44
DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002

DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

  • View
    218

  • Download
    3

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

Page 1: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

DC Phone Home

Defcon, Las Vegas 2002

Page 2: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Chris Davis, CISSP

RedSirenReston, VA

Aaron Higbee, CISSP

FoundstoneWashington DC

Page 3: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Overview

180-Degree HackingPhone Home

Developed PlatformsSega DreamcastCompaq iPAQx86 Bootable CD

DemonstrationsRemedies

Page 4: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

www.dcphonehome.com

This PresentationSega Dreamcast DistributioniPAQ Distributionx86 Bootable CD-Rom

Page 5: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Assumptions

LinuxGeneral Computer ArchitectureTCP/IPGeneral Information Security ConceptsFirewalls / NAT / Private AddressingVPN’sProxiesCommon hax0r toolz

Page 6: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Conventional Enterprise Security

FirewallNetwork Address TranslationPrivate Addressing – RFC1918DMZ

Page 7: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Higher End Enterprise Security

IDS (managed?)VPNs, Remote Access

Strong Authentication

Proxies, URL filtering

Content-checking (email virus)Security PersonnelSecurity Consulting

Page 8: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Hard Crunchy Outside

Soft CHEWY Center

Page 9: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

The Problem

Networks go both ways: in and outThe focus is on perimeter network security instead of the data contained withinEven hackers are focused on the perimeter instead of the data

ApacheOpenSSH

Page 10: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Firewalls

What can they do?Enforcing inbound connection policiesDMZNATAuthenticationVPN Gateways for remote usersRestricting some outbound traffic

Page 11: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Proxies

Used to enhance network performanceLimited content-checking featuresMostly have to allow outbound tcp/80

SoapDAVHTTP-U30+ in development

Page 12: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Network Intrusion Detection

Exists to help identify and respond to hack attempts in a timely manner

Mostly focused on listening for incoming attacks

Signature-based detectionMust be aware of particular attack to identify itAnomaly protocol detection only detects anomalies

WTF is that!?

Page 13: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

The Soft Chewy Center

Outbound connections are believed to be initiated by employeesCompanies need their employees to use the InternetPhysical security is ‘good enough’ Outside =Bad, Inside = Good

Page 14: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

The “Computer” Concept

Fits on a desk or in your lapRuns Windows

WRONG!A “Computer” is a general purpose architecture

TivoCell PhonesPrintersCable BoxesPrintersCopiersGame ConsolesVending Machines

Page 15: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

180-Degree Hacking

Why hack the network? Bring it home!Based on the following principles

FIREWALLS ARE POINTLESSDelivery

Physical accessZero-day sploit

The InternetStupid user tricks

Page 16: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Firewalls Are Worthless

In 180-degree hacking, firewalls are transparent

Data is tunneled through an authorized protocol or via encrypted transportFirewalls are two-wayThey can’t block ALL traffic

Page 17: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Physical Access

Physical access is trivial to obtain (seriously)

Especially for short periods of time [5 min]

Creativity and planning is the only limiting factor

Page 18: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Super Stealth Method

Page 19: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Creativity Continued…

Page 20: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

The Smoke Screen

Page 21: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Piggy Back

Page 22: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

0-day sploit

Same-ole Same-oleBoringAnybody, and Everybody

ApacheOpenssh

BNC and dDoS… is the best you can do!? Get Creative!

Page 23: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

180-Degree Hacking: Post-Delivery

Discover networkEnumerate outbound trafficPhone Home

Page 24: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

180-Degree Hacking: Similar Concepts

P2P File-sharing

WinMXBearshare

Chat AppzAim

Remote Desktops

GoToMyPC.com

Page 25: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

180-Degree Hacking: Network Discovery

NetworkAuto-Configuration

DHCP

EnumerateAllowed Outbound

Traffic

Write ResultsTo /dcph_info.txt

80 443 u53 ICMP Etc...

Page 26: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

180-Degree Hacking: Analysis

Analyzedcph_info.txt

80open?

