next period,
ψt+1(z′, 1). In our quantitative analysis, most matches are indeed accepted.
Notice that the consumer matches with the firm at date t, but does not begin to work until
date t + 1, by which time the consumer’s general human capital has evolved to z′ according
to the law of motion Fu(z′|z) for the unemployed, described in (2).
1.5 Matching, Nash Bargaining, and Vacancy Creation
We now consider the matching technology, the determination of wages through Nash bar-
gaining, and the vacancy creation problem of firms.
10
Matching. Firms can direct their search for consumers submarket by submarket, by posting
vacancies for consumers of a given level of general human capital z. Let ut(z) be the measure
of nonemployed consumers with human capital z and vt(z) the corresponding measure of
vacancies posted by firms for consumers in submarket z. The measure of matches in this
submarket is generated by the matching function
mt (z) = ut (z) vt (z) /[ut (z)η + vt (z)η]1η ,
as in den Haan, Ramey, and Watson (2000) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008). We use
this matching function to ensure that job finding rates are between 0 and 1. Specifically, the
probability that a nonemployed consumer of type z matches with a firm in submarket z is
then
λwt (z) = mt (z) /ut(z) = θt (z) /[1 + θt (z)η]1η ,
where θt (z) = vt (z) /ut (z) is the vacancy to nonemployment ratio for consumers of type
z, and the parameter η governs the sensitivity of λwt(z) to θt. The probability that a firm
posting a vacancy in submarket z matches with a consumer in this submarket is
λft (z) = mt (z) /vt (z) = 1/[1 + θt (z)η]1η .
Nash Bargaining. Consider next the Nash bargaining problem, which determines the wage
w = ωt(z, h) in any given match. The problem is
maxw
[Wt (w, z, h)− Ut (z)
]γJt(w, z, h)1−γ,
where γ is a worker’s bargaining weight. Defining the surplus of a match with a consumer
with human capital z as
St(z, h) = Wt(z, h)− Ut(z) + Jt(z, h),
Nash bargaining implies that firms and consumers split this surplus according to
Wt (z, h)− Ut (z) = γSt (z, h) and Jt (z, h) = (1− γ)St (z, h) .
Vacancy Creation. Consider finally the firm’s choice of vacancy creation. The cost of
posting a vacancy in any submarket z is κ units of goods. The free-entry condition in
submarket z is given by
Qtκ ≥ λft (z)φ
∫max [Jt+1 (z′, 1) , 0] dFu (z′|z) (11)
11
with equality if vacancies are created in submarket z in that vt(z) > 0. Clearly, no vacancies
are created in submarket z if the value of expected profits conditional on matching is suf-
ficiently low in that submarket. This occurs for all values of z such that even if a vacancy
leads to a match for a firm with probability 1, expected profits are lower than the vacancy
posting cost, that is, Qtκ > φ∫
max [Jt+1 (z′, 1) , 0] dFu (z′|z).
Since the surplus from a match increases with z, and the firm’s value is proportional to
the surplus, there is a cutoff level of general human capital z∗t such that firms post vacancies
in all submarkets with z ≥ z∗t and none in all submarkets with z < z∗t .
1.6 The Workings of the Model
Here we provide some discussion about how our model works. We first describe the model’s
steady-state properties and then the responses to a debt tightening.
Steady State Properties. Panels A and B of Figure 1 display the steady-state measures
of the employed e(z) and nonemployed u(z) as a function of general human capital, whereas
panels C and D of this figure display the firm and consumer matching probabilities in sub-
market z. We generate these figures by using the parameter values described later.
As discussed, there is a cutoff level of z, say z∗, such that in submarkets z < z∗, firms
post no vacancies and consumers have a zero matching probability. For z < z∗, even if a
firm meets a consumer of type z with probability 1, the expected discounted stream of profits
from such a match is below the vacancy posting cost κ. To the right of z∗, the consumer job-
finding probability increases with z. The reason is that firms matched with consumers with
higher levels of z earn higher profits and thus have greater incentives to post vacancies aimed
at attracting such consumers. These incentives ensure that market tightness vt(z)/ut(z)
increases with z and the firm matching probability falls with z so that the expected value
of posting a vacancy is the same in all active submarkets and equal to the cost of posting a
vacancy.
Notice also that employed consumers have more general human capital on average than
nonemployed consumers, for two reasons. First, there is a selection effect in that a consumer’s
job-finding probability increases with the consumer’s general human capital. Second, on-the-
job general human capital accumulation means that z increases on average over time for
employed consumers.
A Tightening of Debt Constraints. Consider next how a tightening of debt constraints
affects firms’ incentives to post vacancies and thus equilibrium employment. As we discuss
later, such a tightening leads to a temporary decrease in the family’s consumption as the
12
family reduces its debt position to a new lower level. Hence, the debt tightening leads to a
temporary increase in the family’s marginal utility of consumption and thus the shadow price
of goods Qt. Because the drop in consumption is transitory, the sequence of shadow prices
Qt, Qt+1, Qt+2,. . ., starts high and then reverts back to its steady-state level as consumption
increases to its new steady-state level.
To understand how this temporary increase in the shadow price Qt affects firms’ incentives
to post vacancies, consider the free-entry condition. Since Nash bargaining implies that a
firm’s value is a constant fraction of match surplus, we can write the free-entry condition for
active submarkets as
Qtκ = λft(z)φ(1− γ)
∫max [St+1 (z′, 1) , 0] dFu (z′|z) . (12)
Here the cost of posting vacancies on the left side is equal to the benefit, namely the product
of the firm’s matching probability λft(z), a decreasing function of market tightness θt(z) =
vt(z)/ut(z), and a term proportional to the expected surplus from a match.
The temporary increase in Qt has two effects on the free-entry condition. First, it raises
the benefits of posting vacancies by increasing the expected surplus from a match. The surplus
increases because a match produces a greater flow of output than does nonemployment, and
the family values this net flow more when its consumption is lower. Second, a higher Qt
directly raises the cost of posting vacancies, Qtκ.
Importantly, the second effect dominates the first, so that the cost increases more than the
benefit. The reason is that the cost is paid at t, when consumption is the lowest and goods are
most valuable, but the benefits accrue in future periods when consumption is higher and thus
goods are less valuable than they are at date t. Because the cost of posting vacancies increases
more than the expected surplus from the match, the firm’s matching probability λft(z) must
increase after a debt tightening to ensure that the free-entry condition holds. Intuitively,
firms post fewer vacancies because the cost of investing in new vacancies increases by more
than the returns to such investments. This is a familiar effect from a large class of models in
which a worsening of financial frictions leads to lower investment.
2 Equivalence Results
So far we have described a simple version of an economy with debt constraints. The labor
market outcomes in the model, including employment, nonemployment, vacancies, and wages,
are uniquely determined by the sequence of shadow prices {Qt}. Because of this feature,
there are many alternative setups for the family problem that yield equivalent outcomes for
consumption and the associated shadow prices of goods and hence all labor market outcomes,
13
although they may have different implications for other variables. To illustrate this point,
we show the equivalence between our economy and two other economies: an economy with
housing and an economy with illiquid assets.
In our economy with housing, debt is collateralized by the value of a house. Our equiv-
alence result allows us to rationalize the drop in consumption and associated labor market
outcomes in our baseline economy as actually driven by a tightening of collateral constraints
arising from a fall in the price of housing, as many have argued.
In our economy with illiquid assets, consumers are net savers with the rest of the world
rather than net borrowers as in our baseline model. Nevertheless, since savings are illiquid,
a tightening of debt constraints reduces consumption because of liquidity constraints, as in
the work of Kaplan and Violante (2014) on wealthy but liquidity-constrained households.
Our equivalence result allows us to rationalize the drop in consumption and associated labor
market outcomes in our baseline economy as arising in a model in which consumers are net
savers.
These results make clear that for a large class of models, if the shocks produce the same
paths for consumption as our simpler model, then they produce the same paths for labor
market variables. In this sense, the robust link across models is the link between consumption
and labor market outcomes, not the link between either house prices or levels of net asset
positions and labor market outcomes. Motivated by these results, in our quantitative work
we choose sequences of state-level shocks to reproduce the state-level consumption paths
observed in the data and then study the corresponding labor market outcomes.
2.1 An Economy with Housing
Consider an economy in which families own houses and families’ borrowing is subject to
collateral constraints based on the value of their houses. The preferences of the family are
maxct,ht+1
∑t=0
βt[u(ct) + ψtv(ht)], (13)
where ct is the consumption of any of its members and ht is the amount of housing consumed
in date t. The family faces a budget constraint,
ct + qat+1 + ptht+1 = yt + dt + at + ptht, (14)
which is similar to that in (5) except that here a family owns a house of size ht with value ptht
and chooses its next period’s housing level ht+1. Here, instead of facing the debt constraint
(6), the family faces a collateral constraint that limits the amount it can borrow to a fraction
χ of the value of the family’s house:
at+1 > −χptht+1,
14
where χ is the maximum loan-to-value ratio. The housing supply is fixed, and each unit of
housing delivers one unit of housing services each period. The parameter ψt in the utility
function (13) governs the relative preference for housing. This parameter varies over time
and is the source of changes in house prices and thus, through the collateral constraint, in
the amount the family can borrow.
