DAYUN 1-6 ORBECIDO-ROEHR

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REPUBLIC V ORBECIDO OCTOBER 5, 2005

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized as a

foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the Filipinospouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?

Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling onthis apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision[1]dated May 15, 2002,of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and its Resolution[2]datedJuly 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a quo had declared that hereinrespondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The fallo of the impugned Decisionreads:

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family Codeand by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the petitioner is

given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.

On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United Churchof Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed with a son and adaughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V. Orbecido.

In 1986, Ciprianos wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A fewyears later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.

Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decreeand then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live at5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California./

Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invokingParagraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the petition,the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the SolicitorGeneral (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.

In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE FAMILY CODE[4]

The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to theinstant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebratedbetween a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petitionfor annulment or for legal separation.[5] Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governsrespondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicialdetermination.[6]

For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insiststhat when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, heis likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.[7]

At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial courtactually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63 of theRules of Court provides:RULE 63DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
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Section 1. Who may file petitionAny person interested under a deed, will, contract or other

written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring an actionin the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or validity arising,and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.. . .

The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciablecontroversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that theparty seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe forjudicial determination.[8]

This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between twoFilipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree, and remarriedwhile in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as petitioner representing the Stateasserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while respondent, a private citizen, insists on adeclaration of his capacity to remarry. Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in thecontroversy. The issue raised is also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondentremarries, litigation ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.

Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code applyto the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had come about in thefirst place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?

Brief Historical BackgroundOn July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,

otherwise known as the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26 thereofstates:

All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in thecountry where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.

On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order No.227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family Code. A secondparagraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:

ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws inforce in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in thiscountry, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and adivorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry,the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)

On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by thecase at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where at the time themarriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife wasnaturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting her capacity toremarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen while residing in the U.S.A.

Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings[9] on the Family Code, the Catholic BishopsConference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to Paragraph 2 of Article 26:1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinoswho divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry, while the

spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipinocitizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be considered to bevalidly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted and made into law onlyafter more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
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Legislative IntentRecords of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of

Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil Code RevisionCommittee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alienspouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse.

Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case ofVan Dorn v.Romillo,Jr.[10] The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner.The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien spouse is valid in the

Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to remarry under Philippine law.

Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the marriage,the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign citizenship bynaturalization?

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case ofQuita v. Court of Appeals.[11] In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wifebecame a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The Courttherein hinted, by way ofobiter dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse isno longer married under Philippine law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold

that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at thetime of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomesnaturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise beallowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of themarriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretationof a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravenethe clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason,disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to casesnot within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.[12]

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where theFilipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no longermarried to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within thecontemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 ofArticle 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and aforeigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her toremarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of themarriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spousecapacitating the latter to remarry.

In this case, when Ciprianos wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still avalid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it, thenaturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to remarry. Clearly, thetwin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are both present in this case. ThusCipriano, the divorced Filipino spouse, should be allowed to remarry.

We are also unable to sustain the OSGs theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino spouseis to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment would be a longand tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible, considering that the marriage of

the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On the other hand, legal separation would notbe a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipinospouse would still remain married to the naturalized alien spouse.
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However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted byrespondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondents wife. It is settledrule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is not evidence.[13]

Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his wifewas naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognizedby our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate itsconformity to the foreign law allowing it.[14] Such foreign law must also be proved as our courts

cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact, such laws must be alleged andproved.[15] Furthermore, respondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wifeto remarry as specifically required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient todeclare that he is capacitated to enter into another marriage.

Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the FamilyCode (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen,who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also toremarry. However, considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submittedand on record, we are unable to declare, based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, whowas naturalized as an American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried anAmerican, that respondent is now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be madeproperly upon respondents submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. Theassailed Decisiondated May 15, 2002, and Resolutiondated July 4, 2002, of the Regional Trial Courtof Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985

ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner,vs.

HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court ofthe National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.:\

In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside theOrders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued byrespondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for Reconsiderationof the Dismissal Order, respectively.

