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Ewald, Franois (1993) Two Infinities ofRisk, in The Politics of Everyday Fear, ed. andtrans. by Brian Massumi. Minneapolis:University of Minnesota Press.

Valry, Paul (1952) Lettres quelques-uns. Paris: Gallimard.

van Wyck, Peter C (1997) Primitives inthe Wilderness. Albany: State University ofNew York Press.

In his books Cinema 1: The Movement-Image and Cinema 2: The Time-Image,Gilles Deleuze uses the cinema as hisworkbook for developing philosophical ideas.A predominant example is his thesis oncinematic movement. Deleuze grounds hisstudy of the cinema in a Bergsonianunderstanding of the image. He claims thatthe cinematic image is a movement-image,and from this he thinks through a wholegamut of philosophical problems, such as therelation between matter and image in termsof the question of movement/time.

Another idea in the cinema books, butone much less examined, is Deleuzesconcept of the sign. Thinking about theimage in terms of the problem of the signand language is not itself new: it has beenaround since the 1920s, and in the 1960sMetz was the first to use modernstructural/linguistic models to develop thisproblem (Guzzetti 292). For Metz, the imageis a sign in so far as: 1) it is a material thatrepresents reality; and 2) the nature of itsrepresentation of reality depends on the waythe sign is shaped by social/cultural codes.Deleuzes perspective on the cinematic signis a little different. First of all, his semioticsis developed in step with his determinationof the image as movement-image.Consequently, since the image is movement-image, underlying Deleuzes entire cinematicproject is the equation of image and matter.This makes Deleuzes cinema semiotics also asemiotics of the material world. Second ofall, Deleuze dismisses the primacy given therole of the code in semiology. For Deleuze, asign is meaningful because of its semioticmatter, not because of the code. He uses aconcept of expression (from his earlier workon Spinoza) to describe sign-formation as aself-modulation that is independent oftranscendent structures. Third, he adaptsCharles S. Peirces semeiotics to describe arange of outcomes of expression in otherwords, a range of different signs in thecinema.

In this essay I will explain Deleuzessemiotics in detail. There is a paucity oftexts concerned with an examination of andengagement with Deleuzes concept of thesign. And more broadly, not much has beenwritten on the potential of semeiotics for asemiotic analysis of the moving image.There have been inroads into this problem,but these have only gone as far as toconsider the moving image in relation to thetypology Peirce builds around therepresentative condition of the sign inother words, the sign-object relation as aFirst (Icon), Second (Index) or Third(Symbol) using this range ofrepresentation as a way of offering an

alternative to semiologys preference for thecoded sign. I will make clear how Deleuzesuse of Peirce and development of a semioticsis much more complicated and yields a greatpotential for future semiotic analyses of thecinema.

Most important about my argument isthe way Deleuze translates his concept ofexpression into semeiotics and develops arich and practical range of signs in thecinema. Looking closely at the cinema,reading between the lines of Deleuzes thesis,reveals a version of Peirces Tri-Square ofsign elements underlying the cinema books,and in terms of the (hierarchical)combination of these elements, a version ofPeirces triadic (completed) signs. Thedifference, however, is the sense in whichDeleuzes signs are expressions of semioticmatter, and consequently, that the structureof Deleuzes semiotics is a structure ofimmanence. Deleuze doesnt say as much, yetI think breaking his argument down to itsbare bones and thinking about his signs inthis way gives us a practical semiotics we cantake from the cinema books and apply to allfilms.

1. Background and Context

Consider a key relationship in the cinemabooks. This relationship involves a signaleticmaterial on the one hand and the sign onthe other. The signaletic material is thesemiotic matter of the image, the stuff of theimage. This is the image in terms of itsqualities, colours, and sounds the mostbasic sense of the image. Furthermore, sinceDeleuze specifies how the image moves(movement-image), equating the image andreality, the signaletic material of the image isthe same underlying stuff that makes up theobjects, bodies, sights and sounds of thematerial world. The sign is the imagesfunction as meaningful unit for somebody.Meaning in this sense is identified with theparticular way the signaletic material isembodied in an image; for example, the wayqualities, shapes, colours and sounds areembodied in the image of a snarling dog.Meaning is not the end result of relating theimage of a snarling dog to a code (snarlingdog = rabies); meaning resides strictly in thenature of the embodiment.