Let {Qt} denote the sequence of shadow prices that results from the debt constraint
economy for some given sequence of debt constraints {χt}. Clearly, there exists a sequence of
taste parameters {ψt} that gives rise to this same sequence of shadow prices in the economy
with housing. Given these shadow prices, the search side of the economy with housing is
identical to that of the economy with debt constraints. Hence, consumption, labor allocations,
and wages in the two economies coincide. Likewise, given the sequence of shadow prices that
results from the economy with housing, there exists a sequence of debt constraints in the
debt constraint economy that gives rise to these same shadow prices. We show these results
formally in the Appendix (online) and summarize this discussion with a proposition.
Proposition 1. The debt constraint economy is equivalent to the economy with housing in
terms of consumption, labor allocations, and wages.
2.2 An Economy with Illiquid Assets
Here we consider an economy with illiquid assets. Each family can save in assets that have
a relatively high rate of return but are illiquid and can borrow at a relatively low rate. The
budget constraint is
ct + qaat+1 − qbbt+1 = yt + dt + at − bt − φ(at+1, at), (15)
where at+1 denotes assets and bt+1 denotes debt. We assume that qa = 1/(1 + ra) < qb =
1/(1 + rb) so that the return on assets, 1 + ra, is higher than the interest on debt. We
interpret ra and rb as after-tax interest rates. We imagine a situation in which even though
the before-tax rate on debt is higher than on assets, the after-tax rate is lower due to the
tax deductibility of interest payments. For simplicity, we assume that β = qa. The function
φ(at+1, at) represents the cost of adjusting assets from at to at+1 and captures the idea that
assets are illiquid. Borrowing is subject to the debt constraint
bt+1 ≤ χt, (16)
where {χt} is a sequence of exogenous maximal amounts of borrowing. The consumption
problem of the family is to choose {ct, at+1, bt+1} to maximize the utility function in (4)
subject to the budget constraint (15) and debt constraint (16).
15
We assume that the interest rate on borrowing is sufficiently low in the illiquid asset
economy that the borrowing constraint binds in the illiquid asset economy at the shadow
prices constructed from the debt constraint economy. That is, condition
qb =1
1 + rb>Qt+1
Qt
(17)
holds, where the right side of (17) is evaluated at the consumption allocations in the debt
constraint economy. In the Appendix, we prove an analogous equivalence result to that in
Proposition 1 that we summarize in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under (17), the debt constraint economy is equivalent to the economy with
illiquid assets in terms of consumption, labor allocations, and wages.
3 Quantification
We next describe how we choose parameters for our quantitative analysis and the model’s
steady-state implications.
Assigned Parameters. The model is monthly. The utility function is u(ct) = c1−αt /(1−α).
A large literature finds that the elasticity of intertemporal substitution is very low—on the
order of 0.1 to 0.2—when estimated using data on households. (See Guvenen (2006) and the
references therein.) We follow this literature and set this elasticity, 1/α, equal to 0.2. We
found that the responses of employment to a credit shock are approximately linear in the size
of the shock: doubling the value of α would lead to doubling the employment responses. The
discount factor β is (.96)1/12, the world bond price q is (.98)1/12, and the survival rate φ is set
so that consumers are in the market for 40 years on average. The bargaining weight γ is set
to 1/2. The separation rate σ is set to 2.6% per quarter, in the mid-range of the estimates
reported in Krusell et al. (2011).2 Home production is parameterized by b(z) = b0 + b1z.
We set the slope parameter b1 equal to 0.25 and later discuss how we set the intercept b0. It
turns out that our results are not very sensitive to the choice of b1.
Endogenously Chosen Parameters. We jointly choose the remaining parameters, ϑ =
(b0, η, κ, σz, ρ, ze, h), using the method of simulated moments by requiring that the model
2This figure is lower than the 3.6% used by Shimer (2005) because Shimer includes job-to-job transitions,whereas we focus solely on employment-to-nonemployment transitions. We also experimented with a recal-ibration in which we used the higher separation rate from Shimer and found very similar results. As willbecome evident later, the employment responses in our model are determined by the duration of the benefitflows from a match, which is primarily influenced by the amount of general human capital accumulation ofworkers, rather than the length of time a worker spends attached to a particular firm.
16
matches as closely as possible 10 moments. We can group these parameters into two sets:
ϑ1 = (b0, η, κ, σz) and ϑ2 = (ρ, ze, h). For a given set of parameters ϑ2, the parameters
in ϑ1 are pinned down by the following four moments: an employment-population ratio of
0.63, corresponding to the 2006 Current Population Survey estimate for people aged 16 and
older; a job-finding rate of 0.45 from Shimer (2005); a vacancy cost as a fraction of monthly
match output of 0.15 from Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008); and a standard deviation of
wage changes in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics of 0.21, as in Floden and Linde (2001).
Intuitively, the home production parameter b0 is pinned down by the employment rate, the
matching function elasticity η is pinned down by the job-finding rate, the vacancy posting
cost κ is pinned down by the cost of posting a vacancy as a fraction of output, and the
standard deviation of shocks σz is pinned down by the volatility of changes in wages.
The parameters in ϑ2 determine how consumers accumulate human capital and are pinned
down by moments that describe how wages grow on the job and over the life cycle. As we
show later, the amount of on-the-job human capital accumulation is an important ingredient
in the model’s quantitative predictions. We therefore describe in detail how we quantify these
parameters.
Parameters of Human Capital Processes. We quantify these parameters using mo-
ments and estimates derived from two sources of data on high school graduates: cross-
sectional data from Elsby and Shapiro (2012) on how wages increase with experience and
longitudinal data from Buchinsky et al. (2010) on how wages grow during an employment
spell. Later in our robustness analysis, we show that our results change little if we use
alternative values for these moments and estimates.
The key moment we use from the cross-sectional data is the 1.21 difference in log wages
between workers with 30 years of experience and those just entering the labor market. This
difference corresponds to an average increase in wages of 4.1% per year of experience. This
moment is calculated from the Elsby and Shapiro (2012) data on full-time workers from the
census in years 1970, 1980, and 1990.3
The five moments we use from the longitudinal data are those on how wages grow during an
employment spell. These are calculated from the parameter estimates of the wage equation
estimated by Buchinsky et al. (2010) using PSID data from 1975 to 1992 for high school
graduates. These moments are the average annual growth rate of wages during an employment
spell for workers with different levels of experience. These growth rates are equal to 10%,
8%, 6%, 5%, and 7% for workers with 1 to 10, 11 to 20, 21 to 30, 31 to 40, and 1 to 40 years
3Elsby and Shapiro (2012) use data on earnings. Since they focus on full-time workers working 35 or morehours per week for 50 or more weeks, we interpret their numbers as corresponding to wages in our model.
17
of experience, respectively.
We turn to explaining how Buchinsky et al. (2010) estimate their wage equation and how
we use their parameter estimates to quantify the parameters of our human capital process.
Buchinsky et al. (2010) estimate a structural model of worker labor market participation,
mobility decisions, and wages that allows for rich sources of heterogeneity. In particular,
they estimate the parameters of an equation that relates workers’ wages to their demographic
characteristics and history of past employment, as well as current tenure (number of years
with a given firm) and experience (number of years in the labor market). The equation
describing an individual i’s wages at date t is
logwit = z′itβ + f(experienceit) + g(tenureit) + εit, (18)
where zit captures individual characteristics as well as the history of that individual’s past
employment. The functions f(·) and g(·) are fourth-order polynomials in experience and
tenure.
We use the parameter estimates from (18) as follows. For a given parameterization ϑ of our
model, we simulate paths for wages, experience, and tenure for a panel of individuals. Given
the simulated experience and tenure profiles from our model, we compute the annualized
wage growth predicted by (18). The last five moments we use to calibrate our model are the
predicted growth rates for the five experience groups listed earlier. We choose parameters so
that in our model wages grow during an employment spell at the same rates as those implied
by the Buchinsky et al. (2010) estimates for workers with different levels of experience.
We show later in our robustness analysis that our model’s implications for the labor market
responses to a credit tightening are robust to using alternative evidence on how wages grow
over the life cycle from Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) and how wages grow on the job from
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991).
Intuition for Identification. We now provide some intuition for how we separately iden-
tify the parameters (ρ, ze, h) governing general and firm-specific human capital accumulation.
While increases in ze and h lead to similar increases in on-the-job wage growth, an increase
in ze leads to a much larger increase in life-cycle wage growth than does an increase in h.
The reason is twofold: firm-specific human capital is lost after each transition into nonem-
ployment, whereas general human capital is not, and workers typically experience multiple
employment and nonemployment spells over their lifetimes. Finally, a decrease in ρ makes
the wages of young workers grow faster than the wages of older workers and, hence, helps
the model account for the differential on-the-job wage growth of workers with different levels
of experience. Hence, the combination of the cross-sectional evidence in Elsby and Shapiro
18
(2012) and the longitudinal evidence summarized by the Buchinsky et al. (2010) parameter
estimates jointly identifies these three parameters.
