Date of Examination: 06/13/2016 Examination Level: RO X SRO … · 2019. 4. 30. · ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ILT16-1 Facility: Oconee Date of Examination:

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ILT16-1

Facility: Oconee Date of Examination: 06/13/2016

Examination Level: RO X SRO Operating Test Number: 1

Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed

Conduct of Operations [KA:G2.1.25 (3.9/4.2)] (15 min)

M, R Admin-108, Determine Time for SFP to Reach 200ºF (Both)

Conduct of Operations [KA: G2.1.23 (4.3/4.4)] (15 min)

D, R Admin-109, Unit 3 SFP Boron and Volume Change Calculation (RO Only)

Equipment Control [KA: G2.2.12 (3.7/4.1)] (18 min)

D, R Admin-204, Perform SG Downcomer Temperature Surveillance (RO Only)

Radiological Control [KA: G2.3.4 (3.2/3.7)] (20 min)

M, R

Admin-304, Determine the Maximum Permissible Stay Time Within Emergency Dose Limits (EDLs) (Both)

Emergency Plan

N/A

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

* Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (≤ 3 for ROs; ≤ 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (≥ 1) (P)revious 2 exams (≤ 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ILT16-1


Examination Level: RO SRO X Operating Test Number: 1

Administrative Topic (see Note)

Type Code*

Describe activity to be performed

Conduct of Operations [KA:G2.1.25 (3.9/4.2)] (15 min)

M, R Admin-108, Determine Time for SFP to Reach 200ºF (Both)

Conduct of Operations [KA: G2.1.7 (4.4/4.7 ] (16 min)

D, R Admin-S107, Calculation of Primary to Secondary Leak Rate and Unit Shutdown Requirements (SRO Only)

Equipment Control [KA G2.2.18 (2.6/3.9)] (25 min)

D, R Admin-S203, Complete Plant Configuration Sheet (Time to Core Boil) and Determine Any Required Actions (SRO Only)

Radiological Control [KA: G2.3.4 (3.2/3.7)] (20 min)

M, R

Admin-304, Determine the Maximum Permissible Stay Time Within Emergency Dose Limits (EDLs) (Both)

Emergency Plan [KA G2.4.38 (2.4/4.4)] (20 min)

D, R

Admin-S404, Determine Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations (Complete Emergency Notification Form) (SRO Only)

NOTE: All items (five total) are required for SROs. RO applicants require only four items unless they are retaking only the administrative topics (which would require all five items).

* Type Codes & Criteria: (C)ontrol room, (S)imulator, or Class(R)oom (D)irect from bank (≤ 3 for ROs; ≤ 4 for SROs & RO retakes) (N)ew or (M)odified from bank (≥ 1) (P)revious 2 exams (≤ 1; randomly selected)

ES-301 Control Room/In-Plant Systems Outline Form ES-301-2 ILT 16-1


Exam Level: RO X SRO-I SRO-U Operating Test No.: 1

Control Room Systems:* 8 for RO; 7 for SRO-I; 2 or 3 for SRO-U

System / JPM Title Type Code* Safety Function

a. RO-103a Withdrawal of Safety Rods Group 1 to 50% OP/1/A/1105/019 Encl 4.3 (Withdrawal of Safety Rod Group 1 to 50%) [KA: 001 G2.2.2 (4.6/4.1)] (15 min)

A, D, L, S 1

b. RO-305a Perform Required Actions for a Failed LPI Train EOP Encl 5.1 (ES Actuation) [KA: EPE 011 EA1.04 (4.4/4.4)] (15 min)

A, D, E, EN, L, S

3

c. RO-S403a Align PSW to HPI Pump Motor Coolers AP/2/A/1700/024 Encl 5.4 (PSW to HPI Pump Motor Coolers) [KA: 076 A2.01 (3.5*/3.7*)] (10 min)

A, E, N, S 4S

d. RO-203 Pressure Makeup to CFT OP/1/A/1104/001 Encl 4.7 (Pressure Makeup to CFTs Using Nitrogen) [KA: 006 A1.13 (3.5/3.7)] (10 min)

D, S 2

e. RO-P404 Align ECCS Suction to Emergency Sump

EOP Encl 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES)

[KA: BW/E08 EA1.1 (4.0/3.7)] (15 min)

E, EN, L, M, S

4P

f. RO-504a Perform EOP Encl 5.35 EOP Encl 5.35 (Containment Isolation) [KA: 103 G2.1.23 (4.3/4.4)] (10 min)

A, D, E, L, S 5

g. RO-603a Energize MFBs From CT-5 EOP Encl 5.38 (Restoration of Power) [KA: EPE 055 EA1.07 (4.3/4.5)] (15 min)

A, D, L, S 6

h. RO-804 Place RB Purge in Operation OP/1/A/1102/014 Encl 4.1 (RB Purge Release) [KA: 029 A2.03 (2.7/3.1)] (15 min)

D, L, S 8

In-Plant Systems* (3 for RO); (3 for SRO-I); (3 or 2 for SRO-U)

i. AO-501 Place Reactor Building Hydrogen Analyzers in Service EOP Encl 5,2 (Placing RB Hydrogen Analyzers in Service) [KA: 028 G2.1.30 (4.4/4.0)] (15 min)

D, E, R 5

j. AO-803 Supply SSW by the Fire Hose Station AP/1/A/1700/033 Encl 5.6 (Supply of SSW by the Fire Hose Station) [KA: 075 G2.1.30 (4.4/4.0)] (20 min)

N, E 8

k. AO-S402 Reset an Emergency FDW Pump Turbine OP/1/A/1106/006 Encl 4.2 (Resetting TD EFDWP) [KA: 061 A2.04 (3.4/3.8)] (10 min)

D 4S

@ All RO and SRO-I control room (and in-plant) systems must be different and serve different safety functions; all 5 SRO-U systems must serve different safety functions; in-plant systems and functions may overlap those tested in the control room.

* Type Codes Criteria for RO / SRO-I / SRO-U

(A)lternate path (C)ontrol room (D)irect from bank (E)mergency or abnormal in-plant (EN)gineered safety feature (L)ow-Power / Shutdown (N)ew or (M)odified from bank including 1(A) (P)revious 2 exams (R)CA (S)imulator

4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3

≤ 9 / ≤ 8 / ≤ 4 ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 ≥ 1/ ≥ 1/ ≥1 (control room system) ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 ≥ 2 / ≥ 2 / ≥ 1 ≤ 3 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 2 (randomly selected) ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1



Exam Level: RO SRO-I X SRO-U Operating Test No.: 1




A, D, L, S 1


A, D, E, EN, L, S

3


A, E, N, S 4S

d. RO-203 Pressure Makeup to CFT OP/1/A/1104/001 Encl 4.7 (Pressure Makeup to CFTs Using Nitrogen) [KA: 006 A1.13 (3.5/3.7)] (10 min)

D, S 2

e. RO-P404 Align ECCS Suction to Emergency Sump

EOP Encl 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES)

[KA: BW/E08 EA1.1 (4.0/3.7)] (15 min)

E, EN, L, M, S

4P

f. RO-504a Perform EOP Encl 5.35 EOP Encl 5.35 (Containment Isolation) [KA: 103 G2.1.23 (4.3/4.4)] (10 min)

A, D, E, L, S 5

g. RO-603a Energize MFBs From CT-5 EOP Encl 5.38 (Restoration of Power) [KA: EPE 055 EA1.07 (4.3/4.5)] (15 min)

A, D, L, S 6

h. N/A



D, E, R 5


N, E 8

k. AO-S402 Reset an Emergency FDW Pump Turbine OP/1/A/1106/006 Encl 4.2 (Resetting TD EFDWP) [KA: 061 A2.04 (3.4/3.8)] (10 min)

D 4S




4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3

≤ 9 / ≤ 8 / ≤ 4 ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 ≥ 1/ ≥ 1/ ≥1 (control room system) ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 ≥ 2 / ≥ 2 / ≥ 1 ≤ 3 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 2 (randomly selected) ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1



Exam Level: RO SRO-I SRO-U X Operating Test No.: 1




A, D, L, S 1


A, D, E, EN, L, S

3


A, E, N, S 4S

d. N/A

e. N/A

f. N/A

g. N/A

h. N/A



D, E, R 5


N, E 8

k. N/A




4-6 / 4-6 / 2-3

≤ 9 / ≤ 8 / ≤ 4 ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 ≥ 1/ ≥ 1 / ≥1 (control room system) ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 ≥ 2 / ≥ 2 / ≥ 1 ≤ 3 / ≤ 3 / ≤ 2 (randomly selected) ≥ 1 / ≥ 1 / ≥ 1

FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTEILT 16-1 ONS SRO NRC Examinatio QUESTION 1 D1

Given the following Unit 1 conditions: Initial conditions:

Reactor power = 100% 1TA and 1TB lockout

Current conditions:

Reactor power = 1% decreasing Group 2 rod 6 position = 58% withdrawn

The EOP directs the operator to __(1)__ AND the reason for this action is to __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. GO TO Rule 1, (ATWS/Unanticipated Nuclear Power Production) 2. ensure reactor power is within the heat removal capacity of natural circulation

B. 1. GO TO Rule 1, (ATWS/Unanticipated Nuclear Power Production) 2. achieve a shutdown margin of at least 1% K/K

C. 1. Open 1HP-24 and 1HP-25 2. ensure adequate RCS inventory during the subsequent RCS cooldown

D. 1. Open 1HP-24 and 1HP-25 2. achieve a shutdown margin of at least 1% K/K

EPE007 EK3.01 - Reactor TripKnowledge of the reasons for the following as the apply to a reactor trip: (CFR 41.5 /41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOP for reactor trip ............................

Thursday, April 07, 2016 Page 1 of 269


General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because you are directed to open HP-24 & 25. It is plausible because if reactor power were above 5% or power was not decreasing, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because with only 1 control rod stuck, you are within the heat removal capability of natural circulation even without performing Rule 1. It is plausible because performing Rule 1 would add negative reactivity to further reduce power.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because you are directed to open HP-24 & 25. It is plausible because if reactor power were above 5% or power was not decreasing, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. Based upon the given condition the requirement that HPI be initiated for boron injection is to assure adequate SDM on a stuck control rod.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The EOP requires HPI for a control rod failing to fully insert by opening 1HP-24/25.

2nd part is incorrect because 1HP-24/25 are opened to add shutdown margin. It is plausible because if RCS inventory is required during an RCS cooldown, then 1HP-24/25 would be opened.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The EOP requires HPI for a control rod failing to fully insert.by opening 1HP-24/25.

2nd part is correct. Based upon the given condition the requirement that HPI be initiated for boron injection is to assure adequate SDM on a stuck control rod.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT 39 Q1

Student References ProvidedDevelopment References

ILT39 Q1 (5/2011)EOP IMAs and Subsequent ActionsEAP-SA Obj: R1

Remarks/Status

Basis for meeting the KA

The question requires knowledge of the reasons for EOP steps following a reactor trip with a stuck control rod.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

EPE007 EK3.01 - Reactor TripKnowledge of the reasons for the following as the apply to a reactor trip: (CFR 41.5 /41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOP for reactor trip ............................




FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTEILT 16-1 ONS SRO NRC Examinatio QUESTION 2 A2


Reactor power = 100%

Current Conditions: Reactor power = 95% decreasing 1RC-1 indicates open 1RC-66 (PORV) indicates open Pzr level = 255 inches increasing RCS Wide Range pressure = 2190 psig decreasing 1SA-18/A-1, (Pressurizer Relief Valve Flow) is locked in 6 LED lights are illuminated for 1RC-66 on the Pressurizer Relief Valve Flow

Monitor 1) In accordance with the immediate manual actions of AP/1/A/1700/044, (Abnormal

Pressurizer Pressure Control), __(1)__ is required to be closed at this time. 2) This transient could have been caused by the failure of a median selected controlling narrow range RCS pressure signal being supplied from RPS Channel

__(2)__ . Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. only 1RC-4

2. E B. 1. only 1RC-4

2. C C. 1. 1RC-1, 1RC-3 and 1RC-4

2. E D. 1. 1RC-1, 1RC-3 and 1RC-4

2. C

APE008 AK2.02 - Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Sensors and detectors ............................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. With RCS pressure 2190 psig and the PORV (1RC-66) open, AP/44 IMAs direct you to close 1RC-4.

2nd part is correct. RPS Channel E is one of the 3 RPS narrow range channels that feeds ICS. The others are Channel A & B.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. With RCS pressure 2190 psig and the PORV (1RC-66) open, AP/44 IMAs direct you to close 1RC-4.

2nd part is incorrect because NR RCS Pressure Channel C does not feed ICS. It is plausible because it does feed RPS.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because with RCS pressure 2190 psig and the PORV (1RC-66) open, AP/44 IMAs direct you to close 1RC-4. It is plausible because if RCS pressure were < 2155 psig, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. RPS Channel E is one of the 3 RPS narrow range channels that feeds ICS. The others are Channel A & B.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because with RCS pressure 2190 psig and the PORV (1RC-66) open, AP/44 IMAs direct you to close 1RC-4. It is plausible because if RCS pressure were < 2155 psig, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because NR RCS Pressure Channel C does not feed ICS. It is plausible because it does feed RPS.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT43 Q2


ILT43 Q2 (6/2013)NR RCS Pressure DwgIC-RCI Obj: 9AP/44

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of the cause and effect relationship of NR RCS pressure detectors and how they control plant parameters/components that could lead to a vapor space accident.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE008 AK2.02 - Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)Knowledge of the interrelations between the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Sensors and detectors ............................................



Given the following Unit 1 conditions:

Reactor Trip SBLOCA has occurred Rule 2, (Loss of SCM) in progress 1A & 1B Steam Generator levels = 78” XSUR increasing Cooldown rate = 65°F / ½hr

1) SG levels are being increased to __(1)__. 2) EFDW flow __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. ensure secondary inventory available for heat transfer if SG feed is lost

2. should be stopped until cooldown rate is in compliance with Tech Spec limits

B. 1. ensure secondary inventory available for heat transfer if SG feed is lost 2. will be reduced in an effort to comply with Tech Spec limits but SG levels

must continue to increase

C. 1. ensure boiler-condenser heat transfer is established 2. should be stopped until cooldown rate is in compliance with Tech Spec limits

D. 1. ensure boiler-condenser heat transfer is established 2. will be reduced in an effort to comply with Tech Spec limits but SG levels

must continue to increase

EPE009 EK1.01 - Small Break LOCAKnowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the small break LOCA: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling .........................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the reason is to help establish boiler condenser mode of heat transfer. It is plausible because it is a reason SG levels are increased aspart of mitigation strategy when in the Turbine Building Flood tab of EOP.

2nd part is incorrect because EFDW flow should not be stopped until LOSCM setpoint is reached. It is plausible because TS limits are being exceeded and actions are required to attempt to restore cooldown rates within limits. EFDW flow will be reduced however cannot be secured as enough EFDW flow to keep SG levels increasing is required even if TS cooldown rates are being exceeded.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because the reason is to help establish boiler condenser mode of heat transfer. It is plausible because it is a reason SG levels are increased aspart of mitigation strategy when in the Turbine Building Flood tab of EOP.

2nd part is correct. EFDW flow should not be stopped until LOSCM setpoint is reached.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The reason is to help establish boiler condenser mode of heat transfer.

2nd part is incorrect because EFDW flow should not be stopped until LOSCM setpoint is reached. It is plausible because TS limits are being exceeded and actions are required to attempt to restore cooldown rates within limits. EFDW flow will be reduced however cannot be secured as enough EFDW flow to keep SG levels increasing is required even if TS cooldown rates are being exceeded.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The reason is to help establish boiler condenser mode of heat transfer.

2nd part is correct. EFDW flow should not be stopped until LOSCM setpiont is reached.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

2010A Q2


2010A Q2 (5/2011)LOSCM TabRule 2EAP-LOSCM Obj: 22Rule 7

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of operational requirements to establish reflux (boilercondenser at ONS) boiling during SBLOCA and the implications this has on SG feedrates.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

EPE009 EK1.01 - Small Break LOCAKnowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to the small break LOCA: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Natural circulation and cooling, including reflux boiling .........................................................




FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTEILT 16-1 ONS SRO NRC Examinatio QUESTION 4 C4


Reactor power = 100% Current conditions:

RCS pressure = 328 psig decreasing RB pressure = 5 psig increasing

1) __(1)__ Reactor Building Spray pumps received a start signal. 2) __(2)__ LPI pumps received a start signal. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Two 2. ONLY two

B. 1. Two

2. Three C. 1. Zero

2. ONLY two D. 1. Zero

2. Three

EPE011 EK2.02 - Large Break LOCAKnowledge of the interrelations between the Large Break LOCA and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Pumps .........................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because 0 RBS pumps received a start signal and they will not do so until RB pressure reaches 10 psig. It is plausible because the first ES setpoint based on RB pressure is 3 psig.

2nd part is correct. Only 2 LPIPs receive a start signal on ES (ES-3 LPIP 1A and ES-4 LPIP 1B) with 3 psig in the RB or < 550 psig RCS pressure.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because 0 RBS pumps received a start signal and they will not do so until RB pressure reaches 10 psig. It is plausible because the first ES setpoint based on RB pressure is 3 psig.

2nd part is incorrect because only 2 LPIPs receive a start signal on ES (ES-3 LPIP 1A and ES-4 LPIP 1B). It is plausible because all 3 HPIPs start on ES.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. 0 RBS pumps received a start signal and they will not do so until RB pressure reaches 10 psig.

2nd part is correct. Only 2 LPIPs receive a start signal on ES (ES-3 LPIP 1A and ES-4 LPIP 1B) with 3 psig in the RB or < 550 psig RCS pressure.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. 0 RBS pumps received a start signal and they will not do so until RB pressure reaches 10 psig.

2nd part is incorrect because only 2 LPIPs receive a start signal on ES (ES-3 LPIP 1A and ES-4 LPIP 1B). It is plausible because all 3 HPIPs start on ES.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT42 Q4


ILT42 Q4 (12/2012)IC-ES Obj: 17

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of pumps that will receive a start signal following a LBLOCA.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

EPE011 EK2.02 - Large Break LOCAKnowledge of the interrelations between the Large Break LOCA and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Pumps .........................................................






Reactor power =100% Current conditions:

1HP-120 air line becomes detached from the actuator 1) Pzr level will __(1)__. 2) In accordance with AP/1/A/1700/014, (Loss of Letdown and/or Makeup), __(2)__ will

initially be used to control Pzr level. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. increase 2. 1HP-26

B. 1. increase

2. 1HP-122 C. 1. decrease

2. 1HP-26 D. 1. decrease

2. 1HP-122

APE022 AK1.03 - Loss of Reactor Coolant MakeupKnowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Relationship between charging flow and PZR level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because 1HP-120 fails closed on a loss of IA. This will cause a loss of normal makeup and Pzr level will decrease. It is plausible because other primary valves fail open on a loss of IA (such as 1HP-31, RCP Seal Flow Control Valve).

2nd part is correct. AP/14 uses 1HP-26 to control Pzr level if 1HP-120 fails closed.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because 1HP-120 fails closed on a loss of IA. This will cause a loss of normal makeup and Pzr level will decrease. It is plausible because other primary valves fail open on a loss of IA (such as 1HP-31, RCP Seal Flow Control Valve).

2nd part is incorrect because AP/14 uses 1HP-26 to control Pzr level if 1HP-120 fails closed. It is plausible because if HP-26 fails, it would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. 1HP-120 fails closed on a loss of IA. This will cause a loss of normal makeup and Pzr level will decrease.

2nd part is correct. AP/14 uses 1HP-26 to control Pzr level if 1HP-120 fails closed.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. 1HP-120 fails closed on a loss of IA. This will cause a loss of normal makeup and Pzr level will decrease.

2nd part is incorrect because AP/14 uses 1HP-26 to control Pzr level if 1HP-120 fails closed. It is plausible because if HP-26 fails, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q5


ILT41 Q5 (6/2012)EAP AP14 Obj: 4AP/14AP/22

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of the relationship between losing normal makeup and Pzr level.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE022 AK1.03 - Loss of Reactor Coolant MakeupKnowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Reactor Coolant Makeup: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Relationship between charging flow and PZR level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .






1C LPI Pump is in service providing normal decay heat removal. Current conditions:

Loss of offsite power occurs Power restored via CT-4 1A and 1B LPI Pumps NOT available

Which ONE of the following describes the requirements to start the 1C LPI Pump to restore decay heat removal? Manual reset of Load Shed is __(1)__ and starting of 1C LPI Pump is allowed after a MINIMUM of __(2)__ seconds.

A. 1. NOT required 2. 5

B. 1. required 2. 5

C. 1. NOT required 2. 30

D. 1. required 2. 30

APE025 AK1.01 - Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation .........................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Manual reset of load shed is not required because the signal for the 1C LPI Pump is automatically removed.

2nd part is correct. "C" LPIP can be started 5 seconds after a load shed condition IF either the "A" or "B" LPIP is OFF.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because manual reset of load shed is not required because the signal for the 1C LPI Pump is automatically removed. It is plausible because manual reset of load shed is required for many other components (see pg 16 of EL-PSL). The student must know which ones require manual reset and the LPI pumps do not.

2nd part is correct. "C" LPIP can be started 5 seconds after a load shed condition IF either the "A" or "B" LPIP is OFF.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Manual reset of load shed is not required because the signal for the 1C LPI Pump is automatically removed.

2nd part incorrect because "C" LPIP can be started 5 seconds after a load shed condition IF either the "A" or "B" LPIP is OFF. It is plausible because 30 seconds is the time the Load Shed operation of X5 and X6 load control centers automatically re-energize.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because manual reset of load shed is not required because the signal for the 1C LPI Pump is automatically removed. It is plausible because manual reset of load shed is required for many other components (see pg 16 of EL-PSL). The student must know which ones require manual reset and the LPI pumps do not.

2nd part incorrect because "C" LPIP can be started 5 seconds after a load shed condition IF either the "A" or "B" LPIP is OFF. It is plausible because 30 seconds is the time the Load Shed operation of X5 and X6 load control centers automatically re-energize.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT39 Q6


ILT39 Q6 (5/2011)EL-PSL Obj: 3

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of actions required to restore core decay heat removal following a failure of the LPI/DHR Pumps

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE025 AK1.01 - Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Loss of Residual Heat Removal System: (CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Loss of RHRS during all modes of operation .........................






Reactor trip has just occurred Total RCP seal injection flow = 0 gpm Running Component Cooling pump tripped Standby Component Cooling pump did not start

Which ONE of the following describes the procedure whose performance is directed bythe EOP and why? Initiate…

A. AP/20, (Loss of CC) to restore Component Cooling B. AP/20, (Loss of CC) to ensure letdown is isolated C. AP/25, (SSF EOP) to align an alternate letdown flowpath D. AP/25, (SSF EOP) to align an alternate source of seal injection

APE026 AK3.03 - Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of CCW ..................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because the EOP IMAs will direct performance of AP/25 due to the loss of Seal Injection and CC flow. It is plausible because entry conditions for AP/20 are met as well.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:Incorrect because the EOP IMAs will direct performance of AP/25 due to the loss of Seal Injection and CC flow. The EOP does not mention AP/20. It is plausible since the entry conditions for AP/20 are met and AP/20 does ensure that letdown is isolated if letdown temp is >130 degrees which would normally be true if CC is lost.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because AP/25 is performed to provide seal injection (20 minute Time Critical Action) in order to prevent RCP seal failure.

The stem tells us that CC is unavailable, 1HP-5 would be closed on high letdown temperature. The fact that letdown has been isolated due to the loss of CC makes aligning the alternate letdown flowpath plausible. Additionally, an alternate letdown path is established while running the RCMUP however the RCMUP is started to provide an alternate source of SI and the alternate letdown path is a consequence of that.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:The EOP IMAs will direct performance of AP/25 due to the loss of Seal Injection and CC flow. AP/25 is performed to provide seal injection (20 minute Time Critical Action) in order to prevent RCP seal failure.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT44 Q7


ILT44 Q7 (12/2013)EOP IMAsEAP-TCAEAP IMA Obj: R6

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of reason EOP IMA’s direct initiating AP/25 when RCP seal injection and CC have been lost

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE026 AK3.03 - Loss of Component Cooling Water (CCW)Knowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Loss of Component Cooling Water: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Guidance actions contained in EOP for Loss of CCW ..................


FOR REVIEW ONLY - DO NOT DISTRIBUTEILT 16-1 ONS SRO NRC Examinatio QUESTION 8 B8


Time = 0600 Rule 1, (ATWS / Unanticipated Nuclear Power Production) has been initiated

Current conditions:

Time = 0603 RCS pressure is 2455 psig increasing

1) In accordance with Rule 1, an operator will be dispatched to open the Unit 3 CRD

600V normal power supply breaker at 3X9 and alternate 600V power supply breaker at __(1)__ . 2) Based on the current conditions, DSS __(2)__ de-energize Control Rod Groups 1-7. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 1X1 2. will

B. 1. 2X2

2. will C. 1. 1X1

2. will NOT D. 1. 2X2

2. will NOT

EPE029 EK2.06 - Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)Knowledge of the interrelations between the ATWS and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Breakers, relays, and disconnects ...................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the alternate power supply for U3 CRD breakers is 2X2. It is plausible because if the question was asking about Unit 2, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct because when RCS pressure reaches 2450 psig, a DSS signal will be generated. DSS de-energizes the safety and regulating rods (Groups 1-7) by interrupting the gating current to the motors.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. The alternate power supply for U3 CRD breakers is 2X2.

2nd part is correct: When RCS pressure reaches 2450 psig, a DSS signal will be generated. DSS de-energizes the safety and regulating rods (Groups 1-7) by interrupting the gating current to the motors.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the alternate power supply for U3 CRD breakers is 2X2. It is plausible because if the question was asking about Unit 2, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect. When RCS pressure reaches 2450 psig, a DSS signal will be generated. DSS de-energizes the safety and regulating rods (Groups 1-7) by interrupting the gating current to the motors. It is plausible because if RCS pressure were < 2450 psig, it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The alternate power supply for U3 CRD breakers is 2X2.

2nd part is incorrect. When RCS pressure reaches 2450 psig, a DSS signal will be generated. DSS de-energizes the safety and regulating rods (Groups 1-7) by interrupting the gating current to the motors. It is plausible because if RCS pressure were < 2450 psig, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT43 Q10


ILT43 Q10 (6/2013)IC-RPS Obj: R3EAP-UNPP Rule 1 OBJ: R3U3 EOP Rule 1U2 EOP Rule 1

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of the relationship between an ATWS condition and actions taken to open breakers to shutdown the reactor.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

EPE029 EK2.06 - Anticipated Transient Without Scram (ATWS)Knowledge of the interrelations between the ATWS and the following: (CFR 41.7 / 45.7)

Breakers, relays, and disconnects ...................................





Given the following Unit 1 conditions: Time = 0800:

Reactor power = 100% SGTR occurs Reactor is tripped SGTR tab is entered

Time = 0815:

RCS temperature = 550 oF Crew is ready to perform the initial RCS cooldown

1) RCS cooldown will be initiated by establishing a SG pressure of __(1)__ psig.

2) While performing this cooldown, the cooldown rate is limited only by the ability to

maintain __(2)__ .

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. 710 -720

2. Tech Spec cooldown rate limits

B. 1. 710 – 720 2. Pzr level > 100 inches [180" acc]

C. 1. 835 – 845 2. Tech Spec cooldown rate limits

D. 1. 835 – 845 2. Pzr level > 100 inches [180" acc]

EPE038 EA1.36 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a SGTR: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Cooldown of RCS to specified temperature ..........................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because per the SGTR tab, SG pressure is decreased to 835-845 psig (Tsat of 525-532 degrees). It is plausible because 710-720 is the setting on the TBVs that will be used to establish 835-845 psig in the SGs. Adding the 125 psi bias signal to the TBVs results in the offset.

2nd part is incorrect because in this step (47) it directs you to "Maximize cooldown rate limited only by the ability to maintain Pzr level > 100 [180" acc]." It is plausible because when you cooldown further (later in the procedure), you are limited to TS cooldown rates (step 107).

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because per the SGTR tab, SG pressure is decreased to 835-845 psig (Tsat of 525-532 degrees). It is plausible because 710-720 is the setting on the TBVs that will be used to establish 835-845 psig in the SGs. Adding the 125 psi bias signal to the TBVs results in the offset.

2nd part is correct. Step (47) it directs you to "Maximize cooldown rate limited only by the ability to maintain Pzr level > 100 [180" acc]."

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Per the SGTR tab, SG pressure is decreased to 835-845 psig (Tsat of 525-532 degrees).

2nd part is incorrect because in this step (47) it directs you to "Maximize cooldown rate limited only by the ability to maintain Pzr level > 100 [180" acc]." It is plausible because when you cooldown further (later in the procedure), you are limited to TS cooldown rates (step 107).

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Per the SGTR tab, SG pressure is decreased to 835-845 psig (Tsat of 525-532 degrees).

2nd part is correct because in this step (47) it directs you to "Maximize cooldown rate limited only by the ability to maintain Pzr level > 100 [180" acc]." It is plausible because when you cooldown further (later in the procedure), you are limited to TS cooldown rates (step 107).

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


SGTR TabEAP SGTR Obj: R5

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of specific temperature (SG Pressure) to cool down to during a SGTR including restrictions on cooldown rate.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

EPE038 EA1.36 - Steam Generator Tube Rupture (SGTR)Ability to operate and monitor the following as they apply to a SGTR: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Cooldown of RCS to specified temperature ..........................






Reactor trip from 100% Slow transfer of auxiliaries occurs

1) __(1)__ Feedwater pumps will be supplying the SGs. 2) SG level control setpoint will be __(2)__.

A. 1. Main 2. 25 inches SUR

B. 1. Emergency 2. 30 inches XSUR

C. 1. Main 2. 50% OR

D. 1. Emergency 2. 240 inches XSUR

APE054 AA2.04 - Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Proper operation of AFW pumps and regulating valves .................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect. Plausible because if PCB-21 were closed, it would be correct.Second part is incorrect. Plausible because if Main Feedwater was operating, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:First part is correct. With PCB-21 open when the reactor trips, a slow transfer will occur. The 4160V time delay for the E breakers to close is 1.7 seconds. The HWPs, CBPs, and HDPs will be lost. The Main Feedwater pumps will trip after 90 seconds, and the Emergency Feedwater pumps will start.Second part is correct: The 6900V slow transfer time delay is 1.8 seconds between the opening of the normal feeder breakers and the closing of the startup feeder breakers, however there is a 3 second time delay before the RCPs will trip on undervoltage, so the RCPs will remain operating. The SG level control setpoint on EFDW with RCPs on is 30 inches XSUR.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect. Plausible because if PCB-21 were closed, it would be correct.Second part is incorrect. Plausible because if Main Feedwater was operating and the RCPs tripped, it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:First part is correct. With PCB-21 open when the reactor trips, a slow transfer will occur. The 4160V time delay for the E breakers to close is 1.7 seconds. The HWPs, CBPs, and HDPs will be lost. The Main Feedwater pumps will trip after 90 seconds, and the Emergency Feedwater pumps will start.Second part is incorrect. Plausible because if the RCPs tripped, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


CF-EF Obj. 31EL-EPD Obj. 30

Remarks/Status


Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE054 AA2.04 - Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW): (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Proper operation of AFW pumps and regulating valves .................



Given the following plant conditions:

Loss of offsite power occurs Station Blackout in progress

The Blackout tab directs an __(1)__ to perform EOP Encl. 5.32, (Load Shed of Inverters During SBO) which will result in the removal of __(2)__ loads. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? A. 1. AO

2. essential B. 1. AO

2. vital C. 1. RO

2. essential D. 1. RO

2. vital

APE056 2.4.35 - Loss of Offsite PowerAPE056 GENERIC

Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. An AO is dispatched to perform Enclosure 5.32.

2nd part is correct. Enclosure 5.32 removes Essential Loads (Inverters) from service.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. An AO is dispatched to perform Enclosure 5.32.

2nd part is incorrect because Enclosure 5.32 removes Essential Loads (Inverters) from service. It is plausible because its not evident in the title of the enclosure which or how many inverters you are removing from service and there are numerous Vital loads that are seemingly not required at this time in the event (RPS power, RCP power monitors..).

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because an AO is dispatched to perform Enclosure 5.32. It is plausible because ROs are directed to perform procedures outside the control room ( SSF operations, Aux S/D Panel operations )

2nd part is correct. Enclosure 5.32 removes Essential Loads (Inverters) from service.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because an AO is dispatched to perform Enclosure 5.32. It is plausible because ROs are directed to perform procedures outside the control room ( SSF operations, Aux S/D Panel operations )

2nd part is incorrect because Enclosure 5.32 removes Essential Loads (Inverters) from service. It is plausible because its not evident in the title of the enclosure which or how many inverters you are removing from service and there are numerous Vital loads that are seemingly not required at this time in the event (RPS power, RCP power monitors..).

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


EAP-BO Obj: R8BO tabEncl 5.32Vital / Essential Power Dwg

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of who performs specific local actions during a loss of offsite power and the operational effects of this action.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE056 2.4.35 - Loss of Offsite PowerAPE056 GENERIC

Knowledge of local auxiliary operator tasks during an emergency and the resultant operational effects. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)






Reactor power = 100% OAC Computer Out of Service 1KVIC de-energized

Based on the above conditions, which ONE of the following describes the instrumentation used to determine axial imbalance in accordance with OP/1/A/1105/014, (Control Room Instrumentation Operation And Information)?

A. Incore Detectors B. Backup Incore Detectors C. Imbalance readout indications in RPS cabinets D. Outcore Detectors

APE057 AA1.05 - Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument BusAbility to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Backup instrument indications .....................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect because the OAC is out of service. It is plausible because it would be correct if the Computer Reactor Calculation Package were operable but with the OAC OOS, it is not.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:Per OP/1105/014, the order of preference of measurement systems to determine axial imbalance and quadrant power tilt is as follows:

1. Incore Detectors (Computer Reactor Calculation Package). Not available2. Outcore Detectors (Power Range Outcore Detectors). Not allowed due to KVIC de-energized (1 PR NI not operable in each quadrant). NI-7 is de-energized.3. Backup Incore Detectors. Refer to PT/0/A/1103/019 (Backup IncoreDetector System).

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect. Plausible since there is an analog excore % full power indication available on the Linear Amplifier meter faces in the RPS cabinet.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect. Per 1105/14:Order of preference of measurement systems to determine axial imbalance andquadrant power tilt is as follows:1. Incore Detectors (Computer Reactor Calculation Package).2. Outcore Detectors (Power Range Outcore Detectors). This is what makes D plausible.3. Backup Incore Detectors. Refer to PT/0/A/1103/019 (Backup Incore Detector System).

Per procedure, if at least one power range outcore detector is NOT operable in each quadrant (NI-5 thru NI-8), outcore detectors shall NOT be used to measure axial imbalance or quadrant power tilt. Since 1KVIC is de-energized, one of the power range detectors (NI-7) is not available, therefore outcore detectors should not be used since one not available in each quadrant.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

2009B Q14


2009B Q14 (10/2010)ADM-PIS Obj: 5OP/1105/014 Pg 120

Remarks/Status


Requires the ability to determine what instrumentation to utilize when monitoring Reactor Imbalance with a loss of one of the Vital AC instrument busses (KVIC).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE057 AA1.05 - Loss of Vital AC Electrical Instrument BusAbility to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Loss of Vital AC Instrument Bus: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Backup instrument indications .....................................






Reactor power = 100% 1SA-04/E-6, (125 Volt Ground Trouble) actuates

1) 1SA-04/E-6 ARG directs the Operator to __(1)__ to determine if the ground is on the

battery or the Bus. 2) 1SA-04/E-6 actuating indicates that the ground is located on __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. rotate the Ground Relay Selector Switch 2. Unit 1 ONLY

B. 1. rotate the Ground Relay Selector Switch

2. any Unit C. 1. isolate the battery from the Bus

2. Unit 1 ONLY D. 1. isolate the battery from the Bus

2. any Unit

APE058 2.1.20 - Loss of DC PowerAPE058 GENERIC

Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the ARG directs separating the battery from the bus to determine if the ground is on the battery or the bus. It is plausible because operation of this switch is addressed in the ARG, however its purpose is to be used for testing ofthe ground lamp circuits

2nd part is incorrect because the circuit is physically connected to Unit 1 and any ground will alarm on all 3 units. Normally all 3 units busses are connected in some fashion. A ground on any unit will be detected on the Ground Detection Circuitry on Unit 1's DC system. It then sends an alarm to all 3 units. When the DC systems are separated, and the ground is on Unit 2 or Unit 3, all 3 units alarms will go dark. If it is on Unit 1, all three Unit's alarms will still be lit. It is plausible because it’s a Unit 1 alarm.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because the ARG directs separating the battery from the bus to determine if the ground is on the battery or the bus. It is plausible because operation of this switch is addressed in the ARG, however its purpose is to be used for testing ofthe ground lamp circuits

2nd part is correct. The circuit is physically connected to Unit 1 and any ground will alarm on all 3 units. Normally all 3 units busses are connected in some fashion. A ground on any unit will be detected on the Ground Detection Circuitry on Unit 1's DC system. It then sends an alarm to all 3 units. When the DC systems are separated, and the ground is on Unit 2 or Unit 3, all 3 units alarms will go dark. If it is on Unit 1, all three Unit's alarms will still be lit.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The ARG directs separating the battery from the bus to determine if the ground is on the battery or the bus.

2nd part is incorrect because the the circuit is physically connedted to Unit 1 and any ground will alarm on all 3 units. Normally all 3 units busses are connected in some fashion. A ground on any unit will be detected on the Ground Detection Circuitry on Unit 1's DC system. It then sends an alarm to all 3 units. When the DC systems are separated, and the ground is on Unit 2 or Unit 3, all 3 units alarms will go dark. If it is on Unit 1, all three Unit's alarms will still be lit. It is plausible because it’s a Unit 1 alarm.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The ARG directs separating the battery from the bus to determine if the ground is on the battery or the bus.

2nd part is correct. The circuit is physically connected to Unit 1 and any ground will alarm on all 3 units. Normally all 3 units busses are connected in some fashion. A ground on any unit will be detected on the Ground Detection Circuitry on Unit 1's DC system. It then sends an alarm to all 3 units. When the DC systems are separated, and the ground is on Unit 2 or Unit 3, all 3 units alarms will go dark. If it is on Unit 1, all three Unit's alarms will still be lit.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT39 Q13


ILT39 Q13 (5/2011)EL-DCD Obj: 61SA-04/E-6


Question requires knowledge of actions contained in Alarm Response procedures. These are considered abnormal condition procedures. A DC bus ground is a plausible initiaiting cause for a loss of DC power.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE058 2.1.20 - Loss of DC Power



Remarks/Status

APE058 GENERIC

Ability to interpret and execute procedure steps. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)




Reactor power = 72% 1LPSW-6 fails closed

1) The RCP Motor Stator MINIMUM temperature (ºF) that would require immediately

tripping the RCP in accordance with AP/1/A/1700/016, (Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation) is __(1)__.

2) If the RCP immediate trip criteria is met, AP/16 __(2)__ require the Reactor to be

manually tripped prior to securing the RCP. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 260 2. does

B. 1. 300

2. does C. 1. 260

2. does NOT D. 1. 300

2. does NOT

APE062 AA2.04 - Loss of Nuclear Service WaterAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures of the components cooled by SWS ..................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:First part is Incorrect because AP/16 (Abnormal RCP Operation) Encl. 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria) requires immediately tripping the RCP at a Motor Stator Temperature of 300 degrees. It is plausible because this temperature is where the RCP must be immediately tripped based on Seal Return temperature.

Second part is correct. If power is > 70%, AP/16 directs tripping the reactor prior to tripping the RCP.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:First part is correct because AP/16 (Abnormal RCP Operation) Encl. 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria) requires immediately tripping the RCP at a Motor Stator Temperature of 300 degrees.

Second part is correct. If power is > 70%, AP/16 directs tripping the reactor prior to tripping the RCP.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:First part is Incorrect because AP/16 (Abnormal RCP Operation) Encl. 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria) requires immediately tripping the RCP at a Motor Stator Temperature of 300 degrees. It is plausible because this temperature is where the RCP must be immediately tripped based on Seal Return temperature.

Second part is incorrect. Plausible because if reactor power were </= 70%, it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect: First part is correct. AP/16 (Abnormal RCP Operation) Encl. 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria) requires immediately tripping the RCP at a Motor Stator Temperature of 300 degrees.

Second part is incorrect. Plausible because if reactor power were </= 70%, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT39 Q14


ILT39 Q14 (5/2011)OC AP16 Obj: 2AP/16 Encl 5.1

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of the maximum temperature allowed for the RCP Motor Stator. The stem contains a closure of 1LPSW-6 which results in the loss of SW. The stator is cooled by LPSW.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE062 AA2.04 - Loss of Nuclear Service WaterAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Nuclear Service Water: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

The normal values and upper limits for the temperatures of the components cooled by SWS ..................................






Reactor power = 100% Instrument Air pressure = 85 psig decreasing AP/1/A/1700/022, (Loss of Instrument Air) has been initiated

1) The highest Instrument Air pressure that would require an immediate manual

Reactor trip in accordance with AP/22 is __(1)__ psig. 2) The reason AP/22 directs tripping the Main FDW pumps immediately after tripping the Reactor is __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. 70

2. Controlling FDW valves fail “as is” B. 1. 65

2. Controlling FDW valves fail “as is” C. 1. 70

2. Controlling FDW valves fail closed D. 1. 65

2. Controlling FDW valves fail closed

APE065 AA2.05 - Loss of Instrument AirAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is decreasing



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because if IA pressure is 70 psig, a reactor trip is not required. It is plausible because per AP/22, at ~ 70 psig some valves do fail closed (HP-8/9/11 which are letdown valves).

2nd part is correct. Main and Startup FDW Control Valves fail "as is" at ~ 65 psig. If they continue to feed, an overcooling event could occur.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. Per AP/22, if IA pressure decreases to ~ 65 psig, you are to trip the reactor and Main Feedwater pumps.

2nd part is correct. Main and Startup FDW Control Valves fail "as is" at ~ 65 psig. If they continue to feed, an overcooling event could occur.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because if IA pressure is 70 psig, a reactor trip is not required. It is plausible because per AP/22, at ~ 70 psig some valves do fail closed (HP-8/9/11 which are letdown valves).

2nd part is incorrect because Main and Startup FDW Control Valves fail "as is" at ~ 65 psig. It is plausible because if the valves did fail closed, feedwater could not make it to the SGs so there would be no reason to have the pumps running.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Per AP/22, if IA pressure decreases to ~ 65 psig, you are to trip the reactor and Main Feedwater pumps.

2nd part is incorrect because Main and Startup FDW Control Valves fail "as is" at ~ 65 psig. It is plausible because if the valves did fail closed, feedwater could not make it to the SGs so there would be no reason to have the pumps running.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT44 Q15


ILT44 Q15 (12/2013)SSS-IA Obj: 46AP/22

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of when a reactor trip is required based on decreasing IA pressure.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE065 AA2.05 - Loss of Instrument AirAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Loss of Instrument Air: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

When to commence plant shutdown if instrument air pressure is decreasing




Reactor power = 35% stable SA-16/C-1, (230 KV Swyd Isolate ES Permit) actuated 230 KV Yellow Bus voltage = 224.2 KV increasing

Time = 0401:

AP/1/A/1700/034, (Degraded Grid) in progress 230 KV Yellow Bus voltage = 226.8 KV increasing RCS pressure = 1345 psig decreasing RB pressure = 2.6 psig increasing

1) At Time = 0401, ES Channels __(1)__ have actuated. 2) At Time = 0402, Unit 1’s MFBs will be energized from __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 1 and 2 ONLY 2. CT-1

B. 1. 1 through 6

2. CT-1 C. 1. 1 and 2 ONLY

2. CT-4 D. 1. 1 through 6

2. CT-4

APE077 AA1.05 - Generator Voltage and Electric Grid DisturbancesAbility to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR: 41.5 and 41.10 / 45.5, 45.7, and 45.8 )

Engineered safety features….....................................................



General Discussion

Grid voltage is low and if it stays less than 227,468 for greater than 9 seconds then an ES 1 or 2 actuation on any unit will cause a swyd isolationto occur.In the current conditions swyd voltage is still low along with low RCS pressure which causes a swyd isolation to occur due to ES 1 and 2actuation.A swyd isolation concurrent with a LOCA (LOCA/LOOP) will result in power to the MFBs coming from a Keowee unit via the undergroundand CT-4.

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. ES 1 and 2 have actuated on low RCS pressure of 1600 psig. ES 3-6 will not actuate until RB pressure reaches 3.0 psig.

2nd part is incorrect because due to the low voltage condition, power would not be restored through CT-1. It is plausible because without the low voltage condition, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because while ES 1 and 2 have actuated on low RCS pressure of 1600 psig, ES 3-6 will not actuate until RB pressure reaches 3.0 psig. It is plausible because if RB pressure were 3.0 psig or greater, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because due to the low voltage condition, power would not be restored through CT-1. It is plausible because without the low voltage condition, it would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. ES 1 and 2 have actuated on low RCS pressure of 1600 psig. ES 3-6 will not actuate until RB pressure reaches 3.0 psig.

2nd part is correct. Due to the low voltage condition, power would not be restored through CT-1. Instead, power will come through CT-4.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because while ES 1 and 2 have actuated on low RCS pressure of 1600 psig, ES 3-6 will not actuate until RB pressure reaches 3.0 psig. It is plausible because if RB pressure were 3.0 psig or greater, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. Due to the low voltage condition, power would not be restored through CT-1. Instead, power will come through CT-4.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT39 Q16


ILT39 Q16 (5/2011)IC-ES Obj: 3EL-EPD Obj: 15 & 16

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of how degraded grid and ES actuation is related and determining the plant response.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE077 AA1.05 - Generator Voltage and Electric Grid DisturbancesAbility to operate and/or monitor the following as they apply to Generator Voltage and Electric Grid Disturbances: (CFR: 41.5 and 41.10 / 45.5, 45.7, and 45.8 )

Engineered safety features….....................................................






Loss of all sources of Feedwater has occurred RCS Pressure = 2250 psig increasing Pressurizer level = 294 inches increasing ALL SCM’s = 24°F slowly decreasing

1) The lowest RCS pressure that will require Rule 4, (Initiation of HPI Forced Cooling)

to be performed is __(1)__ psig. 2) The PRIMARY reason for reducing the number of operating RCPs in accordance

with Rule 4 is to __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 2300 2. reduce heat input to the RCS

B. 1. 2300 2. reduce inventory loss from the RCS

C. 1. 2255 2. reduce heat input to the RCS

D. 1. 2255 2. reduce inventory loss from the RCS

BWE04 EK3.2 - Inadequate Heat TransferKnowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply tothe (Inadequate Heat Transfer)(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Inadequate Heat Transfer).



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. With all sources of FDW lost to the SGs, HPI Forced Cooling is established per Rule 4 when RCS pressure reaches 2300 psig.

2nd part is correct. The reason Rule 4 directs reducing the number of operating RCPs is to reduce heat input to the RCS.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect. 1st part is correct. With all sources of FDW lost to the SGs, HPI Forced Cooling is established per Rule 4 when RCS pressure reaches 2300 psig.

2nd part is incorrect. The reason is to reduce heat input into the RCS. It is plausible since there is a large RCS leak present during HPI Forced Cooling (PORV is opened) and one of the reasons that RCPs are secured during a loss of SCM event is to reduce the inventory lost out of the break.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect. Plausible since it is the high RCS pressure alarm setpoint.

2nd part is correct. The reason Rule 4 directs reducing the number of operating RCPs is to reduce heat input to the RCS.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect. 1st part is incorrect. Plausible since it is the high RCS pressure alarm setpoint.

2nd part is incorrect. The reason is to reduce heat input into the RCS. It is plausible since there is a large RCS leak present during HPI Forced Cooling (PORV is opened) and one of the reasons that RCPs are secured during a loss of SCM event is to reduce the inventory lost out of the break.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT44 Q9


ILT44 Q9 (12/2013)LOHT TabRule 4EAP-LOHT Obj. R24 EAP-LOHT Attach. 4, Obj. R10

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the reasons for steps in the EOP for LOHT.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

BWE04 EK3.2 - Inadequate Heat TransferKnowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply tothe (Inadequate Heat Transfer)(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Inadequate Heat Transfer).






Reactor power = 100% TD EFDW Pump is operating in RUN for testing MS Pressure = 885 psig decreasing

Time = 0801:

MS Pressure = 700 psig decreasing Time = 0802:

MS Pressure = 500 psig decreasing

1) At Time = 0801, 1SA-2/D-8, (AFIS HEADER B INITIATED) will be __(1)__. 2) At Time = 0802, the TD EFDW Pump __(2)__ be operating. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

ASSUME NO OPERATOR ACTION A. 1. dark

2. will

B. 1. dark 2. will NOT

C. 1. lit 2. will

D. 1. lit 2. will NOT

BWE05 2.4.50 - Excessive Heat TransferBWE05 GENERIC

Ability to verify system alarm setpoints and operate controls identified in the alarm response manual. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. In order for 1SA-2/D-8 to be lit, MS pressure needs to be < 550 psig.

2nd part is correct. With the TD EFDW Pump in RUN, it will override the AFIS signal to trip it.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. In order for 1SA-2/D-8 to be lit, MS pressure needs to be < 550 psig.

2nd part is incorrect because the TD EFDW Pump will be operating. It is plausible because with some pumps (HPI Pumps A & B), they do not have to be in AUTO to respond to an automatic signal (They will start on ES).

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because in order for 1SA2/D8 to be lit, pressure must be < 550 psig. It is plausible because 1SA2/D11, AFIS ANALOG CHANNEL TRIP will be lit.

2nd part is correct. With the TD EFDW Pump in RUN, it will override the AFIS signal to trip it.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because in order for 1SA2/D8 to be lit, pressure must be < 550 psig. It is plausible because 1SA2/D11, AFIS ANALOG CHANNEL TRIP will be lit.

2nd part is incorrect because the TD EFDW Pump will be operating. It is plausible because with some pumps (HPI Pumps A & B), they do not have to be in AUTO to respond to an automatic signal (They will start on ES).

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


CF-EFW Obj: 28, 30AFIS Dwg1SA2 D8/11

Remarks/Status


Requires the ability to verify alarm status for an Excessive Heat Transfer event.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

BWE05 2.4.50 - Excessive Heat TransferBWE05 GENERIC





Reactor is tripped 1A1 RCP was previously secured due to high vibrations EOP SGTR tab initiated due to a SGTR in 1B SG RCS pressure = 2155 psig stable 1B SG pressure = 1010 psig stable

Time = 0500:

RCS pressure = 2136 psig stable 1B SG pressure = 948 psig stable Pzr spray nozzle delta T = 420 ºF

1) At time = 0500, the 1B SG leak rate is __(1)__ than the leak rate at Time = 0400. 2) In accordance with the SGTR tab, Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray __(2)__ be utilized to

decrease SCM.

A. 1. less 2. can

B. 1. less 2. can NOT

C. 1. greater 2. can

D. 1. greater 2. can NOT

APE037 AK1.02 - Steam Generator (S/G) Tube LeakKnowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Leak rate vs. pressure drop ........................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect. Plausible since RCS pressure is lower at 0500.Second part is incorrect. Plausible because similar numbers are used in the EOP such as 450 degree cooldown plateau in the SGTR tab and when Tcold approaches 470 degrees, ensure < 4 RCPs operating in the FCD tab.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:First part is incorrect. Plausible since RCS pressure is lower at 0500.Second part is correct.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:First part is correct. The delta p between RCS and 1B SG at 0400 = 1145 psig. The delta p at 0500 = 1188 psig. The delta p at 0500 is higher, therefore the leak rate at 0500 is greater than the leakrate at 0400.Second part is incorrect. Plausible because similar numbers are used in the EOP such as 450 degree cooldown plateau in the SGTR tab and when Tcold approaches 470 degrees, ensure < 4 RCPs operating in the FCD tab.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:First part is correct. The delta p between RCS and 1B SG at 0400 = 1145 psig. The delta p at 0500 = 1188 psig. The delta p at 0500 is higher, therefore the leak rate at 0500 is greater than the leakrate at 0400.Second part is correct. The SGTR tab only allows Auxiliary Pressurizer Spray to be utilized if the Pzr spray nozzle delta T is < 410 degrees F.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT 43 Q9


ILT 43 Q9 (6/2013)EAP-SGTR Obj. R6 and 24SGTR tab

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the relationship between leak rate and pressure drop during a SGTR.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE037 AK1.02 - Steam Generator (S/G) Tube LeakKnowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to Steam Generator Tube Leak: CFR 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Leak rate vs. pressure drop ........................................




Reactor power = 100% Reactor Building Normal Sump (RBNS) is being pumped

Current conditions:

Leak develops on discharge of 1A RBNS Pump 1RIA-15 (HPI Room Corridor) in alarm

1) 1RIA-15 __(1)__ have a local audible alarm. 2) 1RIA-15 alarm __(2)__ actuate an interlock. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. does

2. will

B. 1. does 2. will NOT

C. 1. does NOT 2. will

D. 1. does NOT 2. will NOT

APE059 AA1.02 - Accidental Liquid Radioactive-Waste ReleaseAbility to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

ARM system ....................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:First part is correct. 1RIA-15 has a local audible alarm.

Second part is incorrect. There are no interlocks associated with 1RIA-15. Plausible because if it were 1RIA-4, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:First part is correct. 1RIA-15 has a local audible alarm.

Second part is correct. There are no interlocks associated with 1RIA-15

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect.First part is incorrect. 1RIA-15 has a local audible alarm. Plausible because some area radiation monitors do not have a local audible alarm.

Second part is incorrect. There are no interlocks associated with 1RIA-15. Plausible because if it were 1RIA-4, it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect.First part is incorrect. 1RIA-15 has a local audible alarm. Plausible because some area radiation monitors do not have a local audible alarm.

Second part is correct. There are no interlocks associated with 1RIA-15

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


RAD-RIA Obj. 08

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of an Area Radiation Monitor during an accidental liquid radioactive waste release.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE059 AA1.02 - Accidental Liquid Radioactive-Waste ReleaseAbility to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply to the Accidental Liquid Radwaste Release: (CFR 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

ARM system ....................................................




Reactor power = 100% Fire in Unit 1 Cable Room AP/1/A/1700/050, (Challenging Plant Fire) has been initiated

Current conditions:

AP/50, Section 4G (Unit 1 Control Room Evacuation) directs the OATC to perform Encl 5.5, OATC Actions for Control Room Evacuation

1) Encl 5.5 will direct the OATC to take __(1)__. 2) The reason the above action is taken is to __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. 1FDW-315 and 1FDW-316 to MANUAL and close

2. ensure EFDW flow to the SGs can be controlled from the ASD Panel

B. 1. 1FDW-315 and 1FDW-316 to MANUAL and close 2. prevent spurious operation of 1FDW-315 and 1FDW-316 due to fire damage

C. 1. 1A and 1B TBVs to MANUAL and control SG pressure from the ADVs 2. ensure natural circulation develops when the RCPs are secured

D. 1. 1A and 1B TBVs to MANUAL and control SG pressure from the ADVs 2. maximize SG inventory prior to losing secondary pumps due to the fire

APE067 AK3.04 - Plant Fire On SiteKnowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOP for plant fire on site .......................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect. First part is correct. Encl 5.5 directs closing 1FDW 315 & 316.

Second part is incorrect because the concern is spurious operation caused by the fire. It is plausible because the SGs will be fed from ASDP during a control room evacuation not caused by a fire.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:First part is correct. Encl 5.5 directs closing 1FDW 315 & 316.

Second part is correct. The concern is spurious operation caused by the fire.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect because Encl 5.5 does not address the TBVs. It is plausible because if the fire were in the Turbine building and Encl 5.2 were being performed, it could be correct..

Second part could be correct if it were a TB fire. RCPs are secured in the event and levels are raised to ensure NC occurs. SG pressure would have to be controlled to control Tc and therefore, natural circulation heat transfer.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect: First part is incorrect because Encl 5.5 does not address the TBVs. It is plausible because if the fire were in the Turbine building and Encl 5.2 were being performed, it could be correct.

Second part is incorrect because this is not performed. It is plausible because it is correct for a Turbine Building Flood when you could potentially lose secondary pumps.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT45 Q21


ILT45 Q21 (6/2014)EAP-AP50 OBJ. 04AP/50

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of the reason for steps in procedures used during plant fire.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

APE067 AK3.04 - Plant Fire On SiteKnowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply to the Plant Fire on Site: (CFR 41.5,41.10 / 45.6 / 45.13)

Actions contained in EOP for plant fire on site .......................






SBLOCA has occurred ICC tab is in progress RCS pressure = 700 psig SG pressure = 850 psig SG level = 50” XSUR increasing

SGs are depressurized ______ in order to establish primary to secondary heat transfer. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?

A. to establish Tsat 40-60 oF < CETC

B. to establish Tsat 90-110 oF < CETC

C. to approximately 500 psig

D. completely

EPE074 EA2.04 - Inadequate Core CoolingAbility to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Inadequate Core Cooling : (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Relationship between RCS temperature and main steam pressure ........



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect.The ICC tab directs complete depressurization of the SGs. It is plausible because the reason is correct and reducing SG Tsat 40-60 degrees < CETCs to establish heat transfer is actually a step in the HPI CD tab to attempt to regain primary to secondary heat transfer.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:The ICC tab directs complete depressurization of the SGs. It is plausible because the reason is partially correct and reducing SG Tsat 90-110 degrees < CETCs to establish heat transfer is actually a step in the HPI CD tab to attempt to regain primary to secondary heat transfer.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:Both SGs are completely depressurized in an attempt to establish primary to secondary heat transfer. It is plausible because SGs are deprerssurized to ~ 500 psig in Rule 3 during a loss of all FDW in order to feed SGs with the CBPs to establish heat transfer.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:Both SGs are completely depressurized in an attempt to establish primary to secondary heat transfer.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


EAP-ICC Obj: R4ICC tabHPI CD tab

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of how the Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) tab establishes SG pressure in an attempt to control RCS/CETC temperature.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

EPE074 EA2.04 - Inadequate Core CoolingAbility to determine or interpret the following as they apply to a Inadequate Core Cooling : (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

Relationship between RCS temperature and main steam pressure ........



Note: Drawing not representative of actual plant conditions. Given the following Unit 1 conditions: Time = 0400:

Reactor power = 100% decreasing Control Rod Group 1 Rod 3 = 0% withdrawn

Time = 0430:

Reactor power = 68% decreasing 1B1 RCP trips

1) At 0400, the power to which the ICS is running the plant back is displayed in the __(1)__ window. (refer to the drawing above) 2) After the RCP trips, the unit __(2)__ automatically stabilize at the allowed reactor

power for plant conditions. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. upper

2. will B. 1. upper

2. will NOT C. 1. lower

2. will D. 1. lower

2. will NOT

BWA01 AK2.1 - Plant RunbackKnowledge of the interrelations between the (Plant Runback) and thefollowing:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the target power is displayed in the lower window (CTPD SET). It is plausible because if the question was asking about CTP Demand, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because plant conditions (1 dropped CR with 3 RCPs operating), per AP/1, Unit Runback require you to reduce power to < 45% within 2 hours. This has to be done manually. It is plausible because with the dropped control rod, the unit will run back to 55%. It does not matter if there are 4 RCPs or 3 RCPs. ICS will still run back power to 55% after the RCP trips.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because the target power is displayed in the lower window (CTPD SET). It is plausible because if the question was asking about CTP Demand, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. With the dropped control rod, the unit will run back to 55%. It does not matter if there are 4 RCPs or 3 RCPs. ICS will still run back power to 55% after the RCP trips.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The target power is displayed in the lower window (CTPD SET).

2nd part is incorrect because plant conditions (1 dropped CR with 3 RCPs operating), per AP/1, Unit Runback require you to reduce power to < 45% within 2 hours. This has to be done manually. It is plausible because with the dropped control rod, the unit will run back to 55%. It does not matter if there are 4 RCPs or 3 RCPs. ICS will still run back power to 55% after the RCP trips.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The target power is displayed in the lower window (CTPD SET).

2nd part is correct. With the dropped control rod, the unit will run back to 55%. It does not matter if there are 4 RCPs or 3 RCPs. ICS will still run back power to 55% after the RCP trips.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q24


ILT41 Q24 (6/2012)STG-ICS Obj: 3AP/1 Unit Runback


Question requires knowledge of controls used during a unit runback including automatic features of control/safety systems.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

BWA01 AK2.1 - Plant RunbackKnowledge of the interrelations between the (Plant Runback) and thefollowing:(CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Components, and functions of control and safety systems, including instrumentation, signals, interlocks, failure modes, and automatic and manual features.



Remarks/Status




Reactor startup in progress following a refueling outage Reactor power = 50%

Time = 0801:

Main Turbine trips due to low vacuum Reactor trips Subsequent Actions tab is in progress

Time = 0802:

1A and 1B SG pressure = 885 psig stable Main Condenser Vacuum = 9” Hg stable

In accordance with the Subsequent Actions tab, SG pressure will be increased to the desired pressure using __(1)__ in order to prevent potential __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? A. 1. TBVs

2. ES actuation due to low RCS pressure

B. 1. TBVs 2. restart due to positive reactivity added by the cooldown

C. 1. ADVs 2. ES actuation due to low RCS pressure

D. 1. ADVs 2. restart due to positive reactivity added by the cooldown

BWA04 AK3.2 - Turbine TripKnowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply tothe (Turbine Trip)(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Turbine Trip).



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Correct:1st part is correct. TBVs will be used in manual because SG pressure should be ~ 1010 psig (885 psig setpt + 125 psig bias signal). With Vac > 7", the TBVs will still be usable.

2nd part is correct. With the 125 psig bias applied to the TBVs, after a trip, SG pressure should stabilize at ~ 1010psig. With no bias applied, SG pressure will be maintained at ~ 885 psig. The resulting RCS cooldown will cause RCS pressure to decrease.

OE at Oconee U3 states that after a reactor trip, the 125 Bias did not apply to the TBVs which resulted in RCS depressurization and ES 1/2 actuation.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. TBVs will be used in manual because SG pressure should be ~ 1010 psig (885 psig setpt + 125 psig bias signal). With Vac > 7", the TBVs will still be usable.

2nd part is incorrect because the concern is the RCS cooling down / depressurizing to the point that ES 1/2 actuates. It is also incorrect because after a refueling outage, the moderator temperature coefficient at 0% power will be ~ 0 and maybe even slightly positive so a potential restart due to positive reactivity addition with the cooldown is not a concern. It is plausible because if it were at EOL, a significant amount of positive reactivity could be added. This is also true if an ATWS were to occur where positive reactivity addition is to me minimized.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the TBVs will be used. If the TBVs are not available (Vacuum < 7"), it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. With the 125 psig bias applied to the TBVs, after a trip, SG pressure should stabilize at ~ 1010psig. With no bias applied, SG pressure will be maintained at ~ 885 psig. The resulting RCS cooldown will cause RCS pressure to decrease.

OE at Oconee U3 states that after a reactor trip, the 125 Bias did not apply to the TBVs which resulted in RCS depressurization and ES 1/2 actuation.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the TBVs will be used. If the TBVs are not available (Vacuum < 7"), it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because the concern is the RCS cooling down / depressurizing to the point that ES 1/2 actuates. It is also incorrect because after a refueling outage, the moderator temperature coefficient at 0% power will be ~ 0 and maybe even slightly positive so a potential restart due to positive reactivity addition with the cooldown is not a concern. It is plausible because if it were at EOL, a significant amount of positive reactivity could be added. This is also true if an ATWS were to occur where positive reactivity addition is to me minimized

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


SAEAP-SAICS-02 Obj: 4


Question requires knowledge of reasons for procedure steps during a turbine trip.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only



Remarks/Status

BWA04 AK3.2 - Turbine TripKnowledge of the reasons for the following responses as they apply tothe (Turbine Trip)(CFR: 41.5 / 41.10, 45.6, 45.13)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (Turbine Trip).




Reactor power = 100% 3A HPIP operating

Time = 0801:

Chlorine gas is entering the Control Room The CRS has implemented AP/3/A/1700/008,(Loss of Control Room) No actions were taken prior to evacuating the Control Room The Unit 3 Auxiliary Shutdown Panel (ASP) has been manned

Time = 0810:

RCS pressure = 2205 psig 1) 3HP-24, (1A HPI BWST SUCTION) will be opened __(1)__. 2) AP/8 directs reducing RCS pressure by __(2)__from the ASP. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. at the ASP

2. opening 3RC-1, (PZR SPRAY) B. 1. at the ASP

2. de-energizing Pzr Heaters C. 1. locally at the valve

2. opening 3RC-1, (PZR SPRAY) D. 1. locally at the valve

2. de-energizing Pzr Heaters

BWA06 2.4.6 - Shutdown Outside Control RoomBWA06 GENERIC

Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because 3HP-24 is not controlled from the ASP. It is plausible because direction is given once you are at the ASP, but it is for local (at the valve) operation.

2nd part is incorrect because the Pzr Spray valve is not controlled from the ASP. It is plausible because this would be the normal method of reducing RCS pressure from the Control Room.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because 3HP-24 is not controlled from the ASP. It is plausible because direction is given once you are at the ASP, but it is for local (at the valve) operation.

2nd part is correct. Step 4.18 of AP/8 directs you to maintain RCS pressure 1800 to 2200 psig by cycling Pzr Heater Bank Control Switch as required.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. 3HP-24 is not controlled from the ASP. Direction is given to open 3HP-24 at the valve.

2nd part is incorrect because the Pzr Spray valve is not controlled from the ASP. It is plausible because this would be the normal method of reducing RCS pressure from the Control Room.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. 3HP-24 is not controlled from the ASP. Direction is given to open 3HP-24 at the valve.

2nd part is correct. Step 4.18 of AP/8 directs you to maintain RCS pressure 1800 to 2200 psig by cycling Pzr Heater Bank Control Switch as required.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


AP/8EAP AP8 Obj: 4

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of mitigation strategies in AP/8 for shutting down outside of the control room.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

BWA06 2.4.6 - Shutdown Outside Control RoomBWA06 GENERIC

Knowledge of EOP mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)






LOCA CD tab in progress ALL SCMs = 4ºF increasing RCS pressure is controllable Statalarm 1SA-07/E6 (ES LPI Bypass Permit) actuated

1) The RCS pressure setpoint which will cause Statalarm 1SA-07/E6 to actuate is __(1)__ psig. 2) In accordance with the LOCA CD tab, LPI __(2)__ be manually bypassed. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 865 2. will

B. 1. 865

2. will NOT C. 1. 890

2. will D. 1. 890

2. will NOT

BWE08 EA1.3 - LOCA CooldownAbility to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply tothe (LOCA Cooldown)(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The setpoint for the alarm is 865 psig.

