David vs. CA

82 SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED

David vs. Court of Appeals

G.R.No.111180.November16,1995.*

DAISIET.DAVID,petitioner,vs. COURTOFAPPEALS,RAMONR.VILLAR,respondents.

Habeas Corpus; Parent and Child; Custody; While it is truethat the determination of the right to the custody of minor childrenis relevant in cases where the parents, who are married to eachother, are for some reason separated from each other, it does notfollow that it cannot arise in any other situation.—Itisindeedtrue,as the Court of Appeals observed, that the determination of therighttothecustodyofminorchildrenisrelevantincaseswheretheparents, who are married to each other, are for some reasonseparated from each other. It does not follow, however, that itcannot arise in any other situation. For example, in the case ofSalvaña v. Gaela, itwasheldthatthewritofhabeascorpusistheproper remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of aminordaughtereventhoughthelatterbeinthecustodyofathirdpersonofherfreewillbecausetheparentswerecompellinghertomarryamanagainstherwill.

Same; Same; Same; Family Code; Illegitimate Children; Wherethe mother of an illegitimate child has been deprived of her rightfulcustody by the child’s father, she is entitled to issuance of the writ ofhabeas corpus.—Inthecaseatbar,ChristopherJ.isanillegitimatechild since at the time of his conception, his father, privaterespondentRamonR.Villar,wasmarried toanotherwomanotherthanthechild’smother.Assuch,pursuanttoArt.176oftheFamilyCode,ChristopherJ.isundertheparentalauthorityofhismother,the herein petitioner,who, as a consequence of such authority, isentitled to have custody of him. Since, admittedly, petitioner hasbeen deprived of her rightful custody of her child by privaterespondent,sheisentitledtoissuanceofthewritofhabeascorpus.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Support; The fact that thefather of an illegitimate child has recognized the minor child maybe a ground for ordering him to give support to the latter, but notfor giving him custody of the child.—The fact that privaterespondent has recognized the minor child may be a ground forordering him to give support to the latter, but not for giving himcustodyof the child.UnderArt. 213of theFamilyCode, “no childundersevenyearsofageshallbe

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*SECONDDIVISION.

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VOL.250,NOVEMBER16,1995 83


separatedfromthemotherunlessthecourtfindscompellingreasonstoorderotherwise.”

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; That the motherreceives help from her parents and sister for the support of her threechildren is not a point against her—cooperation, compassion, loveand concern for every member of the family are characteristics of theclose family ties that bind the Filipino family and have made itwhat it is.—Nor is the fact that private respondent is welloff areason for depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,especially considering that she has been able to rear and supportthem on her own since they were born. Petitioner is a marketvendorearningfromP2,000toP3,000permonthin1993whentheRTCdecisionwasrendered.Sheaugmentsher incomebyworkingas secretary at the Computer System Specialist, Inc. earning amonthly income of P4,500.00. She has an arrangement with heremployer so that she can personally attend to her children. Sheworks up to 8:00 o’clock in the evening to make up for time lostduringtheday.Thatshereceiveshelpfromherparentsandsisterfor the support of the three children is not a point against her.Cooperation,compassion,loveandconcernforeverymemberofthefamily are characteristics of the close family ties that bind theFilipinofamilyandhavemadeitwhatitis.

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Actions; Pleadings andPractice; Although the question of support is proper in a proceedingfor that purpose, the grant of support in a petition for habeas corpusis justified where the respondent has expressed willingness tosupport the minor child.—Although the question of support isproperinaproceedingforthatpurpose,thegrantofsupportinthiscase is justified by the fact that private respondent has expressedwillingness to support the minor child. The order for payment ofallowanceneednotbeconditionedonthegranttohimofcustodyofthe child.UnderArt. 204 of theFamilyCode, a person obliged togivesupportcanfulfillhisobligationeitherbypayingtheallowancefixed by the court or by receiving andmaintaining in the familydwelling thepersonwho isentitled to supportunless, in the lattercase,thereis“amoralorlegalobstaclethereto.”

PETITIONforreviewofadecisionoftheCourtofAppeals.

ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.Orlando R. Pangilinanforpetitioner.Danilo G. Pinedaforprivaterespondent.

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1.

2.

3.

MENDOZA,J.:

Petitioner Daisie T. David worked as secretary of privaterespondent Ramon R. Villar, a businessman in AngelesCity.Privaterespondentisamarriedmanandthefatheroffourchildren,allgrownup.Afterawhile, therelationshipbetween petitioner and private respondent developed intoanintimateone,asaresultofwhichason,ChristopherJ.,was born on March 9, 1985 to them. Christopher J. wasfollowedbytwomorechildren,bothgirls,namelyChristine,bornonJune9,1986,andCathyMaeonApril24,1988.

The relationshipbecameknown toprivate respondent’swife when Daisie took Christopher J. to Villar’s house atVilla Teresa in Angeles City sometime in 1986 andintroducedhimtoVillar’slegalwife.