Recall that the cross-sectional evidence shows that life-cycle annual wage growth is equal
to 4.1%, whereas the longitudinal data imply an overall on-the-job wage growth of 7%. To
understand how the model can simultaneously account for these two facts, consider Figure
2, which shows the path of wages of a typical worker in our model. This worker experiences
several employment and nonemployment spells over the life cycle and, for simplicity, no shocks
to human capital. Note that wages drop after each transition into nonemployment, owing to
the loss in firm-specific human capital. Thus, even though wages rise relatively rapidly on
the job, they rise less rapidly over the life cycle, due to the wage declines associated with
transitions into nonemployment. As we discuss later, our model’s implications for the loss in
wages after a transition into nonemployment are in line with the data.
Summary and Additional Implications. Table 1, panels A and B, summarizes our pa-
rameterization strategy: it shows the moments used in our calibration, the parameters that
we assign, and those that we endogenously choose. As Table 1 shows, the model exactly
matches the first set of four moments that pin down the parameters in ϑ1 and closely re-
produces the remaining wage growth moments that pin down the parameters in ϑ2. Table
1, panel B, also reports the implied parameter values. Notice that the parameter b0 that
determines how much nonemployed consumers produce is about 42% of the average amount
produced by employed consumers. The parameter governing the drift of general human cap-
ital accumulation, log ze, is equal to 2.44, whereas that governing firm-specific human capital
accumulation, log h, is equal to 0.82.
To see what our parameter estimates imply about the relative importance of the two types
of human capital, consider an alternative version of the model in which firm-specific human
capital is constant at h = 1 and the other parameters are unchanged. The resulting model
generates an average annual on-the-job wage growth of 5%, thus about 1/3 lower than that
implied by our baseline model, but it implies a difference in the log wages of workers with 30
years of experience and workers just entering the labor market of 1.02, which is only slightly
lower than the 1.19 difference implied by the baseline model. Taken together, these numbers
imply that firm-specific human capital accumulation accounts for about 1/3 of on-the-job
wage growth but for only 16% of life-cycle wage growth.
Table 2 shows additional steady-state implications of the model for moments not explicitly
targeted in our calibration. Recall from Table 1 that 37% of consumers in our model are not
working. As Table 2 shows, however, only 4% of the consumers who are not working have a
positive job-finding rate. For this last group, as Table 1 shows, the average job-finding rate
19
is 45% per month on average. Heterogeneity in job-finding rates thus allows our model to
simultaneously replicate the large number of nonemployed in the data and the modest flows
out of nonemployment into employment.
As Table 2 also shows, the average amount produced by nonemployed consumers is about
48% of the average wage of employed consumers, in the mid-range of typical parameterizations
of the DMP model. To put this number into perspective, recall that the corresponding number
in Shimer (2005) is 40% and that in Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) is 96%. Endogenous
separations occur infrequently and account for only 0.02% of all separations. The standard
deviation of log wages in the cross section of employed consumers is equal to 0.82, only slightly
less than the range of numbers reported by Song et al. (forthcoming). The profit share of
revenue is 6%, in line with the estimates of the profit share in the aggregate U.S. data. The
average drop in wages after a nonemployment spell is 5%, a number in line with the estimate
of 5.6% we obtain using the PSID sample of Buchinsky et al. (2010).
4 Response of Employment to a Tightening of Credit
We next illustrate how employment responds to a tightening of credit and then explain the
role of human capital accumulation and consumer-side credit frictions in accounting for this
response.
4.1 Impulse Responses to a Tightening of Credit
To build intuition for how the model works, we conduct an experiment in which we assume
an unanticipated tightening of the debt constraint. We describe the response of consumption
and employment, decompose the drop in employment into the components arising from the
overall job-finding rate and separation rate, and then discuss why the drop in employment is
persistent.
The Response of Employment and Consumption. We assume that this credit tighten-
ing is unexpected prior to the first period and that consumers have perfect foresight afterward.
We choose a sequence of debt limits {χt} so that consumption drops by 5% on impact and
then reverts to its original steady state at a rate of 10% per quarter. This mean-reversion
rate is chosen so as to match the speed of postwar consumption recoveries in the data. The
shadow price Qt increases proportionately to the drop in consumption and reverts to its
original steady state at the same rate as consumption.
Figure 3 displays the path for employment relative to that of consumption in this exper-
iment. The 5% fall in consumption is accompanied by a 2.7% maximal drop in employment.
20
Note that the drop in employment is gradual because, as we show later, it is driven mainly
by a drop in the job-finding rate, rather than by an increase in the separation rate: declines
in the job-finding rate reduce the flow of consumers out of nonemployment and therefore only
slowly reduce the stock of employed consumers.
The Shimer Decomposition of Employment. We next shed light on the mechanism
behind the impulse response for employment. The drop in employment is due to the combi-
nation of the drop in the job-finding rates and the increase in the endogenous component of
separation rates. Quantitatively, the main force leading to the decline in employment is the
decline in the job-finding rates.
To quantify the importance of these two factors in accounting for the employment drop,
we build on the approach in Shimer (2012). Note that the transition law for total employment
can be written as et+1 = (1 − st)et + ft(1 − et), where et is the overall employment rate; st
is the overall separation rate, equal to the sum of exogenous and endogenous separations;
and ft is the overall job-finding rate. We construct two counterfactual employment series in
which we vary st and ft one at a time while leaving the other at its steady-state value.
In Figure 4 we see that the component of the employment drop arising from the change
in the separation rate accounts for a small part of the initial drop in employment. The
reason is that the separation rate increases a bit on impact, because firms find it optimal to
dissolve marginal matches. The vast bulk of the decline in employment, however, is due to
the decline in the job-finding rate. As we discussed earlier, the job-finding rate falls because
posting vacancies requires paying an up-front cost at a time when consumption is especially
low and hence goods are especially valuable, namely in the immediate aftermath of the credit
tightening. In contrast, the benefits to posting vacancies accrue gradually over time when
consumption recovers. The family’s desire to smooth consumption thus leads to a drop in
investment in vacancy creation and thus employment.
The Persistent Drop in Employment. Note that the employment drop in our model is
more persistent than the consumption drop. One way to see this is to note that even though
on impact the fall in employment is lower than that in consumption, the cumulative impulse
response of employment in the first four years is 0.9 times as large as that of consumption.
The employment drop is persistent because of an endogenous deterioration of the general
human capital of nonemployed consumers along the transition. Since employment produces
human capital, the initial drop in employment leads to a persistent reduction in the overall
amount of human capital in the economy and, thus, to a worsening of the skill levels of
the nonemployed. The average skill levels of the nonemployed return to their steady-state
21
values only gradually. Hence, even after the shadow price Qt has returned to its steady state,
firms post fewer vacancies because the average nonemployed consumer is less productive and,
hence, makes for a less profitable match.
A simple moment that illustrates this worsening of the skill level of the nonemployed is
the productivity of the median active nonemployed consumer at any point in time. Figure
5 shows that while on impact this productivity level increases because of the spike in the
separation rate of workers, it decreases in a persistent way over time. Even 10 years after
the initial credit tightening, the median productivity level is still 3% below its steady-state
value. Productivity falls because the entire distribution of nonemployed workers drifts to the
left. This drift is due to consumers spending less time employed during the downturn and,
hence, accumulating less human capital.
Notice that, in contrast to the standard DMP search model, this novel propagation mech-
anism allows our model to generate a reduction in employment that is more persistent than
the underlying shock and can help account for the scarring effects of recessions.
4.2 Key Ingredients of Our Model
We have introduced two ingredients in an otherwise standard search and matching model:
on-the-job human capital accumulation and debt constraints that affect consumer-side and
firm-side valuations. We argue next that each of these ingredients is critical in generating
sizable employment responses to a credit crunch.
On-the-Job Human Capital Accumulation. Consider first the role of on-the-job human
capital accumulation. We compare the implications of our model with those of an alternative
model with no growth in either general or firm-specific human capital in which we set ze = 1
and h = 1. We choose the four parameters in ϑ1 in this version of the model to ensure that
the model exactly reproduces the first four moments in panel A of Table 1. Since credit
market conditions can be summarized by their effect on the shadow prices {Qt}, we choose
the amount of credit tightening in this version of the model to generate the same path for
these shadow prices as in the baseline model.
Figure 6 shows that in the economy without human capital accumulation, employment
responds very little to the debt tightening: it falls by only about one-tenth of the amount it
does in our baseline model. (Notice that although this model has no growth in general human
capital z, it features heterogeneity in z because of the shocks to human capital accumulation.
We also considered a simpler version of the model without such heterogeneity, in which all
consumers have the same fixed level of general human capital, and found similar results.)
We next provide some intuition for this result by examining the firm’s incentives to post
22
vacancies in the two versions of the model. As the earlier discussion of the workings of the
model made clear, the size of the fall in employment depends on the relative size of the
increase in the cost of posting vacancies, Qtκ, and the increase in the expected surplus from
a match.