2nd part is correct. The LOCA CD tab requires the following to be met to bypass the ES channels.__ All SCMs > 0°F__ ES Bypass Permit satisfied__ RCS pressure controllableIn this case, all three conditions are met so the channels will be bypassed.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. The setpoint for the alarm is 865 psig.

2nd part is incorrect because the LOCA CD tab requires the following to be met to bypass the ES channels.__ All SCMs > 0°F__ ES Bypass Permit satisfied__ RCS pressure controllableIn this case, all three conditions are met so the channels will be bypassed. It is plausible because you have to know all of the criteria in order to answer the question.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the setpoint is 865 psig. It is plausible because 890 psig is when the permit resets.

2nd part is correct. The LOCA CD tab requires the following to be met to bypass the ES channels.__ All SCMs > 0°F__ ES Bypass Permit satisfied__ RCS pressure controllableIn this case, all three conditions are met so the channels will be bypassed.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the setpoint is 865 psig. It is plausible because 890 psig is when the permit resets.

2nd part is incorrect because the LOCA CD tab requires the following to be met to bypass the ES channels.__ All SCMs > 0°F__ ES Bypass Permit satisfied__ RCS pressure controllableIn this case, all three conditions are met so the channels will be bypassed. It is plausible because you have to know all of the criteria in order to answer the question.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q26


ILT41 Q26 (6/2012)LOCA CD tab


Requires knowledge of operating parameters required to bypass LPI.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only



1SA7 E6EAP LCD Obj: R9

Remarks/Status

BWE08 EA1.3 - LOCA CooldownAbility to operate and / or monitor the following as they apply tothe (LOCA Cooldown)(CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 / 45.6)

Desired operating results during abnormal and emergency situations.




Reactor power = 100% 1TDEFWP is OOS

Current conditions:

Both Main Feedwater Pumps trip 1A MDEFWP fails to start 1A SG level = 26 inches XSUR decreasing 1B SG level = 28 inches XSUR increasing Enclosure 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation) is in progress 1FDW-313 and 1FDW-314 (1A & 1B EFDW LINE DISCH X-CONNs) open

Which ONE of the following describes the MAXIMUM acceptable flowrate (gpm) allowed to each SG at the same time per EOP Rule 7?

A. 1A SG = 220 / 1B SG = 220

B. 1A SG = 300 / 1B SG = 300

C. 1A SG = 600 / 1B SG = 600

D. 1A SG = 500 / 1B SG = 450

BWE13 EK1.2 - EOP RulesKnowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts asthey apply to the (EOP Rules)(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (EOP Rules).



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because with the stated conditions, the maximum flowrate for 1 MD EFDW pump per Rule 7, table 3 is 600 gpm per pump with suction from the normal (UST). It is plausible because if suction was from the Hotwell, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:With the stated conditions (feeding both SGs with one MDEFDWP), the maximum flowrate for 1 MD EFDW pump per Rule 7, table 3 is 600gpm. (300 gpm in each header in this instance).

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:Because with the stated conditions, the maximum flowrate for 1 MD EFDW pump per Rule 7, table 3 is 600 gpm per pump. It is plausible because the limit if both EFDWPs running would be 600 gpm per EFDWP (1200 gpm total as in this case).

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because with the stated conditions, the maximum flowrate for 1 MD EFDW pump per Rule 7, table 3 is 600 gpm per pump. It is plausible because the limit if the only EFDWP running was the TD EFDWP, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

2009 Q44


2009 Q44 (3/2009)EAP-LOHT Obj: R27Rule 3Rule 7

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the impact of a loss of Main Feedwater with an EFDWP failure and the feed rates allowed by Rule 7 to address the plant condition.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

BWE13 EK1.2 - EOP RulesKnowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts asthey apply to the (EOP Rules)(CFR: 41.8 / 41.10 / 45.3)

Normal, abnormal and emergency operating procedures associated with (EOP Rules).




Reactor power = 100% AP/16 (Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation) in progress RCP Parameters given below:

1B1 RCP 1B2 RCP

UPPER Cavity Pressure

1426 psig stable 714 psig stable

LOWER Cavity Pressure

2140 psig stable 1070 psig stable

RCP __(1)__ should be secured as soon as plant conditions allow because __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? A. 1. 1B1

2. a single failed seal can transport debris to other seals and damage them B. 1. 1B1

2. the seals are not designed to withstand full DP across any one seal C. 1. 1B2

2. a single failed seal can transport debris to other seals and damage them D. 1. 1B2

2. the seals are not designed to withstand full DP across any one seal

SYS003 2.4.20 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)SYS003 GENERIC

Knowledge of the operational implications of EOP warnings, cautions, and notes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is correct. Per AP/16: IAAT RCS pressure is > 1000 psig and DP across any seal is < 100 psig, shut down the affected RCP.

2nd part is correct. This is stated in a caution prior to step 15 in section 4A of AP/16.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is correct. Per AP/16: IAAT RCS pressure is > 1000 psig and DP across any seal is < 100 psig, shut down the affected RCP.

2nd part is incorrect because each seal is rated for full DP. It is plausible because the normal DP across each seal is 1/3 of full DP.

Answer C Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the 1B2 RCP does not meet criteria per AP/16 to shut down. ( IAAT RCS pressure is > 1000 psig and DP across any seal is < 100 psig, shut down the affected RCP). It is plausible because the DP is > 1000 psid across the lower seal. The 1000 psig is part of the criteria but not the DP used to determine if shutdown is required.

2nd part is correct. This is stated in a caution prior to step 15 in section 4A of AP/16.

Answer D Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the 1B2 RCP does not meet criteria per AP/16 to shut down. ( IAAT RCS pressure is > 1000 psig and DP across any seal is < 100 psig, shut down the affected RCP). It is plausible because the DP is > 1000 psid across the lower seal. The 1000 psig is part of the criteria but not the DP used to determine if shutdown is required.

2nd part is incorrect because each seal is rated for full DP. It is plausible because the normal DP across each seal is 1/3 of full DP.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

2009B Q4


AP/162009B Q4 (10/2010)OC-AP-16 Obj: 3PNS CPS

Remarks/Status

Discussed with R. Baldwin on 2/02/16. He said we could write to AP/16.Sam


Question requires knowledge of the operational implications stated in a Note in AP/16 for RCP seal failure.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS003 2.4.20 - Reactor Coolant Pump System (RCPS)SYS003 GENERIC







AP/1/A/1700/002, (Excessive RCS Leakage) is in progress RCS Makeup is in progress using Encl 5.5, (Pzr and LDST Level Control) 1CS-48, (1A BHUT Recirc) is stuck in its normal position

1) 1CS-48 is operated __(1)__.

2) With 1CS-48 stuck in its current position, makeup flow from 1A Bleed Transfer

Pump __(2)__ be adjusted per Encl 5.5. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. locally

2. can

B. 1. locally 2. can NOT

C. 1. from the Unit 1 Control Room 2. can

D. 1. from the Unit 1 Control Room 2. can NOT

SYS004 K6.10 - Chemical and Volume Control SystemKnowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Boric acid storage tank/boron injection tank recirculation flow path ......



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. 1CS-48 is operated locally.

2nd part is incorrect because Encl 5.5 does not provide an alternate method of adjusting makeup flow from 1A BHUT. It is plausible because during normal makeup using the OP/1/A/1103/004 Encl 4.4), the procedure does provide an option to adjust flow rate using 1HP-15 (LDST Makeup Control).

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. 1CS-48 is operated locally.

2nd part is correct. When using the 1A BTP to makeup to the RCS using Encl 5.5, the procedure does not give another option to adjust flow rate.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because 1CS-48 is operated locally. It is plausible because all of the other valves in this evolution is operated in the Control Room.

2nd part is incorrect because Encl 5.5 does not provide an alternate method of adjusting makeup flow from 1A BHUT. It is plausible because during normal makeup using the OP/1/A/1103/004 Encl 4.4), the procedure does provide an option to adjust flow rate using 1HP-15 (LDST Makeup Control).

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because 1CS-48 is operated locally. It is plausible because all of the other valves in this evolution is operated in the Control Room.

2nd part is correct. When using the 1A BTP to makeup to the RCS using Encl 5.5, the procedure does not give another option to adjust flow rate.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


PNS-HPI Obj: 3PNS - CSop/1/a/1103/004Encl 5.5

Remarks/Status

Preview Q.Wrote new question based on feedback.


Question requires knowledge of how losing the recirculation flow path (CS-48) will affect normal CVCS operation (makeup).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS004 K6.10 - Chemical and Volume Control SystemKnowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction on the following CVCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Boric acid storage tank/boron injection tank recirculation flow path ......





Which ONE of the following consists of ONLY components powered from 2TD?

A. 2C LPI pump and 2B HPI pump

B. 2C LPI pump and 2C HPI pump

C. 2B LPI pump and 2B HPI pump

D. 2B LPI pump and 2C HPI pump

SYS005 K2.01 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

RHR pumps .....................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because the 2C LPIP is powered from 2TE. It is plausible because if it were 2TE, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:Incorrect because the 2C LPI pump is powered from 2TE. It is plausible because the 2C HPI pump is correct and it would fit normal nomeclature that the same ES pumps (A HPI/ALPI or BHPI/BLPI) are powered from the same busses.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because the 2B HPI pump is not powered from 2TD. It is plausible because it would meet the standardized bus assignment of TC-A TD-B. and TE-C.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:Both are powered from 2TD.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT46 Q31


ILT46 Q31 (12/2014)PNS LPI Obj: 5PNS HPI

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the bus power supplies to the LPI pumps.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS005 K2.01 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)Knowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

RHR pumps .....................................................




Reactor in MODE 5 LPI in normal decay removal

1) The LPI Pump Minimum Flow recirculation line directs LPI pump discharge flow to

the suction of the respective LPI pump __(1)__. 2) In accordance with OP/1/A/1104/004 Limits and Precautions, if operated below the

minimum allowed flow rate, the associated LPI pump __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. continuously 2. must be stopped immediately

B. 1. continuously

2. can remain running, but Performance testing is required C. 1. ONLY when pump flow decreases to 800 gpm

2. must be stopped immediately D. 1. ONLY when pump flow decreases to 800 gpm

2. can remain running, but Performance testing is required

SYS005 K4.06 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)Knowledge of RHRS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide or the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Function of RHR pump miniflow recirculation ........................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The minimum flow line for RHR pumps is an orificed line that is continually in service to maintain a minimum flow of 800 gpm.

2nd part is incorrect because the pump is allowed to operate with flow < 800 gpm but must be declared inoperable for TS considerations until a PT is performed. It is plausible because if in the EOP and the LPI pumps are running at shutoff head, it directs you to secure the LPI pumps (it does not mention a time restriction).

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. The minimum flow line for RHR pumps is an orificed line that is continually in service to maintain a minimum flow of 800 gpm.

2nd part is correct. The pump is allowed to operate with flow < 800 gpm but must be declared inoperable for TS considerations until a PT is performed.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the minimum flow line for RHR pumps is an orificed line that is continually in service to maintain a minimum flow of 800 gpm. It is plausible because some minimum flow recirc lines are set with a valve that operates automacially at a given flow rate (Condensate Booster Pumps).

2nd part is incorrect because the pump is allowed to operate with flow < 800 gpm but must be declared inoperable for TS considerations until a PT is performed. It is plausible because if in the EOP and the LPI pumps are running at shutoff head, it directs you to secure the LPI pumps (it does not mention a time restriction).

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the minimum flow line for RHR pumps is an orificed line that is continually in service to maintain a minimum flow of 800 gpm. It is plausible because some minimum flow recirc lines are set with a valve that operates automacially at a given flow rate (Condensate Booster Pumps).

2nd part is correct. The pump is allowed to operate with flow < 800 gpm but must be declared inoperable for TS considerations until a PT is performed.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT42 Q31


ILT42 Q31 12/2012)PNS LPI Obj: 401104/004


Requires knowledge of the function of the LPI pump minimum flow recirc line.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS005 K4.06 - Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)Knowledge of RHRS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide or the following : (CFR: 41.7)

Function of RHR pump miniflow recirculation ........................



Remarks/Status




Reactor power = 100% Current conditions:

ES Channels 1 – 8 actuated EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) initiated HPI Flow Train A = 520 gpm HPI Flow Train B = 468 gpm RC Make Up Flow = 160 gpm Seal Inlet Header Flow = 32 gpm

In accordance with the EOP, ______ is/are required to be throttled to prevent HPI pump runout. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1HP-26 ONLY B. 1HP-27 ONLY C. 1HP-26 and 1HP-27 D. NO valve

SYS006 K5.08 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Operation of pumps in parallel .....................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because none of the throttling criteria has been met. It is plausible because the "A" header is greater than 475 gpm and if there was only one HPIP in the "A" header, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:Incorrect because none of the throttling criteria has been met. It is plausible because if the makeup flow was incorrectly added to the B header flow through HP-27 (468 gpm + 160 gpm) you would have greater than 475 gpm which would meet throttle criteria for the B header.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because none of the throttling criteria has been met. It is plausible because "A" header is greater than 475 gpm which require throttling 1HP-26 (if only one HPIP were running in that header) and if you add seal injection to the "B" header flow then 1HP-27 would need to be throttled.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:No valve is required to be throttled because no HPI header flow, with only one HPI pump operating, has more than 475 gpm (including seal injection flow for the "A" header).

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT45 Q33


ILT45 Q33 (6/2014)EOP Rule 6PNS-HPIEAP LOSCM Obj: 24

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the operational limitations (Rule 6) of ECCS pumps operating in parallel.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS006 K5.08 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)Knowledge of the operational implications of the following concepts as they apply to ECCS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Operation of pumps in parallel .....................................




Quench Tank pressure is 25 psig due to 1RC-66 (PORV) leaking by Quench Tank pressure is being lowered using Enclosure 4.5 (Lower QT

Pressure) of OP/1/A/1104/017, Quench Tank Operations 1GWD-12 (QUENCH TANK VENT INSIDE RB) is OPEN Vent Header Pressure is +3 inches GWD-1 is in AUTO

1) In accordance with OP/1/A/1104/017, 1GWD-13 (QUENCH TANK VENT OUTSIDE RB) is __(1)__ until desired Quench Tank pressure is reached. 2) GWD-1 is initially expected to __(2)__ in response to the current vent header pressure. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. cycled open and closed 2. open

B. 1. cycled open and closed

2. close C. 1. opened fully

2. open D. 1. opened fully

2. close

SYS007 A1.02 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Maintaining quench tank pressure ...................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Per 1104/017 Encl. 4.4, to lower QT pressure 1GWD-13 is cycled to prevent exceeding Vent Header Pressure limit.

2nd part is incorrect because GWD-1 is set to maintain a slightly negative pressure in the GWD header. With pressure at +3 inches, it will close to reduce pressure. It is plausible if the applicant does not understand how GWD-1 controls at setpoint.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. Per 1104/017 Encl. 4.4, to lower QT pressure 1GWD-13 is cycled to prevent exceeding Vent Header Pressure limit.

2nd part is correct. GWD-1 is set to maintain a slightly negative pressure in the GWD header. With pressure at +3 inches, it will close to reduce pressure.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because per 1104/017 Encl. 4.4, to lower QT pressure 1GWD-13 is cycled to prevent exceeding Vent Header Pressure limit. It is plausible because just opening it will reduce QT pressure.

2nd part is incorrect because GWD-1 is set to maintain a slightly negative pressure in the GWD header. With pressure at +3 inches, it will close to reduce pressure. It is plausible if the applicant does not understand how GWD-1 controls at setpoint.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because per 1104/017 Encl. 4.4, to lower QT pressure 1GWD-13 is cycled to prevent exceeding Vent Header Pressure limit. It is plausible because just opening it will reduce QT pressure.

2nd part is correct. GWD-1 is set to maintain a slightly negative pressure in the GWD header. With pressure at +3 inches, it will close to reduce pressure.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT43 Q33


ILT43 Q33 (6/2013)OP/1/A/1104/017WE-GWD Obj: 3PNS-CS

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of how venting QT is performed in order to maintain pressure within limits.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS007 A1.02 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRTS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Maintaining quench tank pressure ...................................





Given the following Unit 1 conditions: Initial conditions

Loss of all Feedwater HPI forced cooling initiated Quench Tank pressure = 40 psig increasing RCS activity indicates no fuel failures present

Current conditions

Quench Tank pressure = 3 psig stable 1) Reactor building RIA’s count rate will __(1)__. 2) A HIGH alarm on 1RIA-49 will automatically close __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. increase 2. 1LWD-1 AND 1LWD-2

B. 1. remain constant

2. 1LWD-1 AND 1LWD-2 C. 1. increase

2. 1LWD-2 ONLY D. 1. remain constant

2. 1LWD-2 ONLY

SYS007 K3.01 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Containment ....................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. When the rupture disk bursts, reactor coolant will be released into containment causing RIA readings to increase.

2nd part is incorrect because 1LWD-1 will not close. It is plausible because it would be correct for an ES 1&2 actuation.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because when the rupture disk bursts, reactor coolant will be released into containment causing RIA readings to increase. It is plausible because as stated in the stem of the question, there is no fuel failure (much less activity) and its not stated that the rupture disk has burst (you have to deduce that from the information given).

2nd part is incorrect because 1LWD-1 will not close. It is plausible because it would be correct for an ES 1&2 actuation.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. When the rupture disk bursts, reactor coolant will be released into containment causing RIA readings to increase.

2nd part is correct. 1LWD-1 will not close due to 1RIA-49 reaching High Alarm. 1LWD-2 will close.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because when the rupture disk bursts, reactor coolant will be released into containment causing RIA readings to increase. It is plausible because as stated in the stem of the question, there is no fuel failure (much less activity) and its not stated that the rupture disk has burst (you have to deduce that from the information given).

2nd part is correct. 1LWD-1 will not close due to 1RIA-49 reaching High Alarm. 1LWD-2 will close.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT44 Q33


ILT44 Q33 (12/2013)PNS-CS Obj: 10EAP HPI CDRAD-RIA Obj: 8

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the impact of discharge from PORV to the Quench Tank and indications of failed/blown rupture disk and the impact of the failure on containment parameters (loss of QT) and systems (RBNS flow path isolation).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS007 K3.01 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PRTS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Containment ....................................................






Reactor power = 100% AP/1/A/1700/020, (Loss of Component Cooling) in progress

1) In accordance with AP/20, the LOWEST CRD temperature that will require a

Reactor trip is __(1)__ °F. 2) The LOWEST LETDOWN temperature that will automatically close 1HP-5 is

__(2)__ °F. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. 140

2. 130

B. 1. 140 2. 135

C. 1. 180 2. 130

D. 1. 180 2. 135

SYS008 A2.03 - Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations : (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

High/low CCW temperature .......................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because direction is given in AP/20 to trip the reactor if 2 CRDM temperatures are 180 degrees. It is plausible because 140 degrees is the OAC alarm setpoint.

2nd part is incorrect because letdown isolates when letdown temperature increases to 135 degrees. It is plausible because 130 degrees is the alarm setpoint.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because direction is given in AP/20 to trip the reactor if 2 CRDM temperatures are 180 degrees. It is plausible because 140 degrees is the OAC alarm setpoint.

2nd part is correct. Letdown isolates when letdown temperature increases to 135 degrees.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Direction is given in AP/20 to trip the reactor if 2 CRDM temperatures are 180 degrees.

2nd part is incorrect because letdown isolates when letdown temperature increases to 135 degrees. It is plausible because 130 degrees is the alarm setpoint.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Direction is given in AP/20 to trip the reactor if 2 CRDM temperatures are 180 degrees.

2nd part is correct. Letdown isolates when letdown temperature increases to 135 degrees.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT46 Q51


ILT46 Q51 (12/2014)AP/20PNS CC Obj: 17

Remarks/Status

.


Requires ability to predict the impact of a high CC temperature condition and understand how the procedure (AP/20) will direct actions to mitigate the event.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS008 A2.03 - Component Cooling Water System (CCWS)Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the CCWS, and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations : (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

High/low CCW temperature .......................................






Reactor power = 100% 1RC-1 failed OPEN RCS pressure = 2150 psig decreasing AP/1/A/1700/044, (Abnormal Pressurizer Pressure Control) initiated

Current conditions:

1RC-3 failed OPEN 1) RCS pressure will __(1)__. 2) AP/44 will initially direct stopping the __(2)__ to help mitigate the failure. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. continue to decrease below the reactor trip setpoint 2. 1A1 RCP ONLY

B. 1. continue to decrease below the reactor trip setpoint 2. 1A1 AND 1A2 RCP

C. 1. be maintained above the reactor trip setpoint 2. 1A1 RCP ONLY

D. 1. be maintained above the reactor trip setpoint 2. 1A1 AND 1A2 RCP

SYS010 K3.01 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PZR PCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

RCS ...........................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. With full Pzr spray, Pzr heaters will not be able to maintain RCS pressure above the low pressure reactor trip setpoint.

2nd part is incorrect because AP/44 directs tripping 1A1 & 1A2 RCPs. It is plausible because the spray line taps off down stream of the 1A1 RCP.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. With full Pzr spray, Pzr heaters will not be able to maintain RCS pressure above the low pressure reactor trip setpoint.

2nd part is correct. AP/44 directs tripping 1A1 & 1A2 RCPs.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because with full Pzr spray, Pzr heaters will not be able to maintain RCS pressure above the low pressure reactor trip setpoint. It is plausible because more Pzr heaters will come on as RCS pressure decreases in an attempt to raise RCS pressure. It is a common misconception that Pzr heaters will keep up with Pzr spray.

2nd part is incorrect because AP/44 directs tripping 1A1 & 1A2 RCPs. It is plausible because the spray line taps off down stream of the 1A1 RCP.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because with full Pzr spray, Pzr heaters will not be able to maintain RCS pressure above the low pressure reactor trip setpoint. It is plausible because more Pzr heaters will come on as RCS pressure decreases in an attempt to raise RCS pressure. It is a common misconception that Pzr heaters will keep up with Pzr spray.

2nd part is correct. AP/44 directs tripping 1A1 & 1A2 RCPs.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT45 Q37


ILT45 Q37 (6/2014)PNS-PZR Obj: 6, 11AP/44

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of how a failure of Pzr spray would affect Pzr PCS and the resulting RCS pressure response.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS010 K3.01 - Pressurizer Pressure Control System (PZR PCS)Knowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the PZR PCS will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

RCS ...........................................................






Reactor power = 3% 1A Main FDW Pump is operating

Time = 0810:

1A Main FDW Pump trips Emergency FDW pumps start Reactor power = 3%

1) At Time = 0810, the Reactor must be manually tripped because the Reactor

Protection System (RPS) trip due to the Loss of both MFDWPs __(1)__ .

2) The purpose of the “Loss of both MFDWPs Anticipatory Reactor Trip” is to preclude a reactor trip due to high __(2)__.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. has failed

2. RCS pressure from the loss of heat sink

B. 1. has failed 2. neutron flux from the cold EFDW injection into the SGs

C. 1. is bypassed 2. RCS pressure from the loss of heat sink

D. 1. is bypassed 2. neutron flux from the cold EFDW injection into the SGs

SYS012 K6.10 - Reactor Protection System (RPS)Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/7)

Permissive circuits ...............................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The "Both MFDWP Anticipatory Reactor Trip" is enabled at 1.75% increasing and disabled at 0.5% decreasing. If both MFW pumps have failed and you are still at 3% CTP, the RPS trip has failed.

2nd part is correct. This trip precludes a reactor trip due to high pressure or high temperature from the loss of heat sink.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. The "Both MFDWP Anticipatory Reactor Trip" is enabled at 1.75% increasing and disabled at 0.5% decreasing. If both MFW pumps have failed and you are still at 3% CTP, the RPS trip has failed.

2nd part is incorrect because this trip precludes a reactor trip due to high pressure or high temperature from the loss of heat sink. It is plausible because with the cold water injection from EFW (~ 300 degrees colder), some amount of positive reactivity may be added.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the "Both MFDWP Anticipatory Reactor Trip" is enabled at 1.75% increasing and disabled at 0.5% decreasing. It is plausible because if power were < 1.75% on startup, or < 0.5% on shutdown, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. This trip precludes a reactor trip due to high pressure or high temperature from the loss of heat sink.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect;1st part is incorrect because the "Both MFDWP Anticipatory Reactor Trip" is enabled at 1.75% increasing and disabled at 0.5% decreasing. It is plausible because if power were < 1.75% on startup, or < 0.5% on shutdown, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because this trip precludes a reactor trip due to high pressure or high temperature from the loss of heat sink. It is plausible because with the cold water injection from EFW (~ 300 degrees colder), some amount of positive reactivity may be added.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


IC RPS Obj: R3

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the MFDWP Trip Anticipatory Reactor trip (when it is bypassed/enabled) and the effect on RPS when it malfunctions.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS012 K6.10 - Reactor Protection System (RPS)Knowledge of the effect of a loss or malfunction of the following will have on the RPS: (CFR: 41.7 / 45/7)

Permissive circuits ...............................................






Main Steam Line Break occurred 20 seconds ago Plant response as indicated on attached PT Display

1) Digital ES Channels __(1)__ should have automatically actuated. 2) Diverse HPI __(2)__ have automatically actuated. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. 1 through 8

2. will B. 1. 1 and 2 ONLY

2. will C. 1. 1 through 8

2. will NOT D. 1. 1 and 2 ONLY

2. will NOT

SYS013 A4.03 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

ESFAS initiation .................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. RB pressure is 12.9 psig so ES 1-8 should have actuated.

2nd part is incorrect because with displayed plant conditions, Diverse HPI should NOT have automatically initiated. It is plausible because if RC S pressure was less than 1550 psig, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because RB pressure is 12.9 psig so ES 1-8 should have actuated. It is plausible because if you just look at RCS pressure (1551 psig), it would appear to be correct.


Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. RB pressure is 12.9 psig so ES 1-8 should have actuated.

2nd part is correct. With displayed plant conditions (RPS pressure 1551 psig), Diverse HPI (Setpt = < 1550 psig) should NOT haveautomatically initiated.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because RB pressure is 12.9 psig so ES 1-8 should have actuated. It is plausible because if you just look at RCS pressure (1551 psig), it would appear to be correct.


Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT43 Q12

Student References Provided

PT Display

Development References

ILT43 Q12 (6/2013)OP-OC-IC-ES, Obj: 16PT Display

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of when various ES channels require initiation during a MSLB.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS013 A4.03 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

ESFAS initiation .................................................






Large Break LOCA occurred ES 1-8 actuated LOSCM tab in progress

Time = 1200:

LOCA CD tab in progress RB pressure = 2.0 psig Reactor Engineering has confirmed Condition One per RP/0/B/1000/018, Core

Damage Assessment

1) Plant conditions at Time = 1200 __(1)__ allow securing RB Spray.

2) When allowed by the LOCA CD tab, the reason for securing RB Spray is that continued operation does not outweigh the __(2)__.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. do

2. detrimental effects of corrosion of electrical components from the acidic spray

B. 1. do 2. reduction in NPSH to the LPI pumps while the BS pumps are operating

C. 1. do NOT 2. detrimental effects of corrosion of electrical components from the acidic

spray

D. 1. do NOT 2. reduction in NPSH to the LPI pumps while the BS pumps are operating

SYS022 2.4.18 - Containment Cooling System (CCS)SYS022 GENERIC

Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. All of the criteria per the LOCA CD tab has been met to secure RB Spray: RB pressure < 3 psig, < 24 hours into the event and RE confirms Condition Zero or one.

2nd part is correct. Bases for securing RB spray is that the with RB pressure < 3 psig, significant repressurization is unlikely and the benefit of keeping it operating is outweighed by the damage caused by the acidic (boron) spray on containment electrical components.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. All of the criteria per the LOCA CD tab has been met to secure RB Spray: RB pressure < 3 psig, < 24 hours into the event and RE confirms Condition Zero or one..

2nd part is incorrect because the bases for securing RB spray is that with RB pressure < 3 psig, significant repressurization is unlikely and the benefit of keeping it operating is outweighed by the damage caused by the acidic (boron) spray on containment electrical components. It is plausible because the BS and LPI pumps share the same suction header from the RB sump and securing the RB Spray pumps would increase the NPSH to the LPI pumps. This is not the bases for the step however.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because all criteria are met to secure RB Spray. It is plausible because if RB pressure were 3 psig, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. Bases for securing RB spray is that with RB pressure < 3 psig, significant repressurization is unlikely and the benefit of keeping it operating is outweighed by the damage caused by the acidic (boron) spray on containment electrical components.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because all criteria are met to secure RB Spray. It is plausible because if RB pressure were 3 psig, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because the bases for securing RB spray is that with RB pressure < 3 psig, significant repressurization is unlikely and the benefit of keeping it operating is outweighed by the damage caused by the acidic (boron) spray on containment electrical components. It is plausible because the BS and LPI pumps share the same suction header from the RB sump and securing the RB Spray pumps would increase the NPSH to the LPI pumps. This is not the bases for the step however.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


EAP LCD Obj: R8LOCA CD tab

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the bases for the EOP steps that remove RB Spray Pumps (Cont. Cooling) from operation after a large break LOCA.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS022 2.4.18 - Containment Cooling System (CCS)SYS022 GENERIC

Knowledge of the specific bases for EOPs. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)





Which ONE of the following is the power supply for Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) 1B?

A. 1XS2

B. 1XS3

C. 1X8

D. 1X9

SYS022 K2.02 - Containment Cooling System (CCS)Knowledge of power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Chillers ........................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:The power supply for the 1B RBCU is 1XS3. It is plausible because there are RBCU feeds from the 1XS MCCs.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1B RBCU is powered from 1XS3.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:The power supply for the 1B RBCU is 1XS3. It is plausible because if it were the 1A RBCU, it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:The power supply for the 1B RBCU is 1XS3. It is plausible because if it were the 1C RBCU, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT47 Q41


ILT47 Q41 (6/2015)PNS-RBC

Remarks/Status

Discussed with R. Baldwin on 2/02/16. He said we could use RBCU in the question as containment chiller.Sam


Chief ________ that using RBCU's in place of chillers will meet this KA.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS022 K2.02 - Containment Cooling System (CCS)Knowledge of power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Chillers ........................................................




The Reactor trips from 100% power due to a LBLOCA. __(1)__ is added to the RB Emergency Sump to allow RBS to __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? A. 1. LiOH (Lithium Hydroxide)

2. minimize hydrogen production from the boric acid reaction with Zircoloy

B. 1. LiOH (Lithium Hydroxide) 2. aid in keeping Iodine in solution, ultimately reducing offsite dose

C. 1. TSP (Trisodium Phosphate Dodecahydrate) 2. minimize hydrogen production from the boric acid reaction with Zircoloy

D. 1. TSP (Trisodium Phosphate Dodecahydrate) 2. aid in keeping Iodine in solution, ultimately reducing offsite dose

SYS026 K4.06 - Containment Spray System (CSS)Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Iodine scavenging via the CSS ......................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because Tri-Sodium-Phosphate is added to raise the Ph of sump water. It is plausible because LiOH is added to the RCS to control PH.

2nd part is incorrect because TSP is added to keep iodine in solution. It is plausible since it does inhibit H2 production due to the boric acid reaction with Zinc and Aluminum, but not zircaloy.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because Tri-Sodium-Phosphate is added to raise the Ph of sump water. It is plausible because LiOH is added to the RCS to control PH.

2nd part is correct. TSP is added to keep Iodine in solution.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Tri-Sodium-Phosphate is added to raise the Ph of sump water.

2nd part is incorrect because TSP is added to keep iodine in solution. It is plausible since it does inhibit H2 production due to the boric acid reaction with Zinc and Aluminum, but not zircaloy.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Tri-Sodium-Phosphate is added to raise the Ph of sump water.

2nd part is correct. TSP is added to keep Iodine in solution.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT43 Q40


PNS-RBS Obj: 1ILT43 Q40 (6/2013)

Remarks/Status


The question requires the applicant to recall which chemical is added to the sump (the design feature) that results in scavanging Iodine.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS026 K4.06 - Containment Spray System (CSS)Knowledge of CSS design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Iodine scavenging via the CSS ......................................




Reactor power = 100% SB LOCA occurs 1A SG outlet pressure fails low Rule 2, (Loss of SCM) is in progress

1) The RO performing Rule 2 will use the __(1)__ to reduce 1A SG pressure and

maintain it below RCS pressure.

2) When Rule 2 is complete, the TD EFDW pump __(2)__ be operating.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. TBVs

2. will

B. 1. TBVs 2. will NOT

C. 1. ADVs 2. will

D. 1. ADVs 2. will NOT

SYS039 A2.01 - Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Flow paths of steam during a LOCA .................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The TBVs will be used to control 1A SG pressure because when putting the controller in HAND, the bad input signal will be overriden.

2nd part is incorrect because the TD will be secured as long as the both MD EFDWPs are operating. It is plausible because if one of the MD EFDWPs were not operating, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. The TBVs will be used to control 1A SG pressure because when putting the controller in HAND, the bad input signal will be overriden.

2nd part is correct. The TD will be secured as long as the both MD EFDWPs are operating.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the TBVs will be used to control 1A SG pressure. It is plausible because not all of the inputs to the TBV controllers are cut out when it is in HAND (Low Vacuum inputs to the controller regardless of whether it is in AUTO or HAND).

2nd part is incorrect because the TD will be secured as long as the both MD EFDWPs are operating. It is plausible because if one of the MD EFDWPs were not operating, it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the TBVs will be used to control 1A SG pressure. It is plausible because not all of the inputs to the TBV controllers are cut out when it is in HAND (Low Vacuum inputs to the controller regardless of whether it is in AUTO or HAND).

2nd part is correct. The TD will be secured as long as the both MD EFDWPs are operating.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


ICS 05 Obj: 3Rule 2

Remarks/Status


Requires ability to determine the steam flow paths during a LOCA (TBVs or throught he TD EFDWP) given plant parameters.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS039 A2.01 - Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the MRSS; and (b) based on predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Flow paths of steam during a LOCA .................................






Reactor power = 100% 3MS-112 & 3MS-173 (SSRH 3A/3B Controls) are OPEN in MANUAL 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81 (MS to SSRH's) control switches in OPEN

Current conditions:

Main Turbine trips 1) 3MS-112 & 3MS-173 will __(1)__. 2) 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81 will __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. close 2. close

B. 1. close

2. remain open C. 1. remain open

2. close D. 1. remain open

2. remain open

SYS039 A3.02 - Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Isolation of the MRSS ............................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. 3MS-112/173 will close whether their control switch is in auto or manual when the reactor trips.

2nd part is incorrect because 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81 will remain open. It is plausible because 3MS-112/173 will close whether their control switch is in auto or manual when the reactor trips makes it reasonable to assume that 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81 will close also.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. 3MS-112/173 will close whether their control switch is in auto or manual when the reactor trips.

2nd part is correct. MS-77/78/80/81 will remain open if their control switches are in open when the reactor trips.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because 3MS-112/173 will close whether their control switch is in auto or manual when the reactor trips. It is plausible because the switch is in MANUAL.

2nd part is incorrect because 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81 will remain open. It is plausible because 3MS-112/173 will close whether their control switch is in auto or manual when the reactor trips makes it reasonable to assume that 3MS-77, 78, 80, 81 will close also.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because 3MS-112/173 will close whether their control switch is in auto or manual when the reactor trips. It is plausible because the switch is in MANUAL.

2nd part is correct. MS-77, 78, 80, 81 will remain open if their control switches are in open when the reactor trips.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT39 Q42


ILT39 Q42 (5/2011)STG-MSR Obj: 10, 11

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of how the MSRs are isolated following a turbine trip. The candidate must distinquish between two different operating characteristics of valves for the SSRH's.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS039 A3.02 - Main and Reheat Steam System (MRSS)Ability to monitor automatic operation of the MRSS, including : (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Isolation of the MRSS ............................................



Given the following Unit 3 conditions: Time = 0400:00:

Reactor power = 70% stable 3A Main Feed Pump suction pressure = 236 psig decreasing

Time = 0401:25:

3A Main FDW Pump suction pressure = 230 psig increasing At Time = 0401:25, which ONE of the following describes the status of the Main Feedwater pumps and the plant?

A. Both MFPs are operating / Plant runback in progress at 20%/min B. Both MFPs are operating / Reactor power is 70% stable C. 3A MFP has tripped / Plant runback in progress at 20%/min D. 3A MFP has tripped / Reactor power is 65% stable

SYS059 A3.07 - Main Feedwater (MFW) SystemAbility to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

ICS ............................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The Main FDW Pumps will trip if this condition exists for 90 seconds or more. In the question, this condition has existed for < 85 seconds so MFW Pumps have not tripped yet.

2nd part is correct. CBP/FDW Pump Low Suction Pressure runback (<235 psig- Runback rate = 20%/min to 15%.).

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. The Main FDW pumps will trip if this condition exists for 90 seconds or more. In the question, this condition has existed for < 85 seconds so MFW Pumps have not tripped yet.

2nd part is incorrect because the CBP/FDW Pump Low Suction Pressure runback (<235 psig) will runback to 15% at 20% per minute. It is plausible because as it is the current power level and is consistent with the Main FDW pump operating status (i.e. no runback to 65% due to FDWPT Trip).

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the CBP/FDW Pump Low Suction Pressure trip of the A Main FDW pump will not occur for another 5 seconds (90 sec T.D.). It is plausible because if the time delay had been met, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the CBP/FDW Pump Low Suction Pressure trip of the A Main FDW pump will not occur for another 5 seconds (90 sec T.D.). It is plausible because if the time delay had been met, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect. Plausible since this is the runback setpt for a Main FDW Pump trip.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT42 Q45


ILT42 Q45 (12/2012)CF-FDW Obj: 3,6

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of automatic operation of MFW including the trip setpoint and the power reduction (including MFW) for an ICS runback.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS059 A3.07 - Main Feedwater (MFW) SystemAbility to monitor automatic operation of the MFW, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

ICS ............................................................






Reactor tripped from 35% power due to 3TA lockout 3A Main FDW pump operating

Current conditions:

3FDW-35 & 3FDW-44 (3A and 3B Startup FDW Control) in MANUAL 3A and 3B SG levels = 38 inches SUR and stable

1) If 3FDW-35 & 44 are placed in Automatic, the valves will travel in the __(1)__

direction. 2) The feedwater flow path will utilize the __(2)__ Feed Ring. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. open 2. Main

B. 1. open

2. Auxiliary C. 1. closed

2. Main D. 1. closed

2. Auxiliary

SYS059 K1.03 - Main Feedwater (MFW) SystemKnowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

S/GS ...........................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect. SU Control valves will maintain level at 25" on SUR level. It is plausible because if all RCPs were off, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. With any RCPs operating, the Main feed ring will be utilized.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect. SU Control valves will maintain level at 25" on SUR level. It is plausible because if all RCPs were off, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect. It is plausible because if all RCPs were off, it would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. SU Control valves will maintain level at 25" SUR level. With level at 38" SUR, the valves will travel in the closed direction to allow level to decrease.

2nd part is correct. With any RCPs operating, the Main feed ring will be utilized.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. SU Control valves will maintain level at 25" SUR level. With level at 38" SUR, the valves will travel in the closed direction to allow level to decrease.

2nd part is incorrect. It is plausible because if all RCPs were off, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT44 Q72


ILT44 Q72 (12/2013)ICS-03 Obj: 7CF-EFCF-FDW Obj. 10, 11

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the relationship between the Main Feedwater System and the SGs (level control and flow path).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS059 K1.03 - Main Feedwater (MFW) SystemKnowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the MFW and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

S/GS ...........................................................






Reactor power = 100% Loss of all FDW occurs LOHT tab is entered Booster pump feed is in progress per Rule 3, (Loss of Main or Emergency

FDW) Time = 0930:

Unit 1 TD EFDW pump is operating Total EFW flow = 360 gpm

1) Per the LOHT Tab, the number of operating RCPs will be reduced to__(1)__.

2) EFW flow must be __(2)__ to stabilize RCS temperature.

Based on plant conditions at 0930, which ONE of the following completes the statements above? REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. one total

2. increased

B. 1. one total 2. decreased

C. 1. one per loop 2. increased

D. 1. one per loop 2. decreased

SYS061 2.1.25 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) SystemSYS061 GENERIC

Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the LOHT tab directs reducing operating RCPs to 1/loop. It is plausible because Rule 4 (HPI Forced Cooling) would have you reduce RCPs to 1 total if it were performed. It was not in this case.

2nd part is correct. The required feedwater flow to match decay heat is ~ 380 gpm. With only 360 gpm flow, RCS temperature will be increasing so flow will have to be increased.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the LOHT tab directs reducing operating RCPs to 1/loop. It is plausible because Rule 4 (HPI Forced Cooling) would have you reduce RCPs to 1 total if it were performed. It was not in this case.

2nd part is incorrect because the required feedwater flow to match decay heat is ~ 380 gpm. With only 360 gpm flow, RCS temperature will be increasing so flow will have to be increased. It is plausible because if the curve for 4 RCPs is used, you would think that you would have to reduce feedwater flow.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect;1st part is correct. The LOHT tab directs reducing operating RCPs to 1/loop.

2nd part is correct. The required feedwater flow to match decay heat is ~ 380 gpm. With only 360 gpm flow, RCS temperature will be increasing so flow will have to be increased.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The LOHT tab directs reducing operating RCPs to 1/loop.

2nd part is incorrect because the required feedwater flow to match decay heat is ~ 380 gpm. With only 360 gpm flow, RCS temperature will be increasing so flow will have to be increased. It is plausible because if the curve for 4 RCPs is used, you would think that you would have to reduce feedwater flow.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


Rule 7 Decay Heat Curve


EL EPD EAP SA Obj: R6Rule 7 Decay Heat CurveRule 3LOHT tab

Remarks/Status


Requires ability to interpret data from a curve in Rule 7 to determine EFW flow required.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS061 2.1.25 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) SystemSYS061 GENERIC

Ability to interpret reference materials, such as graphs, curves, tables, etc. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)





The Operators have been directed to synchronize KHU-2 to the grid in accordance with OP/0/A/1106/019, (Keowee Hydro at Oconee). The operators note the following indications:

Grid Frequency is 60.1 Hz Keowee Frequency is 59.7 Hz Keowee Line Voltage is 13.9 KV Keowee 2 Output Voltage is 15.0 kV

1) The synchroscope will be turning in the __(1)__ direction. 2) Placing the UNIT 2 AUTO VOLTAGE ADJUSTER switch in the RAISE position will cause

the __(2)__ to rise. Based on plant conditions, which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Clockwise 2. KEOWEE 2 LINE VOLTS

B. 1. Clockwise

2. KEOWEE 2 OUTPUT VOLTS C. 1. Counterclockwise

2. KEOWEE 2 LINE VOLTS D. 1. Counterclockwise

2. KEOWEE 2 OUTPUT VOLTS

SYS062 K1.04 - AC Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ac distribution system and the following systems : (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9)

Off-site power sources ...........................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the synchroscope will be turning in the counter clockwise direction. It is plausible becasuse if keowee freq were higher than grid freq, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because adjusting KHU 2 voltage will not affect Keowee Line volts. It is plausible if the candidate is unsure where the tap is for Keowee 2 Line Volts. This is a common GFES misconception.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because the synchroscope will be turning in the counter clockwise direction. It is plausible becasuse if keowee freq were higher than grid freq, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. Before paralleling, adjusting KHU voltage will adjust KHU 2 Output Volts.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The synchroscope will be turning in the counter clockwise direction. I

2nd part is incorrect because adjusting KHU 2 voltage will not affect Keowee Line volts. It is plausible if the candidate is unsure where the tap is for Keowee 2 Line Volts. This is a common GFES misconception.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The synchroscope will be turning in the counter clockwise direction. I

2nd part is correct. Before paralleling, adjusting KHU voltage will adjust KHU 2 Output Volts.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT43 Q47


ILT43 Q47 (6/2013)EL KHG Obj: 10

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the relationship between the AC Electrical Distribution system (Keowee) and offsite power sources.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS062 K1.04 - AC Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the ac distribution system and the following systems : (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9)

Off-site power sources ...........................................






The Standby Buses are being powered from the 100 kV line The SL Breakers Auto/Manual Selector switches are in AUTO The TRIP INTERLOCK DEFEAT SWITCH is in the LEE position

Which ONE of the following describes the MINIMUM condition(s) that will cause the SL Breakers to open?

A. Undervoltage on EITHER Standby Bus 1 or Standby Bus 2. B. Undervoltage on BOTH Standby Bus 1 and Standby Bus 2. C. The 1st level 100KV Degraded Voltage Relay has been satisfied for 9 seconds

AND the 2nd level 100KV Degraded Voltage Relay is now satisfied. D. The 1st level 100KV Degraded Voltage Relay is now satisfied AND the 2nd

level 100KV Degraded Voltage Relay has been satisfied for 9 seconds.

SYS062 K4.02 - AC Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of ac distribution system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Circuit breaker automatic trips .....................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because undervoltage protection is all that will trip the SL breakers in this case. It is plausible because under voltage will cause the breakers to open. However it takes under voltage on both buses.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:Undervoltage protection is all that will trip the SL breakers in this case. UV protection is only active if the Auto/Manual Switches are in Auto and it requires both busses to have an undervoltage condition.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because undervoltage protection is all that will trip the SL breakers in this case. It is plausible because this would cause a trip if the Trip Interlock Defeat Switch was in the Central position.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because undervoltage protection is all that will trip the SL breakers in this case. It is plausible because this would cause a trip if the Trip Interlock Defeat Switch was in the Central position.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q46


ILT41 Q46 (6/2012)EL-PSL Obj: R22

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of how the off-site power source (CT-5) relates to the ONS AC distribution system. Including what would cause the SLbreakers to open. This would allow the onsite power source (Keowee) to then power the MFBs.ì

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS062 K4.02 - AC Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of ac distribution system design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Circuit breaker automatic trips .....................................




Reactor power = 100% 1DCA Bus Voltage = 125 VDC 1DCB Bus Voltage = 126 VDC 2DCA Bus Voltage = 127 VDC 2DCB Bus Voltage = 127 VDC

Current conditions:

1XS1 incoming feeder breaker trips Based on the current conditions, which ONE of the following is correct regarding the DC power systems?

ASSUME NO OPERATOR ACTIONS

A. 1DCA will be powered from the standby charger B. 1DCB loads will be powered from Battery 1CB C. 1KX Inverter will be powered from 1DCB D. 1DIC Inverter will be powered from 1DCB

SYS063 K1.03 - DC Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Battery charger and battery ........................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:The standby charger will not automatically power 1DCA. It is plausible because the standby charger can be manually aligned to supply 1DCA.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:DCB is not powered from 1XS1. The Battery Charger will be supplying DCB and the battery. It is plausible because if 1XS2 were deenergized, B would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:Upon a loss of 1XS1, Battery Charger 1CA de-energizes. Battery 1CA automatically picks up DC bus DCA. Essential Inverters (KX, KI and KU) are powered from DCA or DCB (whichever has the higher potential). Vital DC Buses (DIA, DIB, DIC, DID) are powered from their unit or the alternate unit (whichever has the higher potential).

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1DIC is supplied from the alternate unit (higher potential). It is plausible because 1DIC would be supplied from 1DCB if it had the higher potential.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT45 Q47


ILT45 Q47 (6/2014)EL-DCD Obj: 10

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of the relationship between the batteries, battery chargers and the DC distribution system.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS063 K1.03 - DC Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the DC electrical system and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

Battery charger and battery ........................................




1A HWP breaker in the “TEST” position 1) The 1A HWP breaker __(1)__ be closed remotely using the Control Room switch. 2) If the 1A HWP breaker DC control power fuses are removed, 1A HWP breaker __(2)__

be closed locally using the pistol grip switch located on the front of the breaker cubicle. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. can 2. can

B. 1. can 2. can NOT

C. 1. can NOT 2. can

D. 1. can NOT 2. can NOT

SYS063 K3.02 - DC Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Components using DC control power ...............................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. In the test position, the breaker can be closed remotely or locally when in the TEST position.

2nd part is incorrect because the local pistol grip switch only works with the breaker in the test position and DC control power present. It is plausible because the breaker can still be closed locally but must be done using the manual close mechanism (hook).

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. In the test position the breaker can be closed remotely or locally when in the TEST position.

2nd part is correct. With control power fuses pulled, the breaker cannot be closed electrically either locally or remotely.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because in the test position the breaker can be closed remotely or locally. It is plausible because it is a common misconception that when in the TEST position, a 4.16 KV breaker can not be operated remotely (from the CR).

2nd part is incorrect because the local pistol grip switch only works with the breaker in the test position and DC control power present. It is plausible because the breaker can still be closed locally but must be done using the manual close mechanism (hook).

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because in the test position the breaker can be closed remotely or locally. It is plausible because it is a common misconception that when in the TEST position, a 4.16 KV breaker can not be operated remotely (from the CR).

2nd part is correct. With control power fuses pulled, the breaker cannot be closed electrically either locally or remotely.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT39 Q48


ILT39 Q48 (5/2011)EL-CB Obj: R5

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of how a 4160 volt breaker operates with a loss of control power (DC).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS063 K3.02 - DC Electrical Distribution SystemKnowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the DC electrical system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Components using DC control power ...............................




Reactor in MODE 5 LPI aligned to normal Decay Heat Removal mode 2RIA-35, (Combined LPSW effluent leaving the Reactor Building and the

Auxiliary Building) is isolated for repair Time = 1300:

2A LPI Cooler develops a large leak Time = 1500:

Actions to isolate the 2A LPI Cooler are initiated RCS temperature slowly increasing

1) At Time = 1330, there __(1)__ an RIA alarm indicating the LPI Cooler leak? 2) Entry into MODE 4 will occur when RCS temperature exceeds a MINIMUM of __(2)__°F? Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. is 2. 200

B. 1. is

2. 250 C. 1. is NOT

2. 200 D. 1. is NOT

2. 250

SYS073 A1.01 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) SystemAbility to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Radiation levels .................................................



General Discussion

RIA-31 - LPI Cooler LPSW Monitor - (NaI) (CPM) Samples six points: 1A, 1B, 2A, 2B, 3A, and 3B LPI Cooler LPSW returns1RIA-35 -Unit 2 sample points are:

1) 2B LPI cooler (after 2LPSW-5) and Unit 1 and 2 CC coolers 2) 2A LPI cooler (after 2LPSW-4) and Unit 2 RB effluentoÄ

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Both 2RIA-31 AND 2RIA-35 monitor LPSW return from the LPI coolers therefore if 2RIA-35 is isolated, 2RIA-31 would still provide indication of increased activity and result in an RIA alarm.

2nd part is correct. Entry into MODE 4 occurs when RCS temperature exceeds 200 degrees.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. Both 2RIA-31 AND 2RIA-35 monitor LPSW return from the LPI coolers therefore if 2RIA-35 is isolated, 2RIA-31 would still provide indication of increased activity and result in an RIA alarm.

2nd part is incorrect because entry into MODE 4 occurs when RCS temperature exceeds 200 degrees. It is plausible because if the question were asking about entering Mode 3, it would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect;1st part is incorrect because both 2RIA-31 AND 2RIA-35 monitor LPSW return from the LPI coolers therefore if 2RIA-35 is isolated, 2RIA-31 would still provide indication of increased activity and result in an RIA alarm. It is plausible because there is only one RIA that monitors LPSW returns from other primary components.

2nd part is correct. Entry into MODE 4 occurs when RCS temperature exceeds 200 degrees.

.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because both 2RIA-31 AND 2RIA-35 monitor LPSW return from the LPI coolers therefore if 2RIA-35 is isolated, 2RIA-31 would still provide indication of increased activity and result in an RIA alarm. It is plausible because there is only one RIA that monitors LPSW returns from other primary components.

2nd part is incorrect because entry into MODE 4 occurs when RCS temperature exceeds 200 degrees. It is plausible because if the question were asking about entering Mode 3, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT44 Q40


ILT44 Q40 (12/2013)RAD-RIA Obj: 8TS Mode Table


Question requires the ability to monitor changes in radiation levels using Process RIA's in that the ability to monitor levels is predicated on the ability to determine the appropriate RIA based on equipment being monitored, if the process RIA is operating properly.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS073 A1.01 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) SystemAbility to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the PRM system controls



Remarks/Status

including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Radiation levels .................................................




Reactor power = 35% 1A steam generator tube leak = 2.1 gpd RCS activity = 0.25 Ci/ml DEI increasing

Time = 1400:

Reactor power = 35% 1A steam generator tube leak = 2.1 gpd RCS activity = 0.65 Ci/ml DEI increasing

1) Between Time = 1200 and 1400, 1RIA-16 indication will __(1)__. 2) At Time = 1400, in accordance with AP/31, (Primary to Secondary Leakage),

1RIA-59 __(2)__ be used to calculate SG tube leak size. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. stay the same 2. will

B. 1. stay the same

2. will NOT C. 1. increase

2. will D. 1. increase

2. will NOT

SYS073 K5.01 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) SystemKnowledge of the operational implications as they apply to concepts as they apply to the PRM system: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Radiation theory, including sources, types, units, and effects ............



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because RIA-16 will respond to all activity and the increase in DEI will be seen by RIA-16 via the SG tube leak. It is plausible because it would be correct regarding RIA-59.

2nd part is incorrect because AP/31 directs not using RIA-59 once below 40% power.It is plausible since it would be correct if Rx power were > 40%. Additionally, RIA-59 indication appears to be accurate down to 20% which adds additional plausibility.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because RIA-16 will respond to all activity and the increase in DEI will be seen by RIA-16 via the SG tube leak. It is plausible because it would be correct regarding RIA-59.

2nd part is correct. The EOP directs not using RIA-59 once below 40% power.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. RIA-16 will respond to all activity and the increase in DEI will be seen by RIA-16 via the SG tube leak.

2nd part is incorrect because AP/31 directs not using RIA-59 once below 40% power.It is plausible since it would be correct if Rx power were > 40%. Additionally, RIA-59 indication appears to be accurate down to 20% which adds additional plausibility.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. RIA-16 will respond to all activity and the increase in DEI will be seen by RIA-16 via the SG tube leak.

2nd part is correct. AP/31 directs not using RIA-59 once below 40% power.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT39 Q52


ILT39 Q52 (5/2011)RAD-RIA Obj: R2

Remarks/Status


Knowledge of the operational implications of process RIA responses are required to determine expected RIA response to SGTL and failed fuel.Additionally, an understanding of N-16 production and decay is needed to understand RIA-59 responses (or lack of response) to failed fuel.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS073 K5.01 - Process Radiation Monitoring (PRM) SystemKnowledge of the operational implications as they apply to concepts as they apply to the PRM system: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Radiation theory, including sources, types, units, and effects ............






“A” LPSW Pump trips Standby LPSW pump fails to start

Which ONE of the following will begin to increase in temperature?

ASSUME NO OPERATOR ACTION A. Letdown B. Spent Fuel Pool C. Main Feedwater Pump oil temperature D. Primary Instrument Air Compressor discharge air temperature

SYS076 A1.02 - Service Water System (SWS)Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SWS controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Reactor and turbine building closed cooling water temperatures. .........



General Discussion

PLPSW is an approved acronym for Low Pressure Service Water per Chapter F of the EOP/AP Writer's GuideCRD is an approved acronym forControl Rod Drive per Chapter F of the EOP/AP Writer's GuideRCW is an approved acronym for Recirculating Cooling Water per Chapter F of the EOP/AP Writer's Guide

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:LPSW cools the CC coolers which in turn cool letdown. Therefore degraded LPSW flow would result in increasing letdown temperatures.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:LPSW does not cool RCW (Condenser Circulating Water does). Its plausible because it would be correct for degraded RCW flows.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:LPSW does not cool RCW (Condenser Circulating Water does). Its plausible because it would be correct for degraded RCW flows.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:LPSW does not cool the Primary IA compressor. It is plausible since it would be correct for degraded HPSW flows.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT44 Q42


ILT44 Q42 (12/2013)SSS LPW Obj: 16PNS CC

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of the effect of a loss of LPSW on the CC system since LPSW is the cooling medium for the CC coolers and then CC is the cooling medium for letdown.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS076 A1.02 - Service Water System (SWS)Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with operating the SWS controlsincluding: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Reactor and turbine building closed cooling water temperatures. .........




IA pressure is decreasing Current IA pressure is as follows

Based on the above conditions, which ONE of the following describes the air compressors that will be operating? The Primary IA Compressor AND…

A. Diesel Air Compressors ONLY

B. Diesel Air Compressors AND AIA Compressors ONLY

C. AIA Compressors AND Backup IA Compressors ONLY

D. Backup IA Compressors ONLY

TURBBLDG

PSI

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

SYS078 A4.01 - Instrument Air System (IAS)Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Pressure gauges .................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:Diesel Air Compressors will Auto start at 90 psig IA pressure. Gage indicates pressure is slightly > 90 psig. It is plausible because Service Air Pressure is below the start setpoint.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:Diesel Air Compressors will Auto start at 90 psig IA pressure. Gage indicates pressure is slightly > 90 psig. It is plausible because Service Air Pressure is below the start setpoint.. AIA compressors start at 88 psig IA pressure, therefore would not be operating. Again, plausible because the service air pressure stated is below the AIA start setpoint.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:AIA compressors start at 88 psig IA pressure therefore would not be operating. It is plausible because service air header pressure is below the AIA compressor setpoint. Backup IA compressors would be operating.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:Primary IA compressor would be operating loaded and the BackupIA compressors would start at 93 psig IA pressure.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

2010A Q53


2010A Q53 (5/2011)SSS-IA Obj: 16, 25, 41

Remarks/Status


Requires demonstrating the ability to monitor an IA pressure gage in the controlroom and based on the indication determine IA compressor status.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS078 A4.01 - Instrument Air System (IAS)Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Pressure gauges .................................................




Reactor power = 100%

Time = 0410: RCS pressure = 1500 psig decreasing RB pressure = 3.3 psig increasing

1) Reactor Building __(1)__ will have automatically closed. 2) In accordance with EOP Enclosure 5.1, (ES Actuation), a previously closed containment isolation valve will be opened by first placing the associated __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. non-essential isolation valves ONLY 2. ES Channel in MANUAL

B. 1. non-essential isolation valves ONLY

2. voter in OVERRIDE C. 1. non-essential and essential isolation valves

2. ES Channel in MANUAL D. 1. non-essential and essential isolation valves

2. voter in OVERRIDE

SYS103 A3.01 - Containment SystemAbility to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Containment isolation ............................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because with RB pressure > 3 psig, both essential and non-essential RB isolation valves will be closed. It is plausible because if RB pressure was < 3 psig, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. ES Channels are placed in MANUAL first. As an example, EOP Encl. 5.1 directs first taking ES Channel 5 to MANUAL to open 1CC-7. If Channel 5 will not go to MANUAL then the ODD voter is placed in OVERRIDE.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because with RB pressure > 3 psig, both essential and non-essential RB isolation valves will be closed. It is plausible because if RB pressure was < 3 psig, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because ES Channels are placed in MANUAL first. It is plausible because it would be correct if Channel 5 would not go to MANUAL.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Since RB pressure is > 3 psig, both essential and non-essential RB isolation valves will be closed.

2nd part is correct. ES Channels are placed in MANUAL first. As an example, EOP Encl. 5.1 direct first taking ES Channel 5 to MANUAL to open 1CC-7. If Channel 5 will not go to MANUAL then the ODD voter is placed in OVERRIDE.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Since RB pressure is > 3 psig, both essential and non-essential RB isolation valves will be closed.

2nd part is incorrect because ES Channels are placed in MANUAL first. It is plausible because it would be correct if Channel 5 would not go to MANUAL.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q54


ILT41 Q54 (6/2012)IC-ES Obj: 3,7EOP Encl 5.1

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of automatic operation of the containment isolation valves.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS103 A3.01 - Containment SystemAbility to monitor automatic operation of the containment system, including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

Containment isolation ............................................






Mode 6 Reactor Vessel head removed 2LT-5A, (Rx Vessel Level 2A) = 28 inches stable 2LT-5B, (Rx Vessel Level 2B) = 28 inches stable

Current conditions:

2LT-5A REFERENCE LEG is damaged resulting in complete drain down of the reference leg

1) 2LT-5A indication will __(1)__. 2) 2LT-5B indication will __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. decrease

2. decrease

B. 1. increase 2. increase

C. 1. decrease 2. remain the same

D. 1. increase 2. remain the same

SYS002 K6.03 - Reactor Coolant System (RCS)Knowledge of the effect or a loss or malfunction on the following RCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Reactor vessel level indication .....................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect because on Reactor Vessel level (LT-5) DP cell, the variable leg is the high pressure side of the DP cell. A break in the reference leg would result in a higher DP which result in an increase in indicated level. It is plausible because a leak on the reference leg of the Pzr or SG level indication would result in a decreased level.

Second part is incorrect because 2LT-5B is not affected by a break in the reference leg of 2LT-5A. It is plausible because on Unit 3, the two detectors share the same variable leg tap so a failure at that point would cause the two detectors to fail in the same direction.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:First part is correct because on Reactor Vessel level (LT-5) DP cell, the variable leg is the high pressure side of the DP cell. Therefore, a break in the variable leg of the D/P cell creates a lower D/P being sensed by the D/P cell and thus a lower than actual level. It is plausible because on wet leg level transmitters (like the Pzr and SGs), the variable leg is the low pressure side so a leak would cause indicated level to increase.

Second part is incorrect because 2LT-5B is not affected by a break in the reference leg of 2LT-5A. It is plausible because on Unit 3, the two detectors share the same variable leg tap so a failure at that point would cause the two detectors to fail in the same direction.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect because on Reactor Vessel level (LT-5) DP cell, the variable leg is the high pressure side of the DP cell. A break in the reference leg would result in a higher DP which result in an increase in indicated level. It is plausible because a leak on the reference leg of the Pzr or SG level indication would result in a decreased level.

Second part is correct. Since 2LT-5A & B do not share the same reference leg tap, 2LT-5B will not be effected by a leak on the variable leg of 2LT-5A.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:First part is correct. On Reactor Vessel level (LT-5) DP cell, the variable leg is the high pressure side of the DP cell. A break in the reference leg would result in a higher DP which result in an increase in indicated level.

Second part is correct. Since 2LT-5A & B do not share the same reference leg tap, 2LT-5B will not be effected by a leak on the variable leg of 2LT-5A.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


IC-RCI Obj. 01, 10

Remarks/Status


The question requires knowledge of what effect a malfunction (leak on reference leg of 3LT-5A) will have on reactor vessel level indication.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS002 K6.03 - Reactor Coolant System (RCS)Knowledge of the effect or a loss or malfunction on the following RCS components: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.7)

Reactor vessel level indication .....................................






Reactor power = 100% NR RCS pressure Channel B has failed high

Time = 0801:

NR RCS pressure Channel E fails high 1) 1RC-66 (PORV) __(1)__fail open. 2) The reactor __(2)__ receive a “High RCS Pressure“ trip signal. Based on the plant conditions at Time = 0801, complete the above statements. ASSUME NO OPERATOR ACTIONS

A. 1. will 2. will

B. 1. will 2. will NOT

C. 1. will NOT 2. will

D. 1. will NOT 2. will NOT

SYS016 K5.01 - Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the NNIS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)

Separation of control and protection circuits .........................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. NR channels A, B and E feed a median select circuit. If 2 of the 3 signals fail high, one of the high signals will pass on to the control circuits including the PORV. This will cause the PORV to fail open.

2nd part is incorrect because the reactor will NOT receive a HP trip because NR Channel E does not feed RPS. Therefore there is only a 1/4 signal to initiate a reactor trip when 2/4 is required. It is plausible because 1) any combination of NR Channels A, B, C and D would be correct and 2) the reactor will trip on LOW RCS pressure due to the PORV being open. If NR RCS Pressure Channels A & B failed high, this answer would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. NR channels A, B and E feed a median select circuit. If 2 of the 3 signals fail high, one of the high signals will pass on to the control circuits including the PORV. This will cause the PORV to fail open.

2nd part is correct. NR RCS pressure channel E does not feed RPS, therefore the reactor will only receive a trip signal on 1/4 channels when 2/4 is required so the reactor will not trip.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because NR channels A, B and E feed a median select circuit. If 2 of the 3 signals fail high, one of the high signals will pass on to the control circuits including the PORV. This will cause the PORV to fail open. It is plausible because if one of the failed channels were C or D instead of E, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because the reactor will NOT receive a HP trip because NR Channel E does not feed RPS. Therefore there is only a 1/4 signal to initiate a reactor trip when 2/4 is required. It is plausible because 1) any combination of NR Channels A, B, C and D would be correct and 2) the reactor will trip on LOW RCS pressure due to the PORV being open. If NR RCS Pressure Channels A & B failed high, this answer would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because NR channels A, B and E feed a median select circuit. If 2 of the 3 signals fail high, one of the high signals will pass on to the control circuits including the PORV. This will cause the PORV to fail open. It is plausible because if one of the failed channels were C or D instead of E, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. NR RCS pressure channel E does not feed RPS, therefore the reactor will only receive a trip signal on 1/4 channels when 2/4 is required so the reactor will not trip.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT47 Q57


ILT47 Q57 (6/2015)IC-RCI Obj: 9RCI RCS Pressure DWG


This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of how the NR RCS pressure signals feed the control and protections circuits (how they are seperated).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS016 K5.01 - Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)Knowledge of the operational implication of the following concepts as they apply to the NNIS: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.7)



Remarks/Status

Separation of control and protection circuits .........................




Reactor power = 100% TBVs are in HAND ICS HAND power is lost

1) ICS HAND power is supplied by inverter __(1)__. 2) The TBVs __(2)__ be controlled in HAND. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. 1KI

2. can

B. 1. 1KI 2. can NOT

C. 1. 1KU 2. can

D. 1. 1KU 2. can NOT

SYS041 K2.01 - Steam Dump System (SDS)/Turbine Bypass ControlKnowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

ICS, normal and alternate power supply ..............................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because inverter 1KU supplies ICS HAND power. It is plausible because it the question was asking for ICS AUTO power, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. The TBVs have a Static Analog Memory module that provides the "HAND" signal from KI AND KU.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because inverter 1KU supplies ICS HAND power. It is plausible because it the question was asking for ICS AUTO power, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because the TBVs have a Static Analog Memory module that provides the "HAND" signal from KI AND KU. It isplausible because if the question was asking about ICS stations other than the TBVs, it would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Inverter 1KU supplies ICS HAND power.

2nd part is correct. The TBVs have a Static Analog Memory module that provides the "HAND" signal from KI AND KU

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Inverter 1KU supplies ICS HAND powert.

2nd part is incorrect because the TBVs have a Static Analog Memory module that provides the "HAND" signal from KI AND KU. It isplausible because if the question was asking about ICS stations other than the TBVs, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


AP 23ICS-05 Obj: 5

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of power supplies (including backup) to the TBVs and how a failure affects operation.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS041 K2.01 - Steam Dump System (SDS)/Turbine Bypass ControlKnowledge of bus power supplies to the following: (CFR: 41.7)

ICS, normal and alternate power supply ..............................