The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondentis a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that, after the

marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two children born onApril 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were divorced in Nevada, UnitedStates, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
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Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of theRegional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita, Manila,(the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that petitioner beordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be declared with rightto manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the causeof action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Courtwherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community property" as ofJune 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the groundthat the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in

the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.

Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject toappeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of aninterlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patentlycommitted, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this Court ina certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error committedwhich, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it wouldbe useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed inthis case within the exception, and we have given it due course.

For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal property inthe Philippines.

Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal propertybecause of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American Court thatthey had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established through conjugalfunds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior judgment.

For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevailover the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts anddeclaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divestPhilippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations

between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relativecommunity property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The pivotalfact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.

The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner whoappeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction overprivate respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco, California,authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the groundof incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community property nor communityobligations. 3As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm ofKARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:

xxx xxx xxx

You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalfand do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to thefollowing:

1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.

2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the Court.

3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the court.

xxx xxx xxx 4

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the UnitedStates. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private


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respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contendingin this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary tolocal law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 onlyPhilippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being consideredcontrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their nationallaw. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the

standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the FederalSupreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competentjurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to freethem both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party, ceases to bind either.A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the lawprovides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well asthe other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. Hewould have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control

over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validlyexercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his ownrepresentation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered stillmarried to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. ofthe Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respectand fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one ofher heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in herown country if the ends of justice are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss theComplaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998]

FE D. QUITA,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN,*respondents.

D E C I S I O N

BELLOSILLO, J .:

FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationshipsoured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted inthe divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19 July 1950 evidencing their agreement to liveseparately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she

obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz inthe same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married for thethird time, to a certain Wernimont.
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On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed apetition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administrationconcerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent BlandinaDandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan,and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in thepetition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the appointmentinstead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of theoppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 theoppositors (Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950

private writing and the final judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T.Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.

On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent andthe distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent aswell as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the sameday, the trial court required the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten(10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on thedeclaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsedwithout the required documents being submitted.

The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao[1] which held that "a foreign divorce betweenFilipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386)was not entitled to recognition as valid in this jurisdiction,"[2] disregarded the divorce between

petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until thedeath of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugalproperties due to lack of judicial approval. [3] On the other hand, it opined that there was no showingthat marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that thealleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. Asregards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987[4] only petitionerand Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the nethereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate heirs.[5]

On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofsthat the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis whowas recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on15 February 1988[6] partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the

exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, andpetitioner to the other half.[7] Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated inthe aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947, theirmarriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage topetitioner.

In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errorsallegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing,in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversybefore the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributiveshares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided asin ordinary cases.

Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings.[8] On 18 April 1996 it denied reconsideration.[9]

Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists thatthere is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to theheirship of the Padlan children or as to their respective shares in the intestate estate of thedecedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the properheir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based on establishedfacts and admissions of the parties.

We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear: If there isa controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the

distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heardand decided as in ordinary cases.

We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlanchildren to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly
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acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; [10]noras to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains as to who is the legitimatesurviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed to appearduring the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirsand distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth ofthe Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without thedocuments, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.

We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among others,the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that shehad secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the abovequoted procedural rule.[11] To this, petitioner replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remainedlegally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.[12] Reading between the lines, theimplication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce fromArturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish hercitizenship. The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid ofdocumentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting oropposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor bymerely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.

Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's decision shestressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v.Romillo Jr.[13]that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,

provided they are valid according to their national law. She prayed therefore that the case be set forhearing.[14] Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship.[15] The trial court did not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolveher motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were marriedin the Philippines."[16] It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on theircitizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial court was not suppliedwith a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorcewas decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved thatshe was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dornwould become applicableand petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; [17] it did not meritenlightenment however from petitioner.[18] In the present proceeding, petitioner's citizenship isbrought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript ofstenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995 during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of acertain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof beforeanother trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that shewas since 1954.[19] Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was obtained in thesame year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertaintyabout her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conductedby the trial court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the casereturned to the trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited

only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondent'sclaim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in abigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the CivilCode. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this statuspresupposes a legitimate relationship.[20]

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared incontempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, [21] the same lacksmerit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve the same transactions and sameessential facts and circumstances. There must also be identical causes of action, subject matter andissue.[22] The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filedbefore the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles of

certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare theexistence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering theremand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its
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decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. Theorder of the appellate court modifying its previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the nethereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda,with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan, islikewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trialcourt should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the presentpetition for forum shopping is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989

IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,vs.

HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional TrialCourt of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of

Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.

REGALADO,J.:

An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce, only tobe followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the opportunity

to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved jurisdictional question.

On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and privaterespondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of Births,Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage startedauspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where their onlychild, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1

Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by aseparation de facto between them.

After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private

respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the SchonebergLocal Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they hadbeen living apart since April, 1982. 2

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of propertybefore the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the same is stillpending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3

On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody ofthe child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was locallyand internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriagewas legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4

On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, privaterespondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while stillmarried to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as 1982 and


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with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes,Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground ofinsufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution,dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the petitioner. 6 Thecomplaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two branches of the Regional TrialCourt of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and WilliamChia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by therespondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua",docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the

same court.7

On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the aforesaidresolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A similarpetition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The Secretary ofJustice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and directed therespondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have already beenarraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entirerecords of both cases to his office for review. 9

Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to suspendfurther proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended proceedings inCriminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset the date of thearraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such scheduled date, petitionermoved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said CriminalCase No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before theSecretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack ofjurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated September 8,1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused therein, that is, petitioner andWilliam Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the petitioner refused to be arraigned.Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by respondent judge as direct contempt, she and hercounsel were fined and the former was ordered detained until she submitted herself forarraignment. 13 Later, private respondent entered a plea of not guilty. 14

On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a

prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower courtdenying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is withoutjurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that cannot beprosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not qualify as anoffended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior to his filing thecriminal complaint." 15

On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents fromimplementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with CriminalCase No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoez actedon the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolutiondirecting the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the complaints against thepetitioner. 16

We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.

Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other crimesagainst chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the offendedspouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that compliance with thisrule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in point of strict law thejurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for asworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts theprosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.

Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person who

can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the offenses ofseduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the prosecution of thecrimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party.The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses abovementioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens


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patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate thecriminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of seduction,abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents, grandparents or guardian, suchamendment did not include the crimes of adultery and concubinage. In other words, only theoffended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to initiate the action therefor.

Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, itnecessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do soat the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil actions; in

fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined asof the filing of the complaint or petition.

The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean thatthe same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been foundnecessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the State, throughthe People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining witness therein.However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and thepresent prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominantrole since the right to commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within hispower and option.

This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer theoutrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20Hence, as cogently arguedby petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital relationship isstill subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery. This is a logicalconsequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent where the supposedoffended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of thecriminal case. 21

In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant tocommence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status orcapacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if hiscapacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequentto thecommencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was

acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would therebyhave the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legalcapacity to do so.

To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue asto when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a criminalprosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed of suchstatus. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it isnecessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between thecomplainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the actionby the former against the latter.

American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia withours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer has theright to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the innocentspouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. Where, however,proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted can have no legaleffect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a conclusion. 22

In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that

'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have beencommitted, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant insists that hisstatus was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that theoffense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the reason for thisprovision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse must be such whenthe prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)


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We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction,considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that in cases of suchnature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined as of the time thecomplaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be an offended spouse,and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of thecomplaint.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, theFederal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the

Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in ourcivil law on the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case ofVan Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al.,24 after a divorce was granted by a UnitedStates court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed a civil casein a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and praying that she beordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business.Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the UnitedStates. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, privaterespondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. ...

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, onlyPhilippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being consideredcontrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad,which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their nationallaw. ...

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. Hewould have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise controlover conjugal assets. ...25

Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband ofpetitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he wasthe offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree ofdivorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this case.When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would nolonger be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be oneof the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforthbe no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect ofdissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect orcast obloquy on the other.

