Day 1 - Web viewdigital platforms rely on network effects + economies of ... Refraining from misleading recruitment and advertising with respect ... hierarchy, stress, lack of

RESHAPING WORK IN THE PLATFORM ECONOMY19-20 OCTOBER 2017, AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS

Conference Notes

[Disclaimer: My own contributions and remarks in the notes are in red font, with the remaining text being the verbatim or near-verbatim remarks by the speakers. Platform, sharing and gig economy is used interchangeably by the speakers, which is reflected in my notes. Please excuse any grammatical/spelling errors or any omission of content. The copyright of all the slides belong to the respective presenters and serve to fill gaps in my notes.]

Day 1

KEY NOTE SPEECH

“How Digital Platforms Enable Work”

Very Demary (Cologne Institute for Economic Research) VD is a German economist who spoke about the economic properties, relevance, challenges and opportunities of digital platforms.

In the late 1970s there was a fear of automation, in the early 2010s the fear is digitalization. Speaker showed two Der Spiegel covers illustrating these public fears.

Amazon was the first major digital platform but there has been a proliferation recently. What is a digital platform? From an economic viewpoint:

o At least two user groupso Platform allows interaction between user groups via the interneto The goal of the platform: create value for each of the user groups.

Economic model of digital platforms: digital platforms rely on network effects + economies of scale to push rapid growth. Economies of scale are possible as despite initial, fixed costs being very high, the later variable cost (e.g. to add additional users) is negligible.

Why digital platforms are attractive: transaction costs for physical labor are reduced. This includes search and information costs, bargaining and decision costs and policing and enforcement costs. (“The more involved the platform is, the lower the transaction costs are”). In the past, yellow pages and earlier digital platforms like Craigslist were not transparent compared to newer monolithic digital platforms (e.g. myhammer.de to contract craftsmen such as floor tilers, electricians and painters)

Categorization of digital platforms: The speakers categorizations were - search, social networks, market place platforms, sharing economy platforms, digital labor platforms and other digital platforms. Still difficult to categorize as there is overlap and different points of view. The speaker thinks that all of the platforms are digital labor platforms in one way or another.

Types of work done using digital platforms: physical work (“service provider and customer are physically in the same place) and virtual work (service provider and customer are in different places).

o Properties of virtual work:

Morshed Mannan, LLM (Adv.)October 2017

Regular virtual task can be an individual task done for a consumer (e.g. translating a document online)

The other possibility is crowdworking where an individual task is fragmented into micro-tasks for one or multiple service providers. ( A lot of the current discussion in Germany is about this type of crowd-working. How does crowdworking work? - Problem/Question Launch of call/competition gathering of proposals evaluation of proposals and selection decision about future use of resource (i.e. how to use the crowdworkers in the future, if necessary). The speaker notes that this is not very different from how companies contract out work in the past but here tech is used to fragment tasks. German ICT companies in a 2015 survey said that only 4% of companies use crowdworking. Only 8,000 people are using Amazon Mechanical Turk platform in 2017. The speaker stresses that this means crowdworking is still a new phenomenon, ripe for shaping.

Bangladesh and Philippines are 2 of the countries most involved in micro-working in the world. (See Graham and Sabbata’s study from 2013.)

UK, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece crowdworking is emerging according to Eurofund (2015). Netherlands, France crowdworking is not emerging according to Eurofund (2017).

o EU-wide initiatives on digital labor platforms: EU-Com Project, online panel survey on digital labor platforms targeting EU citizens/service providers. The goal is to measure extent and impact of digital labor platforms. The results should come out in 2018.

o Opportunities of digital labor: for service providers its attractive because of its flexibility, eases labor market access and reduces barriers to self-employment; for customers its attractive because of flexibility, expands choice of goods/services and potentially reduces costs; for the economy there can be potential ‘rebound effect’ and some black market activities could be transferred to platforms

o Challenges of digital labor: for service providers there are social risks (occupational risks, security risks, data protection issues, labor law issues), shift of the entrepreneurial risk to the individual and possibly there is a limitation of rights (e.g. rating systems); for customers there is a quality management issue, risks of losing control over a process and inhouse competencies and legal risks (e.g. law applicable if cross-border work); for the economy there is possible risk for social security systems if digital labor does not pay in and potentially lower tax revenue (e.g. by slicing up a large amount of work into micro-tasks, the contracting out of work may not be taxable while they would be if work was contracted more traditionally)

o One discussant pointed out that the presentation was missing a focus on the position/role of the platform.

THE PROTECTION OF DIGITAL LABOR: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES


“Classification of the legal relationship between a platform and workers: an example from the Dutch legal service industry”

Susanne Heeger (Law Department, Utrecht University)Victorien Bruggink (Law Department, Utrecht University) (not present)

Utrecht University is currently undertaking an interdisciplinary research project on the future of work. She is an academic involved in this project. She speaks mainly about testing whether the new RechtDeur platform is an employer or not of lawyers.

Under the Dutch Civil Code, a person can only claim to be an employee if they have an employment contract. Everyone else is responsible for managing their own precariousness.

RechtDeur: It is a platform where accredited law schools can sign up; lawyers who put in certain personal info (cv, expertise, ratings, reviews etc.) are connected with clients through an online app. Lawyers decide when they are available online but their fees are fixed and non-negotiable and they can be removed from the platform if they are not active enough. Lawyers have to take care of their own personal liability insurance, etc. RechtDeur deducts transaction fees. Lawyers must log the work performed off-line within 24 hours. Clients are required to submit a review. The platform enables the creation of communities, fraternal exchange, etc.

