Data and Applications Security Developments and Directions

Data and Applications Security Developments and Directions

Dr. Bhavani Thuraisingham

The University of Texas at Dallas

Security for Distributed Data Management

October 1, 2010

Outline

Distributed Database Systems

- Architecture, Data Distribution, Functions Security Issues

- Discretionary Security, Multilevel Security Secure Heterogeneous and Federated Systems Single Sign-on and Identity Management Assumption: Network is secure; focusing on securing the data

Distributed Architecture

Communication NetworkDistributed Processor 1

DBMS 1

Data-base 1 Data-

base 3

Data-base 2 DBMS 2

DBMS 3

Distributed Processor 2

Distributed Processor 3

Site 1

Site 2

Site 3

Data Distribution

EMP1

SS# Name Salary

1 John 20 2 Paul 303 James 404 Jill 50

605 Mary6 Jane 70

D#

102020 201020

DnameD# MGR

10 30 40

Jane David Peter

DEPT1

SITE 1

SITE 2EMP2

SS# Name Salary9 Mathew 70

D#50

DnameD# MGR

50 Math John

Physics

DEPT2

David 80 30

Peter 90 40

7

8

C. Sci. English French

20 Paul

Distributed Database Functions

Distributed Query Processing

- Optimization techniques across the databases Distributed Transaction Management

- Techniques for distributed concurrency control and recovery

Distributed Metadata Management

- Techniques for managing the distributed metadata Distributed Security/Integrity Maintenance

- Techniques for processing integrity constraints and enforcing access control rules across the databases

Secure Distributed Architecture

global user

localuserlocaluser

SecureNetworkSecureNetwork

SecureDistributedProcessor

SecureDistributedProcessorDistributedProcessor

S-DBMS

DatabaseDatabase

S-DBMS S-DBMS

DatabaseDatabase DatabaseDatabase





Discretionary Security Mechanism

Access Control and AuthorizationPolicies

AdministrationPolicies Identification and Authentication Policies

Discretionary

Security

Discretionary

Security

Access Control and AuthorizationPolicies enforced across the databases

AdministrationPolicies enforcedacross the databases

Identification and Authentication Policies enforcedacross the databases

Discretionary

SecurityDiscretionarySecurity for distributed database systems

Security Policy Integration

Network

Distributed

MLS Network

Distributed/

Network

Distributed

Integrated Policy

Security Policyfor database systemA

Security Policyfor database systemB

Security Policyfor database systemC

Views for Security

EMP1

SS# Name Salary

1 John 202 Paul 303 James 404 Jill 50

605 Mary6 Jane 70

D#

102020201020

DnameD# MGR

10

30

40

Jane

David

Peter

DEPT1

SITE 1

C. Sci.

English

French

SITE 2EMP2


D#50

DnameD# MGR

50 Math John

Physics

DEPT2

David 80 30

Peter 90 40

7

8 20 Paul

Ename

PaulJamesJillJane

EMP-DEPT View(all those who work in the Physics Department)

Secure Distributed Database Functions

Secure Distributed Database Functions:

Distributed Query Processing: Enforce access control rulesduring query processing across databases; distributed inference control; consider security constraints during distributed query optimization

Distributed Transaction Management: Ensure security constraints are satisfied during transaction processing.

Metadata management: Enforce access control on distributed metadata

Integrity management: Ensure that integrity of the data is maintained while enforcing security across the databases

Architecture for Multilevel Security

global user

localuser

Multilevel SecureNetwork


MLS/DBMS

MultilevelDatabase

MLS/DBMS MLS/DBMS

MultilevelDatabase

MultilevelDatabase



Multilevel Distributed Data Model

EMP1 = Secret

SS# Name Salary

1 John 202 Paul 303 James 404 Jill 50

605 Mary6 Jane 70

D#

102020201020

DnameD# MGR

10

30

40

Jane

David

Peter

DEPT1 = UnclassifiedSITE 1

C. Sci.

English

French

SITE 2EMP2 = Secret


D#50

DnameD# MGR

50 Math John

Physics

DEPT2 = Unclassified

David 80 30

Peter 90 40

7

8 20 Paul

MLS/DDBMS Functions

DistributedQueryProcessor

DistributedTransactionProcessor

DistributedMetadataManager

Functionsof an MLS/DDBMS

Site A

Functionsof an MLS/DDBMS

Site B

DistributedQueryProcessor

DistributedTransactionProcessor

DistributedMetadataManager

Distributed Inference Controller

Network

Distributed

InferenceController

Distributed

InferenceController

DistributedInference Controller

DBMS DBMS DBMS

Database Database Database

Network

Distributed

InferenceController

Distributed

InferenceController

DistributedInference Controller

DBMS DBMS DBMS

Database Database Database

Interoperability of Heterogeneous Database Systems

Database System A Database System B

Network

Database System C(Legacy)

