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DDA OCCASIONAL PAPERS

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No.2, September 1999

United Nations

Department for Disarmament Affairs

DDA Occasional Papers is a series of ad hoc publications presenting, in edited form, some of the papers or statements made at international meetings, symposia, seminars or workshops organized by the Department for Disarmament Affairs or its regional cenhes in Lima, Lome Or Kathmandu They deal with topical issues in the field of arms limitation, disarmament and secUlity and are in­tended primarily for those concerned with these matters in government and in the academic community

The views expressed in DDA Occasional Papers are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the United Nations Secretariat, or those of their govern­ment, or of the institutions or organizations with which they are affiliated

Material appearing in DDA Occasional Papers may be reprinted without permission, provided that the credit line reads "Reprinted from DDA Occasio11al Papers", and specifies the number of the occasional paper concerned A tearsheet should be sent to the following address:

Department for Disarmament Affairs MDI Branch, Room 5-3151 United Nations New York, NY 10017 United States

Abstracts of DDA Occasional Papers also appear on the DDA website at www.un.orgIDepts/dda/MDI.htm. link to Publications.

Contents

Preface.

Introduction Jayantha Dhanapala

The future of the Missile Technology Control Regime Istvan Gyarmati ... , ...... .

No place for missile programmes in South America Edmundo S. Fujita

Missile proliferation and international security Kapil Kak ........... ·

The MTCR, the post-modern State, and deterrence Aaron Karp ...

The missile threat: perceptions and prescriptions Wang Qun.

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PREFACE

In 1998, the Department jar Disarmament Afjairs initiated a series of discussions on topics oj interest in the field oj arms limitation and disarmament, with a view to broadening understanding and facilitating a meaningful discussion among Member States and the general public

The Symposium on Missile Development and Its Impact on Global Security, held at the United Nations on 22 April 1999, brought together the following five experts to present their views on various aspects of the subject

Istvan Gyannati, Ambassad01; Chief Advisor to the Foreign Minister of Hungary on Security Policy Issues and the current Chairman of the lVlissile Technology Control Re­gime (MTCR)

Edmundo S Fujita, Director General of the Department oj Asia and Oceania in the Ministry of External Relations of Brazil

Kapil Kak, Air Vice Marshal, Senior Fellow of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses, India

Aaron Karp, Senior Faculty Associate at Old Dominion University, United States

Wang Qun, Division Director at the Department of Arms Con­trol and Disarmament of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China

With the kind permission of the panellists, the presenta­tions made were adapted into the following articles The opening remarks of the Lll1der-Secretary-Geneml for Disarmament Affairs, Mr Jayantha Dhanapala, formed the core of the introduction that follows, giving the lcey issues in the field of missile development today

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Introduction

layantha Dhanapala*

The objective of the Symposium on Missile Development and Its Impact on Global Security and this subsequent publication is to provide an overall picture of the rapidly evolving situation with respect to the development and proliferation of missiles-whether armed with conventional warheads or warheads for weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-export controls, civilian space programmes and missile defence issues, and their potential impact on global security, The panellists explored the prospects for a multilateral consensus on negotiating non-discriminatory restraints on missile development, beginning with confidence­building measures like data exchanges and including the possible creation of missile-free zones,

The issue of ballistic missiles has become a growing concem of the intemational community in recent years, Ballistic missile technology is no longer restricted to certain States, as is clear from the missile programmes of a rising number of countries, Excluding the nuclear-weapon-States, there are reportedly more than a dozen States possessing various levels of capabil­ity for the development and production of ballistic missiles, There has indeed been increasingly easier access to technology, expertise and information for the

* Jayantha Dhanapala has been Under-Secretary­General for Disarmament Affairs since Februanj 1998

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development of such systems. Current targeting po­licies and the fact that large numbers of missiles are ready to be launched on warning imperil the lives of millions of civilians in cities around the world. There is also the real danger of missiles being used as anti­satellite weapons, threatening to engulf outer space in war-fighting strategies.

International concerns have been further heigh­tened by a number of well-documented cases of ballistic missile testing over the previous eight months in various parts of the globe, including Northeast Asia, South Asia and the Middle East These developments have intensified calls in some countries for adequate defences against ballistic missiles, especially those capable of delivering WMD. In the United States, the debate over the need for a national missile defence (NMO) system has been continuing for several years, with national missile defence supporters calling for the deployment of anti-missile defence systems going beyond those permitted by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty As a consequence, concerns have also been raised by some States over the mounting danger of a new, expensive arms race at both the regional and global levels and the negative impact on existing multilateral disarmament agreements.

There is currently no multilateral treaty or agreement regulating the production, possession or trade in missiles. The Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), established in 1987, is an informal and voluntary export control regime that seeks to limit the proliferation of missile systems and related technology (rocket systems, UAVs) that can deliver a payload of500 kg or greater to a range of at least 300 km. Although the scope of the MTCR was extended in 1993 to include missiles capable of delivering weapons of mass destmc-

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tion, it is not intended to impede national space programmes, as long as they do not contribute to the development of delivery systems for WMDs, The MTCR is certainly not a decision-making authority, and each member is responsible for implementing group deci­sions through its national laws and regulations. More­over, many important missile-producing countries still remain outside the MTCR The MTCR also, lil<e some other regimes, focuses on non-proliferation and not the clisarrnament of established missile-producing countries, for some of whom missiles are important tools of nuclear deterrence,

These issues could have negative implications for existing bilateral and multilateral clisarmament and arms control efforts, Indeed, as stated by the Secretary­General in April, recent developments in the field of ballistic missiles and missile defences have underscored the urgent need for multilaterally negotiated norms against the spread of ballistic missile technology for military purposes, International agreement on such norms would substantially improve prospects for future progress on existing bilateral and multilateral disarma­ment and arms control treaties.

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The future of the Missile Technology Control Regime

Istvan Gyannati'''

Abstract Missile technology proliferation, in combination with weapons of mass destruction (WNlD), is a great concem in the field of 11011-prolzjeration, according to the author Some non-partner States of the MTCR underline the legal weakness of the NITCR as an informal group of partners based on voluntary coopera­tion MTCR members, howevel; welcome any form of adherence to the rules and procedures of the regime, through cooperation or application to join the regime The author rebuts the view that the MTCR is discriminatory, stating that its rules over the ex­port of technology apply to partners alld non-partners alilce The MTCR does not prevent the peaceful use of missile technology, although difficulties persist in differentiating peaceful space projects and WMD delivery progmmmes. Convinced oj the ef­fectiveness of the MTCR, the author urges that dialogue and cooperation should be developed between partners and non­partners to allow it to become even more effective. Hungary as current chairman of the regime is exerting great efforts in that direction The LlNDDA can playa role in spreading informa­tion about the regime, a requirement the author believes is neces­sary for the regime's credibility

* Istvan Gyarmati is Chief Adviser to the Minister oj Foreign Affairs oj Hungary on Security Policy Issues and cur­ren t Chairman of the Missile Teclmologlj Control Regime This paper is based on a presentation made at the "Symposium on Missile Development and Its Impact on Global Security", held at the United Nations Headquarters, New Yorl~ 011 22 April 1999.

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Despite the widespread efforts of its members, l

the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) is not a well understood non-proliferation regime, nor is it widely known, Yet, it is not too different from other non-proliferation or export control regimes Some are nevertheless significant This paper explains why its members (partners) believe that MTCR makes an important contribution to security and stability world­wide; why it has been effective regionally in the more than ten years of its existence; why it will be indispens­able in the future; and why it is legitimate and non­discriminatory Most important, it addresses the future of the regime and missile technology export control in general.

The MTCR parties consider it possible to make the regime more widely accepted and more effective in the future, Like the Secretary-General of the United Nations,2 they see great dangers in missile technology proliferation, especially in combination with weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ,

Peaceful purposes The first most frequently asked question is: Why

do the members of the regime believe the spread of missile technology is destabilizing, though the same technology is widely used for peaceful purposes? Is there a basic conflict between the peaceful and non­peaceful use of missiles? The premise of this question is not unique to MTCR. Other non-proliferation regimes struggle with similar problems It is known that quite a few countries possess missiles, which the MTCR clas­sifies as Category I missiles, that is, missiles with ranges longer than 300 km and weighing more than 500 kg, These missile programmes are destabilizing because they not only create a feeling of insecurity among

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neighbouring countries, but also, in most cases, provoke reaction within the region, threatening to upset existing regional balances. The reaction may result in the development and possible deployment of similar mis­siles. Thus the missiles that were first meant to strengthen the security of the country concerned turn out to threaten that very country, as well as the stability and security of other countries in the region.