Is there subordination and dependence in this relationship? (The test for establishing an employment relationship in the Netherlands) (MM: In many other jurisdictions as well)

o Is there subordination? RD is not authorized to give content related instructions i.e. no direct control There is freedom to choose working place/hours i.e. no control Rating system is a form of control Obligation regarding real time oversight within 24 hours of the work done

and expenses incurred – control o Is there dependency?

RD sets the price The price is appropriate or reasonable for the type of work Lawyer controls computer Lawyer has the ability to influence the level of income as s/he can log on and

offo A Speaker concludes that RechtDeur is most likely not an employer, as the

subordination and dependence tests are not cumulatively met. The lawyers perform their service in the capacity of self-employed persons.

o Another relevant factor is that the hourly wage of the lawyers working via RechtDeur is higher than 75 euros, above the Dutch coalition agreement on gig worker wages (CHECK) indicating that the lawyers are not employees.

o MM Question: Is there a third category of independent worker under Dutch law, other than employee and independent contractor? This was addressed in a later presentation by Hanneke. There is no intermediate category in NL but there are certain protections for non-employee workers. (For instance rest times for truck


https://www.uu.nl/en/research/future-of-work

https://www.uu.nl/en/research/future-of-work

drivers and minimum wage rules and co-determination rights and health & safety rules. As such there is an unofficial intermediate category that depends on economic dependence)

“An Incomplete Conversation: Tax Law and Worker Classification Fights in the Sharing Economy”

Diane Ring (Boston College Law School)Shu-Yi Oei (Boston College Law School)

Why classification is important for individuals in the US: Tort/Agency Law, Copyright Ownership, Antitrust, Collective Bargaining, Labor regulations, Tax, Retirement Benefits, Health, Anti-discrimination.

4 common classification tests: o common law of agency test (restatement (third) of agency, with emphasis on

control); o economic realities test (applied by Department of Labor in Fair Labor Standards Act

analysis); o “ABC” test (applied by majority of states for state unemployment insurance law

analysis); o IRS 20-factor test (tax test, focus on behavioral control, financial aspects and nature

of relationship). o Four tests are actually similar.

Sharing Economy Developments in the US:o Piecemeal approaches at worker protection (e.g. Seattle Ordinance). Curious case of

Uber ‘independent contractors’ being able to collectively bargaino Advocacy for “third category” (remains theoretical) o Tax wildcard (uncertain as there have been proposals but no federal action yet)o INC class actions in CA, MA, NY, etc. driven by labor law concerns, not tax


o No major action has happened to regulate the gig economy. The incomplete conversation is due to silos and first movers. Silos: Lawyers, regulators, academics and policy makers operate in their areas of expertise

alone. Can explicitly or implicitly make assumptions about effects in other areas. For instance, there is a dominant assumption that workers would be better off if they are employees due to labor law protections. However, this has problems in the tax context. While independent contractors bear burden of reporting/paying taxes on a quarterly basis and employees do not BUT the former can deduct all reasonable business expenses while the same expenses are not fully deductible if an employee.

o Check the authors’ empirical research on this. First Movers: (1) Litigation, (2) Local Ordinance e.g. allowing Uber and Lyft drivers to

unionize; (3) Federal (tax) Legislation. The risk of (1) is that cases may reach conclusions that are not binding elsewhere (California ruling not applicable in Mass.) but just influential. The concern about (2) is that solving one specific issue (collective bargaining) may ease pressure on re-evaluating the classifications. The concern about (3) is that it may underplay high stakes in classification debate by saying that it is “just about tax”, without wider ramifications.

Takeaway: worker classification debate has not adequately considered the tax implication. Debate has not considered the differential effects across sharing economy sectors (e.g. drivers v. task performers). We should also be cautious that digital platforms may not change their business model just because workers have been ruled to be employees. (The important exception is California, where business model would have to change)

The speaker argues for better classification conversations. We need legislation to minimize (adverse) impact, legislators need to question their assumptions and be attentive of potential ramifications and finally, be attentive to first mover effects

Ongoing questions:o How do we identify the best worker classification? o What should be tied to worker classification?o What processes are best for comprehensive debate?o When is being a first mover appropriate? o How do these tensions play out in other countries?

“What about the service provider? Models of Protection of P2P Service Providers”

Dr. Wouter Verheyen (Erasmus School of Law)

The conventional way academics have approached digital platforms is finding that users need protection and labor law should protect them. The speaker argues that (critical) contract law can have an important role (e.g. unfair contract terms) as well. The speaker did research on how transport law can protect users, in comparison to labor law. This is useful to consider as it allows even independent contractors to have certain protections without being considered an employee.

Liability for damage to contract parties in labour contractso BE + NL -> immunity of employees


o If ZZP, there is a presumed liability on ZZPer to contract parties. This liability is limited. 8,33 SDR in BE or 3.40 EUR per kilo. This is very low liability exposure in case of applicability of transport law rules. There is an exception to this, in NL for courier delivers there is 454 EUR limit/per parcel but only if contractually agreed to.

o Thus for the ZZPer carrier, equivalent protection under transport law. o The problem of course is that carriage law was drafted with trucks in mind.

Liability for damage to third parties o No protection for ZZPer. Needs third party insurance. Transport law doesn’t help

Liability for damage to own property/personal injuryo Caused by third party third party’s insurance (insolvency risk)o Caused by shipper shipper’s insurance.