Reactor power = 8% Power is being increased CTPD SET is adjusted to 12%

As power is increased to 12%, the MAXIMUM rate at which power can be increased __(1)__ limited to 1% per minute and SG levels will __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. is 2. remain at 25 inches

B. 1. is

2. increase above 25 inches C. 1. is NOT

2. remain at 25 inches D. 1. is NOT

2. increase above 25 inches

SYS035 A3.01 - Steam Generator System (S/GS)Ability to monitor automatic operation of the S/G including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

S/G water level control ...........................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. When SGs are on Low Level Limits, the rate of power increase is limited by ICS to 1% per minute.

2nd part is correct. SGs will remain at 25 inches until ~ 18-20% when flow demand exceeds that required to maintain SG level at 25.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. When SGs are on Low Level Limits, the rate of power increase is limited by ICS to 1% per minute.

2nd part is incorrect because SGs will remain at 25 inches until ~ 18-20% when flow demand exceeds that required to maintain SG level at 25. It is plausible because if power were ~ 20%, it could be correct.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because when SGs are on Low Level Limits, the rate of power increase is limited by ICS to 1% per minute. It is plausible because if you were not on LLL, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. SGs will remain at 25 inches until ~ 18-20% when flow demand exceeds that required to maintain SG level at 25.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because when SGs are on Low Level Limits, the rate of power increase is limited by ICS to 1% per minute. It is plausible because if you were not on LLL, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because SGs will remain at 25 inches until ~ 18-20% when flow demand exceeds that required to maintain SG level at 25. It is plausible because if power were ~ 20%, it could be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


ICS-03 Obj: 6ICS-03 PPTICS-02 Integrated MasterOP 3 A 1102 001

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of how the ICS automatically controls SG level.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS035 A3.01 - Steam Generator System (S/GS)Ability to monitor automatic operation of the S/G including: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5)

S/G water level control ...........................................






Reactor power = 25% stable Current conditions:

Main Turbine trips The reactor __(1)__ trip and the TBVs will control at __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above?

A. 1. will 2. setpoint

B. 1. will 2. setpoint plus 125 psig

C. 1. will NOT 2. setpoint

D. 1. will NOT 2. setpoint plus 125 psig

SYS045 K3.01 - Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) SystemKnowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MT/G system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Remainder of the plant ............................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because reactor power is below the trip setpoint (27.75% if power decreasing, 29.75% if power increasing). It is plausible because if power were above one of the trip setpoints, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. TBVs will be controlling at the setpoint if only the turbine is tripped.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect;1st part is incorrect because reactor power is below the trip setpoint (27.75% if power decreasing, 29.75% if power increasing). It is plausible because if power were above one of the trip setpoints, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because the reactor did not trip so there is no bias signal (125 psig) applied in this case. It is plausible because if the reactor did trip, it would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The reactor will not trip because power is below 27.75%.

2nd part is correct. The TBVs will control at setpoint because the turbine has tripped (removing the 50 psig bias) but the reactor has not, so there is no bias applied.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The reactor will not trip because power is below 27.75%.

2nd part is correct. The TBVs will control at setpoint because the turbine has tripped (removing the 50 psig bias) but the reactor has not so there is no bias applied. It is plausible because if the reactor had tripped, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT42 Q62


ILT42 Q62 (12/2012)STG-ICS Obj: 2IC-RPS Obj: R3

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of the effect that a Turbine Trip will have on the plant.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS045 K3.01 - Main Turbine Generator (MT/G) SystemKnowledge of the effect that a loss or malfunction of the MT/G system will have on the following: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.6)

Remainder of the plant ............................................






Reactor power = 50% stable 1A SG develops a tube leak 1RIA-40 is operable CSAE Off-Gas Blower is OFF

1) In accordance with AP/1/A/1700/031, (Primary to Secondary Leakage), OAC point

O1P1599 (Est Total Pri to Sec Leakrate) __(1)__ be used to determine leak rate. 2) 1RIA-40 reads out in __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. will 2. cpm

B. 1. will 2. gpd

C. 1. will NOT 2. cpm

D. 1. will NOT 2. gpd

SYS055 K1.06 - Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CARS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

PRM system ....................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect. Plausible because it would be correct if the CSAE Off-gas Blower were operating.

2nd part is correct. RIA-40 reads out in cpm.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect. Plausible because it would be correct if the CSAE Off-gas Blower were operating.2nd part is incorrect because RIA-40 reads out in cpm. It is plausible because AP/31 does have you use RIA-40 to determine leak rate.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. In order to utilize OAC point O1P1599 to determine leak rate, 1RIA-40 must be operable with the CSAE Off-gas Blower operating.

2nd part is correct. RIA-40 reads out in cpm.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. In order to utilize OAC point O1P1599 to determine leak rate, 1RIA-40 must be operable with the CSAE Off-gas Blower operating.

2nd part is incorrect because RIA-40 reads out in cpm. It is plausible because AP/31 does have you use RIA-40 to determine leak rate.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


RAD-RIA Obj: 8AP/31 Encl. 5.5

Remarks/Status


Knowledge of the cause and effect relationship between process RIA responses and the Condenser Air Removal System (RIA-40).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS055 K1.06 - Condenser Air Removal System (CARS)Knowledge of the physical connections and/or cause-effect relationships between the CARS and the following systems: (CFR: 41.2 to 41.9 / 45.7 to 45.8)

PRM system ....................................................




Reactor power = 30% stable ICS is in MANUAL Condensate Booster Pump (CBP) 1B trips C/FDW PRESSURE Runback Light is lit AP/1/A/1700/001, (Unit Runback) is entered A manual power reduction is initiated

1) The Standby CBP will NOT start if it’s __(1)__ pressure is 10 psig (assuming all

other permissives are met). 2) Per guidance contained in AP/1, if the C/FDW PRESSURE Runback Light does not clear, the manual power reduction will be stopped at __(2)__power. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. suction 2. 15%

B. 1. suction

2. 20% C. 1. auxiliary oil

2. 15% D. 1. auxiliary oil

2. 20%

SYS056 A2.04 - Condensate SystemAbility to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Loss of condensate pumps .........................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Permissives for the CBP to auto-start is Aux Oil Pressure > 6 psig and Suction Pressure > 16 psig.

2nd part is correct. AP/1 directs reducing power to </= 15%.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. Permissives for the CBP to auto-start is Aux Oil Pressure > 6 psig and Suction Pressure > 16 psig..

2nd part is incorrect because AP/1 directs reducing power to </= 15%. It is plausible because some of the runbacks are stopped at 20% (Power load unbalance).

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because Auxiliary Oil pressure has to be > 6 psig for the Auto-Start of the CBP to occur. You meet this criteria. It is plausible because if oil pressure were 6 psig or lower, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. AP/1 directs reducing power to </= 15%.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because Auxiliary Oil pressure has to be > 6 psig for the Auto-Start of the CBP to occur. You meet this criteria. It is plausible because if oil pressure were 6 psig or lower, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because AP/1 directs reducing power to </= 15%. It is plausible because some of the runbacks are stopped at 20% (Power load unbalance).

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


CF-C Obj: 23CF-FDWOC-AP-01 Obj: 4AP/1

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of procedure used to mitigate the loss of condensate pump (CBP).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS056 A2.04 - Condensate SystemAbility to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the Condensate System; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Loss of condensate pumps .........................................






1A GWD tank release in progress 1RIA-37 HIGH alarm actuates 1SA-8/B9 (Process Monitor Radiation High) actuates

1) Which ONE of the following describes the impact on the Gaseous Waste Disposal (GWD) system? 2) What is used to purge the RIA once the GWD tank release is completed? A. 1. Closes 1A GWD tank inlet AND outlet valves

2. Nitrogen

B. 1. Closes 1A GWD tank inlet AND outlet valves 2. Instrument Air

C. 1. Closes 1A GWD tank outlet valves ONLY 2. Nitrogen

D. 1. Closes 1A GWD tank outlet valves ONLY 2. Instrument Air

SYS071 K4.04 - Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Isolation of waste gas release tanks .................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because it does not close the GWD tank inlet valves. It is plausible because it does close the outlet valves and it would be logical to assume it closes the inlet valves as well in an effort to isolate the GWD tank.

2nd part is incorrect because instrument air is used to purge the RIA. It is plausible because Nitrogen is an inert gas that is commonly used as part of instrument calibrations and tank purges. Nitrogen is also used in the GWD System. It is added to the GWD Tanks if needed to increase pressure when placing a tank in service and also to dilute high hydrogen concentration in the GWD tanks.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because it does not close the GWD tank inlet valves. It is plausible because it does close the outlet valves and it would be logical to assume it closes the inlet valves as well in an effort to isolate the GWD tank.

2nd part is correct. Instrument Air is used to purge the RIA after the release is complete.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. A HIGH alarm from RIA-37 will close all of the GWD tank outlet valves and isolate the Waste Gas Exhauster. The associated ARG will direct going to OP/1-2/A/1104/018 (GWD System) to provide additional guidance on what to do with the release that has now been terminated.

2nd part is incorrect because instrument air is used to purge the RIA. It is plausible because Nitrogen is an inert gas that is commonly used as part of instrument calibrations and tank purges. Nitrogen is also used in the GWD System. It is added to the GWD Tanks if needed to increase pressure when placing a tank in service and also to dilute high hydrogen concentration in the GWD tanks.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. A HIGH alarm from RIA-37 will close all of the GWD tank outlet valves and isolate the Waste Gas Exhauster. The associated ARG will direct going to OP/1-2/A/1104/018 (GWD System) to provide additional guidance on what to do with the release that has now been terminated.

2nd part is correct. Instrument Air is used to purge the RIA after the release is complete.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT46 Q63, ILT40 Q51


ILT46 Q63 (12/2014)RAD-RIA Obj: 8AP/18ILT40 Q51


Question requires knowledge of interlocks associated with isolaton of the waste gas release tanks.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS071 K4.04 - Waste Gas Disposal System (WGDS)Knowledge of design feature(s) and/or interlock(s) which provide for the following: (CFR: 41.7)

Isolation of waste gas release tanks .................................



Remarks/Status



Based on the graph above, which ONE of the following describes the EARLIEST time at which SA-141 (SA to IA Controller) will automatically open? A. 1207 B. 1210 C. 1212 D. 1215

SYS079 A4.01 - Station Air System (SAS)Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Cross-tie valves with IAS ..........................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect;Incorrect because SA-141 does not automatically open until IA pressure decreases to 85 psig. It is plausible because 93 psig is the pressure at which the Backup IA compressors will start.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:Incorrect because SA-141 does not automatically open until IA pressure decreases to 85 psig. It is plausible because 90 psig is the pressure at which the Diesel Air Compressors will start.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:Incorrect because SA-141 does not automatically open until IA pressure decreases to 85 psig. It is plausible because 88 psig is the pressure at which the AIA compressors will start

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:SA to IA Controller (SA-141) valve senses the IA system pressure and opens at 85 psig to allow service air into the IA system.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT44 Q54


ILT44 Q54 (12/2013)SSS-IA Obj: 39

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of automatic cross-connect between Service air and Instrument air systems and when monitoring from the control room, knowing when the cross-tie should be open.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS079 A4.01 - Station Air System (SAS)Ability to manually operate and/or monitor in the control room: (CFR: 41.7 / 45.5 to 45.8)

Cross-tie valves with IAS ..........................................




A fire door is blocked open and can NOT be closed NO operable fire detectors are located within 15 feet of either side of the door SLC 16.9.5, (Fire Barriers) Condition A is required

1) In accordance with SLC 16.9.5, a(n) __(1)__ fire watch must be established.

2) In accordance with OMP 2-1, Duties And Responsibilities of On-Shift Operations

Personnel, fire impairment compensatory measures are approved by the __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. continuous

2. Work Control Center SRO

B. 1. continuous 2. Control Room Supervisor

C. 1. hourly 2. Work Control Center SRO

D. 1. hourly 2. Control Room Supervisor

SYS086 A1.03 - Fire Protection System (FPS)Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Fire Protection System operating the controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Fire doors ......................................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Per SLC 16.9.5, Condition A, with no operable fire detectors within 15 ft of the fire door, a continuous fire watch is required.

2nd part is correct. Per OMP 2-1, approval of compensatory measures for fire system impairments is a responsibility of the WCC SRO.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. Per SLC 16.9.5, Condition A, with no operable fire detectors within 15 ft of the fire door, a continuous fire watch is required.

2nd part is incorrect because per OMP 2-1, approval of compensatory measures for fire system impairments is a responsibility of the WCC SRO. It is plausible because the CRS is over all operations of a given unit.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because a continuous fire watch is required. It is plausible because if the nearest fire detector was within 15 ft of the door, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. Per OMP 2-1, approval of compensatory measures for fire system impairments is a responsibility of the WCC SRO.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because a continuous fire watch is required. It is plausible because if the nearest fire detector was within 15 ft of the door, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because per OMP 2-1, approval of compensatory measures for fire system impairments is a responsibility of the WCC SRO. It is plausible because the CRS is over all operations of a given unit.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT42 Q65


ILT42 Q65 (12/2012)SLC 16.9.5OMP 2-1ADM-OMP

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of fire doors and action to take if one is inoperable.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

SYS086 A1.03 - Fire Protection System (FPS)Ability to predict and/or monitor changes in parameters (to prevent exceeding design limits) associated with Fire Protection System operating the controls including: (CFR: 41.5 / 45.5)

Fire doors ......................................................






Reactor power = 100% The BOP determines that the Steam Packing Exhauster is OFF

In accordance with SOMP 1-07 (Control Room Oversight) AND OMP 1-24 (OperationsCommunications Standards)... 1) the BOP will communicate this to the crew using a crew __(1)__. 2) the above communication __(2)__ required to be 3-way. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. update 2. is

B. 1. update 2. is NOT

C. 1. brief 2. is

D. 1. brief 2. is NOT

GEN2.1 2.1.17 - GENERIC - Conduct of OperationsConduct of Operations

Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise verbal reports. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:First part is correct. Per SOMP 1-07, identified equipment problems are to be communicated to the crew using "crew update".

Second part is incorrect. Plausible because 3-way is required when communicating this to the CRS.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:First part is correct. Per SOMP 1-07, identified equipment problems are to be communicated to the crew using "crew update".

Second part is correct. 3-way communication is not required during crew updates.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect. Per SOMP 1-7, Identified equipment problems are communicated to the crew using a crew update. It is plausible because crew briefs are used to ensure the crew understands plant conditions and direction.

Second part is plausible because 3-way is required when communicating this to the CRS.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect. Per SOMP 1-7, Identified equipment problems are communicated to the crew using a crew update. It is plausible because crew briefs are used to ensure the crew understands plant conditions and direction.

Second part is correct. 3-way communication is not required during crew updates.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q66


ILT41 Q66 ADM-OMP Obj: 19AD-OP-ALL-1000 Pg 20SOMP 1-7OMP 1-24

Remarks/Status


Question requires the candidate to demonstrate the ability to properly describe the methods used to communicate information in the control room.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only


Ability to make accurate, clear, and concise verbal reports. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12 / 45.13)




Reactor power = 100% Time = 0801:

Reactor power = 101% increasing Plant Transient Response is performed

Time = 0801:30

Reactor power = 104% increasing The OATC manually trips the reactor

1) The reactor was tripped due to __(1)__ the RPS trip setpoint.

2) SRO concurrence __(2)__ required prior to tripping the reactor.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. approaching

2. is

B. 1. approaching 2. is NOT

C. 1. exceeding 2. is

D. 1. exceeding 2. is NOT


Knowledge of conservative decision making practices. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The Automatic Reactor trip setpoint is 104.75%. Per Reactivity Management, , AD-OP-ALL-0203, 4.4.2.10 Do not rely on reactor trip interlocks to trip the reactor. When a reactor trip is warranted, manually trip the reactor to avoid challenging the Reactor Protection System. Also OMP 1-18, Att J, Plant Transient Response: During abnormal operating conditions a manual reactor trip shall be initiated if any of the following conditions occur: Reactor power level approaches any operating limit.

2nd part is incorrect because SRO concurrence is not required prior to tripping the reactor. It is plausible because when performing plant transient response, one of the CRS responsibilities is to direct a manual reactor trip if the RPS trip envelope is approached…

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. The Automatic Reactor trip setpoint is 104.75%. Per Reactivity Management, , AD-OP-ALL-0203, 4.4.2.10 Do not rely on reactor trip interlocks to trip the reactor. When a reactor trip is warranted, manually trip the reactor to avoid challenging the Reactor Protection System. Also OMP 1-18, Att J, Plant Transient Response: During abnormal operating conditions a manual reactor trip shall be initiated if any of the following conditions occur: Reactor power level approaches any operating limit.

2nd part is correct. SRO concurrence is not required prior to tripping the reactor. AD-OP-ALL-0203, Reactivity Management, 4.4.6 Reactor Operators.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the Automatic Reactor trip setpoint is 104.75%. It is plausible because if power were greater than 104.75%, it would be correct. Per OMP 1-18, Attachment A, the operator is to initiate a manual reactor trip if the setpoint has been exceeded. The candidate has to know the RPS trip setpoint.

2nd part is incorrect because SRO concurrence is not required prior to tripping the reactor. It is plausible because when performing plant transient response, one of the CRS responsibilities is to direct a manual reactor trip if the RPS trip envelope is approached…

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the Automatic Reactor trip setpoint is 104.75%. It is plausible because if power were greater than 104.75%, it would be correct. Per OMP 1-18, Attachment A, the operator is to initiate a manual reactor trip if the setpoint has been exceeded. The candidate has to know the RPS trip setpoint.

2nd part is correct. SRO concurrence is not required prior to tripping the reactor. AD-OP-ALL-0203, Reactivity Management, 4.4.6 Reactor Operators.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


AD ALL Reactivity ManagementOMP 1-18, J Plant Transient ResponseADM OMP Obj: 9IC RPS Obj: R3


Question requires knowledge of conservative decision making policies when a transient occurs during plant operation.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only


Knowledge of conservative decision making practices. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.12)



Remarks/Status




Reactor in Mode 6 Refueling in progress RB purge release in progress A Fuel Assembly is dropped in the Unit 1 & 2 Spent Fuel Pool 1RIA-6 (SFP Area Monitor) in alarm AP/9 (Spent Fuel Damage) is entered

In accordance with AP/9, the control room RO... 1) __(1)__ stop Unit 2 RB Purge Fan.

2) will dispatch an operator to start __(2)__ Spent Fuel Filtered Exhaust Fan(s). Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. will

2. ONLY one

B. 1. will 2. BOTH

C. 1. will NOT 2. ONLY one

D. 1. will NOT 2. BOTH


Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling, such as responding to alarms from the fuel handling area, communication with the fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.12)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Per AP/9, Unit 2 RB Purge Fan will be stopped.

2nd part is correct. Per AP/9, an operator is dispatched to start Fan 1 OR Fan 2 on Spent Fuel Filtered Exhaust Control Panel.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. Per AP/9, Unit 2 RB Purge Fan will be stopped.

2nd part is incorrect because per AP/9, an operator is dispatched to start Fan 1 OR Fan 2 on Spent Fuel Filtered Exhaust Control Panel. It is plausible because damaged fuel is confirmed and this would maximize removal of airborne contamination from the area.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because per AP/9, Unit 2 RB Purge Fan will be stopped. It is plausible because if it were Unit 1, the RB Purge Fan would not be stopped (it would be correct). U1 & U2 share the same SFP and both filtered exhaust fans use Unit 2 RB Purge Filter. This will not work with U2s RB Purge fan operating, so U2's RB purge fan is secured.

2nd part is correct. Per AP/9, an operator is dispatched to start Fan 1 OR Fan 2 on Spent Fuel Filtered Exhaust Control Panel.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because per AP/9, Unit 2 RB Purge Fan will be stopped. It is plausible because if it were Unit 1, the RB Purge Fan would not be stopped (it would be correct). U1 & U2 share the same SFP and both filtered exhaust fans use Unit 2 RB Purge Filter. This will not work with U2s RB Purge fan operating, so U2's RB purge fan is secured.

2nd part is incorrect because per AP/9, an operator is dispatched to start Fan 1 OR Fan 2 on Spent Fuel Filtered Exhaust Control Panel. It is plausible because damaged fuel is confirmed and this would maximize removal of airborne contamination from the area.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


FH-FHS Obj. 16PNS RBPAP 9

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of RO duties in the Control Room during a fuel handling accident and knowledge of alarm response from the fuel handling area (SF Pool) and systems operated from the Control Room (U2 RB Purge Fan).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only


Knowledge of RO duties in the control room during fuel handling, such as responding to alarms from the fuel handling area, communicationwith the fuel storage facility, systems operated from the control room in support of fueling operations, and supporting instrumentation. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.7 / 45.12)





Boron precipitation is primarily a concern for a __(1)__ leg rupture and failure to initiate the Boron Dilution flow path when required would challenge the ability to __(2)__.

A. 1. hot 2. prevent boron stratification in the cold leg to ensure a restart event does not

occur when the cold leg volume enters the core.

B. 1. hot 2. ensure boron does not concentrate in the core and block the long term core

cooling flow path

C. 1. cold 2. prevent boron stratification in the cold leg to ensure a restart event does not

occur when the cold leg volume enters the core.

D. 1. cold 2. ensure boron does not concentrate in the core and block the long term core

cooling flow path

GEN2.2 2.2.38 - GENERIC - Equipment ControlEquipment Control

Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is incorrect because for a break in the Hot leg, water will continue in the normal flow path out through the hot legs and out the break. In a cold leg break, the boiling / pressure buildup in the core will cause the vessel internal vent valves to open allowing steam to flow back into the cold legs and out the break. As the water boils, boron will concentrate in the remaining water and begin to precipitate out of solution, blocking flow channels. It is plausible if you assume that flow will go backwards through the loops to the break and not make it into the core.

2nd part is incorrect because not initiating a Boron Dilution flowpath will allow boron to continue to precipitate in the core and potentially block flow paths. It is plausible as boron stratification/dilution is a concern for RCP restart criteria following a LOSCM.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is incorrect because for a break in the Hot leg, water will continue in the normal flow path out through the hot legs and out the break. In a cold leg break, the boiling / pressure buildup in the core will cause the vessel internal vent valves to open allowing steam to flow back into the cold legs and out the break. As the water boils, boron will concentrate in the remaining water and begin to precipitate out of solution, blocking flow channels. It is plausible if you assume that flow will go backwards through the loops to the break and not make it into the core.

2nd part is correct. Not initiating a Boron Dilution flowpath will allow boron to continue to precipitate in the core and potentially block flow paths.

Answer C Discussion

1st part is correct. For a break in either leg, water will enter into the downcomer, down to the bottom of the vessel and then up through the core. In a Hot leg break, water will continue in the normal flow path out through the hot legs and out the break. In a cold leg break, the boiling / pressure buildup in the core will cause the vessel internal vent valves to open allowing steam to flow back into the cold legs and out the break. As the water boils, boron will concentrate in the remaining water and begin to precipitate out of solution, blocking flow channels.

2nd part is incorrect because not initiating a Boron Dilution flowpath will allow boron to continue to precipitate in the core and potentially block flow paths. It is plausible as boron stratification/dilution is a concern for RCP restart criteria following a LOSCM.

Answer D Discussion

1st part is correct. For a break in either leg, water will enter into the downcomer, down to the bottom of the vessel and then up through the core. In a Hot leg break, water will continue in the normal flow path out through the hot legs and out the break. In a cold leg break, the boiling / pressure buildup in the core will cause the vessel internal vent valves to open allowing steam to flow back into the cold legs and out the break. As the water boils, boron will concentrate in the remaining water and begin to precipitate out of solution, blocking flow channels.

2nd part is correct. Not initiating a Boron Dilution flowpath will allow boron to continue to precipitate in the core and potentially block flow paths.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

2009 Q26


2009 Q26 (3/2009)PNS-LPI Obj: 34PNS RVD


Requires knowledge of the requirements for establishing the Long Term Boron dilutionflowpath and the impact on the ability to meet the 10CFR50.46 requirements forcoolable geometry/flowpath.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only



Remarks/Status


Knowledge of conditions and limitations in the facility license. (CFR: 41.7 / 41.10 / 43.1 / 45.13)




Reactor in MODE 4 Placing LPI in service for cooldown

1) 3LP-11 and 3LP-13 (3A/B LPI Cooler Inlet) are __(1)__ valves. 2) __(2)__ are throttled to control RCS temperature in accordance with OP/3/A/1102/010, (Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown). Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. manual 2. 3LPSW-251 and 3LPSW-252 (3A/3B LPI Cooler Outlet Control)

B. 1. manual 2. 3LP-92 and 3LP-93 (3A/3B LPI Clr Byp Controller)

C. 1. electric 2. 3LPSW-251 and 3LPSW-252 (3A/3B LPI Cooler Outlet Control)

D. 1. electric 2. 3LP-92 and 3LP-93 (3A/3B LPI Clr Byp Controller)


(multi-unit license) Ability to explain the variations in control board/control room layouts, systems, instrumentation, and procedural actions between units at a facility. (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:First part is correct.Second part is incorrect. Plausible because these valves are used to control LPI cooling at other times (after the initial stabilization) and because on Units 1 and 2 it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:First part is correct. 3LP-11 and 13 are manual valves. The same valves on Units 1 and 2 are electric.Second part is correct. The procedure establishes 3000 gpm LPSW flow to each LPI Cooler. 3LP-92 and 93 are open and 3LP-12 and 14 are closed (cooler bypassed). When the last RCP is secured, the procedure directs throttling 3LP-92 and 93 closed and 3LP-12 and 14 open to stabilize temperature. LPSW flow remains at 3000 gpm.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect. Plausible because on Units 1 and 2 it would be correct.Second part is correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:First part is incorrect. Plausible because on Units 1 and 2 it would be correct.Second part is incorrect. Plausible because these valves are used to control LPI cooling at other times (after the initial stabilization) and because on Units 1 and 2 it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q30


ILT41 Q30 (6/2012)PNS-LPI Obj. 06, 07, 10OP/3/A/1102/010

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of LPI differences between Unit 1&2 and Unit 3, which includes procedural actions taken when placing LPI in service during plant shutdown.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only


(multi-unit license) Ability to explain the variations in control board/control room layouts, systems, instrumentation, and procedural actions between units at a facility. (CFR: 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.1 / 45.13)




Reactor power = 100% 1PA Battery is inoperable

In accordance with SLC 16.8.3 (Power Battery Parameters)... 1) the MAXIMUM Completion time allowed to declare the Unit 1 TDEFDW pump inoperable is __(1)__. 2) cross connecting __(2)__ buses is required. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. immediately 2. 1PA and 1PB

B. 1. immediately

2. 1PA, 2PA and 3PA C. 1. within one hour

2. 1PA and 1PB D. 1. within one hour

2. 1PA, 2PA and 3PA


Ability to apply Technical Specifications for a system. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.2 / 43.5 / 45.3)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. SLC 16.8.3 Condition B is for a single power battery inoperable and requires declaring the TDEFDW pump inoperable immediately

2nd part is incorrect because the SLC requires cross-connecting all 3 (Unit) PA busses. It is plausible because the required actions are to cross-connect the buses, however it is referring to cross connecting with other units, not your own.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. SLC 16.8.3 Condition B is for a single power battery inoperable and requires declaring the TDEFDW pump inoperable immediately.

2nd part is correct. Condition B also requires cross connecting all unit's PA buses.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the TD is to be declared inoperable immediately. It is plausible because one hour is a common TS completion time.

2nd part is incorrect because the SLC requires cross-connecting all 3 (Unit) PA busses. It is plausible because the required actions are to cross-connect the buses, however it is referring to cross connecting with other units, not your own.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the TD is to be declared inoperable immediately. It is plausible because one hour is a common TS completion time.

2nd part is correct. Condition B also requires cross connecting all units PA buses.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT46 Q48


ILT46 Q48ADM-ITS Obj 7SLC 16.8.3

Remarks/Status


Question requires ability to apply TS to a given set of plant conditions.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only






SGTR tab in progress RCS temperature = 548ºF stable

Which ONE of the following describes an action taken, in accordance with the SGTR tab, to limit the activity released to the environment? A. The CSAE drains are rerouted to the CST

B. The Turbine Building Sump pump breakers are opened

C. The affected SG is isolated prior to initiating RCS cooldown

D. The Auxiliary Steam systems for all three units are separated

GEN2.3 2.3.11 - GENERIC - Radiation ControlRadiation Control

Ability to control radiation releases. (CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect because this is not addressed in the SGTR tab. It is plausible because AP/31 directs rerouting CSAE drains to the CST to limit activity released to the environment.

Answer B Discussion

CORRECT: The SGTR tab directs opening the TBS Pump breakers to limit the release to the environment.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect . Plausible because it would be correct if RCS temperature was less than 532 degrees.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect because the AS system at ONS is not split for a SGTR. Instead, ONS ensures it is being fed from a non-affected unit. It is plausible because the action of splitting all the units would prevent cross contamination.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT41 Q72


ILT41 Q72 (6/2012)EAP-SGTR R19SGTR Tab

Remarks/Status


Question requires the ability to determine when certain EOP actions are used to control release of radioactive contamination to the environment.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only


Ability to control radiation releases. (CFR: 41.11 / 43.4 / 45.10)



An RWP that you are preparing to work under states the following:

The highest dose rate in the area is 325 mR/hr (at 30 cm) Radiography will be conducted in an area next to where you are working

sometime during the shift

1) An area with the above dose rate should be designated as a __(1)__. 2) The radiography boundary is required to be constructed with __(2)__ at each radiation sign. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. Radiation Area 2. red stop signs ONLY

B. 1. Radiation Area

2. flashing lights AND red stop signs C. 1. High Radiation Area

2. red stop signs ONLY D. 1. High Radiation Area

2. flashing lights AND red stop signs


Ability to comply with radiation work permit requirements during normal orabnormal conditions. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.10)



General Discussion

Dose rates from 100-1000 mR/hr require a posting of HIGH radiation area. A flashing yellow light signifies that an area is a LOCKED high radarea A flashing yellow light is used for "locked high rad areas" (>1 R/hr) where locking is not practical.

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because greater than 100 mr/hr at 30 cm is classified as a High Radiation Area. It is plausible the area should be posted as a radiation area since there are various posting for different dose rates.

2nd part is incorrect because a flashing light is required in addition to the stop sign at each radiography sign. It is plausible because there is already a radiography sign and a stop sign, so a flashing light may seem like too much.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because greater than 100 mr/hr at 30 cm is classified as a High Radiation Area. It is plausible the area should be posted as a radiation area since there are various posting for different dose rates.

2nd part is correct. A stop sign is required in addition to the flashing light at each radiography sign.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Greater than 100 mr/hr at 30 cm is classified as a High Radiation Area.

2nd part is incorrect because a flashing light is required in addition to the stop sign at each radiography sign. It is plausible because there is already a radiography sign and a stop sign, so a flashing light may seem like too much.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Greater than 100 mr/hr at 30 cm is classified as a High Radiation Area.

2nd part is correct. A stop sign is required in addition to the flashing light at each radiography sign.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT45 Q73


ILT45 Q73 (6/2014)RAD-RPP Obj. 10PD-RP-ALL-001

Remarks/Status


Requires ability to recognize how the area SHOULD be posted.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only







The following are Log entries from the Emergency Coordinator (EC/SM) Log following an event at Oconee Unit 2. 1112 – EC/SM declared a General Emergency based on RIA-57 readings. 1117 - EC/SM provided the following offsite protective recommendations to the

Offsite Communicator: Evacuation of Pickens A0, A1, B1, C1, and Oconee A0, D1, E1, F1 Shelter of Pickens A2, B2, C2, and Oconee D2, E2, F2.

1120 - EC/SM signed message form to provide offsite recommendations. 1122 - EC/SM began turnover to TSC. 1125- Present time of day. Based on the above conditions, which ONE of the following describes how many minutes the Offsite Communicator has to initiate the notifications to State and Countiesfrom the present time? A. 2 B. 7 C. 10 D. 15

GEN2.4 2.4.29 - GENERIC - Emergency Procedures / PlanEmergency Procedures / Plan

Knowledge of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:Initial Emergency Notifications and classification upgrades must be provided to Oconee County, Pickens County, and SC State within 15 minutes of event declaration or upgrade. The time starts when the EC/SM declared a GE.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect because Initial Emergency Notifications and classification upgrades must be provided within 15 minutes of event declaration. It is plausible because this would be correct under the misconception that the time used should be the time offsite protective recommendations were given.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect because initial Emergency Notifications and classification upgrades must be provided within 15 minutes of event declaration. It is plausible because this would be correct under the misconception that the time used should be the time EC/SM signed the message form.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect because initial Emergency Notifications and classification upgrades must be provided within 15 minutes of event declaration. It is plausible because this would be correct under the misconception that the time used should be the total time allowed to make offsite notifications.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

2009B Q75


2009B Q75 (10/2010)EAP-SEP Obj: R14RP/0/A/1000/015A

Remarks/Status


Requires specific knowledge of the time allowed to make offsite notifications when Emergency Plan has been implemented.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only


Knowledge of the emergency plan. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)




Time = 0400 Reactor power = 100%

Current conditions:

Time = 0415 1SA-02/D-4 (RC PRESS EMERG LOW) actuated RCS pressure = 520 psig decreasing RB pressure = 2.5 psig increasing ONLY ES Channels 1 and 2 actuated

1) The HIGHER pressure that will result in a RCS Low Pressure reactor trip is __(1)__. 2) At Time = 0415, and in accordance with EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation), __(2)__ trip push buttons must be depressed. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. 1810 psig

2. ES Channels 3 through 6 B. 1. 1810 psig

2. ONLY ES Channels 3 and 4 C. 1. 1850 psig

2. ES Channels 3 through 6 D. 1. 1850 psig

2. ONLY ES Channels 3 and 4





General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect1st part is correct. A reactor trip will occur at 1810 psig.

2nd part is incorrect because only ES channels 3 & 4 must be depressed. It is plausible because if RB pressure were > 3 psig it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionCorrect1st part is correct. A reactor trip will occur at 1810 psig.

2nd part is correct. Per Encl 5.1, ES channels 3 & 4 only must be depressed with building pressure < 3 psig.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect1st part is incorrect. A reactor trip will occur at 1810 psig. 1850 psig is plausible because it is the setpoint for the RC Emerg Low Stat alarm.

2nd part is incorrect because only ES channels 3 & 4 must be depressed. It is plausible because if RB pressure were > 3 psig it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect1st part is incorrect. A reactor trip will occur at 1810 psig. 1850 psig is plausible because it is the setpoint for the RC Emerg Low Stat alarm.

2nd part is correct. Per Encl 5.1, ES channels 3 & 4 only must be depressed with building pressure < 3 psig.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

RO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT45 Q3


ILT45 Q3 (6/2014)IC-ES Obj: 3,7IC-RPS Obj: R31SA2 D4

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of alarm setpoints and controls identified in the ARG.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only






Reactor power = 50% Unit 1 is supplying the AS header 1RC-66 (PORV) fails open 1RC-4 (PORV BLOCK) fails to close

Time = 0810:

LOSCM tab is in progress HPI flow could only be established in the A header MD EFDW pumps FAIL to start TD EFDWP is supplying feedwater to both SGs Rapid SG depressurization has begun

1) Both SGs should be depressurized __(1)__.

2) If the RCS cooldown results in an increase in neutron flux, the CRS will __(2)__.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. to a minimum of ~ 250 psig 2. GO TO the UNPP tab

B. 1. to a minimum of ~ 250 psig 2. remain in the LOSCM

C. 1. completely 2. GO TO the UNPP tab

D. 1. completely 2. remain in the LOSCM

APE008 AA2.28 - Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Safety parameter display system indications ..........................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct because the LOSCM tab directs depressurizing the SGs to 250-275 psig.

2nd part is incorrect because a Note in the LOSCM tab states that if an unexpected increase in neutron flux occurs, the cooldown should be stopped. It is plausible because if NIs are not decreasing, the Parallel Action page has criteria that you should GO TO the UNPP tab if neutron level increases (this is a higher priority tab).

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct because the LOSCM tab directs depressurizing the SGs to 250-275 psig.

2nd part is correct. A note in the LOSCM tab states that if an unexpected increase in neutron flux occurs, the depressurization and cooldown should continue.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the SGs are depressurized to a band between 250 and 275 psig. It is plausible because in the previous revision (rev 0), if Unit 1 was not supplying the AS header, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because a Note in the LOSCM tab states that if an unexpected increase in neutron flux occurs, the depressurization and cooldown should continue. It is plausible because if Nis are not decreasing, the Parallel Action page has criteria that you should GO TO the UNPP tab if neutron level increases (this is a higher priority tab).

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the SGs are depressurized to a band between 250 and 275 psig. It is plausible because in the previous revision (rev 0), if Unit 1 was not supplying the AS header, it could be correct.

2nd part is correct. A note in the LOSCM tab states that if an unexpected increase in neutron flux occurs, the depressurization and cooldown should continue.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


LOSCM tab Old RevisionEAP LOSCM Obj: 9LOSCM tab Rev 1


Question requires knowledge of the safety parameter hirearchy (same used in the SPDS) and when to implement the differents emergency procedures. With count rate going up, this could indciate "return to criticality" and require transfer to the UNPP tab based on critical safety functions because it is a higher priority tab. The procedure anticipates this during the cooldown and directs you to stay in the current EOP tab.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

NUREG 1021, ES 401, Attachment 2, EAssessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures duringnormal, abnormal, and emergency situations. [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)]

APE008 AA2.28 - Pressurizer (PZR) Vapor Space Accident (Relief Valve Stuck Open)Ability to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Pressurizer Vapor Space Accident: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Safety parameter display system indications ..........................



Remarks/Status

Discussed with R. Baldwin on 2/02/16. He said we could use procedure hierarchy in the question in the place of SPDS.Sam




Reactor power = 100% 1A1 RCP MTR UPR GUIDE BRG TEMP = 175°F increasing AP/16, (Abnormal Reactor Coolant Pump Operation) is entered

Time = 0810:

Reactor power = 68% 1A1 RCP is tripped due to high bearing temperature Tc controller fails to re-ratio feedwater

1) The MINIMUM RCP Motor Bearing temperature that meets trip criteria stated in AP/16, Enclosure 5.1, (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria) is __(1)__.

2) The SRO will direct actions required due to the failed Tc controller by __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. 190 oF

2. remaining in AP/16

B. 1. 190 oF 2. initiating AP/28, (ICS Instrument Failures)

C. 1. 225 oF 2. remaining in AP/16

D. 1. 225 oF 2. initiating AP/28, (ICS Instrument Failures)

APE015/017 AA2.08 - Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) MalfunctionsAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

When to secure RCPs on high bearing temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. RCP Immediate Trip Criteria is met when any RCP Motor Guide BRG temperature increases to 190 degrees.

2nd part is correct. There is guidance contained in AP/16 to address the DTc controller failure when securing a RCP.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. RCP Immediate Trip Criteria is met when any RCP Motor Guide BRG temperature increases to 190 degrees.

2nd part is incorrect because there is guidance contained in AP/16 to address the DTc controller failure when securing a RCP. It is plausible because if you were not in AP/16, it would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because RCP Immediate Trip Criteria is met when any RCP Motor Guide BRG temperature increases to 190 degrees. It is plausible because if the question was asking the trip criteria for RCP Radial Bearing Temperature, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. There is guidance contained in AP/16 to address the DTc controller failure when securing a RCP.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because RCP Immediate Trip Criteria is met when any RCP Motor Guide BRG temperature increases to 190 degrees. It is plausible because if the question was asking the trip criteria for RCP Radial Bearing Temperature, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because there is guidance contained in AP/16 to address the DTc controller failure when securing a RCP. It is plausible because if you were not in AP/16, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


EAP-AP16 Obj: 4AP/16AP/28


Question requires knowledge of when to secure RCPs due to high bearing temperature.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only


The applicant’s knowledge can be evaluated at the level of 10 CFR 55.43(b)(5) byensuring that the additional knowledge of the procedure’s content is required tocorrectly answer the written test item, for example:

Knowledge of when to implement attachments and appendices, including how tocoordinate these items with procedure steps

APE015/017 AA2.08 - Reactor Coolant Pump (RCP) MalfunctionsAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Reactor Coolant Pump Malfunctions (Loss of RC Flow): (CFR 43.5 / 45.13)

When to secure RCPs on high bearing temperature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .



Remarks/Status

NEW K/A received 3/14/16.Modified Question to match new KA. KDS - 3/14

3/30/16: Discussed KA match with the Chief Examiner. He is ok with the SRO portion of the question not specifically matching the KA as long as its related to the part that is.




MODE 5 LPI aligned in normal DHR mode Low Range Cooldown Pressure = 5 psig RCS inventory is decreasing AP/26, (Loss of Decay Heat Removal) is in progress

1) __(1)__ are the MINIMUM conditions that would indicate a TOTAL loss of LPI flow. 2) In accordance with AP/26, makeup to the RCS will be initiated by __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? NOTE: 1SA-3/C8 = LP Injection Loop A Flow High/Low 1SA-3/C9 = LP Injection Loop B Flow High/Low

A. 1. 1SA-3/C8 ONLY actuated with Train A LPI flow = 0 gpm 2. Enclosure 5.5, Pzr and LDST Level Control

B. 1. 1SA-3/C8 ONLY actuated with Train A LPI flow = 0 gpm

2. actions contained in AP/26 C. 1. 1SA-3/C8 AND 1SA-3/C9 actuated with Train A AND Train B LPI flow = 0

gpm 2. Enclosure 5.5, Pzr and LDST Level Control

D. 1. 1SA-3/C8 AND 1SA-3/C9 actuated with Train A AND Train B LPI flow = 0

gpm 2. actions contained in AP/26

APE025 2.4.46 - Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)APE025 GENERIC

Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because1SA-3/C9 will also be in alarm. It is plausible because it would be correct if in the High Pressure mode of LPI alignment.

2nd part is incorrect because AP/26 directs initiating AP/26 Encl 5.12 (RCS Makeup) to makeup to the RCS as necessary. It is plausible because AP/2 RCS Leakage directs you to use Encl. 5.5 to makeup to the RCS. EOP Encl 5.5 is what is normally used for RCS inventory control when performing Aps and EOPs.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because1SA-3/C9 will also be in alarm. It is plausible because it would be correct if in the High Pressure mode of LPI alignment.

2nd part is correct. AP/26 directs initiating AP/26 Encl 5.12 (RCS Makeup) to makeup to the RCS as necessary.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. With LPI in the normal DHR alignment there is flow down both LPI headers therefore it would take both headers indicated no flow to have a total loss of LPI flow.

2nd part is incorrect because AP/26 directs initiating AP/26 Encl 5.12 (RCS Makeup) to makeup to the RCS as necessary. It is plausible because AP/2 RCS Leakage directs you to use Encl. 5.5 to makeup to the RCS. EOP Encl 5.5 is what is normally used for RCS inventory control when performing Aps and EOPs.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. With LPI in the normal DHR alignment there is flow down both LPI headers therefore it would take both headers indicated no flow to have a total loss of LPI flow.

2nd part is correct. AP/26 directs initiating AP/26 Encl 5.12 (RCS Makeup) to makeup to the RCS as necessary.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT44 Q78


ILT44 Q78 (12/2013)PNS-LPI Obj 09AP/26OMP 1-18


Requires the ability to interpret and prioritize LPI flow annunciators to determine which alarms are indicative of a total loss of LPI flow while in normal DHR alignment.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only






Remarks/Status


APE025 2.4.46 - Loss of Residual Heat Removal System (RHRS)APE025 GENERIC

Ability to verify that the alarms are consistent with the plant conditions. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.12)




Reactor trips from 100% power Switchyard Isolation occurs

1) Feedwater flow to the SGs will be indicated on __(1)__. 2) The SRO will direct an RO to perform __(2)__ due to the loss of power event. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. TOTAL EFDW FLOW

2. Enclosure 5.38, (Restoration of Power) B. 1. TOTAL EFDW FLOW

2. AP/1/A/1700/011, (Recovery From Loss of Power) C. 1. FDW SU FLOW

2. Enclosure 5.38, (Restoration of Power) D. 1. FDW SU FLOW

2. AP/1/A/1700/011, (Recovery From Loss of Power)

APE054 2.1.31 - Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)APE054 GENERIC

Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. When the switchyard isolate occurs, power will be temporarily lost on the essential busses causing a loss of Hotwell Pumps and Condensate Booster Pumps which will cause a loss of Main Feedwater. Emergency Feedwater will start and provide flow to the SGs.

2nd part is incorrect because for a switchyard isolate, power will return in ~ 15 seconds. When the SRO enters the Subsequent Actions tab, they will review the parallel actions (yellow) page. On that page, if power returns, you are directed to perform AP/11. It is plausible because if power did not return, the same parallel action page would direct you to GO TO the Blackout Tab. In the Blackout Tab, it directs you to perform Enclosure 5.38.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. When the switchyard isolate occurs, power will be temporairly lost on the essential busses causing a loss of Hotwell Pumps and Condensate Booster Pumps which will cause a loss of Main Feedwater. Emergency Feedwater will start and provide flow to the SGs.

2nd part is correct. For a switchyard isolate, power will return in ~ 15 seconds. When the SRO enters the Subsequent Actions tab, they will review the parallel actions (yellow) page. On that page, if power returns, you are directed to perform AP/11.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect;1st part is incorrect because when the switchyard isolate occurs, power will be temporarily lost on the essential busses causing a loss of Hotwell Pumps and Condensate Booster Pumps which will cause a loss of Main Feedwater. Emergency Feedwater will start and provide flow to the SGs which will be indicated on the Total EFDW Flow gauge. It is plausible because if the switchyard isolate did not occur after a trip, Main FDW would be operating and flow would be indicated on the FDW SU Flow gauge.

2nd part is incorrect because for a switchyard isolate, power will return in ~ 15 seconds. When the SRO enters the Subsequent Actions tab, they will review the parallel actions (yellow) page. On that page, if power returns, you are directed to perform AP/11. It is plausible because if power did not return, the same parallel action page would direct you to GO TO the Blackout Tab. In the Blackout Tab, it directs you to perform Enclosure 5.38.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect.1st part is incorrect because when the switchyard isolate occurs, power will be temporarily lost on the essential busses causing a loss of Hotwell Pumps and Condensate Booster Pumps which will cause a loss of Main Feedwater. Emergency Feedwater will start and provide flow to the SGs which will be indicated on the Total EFDW Flow gauge. It is plausible because if the switchyard isolate did not occur after a trip, Main FDW would be operating and flow would be indicated on the FDW SU Flow gauge.

2nd part is correct. For a switchyard isolate, power will return in ~ 15 seconds. When the SRO enters the Subsequent Actions tab, they will review the parallel actions (yellow) page. On that page, if power returns, you are directed to perform AP/11.


Question requires knowledge of control room switch/indications as a result of conditions causing a loss of Main feedwater.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only



Knowledge of when to implement attachments and appendices, including how tocoordinate these items with procedure steps.



Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


EOP SABlackout TabOC-AP-11 Obj: 2

Remarks/Status


APE054 2.1.31 - Loss of Main Feedwater (MFW)APE054 GENERIC

Ability to locate control room switches, controls, and indications, and to determine that they correctly reflect the desired plant lineup. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.12)



Given the following plant conditions: Time = 1100:

All three Oconee Units at 100% power 3KVIB panelboard de-energized

Time = 1200:

3DIC panelboard is de-energized 1) Tech Spec LCO 3.8.8 (Distribution Systems-Operating) is NOT met for __(1)__. 2) The bases behind the different completion times for inoperable Vital Instrument and

Control panelboards in Tech Spec 3.8.8 Condition F is that KVIA AND KVIB have shorter completion times due to __(2)__.

Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. Unit 3 ONLY

2. being the source of power for the ES Voters B. 1. Unit 3 ONLY

2. providing power for SK and SL breakers protective relaying C. 1. Units 1, 2, AND 3

2. being the source of power for the ES Voters D. 1. Units 1, 2, AND 3

2. providing power for SK and SL breakers protective relaying


Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2)



General Discussion

This question is testing 2 major things. The first is the understanding that all 3 units require that Unit 1's DIC panelboard be operable. That is true since 1DIC (and 1DID) supply control power for the SK and SL breakers.

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. 3DIC OOS will result in entering TS 3.8.8 Conditions C for Unit 3 ONLY.

2nd part is correct. KVIA and KVIB have shorter completion times due to powering the ES Voters.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. 3DIC OOS will result in entering TS 3.8.8 Conditions C for Unit 3 ONLY. 2nd part is incorrect. Plausible since SK and SL breakers protective relaying is singled out in the electrical specs as unique. It is unique because unit 1’s DIC and DID panelboards provide power to these breakers that all 3 units rely on. The fact that the power for SK and SL breakers comes from a units power panelboards and is singled out as unique in the electrical specs combine to make this a plausible distractor since Condition F is itself unique for other reasons. Additionally, the breakers are getting power from the "c" and "d" strings of panelboards however it is from the DC panelboards instead of the AC panelboards.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because it only applies to Unit 3. it is plausible because if it were 1DIC, it could be correct. 2nd part is correct. KVIA and KVIB have shorter completion times due to powering the ES Voters.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because it only applies to Unit 3. it is plausible because if it were 1DIC, it could be correct. 2nd part is incorrect. Plausible since SK and SL breakers protective relaying is singled out in the electrical specs as unique. It is unique because unit 1’s DIC and DID panelboards provide power to these breakers that all 3 units rely on. The fact that the power for SK and SL breakers comes from a units power panelboards and is singled out as unique in the electrical specs combine to make this a plausible distractor since Condition F is itself unique for other reasons. Additionally, the breakers are getting power from the "c" and "d" strings of panelboards however it is from the DC panelboards instead of the AC panelboards.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q80


ILT41 Q80 (6/2012)TS 3.8.8ADM-TSS Obj. R1 and R5EL-DCD Obj: 7

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of Tech Spec limiting conditions for operations and bases for different completion times related to loss of DC power.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

ES 401, Attachment 2, B. Requires knowledge of TS application of required actions in accordance with rules of application requirements and bases.


Knowledge of limiting conditions for operations and safety limits. (CFR: 41.5 / 43.2 / 45.2)






Reactor power = 100% 2SA-18/A-11, (TURBINE BSMT WATER LEVEL EMERGENCY HIGH) actuated AP/10, (Turbine Building flood) initiated

Time = 0430:

ALL CBPs, Main, and Emergency FDW pumps have tripped PSW is NOT available

1) At Time = 0430, the SRO will __(1)__. 2) The next method that will be used to remove decay heat is __(2)__ in accordance

with the procedure identified above. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. remain in TBF tab

2. feeding with the SSF ASW pump B. 1. remain in TBF tab

2. initiation of HPI Forced Cooling C. 1. transfer to the LOHT tab

2. feeding with the SSF ASW pump D. 1. transfer to the LOHT tab

2. initiation of HPI Forced Cooling

BWE04 EA2.2 - Inadequate Heat TransferAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply tothe (Inadequate Heat Transfer)(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

Adherence to appropriate procedures and operation within the limitations in the facility's license and amendments.



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is correct. There is no step in the TBF tab including the Parallel Action page that directs going to the LOHT tab.

2nd part is correct. While both methods are IAAT steps in the TBF tab, at 0400 when the pumps trip, the IAAT step for lining up the SSF ASW pump becomes applicable. The IAAT step for performing HPI FC will not become applicable until the SGs dry out and RCS pressure increases to 2300 psig.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is correct. There is no step in the TBF tab including the Parallel Action page that directs going to the LOHT tab.

2nd part is incorrect. While both methods are IAAT steps in the TBF tab, at 0400 when the pumps trip, the IAAT step for lining up the SSF ASW pump becomes applicable. The IAAT step for performing HPI FC will not become applicable until the SGs dry out and RCS pressure increases to 2300 psig. It is plausible because steps do exist such that if SSF ASW is not available, it could be correct.

Answer C Discussion

1st part is incorrect because there no transfer to the LOHT tab from the TBF tab. It is plausible because criteria for performance of the LOHT tab has been met and the LOHT tab is a higher priority tab.

2nd part is correct. While both methods are IAAT steps in the TBF tab, at 0400 when the pumps trip, the IAAT step for lining up the SSF ASW pump becomes applicable. The IAAT step for performing HPI FC will not become applicable until the SGs dry out and RCS pressure increases to 2300 psig.

Answer D Discussion

1st part is incorrect because there no transfer to the LOHT tab from the TBF tab. It is plausible because criteria for performance of the LOHT tab has been met and the LOHT tab is a higher priority tab.

2nd part is incorrect. While both methods are IAAT steps in the TBF tab, at 0400 when the pumps trip, the IAAT step for lining up the SSF ASW pump becomes applicable. The IAAT step for performing HPI FC will not become applicable until the SGs dry out and RCS pressure increases to 2300 psig. It is plausible because steps do exist such that if SSF ASW is not available, it could be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q81


The question requires the candidate to evaluate plant conditions and determine that a LOHT conditions and a TBF exist and then pick the appropriate procedure to use to mitigate the event.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only







ILT41 Q81 (6/2012)EOP SAEOP TBF TabEAP-TBF Obj: R5

Remarks/Status

BWE04 EA2.2 - Inadequate Heat TransferAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply tothe (Inadequate Heat Transfer)(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)





Reactor in Mode 3 1HP-120 fails open INDICATED LDST level remains stable 1A HPI pumps amps fluctuating AP/14, (Loss of Normal HPI Makeup and /or RCP Seal Injection) is entered All HPIPs are secured Encl 5.1, (SSF RC Makeup) is in progress

1) AP/14 directs you to initiate a MAXIMUM RCS heatup of __(1)__in order to

maintain Pzr level > 100” while establishing an RCS makeup source.

2) AP/14 __(2)__ direct performance of Encl 5.2, (Emergency Alignment of 1C HPI pump for Normal Makeup) prior to starting the 1C HPI Pump.


A. 1. 5 oF 2. does

B. 1. 5 oF 2. does NOT

C. 1. 10 oF 2. does

D. 1. 10 oF 2. does NOT

APE028 2.4.20 - Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control MalfunctionAPE028 GENERIC




General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because AP/14 allows RCS heatup up to 10 degrees. It is plausible because the same step allows a decrease in SCM down to 5 degrees.

2nd part is correct. Because there was indication of cavitation, Step 4.30 RNO is used which directs the performance of Enclosure 5.2 to perform emergency alignment of the 1C HPIP. This basically ensures that the suction line is full of water before starting the pump.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because AP/14 allows RCS heatup up to 10 degrees. It is plausible because the same step allows a decrease in SCM down to 5 degrees.

2nd part is incorrect because there was indication of cavitation so step 4.30 RNO is used which directs the performance of Enclosure 5.2 to perform emergency alignment of the 1C HPIP. This basically ensures that the suction line is full of water before starting the pump. It is plausible because if amps were not fluctuating (and the 1B HPIP did not start), when step 4.30 were reached, you would not go to the RNO column. Continuing in the subsequent actions to step 4.34 which has you go to step 4.56 which starts the 1C HPIP.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. AP/14 allows RCS heatup up to 10 degrees.

2nd part is correct. Because there was indication of cavitation, Step 4.30 RNO is used which directs the performance of Enclosure 5.2 to perform emergency alignment of the 1C HPIP. This basically ensures that the suction line is full of water before starting the pump.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. AP/14 allows RCS heatup up to 10 degrees.

2nd part is incorrect because there was indication of cavitation so step 4.30 RNO is used which directs the performance of Enclosure 5.2 to perform emergency alignment of the 1C HPIP. This basically ensures that the suction line is full of water before starting the pump. It is plausible because if amps were not fluctuating (and the 1B HPIP did not start), when step 4.30 were reached, you would not go to the RNO column. Continuing in the subsequent actions to step 4.34 which has you go to step 4.56 which starts the 1C HPIP.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


Question requires knowledge of operational limitations stated in a note/procedure step in AP/14. This event was initiated by a Pzr level control malfunction.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only







AP/14EAP AP 14 Obj: 3

Remarks/Status

APE028 2.4.20 - Pressurizer (PZR) Level Control MalfunctionAPE028 GENERIC





Reactor power = 80% stable 1RIA-40 Alert and High Alarm actuated AP/31, (PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAKAGE) is initiated 1RIA-59 = 20 gpm increasing 1RIA-60 = 0.4 gpm increasing

Time = 0805:

1RIA-59 = 30 gpm increasing 1RIA-60 = 0.6 gpm increasing SGTR tab is entered Maximum Runback is initiated

Time = 0809:

Reactor power = 15% Auxiliaries have been transferred

1) The increased indication on 1RIA-60 is only due to radiation __(1)__. 2) At Time = 0809, the SRO will direct a trip of the __(2)__, then continue in the SGTR

tab. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. from the B steam header due to cross contamination

2. Main Turbine ONLY

B. 1. from the B steam header due to cross contamination 2. Main Turbine AND Reactor

C. 1. from the A SG header reaching 1RIA-60 due to the close proximity of the steam lines 2. Main Turbine ONLY

D. 1. from the A SG header reaching 1RIA-60 due to the close proximity of the steam lines 2. Main Turbine AND Reactor

APE037 AA2.03 - Steam Generator (S/G) Tube LeakAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

That the expected indication on main steam lines from the S/Gs should show increasing radiation levels ......................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because N-16 will have decayed away by the time it has passed through the system and back down the B steam line. It is plausible because some cross contamination will occur.

2nd part is correct. Criteria to trip the turbine is power ~ 15% and auxiliaries transferred. The reactor will not be tripped until power is < 5%.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because N-16 will have decayed away by the time it has passed through the system and back down the B steam line. It isplausible because some cross contamination will occur.

2nd part incorrect because the reactor is not tripped at this time. It is plausible because if less than or equal to 5%, it would be correct. 5%.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Per the caution statement prior to step 12 in the SGTR tab, shine can account for up to 2% of the value of the opposite header.

2nd part is correct. Criteria to trip the turbine is power ~ 15% and auxiliaries transferred. The reactor will not be tripped until power is < 5%.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Per the caution statement prior to step 12 in the SGTR tab, shine can account for up to 2% of the value of the opposite header.

2nd part incorrect because the reactor is not tripped at this time. It is plausible because if less than or equal to 5%, it would be correct. 5%.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT47 Q82


ILT47 Q82 (6/2015)SGTR TabEAP-SGTR Obj: R30


This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of the effects radiation shine on steam line detectors during a SGTR and how they could increase without a SGTR on that particular SG.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only




APE037 AA2.03 - Steam Generator (S/G) Tube LeakAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply to the Steam Generator Tube Leak: (CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)

That the expected indication on main steam lines from the S/Gs should show increasing radiation levels ......................



Remarks/Status




Unit shutdown in progress due to SGTL = 12 gpm in 3A SG Reactor power = 95% decreasing 3RC-67 fails Open

Time = 0801:

MANUAL Reactor Trip initiated Time = 0803:

ALL SCM’s = 0°F ES Channels 1 and 2 actuated

Time = 0812:

ALL SCM’s = 20°F increasing RB pressure = 2 psig increasing

1) The current Emergency Plan Classification would be a/an __(1)__. 2) The MAXIMUM time allowed to notify the NRC per RP/0/A/1000/002 (Control Room

Emergency Coordinator Procedure) is __(2)__.


REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. Alert

2. 15 minutes B. 1. Alert

2. 1 hour C. 1. Site Area Emergency

2. 15 minutes D. 1. Site Area Emergency

2. 1 hour

BWE03 2.4.30 - Inadequate Subcooling MarginBWE03 GENERIC

Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is correct. Per the Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Encl 4.1) an RCS leak rate that results in a loss of subcooling = 5 pts. 4-6 point events are classified as an Alert.

2nd part is incorrect because the maximum time allowed to contact the NRC after an event occurs is 1 hour. It is plausible because if the question were asking about notifying local authorities, it would be correct.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is correct. Per the Fission Product Barrier Matrix (Encl 4.1) an RCS leak rate that results in a loss of subcooling = 5 pts. 4-6 point events are classified as an Alert.

2nd part is correct. The maximum time allowed to contact the NRC after an event occurs is 1 hour.

Answer C Discussion

1st part is incorrect because this event would be classified as an Alert. It is plausible because the Fission Product Barrier Matrix does state that a failure of secondary side of SG that results in a DIRECT OPENING (which you do not have) with a SGTL of greater than 10 gpm = 3 pts. This would give a total of 8 pts which would be classified as a SAE. You have the SGTL but no opening. If you did, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because the maximum time allowed to contact the NRC after an event occurs is 1 hour. It is plausible because if the question were asking about notifying local authorities, it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

1st part is incorrect because this event would be classified as an Alert. It is plausible because the Fission Product Barrier Matrix does state that a failure of secondary side of SG that results in a DIRECT OPENING (which you do not have) with a SGTL of greater than 10 gpm = 3 pts. This would give a total of 8 pts which would be classified as a SAE. You have the SGTL but no opening. If you did, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. The maximum time allowed to contact the NRC after an event occurs is 1 hour.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


RP/0/A/1000/001


RP/0/A/1000/001RP/0/A/1000/002EAP-SEP Obj: R12

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of reporting requirements to the NRC for event involving a loss of subcooling margin.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

Question requires the applicant to evaluate plant conditions and make emergency classifications based on their evaluation.

BWE03 2.4.30 - Inadequate Subcooling MarginBWE03 GENERIC

Knowledge of events related to system operation/status that must be reported to internal organizations or external agencies, such as the State, the NRC, or the transmission system operator. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)






Reactor tripped AFIS header B initiated 1A S/G pressure = 800 psig and slowly decreasing ES 1 & 2 actuated RB pressure = 2 psig and increasing Core SCM = 0º F Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) is in progress

Time = 0608:

Core SCM = 15º F Rule 5 is complete EHT Tab has been initiated Tcold = 460º F stable HPI has been throttled with 1HP-120 fully open and 1HP-26 throttled open to

maintain PZR level stable at 105 inches 1) Rule 8 (PTS) __(1)__ required to be initiated. 2) In accordance with the EHT Tab, the __(2)__ Tab will be initiated. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. is

2. FCD

B. 1. is 2. LOCA CD

C. 1. is NOT 2. FCD

D. 1. is NOT 2. LOCA CD

BWE13 EA2.2 - EOP RulesAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply tothe (EOP Rules)(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)




General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct because HPI operated in the injection mode with no RCPs operating which is entry criteria for Rule 8.

2nd part is incorrect because charging flow in excess of normal makeup capability is required to maintain Pzr level constant which means that the correct tab to GO TO is the LOCA CD tab. It is plausible because if charging flow was within the capability of normal charging, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionCorrect:1st part is correct because HPI operated in the injection mode with no RCPs operating which is entry criteria for Rule 8.

2nd part is correct. Charging flow in excess of normal makeup capability is required to maintain Pzr level constant which means that the correct tab to GO TO is the LOCA CD tab.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because HPI operated in the injection mode with no RCPs operating which is entry criteria for Rule 8. It is plausible because nothing in the stem directly tells you that the RCPs are secured. You have to deduce that from Core SCM = 0, that RCPs have been secured and that 1HP-26 is throttled, that it is in injection mode.

2nd part is incorrect because charging flow in excess of normal makeup capability is required to maintain Pzr level constant.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because HPI operated in the injection mode with no RCPs operating which is entry criteria for Rule 8. It is plausible because nothing in the stem directly tells you that the RCPs are secured. You have to deduce that from Core SCM = 0, that RCPs have been secured and that 1HP-26 is throttled, that it is in injection mode.

2nd part is correct. Charging flow in excess of normal makeup capability is required to maintain Pzr level constant which means that the correct tab to GO TO is the LOCA CD tab

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT43 Q79


ILT43 Q79 (6/2013)EHT TabEAP-EHT Obj: R12


Question matches KA by requiring selection of the appropriate EOP procedures (Rules) based on given plant conditions.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only






OMP 1-18

Remarks/Status

BWE13 EA2.2 - EOP RulesAbility to determine and interpret the following as they apply tothe (EOP Rules)(CFR: 43.5 / 45.13)




Given the following Unit 1 conditions: Time = 0400

Reactor power = 100% Time = 0405

Loss of ALL Main and Emergency Feedwater 1A HPI pump trips and will NOT restart RCS temperature is increasing LOHT tab in progress

Time = 0425

Core SCM = 0ºF due to the RCS heatup The CRSRO will __(1)__ and will direct __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? A. 1. transfer to the LOSCM tab

2. initiating Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) B. 1. transfer to the LOSCM tab

2. initiating depressurization of both SGs C. 1. remain in the LOHT tab

2. initiating Rule 4 (Initiation of HPI Forced Cooling) D. 1. remain in the LOHT tab

2. an operator to perform Encl 5.34 (Aligning SSF-ASW for SG Feed)

SYS006 2.4.21 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)SYS006 GENERIC

Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the SRO should remain in the LOHT tab. It is plausible because Rule 2 (LOSCM) would be initiated.

2nd part is correct. When SCM = 0 degrees, Rule 2 is performed.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the SRO should remain in the LOHT tab. It is plausible because Rule 2 (LOSCM) would be initiated.

2nd part is correct. If the LOSCM tab were entered, both SGs would be depressurized to ~250 psig.

Answer C Discussion

1st part is correct because the SRO would remain in the LOHT tab.

2nd part is correct. Per the LOHT tab, if the RCS heats up to the point where SCM = 0 degrees, Rule 4 will be performed.

Answer D Discussion

1st part is correct because the SRO would remain in the LOHT tab.

2nd part is incorrect because the LOHT tab directs performing Rule 4. It is plausible because if HPI FC was not adequate, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q79


ILT41 Q79 (6/2012)LOHT tabLOSCM tabEAP-LOHT Obj: R1


Question requires making operational judgments based on plant conditions and procedure hirearchy (safety functions) to take actions from the appropriate procedure. This includes initiating Rule 4 (ECCS pumps) to provide core cooling.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only




SYS006 2.4.21 - Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS)SYS006 GENERIC

Knowledge of the parameters and logic used to assess the status of safety functions, such as reactivity control, core cooling and heat removal, reactor coolant system integrity, containment conditions, radioactivity release control, etc. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)



Remarks/Status

Discussed with R. Baldwin on 2/02/16. He said we could use procedure hierarchy in the question.Sam




Reactor power = 100% Pzr safety valve is leaking by 1SA-6/B7, (CS QUENCH TANK PRESSURE HIGH) is in alarm 1SA-6/C7, (CS QUENCH TANK TEMPERATURE HIGH) is in alarm OP/1/A/1104/017, (Quench Tank Operation) is used to address QT parameters

1) In accordance with OP/1/A/1104/017, Enclosure __(1)__ will be performed first.