Legality of the regime

The most intriguing question addressed to MTCR members by non-partners is on the legality of the regime One of the main differences between the MTCR and other non-proliferation regimes is that it is not a legally binding universal treaty MTCR is an informal group of partners that cooperate for the sake of aclLiev­ing an objective that all consider necessary: to prevent the uncontrolled spread of missile technology As a group, they establish principles, procedures and lists, which all of them agree to observe.

Those who accept these rules and procedures make a politically binding commitment to follow them. These rules bind only MTCR partners, though there are others who have volunteered to undertake this commit­ment. MTCR members are convinced that willingness to abide by Its rules and procedures can promote interna­tional and regional security and stability Therefore, we believe that other countries would also best serve their own interest, as well as that of their region, by voluntar­ily observing the same rules and procedures. To do so, they could either apply to join MTCR or could cooperate with it

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A voluntary, non-discriminatory regime MTCR part-

ners do not believe that the regime is dis­criminatory. It is after all voluntary Thus States accept the rules when they decide to join the regime. The objective of the regime

Most of the 32 partners ill the regime,

over two thirds, do /lot possess

missile delivery systems.

-to prevent the proliferation of destabilizing missile technology, that is, delivery vehicles capable of carrying weapons of mass destruction-is fully in line with the spirit of the global and non-discriminatory norm of non-proliferation. The non-proliferation regime does not explicitly cover delivery systems, but is clearly aimed at preventing the creation of capabilities that allow the use of weapons of mass destruction. The connection is unavoidable. A weapon of mass destruc­tion must be used with a delivery system. The most dangerous and destabilizing delivery systems are missiles.

It is true that membership in this regime does not mean that its partners will automatically eliminate missile technology and missile programmes, but it is equally true that membership in the regime does not automatically create the right to produce, possess, import or export missile or missile technology On the contrary, most of the 32 partners, over two thirds, do not possess such delivery systems. No partner has ever used its membership to claim the right to missiles or missile technology. Many countries, including my own, gave up their missile programmes as a consequence of joining the regime The regime does not discriminate between partners and non-partners when it comes to the export

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of technology The same rules apply to both .. The claim that the regime is discriminatory is not correct

The regime cannot, should not and indeed will not prevent the peaceful use of missile technology It is clearly stated in the documents of the MTCR that the regime is not designed to and does not intend to limit national space programmes or international cooper­ation in promoting such programmes, provided that they do not contribute to developing delivery systems of weapons of mass destruction.

Of course, it must be admitted that it is extremely difficult to differentiate between space programmes for peaceful purposes and programmes capable of creating a delivery system with WMD capability In fact, all space-launch vehicles are, in principle, capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction. Accordingly, one could claim MTCR practices risk limiting the peaceful use of missile technology. The truth is that this question, at least at present, is highly theoreticaL All MTCR countries that are lmown to be pursuing space­launch vehicle programmes are States with declared programmes in WMD, at the same time, also pursuing programmes developing some ldnd of weapon of mass destruction.

There is, unfortunately, no easy way out of this problem; non-proliferation is a difficult issue There are, however, ways that can help to establish that a given missile programme is not aimed at the creation of a WMD capability Is the country concerned a full party to all non-proliferation treaties and have any doubts been raised about its compliance with those obligations? Further, has a State demonstrated its preparedness to submit to a thorough inspection of the end use of a technology being transferred prior to and after its delivery? The answers to these questions very seriously

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contribute to the adoption of a positive decision on a technology transfer. This process is difficult; there is nothing automatic about iL The dangers are high and mistakes can be serious

Is the regime effective? The effectiveness of the MTCR has been ques­

tioned. Is the regime effective when more and more missile tests are being carried out, and missile technol­ogy seems to be spreading?

I think the facts point to another assessmenL In the past few years, mis­sile technology has not spread to any new country The States that have missile pro­grammes now are basically the same ones that had pro-

The States that have missile programmes now

are basically the same ones

that had programmes in 1987.

grammes when the regime was created in 1987. More­over, the number of missile programmes of concern has been reduced. Several countries have come to the very rational conclusion that their security interests are better served by giving up their missiles or missile pro­grammes, and cooperating with or joining the MTCR. My country, Hungary, did just this. MTCR has been a great success, in my opinion .. Its existence bears witness to international cooperation in the field. That is not enough, however We must strengthen cooperation between the regime and non-partners. New forms and methods of such cooperation must be found. This has been and remains one of the most important objectives of Hungary's chairmanship in 1999

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Though MTCR's decision-making is confiden­tial by the nature of the regime, new ways have to be identified to make it better l<nown to those who are not yet partners but who want to play an important role in li­miting the prolifer­ation of missile tech­nology. This can be done through in­creased contact, dia­

New forms and methods of cooperation

[between the regime and non-partners]

mllst be fOllnd.

logue and cooperation. This is why Hungary, as chair, has put so much emphasis on increasing transparency Our purpose is to convince countries that MTCR is neither restrictive nor discriminatory It is not intended to limit the use of advanced technology for peaceful purposes to any nation. Hungary has striven to establish strong cooperative, and if necessary, quiet, direct con­tacts with non-partners to help them join the regime and have confidence in it through a better understanding of its principles and practices.

Recently, Hungary as chair has agreed with several non-partners about practices related to admis­sion in the MTCR. We formed close ties between them and the chair through visits to capitals and involvement in practical MTCR activities, such as participation in seminars .. We were encouraged by the positive reaction of some counh'ies, but disappointed by some reactions that were difficult to understand.

Hungary as chair does not intend to put pressure on anybody Nor do we want to lecture our colleagues about the necessity of controlling the arms race through international cooperation in this field. But we find it very difficult to understand how dialogue between Hungary and non-partners could be viewed as a threat

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Also, how could any kind of transparency exist if a non-party refuses even to talk? It is my sincere hope that the countries in this last group will review their position and be ready for a meaningful dialogue

The future-malting the regime better Imown

MICR, like other international regimes, must adjust to new circumstances, More information is needed about regions and countries that can potentially become the subject of international concern. In other words, more emphasis should be put on prevention .. A useful tool to promote cornmon objects could be to assist interested non-partner countries in harmonizing their practices with MICR rules and practice. Also, MTCR partners can assist non-partners in the licensing of enforcement officials in supply and transit rules.

We were glad to be able to cooperate with the Department for Disarmament Affairs in organizing this symposium, which was the first of its kind. We hope it is not the last. It is Hungary's wish that this event will lead to a stronger involvement by the United Nations in the field of missile technology. I assure you that members of the regime are convinced that meetings like this can contribute to the achievement of greater understanding and cooperation among partners and non-partners to the regime and towards dialogue in the future

Notes

1 Members of the MTCR are: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fin­land, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland,

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Portugal, Russian Federation, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Swit­zerland, Turkey, Uluaine, United Kingdom, and United States. China and Israel abide by the regulations of the regime.

2 On 15 April 1999, the Secretary-General stated that "recent tests by India and Pakistan of medium­range missiles, as well as actions by other countries in the area of ballistic missile development and missile defences, have un­derscored the need for the multilaterally negotiated norms against the development of such weapons. Currently there is no treaty regulating missiles International agreements on such norms would substantially improve prospects for future prog­ress on existing bilateral and multilateral disarmament and arms control treaties .. " (United Nations Press Release SG! SM!6960)

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No place for missile programmes in South America Edmundo S. Fujita*

Abstract In his paper the author outlines some features and questions relevant to the phenomenon of missile proliferation including the occurrence, development, and production of missiles. The paper points out that a missile build-up within a region could complicate the achievement ofa shared perception of security and stability Turning to the circumstances of Brazil, he explains that due to the positive atmosphere between countries in South America, missile programmes have no place in the region As a consequence, Brazil has made the choice not to have weapons of mass destruction or long-range missile programmes and has instead dedicated scientific and teci111010gical efforts to improving the living conditions of its population.

Well-known recent events underscore the need for the international community to urgently address the question of missile development in order to evaluate how this theme may influence the architecture of peace and security in the new and evolving international system.