Deleuze describes the signaletic materialin the following way: he calls it 1) an a-signifying and a-syntaxic material eventhough, 2) it is not amorphous (Time 29).From the first point, the a-signifying meansthat the signaletic material is not naturally asignifying matter in other words, it is notnaturally meaningful. Furthermore, the a-syntaxic means much the same, but with a

subtle difference. The a-syntaxic means thatthe signaletic material is not naturallyorganized into a structure of meaningfulunits. The second point tells us that thesignaletic material is not amorphous: it is notindeterminate and without any shape orcharacter. By putting these two pointstogether, then, Deleuze is telling us that thesignaletic material is not a meaningful ororganized substance, but neither is itmeaningless or amorphous. Consequently,Deleuze also explains how the signaleticmaterial is virtual. Its real but not actual.We cant see it, but we know its there.

Why does Deleuze determine thesignaletic material according to the abovetwo points? First, if the signaletic material issignifying/syntaxic then it would already bemeaningful in some sense. Thus the sign, inembodying the signaletic material, would infact be functioning to uncover a latent orpossible meaning. Now, if the meaning ofthe sign is possible, it is inseparable fromactual existing meaning. Consequently, themeaning uncovered by the sign would alwaysbe determined in some sense by pre-existentmeaning. Second, if the signaletic materialwas amorphous, then the sign would notuncover a latent meaning (for there is nomeaning to be uncovered). Instead the sign,in embodying the signaletic material, wouldin fact be shaping the signaletic material andmolding it into meaningful substance. Forthe sign to assume such a function it mustalready be meaningful in some sense,implying that the meaning resulting from thesignaletic materialsign relationship would,at best, be a version of pre-existent meaning.For Deleuze, both the above positions onmeaning have a negative impact oncreativity in language.

Deleuze claims that the signaleticmaterial is neither amorphous norsignifying/syntaxic. It is an existing matter,but since its nature accords with neither ofthe above conditions, he calls it a plasticmass (Time 29), ensuring that the meaningproduced in his conception of the sign is nota version of something pre-existent, but iscompletely new, fresh, original andspontaneous.

For Deleuze, what is the relationship ofsign and signaletic material? We know thatthe sign, as the embodiment of the signaleticmaterial, does not function to make actualsome possible meaning, and neither does itshape the signaletic material. Deleuze tellsus that the sign is 1) irreducible to thesignaletic material, yet 2) not without adeterminable relationship to it (Time 34).For Deleuze, then, the sign determines thesignaletic material, but not in the sense Ihave noted so far. One way we can describe

SRB Insight:

Deleuze, Peirce and the Cinematic SignBy Roger Dawkins

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this process is with Deleuzes concept ofexpression. Deleuze develops this concept inmost detail in his monograph on Benedict deSpinoza. Andr Pierre Colombat (2000:16)gives us an insight into its meaning when hedefines expression as a process of unfoldingand involvement. What is suggested is a sensein which the sign is an expression of thesignaletic material in so far as it marks theextension and transformation of thesignaletic material into something different.Consider again the above example of a sign:the image of a snarling dog. For Deleuze thisimage is not a sign in so far as it is a jumbleof stuff (qualities, shapes, colours) to whichmeaning is attributed (codes). To be sure, itis an assemblage of stuff that is meaningfulbecause of the way, as an assemblage, thesemiotic matter is unfolded, existing slightlydifferent to itself in its form as a sign.

2. Enter Peirce and Spinoza

Not a great deal can be done withcodes (Deleuze Time 28). This is the claimDeleuze makes in the cinema books whenlevelling a critique against semiology.

Keyan G. Tomaselli (1989 qtd. in 1996:44-5) is of the same opinion. Whenconsidering a suitable model for the analysisof how meaning is made in ethnographicdocumentaries, he claims that semiologytakes codes for granted. He writes that codesare not natural, neutral or even necessary.Tomaselli states that the coded sign bringswith it a notion of meaning that is saturatedwith the ideological imperatives of society(45). Furthermore, he feels that theseideological imperatives unavoidably restrictthe signs ability to represent an experience.

