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Day Three: Regional Resiliency & Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism Modeling of Evacuation Destinations

Day Three: Regional Resiliency & Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism

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Day Three: Regional Resiliency & Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism Modeling of Evacuation Destinations. Spontaneous Evacuation. Evacuation should not be conceptualized as the government bringing in buses and taking people to shelters - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Day Three: Regional Resiliency & Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism

Day Three: Regional Resiliency & Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism

Modeling of Evacuation Destinations

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Spontaneous Evacuation

• Evacuation should not be conceptualized as the government bringing in buses and taking people to shelters

• Rather, the vast majority of people evacuate on their own, in their own vehicles

• Where do they go?• What are the implications

for reception communities?

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Three Mile Island - March 28, 1979

• Only 3,500 should have left…144,000 people within a 15 mile radius of the plant evacuated (evacuation shadow)

• Median evacuation response: 85mi (137km), 100 mi (161km), 111 mi (180km) (depending on study cited)

• Virtually none went to Hershey shelter

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Evacuation Planning Tool: Purpose

The objective of this project was to develop a map-based The objective of this project was to develop a map-based tool to predict community population surge following tool to predict community population surge following potential urban disasters. The final product was designed potential urban disasters. The final product was designed as a planning tool for preparedness planners, and as an as a planning tool for preparedness planners, and as an educational tool to inform policy makers about the issue educational tool to inform policy makers about the issue of population surge resulting from urban evacuation.of population surge resulting from urban evacuation.

The tool includes information on the number of likely The tool includes information on the number of likely evacuees, evacuee demographic information (such as evacuees, evacuee demographic information (such as presence of children, disability status, etc.), and local presence of children, disability status, etc.), and local planning information.planning information.

Page 5: Day Three: Regional Resiliency & Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism

How the tool works – 3 types of variables

Scenario Specific Variables: Scenario Specific Variables: Based on the nature of the precipitating event – how much “push” Based on the nature of the precipitating event – how much “push”

does it have, and how many urban citizens are likely to evacuate does it have, and how many urban citizens are likely to evacuate as a result?as a result?

Original scenarios: dirty bomb, pandemic flu, industrial/chemicalOriginal scenarios: dirty bomb, pandemic flu, industrial/chemicalDemographics Variables:Demographics Variables: Based on the demographics of the urban area, who is more or Based on the demographics of the urban area, who is more or

less likely to evacuate? For example, people with children are less likely to evacuate? For example, people with children are more likely to evacuate; people with disabilities are less likely to more likely to evacuate; people with disabilities are less likely to evacuate, etc.evacuate, etc.

Pull Variables:Pull Variables: Based on known information about counties surrounding the Based on known information about counties surrounding the

urban area, which will be more or less attractive to evacuees? urban area, which will be more or less attractive to evacuees? Features that make a county more attractive include things such Features that make a county more attractive include things such as road networks into the county, number of hotel rooms and as road networks into the county, number of hotel rooms and second homes, family networks, etc.second homes, family networks, etc.

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IND Scenario Modifications

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Page 11: Day Three: Regional Resiliency & Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism

IND Scenario Modifications

• Modify Dirty Bomb scenario to 10 Kiloton Detonation– Revise center city population at time of impact to

include commuters (+ 1.48 mil) and tourists (+ 910,000)

– Subtract Manhattan commuters from surrounding counties

– Decrease proportion of Manhattan evacuees assuming injuries and fatalities (from 65% to 40%)

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Page 12: Day Three: Regional Resiliency & Health Challenges in the Aftermath of Nuclear Terrorism

IND Scenario Modifications

• Modify Dirty Bomb scenario to 10 Kiloton Detonation (continued)– “Turn off” immediately surrounding counties as

evacuation destinations/increase evacuation zone (set counties within 10 km at 80% evacuation; 10 to 20 km at 60% evacuation)

– Manually cut Long Island “pull” by 75% and redistribute evacuees

– Decrease numbers of evacuees remaining within 150 mile radius on the assumption that people will evacuate farther (from 52% to 40%); 50 mile radius from 25% to 13%; 50 to 150 stays at 27%

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• Rural Preparedness Planning Guide

• Panel findings synthesized into set of guidelines

• Intended audience: rural preparedness planners (local health depts., emergency managers, etc.)

Implications for Rural Preparedness Planning

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Reports available at:http://walshcenter.norc.org

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Questions

Please contact:

Michael Meit, MA, MPHCo-DirectorWalsh Center for Rural Health AnalysisNORC at the University of Chicago4350 East West Hwy, Suite 800Bethesda, MD 20814

PH: 301-634-9324Fax: 301-634-9301

Email: [email protected]