Coming from a country and a region of the globe that has experienced relatively few major conflicts, I will

* Edmundo S Fujita is Director General of the Depart­ment orAsia and Oceania. in the Ministn; of External Relations of Brazil This paper is based on a presentation made at the "Symposium on Missile Developmen t an d Its Impact on Global Security", lJeld at the Llnited Nations Headquarters, New Yorl~ on 22 April 1999

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try to present the perception of a Brazilian observer on this important theme, although I do not purport to be necessarily expressing the views of the Brazilian Government.

Brazil has enjoyed a set of positive circumstances that have helped to mould its national security percep­tions. Endowed with a large territory and relatively abundant natural resources, it has no territorial ambi­tions nor other kinds of claims against its neighbours In fact, for more than 130 years, Brazil has lived in peace with its ten neighbouring countries, with which it shares a continuous land boundary of more than 16,000 kilometres. The very circumstance of having so many neighbours has highlighted the importance of enhanc­ing constant dialogue and cooperation at regional and subregional levels

With our neighbours to the South, we estab­lished the Southern Cone Common Market (MERCO­SUR), which is a dynamic integration process. With our Amazonian neighbours, we consolidated the Amazon­ian Cooperation Treaty. With our African neighbours on the opposite shore of the South Atlantic, we have formed the Zone of Peace and Cooperation of the South Atlantic. And with other Portuguese-speaking countries, we are strengthening the Community of Portuguese-speaking Countries. The multi-faceted geo­graphical, historical, cultural, socio-economic and human dimensions of Brazil have been instrumental in stimulating a more universal than exclusive outlook.

Brazilian national defence policy In 1996, the Brazilian Government made public

its first official document on national defence policy. This document underscores that one of the main pillars

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of the security of Brazil is its active diplomacy of peace and cooperation and that the set of treaties and other insh'uments of cooperation that Brazil is party to forms a kind of a "ring of peace" around the country.

Another important concept enshrined in this document is the need to maintain a "policy of sustain­able defence", whereby the strengthening of the self­defence capabilities of the country is kept in balance with greater democracy and improvement of the social and economic conditions of the population. In other words, it recognizes that the security of the nation is deeply intertwined with the well-being of the society

In the field of multilateral disarmament, Brazil has a long tradition of conllibuting constructively to the efforts within the United Nations and at the regional level aiming at the prevention of the spread of weapons of mass destruction. Brazil has signed the quadripartite safeguards agreement with Argentina, the Argentina­Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC) and the IAEA; issued the Mendoza Declaration on the Elimination of Chemical and Biologi­cal Weapons with other Latin American countries even before the conclusion of the Chemical Weapons Conven­tion (CWC); and is a full party to the Treaty ofTlatelolco, the Biological Weapons Convention, the CWC, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehen­sive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty In the field of export controls of sensitive materials and technologies, Brazil has joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and has adopted strict internal legislation to conh'Ol the export of sensitive goods, including missile technology

The Brazilian Constitution stipulates that nu­clear energy shall be applied only for peaceful pUIposes. In 1995, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso publicly

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and expressly declared that "Brazil does not possess, nor produce, nor intend to produce, to import or to export long-range military missiles capable of carrying weapons of mass destmction." All these words and deeds clearly show the commitment of Brazil to global efforts in the field of disarmament and the non-prolifer­ation of weapons of mass destruction, including missile technology

Missile proliferation Turning now to the specific question of the

impact of missile development on global security, I would like to point to some features I deem relevant to the phenomenon of missile proliferation,

(a) Missile proliferation tends to occur in regions where there are long-standing focuses of tension or conflicts Thus they are related to the security percep­tions of the relevant actors

(b) Missile development and production are usually conducted by counllies that are known to have or suspected to have nuclear, chemical or biological capabilities. Their rationale is predicated on the explicit or clandestine existence of programmes in these fields. Therefore, the total elimination of these programmes would go a long way towards curbing the missile threat.

(c) The hOlizontal proliferation of missiles may stimulate the development of more effective anti­missile defence systems, which in turn may intensify the vertical proliferation of missiles.

(d) In many cases, a missile build-up and arms race within a region may bring about new strategic concerns in other regions, further complicating the

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achievement of a more widely shared perception of se­curity and stability

(e) In some cases, excessive stringency in export control schemes on dual-use technologies may unduly affect legitimate non-military development pro­grammes in third countries

Whether or not missile technology is destabiliz­ing per se constitutes a crucial question with implica­tions of a philosophical as well as practical nature. Who decides what is destabilizing or not? Does the degree of destabilization vary according to place and time? What is considered defensive technology for some may be considered an offensive programme for others

The relationship between export controls and indigenous development is also a complex question. Are existing controls effective in curbing proliferation, or do they stimulate efforts for covert indigenous development even further?

Transparency and accountability of MTCR po­licies are also relevant, and a balanced evaluation of the patterns and standards applied by the regime may help improve its effectiveness and legitimacy in the eyes of the international community at large.

The question of international cooperation is another point that should be carefully examined by all interested parties. The roll-back efforts to curb the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction should also serve to help enhance the forward-looking char­acter of international cooperation in the promotion of the application of science and technology for peaceful purposes.

These are all extremely relevant questions which could be addressed here today by the participants in order to try to identify the desirable as well as the

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non-desirable features of a new architecture of peace and international security to be strengthened in the new century.

South America Coming back to the circumstances of Brazil, as

pointed out before, South America is a region with a few focuses of tension or conflict Democracy prevails for the most part and there is a considerable degree of confi­dence and cooper a tion among the countries therein The peaceful settlement of disputes through negotiations is a tradition; military confrontations are exceptions.

Due to this positive atmosphere, missile programmes have no place in South America. There is no perception of "enemy States" with­in or around the re­gion, which could be used as an excuse for

There is no perception of "enemy States" within or around South America

that could be used as an excuse

for missile programmes.

such programmes. Rather, the challenges are more of a non-military nature, such as correcting social inequa­lities, curbing rural violence, combatting illicit traffick­ing, etc, which the countries of South America are trying to cope wit!1 in a cooperative manner. As mentioned before, in the Bnizilian case, the policy of sustainable defence always keeps in perspective the priorities of social, economic and human development, because the real foundation for preserving the security of the country lies in the hearts and minds of its citizens.

Therefore, Brazil has made the conscious choice to not have weapons of mass desh"Uction or long-range

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missile programmes, It opted, instead, to dedicate scientific and technological efforts to the betterment of the living conditions of its population. Its nuclear pro­programme empha-sizes the social uses of The real fOllndation nuclear energy, such as medical purposes, food irradiation, lo­calization of water re-

for preserving the security

of the country

sources in arid lands. lies in the hearts Likewise, the space and minds programme aims at of its citizens. promoting scientific research and improving communication conditions in its vast territory for relevant applications such as telemedicine, long-distance education projects, air space surveillance and protection of the environment.

I recall a very interesting and stimulating debate conducted in the United Nations Disarmament Com­mission a few years back on "the role of science and technology in the context of international secmity, disarmament and other related fields" One of the main points of consensus achieved during those discussions was that, "while scientific and technological develop­ments can have both civilian and military applications, science and technology per se are deemed to be neutral. Their application for peaceful purposes should be promoted." Therefore, it is political considerations rather than tecl:mological developments that would condition their positive or negative impacts

Conclusion I should lik.e to conclude by stressing that we

should never overlook the different political root causes that underlie the missile development processes around

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the globe. The international community should assess carefully the impact of science and technology, both in the field of global security and in the promotion of social and economic development of peoples, since both are essential to world peace. Ultimately, disputes among nations should be settled by negotiation rather than by military means. Brazil, for its part, has been able to make diplomacy one of its main lines of national defence, instead of mal<ing defence its main line of diplomacy

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Missile proliferation and international security Kapil Kale*

Abstract This paper highlights issues relating to missile proliferation and its technological and security underpinnings, ballistic missile defences and the future of ballistic missiles. Concern­ing missile proliferati014 it focuses on India's situation ex­plaining that eight countries are capable of targeting India's heartland with missiles In response, India has acquired capa­bilities and developed its missile programme with a view to safeguarding its national security Looking at the ballistic missile and missile technology market, the paper states that the diffusion oj technologies often is motivated by strategic­commercial interests resulting in "selective proliferation" without regard to the vulnerability of nations to missile at­tacles Citing analysts in India, the paper suggests that the deployment of TMDs would trigger an arms race in outer space that would destabilize regions and possibly lead to the revival of the cold war. A comprehensive and non-discrimina­tory treaty prohibiting ballistic missiles along an incremental time-bound route is presented as the only measure to serve the interest of international security in the long run.