Since the increase in the cost of posting vacancies is the same in the two models, the
key to understanding the different responses is the differential increase in the surplus from a
match in the two models. Since the shadow price Qt increases the most immediately and then
mean reverts, the amount by which surplus increases depends on when exactly the returns
to a match accrue. In the model without human capital accumulation, these returns accrue
almost immediately after the credit tightening, and hence their valuation increases almost as
much as Qt does. In contrast, in the model with human capital accumulation, these returns
accrue gradually over time, and hence their valuation increases much less than Qt does.
To understand precisely why the timing of when the flow surplus is accrued matters, write
the free-entry condition for a given submarket z as
Qtκ = λft(z)×[Qt+1st+1(z) +Qt+2st+2(z) +Qt+3st+3(z) + . . .
], (19)
where st+j(z) is the component of the expected flow surplus produced by this match that
accrues in date t + j. The expectation takes into account all the uncertainty concerning
this match, including the possibility that a match dissolves because of death or exogenous
separations, and the shocks to general human capital. (See the Appendix for details on how
we compute these components.)
After a credit tightening at date t, the cost of a match, given by the left side of (19),
increases one-for-one with Qt. Consider next the surplus from a match, given by the term in
brackets on the right side of (19). In the model without human capital accumulation, most
of the returns from a match accrue in the first few periods after the match is formed. To
see this, consider the standard measure of how long-lived the flows from an investment are,
namely, the Macaulay duration. This duration is given by∑∞
k=1 kωk, where ωk is the fraction
of the present value of the flow of benefits accrued k periods after the investment is made.
Here,
ωk =Qt+kst+k(z)
Qt+1st+1(z) +Qt+2st+2(z) +Qt+3st+3(z) + . . ..
In the model without human capital, this duration is equal to 2.8 months on average, so
that the returns to a match accrue quickly. During the first few months following a credit
tightening, Qt has not reverted much to its mean, and hence the surplus increases almost as
much as the cost and, thus, employment falls little.
In contrast, in the model with human capital accumulation, the returns to a match are
long-lived. A similar calculation shows that the Macaulay duration is equal to almost 10
23
years on average. Since the shadow price Qt mean reverts after only a few years, the present
value of these benefits flows from a match, given by the term in brackets on the right side
of (19), increases by much less than the cost. Hence, firms post many fewer vacancies and
employment falls a lot.
We next explain why the textbook model without human capital accumulation implies
such short durations of benefit flows from a match. We do so by setting h = 1, so there is no
firm-specific human capital accumulation, and by setting Fe(z′|z) equal to Fu(z
′|z), so that
there is no general human capital accumulation on the job. When we do so we can write the
expression for match surplus recursively as
St (z) = Qt[z − b (z)] + [1− σ − λwt (z) γ]φ
∫max [St+1 (z′) , 0] dF (z′|z) , (20)
where F (z′|z) is the common law of motion of human capital among employed and nonem-
ployed consumers. This expression, familiar from the textbook model, is simply the dis-
counted sum of the difference between what a consumer produces when employed, z, and
when not employed, b(z). As is well understood, the return from a match accrues almost
immediately in the textbook model because it is discounted by the factor 1 − σ − λwt(z)γ,
which is low due to the relatively high separation, σ, and job-finding probabilities, λwt, in
the data. Intuitively, the fact that these probabilities are high implies that an employed
consumer produces more output than a nonemployed consumer for only a few months on
average. Hence, the duration of benefit flows is very short.
Consider next why our model with human capital accumulation implies such long dura-
tions of benefit flows from a match. Here, match surplus can be written recursively as
St(z, h) = Qt [zh− b (z)] + [1− σ − λwt (z) γ]φ
∫max [St+1 (z′, h′) , 0] dFe (z′|z) (21)
+ φ
∫Ut+1 (z′) [dFe (z′|z)− dFu (z′|z)]
+ λwt (z) γφ
[∫max [St+1 (z′, h′) , 0] dFe (z′|z)−
∫max [St+1 (z′, 1) , 0] dFu (z′|z)
],
where the value of a nonemployed consumer is
Ut (z) = Qtb (z) + λwt (z) γφ
∫max [St+1 (z′, 1) , 0] dFu (z′|z) + φ
∫Ut+1 (z′) dFu (z′|z) . (22)
Equation (21) shows that the surplus from a match is the sum of two components. The
first component, given by the right side in the first line of (21), is essentially identical to
that in the model without human capital accumulation. The second component comes from
the second and third lines in (21) and reflects human capital accumulation. Since human
capital grows faster when the consumer is employed, the surplus also includes the difference
24
between the two laws of motion of general human capital accumulation for employed and
nonemployed consumers, dFe(z′|z)− dFu(z′|z), as well as the difference between firm-specific
human capital h′ for continuing matches and new matches, h = 1. Since general human
capital is transferable across matches, the general human capital earned in the current match
will be used by the consumer in all of its future matches. Hence, this component of match
surplus is long-lived.
Consumer-Side Credit Frictions. A second key ingredient of our model is that a debt
tightening at the level of the family acts like a simultaneous tightening of both firm-side
and consumer-side credit frictions. This ingredient is not present in a sizable literature in
macroeconomics that focuses solely on the effect of firm-level credit frictions. We next conduct
an experiment that shows that consumer-side credit frictions are critical to generating the
large drop in employment in our baseline model.
To isolate the effects of consumer-side credit frictions from firm-side credit frictions, we
allow the shadow prices in the consumer and firm problem to differ. Let Qct denote the
shadow price in the consumer’s problem (9) and (10), and let Qft denote the shadow price in
the firm’s problem (7). We then conduct a credit tightening experiment on the firm side only,
by keeping Qct unchanged at qt and letting Qft follow the same path as Qt in our baseline
model.
One interpretation of this experiment is that the economy consists of two types of families.
One type of families has consumers who supply labor but own no firms, have discount factors
β = q, and face no debt constraint. The second type of families consists of entrepreneurs who
supply no labor and earn income only through their ownership of firms. We imagine a credit
tightening that reduces the consumption of entrepreneurs and thus increases their shadow
price Qft by the same amount by which we increased Qt in our baseline model.
Figure 7 shows that such a firm-side credit tightening leads to only a modest drop in
employment, less than 1/10 that in our baseline model. To see why this is the case, note that
when firms and consumers have different marginal valuations of goods, the Nash bargaining
solution implies a surplus sharing rule of the form
Jt =(1− γ)Qft(Wt − Ut)
γQct
.
Thus, when a firm’s shadow price increases but a consumer’s does not, the fraction of match
surplus received by the firm increases, thus offsetting the increased cost of posting vacancies.
In equilibrium, wages fall a lot in this version of the model, thus insulating firms from adverse
credit conditions. In contrast, in our baseline model, Qct and Qft increase proportionately,
since both firms and consumers are effectively subject to debt constraints. This proportional
25
increase prevents wages from falling too much, thus leading to a much larger drop in vacancies
and employment.
We think of this experiment as a way to decompose the effect of the two sides of credit
frictions in our baseline model, rather than as an interesting alternative to that model. The
reason is that we interpret Mian and Sufi (2011, 2014) as having documented the importance
of consumer-side credit frictions and Giroud and Mueller (forthcoming), among many others,
as having documented the importance of firm-side credit frictions during the Great Recession.
To be consistent with these observations, our model has both consumer-side and firm-side
credit frictions.
4.3 Robustness to Alternative Estimates of Wage Growth
In our quantification of the human capital processes, we have used estimates of wage growth
based on Elsby and Shapiro (2012) and Buchinsky et al. (2010). The literature has provided
a range of such estimates. Here we show that our results on how the economy responds to a
credit tightening are robust to using alternative estimates. We then report how our results
change for a wide range of values for the parameters governing the rate of human capital
accumulation.
Alternative Estimates of Wage Growth. Consider first how wages increase with expe-
rience in the cross section. Recall that Elsby and Shapiro (2012) document that the wage
differential between workers with 30 years of experience and those entering the labor market
is 1.21 log points. In contrast, Rubinstein and Weiss (2006) report a range of values for this
wage differential centered around 0.80 log points. In the two robustness experiments that
follow, we target this lower wage differential.
Consider next the estimates of on-the-job wage growth. Whereas the Buchinsky et al.
(2010) estimates of the wage equation in (18) imply an average on-the-job wage growth
of 7% per year, the earlier literature finds smaller numbers. Accordingly, we consider two
alternative parameterizations derived from the estimated wage equations of the influential
studies of Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991).
As earlier, for a given parameterization of our model, we simulate paths for wages, ex-
perience, and tenure for a panel of individuals. Given the simulated experience and tenure
profiles from our model, we compute the annualized wage growth predicted by the estimated
wage equations in Altonji and Shakotko (1987) and Topel (1991). We then choose parame-
ters in our model to ensure that our model’s implications for wage growth at various levels
of experience are consistent with the implications of these estimates.