Afterthis,thechildrenofDaisiewerefreelybroughtbyVillartohishouseastheywereeventuallyacceptedbyhislegalfamily.

In the summer of 1991, Villar asked Daisie to allowChristopherJ.,thensixyearsofage,togowithhisfamilytoBoracay.Daisieagreed,butafterthetrip,Villarrefusedtogivebackthechild.VillarsaidhehadenrolledChristopherJ.attheHolyFamilyAcademyforthenextschoolyear.

OnJuly30,1991,DaisiefiledapetitionforhabeascorpusonbehalfofChristopherJ.

After hearing, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 58 atAngelesCity,renderedadecision,thedispositiveportionofwhichreads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby renderedinfavorofthepetitionerandagainsttherespondent:

therightfulcustodyoftheminorChristopherJ.T.Davidishereby given to the natural mother, the herein petitionerDaisieT.David;

respondentisherebyorderedtogiveatemporarysupportofP3,000.00 amonth to the subjectminor Christopher J. T.David,ChristineDavidandCathyMaeDavidtotakeeffectuponthefinalityofthisdecision;and

topaythecostsofthissuit.

SOORDERED.

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Onappeal,theCourtofAppealsreversed,holding:

We agree with the respondentappellant’s view that this is notproperinahabeascorpuscase.

Law and jurisprudence wherein the question of custody of aminorchildmaybedecided inahabeascorpuscasecontemplateasituation where the parents are married to each other but areseparated.ThisissobecauseundertheFamilyCode,thefatherandmotherhave jointparentalauthorityovertheir legitimatechildrenandincaseofseparationoftheparentsthereisneedtodeterminerightfulcustodyoftheirchildren.Thesamedoesnotholdtrueinan

adulterousrelationship,asinthecaseatbar,thechildbornoutofsucharelationshipisundertheparentalauthorityofthemotherbyexpress provision of the law. Hence, the question of custody andsupportshouldbebroughtinacasesingularlyfiledforthepurpose.Inpointoffact,thisismoreadvisableinthecaseatbarbecausethetrialcourtdidnotacquirejurisdictionovertheotherminorchildrenof thepetitionerappelleeandrespondentappellantand, therefore,cannotproperlyprovidefortheirsupport.

Admittedly,respondentappellantisfinanciallywelloff,hebeingaveryrichbusinessman;whereas,petitionerappelleedependsuponhersistersandparentsforsupport.Infact,hefinanciallysupportedpetitionerappelleeandherthreeminorchildren.Itis,therefore,forthe best interest of Christopher J. that he should temporarilyremainunderthecustodyofrespondentappellantuntiltheissueoncustodyandsupportshallhavebeendeterminedinapropercase.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby SETASIDE, and a NEW ONE ENTERED dismissing the petition forhabeascorpusinSpecialProceedingNo.4489.

Daisieinturnfiledthispetitionforreviewoftheappellatecourt’sdecision.

Rule102,§1oftheRulesofCourtprovidesthat“thewritof habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegalconfinementordetentionbywhichanypersonisdeprivedofhisliberty,orbywhichtherightfulcustodyofanypersoniswithheldfromthepersonentitledthereto.”

Itisindeedtrue,astheCourtofAppealsobserved,thatthe determination of the right to the custody of minorchildren is relevant in cases where the parents, who aremarriedtoeachother,are forsomereasonseparated fromeachother.Itdoesnot

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follow,however,thatitcannotariseinanyothersituation.Forexample, in the caseofSalvaña v. Gaela,

1 itwasheld

that the writ of habeas corpus is the proper remedy toenable parents to regain the custody of aminor daughtereventhoughthelatterbeinthecustodyofathirdpersonofher free will because the parents were compelling her tomarryamanagainstherwill.

Inthecaseatbar,ChristopherJ.isanillegitimatechildsince at the time of his conception, his father, privaterespondentRamonR.Villar,wasmarriedtoanotherwomanotherthanthechild’smother.Assuch,pursuanttoArt.176of the Family Code, Christopher J. is under the parentalauthority of his mother, the herein petitioner, who, as aconsequenceofsuchauthority,isentitledtohavecustodyofhim.

2Since,admittedly,petitionerhasbeendeprivedofher

rightful custody of her child by private respondent, she isentitledtoissuanceofthewritofhabeascorpus.

Indeed,Rule 102, §1makes no distinction between thecaseofamotherwhoisseparatedfromherhusbandandisentitledtothecustodyofherchildandthatofamotherofan illegitimate child who, by law, is vested with sole

parentalauthority,butisdeprivedofherrightfulcustodyofherchild.

The fact that private respondent has recognized theminor child may be a ground for ordering him to givesupporttothelatter,butnotforgivinghimcustodyofthechild.UnderArt.213of theFamilyCode, “nochildunderseven years of age shall be separated from the motherunless the court finds compelling reasons to orderotherwise.”