Recent weeks have seen international news headlines aflame with dramatic details on NATO cruise

* Air Vice ilIarshal Kapil Kak A VSM VSl'v! (ret) i, a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, India. This paper i, an expanded version of the re­maries made at the "Symposium onlvlissile Development and Its Impact on Global Security ", held at the United NatiollS Head­qual' ters, New York, all 22 April 1999

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missiles raining down on targets in Yugoslavia The unilateral and barbaric air campaign against the Serbs, in flagrant violation of the UN Charter, as also the half centmy-Iong raison d' etre of NATO, has turned out to be counter-productive for the Americans. While the event­ual outcome of the avoidable military conflict in Kosovo is difficult to forecast, a diplomatic rather than a military option alone stands the best chance of ending the tragedy of the Kosovars and the Serbs In any event, the key role of guided missiles in military operations for the future has been validated yet again. The intense missile attacks on Yugoslavia are proof "that missiles would be standard equipment for war and deterrence in the future and therefore, are as much a part of a country's defence as aircraft, tanks and guns 1 Beginning as crude terror weapons of the VI and V2 class in the Second World War, guided missiles have had a slow but sure techno-operational evolution to emerge as highly effec­tive offensive weapon systems in both the conventional and nuclear fields. As a weapon of coercion in limited interventions, it could have a persuasive impact; more­over, its possession undoubtedly provides a defensive capability by raising the costs against intervention.

Since Germany first used missiles in attacks on London in 1944, more than 17,000 have been fired in wars. The experience of wars in Afghanistan and the Gulf region in 1980-88 and 1990-91 proved the high effectiveIl€ss of relatively inaccurate missiles. Nearly 1,500 missile tests have been undertaken worldwide since 1991 As brought out by a RAND study, today 33 countries have the capability to deploy ballistic missiles in war While dochines and technologies for use of missiles may vary from nation to nation, inability of the existing air defence systems to intercept missiles leaves the target country virtually at the mercy of the attacker.

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It is the appreciation of this vulnerability that has impelled major Powers to re­shict transfer of tech­nology to potential missile Powers But today's concerns arise not from ambitious ballistic programmes but from relatively crude missiles incor­

Guided missiles have had a slow but sure techno-operational

evolution to emerge as hig/zly effective offensive

weapon systems in both the conventional

and nuclear fields.

porating low-cost manageable technologies_ This paper would endeavour to highlight salient issues relating to missile proliferation and its technological and security underpinnings, ballistic missile defences and the way ahead_

Missile proliferation Proliferation of missile technology has for long

been a matter of concern for the international conunun­ity, more so in the post-cold war period as nations search worldwide for technology and talent to upgrade and modernize their missile forces .. General industrial progress, advances in information technology, spread of the Internet, low-cost computing power and the global mobil­ity of technologically­sophisticated person­nel make it less of a technological burden for aspiring Powers to develop missile systems_ The techno-

The technology for development

of missiles in the 300-1,000 km range

appears too basic to deter any resolute,

aspiring country.

logy for development of missiles in the 300-1,000 km range appears too basic to deter any resolute, aspiring country. The examples of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) are often cited this context Even the most strict enforcement of technology-control regimes would only impose time and cost penalties, and that too marginally A point that needs to be underscored here is that the criticality of attaining a threshold of high-technology regimes would apply only to countries that aspire to intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) capabilities.

Significantly, the early years of the missile debate provided interesting examples of the gap be­tween precept and practice relating to proliferation concerns. Policies binding transfer of missile technology with restrictive national laws or international regimes were often countervailed. Egypt started her programme in the mid-1950s, initially with German assistance and later with Soviet acquisitions. At the height of the cold war, Amelican generosity in technological assistance in sounding rocket programmes, from which most truly indigenous missile systems evolved, was matched by Moscow providing Scud missiles and associated tech­nologies for conventional operations to its Warsaw Treaty allies ..

It was the Republic of Korea's test of a surface-to­surface missile in 1978 and later, Iraq's attempt to purchase rocket stages from Italy and revelations on Libya's availing itself of German technology assistance in testing (unsuccessfully) a rocket stage in 1981 that set everyone by the ears President Reagan's National Security Directive 70 calling for means to control missile proliferation and the eventual establishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) were a cry in the wilderness. Europe and Russia reportedly con-

24

!

tinued their sales even as two countries, China and the DPRK, provided off-the-shelf missiles from very short ranges to intermediate ranges. The United States, for example, took no action whatsoever when China sup­plied the 2,700 km range CSS-2 ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia in 1988, when the MTCR was operative. This transfer does not feature in any of the American official and unofficial commentaries The 'spin' for some years has been that Saudi Arabia is about to scrap the CSS-2 missiles!

India's situation There is need to press for a more comprehensive

approach to the management of missile proliferation than the one offered by the MTCR. India's secUlity predicament merits a brief mention. Asia has 13 missile­capable States with ranges from 150 km to 5,000 km. Today eight countries have the capability to target India's heartland with missiles .. Of these, five possess a primarily submarine-launch capability India's compul­sion to evolve appropriate responses to counter sh'ategic imbalances that may arise from adversarial impulses appears undeniable, The larger question of whether nuclear weapons and missiles make India really secure is a matter of philosophical debate. But acquiring these capabilities is geared towards safeguarding its national security and ensuring full autonomy in decision-mak­ing relating to not just strategic issues but the vital economic policies as well. An anarchic and amoral world order and an international security environment dominated by a single super-Power and its constella­tions, with pronounced proclivities for aggressive inter­ventionist actions, lends a sharper edge to the perceived vulnerabilities

2S

India's missile programme ofPrithvi-l (150 km), Prithvi-2 (250 km) and Agni (2,500 km), which began in the eighties, has evolved on a solitary, slow and indigenous patho For India, with regard to the primary challenge, prudence demands that while she continues to build good relations with China, she must also ensure possession of capabilities to cater for reversal in the relationship at a future date The development of intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) up to 5,500 km range and their operationalization, therefore, are part of an "insurance" policy so essential to strategic defence, This is also in keeping with the declared nuclear doctrine of no-first-use and minimum credible deterrenceo 2

India has adhered strictly to non-proliferation norms and has never been accused of seeking diplo­matic or commercial gains from its missile capabilities and technologies Export control regulations have been unilaterally and strictly instituted and enforced so that even unconsciously the cause of proliferation does not get furthered in any way This in spite of India not being a member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Nuclear Suppliers Group, It would be worthwhile recalling that in the late seventies, reports of Libyan President Qadda­fi's offer to write off India's entire external debt in exchange for assistance in the nuclear field circulated widely. Similar inducements by Iraq's President, Mr Saddam Hussein, some years later also appear to have received media attention, Notwithstanding the effec­tiveness or otherwise of international missile technol­ogy control regimes, India's policy of strict unilateral self-restraint on this count would be unwavering in the future as well,

26

.)

t

Missile and technology transfers in Asia Looking at the ballistic missile and missile

technology market in Asia, it appears to be completely dominated by China and the DPRK But the diffusion of Russian technologies into China, Chinese technologies into Pakistan and reports on movement of sensitive American technologies, including advanced missile guidance systems, considered China's Achilles heel, are not without reason perceived by some as "selective proliferation". The motivation for such missile technol­ogy transfers is quite simply commercial benefit, and what is often referred to as "strategic considerations".

Reported leakage of secret Western technol­ogies, whether from Aberdeen, New Mexico or the more clandestinely acquired design information on the state­of-the-art W 88 warhead from the United States, makes another point The W 88 warhead goes into missiles fitted with multiple independent re-entry vehicles What does one make of Russian display of various short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) for export at various defence exhibitions? Or media reports on China having signed defence technology contracts with 52 countries, and absorption of technologies not only from the United States and China, but also from France, Spain, A ustria and Israel? The developing world's model for ballistic missile growth is not only shaped by perceived threats but also through what has been vadously de­sctibed as "self-sus­taining technolOgical

It does appear that regional missile

programmes are perceived to develop

along a predictable path towards eventual

possession of long-range ballistic missiles.