For Tomaselli, Peirces semeiotics is atheory of meaning that considers the signindependently of codes (transcendentstructures). In Tomasellis reading of Peirce,signs are the way a subject makes sense of anencounter, but this process of making sensedoes not depend entirely on the subjectsreference to codes. Tomaselli explains thispoint in semeiotics when he notes three stepsinvolved in a subjects attempt to make senseof an encounter. These steps correspond tothe fundamental properties of the universe,or what Peirce calls the phenomenologicalcategories of Being: Firstness, Secondnessand Thirdness. Each step, taken separately,implies a different notion of what anencounter is, and each step implies adifferent notion of the sign (there are signs ofFirstness, Secondness and Thirdness). And,the semiological sign is only one part ofsemeiotics: it falls among Peirces logical orconventional sign of Thirdness (Symbol).Thus semeiotics supports a broader and morevaried idea of the sign and meaning thansemiology.

Similar to Tomaselli, Deleuze uses Peirceto move beyond the limitations of codedsigns and transcendent structures. ButDeleuze also uses semeiotics to develop atheory of expression in the cinema. Based onBergsons matter/time ontology, Deleuzeequates matter in the universe with thecinematic image (movement-image). Hethen uses Peirces signs of Firstness,Secondness and Thirdness to conceive atheory of meaning in the cinema that isindependent of transcendent structures in

other words, he uses Peirces signs toconceive of a semiotic idea of expression.Thus Deleuzes reading of Spinoza is also keyhere. Deleuze conceives of Peirces signs asexpressions because, from Spinoza, heunderstands Peirces categories as immanentto the universe/cinema. The categories andthe universe are in immanence (which Iborrow from Deleuze) in the sense that thecategories rightfully exist and are notdetermined to exist by a transcendent force inthe material world.

Peirces theory depends on his division ofthe universe into three fundamentalcategories. These are ordinal and hierarchical in other words, Thirdness containsSecondness and Firstness, and Secondnesscontains Firstness in the same way that aRussian doll contains a doll within a dollwithin a doll. When the categories areseparated, Firstness is existence in-itself, forexample, redness (independent of itsembodiment in an object) is a First;Secondness is actual or genuine existence,when the redness is embodied in an object ina state of things (a rose, a fez, a Ferrari);Thirdness is logical existence, when anobject in a state of things is conceived as ageneral type that is representative of somelaw.

Consider Peirces concept of the sign.The categories of Being have a bearing onPeirces concept of the sign in two ways: 1)For Peirce, a sign, like everything else in theuniverse, is divisible into the threecategories. There are, then, three properties(or what I will call aspects) of every sign.These are apparent when Peirce defines thesign as something that stands for something else(its object) for some interpreting mind. Fromthis definition a sign is first of all somethingin-itself, and Peirce calls this aspect of thesign the Representamen. Second, a signstands in a relation with an object, andPeirce calls this aspect of the sign the Object.Third, a signobject relation is interpreted bysomebody, and Peirce calls this aspect of thesign the Interpretant; 2) The sign is the waya subject makes sense of an encounter. Insemeiotics there are three kinds ofRepresentamen, three kinds of Object, andthree kinds of Interpretant.

For clarity I call Peirces aspects of thesign, when considered from the perspectiveof their different categorical kinds, the signelements of semeiotics. From the threeaspects of every sign are nine sign elementsof semeiotics. These elements arerepresented below in Peirces Tri-Square:

Table 1

A Tri-Square of the Nine Sign Elements ofSemeiotics:

Table 1 sets out the three different kinds ofRepresentamen, Object and Interpretant ofsemeiotics. I will not explicate them here,instead I will simply note how each signelement is characteristic of a particularcategory of Being; for example, a Legisign is ageneral type that is a sign (a law), an Index isa genuine signobject relation (smoke as asign of its object, fire), and a Rheme, since itfocuses on the Firstness (qualities) of anobject, is a general interpretation.

When referring to the sign from theperspective of its combination of the signelements in a practical context, I will call thesign a completed sign. The fact that there arenine sign elements suggests a certain amountof variation potential to the completed sign.But, it is important to remember that Peircescategories are ordinal and hierarchical, andthis means that the combination of elementsinvolved in every sign is ordered by a certainleading principle derived from Peircesphenomenology. This is what James Liszkacalls the qualification rule, which statesthat a First cannot be combined with aSecond or a Third, and similarly, that aSecond cannot be combined with a Third(1996: 45). The result is that Peirces signelements combine to form only ten classes ofcompleted sign:

Table 2

Ten Classes of Completed Signs ofSemeiotics (Deledalle 2000: 19)

* Note: All expressions such as R1, O2, I3should be read according to Peirce in thefollowing way: a Representamen that is aFirst, an Object that is a Second, and anInterpretant that is a Third (8.353).