Working time regulations under transport lawo E.g. driving and resting time legislation imposes a requirement that 45 min rest ever

4.5 hours; daily rest of 11 hours with max driving of 9 hours; weekly rest of 45 hours and can be shortened to 24 hours with compensation

o This is only applicable to 3.5 ton trucks not bike couriers. Conclusion:

o Transport law could provide for an almost equal protection of the (courier) freelance service as labor law does

o The connection to “the truck” as driver of transport law does erode such protection of course

o Ratio underlying protective legislation would however support incorporation in contracts.

o Collective action seems to be desirable.


“Platformwork vs. franchising: a different approach for regulation”

Hanneke Benaars (University of Amsterdam)HB is doing research on “work-on-demand-via-app”, not crowdwork. She analyses whether certain protections could be extended to service providers via franchise law, imagining the service provider to be franchisee. Could that be a useful alternative to establishing an employment relationship?

Is current legislation ready to deal with new forms of work? More generally, how to make legislation or regulation ‘future-proof’, a topic that is being considered since 2015 in Netherlands policy circles. One approach now being considered is purposive regulation; applying the theories of G. Davidov.


Franchise Agreementso How are franchise agreements regulated in the Netherlands?o There are 750 franchise formulas in NL. Approx. 30, 000 franchisees mainly in retail,

hospitality, services and health care. o No specific Act but there is a code of conduct since 2016. There is a legislative

proposal to give the Code prepared by the Dutch Franchise Association a statutory basis.

Obligations of the franchisor in the Code: Refraining from misleading recruitment and advertising with respect to results/possible earnings. There are pre-contractual information obligations written info on financial situation, forecast of turnover and costs and limitations on non-competition clauses. Franchisor has to provide commercial, operation and logistic means. They also have to provide training and help if results lag behind.

In other words, even if an employment relationship is NOT read into the relationship between a platform and service provider, franchising agreements could offer some of the protections (e.g. insurance!)

o Even in other jurisdictions, the purpose of franchising agreement is to rebalance bargaining relationship.

o Purpose of her research is: can classifying platform work as franchise agreement provide a useful alternative to regulate the relationship?

Similarities between franchise agreement and employment relationship: both relationships provide a source of income for worker/franchisee. Platform and franchisor need control to protect trademark of brand.


Inequality in bargaining power is also there, platform and franchisor both provide contract, have more legal support, knowledge and information.

Differences between franchise agreement and employment relationship: in platforms there may be no upfront payment (though there could be other lock-ins) and a different payment structure and risk. Client pays to franchisee who transfers to franchisors. In platforms, it is the other way around.

o Food for thought: Could there be a platform code of conduct?

Balancing bargaining power; Possibility to provide ‘platform franchisees’ with advantages such as

insurances Avoiding classification issues (and maybe opening other issues) Would franchise agreement be too big an infringement on contract

autonomy (as employment contract is)? Can we be more precise about economic dependence?

THINK-LIKE ROUNDTABLES

“Think Like a Labour Organizer”

Dr. Jason Moyer-Lee (General Secretary, IWGB)New, small trade union that first represented latin American cleaners, now represent couriers, foster care workers, etc. Lobbied same-day courier platforms for pay increases; was successful in some cases. Now the IWGB is engaged with challenging the business model of these platforms, i.e. to gain classification as limb (b) workers. The average courier doesn’t want to be an employee --> they like being self-employed and not tethered, they can get tax relief and more preferential national insurance contributions. In his experience, this was irrespective of whether they are British, transitory service providers (couriers) or immigrant, regular service providers (couriers). In short, Jason argues that an intermediate category of workers is a good thing.

Irene van Hest (Policy Advisor, FNV) and Mei Li Vos (Director, AVV)According to Irene van Hest (Policy Advisor, FNV – largest Dutch union with 1 million members) and Mei Li Vos (Director, AVV – smaller, alternative union), a third category of worker is not desirable in the Netherlands. Irene had very strong words against platform companies, e.g. platform companies not making social security contributions, weakens position of worker, diminishes wages etc. The FNV lobbies for platform workers to be treated as employees rather than for a third category. The Union still struggles with unionizing platform workers because of fragmented, incidental nature of work.

Mei Li Vos sees platform economy as a challenge to labour productivity, welfare and happiness. She worries about how social security will be paid for (40-40-40 system) in this new economy. We need to think of new ways of how platform economies contribute to the economy.

MM: I mentioned Miriam A. Cherry and A. Alioisi’s article “Dependent Contractors in the Gig Economy: A Comparative Approach” and how it compares intermediate categories in Canada, Italy and Spain. They found that a third category is not, practically, a panacea to extending protection to workers. If a third category is created, the Canadian model is preferable.


Jason mentions that in the UK, limb (b) workers are covered by collective bargaining agreements. Contrary to Barendsen’s contention that unions could be caught by EU anti-cartel rules, Jason says that this hasn’t been raised as an issue in the UK. ECHR says that Art. 11 encompasses collective bargaining rights.

Rachida el Johari (Employment Lawyer) argues that individuals should have a choice to determine whether they are a freelancer or employee. Gerrard Boot (Leiden University) says that this is not realistic for most professions as workers don’t have a strong position as companies shape relationships between the business and service providers.

New Dutch government has proposed specific criteria to determine ‘employee’ criteria.

Mohammad Anwar (Oxford Internet Institute) did research on 5 African countries and suggests that there is a high demand for unionizing. There was a discussion of how Whatsapp is used for organizing.

“Think Like a Gig Worker”

Yorick Bleijenberg (Rides for Deliveroo) Yorick spoke about his 18 months riding for Deliveroo. He is 32 years old and joined so that he could earn some money on the side and could bike for health reasons, leisure, etc. He loves how easy it is to join and the flexibility of the job.