27

momentum". As the physicist Ralph Lapp once said, "when technology beckons, men are helpless." It does appear that regional missile programmes are thus perceived to develop along a predictable path towards eventual possession of long-range ballistic missiles.

The Chinese and North Koreans have played a stellar role in missile development in Egypt, Syria, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and, until recent years, in Iraq as well. In Pakistan's case, one of the common threads running through all the missiles, the 300-km tv! 11, 600-km tv! 9, 1,700-km Ghauri 1, 2,000-km Ghauri 2 and the 600-km Shaheen (the last two having been fired in April 1999 in response to India's Agni test) is the Chinese connection. Pakistan has confirmed receipt of missiles from China and in early 1991 China too attested to this development. As per media reports, the DPRK linkage in Pakistan's missile development programmes cannot also be ruled out China's supply of missile technology seems to have begun in the 1980s concurrently with assistance in the nuclear field The objective can only be partly traced to the motivation to keep India strategi­cally engaged and neutralize its preponderant superior­ity in conventional forces Pakistan's IRBM capability, sought to be increased further, enables it to have its missile reach extend to most counh-ies in West Asia, notably IsraeL This is a significant development and goes well beyond the ostensible India-centlicity of its nuclear option because Indian population centres and major economic targets are mostly within range of the M 9 Looking at current trends from the standpoint of missile proliferation, it does seem that Sino-Pakistani nuclear and missile cooperation is expected to continue as before and perhaps increase in the future Pakistan's quest for leadership as a regional influential Power will be more likely along the missile path since it lacks a

28

strong techo-economic and investment orientation that could provide it with more stable and long-term clout.

China and the DPRK are also known to have supplied rnissile technology to Iran, which has developed the Shahab 3 and Shahab 4 IRBMs, Syria, with DPRI( assist-ance, is now in a posi­tion to improve upon the Scud C Israel's 2,000-km Jericho 2 IRBM, which forms the core of its deter­rence lifeline, has reach to cover the Arab world and Iran. The proliferation of ballistic missiles in

The prolzjeration of ballistic missiles

in West Asia is changing

military doctrine rapid~y as missiles render

the traditional distance, secure borders

and air defences

West Asia is chancino- meaningless. <:> <:>

military dochine rapidly as missiles render the tradi-tional distance, secure borders and air defences mea­ningless Israel's strategic review appears to have recommended the setting up of a strategic command that will assess distant threats and conduct long-range missions to counter the same3

The trend of development in Asia points to­wards greater emphasis on technologies for short-range (500 km) and intermediate-range (1,500-1,800 km) missiles. These are usable war-fighting weapons and would need to be factored into the calculus of regional adversaries, At another plane, missiles of major Powers are overwhelmingly moving towards the sea-based component of the nuclear delivery triad .. Developments in the West point towards resumption of interventionist strategies Under NATO's new strategic concept, unilat­eral military forces, outside the scope of the UN Charter,

29

'-

are envisaged to be applied in areas outside NATO geographical limits to address regional and ethnic conflicts .. 4 Such a globally destabilizing path to unipolar hegemony may well characterize the security environ­ment in the foreseeable future unless the opponents of the new dispensation orchestrate their initiatives with vigour and resoluteness .. It would be instructive to recall that a reported 1988 recommendation on long-term American strategy, put out by such thinkers as Kiss­inger, Brzezinski, Ikle and Wohlstetter, had indeed advocated use of long-range missiles in interventionist operations against developing nations5 It is, therefore, no surprise that developing countries tend to perceive indigenous missile research and development and, in the alternative, acquisition of such weapons as a means of strategic empowerment to reduce their vulnerabili­ties On the other hand, developed countries, with far advanced technological wherewithal, are seriously looking at defences against the threat posed by ballistic missiles "of new missile entrants" on the block

Ballistic missile defences (lBMDs): a new arms race?

In the latter half of 1993, ballistic missile defences appear to have been brought on board the arms control agenda. The American administration sought to test the waters and persuade Russia towards are-interpretation of the Al)ti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty to clarify the dividing line between strategic Bi'vlDs addressed in the Treaty and tactical defences which were not. The real issue was the testing and deployment of a new family of advanced capability theatre missile defences (TMDs) or anti-tactical ballistic missile (ATBM) systems. Since the United States perceives missile proliferation and re­gional conflicts as its two major threats in the post-cold

30

war period, the focus of its current technological effort is to develop TIYIDs to defend its troops in forward­deployed positions. This has obvious salience during intervention opera tions.

Justification for TIYIDs is sought largely on the plea of threats arising from proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in various regions, notably from the so-called "rogue States" Iran, Iraq, the DPRK and Libya seem to fuel much of the US congressional concern .. For many years now, the US has been working on a BIYID system and may expend over 35 billion dollars before a deployable system is available. This despite serious reservations on the efficacy of such defences and their potential for exacerbating insecurities and escalating nuclear technological proliferation.

From information available publicly, it is known that the American TIVID comprises three high-technol­ogy programmes including Advanced Capability 3 Patriot, Aegis Navy Area Defence System, and Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), which has borrowed concepts from the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI). A number of long-term space and missile tracking system projects are also on the anviL Little is known about the Russian TIVID programmes. Their military sources claim systems superior to the Patriot that can h"ack and intercept aircraft, theatre missiles and cruise missiles. No details on Russian TIVID modernization plans are forthcoming. But not surprisingly, the conse­quences of introduction of any BIYID systems are perceived clifferently by other countries. China sees TlVIDs as eventually undermining the credibility of its nuclear deterrent Public articulation of such fears has been going on for over five years. The essential rationale of the Chinese argument is that should a major adversa­rial Power with nuclear weapons also acquire a high-

31

J

technology defensive shield, Beijing would be subjected to political blackmail The concern is exacerbated by the considera tion that TMDs are envisaged to be deployed in collaboration with Japan, the Republic of Korea and other East Asian nations, as well as Taiwan.

Analysts in India argue that the deployment of TMDs would trigger an arms race in outer

The deployment of TMDs would trigger an arms

race in outer space that would violate

international treaties, sen'e to destabilize re­

gions and push politico-military establishments into rethinking concepts

of war fighting.

space that would violate international treaties, serve to destabilize regions and push politico-military establish­ments into rethinking concepts of war fighting. There are fears that TMDs could lead to revival of the cold war. Plans to introduce TMDs in Asia, spearheaded by the US and Japan, could provide China with the doctrinal incentive to accelerate the technological upgrading of its nuclear forces It may also be compelled to enhance the size and sophistication of its nuclear arsenal, possibly through accelerated technology transfers from Russia and thus step up its R&D efforts in anti-missile defences. The net result is bound to be increased insecurity of the United States, tension in East Asia and the possibility of China using missile and nuclear proliferation to countervail the United States. The United States has a consistent record of initiating arms races under the assumption that other nations cannot catch up with it technolOgically But this is to ignore the inevitable spread of technology6

32

As the analyst Alastair Johnston warned in a pioneering study, "opposition to ballistic missile control or decisions to test and deploy TMDs that undermine the ABM treaty will not only ensure that the expansive arms control agenda gets nowhere but may well have the unintended consequence of dramatically reducing Chinese incentives to participate in the extant agenda in the Conference on Disarmament Certainly it will provide added incentive for China to speed up its nuclear modernisation programme."7 China's nuclear posture under such circumstances would doubtless arouse new concerns among its Asian neighbours The unleashing of an anti-missile defence arms race will have very serious adverse reperCUSSions on peace and stability in Asia. Possible Russian and Chinese re­sponses could negatively impact India's security. For example, India too may be compelled to revise its doctrine of minimum deterrence. The imperative to sustain credibility may well demand increasing the size of the nuclear arsenal, possibly as part of a "swamping option" in a TMD scenario. Deployment of such missile defences in Asia would, thus, undermine the nuclear deterrents of others and render them vulnerable to the offensive might of the single super-Power.

Ballistic missiles-the way ahead In the offensive scenario, there appears to be

nothing obvious in the future of ballistic missiles Political circumstances and not technological determin­ism would decide the path the world would take The two scenarios at the opposite ends of the spectrum are: negotiated universal missile disarmament or massive missile proliferation Efforts to restrain ballistic missile forces through either unilateral reductions, export con­trols or ballistic missile-centred arms control agree-

33

ments may take long to fruition. In course of time, public pressure on the international community to redouble its efforts to limit the spread not only of nuclear weapons but missile delivery systems also, through time-bound disarmament, may well increase.