Transparent accessto heterogeneousdatabases - both usersand application programs;Query, Transactionprocessing

(Relational) (Object-Oriented)

Technical Issues on the Interoperability of Heterogeneous Database Systems

Heterogeneity with respect to data models, schema, query processing, query languages, transaction management, semantics, integrity, and security policies

Federated database management

- Collection of cooperating, autonomous, and possibly heterogeneous component database systems, each belonging to one or more federations

Interoperability based on client-server architectures

Federated Database Management

Database System A Database System B

Database System C

Cooperating databasesystems yet maintainingsome degree ofautonomy

Federation F1

Federation F2

Schema Integration and Transformation in a Federated Environment

Adapted from Sheth and Larson, ACM Computing Surveys, September 1990

Component Schema for Component A

Component Schema for Component B

Component Schema for Component C

Generic Schema for Component A

Generic Schemafor Component B

Generic Schemafor Component C

Export Schemafor Component A

Export Schema Ifor Component B

Export Schemafor Component C

Federated Schemafor FDS - 1

Federated Schemafor FDS - 2

ExternalSchema 1.2 Schema 2.1

ExternalSchema 2.2

ExternalSchema 1.1

Export Schema IIfor Component B

External

Client-Server Architecture: Example

Network

Clientfrom Vendor A

Clientfrom Vendor B

Serverfrom Vendor C Server

from Vendor D

Database Database

Security Issues

Transforming secure data models Secure architectures: Heterogeneous and federated data

management Security impact on schema/data/policy integration Incomparable/Overlapping security levels Inference Control Secure client-server computing

Transforming Secure Data Models

EMP: Level = Secret

SS# Ename Salary D#

1 John 20K 10

2 Paul 30K 20

3 Mary 40K 20

Class EMP is SecretIt has 3 instances:

John, Paul and Mary

DEPT

D# Dname Mgr

10 Math Smith U

20 Physics Jones C

Level

Class DEPT is UnclassifiedIt has 2 instances Math and Physics

Math is UnclassifiedPhysics is Confidential

Security Architecture: Heterogeneous data management

global user

localuserlocaluser

Secure Network

S-HeterogeneousDistributedProcessor

S-HeterogeneousDistributedProcessorDistributedProcessor

SDBMS 1

SecureDatabase

1

Secure

1

SDBMS 2 SDBMS 3





SecureDatabase

2

SecureDatabase

3

Security Architecture: Federated data management

global user

localuserlocaluser

Secure Network

S-FederatedDistributedProcessor

S-FederatedDistributedProcessorDistributedProcessor

SDBMS 1

SecureDatabase

11

SecureDatabase

11

SDBMS 2 SDBMS 3





SecureDatabase

21

SecureDatabase

3

1

global user

localuserlocaluser

Secure Network



SDBMS 1

Secure

1

SecureDatabase

1

SDBMS 2 SDBMS 3





SecureDatabase

2

SecureDatabase

3

Federated Data and Policy Management

ExportData/Policy

ComponentData/Policy for

Agency A

Data/Policy for Federation

ExportData/Policy


Agency C


Agency B

ExportData/Policy

Incomparable Security Levels

Node B

Node A

Confidential

TopSecret

Trusted Guard

DBMS AUnclassified

Secret

Confidential

TopSecret

Trusted Guard

DBMS AUnclassified

Secret

Overlapping Security Levels

Confidential

TopSecret

DBMS AUnclassified

SecretSecret

Node B

Node A

Inference Control

ExportEngine

Component Data System for Agency A

Federated Data Management

ExportEngine

ComponentData SystemFor Agency C

ComponentData Systemfor Agency B

ExportEngine

Federated Inference Controller

Inference Controller



ExportEngine



ExportEngine



ExportEngine





ExportEngine



ExportEngine



ExportEngine





ExportEngine



ExportEngine



ExportEngine





Secure Client-Server Computing

Secure Client 1

SecureClient 2

SecureClient 3

SecureData Server 1

SecureData Server 2

Secure NetworkMiddle Tier:Policy Enforcement

Middle Tier:Schema Enforcement

Comments

Techniques for centralize data management have to be extended for a distributed/heterogeneous/federated environment

Access control enforced across databases Inference control across databases Web will continue to impact the development of secure

distributed data managers Network security is critical

Single Sign-On

Single sign-on (SSO) is a method of access control that enables a user to log in once and gain access to the resources of multiple software systems without being prompted to log in again.