I will not explain these completed signshere, but merely offer examples: a RhematicIconic Qualisign is a feeling of red; anexample of a Dicent Indexical Sinsign is atelephone ring; and an example of anArgument Symbolic Legisign is a syllogism(Parmentier 1994: 18).

The most important thing aboutDeleuzes appropriation of Peirce is hisunderstanding of the immanence of thecategories. If the categories are immanent,then there is nothing transcendent thatdetermines a certain kind of experience as acertain kind of sign. This means that a signsimply exists, and a subjects relationship witha sign is based on nothing more than thematerial properties of that particularencounter. In The Movement-Image Deleuzegoes to great lengths to prove how thecategories are immanent to theuniverse/cinema. And on this pointBergsons ontology is also key to Deleuzesargument. He equates Peirces categorieswith what Bergson describes as differentlevels of subjectivity. Consequently, thededuction of subjectivity, according to whichsubjectivity is not determined by atranscendent force, is homologous to the

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deduction of the categories according towhich the categories arise in the universe and testimony to their immanence.

In so far as the categories are essentiallyimmanent, it becomes apparent in thecinema books that the categories, in theirnaturally tangled form (Peirce 1.280), arethe semiotic matter of the cinema (plasticmass). They are in immanence: nothing istranscendent to the signaletic material.Moreover, it follows that the signs producedfrom the categories/signaletic material arenot rightfully formed as a result of anytranscendent force. Their meaning is notrightfully pre-determined. Thus with theidentification of the categories in the cinemaDeleuze has the foundation from which todevelop his semiotics.

From Peirce Deleuze notes threecategories in the cinema, and I call these theimage-types of the cinema. Deleuze callsFirstness the affection-image: similar to Peirceit is the category of matters existence in-itself, not as a real thing (a delimited thing inthe universe, a Second), but a quality, avisual impression, an optical effect only.Deleuze calls Secondness the action-image:again it is similar to Peirces category in thatit is the domain of real objects in real spaces:it is the domain of Realism (Movement 141).Deleuze calls Thirdness the relation-image:like Thirdness in semeiotics, the relation-image is also concerned with logicalrelations.

Next, while Peirce describes three aspectsof the sign Representamen, Object andInterpretant Deleuze begins by notingonly two aspects of the cinematic sign. Hecalls these Genesis and Composition. At thisstage it is quite clear that Deleuze is stickingquite closely to Peirces concepts of theRepresentamen and Object respectively. YetDeleuzes terminology also emphasizes theimportance of Spinozistic concepts in hissemiotics.

In Deleuzes reading of Spinozas Ethicshe emphasizes Spinozas claim to oneimmanent substance in the universe. Spinozadefines substance as absolutely infinitebeing (Ethics ID4), and in this definition heconceives of God as that which is in-itselfand is conceived through itself (ID3).Furthermore, human being is a mode of theattributes of nature, and is conceived aspart of a dynamic and interconnectedwhole (Gatens 1996: 165). Deleuzeidentifies how, since Being is univocal,particular things (plants, animals, rocks) areproduced as the effect of a two-fold processof the expression of substance. In the firststage of expression, attributes areconstituted. Deleuze points out thatattributes are forms common to God andcontain the essences of substance(Expressionism 47). They are the basic formsfrom which life is developed and they arepotentially infinite in number. For thisreason Deleuze identifies attributes withgenesis, calling them genetic elements (80).The second stage is based on the expressionof an essence in the attributes by a particularthing, which Deleuze refers to generally as abody (a plant, animal and rock are all bodies).Deleuze (1978/2002: 6) notes that a bodyexpresses a genetic element of substance(attribute) through the composite or complex

relation of its parts (my emphasis).