Alton Frye's proposal to place nuclear warheads in "strategic escrow" and ban ballistic missiles8 is the short answer for secmity in the 21st cenhllY In fairness to former President Reagan, a fierce advocate of SDI, the credit for espousing the concept of a ban on ballistic missile must also go to him. Advanced monitoring and inspection technologies make the plan practicable, there being security pay-offs for one and alL

A non-discriminatory and comprehensive treaty prohibiting development, production and acquisition of ballistic missiles would need to be pursued single-mind­edly along an incremental time-bound route. Russia, the United States, China and perhaps even Pakistan and some other countries may not find a zero ballistic missile regime acceptable. A global anti-missile crusade for a multi­nationally negotiated treaty may not consti­tute starry-eyed ideal­ism but be an idea whose time has come. The Secretary­General's appeal in April 1999 for a mis­sile ban accord could not have been more timely

A nOIl-discriminatOlY and comprehensive treaty

prohibiting development, production and acquisition of

ballistic missiles would need to be

pursued single-mindedly along all incremental

time-bound route.

Significantly, India has been at the forefront of such initiatives After it proposed negotiations for an

34

-'

international convention that would prohibit the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, another initiative in 1982 (before India's missile programme was estab­lished) called for a nuclear freeze, The envisaged prohibition was on production of fissile materials for weapons and of nuclear weapons and related delivery systems, Since the wake-up call invited a stony silence then, India was compelled to embark on the integrated guided missile development programme to pursue its crucial security interests,

As an interim step of banning missiles, univer­salization of the Intermemate- and Shorter-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, which removed IRBMs and ground-launched missiles from super-Power inven­tories in Europe, with the lower-range criteria reduced to 50 km, could be considered, Such a measure would eliminate all ballistic missiles except the ICBMs .. Admittedly, disarmament measures lil<e these, even when accepted in principle, would take a long time to implement. In the meantime, countries may have no alternative to developing and sustaining missile capa­bilities to provide defence through deterrence,

Conclusion Missile proliferation and vulnerability of na­

tions to missile attacks (without any worthwhile de­fences) have been of immense anxiety to the interna­tional commmuty Yet selective proliferation has occurred at the very hands of the concerned countries when their strategic-commercial interests dictated otherwise .. China's consistent nuclear-missile assistance to Pakistan serves as an outstanding example, In contrast, India's self-restraint on this count has been unwavering Technology controls do not deter countries aspiring to acquire missiles; they possibly suffer only

35

time and cost delays, Trends here point towards devel­oping countries perceiving indigenous missile research and development and, in the alternative, acquisition of such systems in the 300-1,000 l<m range as their ultimate security panacea,

Initiatives on testing and possible deployment of TMDs or ATBMs by the Americans in Asia to counter regional threats and missile proliferation are raising new fears, particularly in China It may see in this a compulsion to enhance the size and technological sophistication of its nuclear arsenal, raising in turn yet greater concerns for India's minimum deterrent The TlvID / ATBM issue would need to be thought through carefully, lest precipitate actions serve only to enhance vulnerabilities and insecurities all around.

Looking at the future of ballistic missiles as offensive weapons, a comprehensive and non-discrimi­natory treaty prohibiting these along an incremental time-bound route alone can serve the interests of global security in the 21st century As an interim measure, universalization of the INF Treaty with the lower-range criteria reduced to 50 l<m could be one option In the absence of any such measures, the world has no alternative to witneSSing countries develop and sustain missile capabilities to meet the compulsions of deter­rence and safeguard their security

Notes'

1 K Subrahmanyam, "Agni·Ghauri Tests No Cause for Alarm", The Times ofIlldia, 14 April 1999, p, 12

2 Air Commodore Jasjit Singh, "Agni·Il was a Log· ical Progression", The Piolleer, 13 April 1999

3 faile's Defelice Weekly, 10 March 1999, p 60,

36

}.

4 For an analysis of NATO's future roles, see V R Raghavan, "NATO's New Strategic Concept", The Hind1l, 17 April 1999

5 See Kapil Kak, "Pakistan's Missile Capabilities", Asian Strategic Review 1997-1998, p. 285.

6 K Subrahamanyam, "Offense as Defence", The Times of India (New Delhi), 24 March 1999, p 12

7 Alastair Ian Johnston, "Prospects lor Chinese Nuclear Force Modernisation: Limited Deterrence Versus Arms Control", China Quarterly 1996, p. 575

8 Alton Frye, "Banning Ballistic Missiles", Foreign A//airs, NovemberlDecember 1996, p 99

* * *

37

The MTCR, the post-modern State, and deterrence

Aaron Karp'"

Abstract Jvlissile proliferation is an old issue datingfrom the late 1970s. The various bilateral responses developed by the United States led gradually to the establishment of the MTCR in 1985 It developed rapidly until the early 1990s when the inclusion of fanner target countries of the MTCR in the sys­tem itself required the revision of some of its guidelines. MTCR expansion has slowed down since the mid-1990s, but this is e).:plained by the fact that there is little ambiguity remaining about the identity of the 7-8 States that have active missile development programmes Beyond the MTCR the United States uses bilateral diplomacy to reach non-partners, such as in the cases of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and India, with more or less success Ballistic missile proliferation has resulted in a major change in policy and out­loolc in the United States, in favour of ballistic missile de­fences. The MTCR will play an important role in the future, though the author contends it cannot be converted as it is into an international treaty. The author concludes that reliance on missiles will only be reduced when reliance on deterrence is reduced.

_ * Aaron Karp is a Senior Faculty Associate with Grad­uate Programs in International Studies at Old Dominiol1 University and Assistant Professor at the Armed Forces Staff College, both located in N01joll~ Virginia, United States. This paper is based Oil a presentation made at the "SymposiulIl Oil

Missile Developmellt and Its Impact Oil Global Security", held at the United Nations Headquarters, New York, 011 22 April 1999.

38

lYlissile proliferation is a difficult issue to face and one that the United Nations has perhaps resisted far too long; one can only hope it will begin to embrace it more aggressively in the future .. To be sure the issue is an old one. My own work in the field goes back almost exactly 20 years, when a small group of people in the United States Government became concerned that countries that were not considered reliable inter­nationally, whose security behaviour was unpredict­able, were beginning to acquire long-range ballistic missiles. In the late 1970s, in particular, the United States was worried about the Governments of Libya and Iraq. We began to develop responses bilaterally with various exporting countries, which led gradually to the estab­lishment of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) .. A critical event was India's introduction in 1980 of a space-launched vehicle. India's Government was not seen as irresponsible, but its action was seen as evidence of what a developing country could do with minimal technology inputs, and it showed a need for an international response to make sure other countries did not follow the same path.

Development of MTCR

The MTCR was completed in 1985 though tangential issues prevented it from being announced publiclyuntiH987. The rapidity with which the organiz­ation grew, expanded and gained support was amazing. It was easy to sign on new members until the early 1990s, when we had about 22 members and about half a dozen countries unilaterally adhering to the regime. That was the easy part

39

,.

Expanding the regime Things grew more difficult in the early 1990s as

participating governments looked at the need to bring former target countries into the regime .. In particular, there was concern about counhies such as Argentina and Brazil, as well as Russia and Hungary Bringing these countries into the regime required a totally different diplomatic approach No longer was it a simple matter of asking them to participate in meetings and fulfil certain requirements It became necessary to make deals with countries that, until very recently, were targets of the regime. Consequently, some of the principles that originally guided the MTCR were changed, resulting in heavy criticism in the United States and other countries. This development, however, led to a continuous expansion of the regime and greater acceptance of its principles around the world. A number of countries joined subsequently, including several that had been cooperating with the regime unofficially, bringing the total membership to more than thirty

Slowing down Since the mid-

90s, the MTCR has hit a rough patch. Its progress is slowing down _ once again. This is not to say it has not had considerable successes One of the most important, I would suggest, is that it has strongly nar­rowed the scope of

40

Olle of the most important Sllccesses

oftheMTCR is that it has

strongly narrowed the scope of

the problem of missile proliferation.

the problem of missile proliferation Twenty years ago, two great sources of ambiguity arose: one over the countries involved and the other over the nature of their programmes. Today, there is little ambiguity about the identity of the actors. It is no longer a global phenom­enon, but limited rather to about seven to eight States that have active missile development programmes or are exporting missile technology As for missile pro­grammes, there is greater clarity also, although sur­prises continue to greet us. Indeed, there also is less consensus over how to deal with these remaining problems

Moving beyond the regime It was in this climate of rising frustration that the

international community began to move beyond the MTCR. Bilateral diplomacy has been the most effective and, perhaps, the most important tool for dealing with missile proliferation in the latter half of the 1990s. So far it is only through bilateral diplomacy that we can reach countries that are not part of the regime and­what is also very important-deal with countries that are in the regime but considered weak members.