2) If, when performing Enclosure 4.3, (QT Recirc), QT level decreases to 82 inches,

the __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. 4.3, QT Recirc

2. procedure directs you to stop the Quench Tank Drain Pump

B. 1. 4.3, QT Recirc 2. Quench Tank Drain Pump will automatically trip

C. 1. 4.4, Lower QT Pressure 2. procedure directs you to stop the Quench Tank Drain Pump

D. 1. 4.4, Lower QT Pressure 2. Quench Tank Drain Pump will automatically trip

SYS007 A2.07 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Recirculating quench tank .........................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT::1st part is correct. With both enclosures needing to be performed, an initial condition in Enclosure 4.4 directs you to perform Enclosure 4.3 to lower QT temperature if required (with an alarm in, it is required).

2nd part is correct. Per Enclosure 4.3, if reducing QT level and level decreases to 82 inches, it states to "Ensure stopped QT Drain Pump".

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect::1st part is correct. With both enclosures needing to be performed, an initial condition in Enclosure 4.4 directs you to perform Enclosure 4.3 to lower QT temperature if required (with an alarm in, it is required).

2nd part is incorrect because the automatic trip occurs at 80 inches. It is plausible because the procedure does direct you to stop the pump at 82 inches.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because with both enclosures needing to be performed, an initial condition in Enclosure 4.4 directs you to perform Enclosure 4.3 to lower QT temperature if required (with an alarm in, it is required). It is plausible because the Enclosure 4.4 does need to be performed and with the potential rupture disk failure if pressure gets too high, it may seem that this enclosure would have the higher priority.

2nd part is correct. Per Enclosure 4.3, if reducing QT level and level decreases to 82 inches, it states to "Ensure stopped QT Drain Pump".

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because with both enclosures needing to be performed, an initial condition in Enclosure 4.4 directs you to perform Enclosure 4.3 to lower QT temperature if required (with an alarm in, it is required). It is plausible because the Enclosure 4.4 does need to be performed and with the potential rupture disk failure if pressure gets too high, it may seem that this enclosure would have the higher priority.

2nd part is incorrect because the automatic trip occurs at 80 inches. It is plausible because the procedure does direct you to stop the pump at 82 inches.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


1SA6 B71SA6 C7PNS-CS Obj: 10, 12OP/1/A/1104/017


Requires knowledge of QT parameters and how to use plant procedures to correct parameters that are out of the normal range.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only






Remarks/Status

SYS007 A2.07 - Pressurizer Relief Tank/Quench Tank System (PRTS)Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the P S; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Recirculating quench tank .........................................




Reactor Power = 100% While performing SR 3.3.5.2, (Manual ES Setpoint Verification), FIN24

determines that Reactor Building Pressure High “as found” setpoints are as follows: A = 3.53 psig B = 4.04 psig C = 4.09 psig

1) The ACTUAL Setpoint for ES RB Pressure High is __(1)__ psig. 2) The CRS __(2)__ required to enter Tech Spec 3.3.5, (ESPS Input Instrumentation) CONDITION B. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED

A. 1. 3.0 2. is

B. 1. 3.0 2. is NOT

C. 1. 3.5 2. is

D. 1. 3.5 2. is NOT

SYS013 2.2.37 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)SYS013 GENERIC

Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)



General Discussion

ES is an approved acronym for Engineered Safeguards per Chapter F of the EOP/AP Writer's GuideRB is an approved acronym for Reactor Building per Chapter F of the EOP/AP Writer's Guide

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The actual ES setpoint for RB pressure is 3.0 psig.

2nd part is correct. With two channels > the allowable value of 4.0 psig, there is one parameter with two channels inoperable and therefore both Condition A (one parameter with one channel) and Condition B (one parameter with two or more channels) apply.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. The actual ES setpoint for RB pressure is 3.0 psig.

2nd part is incorrect because Condition B is required to be entered. It is plausible since there is a NOTE above the line that allows separate condition entry for each parameter. That means if it were two parameters that did not meet the allowable value (instead of two channels of the same parameter) then this would be the correct choice.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the actual setpoint for ES RB pressure HIGH is 3.0 psig. It is plausible because 3.5 psig is the setpoint for the RPS RB pressure HIGH.

2nd part is correct. With two channels > the allowable value of 4.0 psig, there is one parameter with two channels inoperable and therefore both Condition A (one parameter with one channel) and Condition B (one parameter with two or more channels) apply.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the actual setpoint for ES RB pressure HIGH is 3.0 psig. It is plausible because 3.5 psig is the setpoint for the RPS RB pressure HIGH.

2nd part is incorrect because Condition B is required to be entered. It is plausible since there is a NOTE above the line that allows separate condition entry for each parameter. That means if it were two parameters that did not meet the allowable value (instead of two channels of the same parameter) then this would be the correct choice.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT46 Q88


Requires knowledge of requirements to meet LCO statement for ES instrument channels.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

NUREG 1021, ES-401 Attachment II

B. Facility operating limitations in the TS and their bases. [10 CFR 55.43(b)(2)]Some examples of SRO exam items for this topic include: Application of Required Actions (Section 3) and Surveillance Requirements (SR)(Section 4) in accordance with rules of application requirements (Section 1).

Application of generic Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) requirements (LCO3.0.1 thru 3.0.7; SR 4.0.1 thru 4.0.4).

Knowledge of TS bases that are required to analyze TS required actions andterminology.




TS 3.3.5


ILT46 Q88 (12/2014)IC-ES Obj 7TS 3.3.5 TSB 3.3.5Admin-TSS pg 140

Remarks/Status

SYS013 2.2.37 - Engineered Safety Features Actuation System (ESFAS)SYS013 GENERIC

Ability to determine operability and/or availability of safety related equipment. (CFR: 41.7 / 43.5 / 45.12)




Reactor power = 100% OAC ALARM (2MS-93 Backup Nitrogen Press 1 LO-LO) is in alarm 2MS-93, TD EFDWP STEAM SUPPLY TRIP VALVE in-service Nitrogen bottle

pressure = 300 psig decreasing Time = 0830:

Air/Nitrogen pressure to 2MS-93 has been lost TD EFDWP receives a start signal TD EFDWP DC auxiliary oil pump fails to start An operator is dispatched to locally start the TD EFDWP using Encl 5.26,

Manual Start of TDEFDWP

1) At Time = 0800, the LCO for TS 3.3.13, Automatic Feedwater Isolation System (AFIS) Digital Channels __(1)__ being met.

2) At Time = 0830, Unit 2 TD EFDWP will be started LOCALLY using __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. is

2. 2MS-94, TD EFDWP STOP VALVE

B. 1. is 2. 2MS-95, TD EFDWP GOVERNOR VALVE

C. 1. is NOT 2. 2MS-94, TD EFDWP STOP VALVE

D. 1. is NOT 2. 2MS-95, TD EFDWP GOVERNOR VALVE

SYS061 A2.02 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) SystemAbility to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Loss of air to steam supply valve ...................................



General Discussion

The questions distractors (C & D) depend largely on knowledge of 1MS-93 operation and if N2 acts to open it or close it. If this is not thought to be plausible, we could ask if the TD will still isolate upon AFIS (the oil portion (train 2)) still isolating the TD.

OE used for this (PIP O-11-07057). This event occurred and applicable TS were entered until the N2 bottles were switched.

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect: 1st part is incorrect because when N2 Accumulator pressure is < 770 psig, per OP/2/A/1106/006, entry into TS 3.3.13 Condition A applies so the LCO is not being met. It is plausible if N2 accumulator pressure were > 770 psig, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect because in this situation, 2MS-95 would be used to start the TD EFDW Pump (per EOP Encl 5.26). It is plausible because 2MS-94 is used to manually start the TD EFDWP during the turbine overspeed test (PT/2/A/0600/009).

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect: 1st part is incorrect because when N2 Accumulator pressure is < 770 psig, per OP/2/A/1106/006, Entry into TS 3.3.13 Condition A applies so the LCO is not being met. It is plausible if N2 accumulator pressure were > 770 psig, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. Without the auxiliary oil pump available, the operator will have to lift the starting lever on 2MS-95 to allow steam to the TD EFDWP. When the pump comes up to speed, the shaft oil pump will develop enough pressure to keep 2MS-95 open.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect: 1st part is correct. When N2 Accumulator pressure is < 770 psig, per OP/2/A/1106/006, Entry into TS 3.3.13 Condition A applies.

2nd part is incorrect because in this situation, 2MS-95 would be used to start the TD EFDW Pump (per EOP Encl 5.26). It is plausible because 2MS-94 is used to manually start the TD EFDWP during the turbine overspeed test (PT/2/A/0600/009).

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. When N2 Accumulator pressure is < 770 psig, per OP/2/A/1106/006, Entry into TS 3.3.13 Condition A applies.

2nd part is correct. Without the auxiliary oil pump available, the operator will have to lift the starting lever on 2MS-95 to allow steam to the TD EFDWP. When the pump comes up to speed, the shaft oil pump will develop enough pressure to keep 2MS-95 open.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


CF-EF Obj: R13TS 3.3.12/13TSB 3.3.12/13PT/2/A/0600/009Encl 5.26


This question matches the KA by requiring knowledge of the impact of low N2 pressure on the EFDW system to determine the requiredprocedure (TS).

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

In accordance with "Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions":Requires knowledge from the Bases of TS 3.3.12/13 (AFIS) to determine operability.This is not system knowledge information.This question cannot be answered Solely on 1 hr or less TS knowledge.This question cannot be answered based on "above the line" TS information.This question cannot be answered with TS Safety Limit information.



Remarks/Status

KA is a soft match from the sample plan provided. The sample plan states "Air or MOV failure". The exam program matches the current KA Catalog (NUREG 1122).

Discussed with R. Baldwin on 2/02/16. He said our K/A wording is good.Sam

SYS061 A2.02 - Auxiliary / Emergency Feedwater (AFW) SystemAbility to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the AFW; and (b) based on those predictions, use procedures to correct, control, or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.13)

Loss of air to steam supply valve ...................................




Reactor power = 100% Station blackout occurs

Time = 0405:

1DCA and 1DCB (Control Battery Buses) are de-energized SM and STA discuss the DC Bus issue and develop a plan to restore them

Time = 0410:

Power restored to both Main Feeder Buses from KHU #1 and CT-1 CT-5 is energized

Time = 0430:

1DCA energized 1) In accordance with OMP 1-18 (Implementation Standard During Abnormal and Emergency Events), the __(1)__ will conduct the Focus Brief on restoration of the

battery charger. 2) In accordance with RP/0/A/1000/001 (Emergency Classification) the HIGHEST emergency classification (if any) for the above sequence of events is __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. SM ONLY

2. Unusual Event B. 1. SM ONLY

2. Site Area Emergency C. 1. SM or the CRS

2. Unusual Event D. 1. SM or the CRS

2. Site Area Emergency

SYS063 2.4.41 - DC Electrical Distribution SystemSYS063 GENERIC

Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the PD/ CRS can conduct the focus brief when the SM is not available. It is plausible because it is one of the Shift Manager's responsibilities.

2nd part is incorrect because it’s a SAE. It is plausible because in Modes 5 and 6, it would be correct.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because the PD/ CRS can conduct the focus brief when the SM is not available. It is plausible because it is one of the Shift Manager's responsibilities.

2nd part is correct. Both DC buses are de-energized for greater than 15 minutes. This is classified as a Site Area Emergency.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. Per OMP 1-18, the SM is responsible for the focused brief. However if the SM is not available the CRS (PD) is allowed to conduct the brief.

2nd part is incorrect because it’s a SAE. It is plausible because in Modes 5 and 6, it would be correct.

Answer D Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. Per OMP 1-18, the SM is responsible for the focused brief. However if the SM is not available the CRS (PD) is allowed to conduct the brief.

2nd part is correct. Both DC buses are de-energized for greater than 15 minutes. This is classified as a Site Area Emergency.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q89


RP/0/A/1000/001


ILT41 Q89 (6/2012)ADM-OMP Obj: R9OMP 1-18RP/0/A/1000/001


Question requires ability to classify an event during an emergency involving a part of the DC system.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

ES-401. Attachment IIF. SRO Only Procedures and limitations involved in initial core loading, alterations in core configuration, control rod programming, and determination of various internal andexternal effects on core reactivity. [10 CFR 55.43(b)(6)]Some examples of SRO exam items for this topic include: Evaluating core conditions and emergency classifications based on core conditions.

SYS063 2.4.41 - DC Electrical Distribution SystemSYS063 GENERIC

Knowledge of the emergency action level thresholds and classifications. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.11)



Remarks/Status




Reactor power = 100% 3DIA supply breaker to CRD breaker shunt trip device in RPS channel “A”

tripped OPEN 1) In accordance with TS 3.3.1 (RPS Instrumentation), the 3A RPS channel is __(1)__. 2) __(2)__ required to be performed. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. operable

2. TS 3.3.4 (Control Rod Drive Trip Devices) action statements are B. 1. operable

2. TS 3.3.4 (Control Rod Drive Trip Devices) action statements are NOT C. 1. NOT operable

2. TS 3.3.1 (RPS Instrumentation) action statements are D. 1. NOT operable

2. TS 3.3.1 (RPS Instrumentation) action statements are NOT

SYS001 2.2.40 - Control Rod Drive SystemSYS001 GENERIC




General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Correct:1st part is correct. The RPS trip signal will still de-energize to trip the CRD breaker and the RPS channel is operable.

2nd part is correct. TS 3.3.4 action statements are required to be performed because IAW the TS bases the shunt trip is required for the trip breaker to be operable. All 4 breakers are required.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is correct. The RPS trip signal will still de-energize to trip the CRD breaker and the RPS channel is operable.

2nd part is incorrect because TS 3.3.4 Condition A applies. It is plausible because TS only requires 3/4 RPS trip functions to be operable.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the RPS Channel is operable ( TS 3.3.1). It is plausible because the trip breaker function, while functional (it works), is not operable because of the shunt trip not being operable (TS 3.3.4).

2nd part is incorrect because the action statements from TS 3.3.1 are not required because the LCO for TS 3.3.1 is currently met. It is plausible because the DC power supply in an RPS cabinet was lost.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the RPS Channel is operable ( TS 3.3.1). It is plausible because the trip breaker function, while functional (it works), is not operable because of the shunt trip not being operable (TS 3.3.4).

Second part would be correct if the RPS channel were inoperable because TS 3.3.1only requires 3/4 RPS trip functions to be operable.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT43 Q86


ILT43 Q86 (6/2013)TS 3.3.4TSB 3.3.4TS 3.3.1TSB 3.3.1IC-RPS Obj: R17


Question requires ability to apply TS to a given set of plant parameters.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

In accordance with "Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions":Requires knowledge from the Bases of TS 3.3.4 (Control Rod Drive Trip Devices) and TS 3.3.1 (RPS Instrumentation) do determine operability.This is not system knowledge information.This question cannot be answered Solely on 1 hr or less TS knowledge.This question cannot be answered based on "above the line" TS information.This question cannot be answered with TS Safety Limit information.

SYS001 2.2.40 - Control Rod Drive SystemSYS001 GENERIC




Remarks/Status

3/30/16: Discussed KA match with the Chief Examiner. He is ok with "action statements being required" matching "ability to apply TS" KA.




Reactor power = 100% Time = 0415:

HPI X-OVER LOOP “A” flow instrument loses power 1) At Time = 0400, if ES Channels 1 – 8 actuated, the HPI X-OVER LOOP “A” flow

instrument __(1)__ indicate flow. 2) At Time = 0415, TS 3.5.2, (HPI) CONDITION “A” __(2)__ required to be entered. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

REFERENCE PROVIDED A. 1. would

2. is B. 1. would

2. is NOT C. 1. would NOT

2. is D. 1. would NOT

2. is NOT

SYS016 A2.02 - Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Loss of power supply .............................................



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because for an ES actuation, HPI X-Over flow would not be indicated.It is plausible because with 3 HPIPs and 2 HPI headers, it would be logical to think that one HPIP is supplying flow through a X-Over header.

2nd part is correct. Per TS 3.5.2 Bases, "To support HPI discharge crossover valve OPERABILITY, the safety grade flow indicator associated with the HPI discharge crossover valve is required to be OPERABLE".

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because for an ES actuation, HPI X-Over flow would not be indicated.It is plausible because with 3 HPIPs and 2 HPI headers, it would be logical to think that one HPIP is supplying flow through a X-Over header.

2nd part is incorrect because TS 3.5.2 Condition A would be entered for the discharge cross-over valve being inoperable. It is plausible because the valve itself has no issues.

Answer C Discussion

Correct:1st part is correct because there would be no indicated flow on the cross over headers.

2nd part is correct. Per TS 3.5.2 Bases, "To support HPI discharge crossover valve OPERABILITY, the safety grade flow indicator associated with the HPI discharge crossover valve is required to be OPERABLE".

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct because there would be no indicated flow on the cross over lines.

2nd part is incorrect because TS 3.5.2 Condition A would be entered for the discharge cross-over valve being inoperable. It is plausible because the valve itself has no issues.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q91


TS 3.5.2


ILT41 Q91 (6/2012)TS 3.5.2TS B3.5.2PNS-HPI


Question requires knowledge concerning the affect of a loss of NNI power to an HPI flow instrument and TS condition required to be entered as a result of the failure.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

In accordance with Rev. 1 of "Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions":Requires knowledge from the Bases of TS 3.5.2 (HPI) regarding requirement of HPI X-over flow instrumentation on X-over valve operabilityand is not system knowledge information.This question cannot be answered Solely on 1 hr or less TS knowledge.This question cannot be answered based on "above the line" TS information.This question cannot be answered with TS Safety Limit information.

SYS016 A2.02 - Non-Nuclear Instrumentation System (NNIS)Ability to (a) predict the impacts of the following malfunctions or operations on the NNIS; and (b) based on those predictions, use or mitigate the consequences of those malfunctions or operations: (CFR: 41.5 / 43.5 / 45.3 / 45.5)

Loss of power supply .............................................



Remarks/Status




Reactor in Mode 3 LBLOCA occurs

Current conditions:

EOP ICC tab in progress CETCs = 754ºF increasing The TSC concurs with starting RCP(s)

1) The CETC readings on the ICCM/RVLIS display will be in __(1)__ video.

2) The ICC tab __(2)__ direct you to perform Encl 5.14, (Jumper Contacts for

Bypassing RCP Motor Starting Interlocks) in order to start RCPs. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. normal 2. does

B. 1. normal

2. does NOT C. 1. reverse

2. does D. 1. reverse

2. does NOT

SYS017 2.4.9 - In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) SystemSYS017 GENERIC

Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect.1st part is incorrect because the value will be displayed in reverse video. It is plausible because if CETCs were < 700 degrees, it would be correct.

2nd part is correct. Per the ICC tab, Step 39, Verify RCP starting interlocks are met, if not the RNO directs performance of enclosure 5.14 to bypass the starting interlocks.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because the value will be displayed in reverse video. It is plausible because if CETCs were < 700 degrees, it would be correct.

2nd part is incorrect. Per the ICC tab, Step 39, Verify RCP starting interlocks are met, if not the RNO directs performance of enclosure 5.14 to bypass the starting interlocks. It is plausible because in other places in the EOP, below 700 degrees, RCP interlocks will not be bypassed to start a RCP. Example: LOHT tab - If there is no heat transfer and SCM > 0 degrees then 1 RCP is started, but you are not given the option to bypass the starting interlocks (they have to be met).

.

Answer C Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. When CETCs are > 700 degrees, the ICCM display will be in Reverse Video.

2nd part is correct. Per the ICC tab, Step 39, Verify RCP starting interlocks are met, if not the RNO directs performance of enclosure 5.14 to bypass the starting interlocks.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. When the CETCs are > 700 degrees, the ICCM display will be in Reverse Video.

2nd part is incorrect. Per the ICC tab, Step 39, Verify RCP starting interlocks are met, if not the RNO directs performance of enclosure 5.14 to bypass the starting interlocks. It is plausible because in other places in the EOP, below 700 degrees, RCP interlocks will not be bypassed to start a RCP. Example: LOHT tab - If there is no heat transfer and SCM > 0 degrees then 1 RCP is started, but you are not given the option to bypass the starting interlocks (they have to be met).

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

MODIFIED

Question Source

ILT41 Q76


Requires knowledge of how ITM system reacts to elevated core temperatures and how that impacts how the EOPs are conducted.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only







ILT41 Q76 (6/2012)ICC TabIC-RCI Obj: R48

Remarks/Status

SYS017 2.4.9 - In-Core Temperature Monitor (ITM) SystemSYS017 GENERIC

Knowledge of low power/shutdown implications in accident (e.g., loss of coolant accident or loss of residual heat removal) mitigation strategies. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)



Given the following plant conditions: Initial conditions:

All 3 Units reactor power = 100% 1SA-3/B6 (FIRE ALARM) actuated AO's dispatched to the Turbine Building 3rd Floor (1TA and 1TB area)

Current conditions:

AO reports the fire on 1TB with heavy smoke and rolling flames Fire Brigade has been dispatched Class C extinguishing agent has been ineffective in extinguishing the fire

1) In accordance with the “Fire Plan” a water fog __(1)__ be used on the switchgear to fight the fire. 2) In accordance with SLC 16.13.1 (Minimum Station Staffing Requirements), an SRO __(2)__ required to serve as the fire brigade leader. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

A. 1. should 2. is

B. 1. should 2. is NOT

C. 1. should NOT 2. is

D. 1. should NOT 2. is NOT


Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is correct. In accordance with the "Fire Plan" a water fog should be used to fight this fire if a Class C extinguishing agent is ineffective.

2nd part is incorrect because an SRO is NOT required to serve as Fire Brigade Leader. It is plausible since under normal conditions an SRO is the Fire Brigade leader.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is correct. In accordance with the "Fire Plan" a water fog should be used to fight this fire if a Class C extinguishing agent is ineffective.

2nd part is correct. In accordance with SLC 16.13.1 an SRO or a qualified AO can be the Fire Brigade Leader.

Answer C Discussion

1st part is incorrect because a fog can be used. It is plausible because a water stream cannot be used on this fire.

2nd part is incorrect because an SRO is NOT required to serve as Fire Brigade Leader. It is plausible since under normal conditions an SRO is typically the Fire Brigade leader.

Answer D Discussion

1st part is incorrect because a fog can be used. It is plausible because a water stream cannot be used on this fire.

2nd part is correct. In accordance with SLC 16.13.1 an SRO or a qualified AO can be the Fire Brigade Leader.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT47 Q95


ILT47 Q95 (6/2015)SLC 16.13.1Fire Plan

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of fire brigade staffing and using water to fight an electrical fire.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

Requires knowledge of the fire plan (when a water fog can be used).The bases of SLC 16.13.1 regarding who can serve as fire brigade leader.


Knowledge of operator responsibilities during all modes of plant operation. (CFR: 41.10 / 45.13)



In accordance with AD-EG-ALL-1132 (Preparation and Control of Design Change Engineering Changes): 1) An on-line temporary design change is required to have a plan that specifies removal of the change within __(1)__ from installation. 2) The Operational Control Group (Operations) __(2)__ responsible for maintaining a

log of installed changes. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. thirty days

2. is B. 1. thirty days

2. is NOT C. 1. one year

2. is D. 1. one year

2. is NOT


Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the time specified is 1 year. It is plausible because 30 days is an often used surveillance time.

2nd part is correct. OCG (operations) is responsible for maintaining the log.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the time specified is 1 year. It is plausible because 30 days is an often used surveillance time.

2nd part is incorrect because the OCG maintains the log. Plausible since the process is "owned" by engineering.

Answer C Discussion

1st part is correct. Per AD-EG-ALL-1132, a plan for removal within one year must be in place before temporary design change will be installed.

2nd part is correct. The operational control group (OPS in this case) is required to maintain a log of installed changes.

Answer D Discussion

1st part is correct. Per AD-EG-ALL-1132, a plan for removal within one year must be in place before temporary design change will be installed.

2nd part is incorrect because the OCG maintains the log. Plausible since the process is "owned" by engineering.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT42 Q95


ILT42 Q95 (12/2012)ADM-SD Obj: 13, 14AD-EG-ALL-1132

Remarks/Status


The question requires knowledge of the process for controlling Temporary Design Changes.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

Per the "Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions":Facility licensee procedures required to obtain authority for design and operating changes in the facility. [10 CFR 55.43(b)(3)]Some examples of SRO exam items for this topic include:Administrative processes for temporary modifications.Also Oconee has SRO only objectives for this knowledge.


Knowledge of the process for controlling temporary design changes. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.3 / 45.13)




Reactor Power = 100% 1A HPI Pump operating 1B HPI Pump in AUTO

Time = 1202:

A seal supply filter problem results in total Reactor Coolant Pump seal injection flow decreasing to 25 gpm

1) At Time = 1202, the 1B HPI pump is __(1)__. 2) The low seal injection flow Auto Start of the 1B HPI pump __(2)__ required to be operable for the 1B HPI pump to be Operable in accordance with Tech Spec 3.5.2 (HPI). Which ONE of the following completes the statements above?

ASSUME NO OPERATOR ACTIONS A. 1. running

2. is B. 1. running

2. is NOT C. 1. NOT running

2. is D. 1. NOT running

2. is NOT


(multi-unit license) Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between units. (CFR: 41.5 / 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.12)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the 1B HPIP will not be running. It is plausible because it would be correct if on Unit 2 or Unit 3 since the low seal injection flow start on those units is 30 gpm.

2nd part is incorrect because the seal injection flow auto start does not have to work for the HPIP to be operable. It is plausible because the low SI flow start of an HPI pump is an auto start provided to mitigate abnormal plant conditions. This means it would be plausible to believe that Tech Specs requires the auto start capability on low SI flow for the HPI pump to be considered operable.

Answer B Discussion

1st part is incorrect because the 1B HPIP will not be running. It is plausible because it would be correct if on Unit 2 or Unit 3 since the low seal injection flow start on those units is 30 gpm.

2nd part is correct. The low seal injection auto start is not required in order to satisfy TS 3.5.2.

Answer C Discussion

1st part is correct. The 1B HPIP will not be operating.

2nd part is incorrect because the seal injection flow auto start does not have to work for the HPIP to be operable. It is plausible because the low SI flow start of an HPI pump is an auto start provided to mitigate abnormal plant conditions. This means it would be plausible to believe that Tech Specs requires the auto start capability on low SI flow for the HPI pump to be considered operable.

Answer D Discussion

1st part is correct. The 1B HPIP will not be operating.

2nd part is correct. The low seal injection auto start is not required in order to satisfy TS 3.5.2.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT44 Q86


ILT44 Q86 (12/2013)PNS-HPI Obj: R4TS 3.5.2 basis

Remarks/Status


Requires knowledge of design difference of the HPI systems between Unit 1 and Units 2&3. KA is met at the SRO level since it requires knowledge from TS basis of TS 3.5.2 with regards to the requirements for an HPI pump to be considered operable.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

Requires knowledge from Tech Spec basis of TS 3.5.2 as it relates to what constitutes an Operable HPI pump.It cannot be answered solely by1hr or less memory items.It cannot be answered solely by above the line knowledgeIt cannot be answered solely by knowing TS Safety LimitsIt does require knowledge of TS basis that is not solely systems knowledge Spec


(multi-unit license) Knowledge of the design, procedural, and operational differences between units. (CFR: 41.5 / 41.6 / 41.7 / 41.10 / 45.12)






Mode 6 Defueling in progress 1RIA-3 (Fuel Transfer Canal Monitor) = 4 mr/hr stable Main Fuel Bridge Area Monitor = 6 mr/hr stable

Current conditions:

1RIA-3 local reading = 0 mr/hr 1RIA-3 View Node indication is magenta

The Re-fueling SRO will determine that Fuel Handling activities in the Reactor Building may ______ in accordance with OP/1/A/1502/007, (Operations Defueling/Refueling Responsibilities)? Which ONE of the following completes the statement above? A. NOT continue until a portable area monitor with local alarm capability is in

place B. continue because only the Main Fuel Bridge Area Monitor is required C. NOT continue until continuous RP coverage is present on the Main Fuel

Bridge D. continue provided 1RIA-49 (RB Normal Gas) is operable


Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Correct. If 1RIA-3 is inoperable, RP must be contacted to provide a portable Area monitor with local alarm capability in accordance with OP/1/A/1502/007.

Answer B Discussion

Incorrect. As stated in OP/1/A/1502/007, Encl 4.2, Step 4.5: 1RIA-3 must be in service while fuel handling is in progress. It is plausible because either RIA would help protect the fuel handlers. However both RIAs are required.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect: RP can not substitute for an inoperable RIA-3. It is plausible because RP is contacted to supply the replacement instrument.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect: A portable monitor with an alarm is required to move fuel. It is plausible because RIA 49 would alarm and sound the RB evacuation alarm if highly radioactive gases were released into the RB.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT39 Q97


ILT39 Q97 (5/2011)FH-FHS OP/1/A/1502/007

Remarks/Status


Question requires knowledge of how an inoperable RIA affects fuel handling activites..

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

In accordance with "Clarification Guidance for SRO-only Questions":Question requires knowledge of Fuel Handling procedures. The SRO must evaluate the RIA availability and requirements to continue fuel movement.This is not an RO task.


Knowledge of radiological safety principles pertaining to licensed operator duties, such as containment entry requirements, fuel handling responsibilities, access to locked high-radiation areas, aligning filters, etc. (CFR: 41.12 / 45.9 / 45.10)




Reactor power = 100% An RCS leak develops AP/2, Excessive RCS Leakage is initiated

Time = 0805:

Reactor is tripped per guidance contained in AP/2 RCS leakage is determined to be 170 gpm increasing

1) When in effect, the Emergency Coordinator __(1)__ approve exceeding Emergency

Dose Limits (EDLs).

2) At time = 0805, EDLs __(2)__ in effect. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. can

2. are B. 1. can

2. are NOT C. 1. can NOT

2. are D. 1. can NOT

2. are NOT





General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

CORRECT:1st part is correct. The emergency coordinator can approve exceeding EDLs.

2nd part is correct. When in the EOP, if leak rate exceeds 160 gpm, EDLs are in effect.

Answer B DiscussionCORRECT:1st part is correct. The emergency coordinator can approve exceeding EDLs.

2nd part is incorrect because per the EOP, if leak rate exceeds 160 gpm, EDLs are in effect. It is plausible because if leak rate were < 160 gpm, it would be correct.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the emergency coordinator can approve exceeding EDLs. It is plausible because if it were a Planned Special Exposure, it would be correct because it requires Site VP permission.

2nd part is correct. When in the EOP, if leak rate exceeds 160 gpm, EDLs are in effect.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the emergency coordinator can approve exceeding EDLs. It is plausible because if it were a Planned Special Exposure, it would be correct because it requires Site VP permission.

2nd part is incorrect because per the EOP, if leak rate exceeds 160 gpm, EDLs are in effect. It is plausible because if leak rate were < 160 gpm, it would be correct.

Cognitive Level

Comprehension

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

NEW

Question Source


AP/2EAP-TCA Obj: R6Subsequent Actions, PA PageEAP-SEP Obj. R10RP/0/B/1000/011PD RP ALL 0001


Question requires knowledge of the requirements for complying with Radiation Work Permits and when those requirements can be circumvented.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

This question requires the assesment of plant conditions to determine if implementation of Emergency Dose Limits is required. This action will modify how procedures performed in the field will be conducted and the approval level required to exceed EDLs.

E. Assessment of facility conditions and selection of appropriate procedures duringnormal, abnormal, and emergency situations. [10 CFR 55.43(b)(5)]

Knowledge of administrative procedures that specify hierarchy, implementation,and/or coordination of plant normal, abnormal, and emergency procedures.




Remarks/Status





Reactor Power = 100% Turbine Building Flood in progress AP/10, (Turbine Building Flood) has just been initiated by the CRS

1) Once the Reactor has been tripped in accordance with AP/10, the highest priority

actions to be performed are contained in __(1)__. 2) Steam Generator levels and feed rates will be directed by __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. AP/10

2. Rule 7 B. 1. AP/10

2. Turbine Building Flood tab C. 1. the EOP

2. Rule 7 D. 1. the EOP

2. Turbine Building Flood tab


Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures, abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is incorrect because the EOP has the higher priority actions. It is plausible because AP/10 is unique in that there is specific guidance in the Turbine Building Flood tab prior to step 1 that directs that AP/10 be used in parallel with this tab. That is primarily due to the fact that it is AP/10 that provides the direction to locate and isolate the sourceof the TBF therefore it would be plausible to believe it is the highest priority.

2nd part is incorrect because direction is contained in the TBF tab. It is plausible because in most every case except a TBF, Rule 7 provides direction for SG levels and feed rates.

Answer B DiscussionIncorrect:1st part is incorrect because the EOP has the higher priority actions. It is plausible because AP/10 is unique in that there is specific guidance in the Turbine Building Flood tab prior to step 1 that directs that AP/10 be used in parallel with this tab. That is primarily due to the fact that it is AP/10 that provides the direction to locate and isolate the sourceof the TBF therefore it would be plausible to believe it is the highest priority.

2nd part is correct. The turbine building flood tab contains guidance on feeding the SGs at the maximum rate (assuming that it will not be available to feed for long).

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The EOP has the highest priority during this event.

2nd part is incorrect because direction is contained in the TBF tab. It is plausible because in most every case except a TBF, Rule 7 provides direction for SG levels and feed rates.

Answer D Discussion

Correct:1st part is correct. The EOP has the highest priority during this event.

2nd part is correct. The turbine building flood tab contains guidance on feeding the SGs at the maximum rate (assuming that it will not be available to feed for long).

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT45 Q100


Requires knowledge of the organization (and implementation requirements/hierarchy) of AP's and EOP's as contained in OMP 1-18 as well as in the EOP itself.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only







ILT45 Q100 (6/2014)ADM-OMP Obj: 9OMP 1-18TBF tabAP/10

Remarks/Status


Knowledge of EOP implementation hierarchy and coordination with other support procedures or guidelines such as, operating procedures,abnormal operating procedures, and severe accident management guidelines. (CFR: 41.10 / 43.5 / 45.13)




The Emergency Plan has been entered due to LBLOCA Time = 0455:

The TSC is activated and turnover is complete 1) At Time = 0400, the NRC Communicator is required to be __(1)__ in accordance

with RP/0/A/1000/002 (Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure). 2) The LOWEST classification which ALWAYS requires a protective action recommendation on the initial notification is a __(2)__. Which ONE of the following completes the statements above? A. 1. a licensed SRO ONLY

2. Site Area Emergency B. 1. a licensed SRO ONLY

2. General Emergency C. 1. any qualified on shift person

2. Site Area Emergency D. 1. any qualified on shift person

2. General Emergency


Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (CFR: 41.10 / 41.12 / 43.5 / 45.11)



General Discussion

Answer A Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is correct. The NRC communicator has to be an SRO.

2nd part is incorrect because a SAE does not always require a PAR. It is plausible because PARs are required for a SAE for the initial notification with a Condition "A" or "B"for one of the dams or dikes.

Answer B DiscussionCorrect:1st part is correct. The NRC communicator has to be an SRO.

2nd part is correct. The General Emergency is the only classification that always requires PARs any time it is used.

Answer C Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is Incorrect because the NRC communicator has to be an SRO. It is plausible because this is correct for the on shift off site communicator.

2nd part is incorrect because a SAE does not always require a PAR. It is plausible because PARs are required for a SAE for the initial notification with a Condition "A" or "B"for one of the dams or dikes.

Answer D Discussion

Incorrect:1st part is Incorrect because the NRC communicator has to be an SRO. It is plausible because this is correct for the on shift off site communicator.

2nd part is correct. The General Emergency is the only classification that always requires PARs any time it is used.

Cognitive Level

Memory

Job Level

SRO

QuestionType

BANK

Question Source

ILT41 Q100


ILT41 Q100 (6/2012)EAP-SEP R01RP/0/B/1000/002RP/0/B/1000/015

Remarks/Status


The question requires knowledge of PARs, which is a function of the emergency coordinator.

Basis for Hi Cog

Basis for SRO only

OSM will be the initial emergency coordinator during the event. It could be his responsibility to make the initial PAR. An RO would not be required to know this information.


Knowledge of emergency plan protective action recommendations. (CFR: 41.10 / 41.12 / 43.5 / 45.11)




AO-501Page 1 of 11

REGION II JOB PERFORMANCE MEASURE

AO-501

PLACE THE REACTOR BUILDING HYDROGEN ANALYZER IN SERVICE

Alternate Path: No Alt Path Failure: Time Critical: Yes Time Critical Criteria:

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

AO-501Page 2 of 11


Task Title : Place the 1A Reactor Building Hydrogen Analyzer In Service Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: No Time Critical: Yes Validation Time: 15 minutes K/A Rating(s):

System: 028 K/A: G2.1.30 Rating: 4.4/4.0 Task Standard:

Reactor Building Hydrogen Analyzers are placed in service by procedure within 90 minutes. References:

EP/1/A/1800/001 EOP Enclosure 5.2, “Placing RB Hydrogen Analyzers in Service” Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

EOP Enclosure 5.2 “Placing RB Hydrogen Analyzers in Service” rev. 001 ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________

NAME Time Finish: ______________ Performance Rating: SAT ______ UNSAT ______ Performance Time: _________ Examiner: ______________________________ ___________________________________/_________ NAME SIGNATURE DATE =====================================================================================

Comments

AO-501Page 3 of 11

SIMULATOR OPERATOR JPM SETUP INSTRUCTIONS

None

AO-501Page 4 of 11

NOTE: Student is expected to know that this procedure is pre-staged at the Hydrogen Analyzers and be able to locate the procedure. (Not Critical)

READ TO OPERATOR

DIRECTION TO TRAINEE I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you. INITIAL CONDITIONS

A LOCA has occurred on Unit 1.

Engineered Safeguards Channels 1 and 2 have actuated.

Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) of the EOP is in progress.

The 1A and 1B RB Hydrogen Analyzer Trains are aligned in the standby mode. INITIATING CUES

The Control Room SRO directs you to place both trains of the RB Hydrogen Analyzers in service on Unit 1 per EOP Enclosure 5.2 “Placing RB Hydrogen Analyzers in Service”.

AO-501Page 5 of 11

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 1

NOTE Hydrogen analyzer (RP) panels are located in A-6-602, Vent Equipment Rm, col Q73 West.

At 1A H2 ANALYZER (RP), perform the following: __ Ensure POWER ON light is on __ Position H2 DUAL RANGE SW to H2 0 -10% Range __ Position FUNCTION SELECTOR switch to SAMPLE

Depress the OFF button for the following: __ 1PR-83 (BYP TO POST AC 1SV220) __ 1PR-86 (BYP TO POST AC 1SV221) STANDARD: Red "Power On" light on remote panel is verified to be ON

at the Remote RB Hydrogen Analyzer Panel (Train “A”).

Cue: Indication is as you see it.

H2 DUAL RANGE Sw. on the Remote Panel is verified to be positioned to the "0-10%" scale.


FUNCTION SELECTOR SWITCH on the Remote Panel is verified to be positioned in the "SAMPLE" position.


At the remote panel, the "OFF" button is pushed for the following valves:

__ 1PR-83 (BYP TO POST AC 1SV220)


Cue: OFF button is depressed and indications are as you see them.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

AO-501Page 6 of 11

2 2

At 1B H2 ANALYZER (RP), perform the following: __ Ensure POWER ON light is on __ Position H2 DUAL RANGE SW to H2 0 -10% Range __ Position FUNCTION SELECTOR switch to SAMPLE

Depress the OFF button for the following: __ 1PR-89 (BYP TO POST AC 1SV222) __ 1PR-92 (BYP TO POST AC 1SV223) STANDARD: Red "Power On" light on remote panel is verified to be ON

at the Remote RB Hydrogen Analyzer Panel (Train “B”).


H2 DUAL RANGE Sw. on the Remote Panel is verified to be positioned to the "0-10%" scale.


FUNCTION SELECTOR SWITCH on the Remote Panel is verified to be positioned in the "SAMPLE" position.


At the remote panel, the "OFF" button is pushed for the following valves:



Cue: OFF button is depressed and indications are as you see them.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

3 3

Notify the Control Room to perform the following:

__ Open 1PR-81 and 1PR-84

__ Open 1PR-87 and 1PR-90

STANDARD: Unit 1 Control Room personnel are notified to open 1PR-81,

1PR-84, 1PR-87, and 1PR-90 to align the Reactor Building Hydrogen Analyzer to the Reactor Building.

Cue: After notification has been made, indicate to student that the red OPEN indication lights for all four valves located at the Remote Panel are ON and green lights are off.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

AO-501Page 7 of 11

4 4

NOTE When ANALYZE is selected, the indication will go up scale, possibly causing a HIGH HYDROGEN ALARM in the Analyzer Panel, the Remote Panel, and the Control Room. It should return down scale to the correct reading in ≈ 3 minutes.

At 1A H2 ANALYZER (RP), perform the following:

__ Position SAMPLE VALVE SEL SW to PR-71 (Top Of Containment Sample).

__ Position OFF / STANDBY / ANALYZE switch to ANALYZE.

__ Depress REMOTE SELECTOR pushbutton to ensure control is from the Remote Panel.

STANDARD: The SAMPLE VALVE SEL switch is positioned to PR-71.

Cue: Point to the Sample Valve Selector Switch and state switch is in the PR-71 position and the red light is illuminated.

The OFF / STANDBY / ANALYZE switch is placed to the ANALYZE position.

Cue: Point to the Off/Standby/Analyze Switch and state the switch is in Analyze position. The Hydrogen Concentration Meter reads approximately 3% hydrogen and the Yellow COMMON ALARM Light and Yellow HIGH HYDROGEN ALARM Lights are ON.

The REMOTE SELECTOR Pushbutton is depressed.

Cue: Pushbutton is depressed.

Cue: Inform candidate that using time compression approximately three minutes have elapsed.

Cue: Inform the candidate that the Hydrogen Concentration Meter indicating 0% hydrogen concentration.

Cue: Inform the candidate that the High alarm is extinguished and the Common alarm is still illuminated.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

AO-501Page 8 of 11

5 5

NOTE When ANALYZE is selected, the indication will go up scale, possibly causing a HIGH HYDROGEN ALARM in the Analyzer Panel, the Remote Panel, and the Control Room. It should return down scale to the correct reading in ≈ 3 minutes.

At 1B H2 ANALYZER (RP), perform the following:

__ Position SAMPLE VALVE SEL SW to PR-76 (Top Of Containment Sample).

__ Position OFF / STANDBY / ANALYZE switch to ANALYZE.

__ Depress REMOTE SELECTOR pushbutton to ensure control is from the Remote Panel.

STANDARD: The SAMPLE VALVE SEL switch is positioned to PR-76.

Cue: Point to the Sample Valve Selector Switch and state switch is in the PR-76 position and the red light is illuminated.

The OFF / STANDBY / ANALYZE switch is placed to the ANALYZE position.

Cue: Point to the Off/Standby/Analyze Switch and state the switch is in Analyze position. The Hydrogen Concentration Meter reads approximately 3% hydrogen and the Yellow COMMON ALARM Light and Yellow HIGH HYDROGEN ALARM Lights are ON.

The REMOTE SELECTOR Pushbutton is depressed.

Cue: The Remote Selector Pushbutton is depressed.

Cue: Inform candidate that using time compression approximately three minutes have elapsed.

Cue: Inform the candidate that the Hydrogen Concentration Meter is indicating 0% hydrogen concentration.

Cue: Inform the candidate that the High alarm is extinguished and the Common alarm is still illuminated.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

AO-501Page 9 of 11

6 6

IAAT either RB Hydrogen Analyzer Train indicates < 2.25% Hydrogen, AND the meter reading stabilizes, THEN push the ALARM RESET pushbutton to reset the COMMON ALARM on appropriate train: __ 1A RB Hydrogen Analyzer Train __ 1B RB Hydrogen Analyzer Train

STANDARD: The ALARM RESET Pushbutton is depressed for both trains.

Cue: Indicate that the Hydrogen reading is 0 percent on both trains. Cue: Indicate to student that both yellow alarm lights are out after the

ALARM RESET Pushbutton is depressed for each train.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

7 7

WHEN HIGH HYDROGEN alarm has been reset on both 1A and 1B RB Hydrogen Analyzer Trains, THEN notify Unit 1 Control Room that 1A and 1B Hydrogen Analyzer Trains are in service.

STANDARD: Phone/radio is located and control room personnel are notified that the RB Hydrogen Analyzers are in service.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

8 8

EXIT this enclosure.

STANDARD: The enclosure is exited.

COMMENTS:

END TASK

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

AO-501Page 10 of 11

CRITICAL STEP EXPLANATIONS

SEQ STEP #

Explanation

3 This step opens the block valves to the 1A and 1B H2 analyzers. 4 This step starts the Analyzer pump and the sampling process for the 1A H2 Analyzer. 5 This step starts the Analyzer pump and the sampling process for the 1B H2 Analyzer. 6 This step is required to enable the Control Room to detect an increase in H2 concentration.

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET

(TO BE RETURNED TO EXAMINER UPON COMPLETION OF TASK)

INITIAL CONDITIONS

A LOCA has occurred on Unit 1.

Engineered Safeguards Channels 1 and 2 have actuated.

Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) of the EOP is in progress.

The 1A and 1B RB Hydrogen Analyzer Trains are aligned in the standby mode. INITIATING CUES

The Control Room SRO directs you to place both trains of the RB Hydrogen Analyzers in service on Unit 1 per EOP Enclosure 5.2 “Placing RB Hydrogen Analyzers in Service”.

AO-803Page 1 of 8


AO-803

SUPPLY SSW BY THE FIRE HOSE STATION

Alternate Path: No Alt Path Failure: Time Critical: No Time Critical Criteria:

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

AO-803Page 2 of 8


Task Title : Supply SSW by the Fire Hose Station Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 20 min K/A Rating(s):


Align HPSW to supply the SSW system using a fire hose in accordance with AP/1/A/1700/033 (Loss of SSW) Enclosure 5.6 (Supply of SSW by the Fire Hose Station). References:

AP/1/A/1700/033 (Loss of SSW) Rev. 007

Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

AP/1/A/1700/033 (Loss of SSW) Enclosure 5.6 (Supply of SSW by the Fire Hose Station) ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments

AO-803Page 3 of 8


None

AO-803Page 4 of 8

READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you. INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 1 Reactor power = 100%

Two of the operating CCW pumps have low bearing seal water flow

Both SSW headers are intact and aligned for normal operation

AP/1/A/1700/033 (Loss of SSW) is in progress INITIATING CUES

The Control Room SRO directs you to perform AP/1/A/1700/033 (Loss of SSW) Enclosure 5.6 (Supply of SSW by the Fire Hose Station) to supply the SSW header by the Fire Hose Station.

AO-803Page 5 of 8

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 1

NOTE The fire hose, pipe wrench and spanner wrench required to perform this

enclosure are in a bag in the Emergency Equipment Cabinet located T-3/M-54/55.

All valves are located in the ESV bldg.

To supply SSW from HPSW-921 (HPSW TO SSW MANUAL CONN (VIA EAST ESVB FIRE HOSE)) fire hose station perform the following:

A. Close SSW-18 (B SSW HEADER STRAINER ISOLATION) (2' SW of B SSW Hdr Strainer).

B. Close SSW-14 (A/B SSW HEADER X-CONN) (3' NW of B SSW Hdr Strainer).

C. Remove the fitting from HPSW-921 (HPSW TO SSW MANUAL CONN (VIA EAST ESVB FIRE HOSE)) (North side of East personnel access door).

D. Remove the pipe cap from SSW-10 (A/B SSW HEADER X-CONN FIRE HOSE CONNECTION) (W of B SSW Hdr Strainer).

E. Connect the fire hose from HPSW-921 (HPSW TO SSW MANUAL CONN (VIA EAST ESVB FIRE HOSE)) to SSW-10 (A/B SSW HEADER X-CONN FIRE HOSE CONNECTION).

F. Open HPSW-921 (HPSW TO SSW MANUAL CONN (VIA EAST ESVB FIRE HOSE)).

G. Open SSW-10 (A/B SSW HEADER X-CONN FIRE HOSE CONNECTION).

STANDARD: *Candidate closes SSW-18 by rotating the valve handle

until it is perpendicular (90°) to the pipe.

Candidate verifies SSW-14 is closed by verifying the valve handle is perpendicular (90°) to the pipe.

*Candidate removes the fitting from HPSW-921 by rotating it in the counterclockwise direction.

*Candidate removes the pipe cap from SSW-10 by using a pipe wrench to rotate the pipe cap in the counterclockwise direction until it is removed.

*Candidate connects the fire hose from HPSW-921 to SSW-10 by rotating the fitting on each end in the clockwise direction until each comes to a hard stop.

*Candidate opens HPSW-921 by rotating the handwheel in the counterclockwise direction until it comes to a hard stop.

*Candidate opens SSW-10 by rotating the handle until it is parallel to the pipe.

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

AO-803Page 6 of 8

2 2

Notify Unit 1 CR SSW is being supplied from HPSW-921 (HPSW TO SSW MANUAL CONN (VIA EAST ESVB FIRE HOSE)) fire hose station.

STANDARD: Candidate notifies Unit 1 control room that SSW is being supplied from HPSW-921 fire hose station.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

3 3

EXIT this enclosure.

STANDARD: Candidate exits the enclosure.

COMMENTS:

END TASK

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

AO-803Page 7 of 8


SEQ STEP #

Explanation

1A This step is required to properly align the flow path from the fire hose station to the ‘B’

SSW header.

1C This step is required to allow the fire hose to be connected to HPSW-921 connection.

1D This step is required to allow the fire hose to be connected to HPSW-921 connection.

1E This step is required to provide the flow path from the HPSW system to the SSW system.

1F This step is required to properly align the flow path from the fire hose station to the ‘B’

SSW header.

1G This step is required to properly align the flow path from the fire hose station to the ‘B’ SSW header.

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 1 Reactor power = 100%

Two of the operating CCW pumps have low bearing seal water flow

Both SSW headers are intact and aligned for normal operation

AP/1/A/1700/033 (Loss of SSW) is in progress INITIATING CUES

The Control Room SRO directs you to perform AP/1/A/1700/033 (Loss of SSW) Enclosure 5.6 (Supply of SSW by the Fire Hose Station) to supply the SSW header by the Fire Hose Station.

AO-S402Page 1 of 11


AO-S402

RESET AN EMERGENCY FDW PUMP TURBINE


Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

AO-S402Page 2 of 11


Task Title : Reset an Emergency FDW Pump Turbine Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 10 min K/A Rating(s):

System: 061 K/A: A2.04 Rating: 3.4/3.8 Task Standard:

Emergency Feedwater Pump Turbine is reset correctly by procedure References:

OP/2/A/1106/006 (Emergency FDW System) Rev. 115 Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

OP/2/A/1106/006 (Emergency FDW System) Enclosure 4.2 (Resetting TD EFDWP) OP/2/A/1106/006 (Emergency FDW System) Enclosure 4.10 (TD EFDWP Control Mechanism) OP/2/A/1106/006 (Emergency FDW System) Enclosure 4.12 (Full Closed Position Indication For 2MS-95) ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments

AO-S402Page 3 of 11


None

AO-S402Page 4 of 11

READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you. INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 2 is operating at 100% power. Some workers in the area have inadvertently bumped the Hand Trip Lever on 2MS-94 (TD EFDWP Stop Valve). The EMERGENCY FEEDWATER TURBINE TRIP Statalarm is lit in the Control Room. INITIATING CUE Control Room Supervisor directs you to reset the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump on Unit 2 per OP/2/A/1106/006 Enclosure 4.2 (Resetting TD EFDWP) beginning at Step 2.2.

AO-S402Page 5 of 11

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 2.2.1

Push RESET LEVER toward turbine shaft until it engages.

STANDARD: Candidate pushes RESET LEVER toward turbine shaft until

it engages

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the Reset Lever is engaged

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 2.2.2

Rotate SPINDLE fully clockwise.

STANDARD: Candidate rotates Trip/throttle valve SPINDLE fully CLOCKWISE

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the SPINDLE is in its fully clockwise position.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

3 2.2.3

Verify the following:

__ LATCH BLOCK protruding ≈ 1 inch out of valve housing.

__ HAND TRIP LEVER traveled to full up position.

STANDARD: Candidate observes Latch Block protruding ≈ 1 inch out of the valve housing.

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the LATCH BLOCK is ≈ 1 inch out of valve housing.

Candidate observes HAND TRIP LEVER traveled to full up position.

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the HAND TRIP LEVER is in the full up position.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

AO-S402Page 6 of 11

4 2.2.4

Rotate SPINDLE counterclockwise to open valve.

STANDARD: Candidate rotates Trip/throttle valve SPINDLE fully counterclockwise.

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the Trip/throttle valve spindle is in its full counterclockwise position.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

5 2.2.5

Verify SPRING PLATE traveled up.

STANDARD: Candidate observes spring plate in its full up position.

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the SPRING PLATE is in its full up position.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

6 2.2.6

Rotate SPINDLE clockwise 1/4 turn.

STANDARD: Candidate rotates Trip/throttle valve SPINDLE clockwise 1/4 turn.

Cue: Indicate that the SPINDLE is ¼ turn from full counterclockwise position.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

AO-S402Page 7 of 11

7 2.2.7


__ 2SA-18/D-12 (TD EFDW PUMP TRIPPED) NOT in alarm

__ O2D1886 "2MS-94 EFWPT Trip Valve" indicates "OPEN"

STANDARD: Candidate contacts the control room to verify that Statalarm 2SA-18/D-12 is NOT is alarm and OAC Computer point O2D1886 indicates “OPEN”.

Cue: When the candidate simulates contacting the control room, indicate that 2SA-18/D-12 is not in alarm and O2D1886 indicates “OPEN”

COMMENTS:

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

8 2.2.8

NOTE

RESET LEVER will only disengage for an overspeed trip condition. If RESET LEVER is NOT engaged, then the TD EFDWP has NO overspeed trip protection. Rotate SPINDLE counterclockwise to open valve.

To ensure positive latching of 2MS-94 RESET LEVER, perform the following:

A. Trip HAND TRIP LEVER.

B. Verify 2MS-94 tripped as follows:

2SA-18/D-12 (TD EFDW PUMP TRIPPED) alarm locked in

O2D1886 “2MS-94 EFWPT Trip Valve” indicates “NOT OPEN”

C. Verify RESET LEVER does NOT disengage. STANDARD: Candidate pushes down on the Hand Trip Lever

Candidate contacts the control room to verify that 2SA-18/D-12 alarm is locked in and OAC Computer point O2D1886 indicates “NOT OPEN”.

Candidate verifies the Reset Lever does NOT disengage.

Cue: Indicate that the Hand Trip Lever is tripped.

Cue: When the candidate simulates contacting the control room, indicate that 2SA-18/D-12 alarm is locked in and O2D1886 indicates “NOT OPEN”.

Cue: Indicate that the Reset Lever is engaged.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

AO-S402Page 8 of 11

9 2.2.9

Rotate SPINDLE fully clockwise.

STANDARD: Candidate rotates Trip/throttle valve SPINDLE fully CLOCKWISE

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the SPINDLE is in its fully clockwise position.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

10 2.2.10


__ LATCH BLOCK protruding ≈ 1 inch out of valve housing.

__ HAND TRIP LEVER traveled to full up position.

STANDARD: Candidate observes Latch Block protruding ≈ 1 inch out of the valve housing.

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the LATCH BLOCK is ≈ 1 inch out of valve housing.

Candidate observes HAND TRIP LEVER traveled to full up position.

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the HAND TRIP LEVER is in the full up position.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

11 2.2.11

Rotate SPINDLE counterclockwise to open valve.

STANDARD: Candidate rotates Trip/throttle valve SPINDLE fully counterclockwise.

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the Trip/throttle valve spindle is in its full counterclockwise position.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

AO-S402Page 9 of 11

12 2.2.12

Verify SPRING PLATE traveled up.

STANDARD: Candidate observes spring plate in its full up position.

Cue: Indicate to candidate that the SPRING PLATE is in its full up position.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

13 2.2.13

Rotate SPINDLE clockwise 1/4 turn.

STANDARD: Candidate rotates Trip/throttle valve SPINDLE clockwise 1/4 turn.

Cue: Indicate that the SPINDLE is ¼ turn from full counterclockwise position.

COMMENTS:

END TASK

___ SAT ___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

AO-S402Page 10 of 11


SEQ STEP #

Explanation

1 This step is required to reset 2MS-94 9 This step is required to latch 2MS-94 so the valve can be opened

11 This step is required to open 2MS-94 so the TDEFWP can start when given a start signal

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 2 is operating at 100% power. Some workers in the area have inadvertently bumped the Hand Trip Lever on 2MS-94 (TD EFDWP Stop Valve). The EMERGENCY FEEDWATER TURBINE TRIP Statalarm is lit in the Control Room. INITIATING CUE Control Room Supervisor directs you to reset the Turbine Driven Emergency Feedwater Pump on Unit 2 per OP/2/A/1106/006 Enclosure 4.2 (Resetting TD EFDWP) beginning at Step 2.2.

Appendix D Scenario Outline Form ES D-1 ILT16-1 NRC Exam

Facility: Oconee Scenario No.: 1 Op-Test No.: 1 Examiners: ________________________ Operators: ________________________SRO

________________________ ________________________OATC

________________________ ________________________BOP

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power = 100%

Turnover:

SASS is in Manual

AMSAC/DSS is bypassed

‘C’ GWD tank release is in progress

Event No.

Malfunction No. Event Type*

Event Description

0a Override AMSAC/DSS Bypassed

0b Override SASS in Manual

1 N: BOP, SRO Place Voltage Regulator in Auto and Decrease VARs

2 Override I: BOP, SRO (SLC) 1RIA-37/38 Fail to Terminate GWR

3 MPS090 C: OATC, SRO 1HP-120 Fails Closed

4 Override C: BOP, SRO Failure of Unit 2 AS Controller

5 MCS004 I: OATC, SRO Controlling Narrow Range Tave Fails High

6 MPS020

MPS020D R: OATC, SRO (TS)

21 gpm Primary to Secondary Leak in 1B SG (Requires Manual Shutdown)

7 MPS020D M: ALL

Spurious Turbine Trip, 1B SGTR

One Stuck Control Rod

1HP-26 Fails Closed

* (N)ormal, (R)eactivity, (I)nstrument, (C)omponent, (M)ajor

Appendix D Required Operator Actions Form ES-D-2 ILT16-1 NRC Exam

Page 2 of 49

Scenario 1

Event Summary

Event 1: When the crew takes the shift, the voltage regulator will be in manual and the crew

will be directed to reduce generator VARs to ≈ 150 MVARs with the voltage regulator in automatic

Event 2: A GWD tank release will be in progress when the crew takes the shift. 1RIA-37 counts will begin to increase and reach the RIA alarm setpoint. The GWD tank release will fail to terminate due to the RIA reaching the alarm setpoint which will require an operator to manually terminate the release. This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions.

Event 3: 1HP-120 will fail closed which will cause RCS makeup to be lost. Pressurizer level will begin to decrease and Letdown Storage Tank level will begin to increase. Once the crew responds to the event to stabilize RCS makeup and letdown, 1HP-120 will be repaired and the crew will place the valve back in automatic and restore normal operation.

Event 4: The Auxiliary Steam (AS) Header will be initially supplied by Unit 2. The AS controller on Unit 2 will fail to properly control AS Header pressure. The crew will be required to align AS from Unit 1 to supply the AS header.

Event 5: Controlling Tave will fail High causing ICS to insert control rods and increase feedwater flow. The crew should perform Plant Transient Response and take the ICS Diamond and Feedwater Loop Masters to MANUAL and stabilize the plant before the reactor trips

Event 6: The unit will experience a SG tube leak of ≈ 21 gpm. The crew will enter the primary to secondary leakage AP which will require the crew to rapidly shutdown the unit with ICS in manual. This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions.

Event 7: Once Reactor power has been reduced > 10% and auxiliary power has been transferred to CT-1, the Main Turbine will experience a spurious trip which will cause the Reactor to trip. There will be one control rod that will not fully insert into the core which will require aligning the BWST to compensate for the stuck control rod. 1HP-26 will not open when trying to inject borated water into the RCS which will require opening 1HP-410. The SG tube leak will evolve into a SG tube rupture of ≈ 200 gpm. The crew will then be required to minimize SCM (lower RCS pressure) in order to reduce the tube leak size and minimize the release of radioactivity to the environment.


Page 3 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 1 Event Description: Place Voltage Regulator in Auto and Decrease VARs (N: BOP, SRO)

Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

SRO

SRO/BOP

OP/1/A/1106/001 Encl 4.8 Crew response:

SRO directs the BOP to reduce Generator MVARs to 150 ± 10 MVARs in accordance with OP/1/A/1106/001 Enclosure 4.8. OP/1/A/1106/001 Encl. 4.8 Rev 131

CAUTION

Do NOT exceed limits as shown on Enclosure 4.5 (Capability Curve).

NOTE

Minimum of 18.05 Generator kV must be maintained.

Operation with leading PF is acceptable.

2.1. Notify other online units of VAR change.

2.2. Select VARS on WATT/VAR TRANSFER Switch.

2.3. Ensure MVARS are indicated on MWATT/MVAR meter.

2.4. IF VOLTAGE REGULATOR MODE will be swapped between AUTO & MANUAL, notify System Operating Center (SOC) that VOLTAGE REGULATOR MODE will be swapped.

2.5. IF AUTO adjustment is required, perform the following:

NOTE

VOLTAGE REGULATOR MODE Ready Light (Amber light) should be ON.

CRD AC Power Fault ‘A’ and/or ‘B’ alarms along with CRD Global System Fault may be received during generator voltage changes.

2.5.1. Ensure VOLTAGE REGULATOR MODE in AUTO.

2.5.2. Use VOLTAGE ADJUST to slowly modify Generator voltage to increase/decrease MVARS.

2.6. IF MANUAL adjustment is required, perform the following: N/A

This event is complete when MVARs have been adjusted to 150 ± 10 MVARs, or when directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 4 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event Description: 1RIA-37/38 Fail to Terminate GWR (I: BOP, SRO) (SLC) Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

SRO/BOP

SRO/BOP

Plant response:

1SA-9/A-4 (GWD DISCH RADIATION INHIBIT)

1SA-8/B-9 (RM PROCESS MONITOR HIGH) 1SA-8/D-9 (RM REACTOR BUILDING PURGE DISCH RAD INHIBIT)

1SA-09/A-4

Crew response:

The BOP refers to Statalarm 1SA-9/A-4 (GWD DISCH RADIATION INHIBIT)

2. Automatic Action

2.1 IF high alarm is received, 1RIA-37 and/or 1RIA-38 will close valves 1GWD-4, 5, 6, and 7 and GWD-206, 207 and stop the WG Exhauster.

3. Manual Action

3.1 Ensure automatic action has taken place. (they have not)

3.2 Refer to OP/1-2/A/1104/18 (Gaseous Waste Disposal System) for direction on continuing or terminating release

1SA-08/B-9

Crew response:

The BOP refers to Statalarm 1SA-8/B-9 (RM PROCESS MONITOR HIGH) 2. Automatic Action

MONITOR DESCRIPTION AUTOMATIC FUNCTIONS

1RIA-37 Waste Gas Effluent Monitor

Closes valves 1GWD-4, -5, -6, -7, GWD-206, 207 if high setpoint is reached

Stop the W. G. Exhauster if high setpoint is reached

1RIA-38 Waste Gas Effluent Monitor

1RIA-45 Norm Vent Gas Stops RB Purge Fan and Mini-Fan if high setpoint is reached

Isolates RB Purge System if high setpoint is reached

This event is complete when GWD Tank C is isolated (GWD-206 closed) in Step 4.4, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 5 of 49


SRO/BOP

SRO/BOP

ARG 1SA-08/B-9 Crew response:

3. Manual Action

3.1 Perform one of the following:

3.1.1 Determine radiation monitors in alarm

3.1.2 IF Radiation Monitoring data from the PMC System is NOT in service, refer to OP/1/A/1103/026, (Loss of Sorrento Radiation Monitor). (does NOT apply)

3.2 IF 1SA-08/B-10 (Process Monitor Fault) has occurred for the same nomtor, Go To ARG for 1SA-08/B-10 (Process Monitor Fault). (N/A)

3.3 IF 1RIA-40 alarms, Go To the appropriate procedure (N/A)

3.4 IF any of the following RIAs have valid alarms, Go To AP/1/A/1700/018 (Abnormal Release of Radioactivity) (page 8)

√ RIA

RIA-31

1RIA-35

1RIA-39

1RIA-41

1RIA-42

1RIA-45, 46

1RIA-49A

1RIA-50

Note: Steps 3.5 through 3.10 do NOT apply

3.11 IF 1RIA-37 OR 1RIA-38 alarms during GWD tank release, Go To OP/1-2/A/1104/018 (GWD System) for applicable guidance.

The BOP refers to Statalarm 1SA-9/A-4 (GWD DISCH RADIATION INHIBIT)

2. Automatic Action

2.1 IF high alarm is received, 1RIA-37 and/or 1RIA-38 will close valves 1GWD-4, 5, 6, and 7 and GWD-206, 207 and stop the WG Exhauster.

3. Manual Action

3.1 Ensure automatic action has taken place. (they have not)

3.2 Refer to OP/1-2/A/1104/18 (Gaseous Waste Disposal System) for direction on continuing or terminating release.

This event is complete when GWD Tank C is isolated (GWD-206 closed) in Step 4.4 of OP/1-2/A/1104/018, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 6 of 49


SRO/BOP

OP/1-2/A/1104/018 Encl 4.9 Crew Response:

Booth Cue: When the BOP goes to secure the GWD tank release, FIRE TIMER 3 to initiate Event 3.

OP/1-2/A/1104/018 (GWD System) Encl 4.9 (GWD Tank Release) rev 077

Complete Encl. 4.9 of OP/1-2/A/1104/018 (GWD Tank Release)

3.19 IF AT ANY TIME desired to terminate release, perform the following:

3.19.1 Close GWR DISCHARGE FLOW CONTROL

3.19.2 Go To Section 4 (GWR Termination)

3.34 IF 1RIA-37 High Alarm is received, perform the following:

3.34.1 Close GWR DISCHARGE FLOW CONTROL (GWD-206)

3.34.2 Record maximum readings for the following in Narrative Log:

1RIA-37 ________ cpm

1RIA-38 ________ cpm

3.34.3 IF NOT desired to continue release, Go To Section 4 (GWR Termination).

3.34.4 Verify desired to continue GWD Tank release.

Note: It is NOT desired to continue GWD tank release.