Single sign-off is the reverse process whereby a single action of signing out terminates access to multiple software systems.

As different applications and resources support different authentication mechanisms, single sign-on has to internally translate to and store different credentials compared to what is used for initial authentication

Single Sign-On

Kerberos based Initial sign-on prompts the user for credentials, and gets a

Kerberos ticket-granting ticket (TGT.) Additional software applications requiring authentication,

such as email clients, wikis, revision control systems, etc, use the ticket-granting ticket to acquire service tickets, proving the user's identity to the mailserver / wiki server / etc. without prompting the user to re-enter credentials.

Windows environment - Windows login fetches TGT. Active directory-aware apps fetch service tickets, so user is not prompted to re-authenticate.

UNIX/Linux environment - Login via Kerberos PAM modules fetches TGT. Kerberized client applications such as Evolution, Firefox, and SVN use service tickets, so user is not prompted to re-authenticate.

Single Sign-On

Smart card based: Initial sign on prompts the user for smart card. Additional software applications also use the smart card, without prompting the user to re-enter credentials. Smart card-based single sign-on can either use certificates or passwords stored on the smart card

Client Certificate Based: Shared Authentication Schemes which are not Single Sign-On

- Single sign on requires that users literally sign in once to establish their credentials. Systems which require the user to log in multiple times to the same identity are inherently not single sign on. For example, an environment where users are prompted to log in to their desktop, then log in to their email using the same credentials, is not single sign on. Shared authentication schemes like OpenID, which require additional sign-on for each web site, are also not single sign on.

Single Sign-On

Enterprise Single Sign-On

- Enterprise single sign-on (E-SSO) systems are designed to minimize the number of times that a user must type their ID and password to sign into multiple applications.

- The E-SSO solution automatically logs users in, and acts as a password filler where automatic login is not possible. Each client is typically given a token that handles the authentication, on other E-SSO solutions each client has E-SSO software stored on their computer to handle the authentication. On the server side is usually an E-SSO authentication server that is implemented into the enterprise network.

Federated Identity Management

Federated identity, or the ‘federation’ of identity, describes the technologies, standards and use-cases which serve to enable the portability of identity information across otherwise autonomous security domains.

The ultimate goal of identity federation is to enable users of one domain to securely access data or systems of another domain seamlessly, and without the need for completely redundant user administration. Identity federation comes in many flavors, including ‘user-controlled’ or ‘user-centric’ scenarios, as well as enterprise controlled or B2B scenarios.


Federation is enabled through the use of open industry standards and/or openly published specifications, such that multiple parties can achieve interoperability for common use cases.

Typical use-cases involve things such as cross-domain, web-based single sign-on, cross-domain user account provisioning, cross-domain entitlement management and cross-domain user attribute exchange.


Use of identity federation standards can reduce cost by eliminating the need to scale one-off or proprietary solutions.

It can increase security and lower risk by enabling an organization to identify and authenticate a user once, and then use that identity information across multiple systems, including external partner websites.

It can improve privacy compliance by allowing the user to control what information is shared, or by limiting the amount of information shared.

It can drastically improve the end-user experience by eliminating the need for new account registration through automatic ‘federated provisioning’ or the need to redundantly login through cross-domain single sign-on.


Leading enterprises around the world have deployed identity federation to get closer with partners, improve customer service, accelerate execution of business partnerships and alliances, cut cost and complexity of integrating outsourced services, and free themselves from vendor lock-in.

End-users and consumer focused web sites are now beginning to engage in identity federation through the adoption of OpenID, which is an open source specification for enabling federation use-cases.


The notion of identity federation is extremely broad, and also evolving. It could involve user-to-user, user-to-application as well as application-to-application use-case scenarios at both the browser tier as well as the web services or SOA (service-oriented architecture) tier.

It can involve high-trust, high-security scenarios as well as low-trust, low security scenarios. The levels of identity assurance that may be required for a given scenario are also being standardized through a common and open Identity Assurance Framework.

It can involve user-centric use-cases, as well as enterprise-centric use-cases. The term ‘identity federation’ is by design, a generic term, and is not bound to any one specific protocol, technology, implementation or company.


One thing that is consistent, however, is the fact that ‘federation’ does describe methods of identity portability which are achieved in an open, often standards-based manner – meaning anyone adhering to the open specification or standard can achieve the full spectrum of use-cases and interoperability.

Identity federation can be accomplished any number of ways, some of which involve the use of formal Internet standards, such as the OASIS SAML specification, and some of which may involve open source technologies and/or other openly published specifications, (e.g. Information Cards, OpenID, the Higgins trust framework or Novell’s Bandit project).

Documents

Data and Applications Security Developments and Directions