Deliveroo decides on shifts two-weeks in advance. You need to apply for shifts: at least one shift in weekend evenings but no maximum. So he isn’t a full employee or an independent contractor (ZZPer). He works for 10 am to 6 pm for Deliveroo on a min-max contract. He gets minimum wages (9.75 EUR) + a small payment for vacation days (~0.50 per hour), sick days etc. for the hours he has worked. Altogether he gets less than 10 EUR/hour after tax. He doesn’t get vacation days. One employment lawyer intervened by saying that it is against European law to automatically get vacation ‘pay’ instead of vacation days. He does not have any additional insurance for riding risks. He is part of the Riders’ Union (linked with FNV union) and does think he is underpaid. He has three other income streams: (1) 15 EUR for referrals to get people on Deliveroo – now terms have changed to prompt inviting more people (2) tips (3) if he delivers more than one order per hour, then he gets a euro per order.

After 24 months, Deliveroo will not extend his contract more. If he becomes a freelancer, rather than a contract employee, he would get 6 EUR per order. Would need to work much, much more as there is no guarantee of orders.

Deliveroo does not do surge pricing to incentivize Deliveroo drivers to ride at certain hours (e.g. lunch, dinner, etc.)

MM: You say that you like the flexibility of Deliveroo but there seem to be a lot of uncertainties caused by it. Do you think about the implications of riding for Deliveroo – or other gig economy jobs – on your retirement prospects, on getting a mortgage for a flat, etc.? The discussant said that it has been part of discussions among riders and is one of the reasons why a union was created. Deliveroo has been non-committal about such concerns, saying that as they transition more riders to becoming freelancers they will consider addressing them and considering ‘additional’ rights.


Communities and meeting of riders were created within the Deliveroo organization but those have been lost force and been dismantled over time. There is now an informal community of 120 riders that speak to each other, joke, etc. There is also RooCommunity.com that just sends information to riders. The algorithm of Deliveroo inhibits riders meeting or idling when food is collected from restaurants.

Priorities of the riders union

End of freelance contracts Collective Bargaining Agreement (insurance, gear, communication from platforms etc.) Formation of Works Council (in the Netherlands, if you have more than 50 employees you

have the right to form a Works Council. This hasn’t happened yet) Permanent contract

Limits of coop conversion/formation, as perceived by Yorick:

Competition from other platforms – Niels van Doorn points out that you need a lot of expertise and USP for cooperatives to develop.

Open source platform (in France) – Coop Cycle Expensive technology. A lot of venture capital has been invested in improving algorithms and

tech infrastructure of Deliveroo. Yorick anticipates that there will be an IPO of Deliveroo soon. MM: To convert an existing business into a coop, a high R & D investment will not be needed but will be for IP rights.

PARALLEL PAPER PRESENTATIONS # 3

“The Regulation and Liberalization of Digital Work in a Cross-Border Context”

Dr. Johanna Jacobsson (Assistant Professor, IE University Madrid) Johanna works for a EU-level platform that answers legal questions for EU citizens from their respective countries. She is interested in digital work transactions that take place transnationally and how they can be regulated.

Can Labor be Traded?

It is already traded! Trade in Goods (Labour input is part of the product and its price) Trade in Services (contractual service provision is already part of international trade

agreements, including certain self-employed activities)

She refers to Richard Baldwin’s “The Great Convergence” (2016) book. He argues that “knowledge crossing borders in massive amount is the big new disruptive thing”. Developing world labour costs can be a tenth of what they are in the West – not just for manufacturing, but also service.

Liberalization of cross-border work

A whole new way of trading between countries: digital work classification problem Labour immigration is very challenging to liberalize, more potential in contractual service

supply.


The old protectionist trade barriers won’t work anymore “The globalization challenge”: many developing countries are likely to benefit from the re-

arrangemeent of global labour markets but especially the middle-class in the developed countries is losing leading to populism and protectionism.

Liberalization is not possible without regulation, especially in services. It is essential that services liberalization ensures Trust. Can platform ratings create trust in international services liberalization? Not likely, as the regulators (countries) do not trust each other.

Two basic drivers of an increase in digital work

Cheaper (i.e. price competition) Searcher for the best service provision internationally (i.e. skills) In short, it depends on how developing countries open up their international labour regimes.

The current regulatory framework for digital work

National country’s business and labour laws EU-wide regulation of the same Little at the international level. Indirectly covered under ITAs, Bilateral Migration

Agreements, DTT, Social Security Conventions, etc.

The speaker contends that questions re: employment classification, remuneration, working conditions, collection of taxes and social security payments and immigration should be regulated internationally.

“Turn Your Hobby into a Business on Etsy: From the Platform Promise to the Work Reality”

Dr. Anne Jourdain (University Paris-Dauphine)

What is Etsy?o The Etsy platform promises that handicrafts and DIY would be promoted as would

self-employment. Anne’s research questions:

o Is Etsy an opportunity of self-employment for hobbyist handicrafters and for professional artist-craftsmen?

o How does Etsy reshape work? Business Social Characteristics of the Work Activity

AJ’s methodology:o Qualitative research: interviews of Etsy sellers, interview of Etsy employees,

observation of Etsy exhibition in Paris o Quantitative research: statistical data from French and American shops.

Main results:


o Etsy is not a business opportunity for most sellers. 89% of Etsy French Sellers are women. They are people between 25 and 45 years old, based on her qualitative sample. They are generally highly educated and urban.

6% of Etsy’s sellers make 80% of sales. 65% of sellers (vast majority) make less than 10 sales.

