7/29/2019 Daniel a. Dombrowski, Rethinking the Ontological

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Int J Philos Relig (2007) 62:171172

DOI 10.1007/s11153-007-9130-0

Daniel A. Dombrowski, Rethinking the Ontological

Argument: A Neoclassical Theistic ResponseNew York: Cambridge University Press, 2006, 172 pp, Hb, US$ 70.00

Donald Wayne Viney

Received: 12 May 2007 / Accepted: 14 May 2007 / Published online: 20 July 2007 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2007

In numerous books and articles, Daniel Dombrowski has explored nearly every aspect of

Charles Hartshornes thought. This book discusses the contribution for which Hartshorne

himself is most widely credited, namely, the rehabilitation of the ontological argument. Begin-

ning with his dissertation in 1923, Hartshorne defended the argument as part of a cumulative

case for Gods existence. (Dombrowski rightly emphasizes that Hartshorne never considered

it as a proof sufficient in itself.) In articles in Philosophical Review (1944, vols. 53 and 54), he

answered the challenge to give a non-fallacious syllogistic statement of the argument. Sevenyears before Norman Malcolms Anselms Ontological Arguments, Hartshorne made the

same point in Philosophers Speak of God(1953). He identified one version of the argument

in Proslogion chapter II that had been attacked by philosophers from Gaunilo to Russell, and

a second version in chapter III, that had been ignored by nearly all of those just mentioned.

The argument ofPros. II presupposes that existence is a perfection, but Pros. IIIs argument

presupposes that modality of existencespecifically, necessary existenceis a perfection.

The second argument, unlike the first, does not confuse the existential quantifier with a pred-

icate. Hartshorne further clarified Anselms reasoning in a notice of Malcolms article in The

Journal of Philosophy (1961, vol. 58) and in The Logic of Perfection (1962) by expressing it in

the formalism of Lewiss S5 modal logic. These developments occasioned a refreshing shift

in the literature from rehearsing Kantian objections to debating the metaphysics of modality.

Dombrowskis aim is to reconsider the neoclassical case for the modal argument in light

of reactions both to Hartshornes work and, more generally, to the ontological argument as

a paradigm of metaphysical reasoning. The intent is not to give an exhaustive survey of the

critical literature but to respond to representative trends of thought about the argument. The

discussion is wide-ranging, competently bringing together disparate thinkers, from decon-

structive postmodernists to mainstream analytic philosophers. These groups are often not

very good at talking to each other, but Dombrowski at least manages to put them in dialogue

with Hartshorne and to make the case for his distinctive approach to the argument and to

D. W. Viney (B)

Department of Social Sciences/Philosophy, Pittsburg State University,

412 G Russ Hall, Pittsburg 66762, KS, USA

e-mail: don_viney@yahoo.com

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metaphysical inquiry as an open-ended search for necessary truths about existence. A curious

lacuna is that, despite an opening chapter on the history of the argument, none of Hartshornes

formalizations of the argument are included, save a position matrix which is less an argument

than a list of options (119).

Hartshornes neoclassical defense of the modal argument is the centerpiece for arguing,against Richard Rorty (chapter 2) and Mark Taylor (chapter 3), for the very possibility of

metaphysics in a postmodern context. Rorty is famous for declaring philosophy otiose. He

eschews the projects of getting things right and of seeking certainty about eternal veri-

ties. Hartshorne meets Rorty half-way by emphasizing the fallibility of our knowledge of

metaphysical necessities. Moreover, the truths in question do not transcend time but are the

everlasting features of process. Dombrowski shows that Hartshornes metaphysics is less an

attempt to mirror reality (to use Rortys metaphor) than to accurately interpret it, analogous

to the way a map can represent a landscape while leaving out a wealth of detail. An illustra-

tion is Hartshornes insistence that, at most, the argument shows the necessary existence of

God, not the actual states in which God exists. Dombrowski claims that it is precisely this

point that Taylor misses in his critique of the viability of philosophy (62f). By focusing

on Hegels use of the argument, Taylor wrongly concludes that metaphysics negates divine

alterity. Hartshorne, on the contrary, denies that one can infer any contingent state of God

from the necessary truth that God exists.

Nearly a third of the book (chapters 4 and 5) is devoted to replying to Graham Oppy, who

Dombrowski honors as the ontological arguments greatest contemporary critic (26). He

accusesOppy, however, of operatingwith a truncated conception of the theistic alternativesto

classical theism and thereby failing to do justice to Hartshornes neoclassical variety(8889).

Therelevance of this criticism forthe ontological argumentis twofold. First, Oppy, like Taylor,treats existence and actuality as roughly synonymous (116). This gives the false impression

that Hartshorne thinks one can deduce a concrete reality from an abstract definition. Second,

Oppy does not attend to Hartshornes semantics for modal operators. For Hartshorne, the

temporal-causal matrix provides the anchor for all discourse about modality. Necessity upon

contingent conditions is what must be, given the actual past; unconditional necessity is what

must be, given any actual past. Combining these points one can say that divine existence

can only be unconditionally necessary whereas divine actuality can only be necessary upon

contingent conditions (96f). Making these discriminations also provides an answer to the

various parodies of the argument: for example, Gaunilos perfect island can be necessary,

at most, upon contingent conditions, like erosion, sea level, tectonic movements, etc.In the last chapter, Dombrowski engages a triad of philosophers who are favorably dis-

posed towards Anselms reasoning: Thomas Morris, Katherin Rogers, and Alvin Plantinga.

They accept that God cannot exist contingently, but they resist Hartshornes view that God

must exist with some world or other. As they see it, this compromises divine sovereignty and

aseity. Dombrowski does not here enter (as he has elsewhere) this thicket of philosophical

theology. He simply registers his doubts about the coherence of classical theism. If he (and

Hartshorne) are correct, then, barring a workable alternative such as neoclassical theism, the

ontological proof becomes an ontological disproofGods existence would be an impossi-

bility. This fact shows that Oppy is mistaken to view debates over the concept of God asunimportant (139).

Dombrowski expertly shows the intimate link between Hartshornes defense of the modal

argument and his dipolar theism. Moreover, his measured assessment is a welcome

counter-point to Oppys strident declaration that ontological arguments are completely

worthless (5). No one expects religious conversion from a philosophical argument, but the

intelligibility it may bring to the religious life is value enough.

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