Table 3A shows the moments from the data and the model for these alternative sets of
26
estimates. For simplicity, we refer to the first robustness experiment that uses estimates of
the parameters of wage growth from Altonji and Shakotko (1987) as the Altonji-Shakotko
experiment, and refer to the second robustness experiment that uses estimates of the param-
eters of wage growth from Topel (1991) as the Topel experiment. The first five moments are
common to both experiments. In particular, we use the cross-sectional log-wage differential
from Rubinstein and Weiss (2006, Figure 3a, page 9), as well as the employment rate, job-
finding rate, vacancy posting cost, and standard deviation of wage changes from our baseline
model.
Notice that we match all of these moments almost perfectly. Importantly, on-the-job
wage growth rates are now substantially smaller than in our baseline model. For example,
the average on-the-job wage growth for workers with 1 to 40 years of experience is 7% in
our baseline model but only 3% in the Altonji-Shakotko experiment and 5% in the Topel
experiment.
Table 3B shows the resulting parameter values and compares them with those in the
baseline model. Notice that the parameters governing the rate of human capital accumulation
ze and h are substantially smaller in these two robustness experiments than in our baseline
model. Nevertheless, both of these alternatives imply a sizable amount of general human
capital accumulation, as indicated by log ze being substantially greater than 0. In these
experiments, all other parameters, which are chosen with the method of simulated moments,
adjust appropriately for the model to replicate all remaining targeted moments.
Figure 8 shows how employment responds to a debt tightening that leads to the same 5%
drop in consumption as in our baseline model. Note that the maximal drop in employment is
slightly larger than in our baseline: it is 2.7% in our baseline and about 3% in both of these
alternative experiments. Also note that both of these alternative experiments predict that
the employment drop is very persistent. In particular, the cumulative impulse response of
employment relative to that of employment after four years is 0.91 in the Altonji-Shakotko
parameterization and 0.98 in the Topel parameterization, which are both larger than the
corresponding 0.9 statistic in the baseline parameterization.
So far we have focused on estimates of life-cycle wage growth and on-the-job wage growth
for high school graduates. We also repeated our exercise for analogous estimates from Elsby
and Shapiro (2012) and Buchinsky et al. (2010) for individuals with less than a high school
education and for individuals with a college education. We found that for both sets of
estimates, the maximal employment drop and the cumulative employment drop were similar
to those in our baseline model.
We thus conclude that our results are robust to alternative estimates of wage growth in
the literature.
27
Results for a Wide Range of Parameter Values. So far we have shown that our
model’s implications for how employment responds to a credit tightening are robust to a range
of estimates of cross-sectional wage-experience profiles and on-the-job wage growth reported
in the literature. In Figure 9 we vary the parameters log ze and log h governing the rate of
general and firm-specific human capital accumulation in a wider region of the parameter space
and present the model’s implications for wage growth and the response of employment to a
credit tightening. We show that as long as log ze is above a threshold consistent with a life-
cycle wage growth of 1.5% per year, the model’s implications for employment are virtually
identical. As earlier, when we vary these parameters, all other parameters, chosen with
the method of simulated moments, adjust appropriately for the model to replicate all other
statistics.
Panels A and B of Figure 9 report the model’s implications for wage growth on the job and
over the life cycle in these experiments. The lines marked with triangles set h equal to our
baseline value, whereas the lines marked with circles eliminate all firm-specific human capital
accumulation by setting h equal to 1. As we vary ze, the model produces a wide range of rates
of wage growth over the life cycle and on the job. Also note, as we discussed earlier, that
cross-sectional wage-experience profiles vary little with the amount of firm-specific human
capital accumulation, in that the two lines in panel B are essentially on top of each other.
Consider next the models’ implications for how employment responds to a credit tight-
ening. We summarize these implications in panels C and D with two statistics: the maximal
employment drop after a 5% drop in consumption and the cumulative drop in employment
relative to consumption in the first four years after the tightening.
Notice from these figures that as long as the drift parameter of general human capital,
log ze, is greater than 1, our model’s key predictions for employment responses are remarkably
similar. In particular, the maximal employment drop is about 2.7% to 3%, whereas the
cumulative drop is about 0.9 that of consumption in the first four years after the tightening.
Figure 9 shows that we would have obtained similar employment responses even if we had
chosen parameters of general and firm-specific human capital to imply an on-the-job wage
growth as low as 2% per year and a differential between the wages of workers with 30 years of
experience and no experience of 0.45 log points—namely, by setting log ze slightly less than 1
and log h = 0. For these parameter values, life-cycle wage growth is equal to 1.5% = 0.45/30
per year.
As the panels C and D show, however, if there were no growth at all in either general
or firm-specific human capital, our model would produce negligible employment responses.
But, interestingly, once we allow for even modest growth in general human capital, our model
produces similar employment responses.
28
We next provide some intuition for why the employment responses are nonlinear in the rate
of general human capital accumulation. Part of the intuition can be obtained by realizing that
the duration of benefit flows is nonlinear in the rate of human capital accumulation. Figure
10 shows how the duration varies as we vary the drift parameter log ze. This figure makes
clear that duration is highly concave in the drift parameter: as this parameter increases,
the marginal effects on duration decrease and duration asymptotes to about 130 months.
Intuitively, the combination of a consumer’s finite lifetime, the positive separation rates from
a firm, and the relatively high job-finding rates for nonemployed consumers gives rise to an
upper bound on how long-lived are the benefit flows to a match.
The rest of the intuition is that when we consider a mean-reverting increase in the shadow
prices of goods, the benefit flows received after some date in the future barely increase in
their valuation, regardless of how distant they are. This explains why employment responses
are even more concave in ze than is duration.
5 An Economy with Tradable and Nontradable Goods
Our one-good model discussed earlier is useful for illustrating the essential ideas behind the
workings of our new mechanism. We next evaluate the ability of this mechanism to account for
the cross-state evidence in the United States during the Great Recession on the comovement
of consumption, employment, and wages. To do so, we embed the labor market structure of
the one-good model into a richer model with tradable and nontradable goods. Importantly,
this richer model has identical steady-state implications for labor market variables and human
capital accumulation as the one-good model and can thus match both the cross-sectional and
longitudinal evidence on how wages grow over the life cycle and during an employment spell.
We discuss the evidence from a cross section of U.S. states, develop the richer version of
our model, and then present our main quantitative findings. We show that our richer model
reproduces well the key cross-state patterns.
5.1 Motivating Evidence from U.S. States
Our work is motivated by several patterns that are closely related to those documented by
Mian and Sufi (2014) and Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016) for a cross section of U.S. regions.
The first pattern is that regions of the United States with the largest declines in consump-
tion experienced the largest declines in employment, especially in the nontradable goods sec-
tor. The second observation is that regions with the largest employment declines experienced
the largest declines in real wages relative to trend.
Here we illustrate the first pattern by using annual data on employment and consumption
29
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) for U.S. states. We provide a brief description of
the data and provide more detail in the Appendix. Employment is measured as total state-
level private nonfarm employment, excluding construction, relative to the total state-level
working-age population. We exclude construction since our model abstracts from housing
investment. We follow the BEA classification of sectors to break down overall employment
into nontradable and tradable employment. We measure consumption as real per capita
consumption expenditure in each state. In the spirit of the model, we isolate changes in
consumption triggered by changes in households’ ability to borrow, or more generally in
credit conditions, as proxied by changes in house prices. To isolate this component, we
project state-level consumption growth on the corresponding growth in state-level (Zillow)
house prices, and use the resulting series for consumption growth in our analysis. See Charles,
Hurst, and Notowidigdo (2015) for a similar approach.
In panel A of Figure 11, we plot state-level employment growth between 2007 and 2009
against state-level consumption growth over this same period. The figure shows that the
elasticity of employment to consumption is 0.38; that is, a 10% decline in consumption is
associated with a 3.8% decline in employment.
Panels B and C show that consumption declines are associated with relatively large de-
clines in nontradable employment and essentially no changes in tradable employment: a 10%
decline in consumption across states is associated with a 5.5% decline in nontradable employ-
ment and a negligible (and statistically insignificant) 0.3% increase in tradable employment.
As the large negative intercept in the figure shows, the decline in tradable employment is
large in all states but unrelated to changes in state-level consumption across states.
Now consider the second observation. Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016) also interpret
the cross-regional variation in employment as arising from shocks that lead to differential
consumption declines across states. They document that states that experienced the largest
employment declines experienced the largest decline in real wages relative to trend.
Here we reproduce a version of their findings. For wages we use data from the Integrated
Public Use Microdata Series, and we control for observable differences in workforce composi-
tion both across states and within a state over time, closely following the approach in Beraja,
Hurst, and Ospina (2016). We show in panel D that a decline in employment of 10% across
states is associated with a decline in wages of 7.8%. As Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016)
argue, in this sense, in the cross section wages are moderately flexible.
In sum, state-level data show that consumption, employment, and real wages all strongly
positively comove. We summarize these comovements in the first column of Table 4.