As such, only a happy few earn a living from Etsy. The vast majority of Etsy sellers are hobbyists and artist-craftsmen. For the former, Etsy is an extra source of revenue and for the latter, it an important way of earning a living.

o Successful Etsy sellers are not makers. She refers to example of a 23 year old woman who designs tshirts and outsources t-shirt production. The woman turns a profit.

o Etsy sellers are encouraged to develop other activities than handicrafts. [See Image below]

o Etsy sellers are encouraged to act like an entrepreneur Etsy helps sellers to develop their commercial competences. They have

training courses, seller handbooks. Etsy encourages profit-oriented works Handicrafts are secondary in importance

o Etsy recently made changes in business model: it extended its code of ethics by authorizing outsourcing; it now promotes “creative entrepreneurs” besides handicrafters.

“What Was Old is New Again: How Digital Platforms Change Chef’s Work and Careers”

Dr. Sidonie Naulin (Associate Professor, Science Po/Grenoble) SN spoke about her ongoing sociological research on La Belle Assiette.


La Belle Asiette was created in 2013 in France. It is in 6 countries (BE, FR, Swiss, Lux, UK and one other). 650 private chefs. 1.3 million dishes served. 17-21% fee on each booking made on the platform.

Research method: qualitative interviews of private chefs (12 so far) Research questions and preliminary results:

o Where are the private chefs? They mostly work in big cities and over-represented in capital cities (although they personally live in the suburbs)

o Who are the private chefs? They are mostly men. 8 out of 10 in most places, except in Paris. From the qualitative research it seems that most of the private chefs are between 25-35, professionals are more numerous than amateurs. (Will later be substantiated with further data)

o Why become a private chef? Interviews revealed a weariness with the working conditions of traditional catering (low wages, extended hours, hierarchy, stress, lack of novelty, lack of advancement, etc.) Of course, they also appreciated it as an additional income stream and the independence it allows.

o What was the role of the platform? The platform is a vital for starting up the business and investment to acquire a customer base. The chefs do not have to depend much on the platform. Over time a personal connection is developed between the chef and customers who would rather not pay platform fee and would book with chef directly.

“Coping with Surveillance Capitalism in the Sharing Economy”

Michael Etter (Copenhagen Business School), Dr. Guilia Ranzini (Assistant Professor, VU Amsterdam), Christopher Lutz (Bl Norewegian Business School), & Gemma Newlands (Bl Norwegian Business School)

The Benefits of the Sharing Economy:o Community Building (Hamari et al. 2016)o Additional Income (Bardhi & Eckhardt, 2010)o Increased Sustainability (Frenken, 2017)

The Risks of the Sharing Economy:o Power Imbalances (Newlands et al. 2017)o Exclusion and Discrimination through Algorithms (Calo & Rosenblat, 2017)o Information Asymmetries (van Doorn, 2017)o Disruption of Established Industries (Bond, 2015)

Surveillance Capitalism: Theory. o In using a platform, both consumers and service providers give large quantities of

data to the platform. o Data collection as a process of capital accumulation, with “the purpose to predict

and modify human behavior as a means to produce revenue and market control”(Zuboff, 2015)

Two research methods: focus groups and surveyso 18 Focus Groups on Three Topics: Participation, Privacy and Power


o Focus Groups in NL, UK, Italy, Germany, Norway, Switzerlando Total of 98 users of sharing economy platforms (mostly consumers)o Focus on 20-35 year old, i.e. millennials o Analysis is still ongoing and is using open coding of material

Result from Focus Groups. 4 categories: Resignation/Inevitability (can’t do anything about data sharing), Optimism (normalizes data collection), Negotiation (willing to give up some data for the benefits of the platform), Cynicism (similar to resignation)

Result from Surveys. Online survey in 12 European Countries. Survey in NL, UK, Italy, DE, NO, Swiss, DE, PO, ES, Port, IRE. Nationally rep. sample of 6111 reps. Did linear regression on sample.

o Equitable Exchange Perceptions i.e. In their view, do they get out from the platform what they put in?

o Women and Lower Educated Users have significant higher values i.e. they generally think it is fairer. Social Responsibility motives of survey participants in using the platform (e.g. concern for environment) have a positive effect on their perception of the equitability of the services. There are also platform-related effects too.

Conclusions:o Qualitative data shows different ways of coping fatalism and cynicism to even an

extent of controlo Quantitative data shows only modest approval of perception about equitable data

practiceso Limitations: self-reported answers, priming, sample etc. of quantitative analysis.

Generalizability of quantitative analysis. Results from survey are available online for free.


Day 2KEY NOTES

“Helpling: Introduction”

Benedict Franke (CEO, Helpling) Helpling is a tech company operating Europe’s leading marketplace for household services, such as vetted service providers, booking, matching, scheduling, payment, invoicing etc. It is a curated online platform that connects households with service providers worldwide. A typical matching exercise will involve a cleaning service provider matched with a family. 90% of business occurs through recurring relationships. There are 100,000 service providers. More than 1 million customers have been served, 80% of clients provide 5/5 stars satisfaction. It operates in 9 countries around the globe (OZ, UAE, Singapore, Italy, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, UK, Ireland and France) .

He repeats the usual shibboleths concerning technology: its benefit in terms of security, time-saving, convenience, trust, etc.

Helpling connects self-employed, SMEs and Plcs to customers. MM: Classic example of a multi-sided ‘Matchmaker’ (David S. Evans).

Usual arguments against platforms:

People on platforms do not make enough money; Platforms create a downward spiral for prices; Speaker adds that Helpling pays more than

the market average. Platforms are a threat for traditional businesses; Self-employment is modern slavery and destroy labour rights

‘Real’ issues:

Income Inequality & Participation in Society Access to Social Security for Sole Entrepreneurs How do we bridge the two?