Deleuzes understanding of these twostages of expression is key in his reading ofsemeiotics and his own development of thecinematic sign. I mentioned above thatGenesis is the concept Deleuze uses toconceive of the sign in-itself(Representamen), but in my opinion thisconcept also reveals his understanding ofhow the sign, in-itself, is equivalent to theessence (genetic element) of a body inSpinozas theology. In respect of thisequivalence, we can note that the sign (in-itself) is an essence of a category of Beingand is immanent to the cinema.Composition is the concept Deleuze uses toconceive of the signs embodiment in asignobject relation (Object), but continuingmy argument, this concept also revealsDeleuzes understanding of how thesignobject relations of semeiotics areequivalent to the way a body in Spinozaexists. For Spinoza, a body exists becausethe composite relation of its parts expressesan essence of substance, not because atranscendent God breathes life into itsmatter. In the same way, Deleuze is claimingthat a sign is embodied when a Compositionof elements in the cinematic frame express acategory of Being characteristic of a Genesis.With Genesis and Composition Deleuzeguarantees that a sign is an existing thingthat is meaningful in-itself. Returning to hiscritique of structuralism, then, Deleuze nowdefinitively rules-out the need fortranscendent structures to shape what wouldotherwise be an amorphous blob of semioticmatter.

Although Deleuzes concern for the bulkof the cinema books lies with the way thesigns of the cinema are embodied independently of their interpretation, hedoes eventually develop a third aspect of thesign quite clearly equivalent to PeircesInterpretant. Deleuze calls this aspect of thesign the Noosign, and I argue that itcompletes the (immanent) structure ofDeleuzes semiotics. Deleuze uses Genesis todescribe a kind of sign particular to acategory of the cinema; Composition todescribe the different ways a sign isembodied particular to the differentcomposite relations of a category of thecinema, and also, to demonstrate how andwhy a kind of sign is immanent (it isexpressed in a composite body of cinematicelements); and the Noosign to describe thedifferent kinds of interpretation forced byeach category of composite whole. In thesame way that Peirces three kinds ofInterpretant represent a continuum ofinterpretation: from the most general kind ofinterpretation (a qualitative interpretation orsensation: Rheme), to a more specific orfactual kind of interpretation (of an objectsproperties: Dicent), and finally, to a logicalinterpretation of an object (the formation oflaws, judgements or concepts: Legisign) ifwe look closely at the latter chapters of TheTime-Image then we can see how DeleuzesNoosigns also represent a continuum ofthought: from the most absolute kind ofthought to conceptual thought. Mostimportantly too, since the composite whole(sign) exists rightfully in-itself (it expressesan essence of substance in the same way as abody in Spinozas theology), the meaning of

the sign is contained naturally in thematerial properties of the sign. In otherwords, an interpretation does not rightfullybegin by attributing transcendent ideas towhat is otherwise amorphous semioticmatter.

3. A Structure of Immanence

If we follow through this thesis of thetriadic sign in the cinema books, then by theconclusion of Deleuzes study we can notethe following version of Peirces Tri-Square ofsign elements:

Table 3

A Tri-Square of Nine Sign Elements of TheMovement-Image

Represented above is the principal structureof signs in The Movement-Image. It must benoted, however, that Deleuze is not explicitabout presenting his signs in this way; it ismy thesis that this structure is underlying inDeleuzes study. The signaletic material isthe tangled skein of affection-images, action-images and relation-images. From Table 3, asign in Deleuzes semiotics is something in-itself, an essence (Genesis); it is manifestaccording to the particular way that essenceis expressed in a composite whole of imagesin the frame (Composition); and it forces acertain kind of thought (Noosign). It is astructure of immanence because there isnothing rightfully transcendent to Deleuzessigns pre-determining their interpretation.

I will be brief in describing myunderstanding of the specific character ofthese sign elements. Similar to semeiotics,Firstness for Deleuze (affection-image) is thecategory of Being in-itself. He borrowsdirectly from semeiotics when he describes itsGenesis as the quality in-itself, or Qualisign,and describes a qualitative Compositionbased on Peirces iconic signobject relation,or Icon. He uses an actors face as hispredominant example of the Icon, statingthat a facial expression can stand for thequalities of some object. He isnt explicitabout naming the Noosign of Firstness, buthe is quite clear in asserting a kind ofthought associated with the affection-imagethat is characterized as an interpretation ofsome possible state of things. This Noosign isequivalent to Peirces Rheme, and for thesake of my analysis I call it a Term (Peircesometimes uses Term and Rhemeinterchangeably).