3

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155Phil.680(1931).2 Family Code, Art. 220 provides that “The parents and those

exercising parental authority shall have with respect to their

unemancipatedchildrenorwardsthefollowingrightsandduties:(1)To

keepthemintheircompany,....3Art.363oftheCivilCodeoriginallyprovidedthat“nomothershall

beseparatedfromherchildundersevenyearsofage,unlessthecourt

finds compelling reasons for suchmeasure.” This was changed by the

Child and Youth Welfare Code (P.D. No. 603), §17 of which provided

that“incaseofseparationofhisparents,nochildunderfiveyearsof

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Nor isthe factthatprivaterespondent iswelloffareasonfor depriving petitioner of the custody of her children,especially considering that she has been able to rear andsupportthemonherownsincetheywereborn.PetitionerisamarketvendorearningfromP2,000toP3,000permonthin 1993 when the RTC decision was rendered. Sheaugments her income by working as secretary at theComputerSystemSpecialist,Inc.earningamonthlyincomeofP4,500.00.Shehasanarrangementwithheremployersothatshecanpersonallyattendtoherchildren.Sheworksupto8:00o’clockintheeveningtomakeupfortimelostduringtheday.Thatshereceiveshelpfromherparentsandsisterforthesupportofthethreechildrenisnotapointagainsther. Cooperation, compassion, love and concern for everymemberofthefamilyarecharacteristicsoftheclosefamilytiesthatbindtheFilipinofamilyandhavemadeitwhatitis.

Daisie and her children may not be enjoying a life ofaffluencethatprivaterespondentpromisesifthechildliveswithhim.Itisenough,however,thatpetitionerisearningadecentlivingandisabletosupportherchildrenaccordingtohermeans.

TheRegionalTrialCourtorderedprivaterespondenttogive temporary support to petitioner in the amount ofP3,000.00 a month, pending the filing of an action forsupport,after findingthatprivaterespondentdidnotgiveany support to his three children by Daisie, except themeageramountofP500.00aweekwhichhestoppedgivingthemonJune23,1992.Heisarichmanwhoprofessesloveforhischildren.Infacthefiledamotionfortheexecutionof

thedecisionof theCourt ofAppeals, alleging thathehadobservedhisson“tobephysicallyweakandpalebecauseofmalnutritionanddeprivation of the luxuryandamenitieshe was accustomed to when in the former custody of therespondent.”Heprayedthathebegiventhecustodyofthechildsothathecanprovidehimwiththe“propercareandeducation.”

Although the question of support is proper in aproceedingforthatpurpose,thegrantofsupportinthiscaseisjustifiedbythe

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age shall be separated from his mother, unless the court finds

compelling reason to do so.” The Family Code, Art. 213 thus restores

theoriginalprovisionoftheCivilCode.

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fact that private respondent has expressed willingness tosupporttheminorchild.Theorderforpaymentofallowanceneednotbeconditionedonthegranttohimofcustodyofthechild.UnderArt.204oftheFamilyCode,apersonobligedtogivesupportcanfulfillhisobligationeitherbypayingtheallowance fixed by the court or by receiving andmaintaining in the family dwelling the person who isentitled to support unless, in the latter case, there is “amoralorlegalobstaclethereto.”

In the case at bar, as has already been pointed out,ChristopherJ.,beinglessthansevenyearsofageatleastatthetimethecasewasdecidedbytheRTC,cannotbetakenfromthemother’scustody.Evennowthatthechildisoversevenyearsofage,themother’scustodyoverhimwillhaveto be upheld because the child categorically expressedpreference to livewith hismother. Under Art. 213 of theFamily Code, courtsmust respect the “choice of the childoversevenyearsofage,unlesstheparentchosenisunfit”andhere ithasnotbeenshownthatthemother is inanyway unfit to have custody of her child. Indeed, if privaterespondentloveshischild,heshouldnotconditionthegrantof support for him on the award of his custody to him(privaterespondent).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals isREVERSED and private respondent is ORDERED todelivertheminorChristopherJ.T.Davidtothecustodyofhismother,thehereinpetitioner,andtogivehimtemporarysupport in theamount ofP3,000.00, pending the fixing oftheamountofsupportinanappropriateaction.

SOORDERED.

Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), RegaladoandPuno, JJ.,concur.

Francisco, J.,Onleave.

Judgment reversed, respondent Ramon R. Villar ordered

to deliver custody of the minor child to petitioner.

Notes.—An unrecognized spurious child has no rightsfrom his parents or to their estate. (Ilano vs. Court ofAppeals,230SCRA242[1994])

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The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegalconfinementbywhichanypersonisdeprivedofhisliberty.(Ordoñez vs. Vinarao,239SCRA114[1994])

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David vs. CA