BF pointed out that policy to create a sustainable platform market really matters. To illustrate this, he used the examples of Country A (France) and Country B (Germany). In short, there is a huge black market for household services in Germany and a small one in France. Conversely, there is a vibrant legal market for household services in France and a small one in Germany.


The speaker attributes this to tax, regulatory, etc. policies which, among other things, leaves less money in the pockets of German service providers compared to French service providers. Note the differences between France and Germany with respect to VAT free income thresholds, sector-specific VAT rates and cost of participation in social security schemes:

The most notable aspect of this comparison, however, is the difference in tax ‘benefits’. BF means tax credits, i.e. the total amount deducted from the gross amount of payable tax. The implications of a 50% tax credit on labour was illustrated in the subsequent slide:


While contribution to social security in France increases with hours worked and income, the high VAT free income threshold and generous tax credits means that a substantially larger net sum is left for the service provider:


“Humans as a Service: Regulating Work in the Gig Economy”

Dr. Jeremias Prassl (Associate Professor, University of Oxford) JP covered the employment perspective and the competing narratives that have created a schism in the gig economy. Narratives are important as they shape regulation.

The ‘freedom’ narrative:

Entrepreneurship encouragement Flexibility, Income, Jobs (Labour Market Activation – bringing people into the legal market) Innovation Better Products, Lower Cost (Reducing frictions in the economy using algorithms)

The ‘medieval exploitation’ narrative:

Tightly controlled insecurity The algorithmic boss Technology is new but the underlying business model is ancient Having powerful intermediaries is an age old structure.

There is truth in both narratives because of the vast heterogeneity of self-employment.

Jeremias introduced the example of David and Zack, two self-employment construction workers who helped him in renovating his home. He claims that dependence is reversed here because despite being their client – there is little he can do if they have torn open his kitchen walls! He contrasts this with Citysprint couriers.

The binary divide between worker and entrepreneur are very important because employment law, tax, social security, consumer, tort etc. are all built on this binary divide.

He emphasizes how the gig economy has moved away from stable, bilateral employment contracts to intermittent, multilateral employment contracts. There has been a legal response to this:

Some are old employment relationship avoidance attempts (easier to deal with under employment law)

Creating new boundaries of work (more challenging to deal with) The real challenge is rethinking norms for a world of intermittent work.

Jeremias Prassl mentions the allegory (hoax) of Mechanical Turk: that no matter how shiny the platform, there is someone working behind it.

JP mentions how drivers can now take away written proof of their ratings (portable ratings).

MM: Question for JP about new norms about work – e.g. data as work. JP responds using the reCaptcha case in the US, which was lost, but brought up issues of unjust enrichment, etc.

In response to another question JP stressed the competition challenge of a platform coordinating/price setting for lots of small-scale entrepreneurs or even small-scale entrepreneurs coming together for price setting reasons.


QUESTIONS FROM GIG WORKERS“Reshaping Work Conference”

Laurin Sepoetro (Senior Associate, EU Public Policy at Uber)LS spoke about the fragmentation of work due to both macro and micro trends. He distinguished between ‘bad’ and ‘good’ flexibility. He claimed that Uber offers good flexibility because there is no exclusivity, no minimum commitment, no shifts, no favoritism and no discrimination. He showed statements from drivers in Brussels, Paris and London that say they like having control over their working hours. He claimed that Uber is able to create work for the short and long term unemployed, students, those with personal responsibilities and those with disabilities.

Uber has been rolling out ‘tips’ and ‘instant pay’ service on the apps. The latter is useful because they don’t have to wait for payment to be made.

Uber is now entering into new partnerships for benefits and protection (IPSE – accident and illness insurance cover; AXA and Moneyfarm – retirement and savings cover) and feedback (with driver associations)

Uber wants to play a constructive role in broader policy debates. LS said that there is a need for portable savings and benefits account, that there is lifelong learning and training as well as better integration of tax and social security systems.

“What Helpling can do for Cleaners”

Michelle van Os (Managing Director, Helping Nederland) In the Netherlands specifically there are more than 1000 cleaners. More than 60,000 jobs

conducted using said platform. Advantages: flexibility and ease of use (can accept or reject offers, receive notifications to

help you manage bookings on the go and easily do invoicing/payments) Looking to add a min – max hours to the app for cleaners to set their own hours; adding

more info to public profile about additional work cleaners would like to do; potentially adding a function that will allow cleaners to negotiate prices using the app.

Uber and Helpling are different because the latter requires 2 day notice to dispatch cleaner. Ratings are not accounted for in the work-allocation algorithm but are useful for clients to decide whether they want a service provider. Helpling service providers are not freelancers and invoicing is done by Helpling. At the end of the year there may be tax implications for Helpling service providers if they go above a tax bracket.

Josien van Breda (International Labor Market Consultant) Essentially argues that we should blend the non-platform (old) and platform (new) world.

Alina Lupu (Conceptual Artist and Gig Worker)Read a prose-proem about her working life.

“Freedom of movement and freedom from stability”.

Doesn’t get to work when they want (tips are not common in the Netherlands) Training was a 2 hour trip to an initial customer.


In the discussion roundtable with gig workers, the platform effectively creates the condition where riders have to work in dinner/weekend times. This takes flexibility out of the picture.

AL: There are other aspects of work other than cycling: mental preparation for example.

Uber Drivers: Ratings are replacing Tips in the taxi business so a tips button is a good addition. One driver felt that there isn’t much of a personal touch or personal recognition (driver of the week, driver of the month etc.) There are downward pressures on pricing in certain types of Uber.

A notable remark by the Uber representative is that it isn’t aware of the real-time supply of drivers at any one time (!!)