Deleuze calls Secondness the action-image. His Genesis and Composition of theaction-image are much the same as PeircesRepresentamen and Object of Secondness,even though he uses different names. ForPeirce, the Representamen of Secondness isthe actual event constituted by the relationof two things, the Sinsign. For Deleuze, theessence of the sign of the action-image ismuch the same, the only difference beingthat he conceives of an event in terms of therelation between a situation and an action. Tomark this emphasis, Deleuze calls the sign ofthe action-image the Imprint. Peirce

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describes the signobject relation particularto Secondness with the Index. DeleuzesComposition of the action-image is a versionof the same: he describes the expression ofSecondness in a genuine relation of cinematicelements. Yet he uses two main scenarios todescribe this category of Composition. First,Deleuze focuses on the relation between asituation and an action; for example, when acharacter responds to a crisis in thecommunity and restores a sense of order.With this scenario Deleuze explains the firstkind of genuine relation as a binomial, andmodifying Peirces terminology slightly hestates that the first kind of Composition ofthe action-image is a Synsign. Second,Deleuze focuses on the relations of actionsthemselves. Furthermore, in so far asDeleuze claims that actions typically disclosesome kind of situation, he describes aversion of Peirces Index and states that thesecond kind of Composition of the action-image (in Chapters 9 and 10 of TheMovement-Image) is an Index.

With his discussion of Robert Flahertysdocumentary style, Deleuze implies aNoosign of the action-image equivalent toPeirces Dicent. He writes that films likeNanook of the North are predominantlyaction-images and simply present anexposition of the milieu, capturing in theraw a characters tte--tte with themilieu (Movement 143). Another way ofputting this criticism is to say that Deleuze(although he is not explicit about it) isnoting a Dicent as the dominant mode ofinterpretation of Flahertys films. Logicalclaims are not made; instead a sign forces akind of propositional thought only. For thesake of my analysis I name the correspondingNoosign the Proposition.

Deleuzes relation-image is based onPeirces category of Thirdness.Consequently, his sign elements function inthe same way as Peirces Legisign, Symboland Argument. Deleuze, however, doesntlabel the Genesis of the relation-image withPeirces Legisign. Instead, it is my claim thathe borrows Peirces concept of the Symbol forthe Genesis of the relation-image, in order toemphasize the plurality of relations potentialto the relation-image. Thus Deleuze shiftsPeirces Symbol from its function as thesecond aspect of the sign of Thirdness to thefirst aspect of the relation-image. In thisway, he shifts the emphasis from theSymbols signobject relation, to theSymbols concept as an abstract andpotentially open-ended relation (in the firstthird of Chapter 12 of The Movement-Image).What about the relation-imagesComposition and Noosign? Deleuzedescribes two kinds of Compositionequivalent to the abstract signobjectrelation characteristic of Thirdness, and hecalls these the Mark and Demark. TheMark is an abstract relation of elementsbased on their common properties, and theDemark is an abstract relation of elementsbased on their differences. And if we shiftthe emphasis in Deleuzes examination ofmontage (in his argument about classicalcinema) away from an emphasis onhistoricity, it becomes clear that hisdiscussion also describes the kind of thoughtparticular to the relation-image. Montagerefers to the relations of images, and more

specifically, montage is one way of describinga grouping together of elements that areotherwise unrelated it refers us to astrictly logical Composition of elements.Thus the kind of thought Deleuze identifieswith montage is the kind of thoughtcharacteristic of the Mark/Demark and therelation-image of the cinema. Furthermore,in so far as Deleuze (from Sergei Eisenstein)notes the whole (concept) as the outcomeof a montage process that is essentiallydialectical in nature, the immanence ofDeleuzes structure of signs is emphasized.This is due to the fact that thinking (in thecase of a dialectical relation) is an evaluationbased on the abstract relations of terms notdetermined by transcendent structures (Time158). For the sake of my argument I namethe sign of conceptual thought in Deleuzessemiotics the Whole.

I mentioned above how, for Peirce, a signis a combination of three aspects. Thisconcept of the sign is much the same forDeleuze: what I call a completed sign is acombination of Genesis, Composition andNoosign. Again, Deleuze isnt so explicitabout this: he doesnt use the wordscompleted sign and he doesnt render hissemiotics according to Table 3, but hisdiscussion nevertheless makes the structure Iam identifying quite transparent. When hedescribes the dialectical relations of imagesin Eisensteins films, he is describing what Iidentify as a Whole Mark/Demark Symbol.When he describes Flahertys documentaries,most pertinently, to be concerned with acharacters battle with a milieu, he isdescribing an event that is a sign, expressedin a binomial, and forcing a range ofpropositional style thoughts: a PropositionSynsign Imprint. When he describes Joan ofArcs face in Carl Th. Dreyers Passion of Joanof Arc as a quality expressed in-itself, a pureIcon, giving rise to an affective charge in theviewing subject, he is pointing to a [TermIcon] Qualisign (Movement 107; NB. I usesquare brackets here in order to denote thoseelements of the completed sign that do nothave to be stated when discussing the sign,since a Qualisign necessarily includes anIcon and a Term).

