De-Secularisation

The Demographic Imperative

Demography in History

Populations are generally stable over the longue duree Periodic population changes through technology, disease

and invasion Demography as Effect: Technological advantage

translates into expansion for some groups at others' expense through lower mortality (Europe) or military conquest (Europeans v. the rest; Bantu v. Khoi San)

Demography as Cause: Role of demographic pressure in causing revolution (Goldstone) or innovation (Durkheim)

Oft-cited role of demography in hastening decline of empires?

The Demographic Transition

From High Fertility/High Mortality to Low Fertility/Low Mortality

UK: Had slower fertility transition than France, had excess population growth for settlement which France did not. Geopolitical implications

Second Demographic Transition: permanently below-replacement fertility for 30 years in Europe and E Asia. Little movement beyond 1.5. Population decline

Who will replace? Values rather than economic status is most strongly linked

to fertility With mortality declining and state boundaries stable, could

values & fertility rather than technology now hold the key to group advantage?

The Rise of Demography

Demographic Transition Uneven Democracy, Equality, Liberty enhance

demographic impact Ethnic differentials have political

ramifications Ethnic Makeover Accepted. What about

religious makeover?

Demography and Modernisation

Modernisation: urbanisation, education, wealth, secularisation

Yet rural, uneducated, poor, religious have higher fertility

Was not true before late 19th c. Something has changed

Modernity must now move forward to stand still No one wants to be poor and uneducated, but

religion has a much stronger hold Modernity can take a 'European/East Asian' or

American route

Religious Demography and Politics?

Early Christianity, spread from some 40 converts in 30 A.D. to over 6 million adherents by 300 A.D. (Stark)

Mormon church: same 40 percent growth in past century, widening fertility gap

Evangelical Protestant growth in the 20th c. US: ¾ demographic. 'Red states' have 12-point TFR advantage over 'Blue' in 2004 election

Secularisation and Religious Fertility

"1. The publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations during the past fifty years. Nevertheless,

2. The world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before-- and they constitute a growing proportion of the world's population." (Inglehart & Norris 2004)

Which will dominate: religious fertility or secularisation?

Data

Based on 1981, 1990 and 2000 EVS, and 2004 ESS

10 Western European countries, in fixed proportions. 4 Scandinavian-Protestant, 4 mainly Catholic, 2 mixed

EVS-ESS continuity on children and attendance only

Weekly Attendance by Cohort, 1981-2004, Ten W. European Countries

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85

1981

1990

2000*

2004**

Weekly Attendance by Cohort, Early Secularising Societies

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85

1981

1990

2000*

2004**

Weekly Attendance by Cohort, Late Secularising Societies

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85

1981

1990

2000

2004*

Religiosity by Cohort, 'Early Secularising' Societies

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85

1981

1990

2000*

2004**

Religiosity by cohort, 'Late Secularising' Societies

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

pre1915 1915-25 1925-35 1935-45 1945-55 1955-65 1965-75 1975-85

1981

1990

2000

2004*

Table 2. Regression Coefficients on Number of Children Ever Born, Females Aged 18+, 1981-2000 EVS and 2004 ESS. EVS

1981-2000 ESS

2004

Marital Status 0.353*** (0.007) 0.246*** (0.015) Religiosity 0.176*** (0.028) 0.045*** (0.008) Postmaterialism -0.089*** (0.023) - - Income .002 (0.007) 0.008 (0.012) Education -0.059*** (0.004) -0.025*** (0.007) Age 0.036*** (0.008) 0.035*** (0.005) Cohort -0.031 (0.046) 0.116 (0.080) Waveyear -0.088 (0.039) - - _cons 2.607*** (0.337) 73.072*** (15.230) R2 .356 .205 N 12046 3980 *p<.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001 N.B. No data for Norway in 2000. Postmaterialism not asked in ESS. For cohort, higher values refer to most recent.

Focus on 6 Early Secularizing Societies 5 Protestant Countries + France (Vanguard of

secularization) Crosstab 'Raised Religious?' and 'Are You

Religious?' questions (EVS 1991) to find apostates/converts

Generate figures on apostasy/conversion by 5-year age group and sex for input into projection

Percentage Difference between Currently Religious/Non-Religious Population and Proportion Raised Religious/Non-Religious, for Each Age Group, 1991, by Sex

Religious Population Net Gain

Nonreligious Population Net Gain

Age Group Male Female Male Female 18-24 -0.058 0.176 0.032 -0.124 25-29 -0.201 0.114 0.166 -0.103 30-34 0.139 0.086 -0.092 -0.083 35-39 -0.168 0.018 0.147 -0.022 40-44 -0.007 0.110 0.007 -0.146 45-49 -0.109 0.048 0.133 -0.075 50-54 -0.107 -0.007 0.135 0.013 55-59 -0.047 0.104 0.080 -0.200 60-64 -0.153 0.117 0.273 -0.215 65-69 -0.098 0.000 0.191 0.000 70-74 -0.056 0.082 0.098 -0.250 75+ 0.037 0.038 -0.048 -0.102 N.B. Based on crosstabulation of Religious and 'Raised Religious' individuals in EVS 1991.