PARALLEL PAPER PRESENTATIONS # 3

“The Rise of the Sharing Economy as a Process of Institutional Entrepreneurship”

Koen Frenken and Arnoud van Waes (Utrecht University) and Lea Funfschilling (Lund University)RQ: How do (Dutch) platforms avoid existing regulation?

Case Studies: Peerby, Snappcar, Airbnb, Airdnd, Uberpop, Helpling, Werkspot

Main institutional logics in a society:

1. Market2. Corporation3. Profession4. State (the above four are part of the old economy – the past 2 centuries) 5. Family6. Religion7. Community

What are the unique qualities of platforms?

Platform is a (local) marketplace1. Market2. Corporation (algorithms) 3. Profession (checks and bans) 4. State (reviews) 5. Family6. Religion7. Community

Before corporations were used for coordination -> algorithms are used for this now.

State enforcement has been replaced with reviews continue service or ejected


This is based on how the platforms present themselves. Next table adds columns for sustainability, hobby and tech (“institutional logic in the

making”).

How do Platforms try to create a space for entrepreneurship?

They enter markets that are heavily regulated (housing , taxi , restaurants) and a large black market (illegal hotels, unofficial taxis, underground restaurants, etc.)

How do Platforms protect the entrepreneurial space?

Use data privacy to inhibit encroachment on their space. Peers cannot transact outside the platform, governments cannot enforce regulations and scientists cannot access claims (just sampling, intuitive research etc).

This process produces both tension and legitimacy. The Government starts to care about platforms after they reach a certain scale.

How do Platforms then try to fill the entrepreneurial space?

Construction of an alternative institutional logic Local ad-hoc regulation to draw old/new boundaries (sometimes platforms want strict

regulations themselves e.g. 60 day max rent on Air B n B) National de-regulation (e.g. discussion on how to de-regulate taxicabs further.) European ICT-regulation

Collective institutional entrepreneurship

Community Logic + Sustainability Argument (Sharing) Family Logic + Tech/Hobby Argument (Hybrid)


State Logic + Formalisation Argument (Gig)

The case studies have different logics for how they want to be regulated and how they perceive themselves (sharing vs. gig economy) The initial coalition of platform players have started to emphasize their difference

Conclusion:

Technology: platform algorithms render institutional logics of corporation, profession and the state largely redundant.

“Work with Bits and Bytes: The Impact of Digitalization on the World of Work”

Dr. Mascha Will-Zocholl (Hessian University of Public Administration, Wiesbaden)Indicators of Digitization:

“Households with internet and/or broadband access” (MM: This is particularly relevant if trying to look at Bangladesh’s digitization)

“Computer/Smart Phones/Laptop Use at Work”

Theory of Informatisation:

Explains the connection between information production, handling and use and capitalist economies (Schmiede 1996; Boes 1995) The speaker makes a distinction between informatisation, digitization and virtualization, as indicated here:


New Topologies of Work

New social space of action: Emergence of new spatio-temporal relations: information space as space of production

Subjects of work are transferred into this space. Spaces are produced by the action (communication and coordination) of people work together globally.

Emergence of New Working Types in contrast to the normal employee

1. Virtual Work (Randle 2014) Platorm-based WorkProsumption Work Consumption Work Social Reproduction: personal qualities and social identities mobilized for value creation

2. Knowledge or information work (Bell 1973, Reich 1991) Means of production changing from work and capital to knowledge and information.

3. Homo faber digitalis (Schmiede 2016) (speaking about human robots; refers to Hannah arendt’s distinctions of work)

Four Dimensons to Tracing Changing Forms of Work

1. Time2. Place


3. Employment4. Qualification

How many jobs are expected to be replaced by automation? The numbers differ according to the context taken into account. Frey/Osborne 2013 47% in US, BMAS 2015 42% in Germany, Dengler/Mattheis 2015 15%.

Limitations of the ‘RNR’ work paradigm

It isn’t useful to only focus on the quantitative employment effects Nor is it useful to only look at technological inefficiencies (i.e. engineering bottlenecks) Not is it useful to only focus on automation when other changing are happening too Nor is it useful to fail to account for the human capacity to adapt


“Legal Interpretation of Digital Algorithms and Consequences for Work”

Dr. Julia Tomasetti (City University of Hong Kong) JT shares hypotheses about the nature of algorithms and its implications on worker rights.

“Legal liability often turns on judgments about human agency—evaluations of discretion, control, and/or culpability. When parties to such disputes attribute their actions to digital algorithms they create and manage, legal decision-makers must interpret the algorithm to determine liability.”

Research questions: o What implications do digital algorithms have on the employment

relationship? o In coordination?

Algorithms seem to be hyper-rational and automated but they have a lot of human tinkering and human feedback.

Can algorithm produce a subjective opinion? – question raised in an ongoing lawsuit. Algorithmic management – concept derived from “Working with Machines” publication.

Legal actors try to show that algorithms are automated, dispassionate objectivity and hyper-cognition; beyond the capacities of humans.

Uber passengers brought an anti-trust lawsuit claiming that algorithm is implicated in a price-fixing conspiracy by Uber and drivers. Former CEO of Uber suggested that algorithm is hyper-rational and isn’t subject to human guile – it can’t be part of a conspiracy. This is even more so because the alleged conspiracy involves hundreds of thousands of drivers. Court rejected


these qualities of the platform and the algorithm the ‘genius’ of the app is that it can coordinate so many drivers.

JT then went over the well-tread discussion re: employment vs. independent contract. More interestingly, can an algorithm fulfill a management function? Yes, because it supplies work, supervises work, etc.