Moreover, when Deleuze describesspecial signs of the relation-image in theWestern for example it can be argued thathe is alluding to the hierarchical flexibility ofhis semiotic structure and the sense inwhich, similar to semeiotics, a kind of sign(Representamen/Genesis) can be expressedin a range of different cinematic elements(Object/Composition), and accordingly, canforce a range of different thought processes(Interpretant/Noosign). Taking the Western,Deleuze describes how the hero is oftenrepresentative of a collectivity: Thehero becomes equal to the milieu via theintermediary of the community (Movement146). This suggests some cases where thehero acts as a result of the wishes of thecommunity and, according to what thesewishes may involve, we can assume theyinclude the communitys desire for justice,and perhaps even vengeance. It can be said,then, that the binomial implied by the herosaction is expressive of a Symbol. And itfollows that the binomial is not interpretedlogically, but in terms of the factualinformation afforded by the combination of

cinematic elements (Proposition), orqualitative information (Term). What isidentified are the Proposition Synsign Symboland the Term Synsign Symbol respectively.

When Deleuze describes a quality that isnot expressed in-itself (Qualisign) but is tiedto a state of things, it is clear to a reader ofsemeiotics that he is describing Peirces ideaof an Icon that does not stand completely forits object. In this case Deleuze is identifyingan event that is expressed qualitativelythrough an Icon: a Term Icon Imprint.Importantly also, Deleuze is pointing outhow there are degrees of purity of the Iconand the thought process associated. In termsof a comparison to semeiotics, the mostcommon Icon is tied to a state of things.This is the most common kind because, asFloyd Merrell makes clear, Peirces Qualisign(a pure Icon) is only given in fleetingmoments of lost consciousness orforgetfulness (1995: 102). Thus Deleuzesdiscussion of the construction of Qualisignsthrough editing and framing also reveals thepotential of cinema, as a text, to readilypresent what may otherwise go unnoticed ineveryday life.

Regarding my discussion of thecompleted signs of The Movement-Image (andtaking into account the hierarchicalflexibility of sign elements noted above), Iwill put forward the following table ofcompleted signs in Deleuzes semiotics:

Table 4

Ten Principal Completed Signs of DeleuzesSemiotics

In this paper I cannot describe each of thesecompleted signs. Instead I hope only to givean overview of Deleuzes (Peircian) semioticsof the cinema.

In this essay I have revealed the Peircianstructure of signs underlying Deleuzescinema books. My aim hasnt been toexplain these signs in any great detail, but tomake the structure, and its flexibility, clear.This is because it isnt just a structure ofsigns in Deleuzes cinema books, but itrepresents a Peircian semiotics of the imageapplicable to the entirety of the cinema, inthe same way Peirces signs are applicable tothe entirety of the material world.

Roger Dawkins received his PhD from theSchool of Theatre, Film and Dance at TheUniversity of New South Wales in 2005. Heis currently teaching in Film and DigitalMedia at NSW.

References

Colombat, Andr Pierre (2000)Deleuze and Signs, in Deleuze andLiterature. Eds. Ian Buchanan and JohnMarks. Edinburgh: Edinburgh U P, pp.1433.

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Dawkins, Roger (2003) The Problem ofa Material Element in the Cinematic Sign:Deleuze, Metz, Peirce, Angelaki: Journal ofthe Theoretical Humanities 8.3.

- (2005) It Took Spinoza andStructuralism to Teach Deleuze thatMeaning is Not Necessarily Attributed toThe Cinematic Sign, Semiotica(forthcoming).

Deledalle, Gerard (2000) Charles PeircesPhilosophy of Signs: Essays in ComparativeSemiotics. Bloomington: Indiana UP.

Deleuze, Gilles (2002) Seminar Sessionon Spinoza, 24 January 1978. Trans.Timothy S. Murphy, Webdeleuze. 25 Jan..

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