The aforecited case ofUnited States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by privaterespondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333 ofthe Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards declaredvoid", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the infidelity of amarried woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that she is entitled tohave her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually secures a formaljudicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that thecomplaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriageis void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from thebeginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a legto stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the decisionin said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was filed before the termination ofthe marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio. The same rule and requisite wouldnecessarily apply where the termination of the marriage was effected, as in this case, by a validforeign divorce.


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Private respondent's invocation ofDonio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must sufferthe same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended spousetherein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was raised as to itssufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not involve a factualsituation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy herein.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and anotherone enteredDISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of jurisdiction. Thetemporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 124371. November 23, 2000]

PAULA T. LLORENTE,petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F. LLORENTE, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

PARDO,J.:

The Case

The case raises a conflict of laws issue.

What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals [1] modifying that of theRegional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City[2] declaring respondent Alicia F. Llorente(herinafter referred to as Alicia), as co-owners of whatever property she and the deceased LorenzoN. Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Lorenzo) may have acquired during the twenty-five (25)years that they lived together as husband and wife.

The Facts

The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States Navy fromMarch 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957. [3]

On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to as Paula)were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua, Camarines Sur. [4]

Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula stayedin the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur.[5]

On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and Certificate ofNaturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States District Court, SouthernDistrict of New York.[6]

Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was granted anaccrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the Philippines. [7] He discovered thathis wife Paula was pregnant and was living in and having an adulterous relationship with hisbrother, Ceferino Llorente.[8]

On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the Registrar ofNabua as Crisologo Llorente, with the certificate stating that the child was not legitimate and theline for the fathers name was left blank.[9]
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Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the couple drewa written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances allotted by the United StatesNavy as part of Lorenzos salary and all other obligations for Paulas daily maintenance and supportwould be suspended; (2) they would dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicialproceedings; (3) they would make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquiredduring their marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since shevoluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully. The agreement wassigned by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paulas father and stepmother. Theagreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro Osabel.[10]

Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed fordivorce with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego. Paulawas represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the proceedings. On November27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for the County of San Diego found all factualallegations to be true and issued an interlocutory judgment of divorce.[11]

On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final.[12]

In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.

On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. [13] Apparently, Alicia had noknowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as Paula, who did not opposethe marriage or cohabitation.[14]

From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. [15] Their twenty-five(25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surnamed Llorente.[16]

On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was notarized byNotary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo,Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will, Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia andtheir three children, to wit:

(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential house and lot,located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines, including ALL the personal propertiesand other movables or belongings that may be found or existing therein;

(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children, Raul F. Llorente,Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real properties whatsoever andwheresoever located, specifically my real properties located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua,Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua,Camarines Sur; and Barangay Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;

(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto my children,Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, my real properties locatedin Quezon City Philippines, and covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands inAntipolo, Rizal, Philippines, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both ofthe Registry of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;

(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or personal

properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other persons, but could onlybe sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among themselves;

(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last Will andTestament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my children in the order ofage, if of age;

(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should served (sic)without bond;

(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions heretoforeexecuted, signed, or published, by me;

(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the LlorentesSide should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife Alicia R. Fortunato and mychildren with respect to any real or personal properties I gave and bequeathed respectively to eachone of them by virtue of this Last Will and Testament.[17]
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On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines Sur, apetition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein Lorenzo moved thatAlicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate.[18]

On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator Lorenzowas still alive.[19]

On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted the will toprobate.[20]

On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died.[21]

On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition [22] for letters of administrationover Lorenzos estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was Lorenzos surviving spouse, (2)that the various property were acquired during their marriage, (3) that Lorenzos will disposed of allhis property in favor of Alicia and her children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in theconjugal property.[23]

On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a petition forthe issuance of letters testamentary.[24]

On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave duecourse to Paulas petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.[25]

On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper Bicol Star.[26]

On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:

Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted to the lateLorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the marriage he contractedwith Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is likewise void. This being so the petition ofAlicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled toreceive any share from the estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzohaving gained the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).

On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious, and so declaresthe intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March 13, 1981 as void and declares her

entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half of their conjugal properties, and as primarycompulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third shouldgo to the illegitimate children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partitionin equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.

Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the deceased, LorenzoLlorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration issue in her favor upon her filing abond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00 conditioned for her to make a return to the court withinthree (3) months a true and complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estatewhich shall at any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her, andfrom the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the same, or suchdividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to render a true and just account ofher administration to the court within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court

and to perform all orders of this court by her to be performed.

On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not be granted.

SO ORDERED.[27]

In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted decision.[28]

On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicias motion for reconsideration but modifiedits earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children legitimate or otherwise ofLorenzo since they were not legally adopted by him. [29] Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the

trial court declared Beverly Llorente as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.[30]

On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.[31]
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On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with modification thedecision of the trial court in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that Alicia isdeclared as co-owner of whatever properties she and the deceased may have acquired during thetwenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.

SO ORDERED.[32]

On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for reconsideration of thedecision.[33]

On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,[34]denied the motion for lack of merit.

Hence, this petition.[35]

The Issue

Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments raised, [36] theissue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N. Llorente?

We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to the trialcourt for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.

The Applicable Law

The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before and at thetime of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of his will; and (4) death, isduly established, admitted and undisputed.

Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by foreign law.

The Civil Code clearly provides:

Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity ofpersons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it issituated.

However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of succession andto the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions, shall beregulated by the national law of the person whose succession is under consideration ,whatever may be the nature of the property and regardless of the country wherein said propertymay be found. (emphasis ours)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorizedto take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.[37]

While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not admit theforeign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore the renvoi doctrine, where thecase was referred back to the law of the decedents domicile, in this case, Philippine law.

We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently proven, inthe same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement that American lawfollows the domiciliary theory hence, Philippine law applies when determining the validity ofLorenzos will.[38]

First, there is no such thing as one American law. The "national law" indicated in Article 16 ofthe Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American law. There is no such law governing thevalidity of testamentary provisions in the United States. Each State of the union has its own lawapplicable to its citizens and in force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the
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law of the State of which the decedent was a resident. [39]Second, there is no showing that theapplication of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions in favor ofAlice, who in the trial courts opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court threw the will out,leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.

The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half (1/2) ofwhatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation, applying Article 144 of theCivil Code of the Philippines.

The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already probatedas duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is fatal, especially in light ofthe factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.

Validity of the Foreign Divorce

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.[40] we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces,the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case,the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their

national law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,[41] that once proven thatrespondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the rulingin Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her right to inherit fromhim.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,[42] we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country,the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may berecognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle inour civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. [43] Wehold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid andrecognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now, the effects of this divorce (as to thesuccession to the estate of the decedent) are matters best left to the determination of the trial court.

Validity of the Will

The Civil Code provides:

Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments shall begoverned by the laws ofthe country in which they are executed.

When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of the Republic ofthe Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws shall be observedin their execution. (underscoring ours)

The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children by her isglaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his wishes, since he was aforeigner, not covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legalcapacity.[44]

Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues best provedby foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was executed in accordancewith the formalities required is answered by referring to Philippine law. In fact, the will was dulyprobated.

As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good customs maybe involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to extend the same to the successionof foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the amount of successional rights to the decedent'snational law.[45]
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Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.

The Fallo

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. SP No.17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.

In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and RECOGNIZES asVALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente by the SuperiorCourt of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.

Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the intrinsicvalidity of Lorenzo N. Llorentes will and determination of the parties successional rights allowingproof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch tosettle the estate of the deceased within the framework of the Rules of Court.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.


Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,vs.

MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding

Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.

QUISUMBING,J.:

At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedlycommitted by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters thatspring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order 1 dated September 30, 1999 ofpublic respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional TrialCourt,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) theorder3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially setaside the trial courts order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issuesrelating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married privaterespondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Theirmarriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental. 4 Out of theirunion were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987,respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition 5 for declaration of nullity of marriage beforethe Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion todismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order8 datedAugust 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court ofAppeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case tothe RTC.


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Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.

The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van Buirenof the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the groundthat the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree ofdivorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioners motion to dismiss.Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed forthe purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the prop

Documents

DAYUN 1-6 ORBECIDO-ROEHR