KEY NOTES

“Regulating Gig Workers in a Progressive Jurisdiction”

Benjamin Sachs (Harvard Law School) What is it that a progressive jurisdiction, one that is interested in the lives of gig workers, what is it that such jurisdiction should do?

EU: Country or municipality; US: State

What do Gig Workers Need from Law?

1. Minimum standards protections (minimum wage and pay, anti-discrimination, physical working environment that is safe and healthy, paid sick and vacation leave, income security and retirement)

2. Collective voice and negotiation with platforms (‘only’ way of democratically influencing gig economy conditions)

3. Protection from technology-related job loss. We need law to be there when driverless cars displace Uber and Lyft drivers. (Moving beyond territory of employment/labor law. What do we with the humans who will lose jobs? (Labor) law should not abdicate their responsibility to protect them) Could we identify moments when human labor has been replaced by robots? Could we then tax those moments? Tax revenue could be used for re-training, upskilling, counselling etc. Jobs of the Future Fund has been created in San Francisco < https://www.crowdpac.com/campaigns/330369/jobs-of-the-future-fund> His main point is that the benefits of automation should not only be earned by platforms and venture capital. Another option is: Equity-ownership of platforms to drivers (e.g. Juno) as well as platform cooperatives!! Freeman argues that it will allow drivers to share in the benefits of the business even if their own job is displaced. He also mentions the under-utilized chapter 157 of Mass. Worker Coop Law.

How should our jurisdictions regulate the gig economy to achieve said objective?

1. Treat them as employees and expanding reach of employees2. Treat them as independent contractors, expand reach of independent contractors and allow

them to collectively bargain3. Create an intermediate category

Option 1) In the US, the test of employment relationship is essentially: “who is the one that controls how work is done”? By his analysis most of the gig economy businesses exercise a great deal of control i.e. they are platforms. He stresses that there isn’t a discrepancy between being an employee and flexibility. Flexibility can be a good thing and is valuable but isn’t contrary to employee status. In the US, worker can set their own schedule, operate without supervision and still be an employee. We


https://www.crowdpac.com/campaigns/330369/jobs-of-the-future-fund

don’t want to lose all employment protections because we bow to the altar of flexibility. We need to understand employment more capaciously.

As an aside, he added that the US isn’t a progressive country in labor terms even employees don’t get pension benefits, guaranteed paid sick leave, guaranteed paid maternal/paternal leave etc. Unionizing rules should be reconsidered.

Option 2) Even if the US retains independent contractor status, we need to expand anti-discrimination and health & safety rights.

He argued for a portable benefit system: every platform would contribute a certain sum of money to a benefit fund. Every gig worker would have an individual benefit account and would maintain regardless of where they work. This fund would provide all the benefits that independent contractors do not currently enjoy. It would be universal. Some progressive US localities (Washington state – considering Bill regarding applying this to ‘brokers’ with 50 or more independent contractors; 25% fee or 6 USD per hour contributed platform) – CHECK. We need to create a carve out for independent contractors to unionize under competition law. Seattle is experimenting with this through an Ordinance independent contractors can now unionize and bargain price; the price will ultimately be accepted by municipality/city government. Further thought needs to be given about how collective action can be organized in the gig economy (e.g. of problem: works councils are illegal in the US)

Option 3) Creation of a third category creates the risk that we don’t see independent contractors being given ‘more’ rights, instead we see employees shifted down to the intermediate category. In his view this is a significant risk in the US. This may happen to janitors, home care workers etc. This could lead to regulation for gig economy ultimately harming other marginalized workers.

In conclusion, he argues that a progressive jurisdiction should protect gig workers as employees.

In response to an audience question, about the implications of employee status and non-compete clauses, he contends that it is possible but the law needs to be amended.

“So what do we do about digital platforms and platform labour?”

Professor Evert Verhulp (University of Amsterdam) Implications of platform labor:

o Detachment of work from an organisation, o shift of employers’ risk to work, o depersonification of work/lack of social context, o invisible labor,o businessmodels moving away from stable, bilateral relationships, o Surveillance and control of worker.

But…the service is great! And why should we oppose new services, new possibilities, etc.?

Problems with employment status: Employment status entails a lot of rights in countries like the Netherlands. For example: 2 years of sick wages at 70% of full pay (!)


Status symbol: (free) time and permanent employment contract.

In the Netherlands it is possible to be a self-employed person in an orchestra! There isn’t any difference in the function of a self-employed person and an employee of the orchestra. See case ECLI: EU: C: 2014: 2411 where it was found that this was a fiction (at least in relation to the orchestra).

Sometimes employees don’t want to be employees. There are tax reduction schemes that make being self-employed more financially lucrative (if you get gigs!)

Why did we invent employment law?

Protection of the subordinated worker? Or solidarity, self-development participation? To create a sustainable and enduring relationship? (Directive 99/70: The employment

contract for an indefinite period contributes to the quality of life of the works concerned.)

So what do we do with platforms?

We have to review the fundamentals of the labour market and social security (e.g. re-imagine subordination concept of employment law, robot tax, basic income, competition law)

Platforms are not able/willing to secure fundamental rights of workers, so we need the state or another body (public or private) to provide and enforce a floor of rights, but also to provide for the security/sense of community for workers.

And the challenge is to rethink the way we value work and it’s place in society


In response to one of the audience questions is that labor is becoming less and less important and interest in company investment in workers is diminishing. This leads to a need for universal basic income, among other things.


Documents

Day 1 - Web viewdigital platforms rely on network effects + economies of ... Refraining from misleading recruitment and advertising with respect ... hierarchy, stress, lack of