I will give two examples of the kinds of problems we face in bilateral diplo­macy: between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the United States and

Bilateral diplomacy has been

the most effective and, perhaps,

the most important tool for dealing with

missile proliferation ill the latter half

of the 1990s.

41

India. The United States Government and the Govern­ment of the DPRK have had four rounds of missile talks At their best, these talks achieve nothing, and a strong case could be made that they are counter-productive. Until the last round, for example, the United States Government was under the impression that the DPRK was willing to give up its missile programmes in exchange for payment of 500 million dollars. At the last meeting in February 1999, it was discovered that the DPRK wanted 500 million dollars annually That is not productive diplomacyl

A more productive form of bilateral diplomacy is seen in the talks between the United States and the Indian Governments. There have been eight rounds between July 1998 and January 1999 The tall,s have not produced any formal agreement; indeed, they have produced very little tangible results. What they have done, however, is to shape the environment very constructively, hopefully leading to an Indian signature of the CTBT, and encouraging India to desclibe its minimum deterrent Again, these are not clear results .. There is a little outlight failure; there is little outright success. For the United States Government in particular, it is all too easy to turn to the inevitable last resort in the face of growing frustration: unilateral sanctions

This is not to say the MTCR ap­proach and the non­proliferation approach it represents have failed. Clearly, how­ever, something has gone wrong. The Clinton Administra­tion, in themid-1990s,

42

TheiHTCR is a tool of States

that are beginning to trade in

their national sovereignty for international collective security.

was inclined to attribute the problems to bad govern­ments, rogue or pariah States. They were not very graceful in their terminology, perhaps, nor were they accurate, but they were on to something. The problem was not, as described in the rogue State argument, a problem of a State not adhering to rules Rather, what was being faced were countries that adhere to different sets of rules. In essence, we do not have deviation from an international norm; rather, we have two separate international norms that are being followed, This gets to the recently articulated distinction between post-modern and modem States,

Modern vs. post-modern States The lvlTCR is a tool of States that are beginning to

trade in their national sovereignty for international collective security Post-modern States no longer believe that the primary tool to ensure survival and the welfare of their peoples is sovereign individual action-the pursuit of national interest maximizing national power. Instead, such States are increasingly willing to rely upon cooperative security and believe that force, if it must be used, should be used collectively, in order to be legitimate.

The other group of States, which includes all those that pose proliferation problems, are modern States that still believe that sovereignty is the key ingredient of the international system, and that national interest is the primary tool for guiding the State, Power maximization is completely legitimate, and the most legitimate form of force is uniliteral action by a State ..

The tension between modern and post-modern States has been widely described, It is not something unique to missile proliferation Similar situations pre-

43

vail in the World Trade Organization, human rights, gender-policy disputes, devolution of political author­ity and ethnicity. These differences--modern and post­modern-are hard to distinguish. They are not absolute. Every country, especially every post-modern nation, is engaged in a strong domestic debate over what it is doing and how right the course is

Missile defences

Clearly, countries can backtrack Post-modern States can restore their sovereignty or try to, and emphasize their national interest The United States may be in just such a process. Ballistic missile proliferation has now resulted in a major change in policy and outlook in the United States. No longer is non-prolifer­ation seen as the primary, most reliable response. Missile proliferation is increasingly viewed in the United States as a phenomenon that must be dealt with through defences. The events of 1998 helped turn attitudes in this direction The surprise missiles launched by Pakistan, the Islamic Republic of Iran and the DPRK had a strong effect on United States public opinion .. The publication of a key government report, the Rumsfield Commission Report, also helped change the views of former opponents of ballistic missile defences, who now are increasingly ambivalent on the question of missile defences. One result was the decision by the Clinton Administration in January 1999 to increase spending on missile defences. And most im­portant, a piece of legislation came out of the United States Congress in the following month, in which the United States set a goal-now a formal goal-to estab­lish a national system of ballistic missile defences The technology is still a problem No one ex-

44

pects anything to happen before the year 2005, This has clearly created addi­tional time pressure for all countries to act more aggressively in dealing with the issue.

Agenda for the future

Ballistic missile proliferation

has now resulted . . mamaJor

change in policy and outlook

ill the United States.

The agenda for the future involves a combina­tion of responses in which the MTCR will continue to playa role. I do not believe, however, that the MTCR itself can be turned into any kind of global treaty A fundamental problem is dealing with closed societies where activities related to large-scale rocketry are still regarded as a State secret, not something suitable for the kind of intrusive inspections that modern disarmament requires. More likely, the MTCR will continue to tighten regulations and to help countlies implement their own regulations, The MTCR also has a role to play in socializing modern States, making them act more "post-modernly," that is, in ways more consistent with the goal of the MTCR. Socialization, however, of something as extraordinarily large as a nation State, will clearly take a lot of time.

In the near term, much more has to been done bilaterally, eSRecially on the question of technology transfer. In addition, we have to look more aggressively at promoting openness on the part of all States with respect to their missile programmes. The Chemical Weapons Convention is a model for showing the way to deal with ballistic missile technology. Only through greater openness can the kinds of confidence begin to be

45

created that are needed to rid the world of ballistic missiles_ However, doing so requires a much greater step

Conclusion My concluding thought is that the key to dealing

with the problem of missile proliferation is to deal with the problem of deterrence Deterrence, which is the long-term basis of strategic stability, is the greatest barrier we face in missile proliferation_ In order to reduce reliance on missiles, we must reduce reliance on deterrence, which is the reason for ballistic missiles_ This is a problem already faced in the START III process .. Indeed, as difficult as it is to imagine a successful START III treaty at this point, reliance on deterrence makes START IV almost inconceivable at this moment in time. There is no doubt that until we begin to reduce and

eliminate our reliance upon deterrence, we cannot deal with the entire host of disarmament issues of which ballistic missile proliferation is one

Note

As a result of discussions between the United States and the DPRK flam 7 to 12 September 1999 in Berlin, Germany, it was announced on 14 September that the DPRK agreed to refrain from testing long-range missiles of any kind at least- as long as it and the United States were engaged in talks on improving relations. (United States National Security Adviser, Mr Sandy Berger, briefing reporters at the Asia-Pacific summit in New Zealand.) On 17 September, the President of the United States announced his decision to ease some economic sanctions and trade restrictions on the DPRK (Office of the White House Press Secretary, Mr.. Joe Lockhart)

* * *

46

The missile threat: perceptions and prescriptions]

TVan a Oun* b-

Abstract

Different perceptions of the problem of missile proliferation make it difficult to focus on precise renledies The author identifies the root causes of missile proliferation: missile diplomacy is a sign of strength enabling countries to inter­fere in the intemal affairs of other countries; the develop­ment, deployment and proliferation of the ballistic missile defence systems (TMD, NlvIO), there is no internationalle­gal agreement prohibiting the proliferation of missiles and there are no agreed criteria in the IvITCR controlling the transfer of delivery vehicles capable of carrying WiVID The aut/lOr prescribes several steps that could be taken to tackle the challenge of missile proliferation: fostering an enabling environment conducive to global and regional security; ad­justing to another country's legitimate security concerns; abandoning BlvID progrmmnes, and making the MTCR more equitable, authoritative, effective and universal.