3.35 IF 1RIA-38 High alarm is received, perform the following:

3.35.1 Close GWR DISCHARGE FLOW CONTROL (GWD-206)

3.35.2 Record maximum readings for the following in Narrative Log:

1RIA-37 ________ cpm

1RIA-38 ________ cpm

3.35.3 Go To Section 4 (GWR Termination) Section 4. GWR Termination:

4.1 Record “Stop GWR # _______” in Narrative Log

4.2 IF GWD Tank ‘A’ released, perform the following: (does not apply)

4.3 IF GWD Tank ‘B’ released, perform the following: (does not apply)



Page 7 of 49


SRO/BOP

SRO

OP/1-2/A/1104/018 Encl 4.9 Crew Response:

Section 4. GWR Termination:

4.4 IF GWD Tank ‘C’ released, perform the following:

4.4.1 Isolate GWD Tank ‘C’ as follows:

Close GWD-204 (Tank 1C Discharge Block)

Close GWD-100 (Decay Tanks Discharge Header Block)

Place GWD-206 (C Interim GWD Tank Discharge) switch in CLOSED

4.4.2 Check GWD Tank ‘C’ for accumulation of water as follows:

Throttle open GWD-197

Throttle open GWD-198

4.4.3 WHEN no water passes through sight-glass, position the following:

Close GWD-197

Close GWD-198

4.5 IF GWD Tank ‘D’ released, perform the following: (does not apply)

4.6 Drain GWD Filters as follows:

Throttle LWD-242 (Waste Gas Absolute Filter Drain)

Throttle LWD-243 (Waste Gas Charcoal Filter Drain)

4.7 After one minute, perform the following:

Close LWD-242 (Waste Gas Absolute Filter Drain)

Close LWD-243 (Waste Gas Charcoal Filter Drain)

4.8 Perform purge on 1RIA-37 and 1RIA-38 per Enclosure 4.16 (1RIA-37 and 38 Purge).

SLC 16.11.3 (Radioactive Effluent Monitoring Instrumentation) Condition C One or more required gaseous effluent monitoring instrument

channels inoperable. Required Action: Enter the Condition referenced in Table 16.11.3-2 for the

function (Immediately)

Restore the instrument(s) to OPERABLE status (30 days) Condition I As required by Required Action C.1 in Table 16.11.3-2 Required Action: Suspend release of radioactive effluents (Immediately)



Page 8 of 49


SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/018 Crew Response:

The SRO will enter AP/1/A/1700/018 (Abnormal Release of Radioactivity) 4.1 Perform the following:

__ At the discretion of the CRS, make a PA announcement of the event including any necessary precautions to be observed

__ Notify the SM to reference the following:

RP/0/A/1000/001 (Emergency Classification) NSD-202 (Reportability) OMP 1-14 (Notifications)

4.2 GO TO appropriate sections for any monitors in High of Alert alarm:

√ Section Monitor

4G 1RIA-45 or 1RIA-46

AP/1/A/1700/018 Section 4G

1. IAAT 1RIA-45 or 1RIA-46 reaches the High set point, THEN ensure automatic actions occurred:

A. RB PURGE FAN secured

B. 1PR-2 closed

C. 1PR-3 closed

D. 1PR-4 closed

E. 1PR-5 closed

2. Verify monitor spike was caused by normal startup of RB Purge System

RNO: GO TO Step 4

4. Verify RB Equipment Hatch is closed

5. Notify RP of RIAs in alarm

6. Stop all station GWRs using in-progress procedures until RP has determined that release limits will maintain compliance with Tech Spec and SLC limits

7. WHEN conditions permit, THEN:

A. Notify appropriate personnel to continue GWRs as necessary

B. EXIT

Booth Cue: If asked, Unit 2 is busy and can NOT perform actions from AP/18.



Page 9 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 4 Event Description: 1HP-120 Fails Closed (C: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

SRO/BOP

Booth Cue: When the BOP goes to secure the GWD tank release,

FIRE TIMER 3 to initiate Event 3.

Plant Response:

RCS makeup flow goes to ≈ 8 – 10 gpm (HPI Warming Flow)

PZR level begins to decrease

LDST level begins to increase

Valve position demand for 1HP-120 will increase to the 100% demand value and valve position indication will indicate closed (green light)

1SA-02/ B-1 (HP LETDOWN TANK LEVEL HIGH/LOW) will illuminate after several minutes

Crew Response:

Examiner Note: If the 1HP-120 failure is recognized before the LDST Statalarm actuates, the SRO will make a direct entry into AP/14 (next page). Otherwise the crew may perform the ARG and OP below and enter AP/14 when the SRO determines the entry conditions are met.

The crew may refer to ARG 1SA-02/B-1 (HP LETDOWN TANK LEVEL HIGH/LOW) and perform the required actions. rev 033

3.1 Instrument Failed:

3.1.1 Compare alternate channels to verify alarm validity:

O1A1042 LDST LEVEL 1

O1A1043 LDST LEVEL 2

3.2 Verify LDST pressure does not exceed LDST level/pressure operability requirement per OP/0/A/1108/001 (Curves and General Information).

3.3 IF High Level alarm is received:

3.3.1 Bleed as required by OP/1/A/1103/004 (Soluble Poison Concentration Control).

This event is complete when Step 4.186 of AP/14 is complete, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 10 of 49


SRO/OATC

OP/1/A/1103/004 Crew Response:

Examiner Note: The crew may perform Enclosure 4.8 as necessary to reduce inventory. Enclosure 4.6 is performed to makeup/batch.

OP/1/A/1103/004 Enclosure 4.8 (Reducing RCS Inventory) rev 105

2.1 Verify HPI System operating.

2.2 Ensure open 1CS-26 (LETDOWN TO RC BHUT).

2.3 Ensure open 1CS-41 (1A RC BHUT INLET).

2.4 Position 1HP-14 (LDST BYPASS) to “BLEED”.

2.5 WHEN desired LDST level achieved, position 1HP-14 to “NORMAL”.

Examiner Note: The crew may initiate EOP Encl 5.5 for RCS inventory

control due LDST level increase (page 39)

AP/1/A/1700/014 (Loss of Normal Makeup and/or RCP Seal Injection) rev 18

3.1 IAAT RCP seal injection flow is lost, AND Component Cooling is lost, THEN perform the following:

A. Trip the Rx

B. Stop all RCPs

C. Initiate AP/25 (SSF EOP)

3.2 IAAT loss of suction to operating HPI pumps is indicated:

Motor amps low or cycling

Discharge pressure low or cycling

Abnormal LDST level trend

THEN GO TO Step 3.3

RNO: GO TO Step 4.7

4.7 Announce AP entry using PA System

4.8 Verify any HPI pump operating



Page 11 of 49


SRO/OATC


4.9 Verify RCP seal injection or HPI makeup line leak indicated by any of the following:

Report of line leak

Abnormal LDST level decrease

1RIA-32 (AUX BLDG GAS)

1RIA-45 (NORM VENT GAS)

RB RIAs in alarm

Abnormal RBNS level increase

Abnormal LAWT or HAWT level increase

RNO: GO TO Step 4.11

4.11 Verify RCP seal injection flow exists to any RCP

4.12 Verify 1HP-120 operable in AUTO

RNO: 1. Attempt to operate 1HP-120 in HAND (will NOT operate)

2. IF 1HP-120 fails to operate, THEN GO TO Step 4.176

4.176 Perform the following as necessary to maintain Pzr level > 200”

Close 1HP-6

Throttle 1HP-7

Throttle 1HP-26

4.177 Place 1HP-120 in HAND and close

4.178 Notify SPOC to investigate and repair 1HP-120

4.179 WHEN 1HP-120 is repaired, THEN slowly re-establish flow through 1HP-120



Page 12 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 3 Page 4 of 4

Event Description: 1HP-120 Fails Closed (C: OATC, SRO)

Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

SRO/OATC


4.180 Place 1HP-120 in AUTO.

4.181 Close 1HP-26.

4.182 Verify 1HP-122 (RC VOLUME CONTROL BYPASS) throttled.


4.184 Verify 1HP-5 open.

Examiner Note: 1HP-6 may be open or closed based on the actions taken in Step 4.176.

4.185 Verify 1HP-6 open.

RNO: 1. Throttle 1HP-7 for ≈ 20 gpm letdown flow.

2. Open 1HP-6.

4.186 Adjust 1HP-7 for desired letdown

4.187 WHEN conditions permit, THEN EXIT this procedure.



Page 13 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event Description: Failure of Unit 2 AS Controller (C: BOP, SRO) Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

SRO/BOP

1SA-06/C-10 Plant Response:

1SA-06/C-10 (AS HDR PRESS LOW) will actuate

1MS-126 & 1MS-129 (MAIN STM TO SU STM PRESS) controller will indicate AS pressure < 300 psig and decreasing

Crew Response:

Booth Cue: While the crew is referring to the ARG, call Unit 1 control room to notify them that Unit 2 AS Controller has failed and Unit 3 cannot take control. The SM is directing you as Unit 1 to take control of AS system pressure.

ARG 1SA-06/C-10

3.1 IF excessive steam flow exists, reduce AS load or locate and isolate leak.

3.2 Verify proper operation of MS/AS controller on Unit supplying Auxiliary Steam Header (U2). (not controlling properly)

3.3 IF necessary, transfer AS Header to another Unit per OP/1/A/1106/22 (Auxiliary Steam System).

3.4 IF necessary, start auxiliary boiler per OP/0/A/1106/04 (Aux Boiler)

OP/1/A/1106/022 Encl 4.2

OP/1/A/1106/022 Encl 4.2 rev 041

Initial Conditions

1.1 Verify Unit 1 in Mode 1 or 2.

1.2 Verify all conditions of SLC 16.10.9 will be met with Unit 1 supplying the Aux Steam Header.

Examiner Note: All conditions of SLC 16.10.9 are met

NOTE: If ICS is in Manual, supplying Aux Steam Header from MS has the potential to affect core reactivity by changing RCS temperature.

1.3 Verify Unit 1 ICS in "AUTO". (R.M.)

1.4 Verify Unit 1 has ≥ 100 EFPD Core burnup.

This event is complete when the Unit 1 AS controller is in AUTO and AS pressure is ≈ 300 psig, or when directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 14 of 49


SRO/BOP

OP/1/A/1106/022 Encl 4.2 Crew Response:

1.5 Notify Secondary chemist that the AS header will be transferred

________________________ _____

Person Notified Date

1.6 Review Limits and Precautions.

Procedure

2.1 IF AP/0/A/1700/025 (SSF EOP) NOT in progress, notify Unit 2 to reduce setpoint on AS controller.

Booth Cue: No actions from booth are required since pressure is below setpoint due to the failure. Notify the crew that Unit 2 has reduced the AS controller setpoint.

2.2 Ensure 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 (MAIN STM TO SU STM PRESS) controller in “MANUAL”.

2.3 Ensure closed 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 (MAIN STM TO SU STM PRESS).

2.4 IF AP/0/A/1700/025 (SSF EOP) NOT in progress, verify Unit 2 has reduced setpoint on AS controller.

Booth Cue: No actions from booth are required since pressure is below setpoint due to the failure. Notify the crew that Unit 2 has reduced the AS controller setpoint.

2.5 Perform one of the following:

__ Open 1MS-24 (1A MS TO AS HDR)

__ Open 1MS-33 (1B MS TO AS HDR)

2.6 Manually throttle open 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 (MAIN STM TO SU STM PRESS) to increase Aux Steam Header pressure.

2.7 Continue to throttle 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 (MAIN STM TO SU STM PRESS) to increase Aux Steam Header pressure to ≈ 300 psig.


NOTE: 1MS-24 is preferred source of MS to AS.

NOTE: MS to Aux Steam flow should NOT exceed 240,000 lbm/hr on any single unit.


Page 15 of 49


SRO/BOP


2.8 WHEN Aux Steam Header is ≈ 300 psig:

2.8.1 Compare 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 (MAIN STM TO SU STM PRESS) controller setpoint to Aux Steam Header pressure.

2.8.2 IF 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 (MAIN STM TO SU STM PRESS) controller setpoint matches AS header pressure, place 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 controller to “AUTO”.

2.8.3 IF 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 controller setpoint does NOT match AS header pressure, notify SPOC.

2.8.4 IF required, adjust 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 controller setpoint to ≈ 300 psig.

2.9 Shut down other sources of AS

IF required, shut down Aux Boiler per OP/0/A/1106/004

IF required, notify U2 CR to secure MS to AS per procedure

IF required, notify U3 CR to secure MS to AS per procedure

2.10 IF Aux Steam will remain being supplied from Unit 1, align Condensate Returns to Unit 1 per OP/0/A/1104/37 (Plant Heating).

Examiner Note: The SRO may announce that SLC 16.10.9 would apply to Unit 2 while Unit 2 is supplying the AS header. Also, the crew may announce that the TD EFDW pump is inoperable on AS only (Main Steam is still available so the pump is still operable).



Page 16 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 3 Event Description: Controlling NR Tave Fails High (I: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

SRO/OATC

CT-1

AP/1/A/1700/028

Plant Response:

Controlling NR Tave digital display reads ≈ 587.1F

Controlling Tave Chessell display reads ≈ 587.1F

1SA-2/A12 ICS Tracking

1SA-2/C11 ICS Loss of OAC CTP Signal

Control Rods will insert and FDW flow will increase

RCS pressure will decrease

Crew Response:

When the Statalarms are received, the candidates should utilize the “Plant Transient Response” (PTR) process to stabilize the plant.

Verbalize to the CRS reactor power level and direction of movement.

Place the Diamond and both FDW Masters in manual and position as necessary to stabilize the plant. (decrease FDW)

Note: The OATC will have to reduce FDW in order to stabilize power below the pre-transient level.

The CRS should:

Refer to AP/28 (ICS Instrument Failures)

Ensure SPOC is contacted to repair the failed instrument

AP/1/A/1700/028 (ICS Instrument Failures) rev 20

4.1 Provide control bands as required. (OMP 1-18 Att. I)

OMP 1-18 Attachment I:

1. Plant Conditions Stable or TPB ≤ Pre-transient Conditions

1.1 The following bands are to be established during manual control of plant conditions (as needed) but may be adjusted by the CRS if required

1.1.1 NI Power ± 1% not to exceed the pre-transient or allowable power. If at the pre-transient or allowable level, band is NI Power – 1%

1.1.2 Current Tave ± 2°F

1.1.3 Current SG Outlet Pressure ± 10 PSIG (N/A)

1.1.4 Delta Tc 0oF ± 2°F

This event is complete when the CRS reaches step 6 (WHEN) in AP/28 Section 4A, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 17 of 49


SRO/OATC


4.2 Initiate notification of the following:

__ OSM to reference the following:

OMP 1-14 (Notifications)

Emergency Plan

__ STA

4.3 Verify a power transient ≥ 5% has occurred.

RNO: GO TO Step 4.5.

4.4 Notify Rx Engineering and discuss the need for a maneuvering plan.

4.5 Use the following, as necessary, to determine the applicable section from table in Step 4.6:

OAC alarm video

OAC display points

Control Board indications

SPOC assistance, as needed

4.6 GO TO the applicable section per the following table:

√ Section Failure

4A RCS Temperature

AP/1/A/1700/028 Section 4A (RCS Temperature Failure)

NOTE If Tave instrument circuit failed high, the following may have occurred

depending on initial ICS station status:

Unit to TRACK due to Rx Cross Limits

Control Rod insertion

Feedwater flow increase

If Tave instrument circuit failed low, the following may have occurred depending on initial ICS station status:


Control Rod withdrawal

Feedwater flow decrease

Feedwater re-ratio



Page 18 of 49


SRO/OATC

AP/1/A/1700/028 Section 4A Crew Response:

1. Ensure the following in HAND:

__ 1A FDW MASTER

__ 1B FDW MASTER

2. Ensure DIAMOND in MANUAL.

3. Notify SPOC to perform the following:

__ Select a valid RCS Tave and Delta Tc input to ICS per AM/1/A/0326/020 (Control of Unit 1 Star Module Signal Selection Function).

__ Investigate and repair the failed RCS temperature instrumentation.

4. PERFORM an instrumentation surveillance using applicable table in Encl 5.2 (ICS Instrument Surveillances) for the failed instrument.

5. Verify instrumentation surveillance in Encl 5.2 (ICS Instrument Surveillances was performed satisfactorily as written.

RNO: Initiate a Surveillance Evaluation in accordance with PT/1/A/0600/001 (Periodic Instrument Surveillance) and OP/1/A/1105/014 (Control Room Instrumentation Operation And Information).

6. WHEN notified by SPOC that a valid RCS Tave and Delta Tc input have been restored to ICS, THEN GO TO OP/1/A/1102/004 A Encl (Placing ICS Stations To Auto).



Page 19 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 9 Event Description: 21 gpm Primary to Secondary Leak in 1B SG (R: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

SRO

AP/1/A/1700/031 Plant Response:

1SA-8/A-9 (RM AREA MONITOR RADIATION HIGH)

1SA-8/E-10 (N-16 RM PRIMARY TO SECONDARY TUBE LEAK)

1SA-8/D-10 (RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH)

1SA-8/B-9 (RM PROCESS MONITOR RADIATION HIGH)

1RIA-40 in alarm

1RIA 60 in alarm and indicating 20 gpm Crew Response:

SRO will enter AP/1/A/1700/031 (Primary To Secondary Leakage) AP/1/A/1700/031 (Primary to Secondary Leakage) rev 021

NOTE The total primary to secondary leak rate can be determined by the following means: OAC point O1P1599 (EST TOTAL PRI TO SEC LEAKRATE) if OAC

primary to secondary leak rate calculation available (including 1RIA-40 operable with CSAE OFF-GAS BLOWER operating).

Sum of 1RIA-59 and 1RIA-60 readings if both operable and reactor power > 40%.

Allowable leakage per Tech Spec 3.4.13 is 150 gpd through any one SG. Estimated SGTR leak rate formula:

Leak rate = ____ + ____ - ____ - ____ = ____ MU SI LD TSR Where: MU = Makeup Flow SI = Seal Inlet Hdr Flow LD = Letdown TSR = Total Seal Return Flow

If the EOP is NOT already in progress, entry will be directly to the SGTR tab. RIA-59 / 60 and RIA-16 / 17 on the unaffected SG may indicate up to 2% of the value of the detector on the affected SG due to radiation shine from the steam line carrying radioactive steam from the SG with the tube leak.

This event is complete when Reactor power has been reduced > 10% and auxiliaries have been transferred, or when directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 20 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 2 of 9 Event Description: 21 gpm Primary to Secondary Leak in 1B SG (R: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO

OATC/BOP


4.1 IAAT primary to secondary leak rate is ≥ 25 gpm (≥ 36,000 gpd), THEN GO TO Unit 1 EOP.

4.2 IAAT either of the following exists for 1RIA-54:

__ is in High alarm

__ inoperable

THEN perform Steps 4.3 - 4.4.

RNO: GO TO Step 4,5




Emergency Plan

__ STA

NOTE 1RIA-59 and 1RIA-60 are considered inoperable below 40% power.

4.6 IAAT notified by Chemistry that 1RIA-40 is inoperable because the minimum detection limit is too high, AND 1RIA-59 or 1RIA-60 is inoperable, THEN perform Encl 5.9 (1RIA-40 Inoperable Due to Failure to Meet Minimum Detectable Limit).

4.7 IAAT primary to secondary leakage exceeds 30 gpd, THEN perform Steps 4.8 – 4.9.

[Pri-Sec leak rate ≈ 21 gpm] 4.8 Dispatch AO to reroute Unit 1 CSAE drains to the CST per

OP/1-2/A/1106/016 (Condenser Vacuum System).

4.9 Initiate Encl 5.2 (Reduction of Secondary Leakage and Cross-Unit Contamination).(page 27)

4.10 IAAT tube leakage is large enough to be indicated by an increase in normal RC makeup flow or a decrease in Pzr level, THEN GO TO Step 4.86.

4.86 Verify OAC primary to secondary leak rate calculation available (including 1RIA-40 operable with CSAE OFFGAS BLOWER operating).



Page 21 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 3 of 9 Event Description: 21 gpm Primary to Secondary Leak in 1B SG (R: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO

OATC/BOP


4.87 Determine primary to secondary leakage rate using OAC point O1P1599 (EST TOTAL PRI TO SEC LEAK RATE).

4.88 GO TO Step 4.93.

4.93 Initiate log readings from the following every 15 minutes in the Auto Log:

1RIA-16

1RIA-17

1RIA-40

1RIA-59 (when Rx power > 40 %)

1RIA-60 (when Rx power > 40 %)

4.94 Initiate a unit shutdown to meet requirements of Encl 5.1 (Unit Shutdown Requirements) using the following, as applicable:

AP/29 (Rapid Unit Shutdown) (Page 23)

OP/1/A/1102/004 (Operation at Power)

OP/1/A/1102/010 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown)

Examiner Note: Per Encl 5.1, if the leak rate is > 150 gpd, the requirement is to be < 50% in one hour and Mode 3 in three hours.

Booth Cue: If asked, Unit 2 will continue actions in AP/31 after the SRO enters AP/29

Booth Cue: If the crew chooses to use the OP to shut down the unit, call as the SM and direct the crew to use AP/29 to shut down the Reactor.

4.95 IAAT primary to secondary leakage increases, THEN modify shutdown as required by Encl 5.1 (Unit Shutdown Requirements).

4.96 Notify OSM to refer to Tech Spec. 3.10.1 Basis to determine SSF operability.



Page 22 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 6 Page 4 of 9 Event Description: 21 gpm Primary to Secondary Leak in 1B SG (R: OATC, SRO)

Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO

OATC/BOP

SRO


4.97 Notify plant personnel, using the PA system, to stay clear of the affected MS line and the Powdex.

4.98 Notify Radwaste to stop all liquid releases in progress until sample results assures release rates within limits.

4.99 Stop all gaseous releases in progress until sample results assure release rates within limits.

4.100 IAAT all the following exist:

__ Primary to secondary leak rate < 100 gpd (< 0.0694 gpm)

__ 1RIA-40 inoperable

__ Rx Power ≤ 40 %

THEN notify RP and Primary Chemistry to sample CSAE off-gas and RCS every 4 hours.

4.101 Make up to the UST only as necessary to maintain UST level > 7.5’

4.102 Notify the following that a shutdown is in progress due to primary to secondary leakage:

__ RP

__ Primary Chemistry

__ Secondary Chemistry

4.103 Verify affected SG identified.

4.104 Verify entry into this procedure was due to one of the following:

__ Tube leakage large enough to be indicated by an increase in normal RC makeup flow or a decrease in Pzr level

__ Tritium sample indicating ≥75 gpd primary to secondary leak

TS 3.4.13 RCS OPERATIONAL LEAKAGE,

Condition B due to Primary to Secondary LEAKAGE not within limit

Required Action: Be in Mode 3 in 12 hours and Mode 5 in 36 hours



Page 23 of 49



AP/1/A/1700/029 Crew Response: AP/1/A/1700/029 Rapid Unit Shutdown rev 13

NOTE The CR SRO should read this procedure and it should NOT be used when EOP entry conditions exist.

4.1 Initiate Encl 5.1 (Support Actions During Rapid Unit Shutdown)

(Page 25)

4.2 Announce AP entry using the PA system

4.3 IAAT both of the following apply:

__ It is desired to stop power decrease

__ CTP > 18 %

THEN perform Steps 4.4 - 4.7

RNO: GO TO Step 4.8

4.4 Verify ICS in AUTO

RNO: 1. Stop manual power reduction

2. GO TO Step 4.6

NOTE Due to the power decrease initiated in this AP, the current plant configuration must be compared to the normal plant configuration in OP/1/A/1102/004 (Operation at Power) power reduction enclosure. Equivalent steps performed by this AP should be signed off as intent met. Any steps NOT performed by this AP must be evaluated in preparation for power increase or continued shutdown.

4.6 Initiate OP/1/A/1102/004 (Operation at Power) power reduction

enclosure

4.7 WHEN conditions permit, THEN perform one of the following:

__ Depress MAXIMUM RUNBACK to resume power reduction

__ GO TO appropriate operating procedure for continued operation

4.8 Verify ICS in AUTO

RNO: 1. Initiate manual power reduction to desired power level

2. GO TO Step 4.10



Page 24 of 49



SRO/BOP


4.10 Verify both Main FDW pumps running.

NOTE

1B Main FDW Pump is the preferred pump to be shutdown first.

To lower 1B Main FDW Pump suction flow, bias is adjusted counter-clockwise.

To lower 1A Main FDW Pump suction flow, bias is adjusted clockwise.

4.11 Adjust bias for first Main FDW pump desired to be shutdown until Suction flow is ≈ 1 x 106 lbm/hr less than remaining Main FDW pump suction flow.

4.12 WHEN core thermal power is < 65% FP, THEN continue.

4.13 IAAT both Main FDW pumps running, AND both of the following exist:

__ 1B Main FDW Pump is first pump to be shut down

__ Any of the following alarms actuate and remain in alarm:

FWP B FLOW MINIMUM (1SA-16/A-3)

FWP B FLOW BELOW MIN (1SA-16/A-4)

THEN trip 1B Main FDW Pump.


__ 1A Main FDW Pump is first pump to be shut down


FWP A FLOW MINIMUM (1SA-16/A-1)

FWP A FLOW BELOW MIN (1SA-16/A-2)

THEN trip 1A Main FDW Pump.

4.15 Verify Turbine-Generator shutdown is required.

4.16 Start the TURBINE TURNING GEAR OIL PUMP.



Page 25 of 49



BOP


4.17 Start 1A through 1E TURBINE BRNG OIL LIFT PUMPS.

4.18 Start the TURBINE MOTOR SUCTION PUMP.

4.19 IAAT both of the following apply: __ ICS in automatic __ NI power is ≤ 18% THEN deselect MAXIMUM RUNBACK.


4.21 WHEN NI power ≤ 18%, THEN depress turbine TRIP pushbutton.

4.22 Verify all TURBINE STOP VALVES closed.

AP/1/A/1700/029 Encl 5.1

AP/29 Enclosure 5.1 (Support Actions During Rapid Unit Shutdown)

1. Notify WCC SRO to initiate Encl 5.2 (WCC SRO Support During Rapid Unit Shutdown).

2. Start the following pumps:

__ 1A FDWP SEAL INJECTION PUMP

__ 1A FDWP AUXILIARY OIL PUMP

__ 1B FDWP AUXILIARY OIL PUMP

__ 1B FDWP SEAL INJECTION PUMP

3. WHEN CTP is ≤ 80%, THEN continue.

4. Stop 1E1 HTR DRN PUMP.

5. Place 1HD-254 switch to OPEN.



8. Verify Turbine-Generator shutdown is required.



Page 26 of 49



SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/029 Encl. 5.1 Crew Response:

9. Place the following transfer switches to MAN:

__ 1TA AUTO/MAN

__ 1TB AUTO/MAN

10. Close 1TA SU 6.9 KV FDR.

11. Verify 1TA NORMAL 6.9 KV FDR opens.

12. Close 1TB SU 6.9 KV FDR.

13. Verify 1TB NORMAL 6.9 KV FDR opens.


__ MFB1 AUTO/MAN

__ MFB2 AUTO/MAN

15. Close E11 MFB1 STARTUP FDR.

16. Verify N11 MFB1 NORMAL FDR opens.



19. Notify CR SRO that Unit auxiliaries have been transferred.

20. IAAT 1SSH-9 is NOT closed, AND CTP is ≤ 75%, THEN throttle 1SSH-9 to Maintain Steam Seal Header pressure 2.5 - 4.5 psig.

21. WHEN CTP ≤ 65%, THEN place the following in MANUAL and close:

__ 1FDW-53

__ 1FDW-65

22. IAAT load is ≤ 550 MWe, THEN perform Steps 23 - 24.

TS 3.10.1 STANDYBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY

Conditions A-E due to Reactor power being < 85%

Required Action: Restore SSF systems to OPERABLE status (7 days)



Page 27 of 49



SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/031 Encl. 5.2 Crew Response:

AP/31 Encl 5.2

1. Verify AS header being supplied by Unit 2 or 3

RNO: Initiate Encl 5.33 (Swapping Aux Steam Header to Another Unit) of the Unit 1 EOP

Examiner Note: The remaining steps in AP/31 Encl 5.2 are performed

outside the control room by an Auxiliary Operator so they were not included.

EOP Encl 5.33 (Swapping Aux Steam Header to Another Unit)

1. Notify Secondary Chemist of AS header transfer

2. Adjust 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 controller setpoint to ≈ 280 psig

3. Notify unit CR that will be supplying AS of Unit 1 header setpoint reduction

4. Notify unit CR that will be supplying AS to perform transfer per the appropriate AS system procedure

5. WHEN notified by other unit to secure MS to AS, THEN continue

6. Ensure 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 controller in MANUAL

7. Reduce 1MS-126 & 1MS-129 valve position demand to zero

8. Close 1MS-24

9. Close 1MS-33

10. EXIT this enclosure



Page 28 of 49

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 1 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 10 Event Description: Spurious Turbine Trip, 1B SGTR (M: All)


SRO

OATC

BOP

Plant Response:

Reactor trips

1SA-8/B-9 RM Process Monitor Radiation High

1SA8/D10 (RM CSAE EXHAUST RADIATION HIGH) Crew Response:

SRO will direct the OATC to perform IMAs and the BOP to perform a symptom check.

The SRO will declare Emergency Dose Limits in effect once the transfer to the SGTR tab is made.

IMAs

EOP Immediate Actions

3.1 Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton.

3.2 Verify reactor power < 5% FP and decreasing.

3.3 Depress the turbine TRIP pushbutton

3.4 Verify all turbine stop valves closed.

3.5 Verify RCP seal injection available.

SYMPTOM CHECK

The BOP will verify the following:

Power Range NIs NOT < 5%

Power Range NIs NOT decreasing

Rule 1, ATWS/Unanticipated Nuclear Power Production

Any SCM < 0°F Rule 2, Loss Of SCM

Loss of Main and Emergency FDW (including unsuccessful manual initiation of EFDW)

Rule 3, Loss of Main or Emerg FDW

Rule 4, Initiation of HPI Forced Cooling (Inability to feed SGs and > 2300 psig, NDT limit reached, or PZR level > 375")

Uncontrolled Main steam line(s) pressure decrease

Rule 5, Main Steam Line Break

CSAE Offgas alarms

Process monitor alarms (RIA-40, 59,60),

Area monitor alarms (RIA-16/17)

None (SGTR Tab is entered when identified SG Tube Leakage > 25 gpm)

This event is complete when the crew begins to minimize core SCM, or when directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 29 of 49



Subsequent Actions Tab Crew Response:

Examiner Note: The crew may not recognize the SGTL has degraded into a SGTR initially so steps in the SA tab were included. When the crew recognizes the SGTR, they should transfer to the SGTR tab (Page 32) as directed by the Subsequent Actions, Parallel Action Page (Page 47).

4.1 Verify all control rods in Groups 1 – 7 fully inserted.

RNO: 1. Open:

__ 1HP-24

__ 1HP-25

2. Secure makeup to LDST

3. IF CRDs are energized, THEN:

A. Initiate regulating control rod insertion to the IN LIMIT

B. Dispatch one operator to open 600V CRD breakers:

__ 1X9-5C (U1 CRD NORM FDR BKR) (U1 Equip Rm)

__ 2X1-5B (U1 CRD ALT FDR BKR) (T3/Dd-28)

4.2 Verify Main FDW in operation.

4.3 Verify either:

__ Main FDW overfeeding causing excessive temperature decrease.

__ Main FDW underfeeding causing SG level decrease below setpoint.


4.5 IAAT Main FDW is operating, AND level in any SG is > 96% on the Operating Range, THEN perform Steps 4.6 - 4.8.


4.9 IAAT TBVs CANNOT control SG pressure at desired setpoint, AND TBVs NOT intentionally isolated, THEN manually control pressure in affected SGs using either:

__ TBVs

__ Dispatch two operators to perform Encl 5.24 (Operation of the ADVs)



Page 30 of 49




4.10 Verify 1RIA-40 operable with CSAE OFF-GAS BLOWER operating.

4.11 GO TO Step 4.14.

4.14 Verify both are closed:

__ 1MS-17

__ 1MS-26

4.15 Verify ES is required.

RNO: 1. Initiate Encl 5.5 (Pzr and LDST Level Control).(Page 39)

2. GO TO Step 4.17.

4.17 Open:

__ PCB 20

__ PCB 21

4.18 Verify Generator Field Breaker open.

4.19 Verify EXCITATION is OFF.

4.20 Verify Aux Bldg and Turbine Bldg Instrument Air pressure ≥ 90 psig.

4.21 Verify ICS/NNI power available.

4.22 Verify all 4160V switchgear (1TC, 1TD & 1TE) energized.

4.23 Verify both SGs > 550 psig.

4.24 Verify Main FDW operating.

4.25 Verify any RCP operating.

4.26 Verify AP/0/A/1700/025 (SSF EOP) Encl (Unit 1 OATC Actions During Fire) in progress or complete.

RNO: Ensure SGs approaching 25″ - 35″ [55″ - 65″ acc] S/U level.



Page 31 of 49




4.27 Place switches in CLOSE:

__ 1FDW-31

__ 1FDW-40

4.28 Verify SFP Cooling: {42}

__ SFP Cooling in service

__ SFP level normal

4.29 Verify all SCMs > 0°F.

4.30 Verify both SGs intentionally isolated to stop excessive heat transfer.


4.32 Verify heat transfer exists.

4.33 Verify primary to secondary heat transfer has been excessive.


4.35 Verify indications of SGTR ≥ 25 gpm.

4.36 GO TO SGTR tab.

Examiner Note: The crew should recognize that the SGTL has degraded to a SGTR at this point.



Page 32 of 49



CT-2

SGTR Tab Crew Response:

1. Verify Rx tripped.

2. Maintain Pzr level 140″ - 180″ [175″ - 215″ acc] by initiating Encl 5.5 (Pzr and LDST Level Control). (Page 39)

Examiner Note: 1HP-26 has failed in the closed position.

3. Ensure Parallel Actions Page reviewed.

NOTE The remainder of this page may be given to an RO. The Procedure Director may continue.

4. Start:

__ A OUTSIDE AIR BOOSTER FAN

__ B OUTSIDE AIR BOOSTER FAN

5. Notify Unit 3 to start:

__ 3A OUTSIDE AIR BOOSTER FAN

__ 3B OUTSIDE AIR BOOSTER FAN

6. Perform the following:

A. Monitor RIAs 16 and 17 to identify all SGs with a tube rupture.

B. Inform SRO of results.

7. Dispatch an operator to open:

__ 1XD-R3C (A Turb Bldg Sump Pump Bkr) (T-1, G-27)

__ 1XE-R3D (B Turb Bldg Sump Pump Bkr) (T-1, J-27)

8. Notify RP to survey both MS lines for radiation.

9. GO TO Step 28.

28. Secure any unnecessary offsite release paths. (Main Vacuum Pumps, TDEFDWP, Emergency Steam Air Ejector, etc.).

29. Verify Main FDW or EFDW controlling properly.

30. Open:

__ 1HP-24

__ 1HP-25



Page 33 of 49




31. Secure makeup to LDST.

32. Maintain both SG pressures < 950 psig using either:

__ TBVs

__ Dispatch two operators to perform Encl 5.24 (Operation of the ADVs)

33. IAAT all the following exist:

__ All SCMs > 0°F

__ ES Bypass Permit satisfied

__ RCS pressure controllable

THEN perform Steps 34 - 35.

34. Bypass applicable ES:

To Bypass HPI:

__ Bypass HPI CH A, B, C

To Bypass LPI:

__ Bypass LPI CH A, B, C

35. Bypass applicable Diverse ES:

To Bypass HPI:

__ Bypass Diverse HPI

To Bypass LPI:

__ Bypass Diverse LPI

NOTE

Leak rate prior to reducing SCM is input to Cool Down Plateau at Steps 103 and 203.

36. Estimate SGTR leak rate:

_____ + _____ - _____ - _____ = _____ gpm MU SI LD TSR LR

Where: MU = Makeup Flow

SI = Seal Inlet Hdr Flow

LD = Letdown Flow

TSR = Total Seal Return Flow

LR = Leak Rate



Page 34 of 49




37. Verify any RCP operating.

38. Maintain RCP NPSH during the reduction of SCM:

OAC

Encl 5.18 (P/T Curves)

NOTE

If normal pzr spray is available, efforts should be made to minimize core SCM ≤ 15°F IF allowed by RCP NPSH requirements.

If normal pzr spray is NOT available, minimize core SCM as low as safely achievable.

39. Reduce and maintain core SCM at minimum using any/all of the following methods:

__ De-energize all Pzr heaters

__ Use Pzr spray

__ Maintain Pzr level 140″ - 180″ [175″ - 215″ acc]

NOTE

The rate of fill of the SG with the tube rupture should be considered when deciding to use alternate depressurization methods.

Pzr spray, if available, is preferred to maintain SCM at minimum after using the PORV. This will prevent repetitive cycling of the PORV.

40. IAAT RCS de-pressurization methods are inadequate in minimizing core SCM, THEN perform Step 41 - 43.

NOTE

BWST temperature should be used in determining Pzr spray nozzle ΔT. Computer point O1P3367 provides Pzr spray nozzle ΔT information.

41. Verify Pzr spray nozzle ΔT ≥ 410°F.

42. Close:

__ 1LWD-1

__ 1LWD-2

43. Cycle PORV as necessary.



Page 35 of 49



SGTR Tab

Crew Response:

44. Verify 1SA-2/C-8 (AFIS HEADER A INITIATED) lit.

RNO: Select OFF for both digital channels on AFIS HEADER A.

45. Verify 1SA-2/D-8 (AFIS HEADER B INITIATED) lit.

RNO: Select OFF for both digital channels on AFIS HEADER B.

46. Verify RCS temperature > 532°F.

NOTE

Close monitoring of RCS pressure is essential during the cooldown if ES has not been bypassed. Slowing the cooldown and stopping Pzr spray momentarily may be needed as ES Bypass Permit is approached to avoid ES actuation.

47. Initiate a cooldown as follows:

__ Decrease SG pressure to 835 - 845 psig using any of the following:

TBV setpoint adjusted to 710 - 720 psig

TBVs in manual

ADVs

__ Maximize cooldown rate limited only by the ability to maintain Pzr level > 100″ [180″ acc].

48. WHEN SG pressure is 835 - 845 psig, THEN adjust SG pressure as necessary to maintain an RCS temperature band of 525°F - 532°F.

49. IAAT any affected SG approaches overfill:

Any SCM ≤ 0°F: LOSCM setpoint

All SCMs > 0°F: 285″ [315″ acc] XSUR


RNO: GO TO Step 53.

50. Verify TBVs available for steaming affected SGs.

51. Open on all affected SGs:

1A SG 1B SG

1MS-17 1MS-26



Page 36 of 49




NOTE

Steaming a SG to prevent overfill should continue even if Tech Spec cooldown rates are exceeded.

52. Steam affected SGs to prevent overfill.

53. Verify at least one open:

__ 1MS-24

__ 1MS-33

54. Verify a SG without a tube leak is available to supply the Aux Steam header.

55. Open on the SG without a tube leak:

1A SG 1B SG

1MS-24 1MS-33

56. Close on the SG with a tube leak:

1A SG 1B SG

1MS-24 1MS-33

57. Open 1AS-40 while closing 1MS-47.

58. Close on all affected SGs:

1A SG 1B SG

1MS-79 1MS-76

1MS-82 1MS-84

1MS-35 1MS-36

59. Close 1SSH-9.

60. Verify one SG isolated due to steam leak.

RNO: GO TO Step 68.

68. Verify all SCMs > 0°F.



Page 37 of 49




69. GO TO applicable step based on number of RCPs operating:

Number of RCPs Operating

Applicable Step

4 69

1,2 or 3 70

None 90

71. Verify steaming both SGs.

RNO: GO TO Step 87.

87. Initiate AP/31 (Primary to Secondary Leakage) Encl 5.2 (Reduction of Secondary Leakage and Cross-Unit Contamination).



Page 38 of 49

Rule 6

HPI

HPI Pump Throttling Limits • HPI must be throttled to prevent violating the RV-P/T limit.

• HPI pump operation must be limited to two HPIPs when only one BWST suction valve (1HP-24 or 1HP-25) is open.

• HPI must be throttled ≤ 475 gpm/pump (including seal injection for A header) when only one HPI pump is operating in a header.

• Total HPI flow must be throttled ≤ 950 gpm including seal injection when 1A and 1B HPI pumps are operating with 1HP-409 open.

• Total HPI flow must be throttled < 750 gpm when all the following exist:

- LPI suction is from the RBES

- piggyback is aligned

- either of the following exist:

• only one piggyback valve is open (1LP-15 or 1LP-16)

• only one LPI pump operating

• HPI may be throttled under the following conditions:

HPI Forced Cooling in Progress:

HPI Forced Cooling NOT in Progress:

All the following conditions must exist: • Core SCM > 0

• CETCs decreasing

All the following conditions must exist: • All WR NIs ≤ 1%

• Core SCM > 0

• Pzr level increasing

• CRS concurrence required if throttling following emergency boration

HPI Pump Minimum Flow Limit

• Maintain ≥ 170 gpm indicated/pump. This is an instrument error adjusted value that ensures a real value of ≥ 65 gpm/pump is maintained. HPI pump flow less than minimum is allowed for up to 4 hours.


Page 39 of 49

Enclosure 5.5

Pzr and LDST Level Control

ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED

NOTE

Maintaining Pzr level >100″ [180″ acc] will ensure Pzr heater bundles remain covered.

1. __ Utilize the following as necessary to maintain desired Pzr level:

• 1A HPI Pump

• 1B HPI Pump

• 1HP-26

• 1HP-7

• 1HP-120 setpoint or valve demand

• 1HP-5

__ IF 1HP-26 will NOT open, THEN throttle 1HP-410 to maintain desired Pzr level.

2. __ IAAT makeup to the LDST is desired, THEN makeup from 1A BHUT.

3. __ IAAT it is desired to secure makeup to LDST, THEN secure makeup from 1A BHUT.

4. __ IAAT it is desired to bleed letdown flow to 1A BHUT, THEN perform the following:

A. Open:

1CS-26

1CS-41

B. Position 1HP-14 to BLEED.

C. Notify SRO.

5. __ IAAT letdown bleed is NO longer desired, THEN position 1HP-14 to NORMAL.


Page 40 of 49

Enclosure 5.5 Pzr and LDST Level Control


6. __ IAAT 1C HPI PUMP is required,


__ GO TO Step 10.

7. Open:

• 1HP-24

• 1HP-25

1. __ IF both BWST suction valves (1HP-24 and 1HP-25) are closed, THEN perform the following:

A. Start 1A LPI PUMP.

B. Start 1B LPI PUMP.

C. Open:

1LP-15

1LP-16

1LP-9

1LP-10

1LP-6

1LP-7

D. __ IF two LPI Pumps are running only to provide HPI pump suction, THEN secure one LPI pump.

E. __ Dispatch an operator to open 1HP-363 (Letdown Line To LPI Pump Suction Block) (A-1-119, U1 LPI Hatch Rm, N end).

F. GO TO Step 8.

2. __ IF only one BWST suction valve (1HP-24 or 1HP-25) is open, THEN perform the following:

A.__ IF three HPI pumps are operating, THEN secure 1B HPI PUMP.

B.__ IF < 2 HPI pumps are operating, THEN start HPI pumps to obtain two HPI pump operation, preferably in opposite headers.

C. GO TO Step 9.


Page 41 of 49


ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 8. Start 1C HPI PUMP.

__ IF at least two HPI pumps are operating, THEN throttle 1HP-409 to maintain desired Pzr level.

9. Throttle the following as required to maintain desired Pzr level:

__ 1HP-26

1HP-27

1. IF at least two HPI pumps are operating, AND 1HP-26 will NOT open, THEN throttle 1HP-410 to maintain desired Pzr level.

2. __ IF 1A HPI PUMP and 1B HPI PUMP are operating, AND 1HP-27 will NOT open, THEN throttle 1HP-409 to maintain desired Pzr level.


Page 42 of 49


ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 10. __ IAAT LDST level CANNOT be

maintained, THEN perform Step 11.

__ GO TO Step 12.


• Open 1HP-24.

• Open 1HP-25.

• Close 1HP-16.




C. Open:

1LP-15

1LP-16

1LP-9

1LP-10

1LP-6

1LP-7



F. __ GO TO Step 13.

2. __ IF only one BWST suction valve (1HP-24 or 1HP-25) is open, AND three HPI pumps are operating, THEN secure 1B HPI PUMP.

NOTE

Maintaining Pzr level > 100” [180” acc] will ensure Pzr heater bundles remain covered.

12.__ Operate Pzr heaters as required to maintain heater bundle integrity.


Page 43 of 49


ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 13. __ IAAT additional makeup flow to LDST

is desired, AND 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP is operating, THEN dispatch an operator to close 1CS-48 (1A BHUT Recirc) (A-1-107, Unit 1 RC Bleed Transfer Pump Rm.).

14. __ IAAT two Letdown Filters are desired, THEN perform the following:

Open 1HP-17.

Open 1HP-18

15. IAAT all of the following exist:

Letdown isolated

LPSW available

Letdown restoration desired

THEN perform Steps 16 - 34. {41}

GO TO Step 35.

16. Open:

__ 1CC-7

__ 1CC-8

1. __ Notify CR SRO that letdown CANNOT be restored due to inability to restart the CC system.

2. __ GO TO Step 35.

17. __ Ensure only one CC pump running.

18. __ Place the non-running CC pump in AUTO.

19. Verify both are open:

__ 1HP-1

__ 1HP-2

1. __ IF 1HP-1 is closed due to 1HP-3 failing to close, THEN GO TO Step 21.


20. GO TO Step 23.

NOTE Verification of leakage requires visual observation of East Penetration Room.

21. Verify letdown line leak in East Penetration Room has occurred.

GO TO Step 23.

22. GO TO Step 35.


Page 44 of 49


ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 23. __ Monitor for unexpected conditions

while restoring letdown.

24. Verify both letdown coolers to be placed in service.

1. __ IF 1A letdown cooler is to be placed in service, THEN open:

1HP-1

1HP-3

2. __ IF 1B letdown cooler is to be placed in service, THEN open:

1HP-2

1HP-4


25. Open:

1HP-1

1HP-2

1HP-3

1HP-4

26. __ Verify at least one letdown cooler is aligned.

Perform the following:

A. __ Notify CR SRO of problem.

B. __ GO TO Step 35.

27. __ Close 1HP-6.

28. __ Close 1HP-7.

29. __ Verify letdown temperature < 125°F. 1. __ Open 1HP-13.

2. Close:

1HP-8

1HP-9&11

3. __ IF any deborating IX is in service, THEN perform the following:

A. Select 1HP-14 to NORMAL.

B. Close 1HP-16.

4. __ Select LETDOWN HI TEMP INTLK BYP switch to BYPASS.


Page 45 of 49


ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 30. Open 1HP-5.

31. Adjust 1HP-7 for ≈ 20 gpm letdown.

32. WHEN letdown temperature is < 125°F, THEN place LETDOWN HI TEMP INTLK BYP switch to NORMAL.

33. Open 1HP-6.

34. __ Adjust 1HP-7 to control desired letdown flow.

NOTE

AP/32 (Loss of Letdown) provides direction to cool down the RCS to offset increasing pressurizer level.

35. __ IAAT it is determined that letdown is unavailable due to equipment failures or letdown system leakage, THEN notify CR SRO to initiate AP/32 (Loss of Letdown).

36. __ IAAT > 1 HPI pump is operating, AND additional HPI pumps are NO longer needed, THEN perform the following:

A. __ Obtain SRO concurrence to reduce running HPI pumps.

B. Secure the desired HPI pumps.

C. __ Place secured HPI pump switch in AUTO, if desired.

37. IAAT all the following conditions exist:

Makeup from BWST NOT required

LDST level > 55″

All control rods inserted

Cooldown Plateau NOT being used

THEN close:

1HP-24

1HP-25


Page 46 of 49


ACTION/EXPECTED RESPONSE RESPONSE NOT OBTAINED 38. Verify 1CS-48 (1A BHUT Recirc) has

been closed to provide additional makeup flow to LDST.

__ GO TO Step 40.

39. __ WHEN 1CS-48 (1A BHUT Recirc) is NO longer needed to provide additional makeup flow to LDST, THEN perform the following:

A. __ Stop 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

B. __ Locally position 1CS-48 (1A BHUT Recirc) one turn open (A-1-107, Unit 1 RC Bleed Transfer Pump Rm.).

C. Close 1CS-46.

D. __ Start 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

E. __ Locally throttle 1CS-48 (1A BHUT Recirc) to obtain 90 - 110 psig discharge pressure.

F. __ Stop 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

40. Verify two Letdown Filters in service, AND only one Letdown filter is desired.

__ GO TO Step 42.

41. Perform one of the following:

Place 1HP-17 switch to CLOSE.


42. __ WHEN directed by CR SRO, THEN EXIT this enclosure.


Page 47 of 49

Subsequent Actions EP/1/A/1800/001

Parallel Actions Page 1 of 1

CONDITION ACTIONS

1. PR NIs ≥ 5% FP

OR

NIs NOT decreasing

GO TO UNPP tab.

UNPP

2. All 4160V SWGR de-energized

{13}

GO TO Blackout tab. BLACKOUT

3. Core SCM indicates superheat GO TO ICC tab. ICC

4. Any SCM = 0°F GO TO LOSCM tab. LOSCM

5. Both SGs intentionally isolated to stop excessive heat transfer

GO TO EHT tab.

LOHT 6. Loss of heat transfer (including

loss of all Main and Emergency FDW)

GO TO LOHT tab.

7. Heat transfer is or has been excessive

GO TO EHT tab.

EHT

8. Indications of SGTR ≥ 25 gpm GO TO SGTR tab. SGTR

9. Turbine Building flooding NOT caused by rainfall event

GO TO TBF tab.

TBF

10. Inadvertent ES actuation occurred Initiate AP/1/A/1700/042 (Inadvertent ES Actuation).

ES

11. Valid ES actuation has occurred or should have occurred

Initiate Encl 5.1 (ES Actuation).

ES

12. Power lost to all 4160V SWGR and any 4160V SWGR re-energized

• Initiate AP/11 (Recovery from Loss of Power).

• IF Encl 5.1 (ES Actuation) has been initiated, THEN reinitiate Encl 5.1.

ROP

13. RCS leakage > 160 gpm with letdown isolated

Notify plant staff that Emergency Dose Limits are in affect using PA system.

EDL

14. Individual available to make notifications

• Announce plant conditions using PA system.

• Notify OSM to reference the Emergency Plan and AD-LS-ALL-0006.

NOTIFY


Page 48 of 49

CRITICAL TASKS

CT-1 ICS must be taken to HAND and FDW adjusted to prevent tripping the reactor.

Adjustment will be dependent on how much time it takes to place ICS in HAND.

CT-2 Outside Air Booster Fans are started to minimize radiation exposure to control room

personnel. (Within 30 minutes of SGTR) TCA #20

SAFETY: Take a Minute

UNIT 0 (OSM)

SSF Operable: Yes KHU's Operable: U1 - OH, U2 - UG LCTs Operable: 2 Fuel Handling: No

UNIT STATUS (CR SRO)

Unit 1 Simulator Other Units

Mode: 1 Unit 2 Unit 3

Reactor Power: 100% Mode: 1 Mode: 1

Gross MWE: 894 100% Power 100% Power

RCS Leakage: 0.01 gpm

No WCAP Action EFDW Backup: Yes EFDW Backup: Yes

RBNS Rate: 0.01 gpm

Technical Specifications/SLC Items (CR SRO) Component/Train OOS

Date/Time Restoration

Required Date/Time

TS/SLC #

AMSAC/DSS 0300 7 Days 16.7.2

Shift Turnover Items (CR SRO)

Primary

Due to unanalyzed condition, the SSF should be considered INOP for Unit 1 if power levels are reduced below 85%. Evaluations must be performed prior to declaring the SSF operable following a return to power (after going below 85%).

1RIA-3 and 5 removed from RB. SASS is in Manual ‘C’ GWD tank release is in progress Just after or during a GWD release, 1SA-8/B-9 may alarm from RIA-32 sample point selected to

‘1 PRV System Filter Discharge’. IF 1SA-8/B-9 is due to RIA-32 - ‘1 PRV System Filter Discharge’, it can be considered an expected alarm

Secondary

AMSAC/DSS bypassed

Unit 2 is supplying the AS header

The Voltage Regulator is in Manual and ready to be placed back in Auto. BOP is to perform OP/1/A/1106/001 Encl 4.8 to lower MVARs to 150 ± 10 MVARs with the

Voltage Regulator in AUTO.

1SSH-1, 1SSH-3, 1SD-2, 1SD-5, 1SD-140, 1SD-303, 1SD-355, 1SD-356 and 1SD-358 are closed with power supply breakers open per the Startup Procedure for SSF Overcooling Event.

Reactivity Management (CR SRO)

RCS Boron 83 ppmB Gp 7 Rod Position: 92% Withdrawn

Batch additions as required for volume control.

Human Performance Emphasis (OSM)

Procedure Use and Adherence



________________________ ________________________OATC

________________________ ________________________BOP


Turnover:

SASS is in Manual

AMSAC/DSS is Bypassed


Event No.


Event Description



1 Override C: BOP, SRO (TS) Pump RBNS (1LWD-1 Fails to Close)

2 MSS200

MSS200D C: BOP, SRO (TS) Condenser Vacuum Leak

3 MPI050 MPI080

I: OATC, SRO Loop B RCS Flow Fails Low

4 R: OATC, SRO Oil Leak on Main Turbine Requires Manual Power Reduction

5 N: BOP, SRO Swap Auxiliaries Due to Oil Leak on ‘B’ LP Turbine

6 MEL220 MPI290 MPI300

C: OATC, SRO 1TB Lockout Causes a Loss of 1A2 and 1B2 RCPs Requiring a Manual Reactor Trip

7 MPS400 M: ALL

Large Break LOCA

1A LPI Pump Fails to Start

Switch Will Not Stop 1A1 RCP When Securing Per Rule 2



Page 2 of 58

Scenario 2

Event Summary

Event 1: When the crew takes the shift, they will be required to pump the Reactor Building Normal Sump due to high level. When the operator begins to secure the alignment, LWD-1 will fail to close. This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions.

Event 2: The condenser will experience a vacuum leak and will require the crew to start the

Main Vacuum Pumps prior to the unit tripping on low condenser vacuum. After the crew dispatches operators to look for vacuum leaks, a report will be made to the control room and the SRO will be required to direct the AO to isolate the source of the leak. This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions.

Event 3: The Loop ‘B’ RCS flow signal will fail low causing ICS to automatically re-ratio FDW. The crew should perform Plant Transient Response and take the ICS Diamond and Feedwater Loop Masters to manual and re-ratio FDW to stabilize the plant.

Event 4: A report will be made to the control room that there is a large oil leak on the Main Turbine and there is no way to isolate the leak without shutting down the oil system. The SRO will enter an Abnormal Procedure to rapidly shut down the unit with ICS in manual in order to take the turbine offline.

Event 5: During the power reduction from Event 4, the BOP operator will be required to swap auxiliary power to the startup transformer (CT-1) before the generator is taken offline.

Event 6: Once Reactor power has been decreased > 10% and auxiliary power has been transferred to CT-1, switchgear 1TB will lockout which will cause the loss of two RCPs. The Reactor will fail to automatically trip which will require an operator to manually trip the Reactor during Immediate Manual Actions.

Event 7: Shortly after the Reactor is tripped, an RCS leak will develop which will evolve into a Large Break LOCA within a short period of time. While performing Rule 2 due to the Loss of SCM, the 1A1 RCP will fail to trip from the control switch which will require the operator to de-energize the switchgear to remove power from the pump. The 1A LPI Pump will also fail to start which will require the operator to isolate the discharge flow path.


Page 3 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event Description: Pump RBNS (LWD-1 Fails to Close) (C: BOP, SRO) (TS) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO/BOP


SRO directs the BOP to pump the Reactor Building Normal Sump in accordance with OP/1/A/1104/007 Enclosure 4.1. OP/1/A/1104/007, Encl. 4.1 (Pumping RBNS to ≥ 1 inch) rev 30

2.1 Verify required to lower RBNS to ≥ 1”

3.1 Verify MWHUT level adequate to receive waste volume.

3.2 Position the following:

Ensure open 1LWD-1 (RB NORMAL SUMP ISOLATION)


3.3 Start one or both of the following:

1A RB NORM SUMP PUMP

1B RB NORM SUMP PUMP

NOTE

Changes in LAWT levels may occur during pumping.

RIA Alarms may be indicative of gas leakage.

If RBNS level was above 14" when pumps were started, a level increase following securing the RBNS pumps may occur.

During outages, it is desirable to maintain RBNS > 6” for shielding to decrease dose rates in RBNS area.

3.4 WHEN RBNS is at desired level OR at 1" (low level alarm), ensure the following:

1A RB NORMAL SUMP PUMP "OFF".

1B RB NORMAL SUMP PUMP "OFF".

Examiner Note: 1LWD-1 will NOT close.

3.5 IF required to close the valves, position the following:

Close 1LWD-1 (RB NORMAL SUMP ISOLATION)


This event is complete when the SRO has referred to Tech Specs, or as directed by the Lead Examiner


Page 4 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event Description: Pump RBNS (LWD-1 Fails to Close) (C: BOP, SRO) (TS) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

Crew response:

Examiner Note: The crew should diagnose the failure of 1LWD-1 and the SRO will refer to Tech Specs. Since 1LWD-1 is a Containment Isolation Valve, the applicable Tech Spec is 3.6.3. Since this path has 2 Containment Isolation Valves, Condition A applies and the Completion Time is 4 hours.

Booth Cue: If directed by the control room, SPOC will investigate the problem with 1LWD-1. Troubleshooting/repair of the valve will be turned over to the WCC and the valve is not expected to be returned to service on this shift.

TS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

Condition A (4 hours) Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, one closed and de-activated non-power operated valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured

AND

(Once per 31 days) Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated for isolation devices outside containment.

This event is complete when the SRO has referred to Tech Specs, or as directed by the Lead Examiner


Page 5 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 2 Event Description: Condenser Vacuum Leak (C: BOP, SRO) (TS) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

CT-1


1SA-3/A-6 (Condenser Vacuum Low) will alarm at 25” Hg

Crew Response:

The SRO may direct the BOP to refer to the Alarm Response Guide for 1SA-3/A-6

The SRO will enter AP/1/A/1700/027 (Loss of Condenser Vacuum)

1SA-3/A-6 (Condenser Vacuum Low) rev 061

3.1 Refer to AP/1/A/1700/027 (Loss of Condenser Vacuum) AP/1/A/1700/027 (Loss of Condenser Vacuum) rev 007

4.1 Announce AP entry using the PA system.


__ Condenser vacuum ≤ 22″ Hg

__ MODE 1 or 2

THEN trip the Rx.

4.3 Dispatch operators to perform the following:

__ Perform Encl 5.1 (Main Vacuum Pump Alignment)

__ Look for vacuum leaks

4.4 Ensure all available Main Vacuum Pumps operating (A, B, & C).

Booth Cue: After all MVPs are running, using TIME COMPRESSION, call the Control Room to notify the operator that the Main Vacuum Pumps are aligned to Unit 1.

4.5 Ensure 1V-186 is closed.

4.6 Ensure Steam to Steam Air Ejector A, B, C > 255 psig.

4.7 Verify Steam Seal Header Press > 1.5 psig.

This event is complete when SRO reaches Step 4.10 of AP/27, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 6 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 2 Page 2 of 2 Event Description: Condenser Vacuum Leak (C: BOP, SRO) (TS) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

OATC


4.8 Ensure all available CCW pumps operating.

Examiner Note: When the 4th CCW Pump is started, the LPSW Leakage Accumulator will alarm on the OAC requiring entry into TS 3.7.7 Condition B (7 days) Restore the LPSW WPS to OPERABLE status.

Booth Cue: Call Control Room as the AO sent out to look for vacuum leaks and report that a leak was found on the 1B Main FDW Pump pumping trap sight glass. The leak will be removed after the control room directs the AO to isolate the sight glass.

4.9 Verify Condensate flow ≥ 2300 gpm

4.10 Verify 1SSH-1 is closed

4.11 WHEN condenser vacuum is stable, AND Encl 5.1 (Main Vacuum Pump Alignment) is complete, THEN EXIT this procedure

Booth Cue: IF/when asked about the status of Encl. 5.1, respond that using time compression, Encl. 5.1 is complete.

TS 3.7.7 LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER

Condition B (7 days) Restore the LPSW WPS to OPERABLE status.

This event is complete when SRO reaches Step 4.10 of AP/27, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 7 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 3 Event Description: Loop ‘B’ RCS Flow Fails Low (I: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

OATC


1SA-1/A-3 (1A Flux/Flow/Imb Trip)

1SA-2/A-4 (RC Loop A Flow Low)

1SA-2/A-5 (RC Total Flow Low)

1SA-2/C-11 (ICS Loss of OAC CTP Signal)

1SA-5/A-5 through D-5 (1A-1D RPS Trouble)

ICS will re-ratio FDW Crew Response:

When the Statalarms are received, the candidates should utilize the “Plant Transient Response” process to stabilize the plant.


Place the Diamond and both FDW Masters in manual and position as necessary to stabilize the plant (decrease FDW).

Note: The OATC will have to reduce FDW in order to stabilize power below

the pre-transient level. The CRS should:


Ensure FIN-24 is contacted to repair the failed instrument. .

AP/1/A/1700/028 (ICS Instrument Failures) Rev 20









This event is complete when the CRS reaches step 6 (WHEN) in AP/28 Section 4E, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 8 of 58


SRO/BOP





Emergency Plan

__ STA





OAC alarm video

OAC display points




√ Section Failure

4E RCS Flow

AP/1/A/1700/028, Section 4E (RCS Flow Failure)

NOTE

The following will occur when an ICS RCS flow loop signal fails: ICS RUNBACK

Controlling Tave swaps to RCS loop with higher flow

Delta Tc station re-ratios loop feedwater flows


__ 1A FDW MASTER

__ 1B FDW MASTER



Page 9 of 58


SRO/OATC

AP/1/A/1700/028 Section 4E Crew Response:



__ Select a valid RCS flow input to ICS per AM/1/A/0326/020 (Control of Unit 1 Star Module Signal Selection Function).

__ Investigate and repair the failed RCS flow instrumentation.




Booth Cue: If asked, Unit 2 will initiate the surveillance evaluation in accordance with PT/1/A/0600/001.

6. WHEN notified by SPOC that a valid RCS flow input has been restored to ICS, THEN GO TO OP/1/A/1102/004 A Encl (Placing ICS Stations To Auto).



Page 10 of 58


Event Description: Oil Leak on Main Turbine Requires Manual Power Reduction (R: OATC, SRO)


SRO/OATC

Booth Cue: To initiate this event, call the Control Room on 4911 and

inform them as follows: "This is the WCC SRO. There is a large oil leak on the north end of the Unit 1 B LP turbine. There does not appear to be a way to isolate the leak without shutting down the oil system".

If asked for Unit 2 to handle the Spill Response procedure, respond that "Unit 2 will handle the Spill Response procedure".

The SRO will initiate AP/29 (Rapid Unit Shutdown) to direct power reduction

AP/1A/1700/029 (Rapid Unit Shutdown) rev 013

4.1 Initiate Encl 5.1 (Support Actions During Rapid Unit Shutdown) (page 12)

4.2 Announce AP entry using the PA system.


__ It is desired to stop power decrease.

__ CTP > 18%

THEN perform Steps 4.4 – 4.7

RNO: GO TO Step 4.8

4.8 Verify ICS in AUTO (ICS is NOT in Auto)

RNO: 1. Initiate manual power reduction to desired power level.

2. GO TO Step 4.10

Note: OATC reduces power by first reducing feedwater and then inserting control rods as necessary.

4.10 Verify both Main FDW pumps running:


NOTE 1B Main FDW Pump is the preferred pump to be shutdown first. To lower 1B Main FDW Pump suction flow, bias is adjusted counter-

clockwise. To lower 1A Main FDW Pump suction flow, bias is adjusted clockwise.

This event is complete when Reactor power has been reduced > 10% and Auxiliaries have been transferred, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 11 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 4 Page 2 of 2 Event Description: Oil Leak on Main Turbine Requires Manual Power Reduction (R: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

BOP/SRO

AP/1/A/1700/029 AP/1/A/1700/029 (Rapid Unit Shutdown)

4.11 Adjust bias for first Main FDW pump desired to be shutdown (1B) until its suction flow is ≈ 1 X 106 lbm/hr less than remaining Main FDW pump suction flow.

4.12 WHEN core thermal power is < 65% FP, THEN continue.


__ 1B Main FDW Pump is first pump to be shut down.


FWP B FLOW MINIMUM (1SA-16/A-3)

FWP B FLOW BELOW MIN (1SA-16/A-4)

THEN trip 1B Main FDW Pump.

4.14 IAAT both Main FDW pumps running, AND both of the following exists:

__ 1A Main FDW pump is the first pump to be shut down


FWP A FLOW MINIMUM (1SA-16/A-1)

FWP A FLOW BELOW MIN (1SA-16/A-2)

THEN trip 1A Main FDW Pump


4.16 Start the TURBINE TURNING GEAR OIL PUMP.

4.17 Start 1A through 1E TURBINE BRNG OIL LIFT PUMPS.

4.18 Start the TURBINE MOTOR SUCTION PUMP.


__ ICS in automatic

__ NI power is ≤ 18%

THEN deselect MAXIMUM RUNBACK. (does NOT apply)

4.20 Verify Turbine-Generator shutdown is required (it is required)

4.21 WHEN NI power ≤18% THEN depress turbine TRIP pushbutton

This event is complete when Reactor power has been reduced > 10% and Auxiliaries have been transferred, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 12 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event Description: Swap Auxiliaries Due To Oil Leak on Main Turbine (N: BOP, SRO) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/029 Encl 5.1

AP/1/A/1700/029 Encl. 5.1 (Support Actions During Rapid Unit Shutdown)

1. Notify WCC SRO to initiate Encl 5.2 (WCC SRO Support During Rapid Unit Shutdown).

2. Start the following pumps:

1A FDWP SEAL INJECTION PUMP

1A FDWP AUXILIARY OIL PUMP

1B FDWP AUXILIARY OIL PUMP

1B FDWP SEAL INJECTION PUMP

3. WHEN CTP is ≤ 80%, THEN continue.





8. Verify Turbine-Generator shutdown is required. (It is required)


1TA AUTO/MAN

1TB AUTO/MAN

10. Close 1TA SU 6.9 KV FDR.

11. Verify 1TA NORMAL 6.9 KV FDR opens.

12. Close 1TB SU 6.9 KV FDR.

13. Verify 1TB NORMAL 6.9 KV FDR opens.

14 Place the following transfer switches to MAN:

MFB1 AUTO/MAN

MFB2 AUTO/MAN




18. Verify N21 MFB2 NORMAL FDR opens

This event is complete when Auxiliaries have been transferred, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 13 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event Description: Swap Auxiliaries Due To Oil Leak on Main Turbine (N: BOP, SRO) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/029 Encl 5.1

19. Notify CR SRO that Unit auxiliaries have been transferred

20. IAAT 1SSH-9 is NOT closed, AND CTP is ≤ 75%, THEN throttle 1SSH-9 to maintain Steam Seal Header pressure 2.5 – 4.5 psig

21. WHEN CTP ≤ 65% THEN place the following in MANUAL

__ 1FDW-53

__ 1FDW-65

22. IAAT load is ≤ 550 MWe, THEN perform Steps 23-24

23. Ensure the following are stopped:

__ 1A MSRH DRN PUMP

__ 1B MSRH DRN PUMP

24. Place 1HD-37 and 1HD-52 in DUMP:

25. WHEN CTP is ≤ 60%, THEN ensure 1SSH-9 closed

26. IAAT load is ≤ 450 MWe, THEN perform Steps 27-30

27. Verify the 1C CBP operating

28. Stop the 1A and 1B CBPs

29. Place the control switch for one shutdown CBP in AUTO

30. Ensure CBP LOAD SHED DEFEAT switch to a running CBP

31. WHEN ≤ 400 MWe, THEN stop the following pumps

__ 1D1 HTR DRN PUMP

__ 1D2 HTR DRN PUMP

32. WHEN ≤ 325 MWe, THEN verify ≤ two HWPs operating

33. WHEN ≤ 225 MWe, THEN stop all but one HWP

34. Place control switch for one idle HWP in AUTO

35. Ensure HWP LOAD SHED DEFEAT switch is positioned to a running HWP

36. WHEN CTP DEMAND is < 20%, THEN Close 1MS-76 and 1MS-79

37. WHEN directed by CR SRO, THEN EXIT this enclosure

This event is complete when Auxiliaries have been transferred, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 14 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 1 Event Description: 1TB Lockout Causes a Loss of 1A2 and 1B2 RCPs Requiring a Manual

Reactor Trip (C: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO/OATC

BOP

SRO

Plant Response:

1TB lockout will occur. This will cause a loss of 6900V power to the 1A2 and 1B2 RCPs. RPS alarms will occur indicating that the Reactor should have tripped, but it will remain at power.