30
5.2 The Richer Model with Tradable and Nontradable Goods
Here we extend our economy to one that can address the cross-state evidence just discussed.
We first present the setup of the model and then the results from our quantitative experiments.
Most of the details of the model are identical to those of the one-good model and are omitted
for brevity. We only discuss the additional ingredients that we introduce.
The economy consists of a continuum of islands, each of which produces intermediate
goods, which are combined to make nontradable goods that are only consumed on the island,
and a differentiated variety of tradable goods that are consumed everywhere. Consumers
receive utility from a composite good that is purchased in the market or produced at home.
Each consumer is endowed with one of two types of skills. Labor is immobile across islands
but can switch sectors. We let s index an individual island.
In our experiments, we consider shocks to only a subset of islands that, taken together,
are small in the world economy and borrow from the rest of the world at a constant bond
price q > β. In our simple interpretation, this subset of islands is a net borrower from
the rest of the world. Of course, given our earlier equivalence results, there are alternative
interpretations of these experiments, such as the illiquid asset interpretation, in which the
subset of the islands we consider is not a net borrower from the rest of the world.
Preferences and Demand. The composite consumption good on island s is produced
from nontradable goods on island s and tradable goods according to
xt(s) =[τ
1µ (xNt(s))
1− 1µ + (1− τ)
1µ (xMt(s))
1− 1µ
] µµ−1
.
The demand for nontradable goods and tradable goods on island s is given by
xNt(s) = τ
(pNt(s)
pt(s)
)−µxt(s) and xMt(s) = (1− τ)
(pMt
pt(s)
)−µxt(s),
where pNt(s) is the price of nontradable goods, pMt is the world price of tradable goods, and
pt(s) =[τ (pNt(s))
1−µ + (1− τ) p1−µMt
] 11−µ
is the price of the composite good on island s.
The tradable good itself is a composite of varieties of differentiated goods produced in all
other islands s′, given by
xMt (s) =
(∫xMt (s, s′)
µX−1
µX ds′) µX
µX−1
,
where xMt (s, s′) is the amount of the island s′ variety of tradable goods consumed on island
s and µX is the elasticity of substitution between varieties produced on different islands. We
31
assume that there are no costs of shipping goods from one island to another so that the law of
one price holds and all islands purchase this particular variety s at the same common price.
The composite price of tradable goods is thus common to all islands and given by
pMt =
(∫pXt (s)1−µ ds
) 11−µ
,
where pXt (s) denotes the price of a tradable variety produced on island s. The demand on
island s′ for a tradable variety produced on s is therefore
xMt (s′, s) =
(pXt (s)
pMt
)−µxMt (s′) ,
so that the world demand for tradable goods produced by an island s is given by
yXt (s) =
∫xMt (s′, s) ds′ = pXt (s)−µ yWt, (23)
where yWt = pµMt
∫xMt (s′) ds′.
Since any individual island is of measure zero, shocks to an individual island do not affect
either the world aggregate price, pMt, or demand, yWt. Since we consider shocks to only
a subset of islands that, taken together, are small in the world economy, world aggregate
quantities and prices are constant. We normalize the constant world price of composite
tradable goods, pMt, to 1 so that the composite tradable is the numeraire.
Family’s Problem. Consider the problem of a family on a given island s. Since from now
on we focus on one island s, for simplicity we suppress the dependence on s. The preferences
of a family are∞∑t=0
βtu (ct) ,
where the family’s consumption ct = xt + bt is the sum of the amount of goods purchased,
xt, and home-produced, bt. The budget constraint is
ptxt + qat+1 = yt + dt + bt + at,
where pt is the price of composite goods on the island, at are the family’s assets, yt is the
income of the family’s workers in the form of wages, and dt are the profits from the firms the
family owns on island s. The debt constraint on island s is
at+1 ≥ −χt.
32
Note that the consumption problem of the family is almost identical to that in the one-good
model. The one difference is that the shadow price of one unit of composite goods at date t
in units of date 0 composite goods is
Qt = βtu′(ct)/pt,
where for simplicity we normalize u′(c0)/p0 = 1.
Technology. Nontradable and tradable goods are produced with locally produced inter-
mediate goods. These intermediate goods are used by the nontradable and tradable sectors
in different proportions. This setup effectively introduces costs of sectoral reallocations of
workers because it implies a curved production possibility frontier between nontradable and
tradable goods.
Specifically, this economy has two types of intermediate goods: type N and type Xgoods. The technology for producing nontradable goods disproportionately uses type Ngoods, whereas the technology for producing tradable goods disproportionately uses type Xgoods according to the production technologies
yNt = A(yNNt)ν (
yXNt)1−ν
and yXt = A(yNXt)1−ν (
yXXt)ν, (24)
with ν ≥ 1/2. Here yNN and yNX denote the use of intermediate inputs of type N in the pro-
duction of nontradable and tradable goods, whereas yXN and yXX denote the use of intermediate
inputs of type X in the production of nontradable and tradable goods. Both nontradable
goods producers and tradable goods producers are competitive and take as given the price
of their goods, pNt and pXt. The demands for intermediate inputs in the nontradable sector
are given by
yNNt = ν
(pXtpNt
)1−ν
yNt and yXNt = (1− ν)
(pNtpXt
)νyNt,
where pXt and pNt are the prices of the intermediate goods N and X—here we have used
the convenient normalization A = ν−ν (1− ν)−(1−ν). Likewise, the demands for intermediate
inputs in the tradable sector are
yNXt = (1− ν)
(pXtpNt
)νyXt and yXXt = ν
(pNtpXt
)1−ν
yXt.
The zero profit conditions in the nontradable and tradable goods sectors imply
pNt =(pNt)ν (
pXt)1−ν
and pXt =(pNt)1−ν (
pXt)ν.
We assume that there are measures of consumers that can produce each of the two types of
intermediate goods, denoted i ∈ {N ,X}. We refer to these consumers as being in occupations
33
N and X . Consumers are hired by intermediate goods firms that produce these goods, which
are then sold at competitive prices pNt and pXt to firms in the nontradable and tradable sectors.
Of course, it is equivalent to think that the consumers in each occupation are assigned to
the sector that purchases the goods they produce. Under this interpretation, we can think
of consumers in occupation X as employed in sector N and X and consumers in occupation
N as employed in sector N and X. Furthermore, sector N employs consumers in occupation
N relatively intensively, whereas sector X employs consumers in occupation X relatively
intensively.
Our setup captures in a simple way the idea that switching sectors is relatively easy
whereas switching occupations is difficult. Here any individual consumer faces no cost of
switching sectors, but if a positive measure of consumers moves from one sector to another,
it reduces those workers’ marginal revenue products and, thus, their wages. This reduction
in marginal revenue products acts like a switching cost in the aggregate.
Labor Market. Firms that produce intermediate good i ∈ {N ,X} post vacancies for
consumers in occupation i with general human capital z, who produce intermediate good i
when matched. We assume that consumers cannot switch occupations, so the measure of
workers in each occupation is fixed. The values of consumers in occupation i with general
human capital z and firm-specific human capital h are similar to those in our one-good model
and are given by
W it (z, h) = Qtω
it(z, h) + φ (1− σ)
∫ψit+1 (z′, h′)W i
t+1 (z′, h′) dFe (z′|z) (25)
+ φ
∫ {(1− σ)[1− ψit+1 (z′, h′)] + σ
}U it+1 (z′) dFe (z′|z) ,
and
U it (z) = Qtb(z) + φλiwt(z)
∫ψit+1 (z′, 1)W i
t+1 (z′, 1) dFu (z′|z) (26)
+ φ
∫ {λiwt(z)[1− ψit+1 (z′, 1)] + 1− λiwt(z)
}U it+1 (z′) dFu (z′|z) ,
where ωit(z, h) is the wage received by a consumer in occupation i as a function of human
capital, ψit(z, h) is an indicator variable for whether a firm continues a match or destroys it,
and λiwt(z) is the consumer’s job-finding probability.
The value of a firm producing intermediate good i matched with a worker in occupation
i with productivity (z, h) is
J it (z, h) = Qt[pitzh− ωit(z, h)] + (1− σ)φ
∫max
[J it+1 (z′, h′) , 0
]dFe (z′|z) . (27)
34
That is, at date t a worker in occupation i with human capital (z, h) matched with a firm in
intermediate good sector i produces zh units of good i, which sell for pitzh, and the firm pays
the worker ωit(z, h). The cost of posting a vacancy is κ units of the composite tradable good.
The free-entry condition in sector i is analogous to (11).
The matching technology for firms producing intermediate good i is the same as in the
one-good model. The matches of firms that produce intermediate good i with workers with
general human capital z are given by
mit (z) = uit (z) vit (z) /[uit (z)η + vit (z)η]
1η ,
where uit(z) is the measure of nonemployed workers and vit(z) is the measure of vacancies
directed at such workers. The associated worker job-finding rate λiwt(z) and firm matching
rate λift(z) then follow as before. The determination of wages by Nash bargaining is exactly
analogous to that in the one-good model.