Fig. 8 Projected Religious Population, 6 Early Secularising Societies, 2004-2104

25%

30%

35%

40%

45%

50%

2004 2014 2024 2034 2044 2054 2064 2074 2084 2094 2104

Pro

po

rtio

n R

eli

gio

us

1816-E6

1816-E10

1818-E6

Projections Under Fertility Convergence and Re-Secularisation Scenarios

The Role of Immigration

Immigrants to Europe have higher religiosity and higher fertility

Fertility behaviour trends toward host mean over the generations

Religiosity seems to decline much more slowly – esp. for Muslims

Immigration from Islamic sources will provide an increasing component of W. Europe's Population

Attendance at Religious Services, by Faith and Age,2004 ESS

0%5%

10%15%20%25%30%35%40%45%50%

18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65+

We

ek

ly A

tte

nd

an

ce

RC

Prot

RC/Prot

Eastern

Muslims

Attend Worship* Retain Religious Practice*2001 2003 N

UK BP Muslims 37% 398 81% 277Foreign BP Muslims 37% 910 89% 817UK Afro Christians 31% 424 37% 57Foreign Afro Christians 48% 843 56% 39UK White Christians 16% 6923 29% 6304Foreign White Christians 26% 318 56% 151

Religious Retention by Faith and Birthplace, UK, 2001-3 (Excludes nonidentifiers. 'Practice' is self-description)

0%10%20%30%40%50%60%70%80%90%

100%

2001 2003

Attend Worship* Retain Religious Practice*

UK BP Muslims

Foreign BP Muslims

UK Afro Christians

Foreign Afro Christians

UK White Christians

Foreign White Christians

'No Religion' will age due to decline in apostasy and low fertility Muslims will grow through immigration, fertility and religious retention Christians will stabilize due to higher fertility, female religiosity and

declining apostasy

Age Structure of Major Religious Groups in UK, 2001

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Muslim No religion Christian

% i

n A

ge

Ban

d

0 - 15

16 - 34

35 - 64

65 and over

Growth of European Islam

Not 'Eurabia' as scaremongers suggest, but: Austria: assuming only 20k immigrants per year,

projected to form 14-26 pc of population by 2051 (Goujon, Skirbekk et al. 2006)

W. Europe will be 10-20 pc Muslim in 2050, up from 3 pc today

Age structure and urban concentration Note that religious revival in Europe is both a Muslim

and Christian phenomenon Political implications – depends on nature of

conservative political strategies

Conclusion: Secularisation

In Europe, more religious (Catholic) countries are secularising faster; less religious (mainly Protestant) countries may have ceased to secularise

Religious fertility and slowing of apostasy will lead to end of secularizing trend c. 2045-55 in Protestant western Europe even without immigration

Immigration, especially of Muslims, will greatly hasten and enhance the onset of de-secularization

R2 = .071; N=7534

Religiosity and Ideology, 1981-2000

Regression Coefficients on Ideological (Left-to-Right) Self-Placement, 1981-2000 EVS religious -0.334*** 0.034 age 0.003 0.005 class -0.051** 0.016 education 0.098*** 0.009 proud of nation -0.325*** 0.029 income 0.063*** 0.009 cohort -0.152** 0.044 _cons 5.081*** 0.421

*p<.05; **p <.01; ***p < .001

Political Implications

An issue for the medium to longer term Religious are much more right-leaning Right-leaning voters vote for more

conservative parties Religious conservatism (USA) vs Nationalist

conservatism (Europe?) What of the future of Enlightenment

modernity and the cultural project of modernism?

Disagree with idea that state 'Should Implement Shari'a Only', Egypt, 2000

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

No child 1 child 2children

3children

4children

5children

6children

7children

8 ormore

children

Per

cen

tag

e D

isag

reei

ng

Future: Expand to Look at Middle East, South Asia and USA

IIASA, near Vienna

Project Website

http://www.sneps.net/RD/religdem.html