Crew Response:

Recognize the Reactor should have tripped (< 3 RCPs operating with Reactor power > 2% - OMP 1-18 Att. A), therefore manually trip the Reactor and then perform Immediate Manual Actions of the EOP.

3.1 Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton

3.2 Verify reactor power < 5% FP and decreasing

3.3 Depress turbine TRIP pushbutton

3.4 Verify all turbine stop valves closed

3.5 Verify RCP seal injection available The BOP will perform a symptom check.










CSAE Offgas alarms




The SRO will transfer to the Subsequent Actions Tab after IMAs and Symptoms Check are complete (page 15).

This event is complete when the SRO reaches Step 4.10 of the Subsequent Actions tab, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 15 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 1 Event Description: 1TB Lockout Causes a Loss of 1A2 and 1B2 RCPs Requiring a Manual

Reactor Trip (C: OATC, SRO) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO/OATC

SRO/BOP


EOP Subsequent Actions Tab

4.1 Verify all control rods in Groups 1-7 fully inserted

4.2 Verify Main FDW in operation

4.3 Verify either:

__ Main FDW overfeeding causing excessive temperature decrease

__ Main FDW underfeeding causing SG level decrease below setpoint

RNO: GO TO Step 4.5

4.5 IAAT Main FDW is operating, AND level in any SG is > 96% on the operating range, THEN perform Steps 4.6 – 4.8

RNO: GO TO Step 4.9

4.9 IAAT TBVs CANNOT control SG pressure at desired setpoint, AND TBVs NOT intentionally isolated, THEN manually control pressure in affected SGs using either:

__ TBVs

__ Dispatch two operators to perform Encl 5.24 (Operation of ADVs)

4.10 Verify 1RIA-40 operable with CSAE OFF-GAS BLOWER operating

4.11 GO TO Step 4.14

4.14 Verify 1MS-17 and 1MS-26 are closed

4.15 Verify ES is required

RNO: 1. Initiate Encl 5.5 (Pzr and LDST Level Control)

2. GO TO Step 4.17

4.17 Open PCB-20 and PCB-21

4.18 Verify Generator Field Breaker open

4.19 Verify EXCITATION is OFF

4.20 Verify Aux Bldg and Turbine Bldg Instrument Air pressure ≥ 90 psig

4.21 Verify ICS/NNI power available

4.22 Verify all 4160V switchgear (1TC, 1TD, & 1TE) energized

4.23 Verify both SGs > 550 psig

4.24 Verify Main FDW operating

This event is complete when the SRO reaches Step 4.10 of the Subsequent Actions tab, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 16 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 10 Event Description: Large Break LOCA (M: ALL) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

SRO/BOP

Crew Response:

The SRO will direct the BOP to perform a Symptoms Check (OMP 1-18)










CSAE Offgas alarms




After verifying IMAs, the SRO will transfer to the Subsequent Actions Tab and review the Parallel Action page. (Page 55) Examiner Note: Core SCM will indicate 0°F or superheated during this

transient depending on when CFTs and LPI flow injects into the core. When the SRO reaches the decision point in the SA parallel action page, if superheated he should transfer to the Inadequate Core Cooling (ICC) tab (Page 17) or if saturated, he should transfer to the Loss of Subcooling Margin (LOSCM) tab (Page 19).

The SRO will direct one of the ROs to perform Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) (Page 27)

This event is complete when the SRO has transferred to the LOCA CD Tab or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 17 of 58


SRO/OATC

ICC Tab Crew Response:

ICC Tab (ICC Parallel Actions on Page 56)

CAUTION

ICC conditions should not exist unless multiple equipment and system failures have occurred. Some of the equipment used in this section may be the same equipment that has failed. It is expected that attempts to restore equipment operations will continue throughout this section. It is also expected that transition to OSAG will occur whenever conditions requiring the transition exist..

1. IAAT CETCs > 1200oF, AND TSC is ready to provide mitigation

guidance, THEN:

A. Notify TSC to enter the OSAG.

B. EXIT this procedure.

2. Ensure full HPI and control per Rule 6 (HPI). (Page 26)

3. IAAT RCS pressure is ≤ 550 psig, OR RB pressure is ≥ 3 psig, THEN perform Steps 4-8.

4. Open:

1LP-21

1LP-17

5. Start 1A LPI pump. (The 1A LPI pump will fail to start.)

RNO: 1. IF 1C LPI Pump is operating, THEN GO TO Step 8.

2. Close 1LP-17.

6. Open:

1LP-22

1LP-18

7. Start 1B LPI pump. (1B LPI pump already operating ).

RNO: 1. IF 1C LPI Pump is operating, THEN GO TO Step 8.

2. Close 1LP-18



Page 18 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 3 of 10 Event Description: Large Break LOCA (M: ALL) Time Position Applicant’s Actions or Behavior

ICC Tab Crew Response:

8. Verify two LPI pumps operating.

RNO: IF LPI/HPI piggyback is aligned, THEN maximize total LPI flow by throttling HPI flow as follows:

1C LPI pump only < 2900 gpm

1A or 1B LPI pump only < 3100 gpm

9. IAAT all exist:

1C LPI Pump off

1C LPI Pump available

LPI required

ECCS pump suction aligned to BWST

1A LPI Pump unavailable

1B LPI Pump unavailable

THEN perform Steps 10-13.

RNO: GO TO Step 14

14. Open:

1CF-1

1CF-2

15. IAAT core SCM is ≥ 0°F, THEN GO TO LOCA CD tab (page 22)

Note: Core SCM will return to 0°F shortly after LPI flow has been established.

16. Verify any injection sources available:

HPI

LPI

CFTs

17. Open:

1RC-4

PORV



Page 19 of 58


SRO

LOSCM Tab Crew Response:

LOSCM Tab

1. Ensure Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) is in progress or complete.

2. Verify LOSCM caused by excessive heat transfer.

RNO: GO TO Step 4.

4. IAAT either exists:

LPI FLOW TRAIN A plus LPI FLOW TRAIN B ≥ 3400 gpm

Only one LPI header in operation with header flow ≥ 2900 gpm.

THEN GO TO LOCA CD tab. (page 22)

5. Verify SSF activated per AP/25 with SSF RC Makeup required.

RNO: GO TO Step 7.

7. Verify all exist:

NO RCPs operating

HPI flow in both HPI headers

Adequate total HPI flow per Figure 1 (Total Required HPI Flow).



Page 20 of 58



LOSCM tab (continued)

8 GO TO Step 104.


105. Verify HPI forced cooling in progress.

RNO: Close 1RC-4

106. Close 1GWD-17, 1HP-1, 1HP-2, and 1RC-3

107. Verify either:

Core superheated

Rx vessel head level at 0″

RNO: GO TO Step 109

109. IAAT BWST level is ≤ 19', THEN initiate Encl 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES).

CAUTION

If TDEFDWP is being used for SG feed, reducing SG pressure below 250 psig can result in reduced pumping capability

110. Maintain SG pressure < RCS pressure utilizing either:

__ TBVs

__ ADVs

111. Verify any SG available for feeding/steaming.

112. Initiate Encl 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell T Control).

113. Verify indications of SGTR exist.

RNO: GO TO Step 116


RNO: GO TO Step 118



Page 21 of 58



NOTE If in boiler condenser cooling, the CETCs may have a saw tooth pattern, sometimes increasing and sometimes decreasing. The overall trend should be used to make this determination.

118. Verify CETCs trend decreasing.

119. Verify primary to secondary heat transfer is excessive.

RNO: GO TO Step 121

121. Verify indications of SGTR 25 gpm.

RNO: GO TO Step 123

123. Verify required RCS makeup flow within normal makeup capability.

RNO: GO TO LOCA CD tab (page 22)



Page 22 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 2 Event No.: 7 Page 7 of 10 Event Description: Large Break LOCA (M: ALL)


LOCA Cooldown Tab Crew Response:

LOCA COOLDOWN Tab

1. IAAT BWST level is ≤ 19’, THEN initiate Encl 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES).

2. Verify ES actuated.

3. GO TO Step 7.


Ensure all RBCUs in low speed.

Open 1LPSW-18

Open 1LPSW-21

Open 1LPSW-24

8. Initiate Encl 5.35 (Containment Isolation).

9. Start all RB Aux fans.

10. IAAT either of the following exists:

LPI FLOW TRAIN A plus LPI FLOW TRAIN B ≥ 3400gpm

Only one LPI header in operation with header flow ≥ 2900 gpm

THEN GO TO Step 11.

11. Stop all RCPs

12. Dispatch an operator to perform the following:

__ Remove white tag and close 1XO-F5C (1A CFT Outlet)

__ Remove white tag and close 1XP-F5C (1B CFT Outlet)

__ Close 1XS2-F3D (1LP-104 Bkr (Post LOCA Boron Dilute))

13. IAAT breakers for 1CF-1 AND 1CF-2 are closed, THEN close 1CF-1 and 1CF-2

14. Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.28 (Local SG Isolation) to isolate both SGs

15. IAAT Spent Fuel Cooling indicates:

__ Abnormal temperature increase

__ Abnormal level change

__ Abnormal SFC flow

THEN initiate AP/35

16. Verify 1MS-24 and 1MS-33 are closed



Page 23 of 58



CT-2

Rule 2 Crew Response:

Rule 2 LOSCM

1. IAAT all exist:

Any SCM ≤ 0°F

Rx power ≤ 1%

≤ 2 minutes elapsed since loss of SCM

THEN perform Steps 2 and 3.

2. Stop all RCPs. 1A1 RCP will NOT trip using the switch

RNO: 1. Place 1TA AUTO/MAN switch in MAN.

2. Place 1TB AUTO/MAN switch in MAN.

3. Open 1TA SU 6.9 KV FDR.

4. Open 1TB SU 6.9 KV FDR.

3. Notify CR SRO of RCP status.

4. Verify Blackout exists.

RNO: GO TO Step 6.

6. Open:

1HP-24

1HP-25

7. Start all available HPI pumps.

8. GO TO Step 13.

13. Open:

1HP-26

1HP-27

14. Verify at least two HPI pumps are operating using two diverse indications.

15. IAAT ≥ 2 HPI pumps operating, AND HPI flow in any header is in the Unacceptable Region of Figure 1 THEN perform Steps16-21.

RNO: GO TO Step 17



Page 24 of 58



SRO/BOP

Rule 2 16. Open in the affected header:

1A Header 1B Header

1HP-410 1HP-409

17. IAAT flow limits are exceeded,

Pump Operation Limit

1HPI pump/hdr 475 gpm (incl. seal injection for A hdr)

1A & 1B HPI pumps operating with 1HP-409 open

Total flow of 950 gpm (incl. seal injection)

THEN perform Steps 18-20.

RNO: GO TO Step 21.

18. Place Diverse HPI in BYPASS.



Page 25 of 58



SRO

OATC

BOP

Rule 2 19. Perform both:

Place ES CH 1 in MANUAL.


20. Throttle HPI to maximize flow ≤ flow limit.

21. Notify CR SRO of HPI status.

22. Verify RCS pressure > 550 psig.



Only one LPI header in operations with header flow ≥ 2900 gpm

THEN GO TO Step 24.

RNO: GO TO Step 35.


Place 1FDW-315 in MANUAL and close.

Place 1FDW-316 in MANUAL and close.

Place 1FDW-35 in HAND and close.

Place 1FDW-44 in HAND and close.

25. Notify crew that performance of Rule 3 is NOT required due to LBLOCA.

26. WHEN directed by CR SRO, THEN EXIT.



Page 26 of 58

Rule 6 HPI

HPI Pump Throttling Limits

• HPI must be throttled to prevent violating the RV-P/T limit.
















• Core SCM > 0


• SRO concurrence required if throttling following emergency boration




Page 27 of 58

EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation)


15. __ Determine all ES channels that should have actuated based on RCS pressure and RB pressure:

16. __ Verify all ES channels associated with actuation setpoints have actuated.

NOTE

Voter OVERRIDE extinguishes the TRIPPED light on the associated channels that have auto actuated. Pressing TRIP on channels previously actuated will reposition components that may have been throttled or secured by this Enclosure.

__ Depress TRIP on affected ES logic channels that have NOT previously been actuated.

17. __ IAAT additional ES actuation setpoints are exceeded, THEN perform Steps 15 - 16.

18. __ Place Diverse HPI in BYPASS. __ Place Diverse HPI in OVERRIDE.

19. Perform both:

__ Place ES CH 1 in MANUAL.


NOTE

Voter OVERRIDE affects all channels of the affected ODD and/or EVEN channels.

In OVERRIDE, all components on the affected ODD and/or EVEN channels can be manually operated from the component switch.

1. __ IF ES CH 1 fails to go to MANUAL, THEN place ODD voter in OVERRIDE.

2. __ IF ES CH 2 fails to go to MANUAL, THEN place EVEN voter in OVERRIDE.

Actuation Setpoint

(psig)

Associated ES Channel

1600 (RCS) 1 & 2 550 (RCS) 3 & 4 3 (RB) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6 10 (RB) 7 & 8


Page 28 of 58


6. __ IAAT all exist:

__ Voter associated with ES channel is in OVERRIDE

__ An ES channel is manually actuated

__Components on that channel require manipulation

THEN depress RESET on the required channel.

7. __ Verify Rule 2 in progress or complete. __ GOTO Step 74.

8. __ Verify any RCP operating. __ GOTO Step 10.

9. Open:

__ 1HP-20

__ 1HP-21

10. __ IAAT any RCP is operating, AND ES Channels 5 and 6 actuate, THEN perform Steps 11 - 15.

__ GOTO Step 16.

11. Perform all:



NOTE





12. __ Verify any RCP is operating __ GO TO Step 16

13. Open:

__ 1CC-7

__ 1CC-8

__ 1LPSW-15

__ 1LPSW-6

14. __ Ensure only one CC pump operating.

15. __ Ensure Standby CC pump in AUTO.


Page 29 of 58


16. __ IAAT ES Channels 3 & 4 are actuated, THEN GO TO Step 17.

__ GO TO Step 54.

17. __ Place Diverse LPI in BYPASS. __ Place Diverse LPI in OVERRIDE.

18. Perform both:



NOTE





CAUTION

LPI pump damage may occur if operated in excess of 30 minutes against a shutoff head. {6}

19. __ IAAT any LPI pump is operating against a shutoff head, THEN at the CR SRO's discretion, stop affected LPI pumps. {6, 22}

20. __ IAAT RCS pressure is < LPI pump shutoff head, THEN perform Steps 21 - 22.

__ GOTO Step 23.


__ Open 1LP-17.

__ Start 1A LPI PUMP.

1. __ Stop 1A LPI PUMP.

2. __ Close 1LP-17.


__ Open 1LP-18.

__ Start 1B LPI PUMP.

1. __ Stop 1B LPI PUMP.

2. __ Close 1LP-18.


Page 30 of 58


23. __ IAAT 1A and 1B LPI PUMPs are off / tripped, AND all exist:

__ RCS pressure < LPI pump shutoff head

__ 1LP-19 closed

__ 1LP-20 closed


__ GO TO Step 26.

24. Open:

__ 1LP-9

__ 1LP-10

__ 1LP-6

__ 1LP-7

__ 1LP-17

__ 1LP-18

__ 1LP-21

__ 1LP-22

25. __ Start 1C LPI PUMP.

26. __ IAAT 1A LPI PUMP fails while operating, AND 1B LPI PUMP is operating, THEN close 1LP-17.

27. __ IAAT 1B LPI PUMP fails while operating, AND 1A LPI PUMP is operating, THEN close 1LP-18.

28. Start:



(CT- 3)





Page 31 of 58


30. Verify open:

__ 1CF-1 __ 1CF-2

__ IF CR SRO desires 1CF-1 and 1CF-2 open, THEN open:

__ 1CF-1 __ 1CF-2

31. __ Verify 1HP-410 closed. 1. __ Place 1HP-120 in HAND.

2. __ Close 1HP-120.

32. __ Secure makeup to the LDST.

33. __ Verify all ES channel 1 - 4 components are in the ES position.

1. __ IF 1HP-3 fails to close, THEN close 1HP-1.


3. __ IF 1HP-20 fails to close, AND NO RCPs operating, THEN close:

__ 1HP-228

__ 1HP-226

__ 1HP-232

__ 1HP-230

4. __ Notify SRO to evaluate components NOT in ES position and initiate action to place in ES position if desired.

34. __ Verify Unit 2 turbine tripped. __ GOTO Step 37.

35. __ Close 2LPSW-139.

36. __ Verify total LPSW flow to Unit 2 LPI coolers 6000 gpm.

__ Reduce LPSW to Unit 2 LPI coolers to obtain total LPSW flow 6000 gpm.

37. __ Close 1LPSW-139.

38. Place in FAIL OPEN:

__ 1LPSW-251 FAIL SWITCH


39. __ Start all available LPSW pumps.


Page 32 of 58


40. Verify either:

__ Three LPSW pumps operating

__ Two LPSW pumps operating when Tech Specs only requires two operable

__ GOTO Step 42.

41. Open:

__ 1LPSW-4 __ 1LPSW-5

__ IF both are closed:

__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5

THEN notify SRO to initiate action to open at least one valve prior to BWST level 19'.

42. __ IAAT BWST level 19', THEN initiate Encl 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES).

1. __ Display BWST level using OAC Turn-on Code "SHOWDIG O1P1600".

2. __ Notify crew of BWST level IAAT step.

43. __ Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.2 (Placing RB Hydrogen Analyzers In Service). (PS)

44. __ Select DECAY HEAT LOW FLOW ALARM SELECT switch to ON.

45. __ IAAT ES channels 5 & 6 have actuated, THEN perform Step 46.

__ GOTO Step 47.

NOTE

RBCU transfer to low speed will NOT occur until 3 minute time delay is satisfied.

46. __ Verify all ES channel 5 & 6 components are in the ES position.

__ Notify SRO to evaluate components NOT in ES position and initiate action to place in ES position if desired.


Page 33 of 58


47. __ IAAT ES channels 7 & 8 have actuated, THEN perform Steps 48 - 49.

__ GOTO Step 50.

48. Perform all:



NOTE







50. __ Notify U2 CR SRO that SSF is inoperable due to OTS1-1 open.

51. __ Ensure any turnover sheet compensatory measures for ES actuation are complete as necessary.

52. __ IAAT conditions causing ES actuation have cleared, THEN initiate Encl 5.41 (ES Recovery).

53. __ WHEN CR SRO approves, THEN EXIT.

END


Page 34 of 58


Unit Status

ES Channels 3 & 4 have NOT actuated.

54. Start:



CT-3




56. Verify open:

__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


2. __ Close 1HP-120.






__ 1HP-228

__ 1HP-226

__ 1HP-232

__ 1HP-230



61. __ Close 2LPSW-139.



63. __ Close 1LPSW-139.


Page 35 of 58






66. Verify either:



__ GOTO Step 68.

67. Open:

__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5


__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5





69. __ Dispatch an operator to perform Encl 5.2 (Placing RB Hydrogen Analyzers In Service). (PS )





END


Page 36 of 58


74. Open:

__ 1HP-24

__ 1HP-25

1. __ IF both BWST suction valves (1HP-24 and 1HP-25) are closed, THEN:

A. __ Start 1A LPI PUMP.

B. __ Start 1B LPI PUMP.

C. Open:

__ 1LP-15

__ 1LP-16

__ 1LP-9

__ 1LP-10

__ 1LP-6

__ 1LP-7



F. __ GOTO Step 75.

2. __ IF only one BWST suction valve (1HP-24 or 1HP-25) is open, THEN:

A. __ IF three HPI pumps are operating, THEN secure 1B HPI PUMP.

B. __ IF< 2 HPI pumps are operating, THEN start HPI pumps to obtain two HPI pump operation, preferably in opposite headers.

C. __ GO TO Step 76.


Page 37 of 58


75. __ Ensure at least two HPI pumps are operating.

76. Verify open:

__ 1HP-26

__ 1HP-27

1. __ IF HPI has been intentionally throttled, THEN GOTO Step 77.

2. Open:

__ 1HP-26

__ 1HP-27


Page 38 of 58


77. __ IAAT at least two HPI pumps are operating, AND HPI flow in any header that has NOT been intentionally throttled is in the Unacceptable Region of Figure 1, THEN open the following in the affected header:

Figure 1

Required HPI Flow Per Header

HPI Pump

Runout Region For 1

Pump In Header

(including seal

injection for A

header)

Unacceptable Region (excluding seal

injection)

1A Header 1B Header

1HP-410 1HP-409


Page 39 of 58



79. Open:

__ 1HP-20

__ 1HP-21


__ GOTO Step 86.

81. Perform all:



NOTE





82. __ Verify any RCP operating __ GO TO Step 86

83. Open:

__ 1CC-7

__ 1CC-8

__ 1LPSW-15

__ 1LPSW-6




Page 40 of 58



__ GO TO Step 124.


88. Perform both:



NOTE





CAUTION


89. __ IAAT any LPI pump is operating against a shutoff head, THEN at the CR SRO's discretion, stop affected LPI pumps.{6, 22}


Page 41 of 58



__ GOTO Step 93.


__ Open 1LP-17.



2. __ Close 1LP-17.


__ Open 1LP-18.



2. __ Close 1LP-18.



__ 1LP-19 closed

__ 1LP-20 closed

THEN perform Steps 94 -95.

__ GO TO Step 96.

94. Open:

__ 1LP-9

__ 1LP-10

__ 1LP-6

__ 1LP-7

__ 1LP-17

__ 1LP-18

__ 1LP-21

__ 1LP-22





Page 42 of 58


98. Start:






100. Verify open:

__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


2. __ Close 1HP-120.






__ 1HP-228

__ 1HP-226

__ 1HP-232

__ 1HP-230



105. __ Close 2LPSW-139.



107. __ Close 1LPSW-139.


Page 43 of 58






110. Verify either:



__ GOTO Step 112.

111. Open:

__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5


__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5








__ GOTO Step 117.

NOTE





Page 44 of 58


117. __ IAAT ES channels 7 & 8 have actuated, THEN perform Step 118 - 119.

__ GOTO Step 120.

118. Perform all:



NOTE












Page 45 of 58

Unit Status


124. Start:






126. Verify open:

__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


__ 1CF-1 __ 1CF-2


2. __ Close 1HP-120.






__ 1HP-228

__ 1HP-226

__ 1HP-232

__ 1HP-230



131. __ Close 2LPSW-139.



133. __ Close 1LPSW-139.


Page 46 of 58






136. Verify either:



__ GOTO Step 138.

137. Open:

__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5


__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5










END


Page 47 of 58

Enclosure 5.5



NOTE



• 1A HPI Pump

• 1B HPI Pump

• 1HP-26

• 1HP-7


• 1HP-5





A. Open:

1CS-26

1CS-41


C. Notify SRO.



Page 48 of 58





__ GO TO Step 10.

7. Open:

• 1HP-24

• 1HP-25




C. Open:

1LP-15

1LP-16

1LP-9

1LP-10

1LP-6

1LP-7



F. GO TO Step 8.




C. GO TO Step 9.


Page 49 of 58





__ 1HP-26

1HP-27




Page 50 of 58




__ GO TO Step 12.


• Open 1HP-24.

• Open 1HP-25.

• Close 1HP-16.




C. Open:

1LP-15

1LP-16

1LP-9

1LP-10

1LP-6

1LP-7





NOTE




Page 51 of 58





Open 1HP-17.

Open 1HP-18


Letdown isolated

LPSW available



GO TO Step 35.

16. Open:

__ 1CC-7

__ 1CC-8






__ 1HP-1

__ 1HP-2



20. GO TO Step 23.



GO TO Step 23.

22. GO TO Step 35.


Page 52 of 58






1HP-1

1HP-3


1HP-2

1HP-4


25. Open:

1HP-1

1HP-2

1HP-3

1HP-4





27. __ Close 1HP-6.

28. __ Close 1HP-7.


2. Close:

1HP-8

1HP-9&11



B. Close 1HP-16.



Page 53 of 58





33. Open 1HP-6.


NOTE









LDST level > 55″



THEN close:

1HP-24

1HP-25


Page 54 of 58




__ GO TO Step 40.




C. Close 1CS-46.





__ GO TO Step 42.






Page 55 of 58



CONDITION ACTIONS

1. PR NIs ≥ 5% FP

OR

NIs NOT decreasing

GO TO UNPP tab.

UNPP


{13}





GO TO EHT tab.



GO TO LOHT tab.


GO TO EHT tab.

EHT



GO TO TBF tab.

TBF


ES



ES




ROP



EDL



• Notify OSM to reference the Emergency Plan and NSD 202 (Reportability).

NOTIFY


Page 56 of 58

ICC EP/1/A/1800/001


CONDITION ACTIONS

1. All 4160V SWGR de-energized after ICC tab is entered {13}

GO TO Blackout tab.

BLACKOUT


ES



ES




ROP



• Notify OSM to reference the Emergency Plan and NSD 202 (Reportability).

• Notify plant staff that

Emergency Dose Limits are in affect using PA system.

NOTIFY and EDL


Page 57 of 58

CRITICAL TASKS

CT-1 Ensure the Main Vacuum Pumps are operating prior to the low vacuum trip. CT-2 (BWOG CT-1) Trip all RCPs

RCPs must be secured within 2 minutes of RCS SCM reaching zero per Rule 2. CT-3 (BWOG CT-27) Implementation of Control Room Habitability Guidance

Start the Outside Air Booster Fans within 30 minutes of a LOCA. Not performing this action could result in Control Room habitability issues.


UNIT 0 (OSM)

SSF Operable: No KHU's Operable: U1 - OH, U2 - UG LCTs Operable: 2 Fuel Handling: No








RBNS Rate: 0.01 gpm



Required Date/Time

TS/SLC #

AMSAC/DSS 0300 7 Days SLC 16.7.2

SSF 0400 7 Days TS 3.10.1


Primary

Due to unanalyzed condition, the SSF should be considered INOPERABLE for Unit 1 if power levels are reduced below 85%. Evaluations must be performed prior to declaring the SSF operable following a return to power (after going below 85%).

1RIA-3 and 5 removed from RB.

SASS is in Manual


Just after or during a GWD release, 1SA-8/B-9 may alarm from RIA-32 sample point selected to ‘1 PRV System Filter Discharge’. IF 1SA-8/B-9 is due to RIA-32 - ‘1 PRV System Filter Discharge’, it can be considered an expected alarm

The BOP is to pump the RBNS per OP/1/A/1104/007 Encl 4.1 due to high level

Secondary

AMSAC/DSS bypassed

Unit 2 is supplying the AS header

1SSH-1, 1SSH-3, 1SD-2, 1SD-5, 1SD-140, 1SD-303, 1SD-355, 1SD-356 and 1SD-358 are closed with power supply breakers open per the Startup Procedure for SSF Overcooling Event.







Page 1 of 48


________________________ ________________________OATC

________________________ ________________________BOP


Turnover:

SASS is in Manual

AMSAC/DSS is Bypassed


Event No.


Event Description



1 Override C: BOP, SRO HPSW Jockey Pump Trips

2 Override C: OATC, SRO (TS) Inadvertent DPLIAS Actuation

3 MPI500 MPI171

I: OATC, SRO 1A THOT Fails High

4 MPS110 C: BOP, SRO (TS) 1HP-5 Fails Closed (Restore Letdown)

5 MPS247 R: OATC, C: BOP, SRO (TS)

1B1 RCP Lower Seal Failure (Requires Manual Power Reduction)

6 N: BOP, SRO Support Activities During Power Decrease and Securing 1B1 RCP

7

MSS010

MSS020

MSS260

MSS270

MSS330

M: ALL

LOHT Requiring CBP Feed

Turbine Fails to Trip When Performing IMAs Requiring EHC Pump Lockout

EFDW Restored From Unit 2



Page 2 of 48

Scenario 3

Event Summary

Event 1: This event will start with the HPSW Jockey Pump tripping off and the BOP will refer to

the Alarm Response Guide for 1SA-9/D-8 (HPSW Jockey Pump Off). Once an operator is dispatched to investigate the cause of the trip, a report will be made to the crew that a scaffold builder accidentally bumped the Jockey Pump breaker. They will also be told that the pump breaker is closed and there is no damage to the Jockey Pump or it’s breaker. The crew will then restart the pump per the ARG.

Event 2: The crew will respond to 1SA-01/E-11 (Diverse LPI Trip) which will direct them to initiate AP/42 (Inadvertent ES Actuation). The crew will bypass Diverse LPI , secure the 1A and 1B LPI pumps, and close 1LP-17 and 1LP-18 (LPI Injection Valves). This will require the SRO to evaluate TS/SLC and enter the appropriate conditions

Event 3: The 1A Loop THOT instrument will fail high which will cause FDW flow to increase and control rods to insert. They should perform Plant Transient Response and take the ICS Diamond and Feedwater Loop Masters to manual and re-ratio FDW to stabilize the plant before the Reactor trips

Event 4: 1HP-5 will fail closed causing a loss of RCS letdown. The crew will enter AP/32 for a Loss of Letdown and minimize charging flow and seal injection to help control RCS inventory. The crew will restore letdown by dispatching an operator to manually open 1HP-5 locally which is a containment isolation valve. This requires an operator stationed locally at the valve in communication with the control room. This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions

Event 5: The 1B1 RCP lower seal will fail and crew will refer to Alarm Response Guides which will direct entry into AP/16 (Abnormal RCP Operation). AP/16 will direct the crew to initiate a manual power reduction since ICS will be in manual. Once Reactor power is < 70%, the 1B1 RCP will be secured. Once the RCP is secured, the OATC will have to manually re-ratio FDW to control ΔTc within a band of ± 2°F. This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions

Event 6: Once power has been reduced to < 70% in event 5, the BOP will secure the 1E1 and 1E2 Heater Drain Pumps and then secure the 1B1 RCP due to the seal failure.

Event 7: Both Main FDW Pumps will trip which will cause the Reactor to trip. During the performance of Immediate Manual Actions, the turbine will fail to trip which will require the OATC to secure the EHC pumps in order to close the Turbine Stop Valves. The 1A and 1B Motor Driven EFDW Pumps do not start on low SG level and the Turbine Driven EFDW Pump will trip on overspeed. Rule 3 (Loss of Main/Emergency FDW) will be initiated following a Symptoms Check which will establish Condensate Booster Pump feed to manually control RCS temperature and pressure. The SRO will transfer to the LOHT tab of the EOP to direct mitigation activities. Once RCS temperature and pressure are stabilized and Emergency FDW is aligned from Unit 2, the crew will initiate EFDW flow and feed the SGs per Rule 7 which will begin to establish a level in both SGs.


Page 3 of 48

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 2 Event Description: HPSW Jockey Pump Trips (C: BOP, SRO)


SRO/BOP

Plant Response:

1SA-9/A-8 HPSW Header A/B PRESS LOW

1SA-9/D-8 HPSW JOCKEY PUMP OFF

OAC Alarm – O1D2146 (HPSW Jockey Pump) OFF

HPSW header pressure decreases due to Jockey Pump trip

Crew Response:

Refer to ARG 1SA-9/D-8

3.1 Verify automatic action until jockey pump is restarted.

3.2 IF there is NO evidence of breaker and/or pump motor problem, attempt to restart jockey pump one time. If restart is unsuccessful, notify Maintenance Department.

Booth Cue: Once dispatched to investigate the Jockey Pump motor/breaker, wait two minutes and call back to report "A scaffold builder bumped the Jockey Pump BKR with a scaffold pole. There is no damage to the breaker and the breaker is closed". If asked about the status of the Jockey Pump, state that there are no problems with the Jockey Pump motor.

The crew may refer to ARG 1SA-9/A-8

3.1 Verify proper jockey pump operation

3.2 Refer to SLC 16.9.8a

3.3 Verify HPSW pumps start (start manually if NOT already in operation per OP/0/A/1104/011) when preset levels in EWST are reached

3.4 IF both HPSW Pumps NOT available, Go To EP/1/A/1800/001 Enclosure 5.31 for method of back charging the HPSW system.

3.5 IF HPSW Header Pressure continues to decrease AND Elevated Storage Tank Level is NOT dropping; i.e., altitude valve stuck closed and jockey pump not providing adequate supply, manually start a HPSW Pump.

Refer to OP/0/A/1104/011 (High Pressure Service Water).

3.6 Refer to AP/1-2/A/1700/030 (Aux Building Flood)

3.7 Investigate and correct reason for excessive HPSW usage

3.8 Verify BASE and STANDBY HPSW Pumps stop at 80,000 gals

This event is complete when the Jockey Pump has been restarted, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 4 of 48

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 1 Page 2 of 2 Event Description: HPSW Jockey Pump Trips (C: BOP, SRO)


SRO/BOP

Crew response:

3.9 IF manually started, return HPSW Pumps when NO longer needed

3.9.1 Ensure ‘B’ HPSW Pump in “BASE”

3.9.2 Ensure ‘A’ HPSW Pump in “STANDBY”

The crew may refer to the ARG for O1D2146 (HPSW Jockey Pump)

1. IF there is NO evidence of breaker and/or pump motor problem, THEN attempt to restart jockey pump one time. If restart is unsuccessful, contact SPOC.

2. Refer to OP/0/A/1104/011 (High Pressure Service Water)

This event is complete when the Jockey Pump has been restarted, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 5 of 48

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 5 Event Description: Inadvertent DLPIAS Actuation (C: OATC, SRO) (TS)


BOP

SRO/OATC


1SA-01/E-11, Diverse LPI Trip

1SA-07/D-3, ES ODD VOTERS TROUBLE

1SA-07/E-3, ES EVEN VOTERS TROUBLE

DLPIAS tripped red light Illuminated

LPI Pumps start

LPI injection aligned

LPSW Pumps start

Crew Response:

ARG: 1SA-01/E-11 (Diverse LPI Trip)

3.1 Determine if DLPIAS condition exists (RCS pressure ≤ 462 psig).

3.2 IF RCS pressure is ≤ 462 psig, Go To EP/1/A/1800/001 (Emergency Operating Procedure).

3.3 IF ES condition does NOT exist, Initiate AP/1/A/1700/042 (Inadvertent ES Actuation).

3.4 Refer to OP/1/A/1105/014 (Control Room Instrumentation Operation And Information).

AP/1/A/1700/042 (Inadvertent ES Actuation) rev 004

4.1 Verify any of the following have inadvertently actuated:

Diverse HPI

ES Channel 1

ES Channel 2

RNO: GO TO Step 4.4


ES Channel 5

ES Channel 6

RNO: 1. IF ES Channel 1, ES Channel 2, or Diverse HPI have inadvertently actuated, AND it is desired to restore letdown, THEN initiate AP/42 Encl 5.2 (Letdown Restoration).

2. GO TO Step 4.10.

This event is complete when Enclosure 5.1 is completed and TS/SLCs have been addressed IAW step 4.25, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 6 of 48



SRO/OATC

CT-1


4.10 Close the following:

1HP-24

1HP-25

NOTE If personnel are available, progression should continue while Encl 5.1 (Required Operator Actions) is in progress.

4.11 Ensure AP/42 Encl 5.1 (Required Operator Actions) is in progress. (Page 8)


Diverse LPI

ES Channel 3

ES Channel 4

4.13 Verify Diverse LPI has inadvertently actuated.

Examiner Note: Placing Diverse LPI in BYPASS will actuate Statalarm 1SA-01/E-10. This is an expected alarm.

4.14 Ensure DIVERSE LPI BYPASS is in BYPASS

4.15 Perform the following on all inadvertently actuated system(s):

Ensure ES CH-3 is in MANUAL (does not apply)

Ensure ES CH-4 is in MANUAL (does not apply)

4.16 Verify LPI was aligned in decay heat removal mode prior to ES actuation.

RNO: 1. Stop the following:

1A LPI PUMP

1B LPI PUMP

2. Simultaneously close the following:

1LP-17

1LP-18

4.17 Verify the Rx is critical.



Page 7 of 48



SRO/OATC


CAUTION Do NOT add demin water to counter the boration until RCS boron concentration stabilizes to prevent a positive reactivity event.

Note: The crew may initiate EOP Encl 5.5 for inventory control. These steps are included beginning on (page 39) if necessary.

NOTE ICS in Auto means ICS is in control of Tave and Rx power.

4.18 Verify ICS in Auto

4.19 Verify control rods are outside the desired control band (they are not)



ES Channel 1

Diverse HPI


4.24 Notify SPOC to investigate and repair the cause of the inadvertent ES actuation, as necessary.

4.25 Initiate logging TS/SLC Entry/Exit, as applicable, in accordance with Encl 5.4 (TS/SLC Requirements). (see page 9)

4.26 WHEN all the following exist:

Reason for inadvertent ES Channel or Diverse HPI/LPI actuation has been resolved

ES Channel or Diverse HPI/LPI reset is desired

OSM concurs

THEN continue.



Page 8 of 48



SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/042 Encl 5.1

Crew Response:

AP/1/A/1700/042 Encl 5.1 (Required Operator Actions)

1 Initiate announcement of AP Entry using the PA system.

NOTE If channels are bypassed or in override, 1SA-1/A-10 (ES 1 Trip) and 1SA-1/B-10 (ES 2 Trip) will be off even though the channel may have actuated.

2 Verify any of the following have inadvertently actuated:

Diverse HPI

ES Channel 1

ES Channel 2

RNO: GO TO Step 5


ES Channel 7

ES Channel 8

RNO: GO TO Step 9

9 Perform the following:

A. Open the following to restore RB RIAs:

1PR-7

1PR-8

1PR-9

1PR-10

B. From the ENABLE CONTROLS screen on the RIA View Node, perform the following:

1) Select OFF for RB RIA sample pump.

2) Start the RB RIA sample pump.


Diverse HPI

ES Channel 1

RNO: GO TO Step 12

12 EXIT this enclosure.



Page 9 of 48



SRO

Crew Response:

Examiner Note: SLC 16.7.6 will apply due to the automatic actuation logic being blocked if any Diverse Actuation system is in OVERRIDE or BYPASS.

SLC 16.7.6 (Diverse Actuation Systems)

Condition A (7 days) Restore DLPIAS to FUNCTIONAL status.

Examiner Note: If OAC alarm is received for LPSW leakage accumulator,

TS 3.7.7 will apply.

TS 3.7.7 (LPSW System)


Examiner Note: If the RB RIAs are isolated during this event, TS 3.4.15 would be entered until unisolated in AP/42 Encl 5.1 at Step 9.

TS 3.4.15 (RCS Leakage Detection Instrumentation)

Condition B (Once per 24 hours) Analyze grab samples of the containment atmosphere

OR

(Once per 24 hours) Perform SR 3.4.13.1

AND

(30 days) Restore required containment atmosphere radioactivity monitor to OPERABLE status



Page 10 of 48

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 3 Event Description: 1A Thot Fails High (I: OATC, SRO)


CT-2

SRO/OATC

Plant Response:

1A Th will fail HIGH

Tave will indicate HIGH

Feedwater flow will increase

Control Rods will insert

1SA-2/B-3 (RC Hot Leg Temp High)

1SA-2/B-4 (RC Average Temperature High/Low)

1SA-2/A-12 (ICS Tracking) Crew Response:

When the Statalarms are received, the candidates should utilize the “Plant Transient Response” process to stabilize the plant.


Place the Diamond and both FDW Masters in manual and position as necessary to stabilize the plant. (decrease FDW)

Note: The OATC will have to reduce FDW in order to stabilize power below

the pre-transient level. The CRS should:


Ensure SPOC is contacted to repair the failed instrument. .

AP/1/A/1700/028 (ICS Instrument Failures) Rev 20









This event is complete when the SRO reaches Step 6 (WHEN) in AP/28 Section 4A, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 11 of 48



BOP





Emergency Plan

__ STA





OAC alarm video

OAC display points




√ Section Failure

4A RCS Temperature

AP/1/A/1700/028, Section 4A (RCS Temperature Failure)

NOTE If Tave instrument circuit failed high, the following may have occurred

depending on initial ICS station status:


Control Rod insertion

Feedwater flow increase

If Tave instrument circuit failed low, the following may have occurred depending on initial ICS station status:


Control Rod withdrawal

Feedwater flow decrease

Feedwater re-ratio



Page 12 of 48



SRO/OATC

AP/1/A/1700/028 Encl 4A Crew Response:


__ 1A FDW MASTER

__ 1B FDW MASTER



__ Select a valid RCS Tave and Delta Tc input to ICS per AM/1/A/0326/020 (Control of Unit 1 Star Module Signal Selection Function).

__ Investigate and repair the failed RCS temperature instrumentation.




6. WHEN notified by SPOC that a valid RCS Tave and Delta Tc input have Been restored to ICS, THEN GO TO OP/1/A/1102/004 A Encl (Placing ICS Stations To Auto).



Page 13 of 48


Event Description: 1HP-5 Fails Closed (Restore Letdown) (C:BOP, SRO) (TS)


SRO/BOP


OAC alarm: HPI LETDOWN FLOW

Letdown flow = 0 gpm

1HP-5 indicates closed Crew Response:

SRO should enter AP/1/A/1700/032 (Loss of Letdown) AP/1/A/1700/032 (Loss of Letdown) rev 006

NOTE This AP may be performed by an RO if the EOP is also in progress. The Procedure Director should resume directing the actions of this AP as soon as EOP actions allow.

4.1 Place 1HP-120 in HAND and reduce demand to zero.

4.2 Position the standby HPI pump switch to OFF.

CAUTION RCP individual seal return valves will close if seal injection is < 22 gpm with CC flow < 575 gpm.

4.3 Throttle 1HP-31, preferably in AUTO, to establish SEAL INLET HDR FLOW to the appropriate value:

√ CC TOTAL FLOW

Throttle HPI Seal flow to:

> 575 gpm 12-15 gpm

≤ 575 gpm 24-25 gpm

NOTE The running HPI pump may operate below 65 gpm for up to 4 hours. HPI pump time of operation below minimum flow is cumulative.

4.4 Verify HPI pump flow ≥ 65 gpm. Note: Flow will be < 65 gpm. 30 + ___ +___ = ___ gpm Recirc + SI + MU

RNO: Log beginning time for HPI pump flow below minimum.

4.5 Initiate makeup to LDST as required.

This event is complete when the Standby HPI pump is placed in AUTO, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 14 of 48




SRO/OATC


4.6 Initiate notification of the following :



Emergency Plan

__ STA

4.7 Verify 1HP-5 closed.

4.8 Dispatch an operator to 1HP-5 (Letdown Isolation) (East Pen Rm) to establish communication with Control Room.

NOTE

Tech Spec 3.4.9 applies when indicated Pzr level > 260” (corrected value for 285”).

Conditions where it is known that letdown CANNOT be restored do not require waiting until 260” to begin a Rapid Shutdown.

4.9 IAAT either of the following exist:

Pzr level > 260”, AND letdown CANNOT be established

Plant conditions exist such that letdown will NOT be restored

THEN initiate unit shutdown per AP/29 (Rapid Unit Shutdown).

4.10 IAAT Pzr level ≥ 375”, THEN trip Rx. 4.11 Determine the cause of loss of letdown AND GO TO designated

mitigation Step:

√ Reason for Loss of Letdown

GO TO

Step

1HP-5 failed closed 4.12 Actual LD Temp high

LD interlock failure

LD line leak

Both LD Coolers isolated

Other

4.28

4.12 Close 1HP-6.



Page 15 of 48




SRO/OATC

AP/1/A/1700/032

Crew Response:

4.13 Close 1HP-7.

4.14 Open 1HP-5 (1HP-5 will NOT open from the control room).

RNO: 1. Notify operator dispatched to 1HP-5 to:

A. Manually open 1HP-5 (LETDOWN ISOLATION)(East Pen Rm).

Booth Cue: When notified to open 1HP-5, FIRE TIMER 13 to manually open 1HP-5. Wait at least 15 seconds and report back that 1HP-5 is manually open.

B. Maintain continuous communication with Control Room.

2. IF 1HP-5 is manually open, THEN enter TS 3.6.3. (see page 16)

4.15 Place the CC system in operation.

4.16 Verify letdown temperature < 135°F.

4.17 Throttle open 1HP-7 to establish ≈ 20 gpm.

4.18 WHEN letdown temperature < 130°F, THEN place LETDOWN HI TEMP INTLK BYP switch in NORMAL.

4.19 Open 1HP-6

4.20 Adjust 1HP-7 to control desired letdown flow.

4.21 Re-establish normal makeup through 1HP-120.

Examiner Note: Normal makeup may include placing 1HP-120 in AUTO.

4.22 Verify any purification IX in service.

4.23 Notify SPOC to initiate repairs on 1HP-5.

4.24 Re-establish normal RCP seal injection flow.

4.25 Position the standby HPI pump switch to AUTO.

4.26 WHEN repairs are compete on 1HP-5 (LETDOWN ISOLATION) (East Pen Rm), THEN perform the following:

A. Locally turn 1HP-5 handwheel fully clockwise.

B. EXIT TS 3.6.3.

4.27 EXIT

Examiner Note: 1HP-5 will not be repaired for this scenario.



Page 16 of 48




SRO

TS 3.6.3 CONTAINMENT ISOLATION VALVES

Condition A (4 hours) Isolate the affected penetration flow path by use of at least one closed and de-activated automatic valve, one closed and de-activated non-automatic power operated valve, closed manual valve, blind flange, or check valve with flow through the valve secured

AND

(Once per 31 days) Verify the affected penetration flow path is isolated.

Note: Penetration flow paths except for 48 inch purge valve penetration flow paths may be un-isolated intermittently under administrative controls.

TS 3.6.3 Bases, Administrative Controls: The opening of locked or sealed closed containment isolation valves on an intermittent basis under administrative control includes the following:

(1) stationing an operator, who is in constant communication with control room, at the valve controls,

(2) instructing this operator to close these valves in an accident situation, and

(3) assuring that environmental conditions will not preclude access to close the valves and that this action will prevent the release of radioactivity outside the containment (Ref. 5).

Examiner Note: If pressurizer level exceeds 260 inches, TS 3.4.9 would

also be entered.

TS 3.4.9 PRESSURIZER

Condition A (1 hour) Restore Pressurizer water level to within limit

If RCS pressure goes below 2125 psig, TS 3.4.1 will apply if power remains inside the steady state band of 4% during Plant Transient Response in Event 3.

TS 3.4.1 RCS Pressure, Temperature, & Flow DNB Limits

Condition A (2 hours) Restore RCS DNB parameter(s) to within limit



Page 17 of 48

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 5/6 Page 1 of 10 Event Description: 1B1 RCP Lower Seal Failure (Requires Manual Power Reduction)

(R: OATC, C:BOP, SRO) (TS)


SRO/BOP

Plant Response:

1SA-06/C-5 (RC PUMP 1B1 SEAL CAVITY PRESS HI/LOW)

OAC Alarm RCP 1B1 LOWER SEAL CAVITY PRESSURE HI HI

OAC Alarm RCP 1B1 UPPER SEAL CAVITY PRESSURE HI HI

OAC Alarm 1B1 UPPER & LOWER SEAL ΔP

Crew response:

Refer to the ARGs

3.1 Upper/Lower Seal Cavity Pressure High

3.1.1 Go To AP/1/A/1700/016, Abnormal RCP Operation, for limits and required action

3.2 Upper/Lower Seal Cavity Pressure Low

3.2.1 IF in Mode 1 or 2, Go To AP/1/A/1700/016, Abnormal RCP Operation, for limits and required action

AP/1/A/1700/016 (Abnormal RCP Operation) rev 033

4.1 IAAT any RCP meets immediate trip criteria of Encl 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria), THEN perform Steps 4.2 - 4.11.


4.12 IAAT either of the following apply:

__ Any RCP approaching immediate trip criteria of Encl 5.1 (RCP Immediate Trip Criteria)

__ There is an immediate need to stop a RCP at this time

THEN perform Steps 4.13 - 4.15.

RNO: GO TO Step 4.16 (see page 20)

Examiner Note: It is acceptable for the SRO to take either procedure path to secure the 1B1 RCP. Step 4.16 is page 20.

4.13 Verify Rx Power > 70%

4.14 Initiate Encl 5.2 (Rapid Power Reduction) (see page 23)

4.15 WHEN Rx Power is ≤ 70%, THEN GO TO Step 4.2

4.2 Verify MODE 1 or 2

4.3 Verify Rx power is ≤ 70% as indicated on all NIs

This event is complete when 1B1 RCP is secured and ΔTc is within 0 ± 2°F, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 18 of 48




SRO/BOP


4.4 Verify three RCPs will remain operating after affected RCP is tripped

4.5 Verify any SG on Low Level Limits

RNO: GO TO Step 4.8

4.8 Verify FDW masters in Auto

RNO: 1. Stop affected pump

2. Manually adjust FDW masters to achieve desired ΔTc

3. GO TO Step 4.29

4.29 IAAT any of the following indicate external RCP seal leakage:

__ RB RIAs increasing or in alarm

__ RCS Tave constant with LDST level decreasing more than normal

__ Quench Tank level rate increasing

__ RB Normal Sump rate increasing

__ Visual confirmation

THEN initiate AP/02 (Excessive RCS Leakage).

4.30 Initiate Encl 4.3 (Special Instructions for < 4 RCP Operation) of OP/1/A/1102/004 (Operation at Power). (Page 24)

4.31 IAAT either of the following conditions is met:

__ a RCP has been shut down for ≥ 3 hours

__ a RCP with high oil level has been shut down

THEN close the associated RCP motor cooler inlet/outlet valve:

__ 1LPSW-7&8 (1A1 RCP)

__ 1LPSW-9&10 (1B1 RCP)

__ 1LPSW-13&14 (1A2 RCP)

__ 1LPSW-11&12 (1B2 RCP)


CAUTION Total FDW flow should be maintained constant to prevent changes in core reactivity


Page 19 of 48




SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/016

4.32 IAAT either of the following has exceeded 260°F including transient situations:

__ O1A1253 - O1A1256 (RCP UPPER SEAL HOUSING TEMP)

__ O1A1910 - O1A1913 (RCP SEAL RETURN TEMP)

THEN closely monitor seal parameters for degradation until an Engineering evaluation is completed due to potential for seal ring and elastomer damage.

NOTE Operating experience has shown that failure of RC Pump components located internal to the RCS can create loose debris which can lead to fuel clad failures. These type RC Pump failures may cause Loose Parts Monitor alarms immediately and increased RCS radioactivity later.

4.33 Verify 1RIA 57 or 1RIA 58 have increased.


4.35 IAAT a RCP has been tripped due to exceeding Immediate Trip Criteria on a RCP motor, THEN contact RCP engineer prior to restart.

4.36 IAAT both are met:

__ There has been a failure of the DELTA Tc controller

__ The DELTA Tc controller has been repaired

THEN initiate OP/1/A/1102/004 A Encl (Placing ICS Stations To Auto).

4.37 Verify any RCP that was shut down had a high vibration alarm.

4.38 Initiate a PIP for Engineering to document potential vibration effects on RCS piping.

4.39 WHEN conditions permit, THEN EXIT this procedure.



Page 20 of 48




SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/016

Alternate Path from Step 4.12

4.16 Announce AP entry using the PA system

4.17 Notify OSM to request evaluation by RCP Component Engineer

4.18 IAAT the failure is identified, THEN GO TO the applicable section per the following table:

√ Section Failure

4A Seal Failure

4B Abnormal Vibration

4C High or Low Oil Pot Level

4D Loss of Seal Return

4E Abnormal RCP Temperatures

AP/1/A/1700/016 Section 4A (RCP Seal Failure)

1. IAAT any RCP meets immediate trip criteria of Encl 5.1, THEN perform Steps 2-11

RNO: GO TO Step 12

12. IAAT any of the following indicate external RCP seal leakage:

RB RIAs increasing or in alarm

RCS Tave constant with LDST level decreasing more than normal

Quench Tank level rate increasing

RB Normal Sump rate increasing

Visual confirmation

THEN initiate AP/02 (Excessive RCS Leakage)

13. Verify the following are open:

__ 1HP-20

__ 1HP-21



Page 21 of 48




SRO/BOP

AP/1/A/1700/016

14. Verify the following is open for the affected RCP:

1HP-232 (1B1 RCP)

15. IAAT either of the following conditions apply to an operating RCP:

√ RCS Pressure ∆P across any seal

> 1000 psig ≤ 100 psid

≤ 1000 psig ≤ 35 psid

OR shut down of an RCP is desired, THEN perform Steps 16-26 to shut down the affected RCP.

16. Verify MODE 1 or 2

17. Verify three RCPs will remain operating after affected RCP is tripped

18. Verify Rx power is ≤ 70% as indicated on all NIs

RNO: 1. Direct an RO to initiate Encl 5.2 (Rapid Power Reduction) (see page 23)

2. WHEN Rx power is ≤ 70% on all NIs, THEN continue this procedure

19. Verify any SG on Low Level Limits

RNO: GO TO Step 22


NOTE

A single failed seal can transport debris to the other seals and damage them. A RCP with a failed seal should be secured as quickly as plant conditions allow.

Use diverse indications, such as changes in other seal pressures, to ensure abnormal parameter is not a single instrument failure. For any seal failure, upper and lower seal cavity pressures should change from normal value.


Page 22 of 48




BOP OATC

AP/1/A/1700/016

22. Verify FDW masters in Auto

RNO: 1. Stop the affected pump

2. Manually adjust FDW masters to achieve desired ∆Tc

3. GO TO Step 25

25. Initiate Encl. 4.3 (Special Instructions for < 4 RCP Operation) of OP/1/A/1102/004 (Operation at Power). (see page 24)

26. Initiate the following notifications:

__ Notify OSM to make required notifications of OMP 1-14 (Notifications).

__ Notify Rx Engineering and request a power maneuver plan, if needed.

__ Notify SOC if load reduction was required.

__ Notify Chemistry to take RCS boron samples on a 1 hour frequency.

27 IAAT a RCP has been shut down for ≥ 3 hours THEN close the associated RCP motor cooler inlet/outlet valve:

__ 1LPSW-7&8 (1A1 RCP)

__ 1LPSW-9&10 (1B1 RCP)

__ 1LPSW-13&14 (1A2 RCP)

__ 1LPSW-11&12 (1B2 RCP)

28 IAAT either of the following has exceeded 260°F including transient situations:

__ O1A1253 - O1A1256 (RCP UPPER SEAL HOUSING TEMP)

__ O1A1910 - O1A1913 (RCP SEAL RETURN TEMP)

THEN closely monitor seal parameters for degradation until an Engineering evaluation is completed due to potential for seal ring and elastomer damage.


CAUTION Total FDW flow should be maintained constant to prevent changes in core reactivity


Page 23 of 48




SRO/OATC

BOP

AP/1/A/1700/016 Encl 5.2

AP/16 Enclosure 5.2 (Rapid Power Reduction)

1. Verify ICS in AUTO

RNO: 1. Notify SRO to provide target power level, average power reduction rate, and control bands, as required

2. Initiate manual power reduction to ≤ 70%

3. WHEN Rx Power ≤ 70% as indicated by all Nis , THEN notify CRS

4. Stop the following pumps:

__ 1E1 HTR DRN PUMP

__ 1E2 HTR DRN PUMP

5. GO TO Step 7

7. Verify Rx Power was reduced ≥ 15% within a 1 hour period

8. Notify Primary Chemistry to perform Tech Spec SR 3.4.11.2 as required

9. EXIT this enclosure Once Reactor Power is reduced to below 85%, the SSF must be declared inoperable and therefore Tech Spec 3.10.1 applies.

TS 3.10.1 STANDBY SHUTDOWN FACILITY (SSF)

Conditions A-E (7 Days) Restore to OPERABLE status



Page 24 of 48




OP/1/A/1102/004 Encl 4.3

OP/1/A/1102/004 (Operations At Power) Encl 4.3 (Special Instructions For < 4 RCP Operations) Rev 147

2.1 IF conditions permit, log the current quadrant power tilt and the position of the ΔTC controller prior to securing a RCP during power operations.

NOTE Instructions for performing OAC trends are located in Working With

Trends enclosure of OP/0/A/1103/020 A (Operator Aid Computer Use).

Only the first 6 points will be displayed initially; press "Page Down" key to see second 6 points.

2.2 Using turn-on code T6 3RCP, digitally trend the following data at one minute intervals:

Point ID Description O1P0889 CORE THERMAL POWER BEST O1P0877 INCORE IMBALANCE O1E3335 API GROUP AVE FOR GROUP 7 O1E3336 API GROUP AVE FOR GROUP 8 O1P0737 INCORE TILT QUADRANT W-X O1P0738 INCORE TILT QUADRANT X-Y O1P0739 INCORE TILT QUADRANT Y-Z O1P0740 INCORE TILT QUADRANT Z-W O1I0828 RC COLD LEG A1 TEMP O1I0829 RC COLD LEG A2 TEMP O1I0830 RC COLD LEG B1 TEMP O1I0831 RC COLD LEG B2 TEMP

2.3 After steady state conditions are attained, perform the following:

2.3.1 Check NI calibration.

2.3.2 IF NI calibration is NOT within requirements of Limit and Precaution Step 2.2.6, calibrate NIs to Thermal Power Best.

NOTE: The 100% Power Imbalance curves also apply for runs at reduced power.

2.4 Maintain Control Rod position and Power Imbalance within COLR limits.



Page 25 of 48




OP/1/A/1102/004 Encl 4.3

NOTE: The Maximum Allowed Power Setpoint (Pmax) is reduced when operating for extended periods with a 3 RC Pump Configuration as a conservative action.

2.5 Perform the following:

2.5.1 IF expected to operate for an extended period of time with only 3 RCPs operating, notify I&E to adjust Flux/Imbalance /Flow trip setpoints for 3 RCP operation per AM/1/A/0315/017 (TXS RPS Channels A, B, C, And D Parameter Changes For Abnormal/Normal Operating Conditions). (R.M.) ________________________ _____ Person Notified Date

2.5.2 IF AT ANY TIME Quadrant Power Tilt problems exist, notify I&E

to Adjust Flux/Imbalance/Flow trip setpoints as required to comply with TS 3.2.3 per AM/1/A/0315/017 (TXS RPS Channels A, B, C, And D Parameter Changes For Abnormal/Normal Operating Conditions). (R.M.) ________________________ _____ Person Notified Date

NOTE

Operations Management/Reactor Engineering Group should be consulted for value to use for high flux alarm setpoint.

Instructions for Adjusting Alarm Setpoints On The NI Recorder are in OP/0/A/1108/001 (Curves And General Information).

2.6 Adjust high flux alarm setpoint per Operations Management/Reactor Engineering Group recommendations. (Alarm setpoint is adjusted on the NI Recorder). (R.M.)

NOTE: 'D' bleed pressure may NOT be high enough to run the FDWP turbines.

2.7 Maintain Auxiliary Steam available to the FDWP turbines.



Page 26 of 48




OP/1/A/1102/004 Encl 4.3

2.8 IF 1SSH-9 (SSH DISCH CTRL BYPASS) is being used to control Steam Seal Header pressure, throttle 1SSH-9 as required to maintain desired SSH pressure during the load reduction to secure an RCP.

NOTE RCS pressure decrease in the loop with two RCPs running is expected. This may cause acceptance criteria of PT/1/A/0600/001 (Periodic Instrument Surveillance) NOT to be met.

2.9 Place note on CR turnover sheet indicating the following:

"Be aware of the effect of the indicated pressure on the margin to trip setpoint for the Reactor Protective System trips associated with RCS pressure."



Page 27 of 48

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 9 Event Description: LOHT Requiring CBP Feed (M: All)


SRO

OATC

BOP

Plant Response:

Both MFWPs trip

Reactor Trips

MD EFDWPs do NOT start

TD EFDWP overspeeds and trips

Crew Response:

SRO directs the OATC to perform IMAs and the BOP to perform a Symptom Check

IMAs EOP Immediate Actions

3.1 Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton

3.2 Verify reactor power < 5% FP and decreasing

3.3 Depress turbine TRIP pushbutton

3.4 Verify all turbine stop valves closed

RNO: Place both EHC pumps in PULL TO LOCK

3.5 Verify RCP seal injection available SYMPTOM CHECK

The BOP will perform a Symptom Check:










CSAE Offgas alarms




BOP will perform Rule 3 due to a loss of ALL Feedwater: (Page 31)

This event is complete when the SRO transfers to the Subsequent Actions tab, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 28 of 48



LOHT Tab Crew Response:

SRO will transfer to the Subsequent Actions tab of the EOP.

SRO will refer to Subsequent Actions Parallel Actions Page and transfer to the LOHT tab.. (see page 37)

SRO will refer to the LOHT Parallel Actions Page and direct an RO to announce plant conditions and notify the SM to reference the Emergency Plan and AD-LS-ALL-0006 (page 38)

Loss of Heat Transfer Tab (LOHT)

1. Ensure Rule 3 is in progress or complete

2. IAAT the RCS heats to the point where core SCM = 0°F, THEN GO TO Step 4.

3. IAAT NO SGs can be fed with FDW (Main/CBP/Emergency/PSW), AND any of the following exist:

__ RCS pressure reaches 2300 psig OR NDT limit

__ PZR level reaches 375" (340" acc)

THEN GO TO Step 4

NOTE: 1A1 RCP provides the best Pzr spray.

RNO: 1. Reduce operating RCPs to one pump/loop.

2. WHEN any exists:

__ EFDW or PSW SG feed flow has been re-established by existing Rules/Enclosures

__ EFDW aligned from another unit

__ Operator performing Rule 3 or Encl. 5.27 reports EFDW available

THEN GO TO Step 50

50. Verify EFDW or PSW flow has been re-established to any SG per Rule 3 or Encl. 5.27 (it has not).

RNO: GO TO step 52.


NOTE

Transfer to LOSCM tab is NOT required if RCS heats to the point where core SCM = 0F.


Page 29 of 48



BOP


52. Verify Unit 1 EFDW available.

RNO: GO TO step 56.

56. Confirm ability to feed any intact SG:

A. Throttle EFDW control valve on each intact SG until flow confirmed

B. WHEN flow confirmed, THEN close valve on each intact SG

57. Perform a brief to discuss operator roles for restoring EFDW flow to the SGs.

58. Verify all:

Tcold > 510°F

TBVs available

59. Verify Tcold ≤ 547°F

Examiner Note: The crew will perform Step 59 based on where they stabilize RCS temperature during CBP feed.

RNO: 1. Set THP setpoint at ≈ 885 psig

2. GO TO step 62

60. Determine Psat for existing RCS temperature (RCS Psat)

61. Adjust THP setpoint to RCS Psat minus 140 psi:

Setpoint = RCS Psat (psia) - 140 psi = ______ psig

62. Place TBVs in AUTO for available SGs.

63. Initiate feed to available SGs per Rule 7 (SG Feed Control)

64. IAAT heat transfer is established in any SG, THEN GO TO Step 75.

75. Control feeding and steaming of available SGs to maintain SG level at setpoint and cooldown rate within Tech Spec limits:

Tcold ≥ 270°F: ≤ 50°F / 1/2 hour

Tcold < 270°F: ≤ 25°F / 1/2 hour

76. Close all loop high point vents: (already closed)

1RC-155

1RC-156

1RC-157

1RC-158



Page 30 of 48




77. WHEN all SCMs are > 0°F, OR HPI flow is established, THEN continue.

78. Verify indications of SGTR ≥ 25 gpm.

RNO: GO TO step 80


81. Verify either:

Any SG isolated

Any SG has an unisolable steam leak

RNO: GO TO step 83.

83. GO TO Subsequent Actions.

EOP Subsequent Actions EOP Subsequent Actions

4.1 Verify all control rods in Groups 1–7 fully inserted.

4.2 Verify Main FDW in operation.

RNO: 1. Ensure Rule 3 is in progress or complete.

2. GO TO Step 4.5

4.5 IAAT Main FDW is operating, AND level in any SG is > 96% on the Operating Range, THEN perform Steps 4.6 - 4.8.


4.9 IAAT TBVs CANNOT control SG pressure at desired setpoint, AND TBVs not intentionally isolated, THEN manually control pressure in affected SGs using either:

__ TBVs

__ Dispatch two operators to perform Encl 5.24

4.10 Verify 1RIA-40 operable with CSAE OFF-GAS BLOWER operating.

4.11 GO TO Step 4.14

4.14 Verify 1MS-17 and 1MS-26 are closed

RNO: Dispatch an operator with Encl 5.29 (MSRV Locations) to verify all MSRVs have reseated



Page 31 of 48



Rule 3

Crew Response:

Rule 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency FDW)

1. Verify loss of Main FDW and/or EFDW was due to TBF.

RNO: GO TO Step 3


RCS pressure reaches 2300 psig or NDT limit.

PZR level reaches 375” (340” acc)

THEN PERFORM Rule 4 (HPI Forced Cooling)

4. Start operable EFDW pumps, as required, to feed all intact SGs.

5. Verify any EFDW pump operating.

RNO: GO TO Step 7

7. Place 1FDW-315 and 1FDW-316 in MANUAL and closed.

8. Verify both:

Any CBP operating

TBVs available on an intact SG

9. Select OFF for both digital channels on AFIS HEADER A.

10. Select OFF for both digital channels on AFIS HEADER B.

11. Place 1FDW-33 and 1FDW-42 switches in OPEN

12. Simultaneously position 1FDW-35 and 1FDW-44 (Startup Control Valves) to 10 – 20% open.


Place 1FDW-31 and 1FDW-40 switches in CLOSE.