While no one, generally speaking, disputes that missile development may constitute a threat to global security, people are nevertheless far apart in their views on how I will, therefore, examine that question before

* Wang Qun is Division Director at the Arms Control llnd Disarmllment Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China This article is an edited version oj a presenta­tion made at the "Symposium on Ivlissile Development and Its Impact on Global Security", held at the L1nited Nations Head­quarters, New York, on 22 April 1999

47

zeroing in on the root causes of the problem In conclusion, I will try to come up with some prescrip­tions,

Differing perceptions In tall<ing about missile threats, one must be

aware of the different perceptions that people may have of this issue, To some military Powers, the missile threat is attributable only to some developing countries, It is the missile development in these countries that consti­tutes a threat to global security, whereas their own missiles present an effective means to maintain world peace, security and stability That is their view. But not all countries--especially some developing countries­will go along with such a view. In fact, they think quite otherwise" To them, a missile threat is not just a product of some developing countries" On the contrary, it is the missile programmes of some military Powers that have put the security of certain developing countries in jeopardy, thus threatening global security

If we look at the balance sheet of military strength between developed and developing countries in terms of the types and the numbers of missiles, it is not difficult to conclude which enjoy absolute military advantage and where exactly the missile threat comes from" In fact, the missile attacks on Iraq and Kosovo are cases in point

Identifying root causes To understand the different perceptions of threat

from missiles, it is essential to identify the root causes of missile development and proliferation and, from there, elaborate some prescriptions, Despite the ongoing

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intensified efforts of MTCR, the problem is still with uSo In fact there is a mounting risk of missile proliferation, with its attendant threats to global peace, security and stability Under such circumstances, it is natural to ask why. Only by doing so can we put this problem behind us"

I have identified several factors

First, I attribute missile proliferation to the pursuit of missile diplomacy by some military Powerso. The recent actions of certain countries have demon­strated to the international community that missiles are a sign of strength, and that diplomatic approaches can be given a certain "muscle" through missiles" Indeed, missiles to these countries represent an effective means to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries through a non-ground war" In doing so, those military Powers are flagrantly advertising their missiles Such a marketing strategy can be impressive, especially in the wake of the Asian financial crisis, when civilian in­dustries are shrinking Will this trend continue? It is not too difficult to foresee that neither the MTCR nor the relevant policies of certain countries will ultimately be able to check missile proliferation .. On the contrary, countries currently implementing missile programmes will feel compelled not only to press rapidly ahead with their ballistic missile programmes, but also to seek to develop cruise missile so

Second, the development, deployment and pro­liferation of ballistic missile systems, which naturally include Theatre Missile Defence (TlvID) and National Missile Defence (NMD), is the starting shot for a missile race, for the following reasons:

• The ballistic missile defence programme re­cently announced by a certain country is in

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•

•

50

essen:e aimed at enhancing its already over­whelming offensive capability with even more awesome defensive capability Under such circumstances, I think it is only natural for other affected countries, should they have sufficient money for joining the costly game of missile defence development, to vigorous­ly sharpen their swords, 50 to speak, as a countermeasure,

A Ballistic Missile Defence system (BMD), though defensive in name, is not purely de­fensive .. In fact, it is part and parcel of an over­all, integrated defensive and offensive capa­bility that functions to enhance one country's offensive capability by weakening that of others. In that context, BlYID in itself constitutes a threat to other countries' securi­ty and will stimulate or compel them to vigor­ously pursue their own missile programmes,

The transfer and joint development of TMD will inevitably result in the prolifer­ation of missile teclmologies. As mis­sile and anti-missile technologies are in­terre1.ated, they are mutually convert­ible. Many of the technologies used in

The transfer andjoint

development ofTMD

will inevitably result in the proliferation

of missile technologies.

missile defence systems can be adapted to de­veloping and improving offensive missiles, So the deployment, development and prolif­eration of missile defence systems will

prompt a vicious circle in the missile race, poi­son the global and regional security environ­ment by tipping the strategic balance with an obvious negative effect on nuclear disarma­ment, and exacerbate regional tension, This, in my view, is an issue of great importance, worthy of the attention of the international community Third, the lacunae in the international non-pro­

liferation regime Missile non-proliferation is the most underdeveloped part of that entire regime. One must wonder why The following points come to mind:

• There is no legal basis, that is, no international legal instrument, which provides for a com­prehensive prohibition of missile develop­ment and proliferation, The non-proliferation of missiles cannot thus be put on a par with the non-proliferation of weapons of mass de­struction, as the latter has firm legal bases in international treaties such as the NPT, EWC and CWe.

• There are no agreed objective criteria within the MTCR strictly controlling the transfer of delivery vehicles of weapons of mass de­struction Given the numerous types of mis­siles, however, as well as the convertibility of missile and anti-missile technologies, it is hard to envisage a system for standardizing objective criteria for prohibition. For instance, we have noticed that missile defence systems and related technologies are not on the con­trollist, though they constitute a contributing factor to missile proliferation. Moreover, the double standards applied by certain MTCR members in implementing the requirements

51 'j

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have diminished the role of the regime. Even the founders of MTCR have admitted that it is only a time-winning mechanism. It cannot provide a comprehensive solution to the question

• The lacunae in the international non-prolifer­ation regimes have made us realize there is a need for the international community to take a collective look at this issue and explore bet­ter ways to combat the danger of missile pro­lifera tion.

• The absence of a comprehensive solution to the political and security concerns of coun­tries flowing from missile-related matters is another factor We cannot discuss missile pro­liferation without refening to political and security concerns. Missile proliferation is, in fact, the tip of the iceberg. Given the fact that there are no standard nor agreed international norms governing missile non-prolifer­ation, what is cur­rently reflected on the missile non­proliferation front is not the will of the in-ternational commu-

We cannot discuss missile proliferation

without referring to political and

security concerns. Missile proliferation

is, in fact, the tip

of the iceberg.

munity, but rather the specific policy of a cer­tain country If other countries are required to respect that country's policy, their own legit­imate concerns, especially on the secmity

front, should also be addressed on a recipro­cal basis, This is an important principle.

Prescriptions First, it is essential to foster an enabling environ­

ment conducive to global and regional security This is a sine qua non in areas such as the Korean peninsula, the South Asian subcontinent and the Middle East, if this question is to be put behind us, A new concept of security and a new international political order need to be based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation, Dialogues, consultations and negotiations are equally important It is time for us to do away with any mentality of the cold war It is time for us to give up missile diplomacy

Second, it is fundamental to adjust to each other's legitimate concerns, particularly on the political and security front In this context, the principle of reciprocity is essential Only in this way can the internal driving factor for missile proliferation be totally eliminated.

Third, ballistic missile defence programmes must be abandoned, It is not realistic to assume that missile development and proliferation can be checked through the development of anti-missile systems. That simply will not happen On the contrary, it can only be counter-prod uctive.

Fourth, there must be a reform of the existing international missile non-proliferation regime to make it more equitable, more authoritative, more effective and universal. In fact, in the wake of the recent missile tests, as well as the action of some other countries in the area of

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--~

ballistic missile de­velopment and mis­sile defences, Secre­tary-General Kofi Annan underscored the urgent need for multinational nego­tiated norms against the development of such weapons. If all parties can work along these lines, then

There must be a reform of the existing

international missile non-proliferation regime

to make it more equitable,

more authoritative, more effective and universal.

the international community may ultimately find the correct approach to effectively address the missile question.

Note

1 The Editor has omitted from the text and re-produces below part of Mr: Qun's response to Mr. Kak's com­ments made during the Symposium concerning China's en­gagement in missile proliferation to Pakistan and other countries and China's threat to India through its missile de­velopment The author categorically rejected such comments as "totally groundless"and "untenable", He reiterated Chi­na's non-proliferation policy, especially on missile-related exports, stressing that China has all along adopted a prudent and responsible attitude towards this question Based on its own non-proliferation policy and UN Security Council reso­lution 1172, China has undertaken not to assist countries in South Asia to develop nuclear weapons and delivery sys­tems that are capable of carrying such weapons, He also reit­erated that China's policy on missile development is defen­sive in nature: to defend its own sovereign and territorial integrity so as to create a favourable security environment for its own economic development He stressed that China's

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missile development does not constitute a threat to any other country, and that China does not single out India as its en­emy It does not use missiles to attack anyone, including In­dia Moreover, it has undertaken not to be the first to use nu­clear weapons. He emphasized the importance of a correct secUlity perception and called for India to calmly reflect on such a perception and its missile development programmes based thereon. He further cautioned India that any decision based on a wrong security perception will result in serious consequences not only for its own security, but also for the secUlity of the region as a whole.

* * *

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