443open?

53open?

ICMPopen?

StartVTun

StartVTun

StartcIPe Start

icmptunnel

Yes No

GotoProxyFinder

Page 27: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

180-Degree Hacking: Proxy Finder

ProxyFinder

ZoneTransfer

DNS

ReverseLookupRange

Grepproxy, pxy

squid ?

Http-tunnel

Page 28: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

180-Degree Hacking: Delivery Types

Drop-n-go hardwareSEGA DreamcastCompaq iPAQ

SoftwareBootable x86 CD-Rom

Remote Exploitduh

Page 29: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

DC Phone Home

Why the hell did we pick a Dreamcast!?

Innocuous: doesn’t it just play games?Cheap: under $100 for everything10/100 Ethernet: made just for hackingPowerful processorRumors of a Linux portCrazy Taxi got boring

Page 30: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Dreamcast Architecture

Hitachi SH4 Core Processor @200MHz16MB RAMCD-ROM10/100 RTL-8931 EthernetKeyboard (pretty useful)

Page 31: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Dreamcast Development

Building the distroRPMs from www.sh-linux.orgX-Compile ToolchainKernel patching and compiling

Experimental support in recent 2.4 kernels

Linux development waning since DC was discontinued

Compiling ToolzLimited RAM prevents native compilation

Page 32: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Compaq iHACK Architecture

Compaq iPAQ 3765StrongARM 206MHz core processor64MB RAM32MB Flash ROMDual-Slot PCMCIA Expansion PackUSB/Serial Interface10/100 Ethernet and 802.11b capable

Page 33: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Compaq iHACK Development

Linux SupportARM proc support in kernel since 2.2.xLarge group of Linux developers

www.handhelds.org

Functional distribution availableUsed Familiar v0.5.2

Native compilerIndependent development platform

Page 34: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

x86 Bootable CD

TrinuxSupport’s many types of hardwareRuns on virtually any PC20meg ISOKernel 2.4.5Easily modified

Page 35: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Toolz

Network Autoconfig

DHCP

Scanningnetcatnmap

SniffingPHossngreptcpdump

TunnelingVTunCIPEhttptunnelicmptunnelstunnelpppssh

Page 36: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Common Tools

hostnslookupshell scriptingsedcuttr

Page 37: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Phoning Home Simplified

DeliveryBootingNetwork autoconfigurationNetwork discoveryEnumerationTunneling

Page 38: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Demos

Enough chit-chat! Let’s see it work!

Page 39: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Demo Summary

Page 40: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

How is this stopped?

To sum it up: constriction, not prevention.

Limited egress pathsAs many proxies as possible

HTTPDNSEmail

Full-mesh intranet VPN topologyAuthentication between all endpoints, including gatewaysOnly prevents drop-n-go hardware

Page 41: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

More Security Measures…

Switch Port SecurityPre-registration of MAC addresses

Superfine Granular IDSProtocols must adhere to strict specifications

Protocol-analyzing proxiesCan deconstruct sessions to detect misuse

Wireless JammingPrevents rouge Access-Points

Page 42: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

But…

Covert channels will ALWAYS be possibleSmaller devices make detection and removal more difficultTargeted attacks are based on research of your organizationLike most information security, the only true protection is the air-gap

Page 43: DC Phone Home Defcon, Las Vegas 2002. Chris Davis, CISSP RedSiren Reston, VA Aaron Higbee, CISSP Foundstone Washington DC

Linkshttp://www.dcphonehome.comhttp://trinux.sourceforge.nethttp://www.sh-linux.orghttp://sites.inka.de/sites/bigred/devel/cipe.htmlhttp://www.phenoelit.dehttp://vtun.sourceforge.nethttp://www.nocrew.org/software/httptunnel.htmlhttp://www.detached.net/icmptunnel/http://www.stunnel.orghttp://www.buildinglinuxvpns.nethttp://www.foundstone.comhttp://www.redsiren.comhttp://www.realultimatepower.net