Close 1FDW-32 and 1FDW-41.



Page 32 of 48




14. Verify Rule 4 (HPI Forced Cooling) in progress.

RNO: 1. Lower SG pressure in available SGs to ≈ 500 psig

2. Control FDW flow to stabilize RCS P/T by throttling the SU CVs and TBVs as necessary

3. Notify CRS that CBP feed is in progress

4. Place 1FDW-38 and 1FDW-47 switches to OPEN

5. Place 1FDW-36 and 1FDW-45 switches to CLOSE

6. GO TO Step 16

16. Verify 1TD EFDW Pump is operable and available for manual start.

17. Dispatch an operator to perform Encl. 5.26 (Manual Start of TD) (PS)

18. Verify cross-tie with Unit 2 is desired.

19. Dispatch an operator to open 2FDW-313 & 2FDW-314.

20. Dispatch an operator to 1FDW-313 and have them notify the CR when in position.

21. Notify alternate unit to:

Place both EFDW control valves in MANUAL and closed.

Start their TD EFDW Pump

22. IAAT SGs are NOT being fed from any source AND PSW SG Feed available, THEN establish SG feed from PSW using Encl. 5.45 (PSW Feed and RCP Seals).

23. WHEN either exists:

Operator is in position at 1FDW-313

Unit 1 TD EFDW Pump has been manually started

THEN continue.

Booth Cue: Notify crew that AO is in position at 1FDW-313.

Examiner Note: EFDW will be cross-connected with Unit 2.


CAUTION Until SGs are dry, lower SG pressure slowly to prevent overcooling.


Page 33 of 48



Rule 3

Crew Response:

24. IAAT an operator is in position at 1FDW-313, AND Unit 1 TDEFDW Pump is NOT operating, THEN notify the operator to open:

1FDW-313 (1A EFDW Line Disch to 1A S/G X-conn)

1FDW-314 (1B EFDW Line Disch to 1B S/G X-conn)

Booth Cue: Once an AO is directed to open 1FDW 313 & 1FDW-314, FIRE TIMER 15 and notify crew 1FDW-313/314 and 2FDW-313/314 are open.

25. Verify either exists:

HPI Forced Cooling is maintaining core cooling

CBP feed providing SG feed (applies)

26. WHEN either exists:

Unit 1 TDEFDW Pump running

Alignment complete from alternate unit

THEN notify CRS of the following:

Source of EFDW availability

Rule 3 actions are continuing

27. IAAT CBPs were feeding the SGs, AND CBP feed has been lost, THEN:

Position TBVs as desired by CRS

Close 1FDW-35

Close 1FDW-44

28. IAAT an EFDW valve CANNOT control in AUTO, OR manual operation of EFDW valve is desired to control flow/level, THEN perform steps 29 - 33.

RNO: GO TO Step 34

34. Verify any SCM ≤ 0°F.

RNO: IF overcooling, OR exceeding limits in Rule 7 (SG Feed Control), THEN throttle EFDW , as necessary.


NOTE Procedure must continue while cross connects are being opened.


Page 34 of 48



SRO/OATC

BOP


35. Notify the alternate unit to:

Monitor EFDW parameters

Maintain UST level > 7.5'.

Enter appropriate TS/SLC for EFDW valves closed in manual.

36. IAAT Unit 1 EFDW is in operation, THEN initiate Encl. 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation). (applies if Unit 1 TDEFDW Pump running).

37. WHEN directed by CRS, THEN EXIT.

EOP Encl 5.9 Encl. 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation)

1. Monitor EFDW parameters on EFW graphic display.

2. IAAT UST level is < 4', THEN GO TO Step 120.

3. IAAT feeding both SGs with one MD EFDWP is desired, THEN perform Steps 4 - 7.

RNO: GO TO step 8.

8. Perform as required to maintain UST level > 7.5':

Makeup with demin water.

Place CST pumps in AUTO.

9. IAAT all exist:

Rapid cooldown NOT in progress

__ MD EFDWP operating for each available SG

__ EFDW flow in each header < 600 gpm

THEN place 1 TD EFDW PUMP switch in PULL TO LOCK.



Page 35 of 48

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 3 Event No.: 7 Page 9 of 9 Event Description:


EOP Encl 5.9

Crew Response:

10. Verify 1 TD EFDW PUMP operating.

RNO: GO TO step 12.

11. Start TD EFDWP BEARING OIL COOLING PUMP.

NOTE Loss of the condensate system for ≥ 25 minutes results in cooling down to LPI using the ADVs. If NO HWPs are operating, continuing this enclosure to restore the condensate system is a priority unless the CRS deems EOP activities higher priority. The 25 minute criterion is satisfied when a HWP is started and 1C-10 is 10% open. If the condensate system is operating, the remaining guidance establishes FDW recirc, monitors and maintains UST, and transfers EFDW suction to the hotwell if required.

12. Notify CR SRO to set priority based on the NOTE above and EOP activities.

Examiner Note: The CRS will most likely direct the RO to suspend

Encl. 5.9 at this point due to higher priorities.



Page 36 of 48

Rule 6 HPI


















• Core SCM > 0






Page 37 of 48



CONDITION ACTIONS

1. PR NIs ≥ 5% FP

OR

NIs NOT decreasing

GO TO UNPP tab.

UNPP


{13}





GO TO EHT tab.



GO TO LOHT tab.


GO TO EHT tab.

EHT



GO TO TBF tab.

TBF


ES



ES




ROP



EDL



• Notify OSM to reference the Emergency Plan and AD-LS-ALL-0006 (Reportability).

NOTIFY


Page 38 of 48

LOHT EP/1/A/1800/001


CONDITION ACTIONS

1. PR NIs ≥ 5% FP

OR

NIs NOT decreasing

GO TO UNPP tab.

UNPP


{13}



4. All of the following exist:

Any SCM = 0°F

HPI forced cooling NOT in progress

Condition other than RCS heat-up is the cause of loss of subcooling

GO TO LOSCM tab.

LOSCM


ES



ES


Initiate AP/11 (Recovery from Loss of Power).

IF Encl 5.1 (ES Actuation) has been initiated, THEN reinitiate Encl 5.1.

ROP


OR

SGTR > 25 gpm


EDL


Announce plant conditions using PA system.

Notify OSM to reference the Emergency Plan and AD-LS-ALL-0006 (Reportability).

NOTIFY


Page 39 of 48

Enclosure 5.5



NOTE



• 1A HPI Pump

• 1B HPI Pump

• 1HP-26

• 1HP-7


• 1HP-5





A. Open:

1CS-26

1CS-41


C. Notify SRO.



Page 40 of 48





__ GO TO Step 10.

7. Open:

• 1HP-24

• 1HP-25




C. Open:

1LP-15

1LP-16

1LP-9

1LP-10

1LP-6

1LP-7



F. GO TO Step 8.




C. GO TO Step 9.


Page 41 of 48





__ 1HP-26

1HP-27




Page 42 of 48




__ GO TO Step 12.


• Open 1HP-24.

• Open 1HP-25.

• Close 1HP-16.




C. Open:

1LP-15

1LP-16

1LP-9

1LP-10

1LP-6

1LP-7





NOTE




Page 43 of 48





Open 1HP-17.

Open 1HP-18


Letdown isolated

LPSW available



GO TO Step 35.

16. Open:

__ 1CC-7

__ 1CC-8






__ 1HP-1

__ 1HP-2



20. GO TO Step 23.



GO TO Step 23.

22. GO TO Step 35.


Page 44 of 48






1HP-1

1HP-3


1HP-2

1HP-4


25. Open:

1HP-1

1HP-2

1HP-3

1HP-4





27. __ Close 1HP-6.

28. __ Close 1HP-7.


2. Close:

1HP-8

1HP-9&11



B. Close 1HP-16.



Page 45 of 48





33. Open 1HP-6.


NOTE









LDST level > 55″



THEN close:

1HP-24

1HP-25


Page 46 of 48




__ GO TO Step 40.




C. Close 1CS-46.





__ GO TO Step 42.






Page 47 of 48

CRITICAL TASKS

CT-1 Secure LPI pumps within 30 minutes to prevent pump damage from pump

overheating CT-2 ICS must be taken to HAND and FDW adjusted to prevent tripping the reactor.

Adjustment will be dependent on how much time it takes to place ICS in HAND.


UNIT 0 (OSM)

SSF Operable: Yes KHU's Operable: U1 - OH, U2 - UG LCTs Operable: 2 Fuel Handling: No








RBNS Rate: 0.01 gpm



Required Date/Time

TS/SLC #

AMSAC/DSS 0300 7 Days 16.7.2


Primary


1RIA-3 and 5 removed from RB. SASS is in Manual ‘C’ GWD tank release is in progress Just after or during a GWD release, 1SA-8/B-9 may alarm from RIA-32 sample point selected to

‘1 PRV System Filter Discharge’. IF 1SA-8/B-9 is due to RIA-32 - ‘1 PRV System Filter Discharge’, it can be considered an expected alarm

Secondary

AMSAC/DSS bypassed

Unit 2 is supplying the AS header 1SSH-1, 1SSH-3, 1SD-2, 1SD-5, 1SD-140, 1SD-303, 1SD-355, 1SD-356 and 1SD-358 are

closed with power supply breakers open per the Startup Procedure for SSF Overcooling Event.








________________________ ________________________OATC

________________________ ________________________BOP

Initial Conditions: Reactor Power = 3.5%

Turnover:

SASS is in Manual

Event No.


Event Description

0a Override SASS in Manual

0b Override Standby LPSW Pump Auto Start Circuit Disabled

1 N: OATC, SRO Makeup to LDST 100 Gallons

2 Override C: BOP, SRO 1C Hotwell Pump Casing Water Level Low

3 Override C: BOP, SRO (TS) ‘A’ LPSW Pump Trips and ‘C’ LPSW Pump Fails to Auto Start

4 MSS470 C: BOP, SRO (TS) 1C RBCU Cooler Rupture

5 MPI150 I: OATC, SRO (TS) PZR ‘A’ RTD Fails Low

6 MCR061 C: OATC, SRO Continuous Rod Withdrawal

7 MPS400

MPS400D M: ALL

Small Break LOCA

1A MDEFDW Pump fails to start

ES Channel 3 Fails to go to Manual



Page 2 of 58

Scenario 4

Event Summary

Event 1: As soon as the crew takes the shift, the OATC will perform OP/1/A/1103/004 Enclosure 4.6 (RCS Makeup From 1A and 1B BHUT) to add approximately 100 gallons to the LDST for RCS inventory control.

Event 2: The crew will receive alarms indicating that 1C Hotwell Pump casing water level is

low. The associated Alarm Response Guides will require the BOP to start a standby HWP and secure the 1C HWP. The BOP will also bypass the Powdex System as directed by the ARG.

Event 3: The ‘A’ LPSW Pump will trip. This will result in several alarms to alert the operator of the failure since the standby LPSW Pump will not auto start. The associated Alarm Response Guides will direct entry into AP/1/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW). AP guidance will be used to restore normal LPSW system parameters by manually starting the ‘C’ LPSW Pump. This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions.

Event 4: Once the ‘C’ LPSW pump is started, a cooling water line for the 1C Reactor Building Cooling Unit (RBCU) will rupture inside containment. The BOP will use guidance provided in the associated Alarm Response Guide to secure the 1C RBCU and isolate cooling water to stop the leak. If time permits, the crew may decide to begin pumping the RBNS (due to the LPSW leakage from the 1C RBCU Cooler). If so, they will use OP/1/A/1104/007 Enclosure 4.1 (Pumping RBNS to ≥ 1"). This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions.

Event 5: The ‘A’ PZR RTD will fail low causing PZR levels 1 & 2 to indicate low. With SASS in manual, this will cause 1HP-120 to begin throttling open in an attempt to restore the indicated PZR level. Actual PZR level will start to increase and LDST level will begin to decrease. The OATC is expected to place 1HP-120 in Hand and stabilize PZR level. The crew will refer to OP/1/A/1105/014 which will direct them to select PZR Level Channel 3 as the controlling channel. The OATC should then return 1HP-120 to AUTO. This will require the SRO to evaluate Tech Specs and enter the appropriate conditions.

Event 6: Control Rods will begin to withdraw and Reactor power will begin to increase. The crew will perform Plant Transient Response (PTR) to evaluate plant response and determine the cause of the associated transient. The OATC will either place the Diamond in manual and insert Control Rods to stabilize Reactor power or trip the Reactor due to the power increase. If the crew promptly diagnoses the failure and does not trip the Reactor, the scenario will continue by initiating Event 7.


Page 3 of 58

Scenario 4

Event Summary

Event 7: Once the event is initiated, RCS pressure will begin to rapidly decrease and ES

Channels 1 & 2 will actuate on low RCS pressure. Once ES Channels 1 and 2 have actuated, the SRO will direct an operator to perform EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation). After a few minutes ES Channels 3-6 will also actuate. EOP Enclosure 5.1 will require all actuated ES Channels to be placed in manual but ES Channel 3 will fail to go to manual which will require the operator to place the Odd Voters in override. Shortly after ES Channels 1 & 2 actuate, the crew will observe at least one SCM indication ≤ 0°F which will require performing Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) and entry into the EOP LOSCM tab. Rule 2 requires the operator to stop all RCPs within 2 minutes of any SCM indication ≤ 0°F. While performing Rule 2, the 1A Motor Driven EFDW Pump will not start which will require the Turbine Driven EFDW Pump to be started. Rule 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency FDW) is performed as directed by Rule 2 to raise SG levels to the loss of SCM setpoint. EOP Enclosure 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation) will be performed when directed by Rule 3.


Page 4 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 1 Page 1 of 4 Event Description: Makeup To LDST 100 Gallons (N: OATC, SRO)


SRO

OATC


SRO directs the OATC to use the in progress procedure OP/1/A/1103/004 (Soluble Poison Control) Enclosure 4.6 (RCS Makeup From 1A and 1B BHUT) beginning at Step 2.1 to makeup to the RCS from 1A and 1B BHUT. OP/1/A/1103/004, Encl. 4.6 (RCS Makeup From 1A and 1B BHUT) rev 105

Examiner Note: Steps 3.1 -3.3 are complete and the crew will start at Step 3.4 below.

2.1 Perform appropriate section(s) to achieve desired results:

Perform Section 3 (Makeup From 1A and 1B BHUT) for RCS Makeup

3.1 Determine required RCS Makeup volume by performing the following:

3.1.1 IF desired, utilize Enclosure 4.1 (RCS Boron Change Calculation)

3.1.2 IF two Letdown Filters are available, perform the following:

A. Review Component Boron Log for out-of-service Letdown Filter boron

B. Make appropriate adjustments to Makeup volumes for placing second Letdown Filter in service

3.1.3 Perform the following:

A. Review Component Boron Log for 1A RC Bleed Storage Header boron. {18}

B. Make appropriate adjustments to Makeup volumes based on 1A RC Bleed Storage Header boron {18}

3.1.4 Record required Makeup volume: 100 gallons (≈ 70 gals 1A BHUT and ≈ 30 gals DW)

3.2 Ensure required RCS Makeup volume and source acceptable. (R.M.)

3.3 IF predicted change in boron concentration per shift is expected to be ≥ 10 ppm, notify Primary Chemistry of the following:

Total Makeup volume to be added

Expected Boron change from the addition

3.4 IF two Letdown Filters are available, perform the following:

Open 1HP-17 (1A LETDOWN FILTER INLET)

Open 1HP-18 (1B LETDOWN FILTER INLET)

3.5 Ensure open 1HP-16 (LDST MAKEUP ISOLATION).

This event is complete when Step 3.27 is complete, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 5 of 58



OATC


Note: The crew may choose to perform the makeup with 1HP-15 in AUTO or MANUAL.

3.6 IF Makeup with 1HP-15 in "AUTO" desired, perform the following:

3.6.1 Select "S" on 1HP-15 Controller.

3.6.2 Enter batch size on 1HP-15 Controller. (R.M.)

3.6.3 Place 1HP-15 Controller in "AUTO".

3.6.4 Ensure "P" on 1HP-15 Controller.

3.7 WHILE making up to Unit 1 LDST from 1A and 1B BHUT, monitor the following indications: (R.M.)

Appropriate ranged NIs

Primary tank levels

Neutron error (if applicable)

CRD position (if applicable)

3.8 IF AT ANY TIME abnormal condition(s) require stopping RCS Makeup, perform the following: (RM)

3.8.1 Stop 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

3.8.2 IF RCS Makeup stopped due to alarm(s) OR abnormal indication(s), notify CRS.

3.8.3 WHEN conditions allow RCS Makeup to continue, perform one of the following:

Start 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

Go To Step 3.13 to terminate the addition.

3.9 Start 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

3.10 Open 1CS-46 (1A RC BLEED XFER PUMP DISCH).

3.11 IF increased Makeup flow required, perform the following: (AB-1, Unit 1-BTP Room).

Throttle 1CS-48 (1A BHUT Recirc) to establish desired flow.

Ensure 90 - 125 psig on 1CS-PG-0084.

3.12 WHEN required volume is added, ensure stop 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

3.13 Close 1CS-46 (1A RC BLEED XFER PUMP DISCH). (R.M.)



Page 6 of 58



OATC


3.14 Perform one of the following: (R.M.)

Verify correct volume added

Notify CRSRO of incorrect volume added.

3.15 Reset 1HP-15 Controller for Normal Operation.

3.16 Record 1A BHUT boron in Component Boron Log for 1A RC Bleed Storage Header

Note: The crew may choose to perform the makeup with 1HP-15 in AUTO or MANUAL.

3.17 IF Makeup with 1HP-15 in "AUTO" desired, perform the following:

3.16.1 Select "S" on 1HP-15 Controller.

3.16.2 Enter batch size on 1HP-15 Controller. (R.M.)

3.16.3 Place 1HP-15 Controller in "AUTO".

3.16.4 Ensure "P" on 1HP-15 Controller.

3.18 Ensure open 1HP-16 (LDST MAKEUP ISOLATION)

3.19 IF AT ANY TIME abnormal condition(s) require stopping RCS Makeup, perform the following: (RM)

3.19.1 Stop 1B BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

3.19.2 IF RCS Makeup stopped due to alarm(s) OR abnormal indication(s), notify CRS.

3.19.3 WHEN conditions allow RCS Makeup to continue, perform one of the following:

Start 1B BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

Go To Step 3.22 to terminate the addition.

3.20 Start 1B BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

3.21 Open 1CS-56 (1B RC BLEED XFER PUMP DISCH).

3.22 IF increased Makeup flow required, perform the following: (AB-1, Unit 1-BTP Room).

Throttle 1CS-58 (1A BHUT Recirc) to establish desired flow.

Ensure 90 - 125 psig on 1CS-PG-0085.

3.23 WHEN required volume is added, stop 1B BLEED TRANSFER PUMP.

3.24 Close 1CS-56 (1B RC BLEED XFER PUMP DISCH). (R.M.)



Page 7 of 58



OATC


3.25 Perform one of the following: (R.M.)

Verify correct volume added

Notify CRS of incorrect volume added.

3.26 Reset 1HP-15 Controller for Normal Operation.

3.27 Close 1HP-16 (LDST MAKEUP ISOLATION).

3.28 Record RCS batch volume in narrative log.

3.29 IF desired to remove one Letdown Filter from service, perform the following: (Continue)

3.29.1 Verify > 10 minutes since LDST Makeup was secured. {8} (R.M.)

3.29.2 Position one of the following:

Close 1HP-17 (1A LETDOWN FILTER INLET)

Close 1HP-18 (1B LETDOWN FILTER INLET)

3.29.3 Record RCS boron for out-of-service Letdown Filter in Component Boron Log

3.30 IF RCS sample for boron required, notify Chemistry to sample

3.31 IF increased Makeup flow from 1A BHUT was required, perform the following:

3.31.1 Start 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP

3.31.2 IF discharge pressure is NOT 90-110 psig, throttle 1CS-48 to obtain 90 – 110 psig on 1CS-PG-0084

3.31.3 Stop 1A BLEED TRANSFER PUMP

3.32 IF increased Makeup flow from 1B BHUT was required, perform the following:

3.32.1 Start 1B BLEED TRANSFER PUMP

3.32.2 IF discharge pressure is NOT 90-110 psig, throttle 1CS-58 to obtain 90 – 110 psig on 1CS-PG-0085

3.32.3 Stop 1B BLEED TRANSFER PUMP


NOTE: • 1B Letdown Filter is preferred filter to leave in service for ALARA.

• Only one Letdown Filter should be in service to prevent clogging both filters during startup.


Page 8 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 2 Page 1 of 1 Event Description: 1C Hotwell Pump Casing Water Level Low (C: BOP, SRO)


SRO

BOP

1SA-9/E-5 Plant Response:

1SA-9/E-5 (HWP C CASING WATER LEVEL LOW)

Crew Response:

The SRO should direct the BOP to refer to ARG 1SA-9/E-5 Alarm Response Guide 1SA-9/E-5 (HWP C Casing Water Level Low) rev 047

3.1 IF '1C' HWP is in operation, then immediately:

Start a standby HWP.

Trip '1C' HWP.

Note: When the 1C HWP is tripped, OAC alarm “1C HWP LOCA/LS OFF” will actuate and the crew may place the LOCA Load Shed switch to an operating Hotwell pump per the OAC alarm response guide.

Bypass Powdex. [Open 1C-14/1C-15]

Decrease load.

3.2 Monitor hotwell level.

3.3 Determine cause of low level alarm (possible suction filter clogging) and initiate corrective action necessary to return pump to normal operation.

Examiner Note: The crew may use OP/1/A/1106/002 (Condensate and

FDW System) to bypass Powdex OP/1/A/1106/002 Enclosure 4.19 (Placing Powdex In/Out of Service) rev 169

3.1 IF Powdex is to be removed from service for an extended period of time AND condensate system will NOT be shutdown, perform the following:

3.1.1 Ensure MSDD System in service

3.1.2 Notify Chemist that Powdex will be removed from service for an extended period of time

3.2 Ensure Open 1C-14/1C-15 (POL DEMIN BYPASS CONTROL)

3.3 Place note on Turnover sheet that Powdex has been removed from service

3.4 Notify Chemist that Powdex has been removed from service

This event is complete when the standby HWP has been started, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 9 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 3 Page 1 of 3 Event Description: ‘A’ LPSW Pump Trips and ‘C’ LPSW Pump Fails to Auto Start

(C: BOP, SRO) (TS)


SRO/BOP

BOP

OATC

Plant response:

Statalarm 1SA-9/A-9 (LPSW Header A Press Low)

OAC Alarm LPSW HDR Pressure LO LO

OAC Alarm LPSW leakage accumulator level

OAC Alarm LO LO RCP MTR Cooler Inlet HDR LPSW

LPSW Header A/B Pressure Gauge indicates low Crew Response:

The SRO should direct the BOP to refer to ARG 1SA-9/A-9

The OATC may refer to the OAC alarm response

ARG 1SA-9/A-9 (LPSW Header A Press Low) rev 047

3.1 Refer to AP/1/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) (next page)

3.2 Have Unit 2 refer to AP/2/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW).

OAC Alarm Response

1. Refer to AP/24 (Loss of LPSW) (next page)

2. Notify engineering

3. Refer to TS 3.7.7

OAC Alarm Response

1. If Standby LPSW pump doesn’t start automatically, then start manually.

2. Refer to AP/1/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW)

3. Notify Engineering

4. Refer to Tech Spec 3.7.7 Examiner Note: The SRO may direct an RO to start the ‘C’ LPSW pump

per OMP 1-18 prior to entering AP/24. Examiner Note: The SRO may direct an RO to start the ‘C’ LPSW pump

per OAC alarm response prior to entering AP/24.

This event is complete when the ‘C’ LPSW pump is started, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 10 of 58


(C: BOP, SRO) (TS)


SRO/BOP


AP/1/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) rev 028

4.1 Verify Unit 1 is going to handle LPSW system operations.

4.2 IAAT any LPSW pump is cavitating, THEN perform Steps 4.3 – 4.4

RNO: GO TO Step 4.5

4.5 Verify LPSW pressure ≤ 70 psig

4.6 Ensure Unit 1/2 Standby LPSW Pump Auto Start Circuit in Disable

4.7 IAAT a non-operating LPSW pump is available AND pump start is desired, THEN start the available pump (C LPSW Pump will start).

Examiner Note: When the C LPSW pump is manually started, TIMER 4 will auto actuate after 5 seconds to initiate Event 4.

4.8 IAAT LPSW to all RBCUs has been isolated, AND LPSW header pressure is > 25 psig, THEN perform Step 4.9


4.10 Verify normal LPSW System operation is restored.

NOTE

1LPSW-1054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 will close to isolate RB Auxiliary Coolers on low LPSW pressure.

If RB Auxiliary Coolers are aligned for outage cooling with the portable chiller, sliding links have been positioned such that 1LPSW-1054, 1055, 1061, and 1062 will NOT close.


NOTE Unit 1 normally handles LPSW System operation unless otherwise directed by the CRS

NOTE If an LPSW pump is stopped due to cavitation, it is NOT available until filled and vented.


Page 11 of 58


(C: BOP, SRO) (TS)


SRO/BOP

SRO


4.11 Verify that RB Auxiliary Coolers have isolated:

1LPSW-1054 closed

1LPSW-1055 closed

1LPSW-1061 closed

1LPSW-1062 closed


4.14 EXIT this procedure

TS 3.7.7 (LOW PRESSURE SERVICE WATER SYSTEM)

Condition A (72 hours) Restore required LPSW pump to OPERABLE status.


TS 3.3.28 (LPSW PUMP AUTO START CIRCUITRY)

Condition A (7 days) Restore LPSW standby pump auto-start circuitry to OPERABLE status.



Page 12 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 4 Page 1 of 3 Event Description: 1C RBCU Cooler Rupture (C: BOP, SRO) (TS)


SRO/BOP

Plant Response:

1SA-9/D-9 (LPSW RBCU C Cooler Rupture)

1SA-9/A-6 (RB Normal Sump Level High/Low)

RB normal sump level will increase

1C RBCU LPSW flow indicator indicates low on 1VB2

Crew Response:

ARG for 1SA-9/D-9 (RBCU C Cooler Rupture) rev 047

3.1 Verify alarm is valid by checking RBCU 1C Inlet Flow and RBCU 1C delta flow.

3.2 Verify 1LPSW-24 (RBCU 1C Outlet) throttled

3.3 Verify adequate LPSW flow is available; check LPSW pump operation

3.3.1 Verify 1LPSW-22 (1C RBCU INLET) is open.

3.3.2 IF 1LPSW-22 (1C RBCU INLET) is NOT open, refer to Technical Specifications and Selected Licensee Commitments

3.4 Monitor RBNS Level for any unexplained increase

3.5 IF RBNS Level is increasing AND ES has actuated, notify Chemistry to sample the RBNS for boron concentration to determine if a cooler rupture has occurred based on sample results.

3.6 IF RBCU 1C Cooler rupture or line break is indicated, then:

NOTE: This sequence prevents having to call LPSW and Containment inoperable per SLC 16.9.12.

3.6.1 Isolate the 1C RBCU Cooler as follows:

A. Close 1LPSW-22 (1C RBCU INLET).

B. Close 1LPSW-24 (RBCU 1C OUTLET).

C. Evaluate TS 3.6.3 Condition C (does NOT apply)

D. Evaluate TS 3.6.5 for inoperable RBCU (page 14)

E. Continue to monitor RBNS level for increase.

F. IF RBNS level is still increasing, notify Engineering to evaluate further isolation of 1C RBCU.

This event is complete when the 1C RBCU rupture is isolated and the SRO has referred to TS, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 13 of 58



BOP

BOP

SRO

Crew Response:

ARG 1SA-9 / D-9 (RBCU C Cooler Rupture) (cont.):

3.6.2 Refer to Technical Specifications

3.6.3 Refer to SLC 16.9.12 (Does NOT apply)

3.6.4 Refer to OP/1/A/1104/010 (LPSW)

3.6.5 Refer to OP/1/A/1104/015 (RB Cooling System)

Examiner Note: The crew may decide to pump the RB Normal Sump. If so, see the steps below from OP/1/A/1104/007 (LWD System) Enclosure 4.1 (Pumping RBNS to ≥ 1")

OP/1/A/1104/007 Enclosure 4.1 (Pumping RBNS ≥ 1 Inch) rev 030

3.1 Verify MWHUT level adequate to receive waste volume.

3.2 Position the following:



3.3 Start one or both of the following:

1A RB NORM SUMP PUMP

1B RB NORM SUMP PUMP

3.4 WHEN RBNS is at desired level OR at 1" (low level alarm), ensure the following:

1A RB NORMAL SUMP PUMP "OFF".

1B RB NORMAL SUMP PUMP "OFF".

3.5 IF required to close the valves, position the following:





Page 14 of 58



SRO

Crew Response:

Note: TS 3.6.3 Condition C does not apply since no Containment

Isolation Valves are inoperable.

TS 3.6.5 REACTOR BUILDING SPRAY AND COOLING SYSTEMS Condition B (7 days and 14 days from discovery of failure to meet LCO) Restore reactor building cooling train to OPERABLE status.

TS 3.4.15 (RCS LEAKAGE DETECTION INSTRUMENTATION)

Condition A (Once per 24 hours) Perform SR 3.4.13.1

AND

(30 days) Restore required containment sump level indication to OPERABLE status



Page 15 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 1 of 2 Event Description: PZR ‘A’ RTD Fails Low (I: OATC, SRO) (TS)


BOP/SRO

Booth Cue: If needed, call the BOP to request the following: “This

is Secondary Chemistry. I need you to report steam flow to Unit 1 E Heaters as read on the gauge on 1VB1". This will help to ensure the OATC will take actions for the PZR RTD failure.

Plant Response:

OAC alarm (RC PZR level 1&3 mismatch)

OAC alarm (RC PZR level 2&3 mismatch)

Statalarm 1SA-02/C-3 (RC Pressurizer Level High/Low)

PZR level 1 and 2 indicates ≈ 95 inches

PZR level 3 indicates ≈ 120 inches and slowly increasing

Crew Response:

Refer to ARG 1SA-02/C-3 (RC Pressurizer Level High/Low): rev 033

3.1 Check alternate PZR level indications..

3.2 Check for proper Makeup/Letdown flows and adjust to restore proper level.

Examiner Note: The RO may take 1HP-120 to MANUAL to control Pzr level. If so, they should place it in AUTO after the failure is addressed.

Examiner Note: The SRO may direct the OATC to select PZR level 3 prior to referencing OP/1/A/1105/014.

3.1 Refer to the following procedures as required:

AP/1/A/1700/002 (Excessive RCS Leakage)

AP/1/A/1700/014 (Loss of Normal HPI M/U and/or RCP SI)

AP/1/A/1700/032 (Loss of Letdown)

3.4 Refer to Technical Specification 3.4.9 (Pressurizer) (does not apply)

3.5 Refer to Technical Specification 3.3.8 (PAM Instrumentation) (Page 16)

3.6 Refer to OP/1/A/1105/014 Control Room Instrumentation Operation And Information.

This event is complete when PZR level 3 has been selected, 1HP-120 is in Auto, and the SRO has referred to TS, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 16 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 5 Page 2 of 2 Event Description: PZR ‘A’ RTD Fails Low (I: OATC, SRO) (TS)


SRO/OATC

SRO

Crew Response:

OP/1/A/1105/014 Enclosure 4.11 (SASS Information) rev 042

3.2 SASS (Smart Automatic Signal Selector) Manual Operation

3.2.1 IF "MISMATCH" light is on and "TRIP ‘A’" or "TRIP ‘B’" light is on, a SASS trip has occurred.

A. Controlling signal will be signal selected from CR keyswitch (for parameters in ICS Cabinet #8).

B. Select valid signal as controlling signal by positioning CR keyswitch or pushbutton for Pzr level to valid signal (for parameters in ICS Cabinet #8).

3.2.2 IF "MISMATCH" light is on, a mismatch has occurred

A. Controlling signal will be signal selected from CR keyswitch (for parameters in ICS Cabinet #8).

B. Select valid signal as controlling signal by positioning CR keyswitch or pushbutton for Pzr level to valid signal (for parameters in ICS Cabinet #8). (Select Pzr Level #3)

3.2.3 Initiate a Work Request to repair faulty signal

TS 3.3.8 POST ACCIDENT MONITORING (PAM) INSTRUMENTATION

Condition A (30 days) Restore required channel to OPERABLE status.

This event is complete when PZR level 3 has been selected, 1HP-120 is in Auto, and the SRO has referred to TS, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 17 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 6 Page 1 of 1 Event Description: Continuous Rod Withdrawal (C: OATC, SRO)


SRO/OATC

Plant response:

Control Rods withdrawing without operator action

NI-5 thru NI-8 indicate increasing reactor power

SURs on Wide Range NIs increasing

Crew Response:

The candidates should utilize the “Plant Transient Response” process to stabilize the plant and recognize that control rods are withdrawing without a valid signal.

Verbalize to the SRO reactor power level and direction of movement.

Place the Diamond and both FDW Masters in MANUAL to stabilize the plant.

The crew should insert control rods and monitor reactor power and wide range startup rate to stabilize the plant

Report no valid (ICS) Runback and monitor RCS pressure and inventory

Contact SPOC to investigate the continuous rod withdrawal.

Examiner Note: The OATC may elect to trip the Reactor during this transient per SOMP 01-02 and OMP 1-18 Attachment J (Plant Transient Response).

6.3.3 During abnormal operating conditions a manual reactor trip shall be initiated if any of the following conditions occur:

Reactor power level approaches any operating limit

Reactor power level exceeds the pre-transient power level by greater than 5% AND the cause of the power change is NOT understood, OR is NOT controllable

Any time plant conditions are considered uncontrollable or unsafe

Examiner/Booth Cue: If the crew does NOT manually trip the Reactor, then once they have completed PTR, FIRE TIMER 7 to initiate Event 7 when directed by the Lead Examiner.

This event is complete once the Reactor has tripped or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 18 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 1 of 9 Event Description: Small Break LOCA (M: ALL)


SRO/OATC

SRO/BOP

OATC/BOP

BOP/OATC

Plant response:

1SA-2/D-3 (RC PRESS HI/LOW)

RCS pressure and PZR level decreasing

ES 1-6 actuate

RCS subcooling margin will indicate 0°F

Reactor Building level increasing Crew response:

The SRO will direct the OATC to perform IMAs.

3.1 Depress REACTOR TRIP pushbutton.

3.2 Verify reactor power < 5% FP and decreasing.

3.3 Depress the turbine TRIP pushbutton

3.4 Verify all turbine stop valves closed.

3.5 Verify RCP seal injection available. The SRO will direct the BOP to perform a Symptoms Check.










CSAE Offgas alarms




SRO will transfer from the Subsequent Actions Tab to the LOSCM tab (page 19) from the Parallel Actions Page (page 56) to direct crew activities. Once the RCS saturates, one of the ROs will perform Rule 2 (page 22). The RO not performing Rule 2 will begin performing Enclosure 5.1 due to ES actuation (page 27).

This event is complete when the SRO transfers to the LOCA CD Tab, or as directed by the Lead Examiner.


Page 19 of 58




LOSCM tab

1. Ensure Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) is in progress or complete.

2. Verify LOSCM caused by excessive heat transfer

RNO: GO TO Step 4




THEN GO TO LOCA CD tab.

5. Verify SSF activated per AP/25 with SSF RC Makeup required.

RNO: GO TO Step 7

7. Verify all exist:

NO RCPs operating

HPI flow in both HPI headers

Adequate total HPI flow per Figure 1 (Total Required HPI Flow)

8. GO TO Step 104.



Page 20 of 58



SRO


LOSCM tab (continued)



RNO: Close 1RC-4

106. Close 1GWD-17, 1HP-1, 1HP-2, and 1RC-3

107. Verify either:

Core superheated

Rx vessel head level at 0″

RNO: GO TO Step 109

109. IAAT BWST level is ≤ 19', THEN initiate Encl 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES).

CAUTION

If TDEFDWP is being used for SG feed, reducing SG pressure below 250 psig can result in reduced pumping capability

110. Maintain SG pressure < RCS pressure utilizing either:

__ TBVs

__ ADVs

111. Verify any SG available for feeding/steaming.

112. Initiate Encl 5.16 (SG Tube-to-Shell T Control).

113. Verify indications of SGTR exist.

RNO: GO TO Step 116


RNO: GO TO Step 118

118. Verify CETCs trend decreasing.

119. Verify primary to secondary heat transfer is excessive.

RNO: GO TO Step 121

121. Verify indications of SGTR 25 gpm.

RNO: GO TO Step 123


RNO: GO TO LOCA CD tab (page 21)



Page 21 of 58



CT-2

LOCA Cooldown Tab Crew Response:

LOCA Cooldown Tab

1. IAAT BWST level is ≤ 19’, THEN initiate Encl 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES).

2. Verify ES actuated.

3. GO TO Step 7.

4. Verify two LPI pumps operating.

RNO: IF any HPI pump is operating, AND LPI/HPI piggyback is aligned, THEN maximize total LPI flow < 3100 gpm by throttling HPI flow.

5. Notify Unit 3 to start the following:

3A Outside Air Booster Fan

3B Outside Air Booster Fan

6. Start the following: (should already be started in Encl. 5.1 step 27) (Page 30)

A Outside Air Booster Fan

B Outside Air Booster Fan


Ensure all RBCUs in low speed.

Open 1LPSW-18

Open 1LPSW-21

Open 1LPSW-24

8. Initiate Encl 5.35 (Containment Isolation).

9. Start all RB Aux fans.

10. IAAT either of the following exists:

LPI FLOW TRAIN A plus LPI FLOW TRAIN B ≥ 3400gpm


THEN GO TO Step 11.

RNO: GO TO Step 43

43 Initiate Encl 5.36 (Equipment Alignment For Plant Shutdown)



Page 22 of 58



OATC/BOP

CT-1


Rule 2 (Loss of SCM)

1. IAAT all the following exist:

Any SCM ≤ 0°F

Rx power ≤ 1%

≤ 2 minutes elapsed since loss of SCM

THEN perform steps 2 & 3

2. Stop all RCPs

3. Notify CRS of RCP status.

4. Verify Blackout exists.

RNO: GO TO Step 6

6. Open 1HP-24 & 25

7. Start all available HPI Pumps

8. GO TO step 13.

13. Open 1HP-26 & 27

14. Verify at least two HPI pumps are operating using two diverse indications.

15. IAAT > 2 HPI pumps operating and HPI flow in any header is in Unacceptable Region of Fig. 1, THEN perform Steps 16-21.

RNO: GO TO step 17

17. IAAT flow limits are exceeded THEN perform Steps 18 - 20

RNO: GO TO Step 21

18. Place Diverse HPI in BYPASS.

19. Perform both:



20. Throttle HPI to maximize flow flow limit.



Page 23 of 58

Op-Test No.: ILT16-1 Scenario No.: 4 Event No.: 7 Page 6 of 9 Event Description: Small Break LOCA (M: ALL) Time Position Applicant's Actions or Behavior

BOP/OATC


Rule 2 ( Loss of SCM) (Continued)

21. Notify CRS of HPI status.

22. Verify RCS pressure >550 psig




THEN GO TO Step 24.

RNO: GO TO Step 35

35. IAAT TBVs are unavailable, THEN

A. Dispatch two operators to perform Encl 5.24 (Operation of ADVs)

B. Notify CRS the ADVs are being aligned for use.

36. Select OFF for both Digital Channels on AFIS HEADER A

37. Select OFF for both Digital Channels on AFIS HEADER B


RNO: Place 1FDW 315 and 1FDW-316 in MANUAL and close.

39. Start MD EFDW pumps on all intact SGs:

1A MD EFDWP (1A MD EFDWP will not start)

1B MD EFDWP

RNO: Start 1 TD EFDW PUMP


41. Verify both SGs intact.

42. Establish 300 gpm EFDW flow to each SG

43. Verify both MD EFDWPs operating. (the 1A MD EFDWP did not start)

RNO: 1. IF 1TD EFDW PUMP is operating, OR NO Main FDW pumps operating, GO TO Step 45

2. GO TO Step 47

45. Trip both Main FDW pumps.



Page 24 of 58


Event Description: Small Break LOCA (M: ALL)



Rule 2 ( Loss of SCM) (Continued)

46. Place FDW block valve switches in CLOSE:

1FDW-33

1FDW-31

1FDW-42

1FDW-40

47. Utilize Rule 7 (SG Feed Control) to feed all intact SGs to the appropriate SG Level Control Point using available feed sources; EFDW/Main FDW.

48. IAAT SG Level Control Point is reached, THEN maintain SG Level Control Point by feeding and steaming as necessary.

49. Notify CRS of SG feed status.

CAUTION If 1 TD EFDW PUMP is being used for SG feed and Unit 1 is supplying the Auxiliary Steam header, reducing SG pressure below ≈ 250 psig can result in reduced pumping capability.

50. IAAT SG pressure is > RCS pressure, THEN reduce SG pressure <

RCS pressure using either:

TBVs

Dispatch two operators to perform Encl 5.24 (operation of the ADVs)

51. Verify any Main FDW pump operating.

RNO: GO TO Step 58.

58. Ensure Rule 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency FDW) is in progress or complete. (page 25)




Page 25 of 58



SRO/OATC


Rule 3 (Loss of Main or Emergency Feedwater)

1. Verify loss of Main FDW/EFDW is due to TBF.

RNO: GO TO Step 3


RCS pressure reaches 2300 psig or NDT limit.

PZR level reaches 375” (340” acc)

THEN PERFORM Rule 4 (HPI Forced Cooling)

4. Start operable EFDW pumps, as required, to feed all intact SGs.


6. GO TO Step 38

38. IAAT an EFDW valve CANNOT control in AUTO, OR manual operation of EFDW valve is desired to control flow/level, THEN perform Steps 39 - 43.

RNO: GO TO Step 44

44. Verify any SCM 0F

RNO: IF overcooling OR exceeding limits in Rule 7, THEN throttle EFDW as necessary.

45. IAAT Unit 1 EFDW is in operation, THEN initiate Encl 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation).




Page 26 of 58



EOP Encl 5.9 Crew Response:

EOP Encl 5.9 (Extended EFDW Operation)

1. Monitor EFDW parameters on EFW graphic display.

2. IAAT UST level is < 4', THEN GO TO Step 120

3. IAAT feeding both SGs with one MD EFDWP is desired, THEN perform steps 4 - 7.

RNO: GO TO Step 8

8. Perform as required to maintain UST level > 7.5':

Makeup with demin water.

Place CST pumps in AUTO.

9. IAAT all exist:

__ Rapid cooldown NOT in progress

__ MD EFDWP operating for each available SG

__ EFDW flow in each header < 600 gpm

THEN place 1 TD EFDW PUMP switch in PULL TO LOCK

10. Verify 1 TD EFDW PUMP operating.

RNO: GO TO Step 12

11. Start TD EFDWP BEARING Oil Cooling Pump.

NOTE

Loss of the condensate system for 25 minutes results in cooling down to LPI using the ADVs. If NO HWPs are operating, continuing this enclosure to restore the condensate system is a priority unless the CR SRO deems EOP activities higher priority. The 25 minute criterion is satisfied when a HWP is started and 1C-10 is 10% open.

If the condensate system is operating, the remaining guidance establishes FDW recirc, monitors and maintains UST, and transfers EFDW suction to the hotwell if required.

12. Notify CR SRO to set priority based on the NOTE above and EOP activities.

The SRO should determine that continuing in Encl 5.9 is not a priority at this time and direct the RO from the LOSCM Tab of the EOP.



Page 27 of 58

EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation)


1. __ Determine all ES channels that should have actuated based on RCS pressure and RB pressure:

2. __ Verify all ES channels associated with actuation setpoints have actuated.

NOTE

Voter OVERRIDE extinguishes the TRIPPED light on the associated channels that have auto actuated. Pressing TRIP on channels previously actuated will reposition components that may have been throttled or secured by this Enclosure.

__ Depress TRIP on affected ES logic channels that have NOT previously been actuated.

3. __ IAAT additional ES actuation setpoints are exceeded, THEN perform Steps 1 - 2.

4. __ Place Diverse HPI in BYPASS. __ Place Diverse HPI in OVERRIDE.

5. Perform both:



NOTE





Actuation Setpoint

(psig)

Associated ES Channel

1600 (RCS) 1 & 2 550 (RCS) 3 & 4 3 (RB) 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, & 6 10 (RB) 7 & 8


Page 28 of 58


6. __ IAAT all exist:

__ Voter associated with ES channel is in OVERRIDE

__ An ES channel is manually actuated

__Components on that channel require manipulation

THEN depress RESET on the required channel.

7. __ Verify Rule 2 in progress or complete. __ GOTO Step 74.


9. Open:

__ 1HP-20

__ 1HP-21


__ GOTO Step 16.

11. Perform all:



NOTE





12. __ Verify any RCP is operating __ GO TO Step 16

13. Open:

__ 1CC-7

__ 1CC-8

__ 1LPSW-15

__ 1LPSW-6




Page 29 of 58



__ GO TO Step 54.


18. Perform both:



NOTE





CAUTION


19. __ IAAT any LPI pump is operating against a shutoff head, THEN at the CR SRO's discretion, stop affected LPI pumps. {6, 22}


__ GOTO Step 23.


__ Open 1LP-17.



2. __ Close 1LP-17.


__ Open 1LP-18.



2. __ Close 1LP-18.


Page 30 of 58




__ 1LP-19 closed

__ 1LP-20 closed


__ GO TO Step 26.

24. Open:

__ 1LP-9

__ 1LP-10

__ 1LP-6

__ 1LP-7

__ 1LP-17

__ 1LP-18

__ 1LP-21

__ 1LP-22




28. Start:



(CT- 2)





Page 31 of 58


30. Verify open:

__ 1CF-1 __ 1CF-2


__ 1CF-1 __ 1CF-2


2. __ Close 1HP-120.






__ 1HP-228

__ 1HP-226

__ 1HP-232

__ 1HP-230



35. __ Close 2LPSW-139.



37. __ Close 1LPSW-139.






Page 32 of 58


40. Verify either:



__ GOTO Step 42.

41. Open:

__ 1LPSW-4 __ 1LPSW-5


__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5








__ GOTO Step 47.

NOTE





Page 33 of 58


47. __ IAAT ES channels 7 & 8 have actuated, THEN perform Steps 48 - 49.

__ GOTO Step 50.

48. Perform all:



NOTE











END


Page 34 of 58


Unit Status


54. Start:



CT-2




56. Verify open:

__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


2. __ Close 1HP-120.






__ 1HP-228

__ 1HP-226

__ 1HP-232

__ 1HP-230



61. __ Close 2LPSW-139.



63. __ Close 1LPSW-139.


Page 35 of 58






66. Verify either:



__ GOTO Step 68.

67. Open:

__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5


__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5










END


Page 36 of 58


74. Open:

__ 1HP-24

__ 1HP-25

1. __ IF both BWST suction valves (1HP-24 and 1HP-25) are closed, THEN:

A. __ Start 1A LPI PUMP.

B. __ Start 1B LPI PUMP.

C. Open:

__ 1LP-15

__ 1LP-16

__ 1LP-9

__ 1LP-10

__ 1LP-6

__ 1LP-7



F. __ GOTO Step 75.

2. __ IF only one BWST suction valve (1HP-24 or 1HP-25) is open, THEN:

A. __ IF three HPI pumps are operating, THEN secure 1B HPI PUMP.

B. __ IF< 2 HPI pumps are operating, THEN start HPI pumps to obtain two HPI pump operation, preferably in opposite headers.

C. __ GO TO Step 76.


Page 37 of 58


75. __ Ensure at least two HPI pumps are operating.

76. Verify open:

__ 1HP-26

__ 1HP-27

1. __ IF HPI has been intentionally throttled, THEN GOTO Step 77.

2. Open:

__ 1HP-26

__ 1HP-27


Page 38 of 58


77. __ IAAT at least two HPI pumps are operating, AND HPI flow in any header that has NOT been intentionally throttled is in the Unacceptable Region of Figure 1, THEN open the following in the affected header:

Figure 1

Required HPI Flow Per Header

HPI Pump

Runout Region For 1

Pump In Header

(including seal

injection for A

header)

Unacceptable Region (excluding seal

injection)

1A Header 1B Header

1HP-410 1HP-409


Page 39 of 58



79. Open:

__ 1HP-20

__ 1HP-21


__ GOTO Step 86.

81. Perform all:



NOTE





82. __ Verify any RCP operating __ GO TO Step 86

83. Open:

__ 1CC-7

__ 1CC-8

__ 1LPSW-15

__ 1LPSW-6




Page 40 of 58



__ GO TO Step 124.


88. Perform both:



NOTE





CAUTION


89. __ IAAT any LPI pump is operating against a shutoff head, THEN at the CR SRO's discretion, stop affected LPI pumps.{6, 22}


Page 41 of 58



__ GOTO Step 93.


__ Open 1LP-17.



2. __ Close 1LP-17.


__ Open 1LP-18.



2. __ Close 1LP-18.



__ 1LP-19 closed

__ 1LP-20 closed

THEN perform Steps 94 -95.

__ GO TO Step 96.

94. Open:

__ 1LP-9

__ 1LP-10

__ 1LP-6

__ 1LP-7

__ 1LP-17

__ 1LP-18

__ 1LP-21

__ 1LP-22





Page 42 of 58


98. Start:






100. Verify open:

__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


2. __ Close 1HP-120.






__ 1HP-228

__ 1HP-226

__ 1HP-232

__ 1HP-230



105. __ Close 2LPSW-139.



107. __ Close 1LPSW-139.


Page 43 of 58






110. Verify either:



__ GOTO Step 112.

111. Open:

__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5


__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5








__ GOTO Step 117.

NOTE





Page 44 of 58


117. __ IAAT ES channels 7 & 8 have actuated, THEN perform Step 118 - 119.

__ GOTO Step 120.

118. Perform all:



NOTE












Page 45 of 58

Unit Status


124. Start:






126. Verify open:

__ 1CF-1

__ 1CF-2


__ 1CF-1 __ 1CF-2


2. __ Close 1HP-120.






__ 1HP-228

__ 1HP-226

__ 1HP-232

__ 1HP-230



131. __ Close 2LPSW-139.



133. __ Close 1LPSW-139.


Page 46 of 58






136. Verify either:



__ GOTO Step 138.

137. Open:

__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5


__ 1LPSW-4

__ 1LPSW-5










END


Page 47 of 58

Rule 6 HPI


















• Core SCM > 0






Page 48 of 58

Enclosure 5.5



NOTE



• 1A HPI Pump

• 1B HPI Pump

• 1HP-26

• 1HP-7


• 1HP-5





A. Open:

1CS-26

1CS-41


C. Notify SRO.



Page 49 of 58





__ GO TO Step 10.

7. Open:

• 1HP-24

• 1HP-25




C. Open:

1LP-15

1LP-16

1LP-9

1LP-10

1LP-6

1LP-7



F. GO TO Step 8.




C. GO TO Step 9.


Page 50 of 58





__ 1HP-26

1HP-27




Page 51 of 58




__ GO TO Step 12.


• Open 1HP-24.

• Open 1HP-25.

• Close 1HP-16.




C. Open:

1LP-15

1LP-16

1LP-9

1LP-10

1LP-6

1LP-7





NOTE




Page 52 of 58





Open 1HP-17.

Open 1HP-18


Letdown isolated

LPSW available



GO TO Step 35.

16. Open:

__ 1CC-7

__ 1CC-8






__ 1HP-1

__ 1HP-2



20. GO TO Step 23.



GO TO Step 23.

22. GO TO Step 35.


Page 53 of 58






1HP-1

1HP-3


1HP-2

1HP-4


25. Open:

1HP-1

1HP-2

1HP-3

1HP-4





27. __ Close 1HP-6.

28. __ Close 1HP-7.


2. Close:

1HP-8

1HP-9&11



B. Close 1HP-16.



Page 54 of 58





33. Open 1HP-6.


NOTE









LDST level > 55″



THEN close:

1HP-24

1HP-25


Page 55 of 58




__ GO TO Step 40.




C. Close 1CS-46.





__ GO TO Step 42.






Page 56 of 58



CONDITION ACTIONS

1. PR NIs ≥ 5% FP

OR

NIs NOT decreasing

GO TO UNPP tab.

UNPP


{13}





GO TO EHT tab.



GO TO LOHT tab.


GO TO EHT tab.

EHT



GO TO TBF tab.

TBF


ES



ES




ROP



EDL



• Notify OSM to reference the Emergency Plan and AD-LS-ALL-0006 (Notification/Reportability Evaluation).

NOTIFY


Page 57 of 58

CRITICAL TASKS

CT-1 (BWOG CT-1) Trip all RCPs

RCPs must be secured within 2 minutes of RCS SCM reaching zero per Rule 2. CT-2 (BWOG CT-27) Initiate Control Room Outside Air Booster Fans

Start the Outside Air Booster Fans within 30 minutes of a LOCA. Not performing this action could result in Control Room habitability issues.


UNIT 0 (OSM)

SSF Operable: No KHU's Operable: U1 - OH, U2 - UG LCTs Operable: 2 Fuel Handling: No




Reactor Power: 3.5% Mode: 1 Mode: 1




RBNS Rate: 0.01 gpm



Required Date/Time

TS/SLC #

SSF Yesterday 0000 6 Days TS 3.10.1


Primary


1RIA-3 and 5 removed from RB. SASS is in Manual. Reactor power is being held at ≈ 3% for Reactor Engineering to update the maneuvering plan. OP/1/A/1102/001 Encl 4.7 is in progress up to Step 3.44 R1 Reactivity Management controls have been established per AD-OP-ALL-0203 After taking the shift, the OATC is to makeup to the LDST 100 gal (70 gal 1A BHUT & 30 gal 1B

BHUT) per OP/1/A/1103/004 Encl 4.6 beginning at step 3.4

Secondary

Unit 2 is supplying the AS header 1AS-35 throttled per Secondary Chemist to provide steam to ‘E’ heaters for secondary O2

removal. Temporary OAC alarms for FDW Loop A/B Composite Valve Demand set at 9.8% per the

Startup Procedure. When in MODE 2, evaluate or restrict evolutions involving MS, FDW, EFDW to minimize

changes to RCS temperature and reactor power. 1SSH-1, 1SSH-3, 1SD-2, 1SD-5, 1SD-140, 1SD-303, 1SD-355, 1SD-356 and 1SD-358 are

closed with power supply breakers open per the Startup Procedure for SSF Overcooling Event.



Batch additions per the maneuvering plan.



RO-103aPage 1 of 9


RO-103a

WITHDRAWAL OF SAFETY RODS GROUP 1 TO 50%

Alternate Path: Yes Alt Path Failure: Time Critical: No Time Critical Criteria:

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

RO-103aPage 2 of 9


Task Title : Withdrawal of Safety Rods Group 1 to 50% Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 min K/A Rating(s):


Begin withdrawal Of Safety Rod Group 1 To 50% and manually trip the reactor when CRD temperature limits are exceeded per OMP 1-18. References:

OP/1/A/1105/019 (Control Rod Drive System) Encl. 4.3 (Withdrawal Of Safety Rod Group 1 To 50%) rev 26

OMP 1-18 Implementation Standards During Abnormal and Emergency Events rev 37


OP/1/A/1105/019 (Control Rod Drive System) Encl. 4.3 (Withdrawal Of Safety Rod Group 1 To 50%) ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments

RO-103aPage 3 of 9


1. RECALL SNAP 211 2. IMPORT RO-103a Simulator files

3. Go To RUN

4. Select SR/WR on NI Recorder

RO-103aPage 4 of 9

READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you. INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 startup is in progress RCS temperature = 332ºF RCS pressure = 475 psig INITIATING CUE The Control Room SRO directs you to:

1. Withdraw CRD Group 1 to 50% per OP/1/A/1105/019 (Control Rod Drive System) Enclosure 4.3 (Withdrawal Of Safety Rod Group 1) beginning at Step 2.1.

a. Perform an Automatic Latch of Group 1 Control Rods when directed.

RO-103aPage 5 of 9

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 3.1

Perform the following: (R.M.)

Ensure RUN is ON.

Ensure SINGLE SELECT SWITCH to ALL.

STANDARD: Determine control rod speed switch is selected to RUN by observing light indication on the Diamond.

Determine SINGLE SELECT SWITCH is selected to ALL on the Diamond.

Examiner Note: If asked about Concurrent Verification, state that the verifier agrees with whatever actions you decide to take.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 3.2

WHILE CRDs are moving, monitor the following indications:

CRD position

Appropriate ranged NIs

Startup Rate

STANDARD: As CRDs are withdrawn, monitor the above indications.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-103aPage 6 of 9

3 3.3

Perform Latch and PI alignment of Group 1, as follows: (R.M.)

3.3.1 Ensure GROUP SELECT SWITCH to 1.

3.3.2 Verify only Group 1 CONTROL ON lights are ON. (PI panel)

3.3.3 IF Manual Latch and PI Alignment desired, perform the following:

(Per the initiating cue, Manual Latch is NOT desired)

NOTE: When LATCH AUTO is selected, the following automatically occurs:

Group inserts to latch rods (CRD TRAVEL "In" light ON)

Group withdraws to test for latching (CRD TRAVEL "Out" light ON)

Group inserts (CRD TRAVEL "In" light ON)

RPI resets

Group In Limit light on Diamond will momentarily extinguish then illuminate

3.3.4 IF Auto Latch and PI Alignment desired, perform the following: (R.M.)

A. Select LATCH AUTO

B. WHEN Auto Latch is complete, perform the following:

Verify LATCH AUTO is OFF.

Verify all 0% lights ON for Group 1. (PI Panel)

Verify Group 1 API/RPI indications agree. (PI Panel) STANDARD: *Rotate GROUP SELECT SWITCH to 1.

Determine that only Group 1 CONTROL ON lights are “ON” on the PI panel.

*Depress the LATCH AUTO pushbutton.

WHEN Auto Latch is complete:

Verify LATCH AUTO is OFF.

Verify Group 1 0% lights are ON. (PI Panel)

Verify Group 1 API/RPI indications agree using the position switch on the PI Panel.

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

4 3.4

Select FAULT RESET.

STANDARD: Depress FAULT RESET pushbutton on the diamond panel.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-103aPage 7 of 9

5 3.5

Select Group 1, as follows: (R.M.)

3.5.1 Ensure GROUP SELECT SWITCH to 1.

3.5.2 Ensure only Group 1 CONTROL ON lights are ON. (PI panel)

3.5.3 Ensure Group 1 at 50%. (R.M.)

3.5.4 Place GROUP SELECT SWITCH to OFF. STANDARD: Ensure GROUP SELECT SWITCH to 1.

Determine that only Group 1 CONTROL ON lights are ON on the PI panel.

*Begin withdrawing Group 1 Control Rods to 50%

Note: As control rods are withdrawn, CRD temperatures will begin to increase.

Examiner Note: If asked about Concurrent Verification, state that the verifier agrees with whatever actions you decide to take.

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

6

[ALTERNATE PATH]

Manually Trip the Reactor when two or more CRDM stator temperatures are ≥ 180°F in accordance with OMP 1-18 Attachment A (Licensed Operator Memory Items).

STANDARD: Candidate Manually Trips the Reactor when two or more

CRDM stator temperatures are ≥ 180°F IAW OMP 1-18 Attachment A (Licensed Operator Memory Items).

Note: At ≈ 10% withdrawn, CRD stator temperatures will begin to increase. At ≈ 18% withdrawn, CRD stator temperatures will reach the OAC alarm set point. Once any two CRD stator temperatures reach 180°F, the candidate should trip the Reactor. The Critical Step is satisfied if the Reactor is manually tripped before Group 1 Control Rods reach 50% withdrawn and the candidate decides the task is completed.

OMP 1-18 Attachment A states the following:

1.17 Initiate a manual Rx trip if any of the following conditions exist:

Two or more CRDM stator temperatures ≥ 180°F COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

RO-103aPage 8 of 9


SEQ STEP #

Explanation

3 This step is required to withdraw group 1 control rods. 5 This step is required to withdraw group 1 control rods. 6 This step is required to manually trip the reactor when CRD temperature limits are

exceeded.

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 startup is in progress RCS temperature = 332ºF RCS pressure = 475 psig INITIATING CUE The Control Room SRO directs you to:

1. Withdraw CRD Group 1 to 50% per OP/1/A/1105/019 (Control Rod Drive System) Enclosure 4.3 (Withdrawal Of Safety Rod Group 1) beginning at Step 2.1.

a. Perform an Automatic Latch of Group 1 Control Rods when directed.

RO-203Page 1 of 9


RO-203

PRESSURE MAKEUP TO CFT


Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

RO-203Page 2 of 9


Task Title : Pressure Makeup to CFT Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 10 min K/A Rating(s):


Use OP/1/A/1104/001 (Core Flooding System) to increase 1A CFT pressure to ≈ 605 psig. References:

OP/1/A/1104/001 (Core Flooding System) rev 079


OP/1/A/1104/001 (Core Flooding System) Enclosure 4.7 (Pressure Makeup to CFTs Using Nitrogen) ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments

RO-203Page 3 of 9


1. RECALL SNAP 212 2. IMPORT files for RO-203

3. Go to RUN

RO-203Page 4 of 9

READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you. INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Core Flood Tank low pressure Statalarm is actuated OP/1/A/1104/001 (Core Flooding System) Enclosure 4.7 (Pressure Makeup To CFTs Using Nitrogen) is in progress INITIATING CUES The CR SRO directs you to complete the pressurization of the affected CFT by pressurizing to ≈ 600 psig beginning at Step 2.1 of Enclosure 4.7

RO-203Page 5 of 9

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 2.1

Notify operator to open 1N-137 (CFTs Supply). (A-2-Hallway)

STANDARD: The candidate directs an AO to open 1N-137, communicate

when the valve is open, and standby for further instruction.

Booth Cue: When contacted, use Manual Valves to open 1N-137 and inform student that 1N-137 is OPEN and you are standing by for further instructions.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 2.2

IF required to increase pressure in 1A CFT:

STANDARD: Determine that 1A CFT is has low pressure by observing either:

The computer point for Core Flood Tank “1A” on the Operator Aid Computer.

OR

“1A” Core Flood Tank pressure gauge located on 1VB2.

OR

Statalarm 1SA-8/A-11 (CF TANK A PRESS HIGH/LOW)

Continue to step 2.2.1

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-203Page 6 of 9

3 2.2.1

NOTE: TS 3.6.3 Condition 'B' requires penetration flow path to be isolated within one hour. A check valve with flow secured through the valve is considered operable.

Enter Technical Specification 3.6.3 Condition 'A' and 'B'.

STANDARD: Candidate notifies the CRS to enter Technical Specification

3.6.3 Condition 'A' and 'B'.

Cue: Inform candidate that Tech Spec 3.6.3 Conditions ‘A’ and ‘B’ have been entered and step 2.2.1 is complete and signed off

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

4 2.2.2

Open 1N-298 (N2 FILL CORE FLOOD TANK 1A).

STANDARD: Open 1N-298 the “1A” Core Flood Tank nitrogen fill valve,

located on 1VB2. Verify RED OPEN indicating light lit; Green CLOSE light off.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

5 2.2.3

IF 1N-128 (CFT 1A Supply) is closed, throttle 1N-128 (CFT 1A Supply) for a rate of ≤ 100 psig per 15 minutes (≈ 6.6 psig/min). (A-4-409)

STANDARD: Determine 1N-128 is NOT closed.

Continue to Step 2.2.4.

Cue: If asked, inform candidate that 1N-128 is NOT closed

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-203Page 7 of 9

6 2.2.4

Monitor 1A CFT pressure.

STANDARD: Observe computer point or pressure gauge for “1A” Core

Flood Tank on 1VB2 and verify Core Flood Tank pressure is increasing.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

7 2.2.5

IF AT ANY TIME ES actuation occurs, close 1N-298 (N2 FILL CORE FLOOD TANK 1A).

STANDARD: Determine ES actuation has not occurred by observing:

Statalarm Panel 1SA-1 Alarms 10 and 11 on rows A thru D NOT in alarm

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

8 2.2.6

IF AT ANY TIME 1N-298 fails to close, notify operator to close 1N-137 (CFTs Supply). (A-2-Hallway).

STANDARD: Acknowledges the IAAT step to notify an operator to close

1N-137 if 1N-298 fails to close.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

9

WHEN pressurization of 1A CFT complete, close 1N-298 (N2 FILL CORE FLOOD TANK 1A).

STANDARD: Close the 1N-298 located on 1VB2 when Core Flood Tank

pressure is approximately 605 psig (600 psig to 610 psig). Verify CFT pressure stops increasing.

COMMENTS:

END TASK

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

RO-203Page 8 of 9


SEQ STEP #

Explanation

1 1N-137 must be opened to supply Nitrogen to pressurize the CFT. 4 1N-298 must be opened to supply Nitrogen to pressurize the CFT. 9 1N-298 must be closed to prevent over pressurizing the CFT.

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 is operating at 100% power Core Flood Tank low pressure Statalarm is actuated OP/1/A/1104/001 (Core Flooding System) Enclosure 4.7 (Pressure Makeup To CFTs Using Nitrogen) is in progress INITIATING CUES The CR SRO directs you to complete the pressurization of the affected CFT by pressurizing to ≈ 600 psig beginning at Step 2.1 of Enclosure 4.7

RO-305aPage 1 of 10


RO-305a

PERFORM REQUIRED ACTIONS FOR A FAILED LPI TRAIN

Alternate Path: Yes Alt Path Failure: Both LPI pumps fail to start requiring the 1C LPI pump to be aligned and

started Time Critical: Yes Time Critical Criteria: The 1C LPI pump must be started within 60 minutes from the failure of

the second LPI pump

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

RO-305aPage 2 of 10


Task Title : Perform Required Actions For a Failed LPI Train Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: Yes Validation Time: 15 min K/A Rating(s):

System: EPE 011 K/A: EA1.04 Rating: 4.4/4.4 Task Standard:

1C LPI pump is aligned and started in accordance with EOP Enclosure 5.1. Time critical clock starts when the second LPI pump fails to start and stops when 1C LPI pump is started. The 1C LPI pump must be started within 60 minutes from the failure of the second LPI pump. References:

EP/1/A/1800/001 (Unit 1 Emergency Operating Procedure) Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

EOP Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) rev. 001 ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments

RO-305aPage 3 of 10


1. RECALL SNAP 213 2. IMPORT files for RO-305a

3. Go to RUN when directed by the Lead Examiner

RO-305aPage 4 of 10

READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you.