Consider next the market clearing conditions. Market clearing for the two types of inter-
mediate goods requires ∫z,h
zh deit(z, h) = yiNt + yiXt for i ∈ {N ,X} . (28)
The left side of this equation is the total amount of intermediate goods of type i produced
by the measure of employed workers, eit(z, h), and the right side is the total amount of these
intermediate goods used by firms in the nontradable and tradable sectors.
Market clearing for nontradable goods can be written as xNt = yNt. Market clearing for
tradable goods requires that the demand for these goods in (23) equals the supply of these
goods in (24).
5.3 The Workings of the Richer Model
Consider how employment responds to a debt tightening in this version of the model. In
contrast to the one-good model, here consumers can reallocate across sectors. The cost of
this reallocation is governed by the curvature of the production possibility frontier between
nontradable and tradable goods: the more curved this frontier (the higher is ν), the higher
the cost of reallocation. Mechanically, as ν increases, a given flow of consumers into a sector
leads to a greater fall in the marginal product and thus wages in that sector.
In this environment, a credit tightening has two effects on employment. The first, the
investment effect, is similar to that in the one-good model: the cost of posting vacancies
increases by more than the surplus from a match, leading firms in both sectors to post fewer
vacancies and, hence, to a drop in overall employment.
35
The second, the relative demand effect, is due to the reduction in the demand for nontrad-
able goods produced on the island and thus their relative price. This drop in prices amplifies
the drop in employment in the nontradable sector relative to that in the tradable sector.
When the cost of sectoral reallocation is small, a large flow of labor from the nontradable
to the tradable sector ensues. This reallocation can be so large that even though overall
employment declines, employment in the tradable sector increases. In contrast, when the
cost of sectoral reallocation is large, there is little flow of labor from the nontradable to the
tradable sector so that employment falls in both sectors.
Thus, in response to a credit tightening, nontradable employment falls unambiguously,
because of both the investment effect and the reallocation effect. The response of tradable
employment is ambiguous. If sectoral reallocation is costly (high ν), then tradable employ-
ment falls because the investment effect dominates the reallocation effect. If, in contrast,
sectoral reallocation is not too costly (low ν), then tradable employment increases because
the reallocation effect more than offsets the investment effect.
To see these effects, consider first the extreme case in which the two sectors use the
two occupations equally intensively, that is, an economy with ν = 1/2, in which the costs
of sectoral reallocation are relatively low and the remaining parameter values are equal to
those in the quantitative model discussed later. Figure 12 shows the response to a credit
tightening that generates a 5% drop in consumption. As the figure shows, in this case
tradable employment expands because of the inflow of workers from the nontradable sector.
Consider the second extreme case in which consumers cannot switch sectors, that is, an
economy with ν = 1. As Figure 13 shows, in this case a similar credit tightening leads both
tradable and nontradable employment to fall. The drop in tradable employment is somewhat
smaller since it is driven solely by the investment effect. Because the price of nontradable
output falls more than tradable output, firms find it even less attractive to post vacancies in
that sector.
For ν in between these two extremes, employment in both occupations falls, employment
in the nontradable sector falls and employment in the tradable sector can either rise or fall
depending on ν. As we discuss later, we discipline our choice of ν by the patterns of tradable
employment in the Great Recession.
5.4 Comparison with Cross-Sectional Data
We begin by discussing how we set parameters in this new version of the model. There are
five new parameters, in addition to those in the one-good model. We choose the parameter
τ so that the share of spending on nontradable goods is 2/3 and the trade elasticity µX is
4. Both of these numbers are fairly standard in the trade literature. We choose the fraction
36
of consumers in the two occupations to ensure that in the steady state, wages in the two
occupations are the same for a given level of human capital. Given this choice, the steady-
state implications of this richer model are identical to those of the one-good model reported
in panel A of Table 1, and so we choose the rest of the parameters as we did before in panel
B of Table 1.
As discussed earlier, one key parameter in this richer version of the model is the param-
eter ν governing the curvature of the production possibility frontier between tradable and
nontradable goods. This parameter allows us to capture, in a parsimonious yet flexible way,
the cost of reallocating workers across the two sectors. We choose this parameter by requiring
our model to reproduce the Mian and Sufi (2014) observation that declines in consumption
across states were essentially unrelated to changes in tradable employment. Specifically, we
choose ν so as to generate an elasticity of tradable employment to consumption of −0.03.
The resulting share is ν = 0.87.
A second key parameter is µ, the elasticity of substitution between tradable and nontrad-
able goods. The lower µ is, the more the relative price of nontradable goods falls following
a credit tightening and, thus, the more wages fall. We choose this parameter to reproduce
the observation of Beraja, Hurst, and Ospina (2016) that in the cross section of U.S. states,
wages are moderately flexible. Specifically, we choose µ so as to generate an elasticity of
wages to employment of 0.78. The resulting elasticity of substitution is µ = 2.5.
We next describe the experiments we conduct. For each state, we choose a sequence of
shocks to the debt limit so that the model exactly reproduces the predicted consumption
series for each state in the data. Each of these shocks is unanticipated. As in our one-good
model, the path for shocks is such that agents believe that consumption will revert to its
steady state at a rate of 10% per quarter. Given these paths for shocks, we calculate the
evolution of state-level variables. We then calculate the summary statistics in our model and
compare these with the corresponding statistics in the data summarized in Table 4.
As discussed, we have chosen the parameters ν and µ so that the model reproduces the
observed elasticities of nontradable employment to consumption and of wages to employment.
We now evaluate the extent to which the model can account for how overall employment and
nontradable employment fell as consumption fell during the Great Recession.
Recall that in the data, a fall in consumption across states of 10% is associated with a fall
in nontradable employment of 5.5% and a drop in employment of 3.8%. As Table 4 shows,
our model implies that such a fall in consumption is associated with a fall in nontradable
employment of 5.7% and a fall in overall employment of 3.3%. Thus, our model successfully
accounts for the comovements of consumption and both nontradable employment and overall
employment.
37
Table 5 shows how these elasticities change as we vary the cost of reallocating workers
from one extreme case with low costs of reallocating workers (ν = 0.5) to the other extreme
case with prohibitively high costs of reallocating workers (ν = 1). When reallocation costs are
low, the relative demand effect dominates the investment effect, leading to a counterfactually
sharp decline in nontradable employment and a sharp increase in tradable employment. The
model’s implication for the comovement of employment and wages is also grossly at odds
with the data: wages comove too little with employment compared with the data. When
reallocation costs are high, the investment effect dominates the relative demand effect, lead-
ing, counterfactually, to similarly sized declines in nontradable and tradable employment
following a credit tightening.
Table 5 also shows how these elasticities change as we vary the elasticity of substitution
between tradable and nontradable goods from a relatively low elasticity of µ = 1 to a relatively
high elasticity of µ = 5. When this elasticity is low, nontradable goods prices fall a lot, leading
to a counterfactually large wage drop, whereas when this elasticity is high, nontradable goods
prices fall little, leading to a counterfactually small wage drop.
Table 6 shows the effects of eliminating the growth in human capital accumulation. In our
baseline model, we chose the values of ν and µ so that the model reproduces the features that
wages are moderately flexible and that tradable employment does not comove with consump-
tion in the cross section. Table 6 shows that, regardless of the values of these parameters,
the model without human capital is unable to come anywhere close to reproducing these
features. Moreover, consistent with our results from the one-good model, for all such values,
the overall employment responses are much smaller than those in both the baseline model
and the data.
6 Conclusion
We have explored the interplay between credit and labor market frictions in accounting for
the regional comovements between consumption, employment, and wages during the Great
Recession in the United States. The key idea we developed is that in a search and matching
model, hiring a worker is an investment activity and is thus affected by credit frictions.
In the standard DMP model, the returns to posting vacancies are so short-lived, though,
that the model is essentially static so that vacancies are not sensitive to a tightening of credit.
In contrast, once we introduce on-the-job human capital accumulation large enough to allow
the model to reproduce the evidence on wage growth over the life cycle and on the job,
the returns to posting vacancies are much longer-lived and thus sensitive to a tightening of
credit. We show that the model accounts well for the cross-regional patterns of consumption,
38
employment, and wages observed during the Great Recession.
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41
Tab
le1:
Par
amet
eriz
atio
n
Pan
elA
:M
omen
ts
Dat
aM
odel
Em
plo
ym
ent
rate
0.63
0.63
Job
-findin
gra
te0.
450.
45V
acan
cyco
st(%
outp
ut)
15.0
15.0
Sta
ndar
ddev
iati
onof
wag
ech
ange
s0.
210.
21
Cro
ss-s
ecti
onal
diff
eren
cein
log
wag
es:
30to
1ye
ars
ofex
per
ience
1.21
1.19
Annual
wag
egr
owth
duri
ng
emplo
ym
ent
spel
l:
1-10
year
sof
exp
erie
nce
0.10
0.10
11-2
0ye
ars
ofex
per
ience
0.08
0.07
21-3
0ye
ars
ofex
per
ience
0.06
0.06
31-4
0ye
ars
ofex
per
ience
0.05
0.06
1-40
year
sof
exp
erie
nce
0.07
0.07
Pan
elB
:P
aram
eter
s
Endogenou
slychosen
b 0,
hom
epro
duct
ion
(rel
.to
mea
nou
tput)
0.42
η,
mat
chin
gfu
nct
ion
elas
tici
ty0.
61κ
,va
cancy
cost
(rel
.to
mea
nou
tput)
0.15
σz,
stan
dar
ddev
iati
onof
shock
s0.
06ρ,
conve
rgen
cera
te0.
951/12
logz e
,ge
ner
alhum
anca
pit
aldri
ft2.
44
logh
,firm
-sp
ecifi
chum
anca
pit
aldri
ft0.
82
Assigned
Per
iod
lengt
h1
mon
thβ
,dis
count
fact
or0.
961/12
q,b
ond
pri
ce0.
981/12
φ,
surv
ival
pro
bab
ilit
y1-
1/48
0σ
,pro
bab
ilit
yof
separ
atio
n0.
026
α,
inve
rse
EIS
5b 1
,re
pla
cem
ent
rate
0.25
γ,
wor
ker’
sbar
gain
ing
shar
e0.
50
42
Table 2: Additional Model Implications
Fraction both nonemployed and with positive match probability 0.04
Mean home production to mean wage 0.48
Endogenous separations, % 0.02
Std. dev. log wages 0.82
Profit share of revenue 0.06
Mean wage drop after unemployment spell 0.05
Table 3A: Moments Targeted in Robustness Checks∗
Altonji-Shakotko Topel
Data Model Data Data Model
Employment rate 0.63 0.63 0.63 0.63Job-finding rate 0.45 0.44 0.45 0.45Vacancy cost (% output) 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15Std. dev. of wage changes 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.21
Cross-sectional ∆ logw (30 to 1 years) 0.80 0.78 0.80 0.81
On-the-job wage growth (1-10 years) 0.05 0.05 0.08 0.08On-the-job wage growth (11-20 years) 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06On-the-job wage growth (21-30 years) 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.05On-the-job wage growth (31-40 years) 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04On-the-job wage growth (1-40 years) 0.03 0.03 0.05 0.05
∗Both calibrations use cross-sectional wage growth from Rubinstein and Weiss (2006).
Table 3B: Parameters Used in Robustness Checks
Baseline Altonji-Shakotko Topel
b0, home production (rel. to mean output) 0.42 0.39 0.51η, matching function elasticity 0.61 0.77 0.72κ, vacancy cost (rel. to mean output) 0.15 0.15 0.15σz, std. dev. of shocks 0.06 0.06 0.06
ρ, convergence rate 0.951/12 0.961/12 0.931/12
log ze, general human capital drift 2.44 1.68 1.56log h, firm-specific human capital drift 0.82 0.00 0.57
43
Table 4: Cross-State Elasticities
Data Baseline Model
Elasticity ∆e vs. ∆c 0.38 0.33
Elasticity ∆eN vs. ∆c 0.55 0.57
Elasticity ∆eT vs. ∆c -0.03 -0.03
Elasticity ∆w vs. ∆e 0.78 0.78
Note: ∆e, ∆eNT , and ∆eT denote changes in overall, non-tradable, and tradable employment; ∆c denotes changesin predicted consumption; ∆w denotes changes in wages.
Table 5: Alternative Parameterizations
Baseline Varying ν Varying µModel ν = 0.5 ν = 1 µ = 1 µ = 5
Elasticity ∆e vs. ∆c 0.33 0.49 0.27 0.25 0.40
Elasticity ∆eN vs. ∆c 0.57 1.42 0.30 0.57 0.58
Elasticity ∆eT vs. ∆c -0.03 -0.85 0.23 -0.21 0.13
Elasticity ∆w vs. ∆e 0.78 0.03 1.21 1.70 0.22
Table 6: Model without Human Capital Accumulation
ν = 0.87 Varying ν Varying µµ = 2.5 ν = 0.5 ν = 1 µ = 1 µ = 5
Elasticity ∆e vs. ∆c 0.07 0.14 0.05 0.08 0.07
Elasticity ∆eN vs. ∆c 0.41 0.90 0.22 0.51 0.31
Elasticity ∆eT vs. ∆c -0.47 -1.07 -0.23 -0.61 -0.33
Elasticity ∆w vs. ∆e 5.72 2.07 9.89 6.71 4.57
44
Figure 1: Steady-State Measures and Matching Rates
-2 0 2 4 0
0.005
0.01
0.015A. Measure Employed
-2 0 2 4 0
0.005
0.01
0.015B. Measure Nonemployed
log z-2 0 2 4 0
0.5
1C. Firm Matching Rate
log z-2 0 2 4
0
0.5
1D. Worker Matching Rate
log z∗
log z∗
e(z) u(z)
Figure 2: Example of Individual Wage Path
years of experience0 5 10 15 20 25 30
logwag
e
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
45
Figure 3: Employment Response to a Credit Tightening
months0 20 40 60 80 100 120
%deviation
from
s.s.
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
Consumption
Employment
Figure 4: Shimer Decomposition of Employment
months0 20 40 60 80 100 120
%deviation
from
s.s.
-3
-2
-1
0Due to separation rate
Due to finding rate
Actual
46
Figure 5: General Human Capital of Median Active Nonemployed Consumer
months0 20 40 60 80 100 120
%deviation
from
s.s.
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
Figure 6: Employment Response without Human Capital Accumulation
months0 20 40 60 80 100 120
%deviation
from
s.s.
-3
-2
-1
0
Without human capital accumulation
Baseline
47
Figure 7: Employment Response with Only Firm-Side Credit Frictions
months0 20 40 60 80 100 120
%deviation
from
s.s.
-3
-2
-1
0
Only firm-side credit frictions
Baseline
Figure 8: Employment Responses under Alternative Parameterizations
months0 20 40 60 80 100 120
%deviation
from
s.s
-3
-2
-1
0
Altonji-Shakotko
Topel
��
����
Baseline
48
Figure 9: Robustness Analysis
A. On-the-Job Wage Growth0
.03
.06
.09
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
log h = 0
log h = 0.82
B. Cross-Sectional WageDifference(1-30 Years)
0.5
11.
5
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
C. Maximal Employment Drop
0.7
51.
52.
253
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
drift of general human capital, log ze
D. Cumulative Employment Drop (4 Years)
0.2
5.5
.75
1
0 .5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
drift of general human capital, log ze
Figure 10: Macaulay Duration of Match Flows
drift of general human capital, log ze0 0.5 1 1.5 2 2.5 3
Mac
aula
y D
urat
ion
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
log h = 0
log h = 0.82
49
Fig
ure
11:
Em
plo
ym
ent,
Con
sum
pti
on,
and
Wag
es
A.
Em
plo
ym
ent
vs.
Con
sum
pti
on
AL
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL
IN
KY
LA
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NC
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
UT
VA W
A
WI
elas
ticity
= 0
.38
-.08-.06-.04-.020.02Change in Employment, 2007-2009
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
0.0
2C
hang
e in
Con
sum
ptio
n, 2
007-
2009
B.
Nontr
ad
ab
leE
mp
loym
ent
vs.
Con
sum
pti
on
AL
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL
INK
Y
LA
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NC
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
UT
VA W
A
WI
elas
ticity
= 0
.55
-.08-.06-.04-.020.02Change in Nontradable Employment, 2007-2009
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
0.0
2C
hang
e in
Con
sum
ptio
n, 2
007-
2009
C.
Tra
dab
leE
mp
loym
ent
vs.
Con
sum
pti
on
AL
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA
ID
IL
IN
KY
LA
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NC
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
UT
VAW
A
WI
elas
ticity
= -
0.03
-.25-.2-.15-.1-.050.05Change in Tradable Employment, 2007-2009
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
0.0
2C
hang
e in
Con
sum
ptio
n, 2
007-
2009
D.
Wages
vs.
Em
plo
ym
ent
AL
AZ
AR
CA
CO
CT
DE
FL
GA ID
ILIN
KY
LA
MD
MA
MI
MN
MS
MO
NE
NV
NH
NJ
NM
NC
OH
OK
OR
PA
RI
SC
SD
TN
UT
VA
WA
WI
elas
ticity
= 0
.78
-.12-.1-.08-.06-.04-.020.02Change in Wages, 2007-2009
-.08
-.06
-.04
-.02
0.0
2C
hang
e in
Em
ploy
men
t, 20
07-2
009
50
Figure 12: Low Cost of Sectoral Reallocation (ν = 0.5)
0 50 100months
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0%
dev
iation
from
s.s.
A. Overall Employment
0 50 100months
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
%dev
iation
from
s.s.
B. Employment by Sector
Nontradable
Tradable
Figure 13: High Cost of Sectoral Reallocation (ν = 1)
0 50 100months
-3
-2.5
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
%dev
iation
from
s.s.
A. Overall Employment
0 50 100months
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
%dev
iation
from
s.s.
B. Employment by Sector
Nontradable
Tradable
51