INITIAL CONDITIONS A LOCA has been in progress that initially stabilized RCS pressure at ≈ 1200 psig. ES Channels 1-8 have actuated on high RB pressure. The LPI pumps were secured as directed by Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) to prevent pump damage from operating against a shutoff head. Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) has been completed up to Step 52. The LOCA CD Tab in progress. Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) is complete. Steam Generator levels are being raised to the Loss of Subcooling Margin setpoint by the OATC. All actions have been taken in Enclosure 5.1 for ES Channels 1-8 actuation. RCS pressure has decreased rapidly and Reactor Building pressure has increased. INITIATING CUES The Control Room SRO directs you to continue in Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) and respond to plant conditions. THIS JPM IS TIME CRITICAL

RO-305aPage 5 of 10

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1

REFER TO Enclosure 5.1 IAAT Steps prior to Step 52.

STANDARD: Candidate checks the IAAT steps to determine if any of

them apply.

Candidate determines that IAAT Step 20 now applies.

Candidate continues to Step 20

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 20

IAAT RCS pressure is < LPI pump shutoff head, THEN perform Steps 21 - 22. STANDARD: Candidate determines that RCS pressure is < LPI pump

shutoff head and continues to Step 21.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

3 21


__ Open 1LP-17.

__ Start 1A LPI PUMP. STANDARD: Candidate determines that 1LP-17 is open by observing the

Red open light is lit and green closed light is off located on 1UB2.

Candidate places 1A LPI pump switch to START and determines that the 1A LPI pump does not start by observing red lights remain off and white light remains on.

Candidate continues to Step 21 RNO.

Note: The 1A LPI pump fails to start.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-305aPage 6 of 10

4 21

RNO

1. Stop 1A LPI PUMP.

2. Close 1LP-17. STANDARD: Candidate determines that the1A LPI pump is stopped by

observing the white off light lit

Candidate closes 1LP-17 located on 1UB2 by rotating the switch to the close position and observes the green close light on and the red open light off.

Continue to Step 22.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

5 22


__ Open 1LP-18.

__ Start 1B LPI PUMP. STANDARD: Candidate determines that 1LP-18 is open by observing the

Red open light is lit and green closed light is off located on 1UB2.

Candidate places 1B LPI pump switch to START and determines that the 1B LPI pump does not start by observing red lights remain off and white light remains on.


Note: The 1B LPI pump fails to start. The Time Critical completion time is 60 minutes from the failure of the second LPI pump.

TIME CRITICAL clock starts: ______________

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-305aPage 7 of 10

6 22

RNO

1. Stop 1B LPI PUMP.

2. Close 1LP-18. STANDARD: Candidate determines that the1B LPI pump is stopped by

observing the white off light lit.

Candidate closes 1LP-18 located on 1UB2 by rotating the switch to the close position and observes the green close light on and the red open light off.

Continue to Step 23.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

7 23

[ALTERNATE PATH]

IAAT 1A and 1B LPI PUMPs are off / tripped,

AND all exist:


__ 1LP-19 closed

__ 1LP-20 closed

THEN perform Steps 24 - 25. STANDARD: Candidate determines the following:

1A and 1B LPI pumps are off / tripped

RCS pressure is < LPI pump shutoff head (≈ 180 psig) by observing the RCS pressure gauge on 1UB1

1LP-19 and 1LP-20 are both closed by observing the green closed lights lit and the red open lights off on 1UB2

Candidate continues to Step 24.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-305aPage 8 of 10

8 24

Open:

__ 1LP-9 and 1LP-10

__ 1LP-6 and 1LP-7

__ 1LP-17 and 1LP-18

__ 1LP-21 and 1LP-22

STANDARD: Candidate opens the following valves (located on 1UB2)

and observes the red open lights lit and the green closed lights off.

*1LP-9 and 1LP-10

*1LP-6 and 1LP-7

*1LP-17 and 1LP-18

Candidate determines that 1LP-21 and 1LP-22 are open by observing the red open lights lit and the green closed lights off (located on 1UB2).

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

9 25

Start 1C LPI PUMP. STANDARD: Candidate starts the 1C LPI pump located on 1UB2 and

verifies the red on light are lit, the white off light is off, and verifies the pump develops discharge pressure and flow.

TIME CRITICAL clock stops: ______________

Note: The 1C LPI pump must be started within 60 minutes of the 1B LPI pump failure to start.

COMMENTS:

Cue: Another operator will continue with this procedure.

END TASK

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

RO-305aPage 9 of 10


SEQ STEP #

Explanation

8 This step is necessary to align a suction source and a discharge flow path for the

1C LPI pump since 1A and 1B LPI pumps fail to start. 9 This step is necessary to start the 1C LPI pump to provide LPI flow to the core (must be

completed within 60 minutes of 1A and 1B LPI pump failure).

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS A LOCA has been in progress that initially stabilized RCS pressure at ≈ 1200 psig. ES Channels 1-8 have actuated on high RB pressure. The LPI pumps were secured as directed by Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) to prevent pump damage from operating against a shutoff head. Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) has been completed up to Step 52. The LOCA CD Tab in progress. Rule 2 (Loss of SCM) is complete. Steam Generator levels are being raised to the Loss of Subcooling Margin setpoint by the OATC. All actions have been taken in Enclosure 5.1 for ES Channels 1-8 actuation. RCS pressure has decreased rapidly and Reactor Building pressure has increased. INITIATING CUES The Control Room SRO directs you to continue in Enclosure 5.1 (ES Actuation) and respond to plant conditions. THIS JPM IS TIME CRITICAL

RO-504aPage 1 of 10


RO-504a

PERFORM EOP ENCLOSURE 5.35

Alternate Path: Yes Alt Path Failure: 1HP-3 fails to close requiring 1HP-1 to be closed in order to

isolate containment Time Critical: No Time Critical Criteria:

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

RO-504aPage 2 of 10


Task Title : Perform EOP Enclosure 5.35 Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No Validation Time: 10 min K/A Rating(s):


Perform EOP Encl 5.35 (Containment Isolation) correctly. References:


EOP Enclosure 5.35 (Containment Isolation) rev. 0 ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments

RO-504aPage 3 of 10


1. RECALL SNAP 215 2. IMPORT RO-504a simulator files

3. On the initial setup, recall IC-41 and set breaker flags to match plant conditions 4. Go to RUN and acknowledge alarms 5. Go to FREEZE 6. Go to RUN when directed by the Lead Examiner

RO-504aPage 4 of 10


INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 Reactor tripped from 100% power due to a spurious Main Turbine trip. RCS leak of 190 gpm occurs as result of the trip. EOP LOCA CD tab is in progress. ES Actuation has NOT occurred. INITIATING CUE The Control Room SRO directs you to perform EOP Enclosure 5.35 (Containment Isolation).

RO-504aPage 5 of 10

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 1

Verify Encl 5.1 (ES Actuation) is in progress or complete. STANDARD: Candidate determines that ES has NOT actuated from the

Initial Conditions and continues to Step 1 RNO.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 1

RNO

1. Close the following ES operated RB isolation valves:

√ ES Chan 1 √ ES Chan 2

1HP-3 1HP-5

1HP-4*

1GWD-12 1GWD-13

1LWD-1 1LWD-2

1CS-5 1CS-6

1PR-1 1PR-2

1PR-6 1PR-3

1PR-4

1PR-5

1PR-7* 1PR-8*

1PR-9* 1PR-10*

1RC-5 1RC-7

1RC-6

1FDW-105 1FDW-106

1FDW-107 1FDW-108

1FDW-103

1FDW-104

STANDARD: Candidate closes the valves listed above and determines

that 1HP-3 will not close.

Note: 1HP-3 will NOT close.

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-504aPage 6 of 10

3 1

RNO

[ALTERNATE PATH]

2. IF 1HP-3 fails to close, THEN close 1HP-1. STANDARD: Candidate determines that 1HP-3 is open by observing the

red open light on and green closed light off.

Candidate positions 1HP-1 switch in the closed position and verifies the green closed light is on and the red open light is off.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

4 1

RNO

3. IF 1HP-4 fails to close, THEN close 1HP-2. STANDARD: Candidate determines that 1HP-4 is closed by observing the

red light off and green light on.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

5 1

RNO

4. IF 1HP-5 fails to close, THEN close:

__ 1HP-7

__ 1HP-6 STANDARD: Candidate determines that 1HP-5 is closed by observing the

red light off and green light on.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-504aPage 7 of 10

6 2

Verify all RCPs off. STANDARD: Candidate determines that all RCPs are operating by

observing red on light lit and RCP amps indicate normal.


COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

7 2

RNO

GO TO Step 5. STANDARD: Candidate continues to Step 5

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

8 5

Rotate switches to the closed position for the following components:

__ 1LPSW-1054

__ 1LPSW-1055

__ 1LPSW-1061

__ 1LPSW-1062 STANDARD: Candidate rotates the above switches to the closed position

located on 1VB3.

Note: Either 1LPSW-1054 or 1LPSW-1055 and 1LPSW-1061 or 1LPSW-1062 must be closed to satisfy the critical step.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-504aPage 8 of 10

9 6

Verify the following components indicate closed:

__ 1LPSW-1054

__ 1LPSW-1055

__ 1LPSW-1061

__ 1LPSW-1062 STANDARD: Candidate verifies the above valves indicate closed by

observing the green closed lights are on and red open lights are off located on 1VB3.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

10 7

EXIT this enclosure. STANDARD: Candidate exits the enclosure

COMMENTS:

END TASK

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

RO-504aPage 9 of 10


SEQ STEP #

Explanation

2 This step is critical to isolate the Reactor Building. 3 This step is critical since 1HP-3 is failed open 1HP-1 isolates this pathway. 8 This step is critical to isolate the Reactor Building.

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 Reactor tripped from 100% power due to a spurious Main Turbine trip. RCS leak of 190 gpm occurs as result of the trip. EOP LOCA CD tab is in progress. ES Actuation has NOT occurred. INITIATING CUE The Control Room SRO directs you to perform EOP Enclosure 5.35 (Containment Isolation).

RO-804Page 1 of 10


RO-804

PLACE REACTOR BUILDING PURGE IN OPERATION


Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

RO-804Page 2 of 10


Task Title : Place Reactor Building Purge in Operation Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 min K/A Rating(s):


The Reactor Building Purge is placed in operation correctly in accordance with OP/1/A/1102/014 Enclosure 4.1. References:

OP/1/A/1102/014 (RB Purge System) rev. 046

PT/0/A/0230/001 (Radiation Monitor Check) rev. 169


OP/1/A/1102/014 Enclosure 4.1 (RB Purge Release) ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments

RO-804Page 3 of 10


1. RECALL SNAP 218 2. There are NO files to import

3. Ensure T/O Sheet tags are removed from the 1A or 1B RB Aux Fans from the prior JPM


RO-804Page 4 of 10

READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you. INITIAL CONDITIONS RCS temperature = 120°F RCS pressure = 41 psig No GWD or LWD releases are in progress RB Hatch is CLOSED Continuous release is NOT in progress RB Purge startup is in progress using OP/1/A/1102/014 (RB Purge System), Enclosure 4.1 (RB Purge Release) INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to place the RB Purge in operation at 1/3 Station Limit using OP/1/A/1102/014 Enclosure 4.1 starting at Step 3.8

RO-804Page 5 of 10

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 3.8


3.8.1 Ensure one of the following:

__ 1A RB AUX FAN is Off.

__ 1B RB AUX FAN is Off.

3.8.2 Ensure "T/O Sheet" CR Tag on 1A RB AUX FAN.

3.8.3 Ensure "T/O Sheet" CR Tag on 1B RB AUX FAN.

3.8.4 Ensure note on Turnover sheet: "If RB Purge Fan is operating, 1A RB Aux Fan OR 1B RB Aux Fan should be off."

STANDARD: *Candidate rotates the control switch for the 1A or 1B RB

Aux Fan to the STOP position and verifies the green off light is on and the red on light is off.

Candidate ensures a T/O Sheet tag is on the 1A and 1B RB AUX Fan switches (not critical).

Candidate states that he/she would place a note on the Turnover sheet as stated above (not critical).

Cue: If asked as the SRO, inform the candidate that the 1A RB Aux Fan should be secured.

Cue: If the candidate tries to put a note on the turnover sheet, inform him/her that another RO will place the note on the turnover sheet.

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 3.9

NOTE: Completion of Step 3.9 establishes an appropriate vent path during Fuel Movement Operations with any Transfer Tube open per the Shutdown Protection Plan. This prevents FTC and SFP level variations caused by differential pressures between RB and SFP.


3.9.1 Open 1PR-1 (RB PURGE OUTLET (RB)).

STANDARD: Candidate rotates 1PR-1 switch located on 1AB3 to the

open position and verifies the red open light lit and green closed light off.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-804Page 6 of 10

3 3.9


3.9.2 Open 1PR-2 (RB PURGE OUTLET (PR)).

STANDARD: Candidate rotates 1PR-2 switch located on 1AB3 to the

open position and verifies the red open light lit and green closed light off.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

4 3.9


3.9.3 Ensure closed 1PR-3 (RB PURGE FLOW). (Bailey Controller) STANDARD: Candidate ensures 1PR-3 is closed by rotating the Bailey

Controller knob until the position indication indicates zero demand located on 1AB3.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

5 3.9


NOTE: It may take several minutes for the air to bleed off 1PR-3.

3.9.4 Verify 1PR-3 closed using alternate indication.

STANDARD: Candidate verifies 1PR-3 is closed on the Component

Status Panel and/or the switch located under the Component Status Panel both located on 1VB-2. Candidate may also verify 1PR-3 is closed by using the OAC graphic display.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-804Page 7 of 10

6 3.9


3.9.5 WHILE RB Purge operating, monitor unit vent RIAs.

STANDARD: Candidate monitors Unit Vent RIAs (RIA-43, 44, 45, & 46)

using the RIA View Node located on 1VB3 or by using the OAC while the RB Purge is operating.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

7 3.9


3.9.6 Perform the following:

NOTE: When 1PR-3 (RB PURGE OUTLET SWITCH) is positioned to open, 1PR-3 will remain in the closed position since 1PR-3 Bailey Controller is closed.

A. Position 1PR-3 (RB PURGE OUTLET SWITCH) to open.

B. Throttle 1PR-3 (RB PURGE FLOW) to > 60% demand on Bailey Controller.

STANDARD: Candidate rotates 1PR-3 switch to the open position located

on 1VB2.

Candidate rotates the knob on 1PR-3 Bailey Controller in the increase direction until the controller indicates > 60% demand located on 1AB3.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-804Page 8 of 10

8 3.10

3.10 IF required to operate the RB Purge Fan, perform the following:

3.10.1 Perform one of the following:

A. Perform the following:

Open 1PR-4 (RB PURGE INLET)

Open 1PR-5 (RB PURGE INLET (PR))

Open 1PR-6 (RB PURGE INLET (RB))

B. Ensure the following: (Not Applicable)

NOTE: • Starting/Stopping RB Purge may cause SFP level changes. Entry into AP/1-2/A/1700/35 NOT required if SFP level changes are evaluated and stabilizes.

• There is ≈ 20 second time delay to open the dampers before the Purge starts.

3.10.2 Start RB Purge Fan.

NOTE: • Interlock may trip Purge if 1PR-3 demand is < 35%.

• Operating 1PR-3 slowly allows time for the valve to respond to demand changes.

3.10.3 Ensure 1PR-3 (RB PURGE FLOW) (Bailey Controller)

adjusted to < recommended release rate. STANDARD: *Candidate opens 1PR-4, 1PR-5, and 1PR-6 by rotating the

control switches to the open position located on 1AB3 and verify the red open lights are on and the green closed lights are off.

*Candidate starts the RB Purge Fan by rotating the switch to the start position located on 1AB3 and verify the red on light is on and green off light is off.

Candidate ensures 1PR-3 is adjusted to < the recommended release rate as read on Chessel Misc. System Recorder 1 located on 1VB1.

Cue: Another RO will complete this release.

COMMENTS:

END TASK

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

RO-804Page 9 of 10


SEQ STEP #

Explanation

1 This step is required to prevent tripping 1XR incoming feeder breaker. 2 This step is required to establish RB Purge flow. 3 This step is required to establish RB Purge flow. 7 This step is required to establish desired RB Purge flow. 8 This step is required to establish RB Purge flow and start the RB Purge fan.

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS RCS temperature = 120°F RCS pressure = 41 psig No GWD or LWD releases are in progress RB Hatch is CLOSED Continuous release is NOT in progress RB Purge startup is in progress using OP/1/A/1102/014 (RB Purge System), Enclosure 4.1 (RB Purge Release) INITIATING CUE The CRS directs you to place the RB Purge in operation at 1/3 Station Limit using OP/1/A/1102/014 Enclosure 4.1 starting at Step 3.8

RO-P404Page 1 of 10


RO-P404

ALIGN ECCS SUCTION TO EMERGENCY SUMP


Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:

RO-P404Page 2 of 10


Task Title : Align ECCS Suction to Emergency Sump Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 min K/A Rating(s): System: BW/E08 K/A: EA1.1 Rating: 4.0/3.7 Task Standard:

ECCS suction is properly aligned to the Reactor Building Emergency Sump in accordance with EOP Enclosure 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES) References:


EOP Enclosure 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES) rev. 0 ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments

RO-P404Page 3 of 10


1. RECALL SNAP 217 2. IMPORT simulator files for RO-P404


4. Ensure SHOWDIG O1P1600 (BWST Level) OAC screen is available

5. Timer 1 will lower BWST level to < 9’ if needed at step 5

6. Timer 2 will lower BWST level to < 6’ if needed at step 7

RO-P404Page 4 of 10

READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you. INITIAL CONDITIONS A Large Break LOCA has occurred which is depleting the BWST. The LOCA Cooldown Tab is in progress. INITIATING CUES The CRS directs you to align ECCS suction to the Emergency Sump per EOP Enclosure 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES).

RO-P404Page 5 of 10

START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 1

Start:

__ 1A LPI PUMP

__ 1B LPI PUMP STANDARD: Candidate locates the control switches for 1A and 1B LPI

pumps and verifies the red on lights are lit and pump amps are indicated on 1UB2.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 2

Verify either:

__ LPI FLOW TRAIN A plus LPI FLOW TRAIN B ≥ 3400 gpm

__ Only one LPI header is operating, AND flow in that header is ≥ 2900 gpm STANDARD: Candidate determines that LPI flow train A plus LPI flow

train B is > 3400 gpm by observing the LPI flow gauges located on 1UB2.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

3 3

GO TO Step 52. STANDARD: Candidate continues to Step 52.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-P404Page 6 of 10

4 52

WHEN BWST level is ≤ 15', THEN stop all HPI pumps. STANDARD: Candidate determines BWST level is < 15’ by using any of

the following:

BWST level from the OAC BWST level gauge on 1UB2 BWST level from the ICCM monitors located on 1UB1

Candidate then places the control switch for the 1A HPI pump in the OFF position and rotates the 1C HPI pump control switch to the TRIP position and verifies all HPI pumps are not operating by observing the red on lights off and no indicated HPI flow on 1UB1.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

5 53

NOTE

RB level of ≥ 2' is expected when BWST level reaches 9'.

WHEN BWST level ≤ 9', AND RB level is rising, THEN continue procedure. STANDARD: Candidate determines BWST level is < 9’ by using any of

the following:



Cue: If needed, inform the candidate that using time compression BWST level has been lowered and RB level has increased.

Booth cue: Fire TIMER 1 to lower BWST level to < 9’.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-P404Page 7 of 10

6 54

Simultaneously open:

__ 1LP-19

__ 1LP-20 STANDARD: Candidate locates the control switches for 1LP-19 and

1LP-20 on 1UB2 and simultaneously rotates both control switches in the OPEN direction and then verifies the red open light is on and the green closed light is off for both valves.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

7 55

IAAT BWST level is ≤ 6', THEN perform Steps 56 - 59. STANDARD: Candidate determines BWST level is < 6’ by using any of

the following:



Cue: If needed, inform the candidate that using time compression BWST level has been lowered and RB level has increased.

Booth cue: Fire TIMER 2 to lower BWST level to < 6’.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

8 56

Verify 1LP-19 open. STANDARD: Candidate locates the control switch for 1LP-19 on 1UB2

and verifies the red open light on and green closed light off.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

RO-P404Page 8 of 10

9 57

Verify 1LP-20 open. STANDARD: Candidate locates the control switch for 1LP-20 on 1UB2

and verifies the red open light on and green closed light off.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

10 58

Simultaneously close:

__ 1LP-21

__ 1LP-22 STANDARD: Candidate locates the control switches for 1LP-21 and

1LP-22 on 1UB2 and simultaneously rotates both control switches in the CLOSE direction and then verifies the red open light is off and the green closed light is on for both valves.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

11 59

Dispatch an operator to close 1LP-28 (BWST Outlet) (East of Unit 1 BWST). STANDARD: Candidate dispatches and AO to locally close 1LP-28.

COMMENTS:

END TASK

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________

RO-P404Page 9 of 10


SEQ STEP #

Explanation

4 This step is required to protect the HPI pumps since the suction source from the BWST

will be isolated. 6 This step is required to align LPI pump suction to the Reactor Building Emergency

Sump.

10 This step is required to secure LPI pump suction from the BWST.

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS A Large Break LOCA has occurred which is depleting the BWST. The LOCA Cooldown Tab is in progress. INITIATING CUES The CRS directs you to align ECCS suction to the Emergency Sump per EOP Enclosure 5.12 (ECCS Suction Swap to RBES).

RO-S403aPage 1 of 12


RO-S403a

ALIGN PSW TO HPI PUMP MOTOR COOLERS

Alternate Path: Yes Alt Path Failure: Time Critical: No Time Critical Criteria:

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:



Task Title : Align PSW to HPI Pump Motor Coolers Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: Yes Time Critical: No Validation Time: 10 min K/A Rating(s): System: 076 K/A: A2.01 Rating: 3.5*/3.7* Task Standard:

Align PSW to supply the HPI Motor Coolers in accordance with AP/2/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) Enclosure 5.4 (PSW to HPI Pump Motor Coolers) References:

AP/2/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) rev. 028

AP/3/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed:

AP/2/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) Enclosure 5.4 (PSW to HPI Pump Motor Coolers) ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments



1. RECALL SNAP 214 2. IMPORT RO-S403a simulator files



READ TO OPERATOR DIRECTIONS TO STUDENT I will explain the initial conditions, and state the task to be performed. All control room steps shall be performed for this JPM, including any required communications. I will provide initiating cues and reports on other actions when directed by you. Ensure you indicate to me when you understand your assigned task. To indicate that you have completed your assigned task return the handout sheet I provided you. INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 3 has experienced a total loss of LPSW. Operators have been dispatched to cross connect Unit 1&2 LPSW system with Unit 3 LPSW system. The PSW Booster Pump is available for operation. AP/3/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) directs an RO to perform AP/2/A/1700/024 Enclosure 5.4 (PSW to HPI Pump Motor Coolers). INITIATING CUE The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform AP/2/A/1700/024 Enclosure 5.4 to align PSW to supply HPI pump motor cooling.


START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 1

NOTE

Other procedures may direct the performance of this Enclosure in order to supply the HPI Pump motor coolers with water supplied from the PSW Booster Pump. If directed by another procedure to perform Encl 5.4 (PSW to HPI Pump Motor Coolers), it is permissible to run this Enclosure, by itself, without meeting the Entry Conditions of Unit 2 AP/24 (Loss of LPSW).

Verify PSW Booster Pump available for operation. STANDARD: Candidate determines from the Initial Conditions that the

PSW Booster Pump is available for operation.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 2

Verify all:

__ PSW 13KV FANT POWER AVAILABLE light lit

__ FANT BKR B closed

__ FANT BKR D closed STANDARD: Candidate determines that the PSW 13KV Fant Power

Available light on EF7 is NOT lit and continues to Step 2 RNO.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


3 2

RNO

1. IF GENERATOR OPERATION COMPLETE light NOT lit on any Keowee unit, THEN Emergency start Keowee units:

__ KEOWEE EMER START CHANNEL A

__ KEOWEE EMER START CHANNEL B STANDARD: Candidate determines that the GENERATION OPERATION

COMPLETE light is NOT lit for either Keowee on 2AB3 and then locates KEOWEE EMER START CHANNEL A and CHANNEL B switches and rotates both switches to the START position located on 1UB1.

Note: Only one of the Keowee EMER Start switches must be placed in the START position to satisfy the Critical Step.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

4 2

RNO

NOTE KPF-9 and KPF-10 have a 6 sec closing delay. Acceptable Keowee operating limits are: Output voltage

13.5 - 14.5 KV Frequency 57 - 63 Hz

2. IF both the following: __ ACB-3 is closed __ Keowee U2 within limits

THEN close KPF-10. STANDARD: Candidate determines that ACB-3 is open by observing the

white open light on and the red closed light off located on 2AB3 and continues to Step 2 RNO Step 3

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


5 2

RNO

3. IF both the following: __ ACB-4 is closed __ Keowee U1 within limits

THEN close KPF-9.

Note: Per the note in the previous step, KPF-9 has a 6 second closing delay.

STANDARD: Candidate determines that ACB-4 is closed by observing

the white open light off and the red closed light on located on 2AB3 and determines that Keowee U1 is operating within limits by observing Keowee output voltage 13.5-14.5 KV and Keowee frequency 57-63 Hz located on 2AB3.

Candidate closes KPF-9 by rotating the control switch to the close position and verifying the red closed light on and the white open light off located on 2AB3.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

6 2

RNO

4. IF neither KPF-9 nor KPF-10 closed, THEN close the breaker on any Keowee unit that is within limits:

__ KPF-9 (supplied from Keowee U1)

__ KPF-10 (supplied from Keowee U2) STANDARD: Candidate determines that KPF-9 is closed by observing the

red closed light on and the white open light off located on 2AB3.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

7 2

RNO

5. Open FANT PSW BREAKERS B & D. STANDARD: Candidate opens PSW BREAKERS B & D by rotating the

switch to the TRIP position and observing the green open lights lit and red closed lights OFF located on 2EF7.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


8 2

RNO

6. Close KEOWEE PSW BREAKERS A & C. STANDARD: Candidate closes Keowee PSW Breakers A & C by rotating

the control switches to the close position and observing the red closed light on and white open light off located on 2EF7.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

9 2

RNO

7. IF the PSW 4KV POWER AVAILABLE light is NOT lit, THEN:

A. Inform the CRS on all units that PSW power is NOT available.

B. EXIT this enclosure. STANDARD: Candidate determines that the PSW 4KV POWER

AVAILABLE light is lit located on 2EF7.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

10 2

RNO

8. GO TO Step 3. STANDARD: Candidate continues to Step 3.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

11 3

IAAT PSW power is lost, THEN GO TO Step 2. STANDARD: Candidate acknowledges the IAAT step and continues to

Step 4.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


12 4

Ensure PSW-14 in AUTO. STANDARD: Candidate places PSW-14 is in AUTO by rotating the switch

to the Auto position on 2EF6.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

13 5

Verify PSW-14 is beginning to throttle open or is open. STANDARD: Candidate determines that PSW-14 is closed and not

throttling open by observing the green closed light ON and red open light OFF. Candidate may also observe that there is no flow indicated on the PSW Booster Pump flow gauge (both located on 2EF6).

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

14 5

RNO

[ALTERNATE PATH]

1. Place PSW-14 in Manual.

2. Open PSW-14. STANDARD: Candidate places PSW-14 controller in Manual by rotating

the control switch to the Manual position and then throttles PSW-14 open until the red open light is lit and green closed light is OFF located on 2EF6.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

15 6

Start the PSW BOOSTER PUMP. STANDARD: Candidate places the control switch for the PSW Booster

Pump in the start position and verifies the red on light lit and white light off located on 2EF7.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


16

Notify all that PSW Booster Pump is feeding HPI Pump motor coolers:

__ U1 CRS

__ U2 CRS

__ U3 CRS STANDARD: Candidate notifies Unit 3 control room that the PSW Booster

Pump is feeding HPI Pump motor coolers.

COMMENTS:

END TASK

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________



SEQ STEP #

Explanation

3 This step is required to supply power to the PSW Booster Pump. 5 This step is required to supply power to the PSW Booster Pump.

14 This step is required to supply cooling water to the HPI Pump motor coolers

15 This step is required to supply cooling water to the HPI Pump motor coolers

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 3 has experienced a total loss of LPSW. Operators have been dispatched to cross connect Unit 1&2 LPSW system with Unit 3 LPSW system The PSW Booster Pump is available for operation AP/3/A/1700/024 (Loss of LPSW) directs an RO to perform AP/2/A/1700/024 Enclosure 5.4 (PSW to HPI Pump Motor Coolers) INITIATING CUE The Control Room Supervisor directs you to perform AP/2/A/1700/024 Enclosure 5.4 to align PSW to supply HPI pump motor cooling.

Admin-S203Page 1 of 8


Admin S203

COMPLETE PLANT CONFIGURATION SHEET (TIME TO CORE BOIL) AND DETERMINE ANY

REQUIRED ACTIONS

Alternate Path: (No) Alt Path Failure: ____________________________________________________________ Time Critical: (No) Time Critical Criteria: ________________________________________________________

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:



Task Title : Complete Plant Configuration Sheet (Time to Core Boil) and Determine Any Required Actions

Task Number : Alternate Path: (No) Time Critical: (No) Validation Time: 25 Minutes K/A Rating(s): System: GEN K/A: 2.2.18 Rating: 2.6/3.9 Task Standard: Tables in OP/0/A/1108/001 A are used to determine Total Loss Of DHR Time to Boil is less than 16 minutes and that the RB Equipment hatch must be closed

References: OP/0/A/1108/001 A (Reactor Core and SFP Loss Of Cooling Heatup Tables) Enclosure 4.1 (Total Loss of DHR Time to Boil) Rev. 05

Site Directive 1.3.5 (Shutdown Protection Plan) Attachment 9.2.A

Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed: OP/0/A/1108/001 A (Reactor Core and SFP Loss Of Cooling Heatup Tables) Enclosure 4.1 (Total Loss of DHR Time to Boil) Rev. 05

Site Directive 1.3.5 (Shutdown Protection Plan) Attachment 9.2.A

===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments



1. N/A



INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 was shutdown on 12/01 at 0400

Site Directive 1.3.5 (Shutdown Protection Plan) Attachment 9.2.A is being prepared for this shift

LPI aligned for Normal Decay Heat Removal

INITIATING CUES

Current Date/Time: 12/03 at 0615

The CRS instructs you to determine the “Time To Core Boil” utilizing OP/0/A/1108/001 A, (Reactor Core and SFP Loss of Cooling Heatup Tables), and perform any required actions based on the results, in accordance with Site Directive 1.3.5 (Shutdown Protection Plan) Attachment 9.2.A.


START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1

Refer to Enclosure 4.1 of OP/0/A/1108/001 A.

Chose the correct Table

STANDARD: Refer to enclosure 4.1 of OP/0/A/1108/001 A, Table 9 (Initial Temp = 120ºF) (24-120 Hours); Time to Boiling, Min. table.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2

Determine the number of hours the reactor has been shutdown.

STANDARD: Candidate determines the reactor has been shut down for 50 Hours:

shutdown 12/01 at 0400 current date/time is 12/03 at 0615 50 hours and 15 minutes (rounded down to

most recent whole hour)

EXAMINER NOTE: For tables that have time since Rx was shut down measured in hours, select the most recent whole hour (per Encl. 4.1, step 1.5)

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


3

Determine time to boil.

STANDARD: Candidate determines time to boil is 15.7 minutes by using 50 hours and 70 inches on LT-5.

LT-5 level is 76 inches per Attachment 9.2.A Next lower level is 70 inches

EXAMINER NOTE: If RCS level is at some point between the columns provided, use the column for the next lower level (per Encl. 4.1, step 1.4)

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

4

Ensure equipment hatch is closed.

STANDARD: Candidate determines the equipment hatch must be closed since the Configuration Sheet indicates that the Equipment Hatch is Open and time to Core Boil is less than 16 minutes.

COMMENTS:

END TASK

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________



SEQ STEP #

Explanation

1 Required to determine the time for core boil. 2 Required to determine the time for core boil. 3 Required to determine the time for core boil. 4 Required to determine actions required as a result of the time to core boil

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS Unit 1 was shutdown on 12/01 at 0400

Site Directive 1.3.5 (Shutdown Protection Plan) Attachment 9.2.A is being prepared for this shift

LPI aligned for Normal Decay Heat Removal

INITIATING CUES

Current Date/Time: 12/03 at 0615

The CRS instructs you to determine the “Time To Core Boil” utilizing OP/0/A/1108/001 A, (Reactor Core and SFP Loss of Cooling Heatup Tables), and perform any required actions based on the results, in accordance with Site Directive 1.3.5 (Shutdown Protection Plan) Attachment 9.2.A.

Admin-108 1.1BPage 1 of 8


Admin-108

Determine Time for SFP to Reach 200ºF


Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:



Task Title : Determine Time for SFP to Reach 200ºF Task Number : Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 15 minutes K/A Rating(s): System: GEN K/A: 2.1.25 Rating: 3.9/4.2 Task Standard: Tables in AP/1-2/A/1700/035 (Loss of SFP Cooling And/Or Level) are used to determine total time required for SFP temperature to reach 200ºF References: AP/1-2/A/1700/035 (Loss of SFP Cooling And/Or Level) Rev 17 Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed: AP/1-2/A/1700/035 Encl. 5.4 (Unit 1-2 SFP Time to Reach 180ºF, 200 ºF) ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments



1. N/A



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 1 is at 100% stable

Unit 1 EFPD = 278

Unit 2 EFPD = 47

Unit 2 was operating at 100% when it experienced a Unit blackout

SSF has been activated for Unit 2

Unit 2 RCMUP is aligned and operating

2HP-426 is being cycled to maintain Pressurizer Level as directed by AP/25

AP/1-2/A/1700/035 (Loss of SFP Cooling And/Or Level) has been initiated

Unit 1 & 2 SFP level = 0.0 ft stable

Unit 1 & 2 SFP temperature = 102ºF INITIATING CUES

CRS has directed you to utilize AP/35 Enclosure 5.4 and determine the time for Unit 1&2 SFP to reach 200 ºF.


START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1

1. Refer to tables A, B, and C below.

2. ONLY one row from one table below applies

3. Check the row in Table A, B, or C that applies to current conditions, and then use Tables listed on subsequent pages of Encl 5.4, as directed, to calculate SFP heat up times.

STANDARD: Candidate selects Table B and then chooses to use Table 11 based on:

SSF Event in progress for U1 or U2 with Unit letdown going to SFP

AND

U1 and U2 each have 177 Fuel Assemblies in RB

Candidate proceeds to Table 11 (page 41 of 63)

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2

Determine the Time (in days) row based on direction from page 5 of 63

STANDARD: Candidate selects the lower EFPD unit (Unit 2 = 47 days) and adds 20, which results in 67 days.

Determines that 67 days is between 60 and 70 days on far left column of Table 11.

Based on guidance in Step 7 on Page 7 of 63, candidate elects to use 60 days (the shorter time).

NOTE: Steps 2 and 3 can be performed in any order

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


3

Determine initial Spent Fuel Pool Temperature column based on directions from page 7 of 63 Step 6.

STANDARD: Candidate utilizes the 105 column based on:

Actual SFP temperature = 102ºF Temperature columns available are 100 and 105 Directions in Step 6, page 7 of 63, direct the use of

the higher temperature column.

NOTE: Steps 2 and 3 can be performed in any order

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

4

Find the Time in hours based on the intersection of the 60 day row and the 105 degree column.

STANDARD: Based on the intersection of the 60 day row and the 105 degree column, determine that 20.0 hours is the time to reach 200ºF

COMMENTS:

END TASK

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________



SEQ STEP #

Explanation

1 Required to determine the time to reach 200 ºF

2

Required to determine the time to reach 200 ºF

3 Required to determine the time to reach 200 ºF

4

Required to determine the time to reach 200 ºF

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 1 is at 100% stable

Unit 1 EFPD = 278

Unit 2 EFPD = 47

Unit 2 was operating at 100% when it experienced a Unit blackout

SSF has been activated for Unit 2

Unit 2 RCMUP is aligned and operating

2HP-426 is being cycled to maintain Pressurizer Level as directed by AP/25

AP/1-2/A/1700/035 (Loss of SFP Cooling And/Or Level) has been initiated

Unit 1 & 2 SFP level = 0.0 ft stable

Unit 1 & 2 SFP temperature = 102ºF INITIATING CUES

CRS has directed you to utilize AP/35 Enclosure 5.4 and determine the time for Unit 1&2 SFP to reach 200 ºF.

Admin-109 1.2RPage 1 of 12


Admin-109

Unit 3 SFP Boron and Volume Change Calculation

Alternate Path: No Alt Path Failure: ____________________________________________________________ Time Critical: No Time Critical Criteria: ________________________________________________________

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:



Task Title : Calculate the minimum makeup volumes from CBAST and 3B BHUT to raise Final SFP Boron Concentration and level and determine operability of CBAST if makeup is performed Task Number : Alternate Path: No Time Critical: No Validation Time: 20 min K/A Rating(s): System: Gen K/A: 2.1.23 Rating: (4.3/4.4) Task Standard: Calculate makeup volumes and recognize that CBAST will be outside the procedural limits of operability if used as the boric acid makeup source References: OP/3/A/1104/006 C (SFP Makeup), Enclosure 4.8 (Unit 3 SFP Makeup From CBAST) rev. 18 OP/3/A/1104/006 C (SFP Makeup), Enclosure 4.1 (Unit 3 SFP Boron and Volume Change Calculation) OP/0/A/1108/001 Enclosure 4.2 (CBAST Volume Vs. Level Curve – All Units) rev. 111 OP/0/A/1108/001 Enclosure 4.15 (CBAST Concentration Vs. Level Curve – All Units) Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed: OP/3/A/1104/006 C (SFP Makeup), Enclosure 4.8 (Unit 3 SFP Makeup From CBAST) OP/3/A/1104/006 C (SFP Makeup), Enclosure 4.1 (Unit 3 SFP Boron and Volume Change Calculation) OP/0/A/1108/001 Enclosure 4.2 (CBAST Volume Vs. Level Curve – All Units) OP/0/A/1108/001 Enclosure 4.15 (CBAST Concentration Vs. Level Curve – All Units) ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments



1. N/A



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Unit 3 Reactor power = 75% stable

Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) level = 0.0 ft

Unit 3 SFP Boron = 2525 ppm

Unit 3 CBAST Boron = 13,200 ppm

Unit 3 CBAST level = 75 inches

3B BHUT Boron = 0 ppm

Unit 3 SFP level will be increased to +0.5 ft and the Unit 3 SFP concentration will be raised to 2575 ppm using Unit 3 CBAST and 3B BHUT.

INITIATING CUE You are directed to perform the procedure to makeup to the Unit 3 SFP as follows:

Raise Final Unit 3 SFP Boron Concentration to 2575 ppm and level to +0.5 feet. Using the in-progress procedure provided and any other required procedure(s), perform OP/3/A/1104/006 C (SFP Makeup), Encl. 4.8 (Unit 3 SFP Makeup) through Step 2.4. Round all calculations to two decimal places. Assume you have SRO agreement/concurrence whenever it is required.


START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 2.2

Determine required U3 SFP makeup volume from CBAST and DW.

IF, desired utilize Enclosure 4.1 (U3 SFP Boron and Volume Change Calculation).

STANDARD: Refer to Enclosure 4.1 (U3 SFP Boron and Volume Change Calculation) and determine that there is 1041gal / 0.1 foot in the SFP and then calculate total gallons required to raise level to +0.5ft.

0.5 ft x 1041 gal/0.1 ft = 5205 gallons

OR Calculate the total gallons required to raise level to + 0.5 ft using OP/1108/001 (Curves and General Information) Encl. 4.26 (Miscellaneous Data).

0.5 ft x 1041 gal/0.1 ft = 5205 gallons

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


2 2.2

con't.

Determine the required concentration of the makeup volume

STANDARD: Refer to Enclosure 4.1 (U3 SFP Boron and Volume Change Calculation)step 2.1.

Note: SFP final vol = 376,000 gal + (1041 gal/0.1ft X 0.5 ft) = 381,205 gal

C1V1 + C2V2 = CfVf

C1= 2525 ppm= Present Unit 3 SFP Boron concentration

V1 = 376,000 gal = Present Unit 3 SFP volume gal

C2 = unknown

V2 = 5205gal

Cf= 2575 ppm = Desired SFP Boron Concentration

Vf = 381,205 gal = Final SFP Volume

Required makeup concentration = 6186.9 ppm

(Accept: 6186 – 6187 ppm)

Note: This calculation may be performed in different sequences using various derivations of the same equation below.

(C1V1 + C2V2 + C3V3 = CfVf)

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


3 2.2

con't.

Determine the required CBAST makeup volume

STANDARD: Refer to Enclosure 4.1 (U3 SFP Boron and Volume Change Calculation) step 2.1.

C1V1 + C2V2 = CfVf

C1= 0 ppm = 3B BHUT concentration

V1 = unknown

C2 = 13,200 ppm = CBAST concentration

V2 = unknown

Cf= 6187ppm = Required Boron Concentration of makeup

Vf = 5205 gal = Final SFP Makeup Volume

V2 = Cf Vf /C2 =2439.6 gal

CBAST volume = 2439 gal

(Accept: 2439 – 2440 gal)

Note: This calculation may be performed in different sequences using various derivations of the same equation. Steps 2, 3, and 4 demonstrate one method. Step 5 demonstrates an alternate method. If the candidate performs the calculation as one formula (shown below), skip steps 2, 3, and 4 and go to step 5

(C1V1 + C2V2 + C3V3 = CfVf)

*NOTE: Step only critical if step 5 NOT performed.

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


4 2.2

con't.

Determine 3B BHUT makeup volume required.


3B BHUT volume = Total required makeup volume - CBAST volume

3B BHUT volume = 5205 gal – 2439 gal = 2766 gal

= 5205 gal – 2440 gal = 2765 gal

3B BHUT volume = 2766 gal

(Accept: 2765 – 2766 gal)

Note: This calculation may be performed in different sequences using various derivations of the same equation. Steps 2, 3, and 4 demonstrate one method. Step 5 demonstrates an alternate method. If the candidate performs the calculation as one formula (shown below), skip steps 2, 3, and 4 and go to step 5

(C1V1 + C2V2 + C3V3 = CfVf)

*NOTE: Step only critical if step 5 NOT performed.

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


5 2.2

con't.

Determine required U3 SFP makeup volume from CBAST and DW.


C1V1 + C2V2 + C3V3 = CfVf

C1= 0 ppm = 3B BHUT concentration

V1 = unknown

C2 = 13,200 ppm = CBAST concentration

V2 = unknown

C3 = 2525 ppm = initial SFP concentration

V3 = 376,000 gal = initial SFP volume

Cf = 2575 ppm = final SFP concentration

Vf = 381,205 gal = final SFP volume (376,000+5205)

CBAST volume = 2439 gal

(Accept: 2433 – 2440 gal)

3B BHUT volume = 5205 gal – 2439 gal = 2766 gal

= 5205 gal – 2440 gal = 2765 gal

(Accept: 2764 – 2767 gal)

*NOTE: Step only critical if steps 3 and 4 NOT performed.

COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

6 2.3

Obtain SRO approval of required Unit 3 SFP makeup volume from CBAST and DW.

STANDARD: SRO approval of the CBAST and DW makeup volumes is obtained.

NOTE: SRO approval is granted per cue sheet.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


7 2.4

IF Unit 3 in MODE 1 OR 2, verify that sufficient level will be available to satisfy "CBAST Concentration vs. Level" curve in OP/0/A/1108/001 (Curves and General Information).

STANDARD: Refer to OP/0/A/1108/001 Enclosure 4.2 (CBAST Volume Vs. Level Curve – All Units) and determine that a CBAST level of 75 inches equates to 11,700 (11,000 – 12,000 is acceptable) gallons in CBAST

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

8 2.4

con't.


STANDARD: Refer to OP/0/A/1108/001 Enclosure 4.15 (CBAST Concentration vs. Level Curve - All Units) and determine that the minimum level required in CBAST at 13,200 ppm to meet Operability is approximately 58+/- 1 inches

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

9 2.4

con't.


STANDARD: Refer to OP/0/A/1108/001 Enclosure 4.2 (CBAST Volume Vs. Level Curve – All Units) and calculate the remaining level in CBAST if 2439 gallons is transferred from CBAST to the Unit 3 SFP.

75 inches = 11,600 – 11,800 gallons

High: 11,800 gal – 2439 gal = 9361 gal (~ 62 inches)

Low: 11,600 gal – 2440 gal = 9160 gal (~ 61 inches)

Level is more than the required level of 58-59 inches

COMMENTS:

END TASK

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________



SEQ STEP #

Explanation

3 This step is required to determine U3 CBAST volume if step 5 NOT performed. 4 This step is required to determine 3B BHUT volume if step 5 NOT performed. 5 This step is required to determine U3 CBAST and 3B BHUT volumes if steps 3 and 4

NOT performed. 9 This step is required to determine if final U3 CBAST level is sufficient to meet Operability

requirements.

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS


Unit 3 Spent Fuel Pool (SFP) level = 0.0 ft

Unit 3 SFP Boron = 2525 ppm

Unit 3 CBAST Boron = 13,200 ppm

Unit 3 CBAST level = 75 inches

3B BHUT Boron = 0 ppm

Unit 3 SFP level will be increased to +0.5 ft and the Unit 3 SFP concentration will be raised to 2575 ppm using Unit 3 CBAST and 3B BHUT.

INITIATING CUE You are directed to perform the procedure to makeup to the Unit 3 SFP as follows:

Raise Final Unit 3 SFP Boron Concentration to 2575 ppm and level to +0.5 feet. Using the in-progress procedure provided and any other required procedure(s), perform OP/3/A/1104/006 C (SFP Makeup), Encl. 4.8 (Unit 3 SFP Makeup) through Step 2.4. Round all calculations to two decimal places. Assume you have SRO agreement/concurrence whenever it is required.

Admin-304 3BPage 1 of 8


Admin-304

Determine the Maximum Permissible Stay Time Within Emergency Dose Limits (EDL)

Alternate Path: (No) Alt Path Failure: _______________________________________________________ Time Critical: (No) Time Critical Criteria: ___________________________________________________

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:



Task Title : Determine the Maximum Permissible Stay Time Within the Emergency Dose Limits. Task Number : Alternate Path: (No) Time Critical: (No) Validation Time: 20 Min K/A Rating(s): System: Gen K/A: 2.3.4 Rating: 3.2/3.7 Task Standard: Determine the Maximum Permissible Stay Time Within the Emergency Dose Limits. References: PD-RP-ALL-0001 Radiation Worker Responsibilities OMP 1-18 (Implementation Standard During Abnormal And Emergency Events) Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed: Calculator Note tablet =============================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________

NAME Time Finish: ______________ Performance Rating: SAT ______ UNSAT ______ Performance Time: _________ Examiner: ______________________________ ________________________________/_________ NAME SIGNATURE DATE ===============================================================================

Comments



1. N/A



INITIAL CONDITIONS Steam Generator Tube Rupture has occurred on Unit 3

Emergency Dose Limits are in effect

Before assuming today’s shift, AO “A” has received 1.26 Rem TEDE this year, and AO “A” has not received any dose for this event except as specified below.

The following tasks are required to be performed:

# TASK TIME REQUIRED DOSE RATE

1 Close 3C-573 9 min 9.35 R/hr

2 Open 3FDW-313 4 min 21.25 R/hr

3 Open all Unit 3’s ADVs 7.55 R/hr

Note: Assume no dose is received while traveling between tasks. Tasks 1, 2, 3 are not for lifesaving or protecting valuable property.

INITIATING CUE Refer to the above information. AO “A” has completed tasks 1 and 2 in the time required. Determine how long (in minutes) that AO “A” has to complete task 3 without exceeding Emergency Dose Limits. Round all calculations to two (2) decimal places.


START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1

Examiner Note: Candidate may perform these steps in a different order;

however, the calculated stay time must be correct. EDL is 5 Rem per event (LOCA or SGTR). Current exposure for the year is not counted toward the

Emergency Dose Limits (EDL).

2

Determine dose received while performing task 1.

STANDARD: Determine dose received while performing task 1.

9.35 R/hr X 1hr/60 min X 9 min = 1.4025 R

(1.40 to 1.41 R)

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

3

Determine dose received while performing task 2.

STANDARD: Determine dose received while performing task 2.

21.25 R/hr X 1hr/60 min X 4 min = 1.4166 R

(1.41 to 1.42 R)

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


4

Determine dose remaining from EDLs.

STANDARD: Determine dose remaining from EDLs.

5R – 1.4025R – 1.4166R = 2.1809 R

(2.17 to 2.19 R)

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

5

Determine time available for the AO to complete task 3 without exceeding EDL.

STANDARD: Stay time is calculated to be:

Available Dose = 2.1809 R = .29 hr X 60 min = 17.4 min Dose Rate 7.55 R/hr 1hr (17 to 18 Minutes)

COMMENTS:

END TASK

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________



STEP # Explanation

1

Required to calculate stay time.

2 Required to calculate stay time.



CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS Steam Generator Tube Rupture has occurred on Unit 3

Emergency Dose Limits are in effect

Before assuming today’s shift, AO “A” has received 1.26 Rem TEDE this year, and AO “A” has not received any dose for this event except as specified below.

The following tasks are required to be performed:

# TASK TIME REQUIRED DOSE RATE

1 Close 3C-573 9 min 9.35 R/hr

2 Open 3FDW-313 4 min 21.25 R/hr

3 Open all Unit 3’s ADVs 7.55 R/hr

Note: Assume no dose is received while traveling between tasks. Tasks 1, 2, 3 are not for lifesaving or protecting valuable property.

INITIATING CUE Refer to the above information. AO “A” has completed tasks 1 and 2 in the time required. Determine how long (in minutes) that AO “A” has to complete task 3 without exceeding Emergency Dose Limits. Round all calculations to two (2) decimal places.

Admin-S107 1.2SPage 1 of 11


Admin-S107

CALCULATION OF PRIMARY TO SECONDARY LEAK RATE

AND DETERMINATION OF SHUTDOWN REQUIREMENTS


Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:



Task Title : Calculation of Primary to Secondary Leak Rate and determination of shutdown requirements

Task Number : Alternate Path: (No) Time Critical: (No) Validation Time: 15 Minutes K/A Rating(s):

System: Gen K/A: 2.1.7 Rating: 4.4/4.7 Task Standard: Utilize AP/1/A/1700/031 (Primary to Secondary Leakage) Subsequent Actions to determine correct procedure path, calculation enclosure to use to quantify the leak rate, and enclosure to determine unit shutdown requirements. Utilize AP/1/A/1700/031 (Primary to Secondary Leakage) Enclosure 5.5 (Calculation of Primary to Secondary Leak Rate using 1RIA-40) and RCS Samples to correctly calculate SG Tube Leak flow rate. Utilize AP/1/A/1700/031 (Primary to Secondary Leakage), Enclosure 5.1 (Unit Shutdown Requirements) to determine shutdown requirements based on quantified leak rate from Enclosure 5.5. References: AP/1/A/1700/031, Primary to Secondary Leakage Rev 21 Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed: AP/1/A/1700/031 complete up thru Step 4.18 Calculator ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments



1. N/A



INITIAL CONDITIONS

Time = 0400


AP/1/A/1700/031 (Primary to Secondary Leakage) entered due to suspected leakage

> 5 gpd but < 25 gpm

1RIA-40 (from View Node information) = 552 cpm

Spiked as high as 805 cpm approximately 2 hours ago

Off Gas Blower is in operation

OAC primary to secondary leak rate calculation became unavailable at shift turnover

RP and Primary Chemistry sample results are as follows:

Total Xe 133 equivalent activity (from RP CSAE off-gas sample) = 2.1 E-5 µCi/ml

Total Xe 133 activity (from RP CSAE off-gas sample) = 2.23 E-5 µCi/ml

RCS Xe 133 equivalent corrected (from Primary Chemistry RCS sample) = 0.278 µCi/ml

RCS Xe 133 activity (from Primary Chemistry RCS sample) = 0.301 µCi/ml

CSAE off-gas flow = 12.5 scfm

INITIATING CUES AP/1/A/1700/031 is complete up thru Step 4.18. You are to continue in the AP and determine the primary to secondary leak rate and make a recommendation for continued operation and/or required time to shutdown based on the calculated leak rate. Document the primary to secondary leak rate and your operational recommendation below. Another operator will make all required log entries.


START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1 4.19

Verify OAC primary to secondary leak rate calculation available (including 1RIA-40 operable with CSAE OFFGAS BLOWER operating).

STANDARD: Candidate determines from initial conditions that OAC program is NOT available. Utilizes the RNO: GO TO Step 4.22.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 4.22

Verify all of the following: __ Rx power > 40 % __ 1RIA-59 operable __ 1RIA-60 operable

STANDARD: Candidate determines from initial conditions that power is < 40%. Proceeds to the RNO: GO TO Step 4.25.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

3 4.25

Verify 1RIA-40 operable with CSAE OFF-GAS BLOWER operating. STANDARD: Candidate determines from initial conditions that

1RIA-40 is operable and the CSAE Off Gas Blower is operating.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


4 4.26

PERFORM Encl.5.5 (Calculation of Primary to Secondary Leak Rate using 1RIA-40).

STANDARD: Candidate proceeds to Enclosure 5.5

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

5

Encl

5.5

1

Obtain RCS Xe 133 equivalent corrected from latest available Primary Chemistry RCS sample. __________________(mCi/ml)

STANDARD: Candidate must pick the RCS Xe 133 equivalent corrected from the Initial conditions (0.278 µCi/ml).

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

6 2

NOTE The maximum indicated 1RIA-40 count rate (the peak of any spikes) should be used to calculate leak rate. {15}

Obtain 1RIA-40 counts from the Control Room RIA View Node. (1VB2) _________________ cpm

STANDARD: Candidate obtains the 1RIA-40 spike counts (from initial conditions) per the NOTE preceding Step 2 (805 cpm).

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


7 3

NOTE Total CSAE off-gas flow has been conservatively assumed, as required by PIP O-07-5869 CA 1, to be 100 ft3/min . This may cause indicated SG tube leak rate to be greater than actual SG tube leak rate.

Determine primary to secondary leak rate from the following formulas: Leak rate = 100 ft3/min X 1RIA-40 (cpm) X 3.67E-4 (gal)(min)(Ci/ml) RCS Xe 133 eq corr (Ci/ml) (ft3)(day)(cpm) Leak rate =100 ft3 X cpm X 3.67E-4 (gal)(min)(Ci/ml) = _________ gpd min Ci/ml (ft3)(day)(cpm)

STANDARD: Candidate calculates the SGTL size as follows per Encl. 5.5. formula, determines leak rate is 106.27 gpd (106 to 107 gpd).

Candidate exits enclosure 5.5. Returns to step 4.27.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

8 4.27

GO TO the appropriate step based on Primary to Secondary Leak Rate: STANDARD: Candidate determines that the GO TO step is 4.93

based on leak rate calculation 100 gpd to < 25 gpm, and proceeds to that step.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


9 4.93

Initiate log readings from the following every 15 minutes in the Auto Log:

1RIA-16 1RIA-17 1RIA-40 1RIA-59 (when Rx power > 40 %) 1RIA-60 (when Rx power > 40 %)

STANDARD: Per the cue sheet, another operator will make all log entries.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

10 4.94

Initiate a unit shutdown to meet requirements of Encl 5.1 (Unit Shutdown Requirements) using the following, as applicable:

AP/29 (Rapid Unit Shutdown) OP/1/A/1102/004 (Operation at Power) OP/1/A/1102/010 (Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown)

STANDARD: Candidate proceeds to Enclosure 5.1

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


11 Encl

5.1

NOTE The time limits for all conditions begin when the associated

leak rate is first quantified, typically by OAC point O1P1599 or 1RIA-59/60 reading. Although grab samples may be collected to validate leak size, the time limits begin from the first quantified leak rate.

For items 1&2, shutdown must commence immediately. For items 3-5, commencement of shutdown may be

delayed until leak rate is confirmed by grab samples, however the time limit begins when the leak rate was first quantified.

Continuous Primary to Secondary Leakage Monitoring is provided by the following methods: 1-OAC Point O1P1599 (EST TOTAL PRI TO SEC LEAKRATE) including 1RIA-40 operable with CSAE OFF-GAS BLOWER operating 2-1RIA-59 and 1RIA-60 operable with power > 40%

If shutdown begins based on crediting 1RIA-59 and 1RIA-60 (1RIA-40 inoperable), the time limit does NOT change when Rx power is decreased below 40%.

STANDARD: Candidate utilizes the Table and Notes in AP/31 Encl. 5.1, Unit Shutdown Requirements, and determines the time to be in Mode 3 based on a leak rate of 106 gpd to be 3 hours from the time of quantification. Unit 1 must be shut down and in Mode 3 by 0700 (or 3 hours).

COMMENTS:

END TASK

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________



SEQ STEP #

Explanation

5 Required to calculate the leak rate correctly



11 Required to determine time of shutdown to Mode 3

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS

Time = 0400


AP/1/A/1700/031 (Primary to Secondary Leakage) entered due to suspected leakage

> 5 gpd but < 25 gpm

1RIA-40 (from View Node information) = 552 cpm

Spiked as high as 805 cpm approximately 2 hours ago

Off Gas Blower is in operation

OAC primary to secondary leak rate calculation became unavailable at shift turnover

RP and Primary Chemistry sample results are as follows:

Total Xe 133 equivalent activity (from RP CSAE off-gas sample) = 2.1 E-5 µCi/ml

Total Xe 133 activity (from RP CSAE off-gas sample) = 2.23 E-5 µCi/ml

RCS Xe 133 equivalent corrected (from Primary Chemistry RCS sample) = 0.278 µCi/ml

RCS Xe 133 activity (from Primary Chemistry RCS sample) = 0.301 µCi/ml

CSAE off-gas flow = 12.5 scfm

INITIATING CUES AP/1/A/1700/031 is complete up thru Step 4.18. You are to continue in the AP and determine the primary to secondary leak rate and make a recommendation for continued operation and/or required time to shutdown based on the calculated leak rate. Document the primary to secondary leak rate and your operational recommendation below. Another operator will make all required log entries.

Admin-S404 4SPage 1 of 11


Admin-S404

Determine Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations (Complete Emergency

Notification Form)

Alternate Path: No Alt Path Failure: ____________________________________________________________ Time Critical: Yes Time Critical Criteria: Classify within 15 minutes. Complete ENF within 15 minutes of Declaration

Prepared By:

Date:

EP Review By: Date:

Reviewed By: Date:

Approved By: Date:



Task Title : Determine Emergency Classification and Protective Action Recommendations (Complete Emergency Notification Form) Task Number : N/A Alternate Path: No Time Critical: Yes Validation Time: 20 minutes K/A Rating(s): System: Gen K/A: 2.4.38 Rating: 2.4/4.4 Task Standard: Appropriate classification is determined and associated Emergency Notification Form is completed.

References: RP/0/A/1000/001 (Rev. 4) RP/0/A/1000/002 (Rev. 10) Basis Document (Volume A, Section D of the Emergency Plan Tools/Equipment/Procedures Needed: RP/0/A/1000/001 RP/0/A/1000/002 ===================================================================================== Candidate: __________________________________ Time Start: _______________


Comments



1. N/A



INITIAL CONDITIONS

TIME: 5 Minutes ago

Unit 2 & 3 at 100% power

Unit 1 tripped due to a turbine control system malfunction

1A SG MSRV 1MS-6 failed to fully reseat resulted in 1A SG pressure stabilizing at ≈ 850 psig

CURRENT CONDITIONS

Chemistry reports Unit 1 RCS activity is 305 μCi/ml DEI

1A SG tube leakage calculated at 105 gpm

1RIA-58 (High Range Containment Monitor) reading 1.3 R/hr and slowly increasing

INITIATING CUE You are to perform the required actions of the Emergency Coordinator by referring to RP/0/A/1000/01, Emergency Classification:

1. Determine Emergency Classification at present time.

2. Complete appropriate Emergency Notification Form for the current conditions per RP/0/A/1000/002, Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure..

Inform the examiner when you have made the classification. THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM NOTE: Do not use Emergency Coordinator’s judgment while classifying the event.

When required, an operator will maintain the Emergency Coordinator’s Log and assume the duties of the Control Room Offsite Communicator.


START TIME: _______

SEQ STEP

PROC STEP

DESCRIPTION

1

Classify the Event

STANDARD: Refer to RP/0/A/1000/01 (Emergency Classification) Enclosure 4.1 (Fission Product Barrier Matrix).

Classify the event as a “General Emergency” due to the following:

Loss of RCS barrier (5 points) (1RIA-58 > 1.0 R/hr)

Loss of Fuel Clad Barriers (5 points) (Coolant activity ≥ 300 μCi/ml DEI)

Loss of Containment Barrier (3 points) (Failure of secondary side of SG results in a direct opening to the environment with SG Tube Leak ≥ 10 gpm in the SAME SG)

Time for Classification __________

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

2 1.1

Commence the Off-Site Notification Form.

STANDARD: Go to RP/0/A/1000/002 (Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure) and initiate procedure by determining symptoms for entry exist and check Step 1.1

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


3 2.1

IF an EAL exists, Declare the appropriate Emergency Classification level. Classification ___________ (UE, Alert, SAE, GE) Time Declared: __________ STANDARD: Applicant declares a GE due to 4.1.G.2, Loss of all

three barriers, and records the time that the classification was made.

COMMENTS:

CRITICAL

STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

4 2.2

IF A Security event is in progress, THEN GO TO Step 2.4. STANDARD: Applicant determines that a security event is NOT in

progress and proceeds to step 2.3.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


5 2.3

IF ERO has NOT yet been activated AND ERO activation is needed, perform the following: 2.3.1: Circle the applicable initial notification code below.

EAL classification

Notification Codes (see Enclosure 4.11 for descriptions)

DRILL EMERGENCY

TSC, OSC, & EOF

TSC & OSC TSC, OSC, & EOF

None F1a (TSC & OSC only)

NOUE D1a D1b E1a

Alert D2a D2b E2a

SAE D3a D3b E3a

GE D4a D4b E4a

Augmentation D6b D6a

2.3.2 IF a qualified individual is available to notify the ERO, provide the circled notification code above to a qualified individual and direct them to begin Enclosure 4.10 (Activation of the Emergency Response Organization). STANDARD: Applicant determines that the notification code is either

D4a, D4b, or E4a.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

6 2.4

Direct Control Room Offsite Communicator(s) to perform the following: • Record Name ________________________________________ • REFER TO RP/0/A/1000/015A (Offsite Communications From The Control Room), Immediate Actions steps 2.1 and 2.2 AND Enclosure 4.7 (Guidelines for Manually Transmitting a Message) in preparation for notifying offsite agencies. STANDARD: There is no offsite communicator for this JPM.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


7 2.5

IAAT Changing plant conditions require an emergency classification upgrade, THEN Notify Offsite Communicator to complete in-progress notifications per RP/0/A/1000/15A (Offsite Communications From The Control Room), AND Start a new clean copy of this procedure for the upgraded classification AND stop working on this copy, noting the time in your log that each new copy started.

STANDARD: No upgrade will be required for this JPM.

COMMENTS:

___ SAT

___ UNSAT


8 2.6

Obtain the applicable Offsite Notification form in the control room and complete as follows: ___ 2.6.1 Ensure EAL # as determined by RP/0/A/1000/001 matches

Line 4. ___*2.6.2 Line 1 - Mark appropriate box "Drill" or "Actual Event" ___*2.6.3 Line 1 - Enter Message # ___*2.6.4 Line 2 - Mark Initial ___ 2.6.5 Line 6 – A. Mark "Is Occurring" if any of the following are true: • RIAs 40, 45, or 46 are increasing or in alarm • If containment is breached • Containment pressure > 1 psig B. Mark "None" if none of the above is applicable. ___ 2.6.6 Line 7 - If Line 6 Box B or C is marked, mark Box D.

Otherwise mark Box A. ___ 2.6.7 Line 8 - Mark "Stable" unless an upgrade or additional PARs are anticipated within an hour. • Refer to Enclosure 4.8 (Event Prognosis Definitions) ___*2.6.8 Line 10 - Military time and date of declaration (Refer to

date/time in Step 2.1) ___ 2.6.9 Line 11 - Evaluate the following for classification for all units. • Security event • Seismic event • Tornado on site • Hurricane force winds on site • SSF event • Fire affecting shared safety related equipment

Mark or select ALL if event affects the emergency classification on more than one unit. If event only affects one (1) unit OR one (1) unit has a higher emergency class, select or mark the appropriate unit.

___*2.6.10 Line 12 - Mark unit(s) affected (reference Line 11) AND enter percent power for each unit affected. {14}

• If affected unit is shutdown, then enter shutdown time and date.

___ 2.6.11 Line 13 - If the SM has no remarks, write "None" ___ 2.6.12 If Condition "A" exists ensure following PARs are included

on Line 5. A. Evacuate: Move residents living downstream of the Keowee

Hydro Project dams to higher ground. B. Other: Prohibit traffic flow across bridges identified on your

inundation maps until the danger has passed. ___*2.6.13 Line 17 - SM signature, CURRENT Time/Date STANDARD: Correctly fills out Emergency Notification Form 4.1.G.2

in accordance with Key. COMMENTS:

*CRITICAL STEP

___ SAT

___ UNSAT

TIME STOP: ________



SEQ STEP #

Explanation

1 The candidate needs to be able to utilize the procedure and determine the conditions meet a

General Emergency classification. 3 This is a time critical step. The candidate needs to declare the GE within 15 minutes of

beginning the JPM. (The start of the JPM is the beginning of the assessment period) 8 The emergency notification form is accurately filled-out; identified steps from the KEY are critical

items within 15 minutes from the time the EAL was declared. (Declaration time is the time recorded in JPM step 3)

CANDIDATE CUE SHEET


INITIAL CONDITIONS

TIME: 5 Minutes ago

Unit 2 & 3 at 100% power

Unit 1 tripped due to a turbine control system malfunction

1A SG MSRV 1MS-6 failed to fully reseat resulted in 1A SG pressure stabilizing at ≈ 850 psig

CURRENT CONDITIONS

Chemistry reports Unit 1 RCS activity is 305 μCi/ml DEI

1A SG tube leakage calculated at 105 gpm

1RIA-58 (High Range Containment Monitor) reading 1.3 R/hr and slowly increasing

INITIATING CUE You are to perform the required actions of the Emergency Coordinator by referring to RP/0/A/1000/01, Emergency Classification:

1. Determine Emergency Classification at present time.

2. Complete appropriate Emergency Notification Form for the current conditions per RP/0/A/1000/002, Control Room Emergency Coordinator Procedure..

Inform the examiner when you have made the classification. THIS IS A TIME CRITICAL JPM NOTE: Do not use Emergency Coordinator’s judgment while classifying the

event. When required, an operator will maintain the Emergency Coordinator’s Log and assume the duties of the Control Room Offsite Communicator.

Documents

Date of Examination: 06/13/2016 Examination Level: RO X SRO … · 2019. 4. 30. · ES-301 Administrative Topics Outline Form ES-301-1 ILT16-1 Facility: Oconee Date of Examination: