Dangerous Liaisons Capri 2009

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July 2009

Dangerous Liaisons

A report arising from a CMC investigation intoallegations of police misconduct

(Operation Capri)


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CMC iin:

To be a powerul agent or protecting Queenslanders rom major crime and promoting a trustworthy

public sector.

CMC miin:

To combat crime and improve public sector integrity.

WARNING

Lawll inrcp inrmain an inrcpin warran inrmain

The lawully intercepted inormation and interception warrant inormation in this report has beenused, recorded and communicated to the CMC pursuant to section 68 Telecommuicatios

(Iterceptio ad Access) Act 1979 (Cth), or a permitted purpose o the Crime and Misconduct

Commission namely, a report on an investigation under the Crime ad Miscoduct Act 2001 into

whether misconduct may have occurred. Any urther dealing with the inormation, including copying,

may be regulated by the Telecommuicatios (Iterceptio ad Access) Act 1979 (Cth) and recipients

o this inormation should be aware o the provisions o that Act.

Car langag an all plici rrnc

Some o the narratives presented in this report contain strong coarse language, oensive words or

phrases and seually eplicit reerences.

Crime and Misconduct Commission 2009

Apart rom any air dealing or the purpose o private study, research, criticism or review, as permittedunder the Copyright Act 1968, no part may be reproduced by any process without permission. Inquiriesshould be made to the publisher, the Crime and Misconduct Commission.

ISBN 978-1-876986-58-2

Crime and Misconduct CommissionLevel 2, North Tower Green Square515 St Pauls Terrace, Fortitude Valley, Australia 4006

GPO Bo 3123Brisbane Qld 4001

Tel.: (07) 3360 6060Fa: (07) 3360 6333Email: [email protected]

Note: This publication is accessible through the CMC website www.cmc.qld.gov.au or a limited period.


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i

FoReWoRd

With the introduction o the Police Powers ad Resposibilities Act 2000, Queensland police

were granted a wide range o powers necessary or eective law enorcement and or the

protection o the community.

Regrettably, the misconduct we investigated as part o Operation Capri in large part the

story o police ocers involvement with a dangerous criminal inormant demonstrated that

while those ocers who were the subject o our investigation made wide use o the powers

aorded them under the Act, they largely ailed to eercise or even recognise their associated

responsibilities.

More generally, they took advantage o the authority derived rom their status and standing in

the community as police ocers.

In addition, the evidence revealed an attitude on the part o a not insignicant number o police

ocers, and their supervisors, that it was acceptable to act in ways that ignored legislative and

QPS policy requirements, that were improper, and in some cases were dishonest and unlawul.

Based on past eperiences, the CMC had no condence that the attitudes o those police

ocers would change without the pressure o public eposure. For that reason, I appreciate

Commissioner Atkinsons public recognition o the ailures o some o his ocers, and his

rearmation o the principles that the Queensland Police Service must stand or.

The publication o this report, coming as it does close to the 20th anniversary o the release o

the Fitzgerald Report, should serve as a reminder that lessons learned gradually diminish with

the passage o time and generational change. It is inevitable that as time passes, slippage in the

ethical standards o our police will occur.

In that contet I would draw attention in this report to the actions o honest ocers who

reused to be drawn into misconduct, actively warned against it, and did not allow themselves

to be manipulated by a criminal. Behaviour such as theirs, which seeks to prevent and

discourage misconduct, is what the people o Queensland have the right to epect rom their

police ocers.

Finally, in making the ndings o Operation Capri public, I hope this report will be read by all

police ocers and their supervisors, particularly those who deal with inormants, and that it

will impress upon them both the risks and the responsibilities inherent in the eercise o their

proessional duties.

Rr Nham

Chairperson


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FoReWoRd


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ii

CoNteNts

List o abbreviations i

Prologue i

Introduction 1

Segment 1: The Inormant unds 9

Segment 2: Removing prisoners rom custody 20

Segment 3: Unlawul diversion o telephone calls 44

Segment 4: The contrived drug raid 50

Segment 5: Payments made to police ocers 56

Segment 6: An unauthorised investigation 70

Segment 7: Improper disclosure o condential police inormation 82

Segment 8: Payment o a reward to Henderson 94

Segment 9: Operation Delta Fawn 98

Discussion 108

Appendies:

1. Tet o Supergrass article 117

2. Etract rom CJC Report on Project Piper 120

Reerences 127


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i

LIst oF AbbRevIAtIoNs

ABA Australian Bankers Association

ACC Australian Crime Commission

ACLEI Australian Commission or Law Enorcement Integrity

AFP Australian Federal Police

ARU Armed Robbery Unit

CIB Criminal Investigation Branch

CMC Crime and Misconduct Commission

CM Act Crime ad Miscoduct Act 2001

CSA Corrective Services Act 2002

CRISP Computerised Reporting Inormation System or Police

CUSF Credit Union Security Forum

DPP Director o Public Prosecutions

ESC Ethical Standards Command

FMPM Financial Management Practice Manual (QPS)

ICAC Independent Commission Against Corruption (New South Wales)

JAG Department o Justice and Attorney-General

OCIG Organised Crime Investigation Group

OPI Oce o Police Integrity (Victoria)

OPM Operation Procedures Manual

PPRA Police Powers ad Resposibilities Act 2000

QCS Queensland Corrective Services

QPRIME Queensland Police Records and Inormation Management Echange

QPS Queensland Police Service

SCOC State Crime Operations Command

SDIG State Drug Investigation Group

SIMS State Inormant Management System

SOP Standard Operating Procedures


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i

PRoLoGue

The newspaper article reproduced on the opposite page rst published by the Gold Coast

Bulleti in July 1993 contains a warning o the risks involved in rewarding dangerous

prisoners who turn inormer or personal advantage.1

The article ocuses upon a prisoner inormant named Lee Owen Henderson who, it was said,

was a supergrass possessing a twisted imagination. Henderson had deceived ocers o both

the National Crime Authority and the New South Wales Police, beore killing a young woman

on the Gold Coast.

The article continued:

the unpalatable act remains that Henderson represents a new breed o criminalwho knows no honour and would shop his best mate or even his own mother to buyhis reedom.

Despite the intervening 16 years, the newspaper article o July 1993 could have been

written today.

This report details a lengthy and comple investigation conducted by the Crime and

Misconduct Commission (CMC) over two and a hal years between March 2006 and

September 2008. The investigation, codenamed Operation Capri, revealed multiple

incidents o police misconduct, particularly in connection with the use and management o

prison inormants.

Operation Capri had its genesis in 2005, when the CMC received inormation rom the

Australian Federal Police (AFP) suggesting that certain Queensland police ocers had an

improper association with Lee Owen Henderson, a prisoner then incarcerated at the

Capricornia Correctional Centre, near Rockhampton. That association appeared to be largely

based around Hendersons alleged value as an inormant.

Henderson was regarded as a valuable condential human source by certain Queensland

police ocers (and indeed, this is how Henderson viewed himsel). However, the evidence

suggests that he rarely, i ever, provided inormation o value. Instead, Henderson manipulated

police ocers or his own ends.

In return or his supposed assistance, Henderson was obtaining benets rom police, including

access to condential law enorcement inormation, access to Queensland Police Service (QPS)

and Queensland Corrective Services (QCS) resources or his own personal use, removals rom

custody, and some nancial assistance. Some ocers assisted him in an (unsuccessul) attemptto secure a lower security classication.

In the course o investigating these matters, the CMC discovered that the relationship between

the QPS and Henderson had grown out o a practice that appears to have originated in the

Armed Robbery Unit, in 2001. The practice involved police ocers providing prisoners with

rewards and other benets to encourage the making o conessions and the giving up o

inormation.

1 Bernie Matthews, Gold Coast Bulleti, 19 July 1993, p.9. The ull tet is reproduced as Appendi 1.


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ii

As the CMCs investigation progressed, a suspicion arose that police ocers may have been

involved in other dishonest conduct which included the removal o prisoners rom custody or

improper purposes, the unlawul diversion o telephone calls made by prisoners rom

correctional centres, misappropriation o money intended to be used as rewards, and the

improper receipt o money and gits rom Henderson. Later, the investigation revealed what

appears to have been an attempt by police ocers to conceal evidence o Hendersons

involvement in a murder investigation.

In many instances it is unclear what motivated the police ocers. Some o the misconduct

identied during Operation Capri appears to have stemmed rom a misguided belie held by

certain police ocers that the results they appeared to be achieving would ultimately justiy

their actions. (With the benet o hindsight, little o substance was achieved.)

Some misconduct evolved out o the relationship that developed between certain police

ocers and Henderson, and was the product o Hendersons capacity to manipulate

those ocers.

Otherwise a small number o police ocers appear to have simply taken advantage

o opportunities available to them, believing there was little chance o their dishonesty

being detected.

The events detailed in this report reveal that the level o misconduct not only compromised

individual police ocers, but had the potential to undermine the integrity o the QPS as an

organisation, and with it, the criminal justice system. The reliance by law enorcement ocers

on inormants, without regard to the associated risks, poses an obvious threat to the integrity

o the criminal justice system.

An irony in the Superliararticle is its statement that thankully, [Hendersons] continuing spiel

o lies cuts little ice with the Queensland police.

It is regrettable that, despite that public revelation o the dangers o dealing with Henderson,

just over a decade later the relationship between Henderson and Queensland police ocers

warranted investigation by the CMC.


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INTRODUCTION 1

INtRoduCtIoN

en laing oprain Capri

Iniial cmplain a h rmal prinr: ocr 2003 March 2004In October 2003, the CMC received an anonymous complaint alleging that a police ocer

attached to the Armed Robbery Unit o the QPS had removed a prisoner rom custody and

had allowed the prisoner to have seual contact with his wie in echange or his conessing

to crimes.

The complaint was assessed and reerred to the QPS to be dealt with.

Initial inquiries by the QPS revealed that the allegation most likely related to Prisoner BR.2

Both Prisoner BR and his wie were approached by the QPS, but neither was willing to speak

about the matter. Consequently, the allegation was regarded as unsubstantiated.

A ew months later, in March 2004, a urther complaint was made to the CMC alleging that

two police ocers attached to the ARU had removed prisoners rom custody and permitted

them to have visits and seual contact with their respective partners. Again, it was alleged that

these avours were provided in return or the prisoners making conessions to crimes.

On this occasion, the complaint identied two prisoners, one o whom was Prisoner BR.

Again, having assessed the complaint, the CMC reerred the matter to the QPS. As he haddone on the earlier occasion, Prisoner BR reused to speak about the matter, while the other

prisoner conrmed the allegation but declined to make any complaint. The two police ocers

concerned were spoken to about the matter, and denied the allegations. The QPS investigation

was unable to substantiate the complaint.

Cmplain Prinr bR: Nmr 2004On 25 November 2004, the CMC received a complaint rom the lawyer then representing

Prisoner BR, who at that time was acing criminal charges in respect o armed robbery oences.

The lawyer advised that BR was asserting that, in the course o 2003, he had been removed

rom custody by ocers o the ARU on a number o occasions so that he could be interviewed

about, and coness to, various unsolved armed robbery oences. BR alleged that whenremoved rom custody he had been permitted by police ocers to visit and have seual

contact with his wie.

Based on his conessions to police, Prisoner BR had been charged with numerous armed

robbery oences. The CMC was told that BR proposed to argue that those conessions had

been improperly obtained as a result o the inducements provided to him in the orm o

unsupervised time with his wie, and that BR was aware that police ocers had acted in a

similar way in relation to other (nominated) prisoners.

Having decided to commence its own investigation o Prisoner BRs claims, the CMC

ascertained that yet another prisoner Prisoner SA had recently challenged the admissibility

2 The use o pseudonyms throughout this report is eplained on page 5.


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2 DANGEROUS LIAISONS: A REPORT ARISING FROM A CMC INVESTIGATION INTO ALLEGATIONS OF POLICE MISCONDUCT

o conessions he had made to police in relation to various breaking and entering charges on

the basis that he had been induced to make the conessions ater being promised opportunities

to have se with his girlriend. In Prisoner SAs case, on 25 February 2005, Judge Brabazon o

the District Court ruled that icosistecies ad strage eatures in the police ocers

evidence made it impossible or him to conclude that the conessions were voluntary.

Accordingly, the conessional evidence was ecluded, with the result that the prosecution was

orced to discontinue proceedings in relation to 70 oences.

Between 28 February and 10 March 2005, the allegations raised by Prisoner BR were the

subject o argument in a pre-trial hearing in the District Court. Having considered the evidence,

Judge OSullivan ruled that the prosecution had not shown that BRs conessions had been

made voluntarily, and the evidence o those conessions was ruled inadmissible. The

prosecution subsequently discontinued proceedings against BR in relation to 10 oences.

The circumstances in which Prisoner BR (and certain other prisoners) were removed rom

custody by police ocers were eamined by the CMC as part o what became Operation

Capri. That aspect o the investigation is detailed in segment 2 o this report.

Inrmain rci cncrning imprpr aciain plic fcrwih prinr Hnrn: April 2005In late April 2005, the AFP inormed the CMC that, in the course o one o its criminal

investigations, inormation had been identied that suggested a prisoner, Lee Owen Henderson,

then an inmate at Capricornia Correctional Centre in Central Queensland, had an improper

association with certain QPS ocers.

Central to the AFP inormation was evidence that had been gathered by means o lawul

telephone interceptions conducted as part o the AFPs investigation o a suspected large-scale

drug importation. (The AFP investigation is reerred to in segment 6 o this report.)

The telephone interceptions demonstrated that calls made by Henderson rom inside prison

were routinely being unlawully diverted and that such diversions had been acilitated withthe assistance o police ocers. (The circumstances surrounding the diversion o Hendersons

telephone calls are canvassed more ully in segment 3 o the report.)

O urther concern to the CMC was the act that it was evident rom the telephone intercepts

that Henderson was privy to condential police inormation, and that he appeared to be

sharing that inormation with criminal associates. (The details o this matter are outlined in

segment 7 o this report.)

Based on the AFP inormation, the CMC commenced a covert investigation.

oprain CapriBy 8 March 2006 the CMCs covert investigation into allegations concerning Henderson and

his association with police ocers had progressed to the point that it was elevated to

operational status,3 and given the codename Operation Capri.

In April 2006, the allegations concerning the various prisoner removals were incorporated into

Operation Capri.

Over time, other related allegations or lines o inquiry were also placed under the overall

umbrella o Operation Capri. Those matters are canvassed in the nine segments o this report.

(For an overview o the segments and a diagrammatic timeline o events, see pages 78.)

3 An investigation is accorded operational status by the CMC when it has grown, or is likely to grow, to thepoint where its compleity will require a signicant investment o resources by the CMCs MisconductInvestigations area.


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INTRODUCTION 3

Operation Capri began in March 2006 and the last o the investigation reports was sent to

the QPS in September 2008. The QPS disciplinary process began in 2008, with the most

recent decision being handed down in April this year. Disciplinary proceedings have yet to

be nalised.

Lgiic h inigainPrimary responsibility or Operation Capri lay with the CMCs Covert Investigation Team, asmall multi-disciplinary group comprised o police and civilian investigators, intelligence

analysts, a nancial investigator and a lawyer.4 At critical times, the Covert Investigation Team

was supplemented by ocers drawn rom other areas o the CMC, including senior lawyers.

Additionally, Mr Paul Smith, a barrister, was engaged to act as counsel assisting the CMC at

some investigative hearings.

The investigation involved working through tens o thousands o documentary ehibits and

assessing more than 6000 recorded telephone conversations.

As part o Operation Capri, the CMC conducted over 200 separate interviews with witnesses

and subject ocers, and issued close to 100 Notices to Discover. In addition, 24 searches were

conducted.5 Over 10 000 separate documents were created in the orm o reports, assessments,correspondence and bries o evidence.

The CMC conducted 104 witness eaminations over 37 days, in Brisbane, Rockhampton,

Yeppoon, and Mareeba; 75 o those eaminations involved 60 police ocers.

In addition to salary epenses, approimately $150 000 was spent by the CMC on Operation

Capri, the majority o which involved the cost o transcription, witness travel and related

epenses, legal ees, and the costs associated with conducting investigative hearings outside

Brisbane.

One segment o Operation Capri reerred to as Operation Fotrot Distinct was undertaken

jointly by the CMC and a small team o eperienced police ocers attached to the QPS Ethical

Standards Command (ESC) (see segment 1). Those ocers are commended or the quality and

thoroughness o the investigation and or their proessionalism. Furthermore, the CMC

acknowledges the signicant assistance aorded by ocers and sta rom QCS, JAG, the AFP,

ACC, OPI, and ACLEI.

Criminal r iciplinar prcingAt an early stage o Operation Capri, the CMC recognised that although evidence was

emerging o possible criminal behaviour, it would be dicult to prosecute such matters.

For instance, in respect o almost every matter investigated, the evidence suggesting police

misconduct comes rom individuals with lengthy criminal histories, including or oences o

dishonesty. Furthermore, while the police ocers at the centre o allegations were able to bequestioned through the use o the CMCs coercive powers, and as part o the police disciplinary

process, almost nothing o those ocers evidence would be admissible against them in

criminal proceedings.

The CMC thereore took the pragmatic view that the public interest would be best served i

Operation Capri ocused on eposing and correcting any improper conduct rather than on

4 The Covert Investigations Team numbered no more than 12 persons at any time.

5 13 search warrants were issued pursuant to the Police Powers ad Resposibilities Act 2000, and11 searches were conducted in accordance with authority granted pursuant to the Crime ad Miscoduct

Act 2001.


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prosecuting individual oenders.6 Accordingly, in any particular instance, unless there was

evidence o guilt independent o witnesses whose credibility was likely to be challenged, the

matter was not reerred or consideration o criminal prosecution. However, many cases were

reerred to the QPS or consideration o disciplinary action against particular police ocers.

Criminal, iciplinar an hr cmRl iciplinar prcingOn the basis o evidence identied during Operation Capri the CMC recommended to the QPS

that disciplinary action or misconduct be considered against 17 serving ocers, and that a

urther 6 ocers receive managerial guidance.

O the latter 6 ocers, 5 were given managerial guidance as recommended, and in one case

no action at all has been taken.

O the 17 ocers or whom disciplinary action or misconduct was recommended:

in one case, no action at all has been taken by the QPS to date

one ocer resigned and two ocers retired medically unt beore the QPS commenced

any disciplinary action

one ocer resigned and one ocer retired medically unt ater the QPS commenced

disciplinary action, but beore the charges were heard.

si ocers were ultimately dealt with by way o managerial guidance only: in one instance

because the QPS considered the evidence insucient to warrant a charge o misconduct,

and in the remaining ve cases because the QPS, ater disciplinary hearings, dismissed the

charges o misconduct as unsubstantiated.

in three cases, charges o misconduct were ound to be substantiated, and in those instances:

one ocer was dismissed 7

one ocer resigned beore a sanction was delivered

one ocer submitted an application or medical retirement beore the sanction was

delivered and that application is currently under consideration

in two cases, disciplinary action or misconduct has not yet concluded.

Rl criminal prcingCriminal proceedings were commenced against si people (including two o the 15 ocers

reerred to above). In this respect:

One serving police ocer and two now ormer police ocers have been charged with

indictable oences arising rom alleged conduct in the course o duty. These are currently

beore the courts.

Two civilians were charged and pleaded guilty to summary oences.

One prisoner was charged with attempting to pervert the course o justice in respect o his

involvement in the murder investigation, Operation Delta Fawn. That charge was dismissed

ater a committal hearing.

In large measure, the disciplinary and other outcomes refect the diculty that was anticipated

by the CMC at the outset o Operation Capri: namely, that establishing particular oences or

conduct would prove to be problematic.

6 This approach is consistent with the Prosecution Guidelines applied by the Director o Public Prosecutions,which recognise that i it is not in the interests o the public that a prosecution be initiated then it should

not be pursued. The CMC took into account the various criteria identied in the DPPs Guidelines asunderpinning the concept o public interest.

7 The ocer has appealed the decision.


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INTRODUCTION 5

Prcral rrmThroughout the course o Operation Capri, the CMC identied procedural and systemic

weaknesses within QPS and the Department o Corrective Services (DCS), and raised these

issues with the agencies concerned. As a result, reorms were put in place by both QPS

and DCS.

For eample, the process by which prisoners are able to be temporarily removed rom custodyby police ocers was addressed by both agencies, and modications were made to the

relevant procedures.

Furthermore, signicant reorms to policy, management structures and training occurred within

the QPS, particularly in the area o State Crime Operations Command.8

A hi rprThis report does not provide an ehaustive account o all the evidence brought together under

the umbrella o Operation Capri. This has already been delivered to the QPS in a series o

ormal investigation reports.

This report is not intended to chronicle the activities o any police ocer, police station or

work unit, or o any single prisoner, but simply refects the development and direction o the

investigation. It oers a concise summary o the matters investigated, the outcomes, and a

discussion o what the CMC considers to be the key implications or the QPS.

Iniing iniialIn reporting publicly on Operation Capri, the CMC had to consider the degree to which this

report should identiy individuals, be they police ocers, ormer police ocers, serving

prisoners or private citizens.

The CMC is mindul o the act that naming a person in a report about police misconduct can

cause signicant embarrassment to that person and may in some circumstances have the

potential to damage a persons reputation. In the case o serving prisoners, there is the added

risk o potential prejudice to their personal saety.

Ultimately, the CMC elected to adopt a consistent naming convention, whereby pseudonyms

have been applied to all police ocers and prisoners (with the eception o Lee Owen

Henderson, or reasons given below).

The CMC does recognise however that the identity o particular ocers may be apparent to

those who may have worked with them, or who are otherwise amiliar with the events and

physical locations to which the report makes reerence.9

Where people have been reerred to by name, it is solely or the purpose o clarication(or eample, some senior police ocers are reerred to by name). In such cases, the CMC

wishes to emphasise that no adverse inerence should be drawn against those individuals.

L own Hnrn

This report requently reers to the activities o prisoner Lee Owen Henderson. It does so

because his activities were one catalyst o the investigation, and because his improper

association with several police ocers was a connecting thread between many o the segments

o Operation Capri.

8 Some o these reorms occurred independently o Operation Capri revelations.

9 Place names remain unchanged.


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Lee Owen Henderson has an etensive criminal history etending over two decades, and has

served terms o imprisonment in Victoria, New South Wales, Western Australia, and the

Northern Territory. Continuously incarcerated in Queensland since 1989, he is currently serving

two concurrent terms o lie imprisonment.

Henderson has been publicly outed as an inormant on previous occasions rom as early

as the mid-1980s. In a series o articles published in The Sydey Morig Heraldin July 1987,Henderson was quoted, and variously described as a maa hitman-turned-inormant, an

inmate-inormant, and Maa strongman and now alleged NCA inormant.10

As recently as 6 March 2008, Henderson published an Open letter to the media, identiying

himsel as one o these police inormants reerred to in newspaper articles that he claimed had

been published during 2007 concerning allegations investigated as part o Operation Capri.

The act Henderson identied himsel as an inormer removes any argument that his status as

an inormant should be kept secret, and that his name should not appear in this report.

Prcral airn

The CMC is satised it has complied with procedural airness requirements.

All persons and entities thought at risk o being viewed in an adverse light because o

publication o this report were given an early drat and invited to make submissions. Most did

so, and all o the issues raised in those submissions have been taken into account and, where

appropriate, the CMC has acceded to the requests.

A jointly coordinated submission rom the Queensland Police Union o Employees on behal

o some police ocers and other individuals was received which was critical o the CMCs

determination to publicly report on Operation Capri. In noting that the aected persons

rejected any suggestion o criminal behaviour or misconduct, the submission argued that the

report should not be published because, inter alia:

the CMC had not allowed sucient time or proper consideration and comment upon the

drat report

the allegations, assertions and conclusions are untested, in that they have not been the

subject o cross-eamination

the persons involved have never been the subject o adverse criminal or disciplinary

ndings.

The CMC rejects these arguments.

In every case, the relevant issues had either been eplored with, or otherwise identied to,

the individuals concerned. With one eception, every aspect o the evidence contained in

this report had been canvassed with the respective individual in the course o investigative

hearings, disciplinary interviews and, in relevant cases, in the QPS disciplinary process. In thateception reerred to above, the person concerned had reused to answer questions in the

course o a CMC investigation hearing on the basis o a claim or spousal privilege.

While it is true that some aspects o the evidence remain untested by cross-eamination, the

report makes it clear where allegations have been accepted or denied by a respondent. In the

case o those ocers who are reerred to, it is not disputed that the conduct in question

occurred. At issue in those cases is the ocers knowledge, or intent.

10 The Sydey Morig Herald: Akister angry at inormants claims (7 July 1987), Strike threat by crimeinormer (15 July 1987); Inormer provides big-crime diaries (16 July 1987)


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INTRODUCTION 7

timlin h inigainThe timeline should be viewed in conjunction with the segments, to appreciate how they

t together.

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

1. The informant funds

2. Removing prisoners

3. Call diversions

4. Contrived drug raid

5. Payments by Henderson

6. Disclosure of police information

7. Unauthorised investigation

8. Payment of a reward

9. Operation Delta Fawn

AFP information received.

(Analysis begins of 6000 Arunta calls.)

Last brief of evidence delivered 19.9.08

Disciplinary processOp Capri commenced 8.3.06

Operation Capri

So ar as is possible, each segment o the report has been placed in chronological sequence to

convey how some events occurred well beore the commencement o Operation Capri (e.g. as

early as 2001), how other events overlapped, and how some events were taking place even as

the investigation progressed. Thus:

sgmn 1: th inrman n eamines the circumstances in which police ocers

attached to the Armed Robbery Unit ailed to properly deal with monies intended or the

payment o rewards or inormation in respect o armed robbery oences committed upon

banks and other nancial institutions.

sgmn 2: Rming prinr rm c eamines the actions o police ocers in

temporarily removing prisoners rom custody. The investigation ocused upon allegations

that police ocers attached to the Armed Robbery Unit, and indeed elsewhere, acted

improperly in securing the removal o prisoners rom correctional centres. The evidence

suggests they used that process, in part, as an inducement to prisoners to coness to

unsolved armed robbery and other oences.

sgmn 3: unlawl irin lphn call eplores how certain police ocers

principally Detective Sergeants OT and AS acilitated the unlawul diversion o telephone

calls made by Lee Owen Henderson rom correctional institutions, thus enabling him to

routinely circumvent the Corrective Services secure telephone system. They provided him

with a virtually uncontrolled means o communication by which to conduct his own aairs

at the epense o the QPS.

sgmn 4: th cnri rg rai centres on evidence suggesting that Henderson

orchestrated the thet o a sports bag (containing a rearm, a quantity o marijuana, and a

large sum o money) which belonged to a drug tracker, rom an address in one o

Brisbanes outer suburbs. To cover the thet o the items by his criminal associates,

Henderson used his police contacts to arrange or a police drug raid to be conducted on the

address. Henderson arranged or the rearm to be recovered by police, but retained and

made use o the sum o money.

sgmn 5: Pamn ma plic fcr summarises evidence suggesting that

certain police ocers principally Detective Sergeant OT accepted gits o cash and

other property rom Henderson. It also shows how those ocers involvement with theirinormant etended well beyond that o a proessional relationship or law-enorcement

purposes.


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sgmn 6: An nahri inigain eamines how, in 2004, police ocers at

Rockhampton CIB allowed Lee Owen Henderson to pose as an underworld crime gure

with connections to corrupt police, supposedly to assist those ocers in an investigation

o a potential large-scale importation o cannabis. The Police Powers ad Resposibilities

Act 2000 imposed an obligation on police to obtain authorisation to conduct the

investigation. No authorisation was ever given or the conduct o the investigation, and a

belated application or approval was rejected on the basis that Henderson was unsuitable.

sgmn 7: Imprpr iclr cnfnial plic inrmain canvasses evidence

suggesting that Detective Sergeant OT improperly accessed and provided condential

police inormation to a prisoner and to a journalist.

sgmn 8: Pamn a rwar Hnrn reveals how, in early 2005, police ocers

sought and obtained or Henderson a $5000 reward, supposedly in recognition o the

assistance he had given to law enorcement, and how $1000 rom that reward was paid into

a bank account o a police ocer.

sgmn 9: oprain dla Fawn outlines the circumstances in which police ocers at

Rockhampton colluded with Henderson in order to conceal the true circumstances o

Hendersons role in a murder investigation.


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SEGMENT 1: THE INFORMANT FUNDS 9

seGMeNt 1: tHe INFoRMANt FuNds

timlin: Janar 2001 dcmr 2005

thi gmn h rpr amin h circmanc in which plic fcr aach

h Arm Rr uni ail prprl al wih mni inn r h pamn rwar r inrmain in rpc arm rr nc cmmi pn ank an

hr fnancial iniin. I al amin h ARu ailr ahr QPs plici an

prcr, incling h r inrman managmn.

As dierent things occurred down the track and the success rate was so good, a lot o[conditions] were relaxed a bit by the Assistant Commissioners and people down theline, to say, Well, listen, you know, youre doing a great job there, just pay theinormants.

dci Inpcr od, rmr fcr-in-charg ARu, inriw, 16 Nmr 2007

backgrn h inigainAt a relatively late stage in the conduct o Operation Capri, the CMC became aware o the

eistence and operation o two separate pools o money made up o contributions rom the

Australian Bankers Association (ABA) and Credit Union Security Forum (CUSF). Collectively

these are reerred to as the inormant unds.

As the phrase implies, the inormant unds were used by police ocers attached to the Armed

Robbery Unit to pay inormants including prisoners or inormation about armed

robberies o nancial institutions.

In February 2007, the CMC received inormation alleging that police ocers attached to the

Armed Robbery Unit had used money rom these unds or improper purposes.

It was apparent that the allegations concerning the operation o the inormant unds warranted

closer scrutiny. However, by that time Operation Capri was already well advanced, and the

CMCs investigative resources were stretched. It was thereore determined, in consultation with

the QPS, that a joint investigation should be conducted in respect o the inormant unds.

In June 2007, under the umbrella o Operation Capri, the Ethical Standards Command o the

QPS commenced an investigation called Operation Fotrot Distinct.

Operation Fotrot District ocused on:

how the inormant unds were obtained

how the unds were administered, including the process by which payments were

authorisedidentiying monies paid out rom the inormant unds, to whom they were paid and why,

and the responsible and authorising ocers

identiying any impropriety that may have occurred.

Operation Fotrot Distinct eamined 77 separate transactions conducted by ocers o the

Armed Robbery Unit between February 2001 and December 2005.

The close eamination o payments made into and out o the inormant unds suggests that the

unds were not properly managed and that money disbursed rom the unds cannot be

adequately accounted or. While all ocers deny impropriety, the evidence is such that the

suspicion that police ocers used money or personal or otherwise impermissible purposes

cannot be discounted.


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Wha h inigain ral

Crain h inrman nIn April 1999, the ABA wrote to the then Commissioner o Police advising that several o its

member banking institutions wished to contribute towards a und to assist police investigations

into armed robberies o banks. The ABA letter stipulated specic conditions or management o

that und: money was to be placed in a departmental trust account, with payments to be made

oly or iormatio leadig to some result. Wherever possible, two responsible ocers were

to witness each payment and secure a signed receipt rom the inormant.

The ABA letter urther stipulated that payments rom the und were to be authorised by the

Commissioner o Police, a Deputy or Assistant Commissioner, and they were to be suciently

documented to satisy the Auditor-Generals requirements or such transactions. The ABA also

required aual eedback o the results achieved ad the eectiveess o usig the ud.

On 13 October 2000, the Finance Ocer, State Crime Operations Command (SCOC) received

$10 000 rom the ABA or the inormant und.

Similar arrangements governed the CUSF und, which was established in May 2001 with an

initial contribution o $8000.1 In that case, approval o the Assistant Commissioner State Crime

Operations Command was required beore a payment (o not more than $1000) could be paid

or inormation that had led to a result.

Frmain h Arm Rr uni an i inrman ragNot long ater the receipt o the money rom the ABA, Detective Senior Sergeant OD, then a

member o the Fraud Squad, was tasked to re-orm an armed robbery squad as part o the

Organised Crime Investigation Group o the SCOC. This, it was suggested to the CMC, was a

strategy adopted in response to the signicant institutional armed robbery problem that eisted

at that time. According to OD, such robberies were out o cotrol:

My role was to make sure armed robberies were solved to clear up armed robberies inthe state. And over a our year period those armed robberies went rom 92 to 45, to 23,and when I let there was three unsolved armed robberies. I think the results speak orthemselves.2

Senior Sergeant ODs observations in this regard need to be viewed in light o the act that

a good many o the charges instituted by the Armed Robbery Unit ultimately had to be

withdrawn ater courts ruled that conessions obtained by the ARU were inadmissible.

Thus, some o the oences regarded as solved by the QPS may, in truth, remain outstanding.

(This issue is addressed in greater detail in segment 2.)

OD also claimed he was permitted to hand-pick his sta:

I was asked to put that squad together. I was asked to put together a squad o blokes who

could deal with the problem. I said, Well, I want to go outside State Crime Operations.I want to go to squads all around Brisbane. And the reason I wanted to do that wasbecause they had inormants and they had local knowledge o things that werehappening out in those areas. And I thought that having those sta there was a ar

better option than other State Crime Operations detectives. And that was agreed to to recruit those people to come in and do that. Armed robberies at that time wereseen as a very big problem, and they wanted it stamped out.

1 The requirements are set out in a letter rom the CUSF to the QPS, dated 23 May 2001. They are similar tothe conditions applying to the ABA monies.

2 CMC disciplinary interview, 20 June 2008.


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Thus, the Armed Robbery Unit was established on 12 January 2001, with Senior Sergeant OD

as Ocer in Charge. OD told the CMC he had invited particular detectives to apply, and ie

times out o te those detectives were appointed to his Unit.3

According to Senior Sergeant OD, a strategy adopted by the Armed Robbery Unit in tackling

the crime problem was or investigators to approach serving prisoners:

We had a large number o photographs throughout Queensland o oenders committingviolent armed robberies o nancial institutions and I thought the only way to reallyidentiy those people was to get into the gaols and say, Look, boys, who is this? And sowe might speak to a number o people throughout the gaol, obviously oer money or

anyone that would come up with the right name, and i that proved ruitul wed go backand give payment to those people.

This strategy, OD eplained, was nanced rom the inormant unds.

oprain h inrman nOn 21 February 2001, Assistant Commissioner Andrew Kidca,4 who was then in charge o the

State Crime Operations Command (SCOC), ormally approved the establishment o an account

or the $10 000 received rom the ABA and instructed then-Detective Chie SuperintendentPeter Swindells to manage the account i lie with the coditios outlied by the ABA. The

$10 000 was not deposited into a separate trust account, but into the general operating account

used or the entire QPS.

The rst payment made rom the ABA Fund occurred on 26 February 2001, when $1000 was

given to an inormant recorded only by the pseudonym Ma. The supporting documentation

included the Assistant Commissioners approval or the payment and a receipt that had been

signed and witnessed. However, there was nothing in the material to show that the payment

had been made or iormatio leadig to some result.

On 11 April 2001, Assistant Commissioner Kidca was inormed that the procedures adopted

or obtaining witnessed receipts etended to the making o audio recordings o the handover othe payment to the inormant.

According to Senior Sergeant OD, in its rst year o operation, the Armed Robbery Unit

achieved an 86 per cent clear-up rate or armed robberies o nancial institutions. The number

o unsolved armed robberies declined rom 92 to about 45. As OD eplained, The baks were

extremely happy ad really probably would have give me a hudred millio i I wated it.

Encouraged by the improved clear-up rate, in May 2001, member institutions o the CUSF

combined to make a contribution o $8000 or use by the Armed Robbery Unit.

In the case o payments made rom the inormant unds, details were recorded in a handwritten

ledger held in the sae o the Detective Inspector, Organised Crime Investigations Group

(OCIG), within the State Crime Operations Command.

In June 2001, OD5 was instructed by the Superintendent, OCIG, to ensure that ormal operating

procedures (known as Standard Operating Procedures or SOPs) were developed in relation to

the inormant unds. This was never done.

The rst payment rom the monies contributed by the CUSF occurred on 3 January 2002, when

$250 was handed to an inormant recorded under the pseudonym The Apprentice. The

supporting documentation included the Assistant Commissioners approval and the signed and

3 According to now-retired Assistant Commissioner Swindells, OD and other senior ocers were able torecommend sta or the Armed Robbery Unit, but the transer o those ocers who were recommended

was nonetheless processed in the normal way through the chain o command.4 Since retired.

5 Then acting as Inspector.


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witnessed receipt, but there was no audio recording o the payment being made, nor material

to show that the inormation paid or had led to some result.

Over the net ew months payments to inormants rom the inormant unds were generally

supported in each case by the Assistant Commissioners approval, the witnessed receipt and

the audio recording o the payment being made. The last inormant payment approved by

Assistant Commissioner Kidca occurred on 10 July 2002. Kidca retired in July 2002, andDetective Chie Superintendent Swindells was promoted into the vacancy created by Kidcas

retirement.

Assistant Commissioner Swindells subsequently decided that his authority was no longer

required or payments to inormants o up to $1000, as he considered management o the

inormant unds could be appropriately delegated to the inspector/senior sergeant level.

Inrcin h sa Inrman Managmn plicOn 1 March 2001 the State Inormant Management System (the SIMS policy) the QPS policy

by which police ocers are meant to deal with inormants came into eect.6 It gave eplicit

instructions on how to manage and pay rewards to inormants.

At the time o its introduction, the Commissioner o Police described the SIMS policy as

bringing into eect sigicat chages to the previous systems ad structures i relatio to the

maagemet o iormats. Greater emphasis has bee placed o accoutability mechaisms.

The Statement o Principle contained in the SIMS policy identied and addressed risks

associated with the management o inormants:

Registration o all inormants is the basic element o any inormant management system.Registration reduces the potential or corruption and/or impropriety. It also minimises anyperception o any corruption and/or impropriety.

The supervisor o a member o the QPS who handles an inormant is accountable orensuring integrity through the eective control and management o the subordinate. Each

step in the inormant management process needs to be supervised and documented. Theprovision o rewards or benets to an inormant, whether monetary or otherwise, mustbe careully monitored and scrutinised.

It is epected that procedures outlined in the SIMS (which sets out minimum standardso inormant management) will be adhered to. However, rom time to time uniquecircumstances may arise which will necessitate variance. Any departure rom theseprocedures must be documented and a record maintained o the reasons or such

departure.

Ai h inrman nIn October 2003 the Ethical Standards Command commenced a routine audit o all groups in

the SCOC. When it came to the inormant unds, the audit showed that the accounts were not

being managed in accordance with the conditions stipulated by the ABA and CUSF, and there

had been instances o non-compliance with the QPS Financial Management Practice Manual

(FMPM) and the SIMS policy. The audit revealed that:

payments had been made without written approval o the Assistant Commissioner

payments had been made without ensuring that the inormation had led to a result

some payment receipts had not been witnessed by two ocers

reasons or payments and outcomes were not always documented

the inormants identity or pseudonym was not always documented

6 Introduced via Commissioners Circular No. 03/2001, dated 23 February 2001.


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there was no process to ensure the security o the combination to the sae used to store the

inormant unds and associated records

the controls to ensure compliance with the ABA and CUSF conditions were ineective

there was limited evidence o auditing.

The ESCs audit report included the ollowing recommendations related to the inormant unds:

That the Assistant Commissioner SCOC seek amendment to the FMPM and SIMS policy to1.

recognise and refect the purpose o the inormant unds.

That the Detective Inspector OCIG ensure compliance with the management o the2.

inormant unds.

That the Detective Chie Superintendent SCOC ensure quarterly compliance audits o the3.

inormant unds.

On 30 September 2004, the Assistant Commissioner, ESC, reported that o the audit reports

67 recommendations, only three had not yet been implemented: each o these concerned the

inormant unds.

No urther action was ever taken to implement the three outstanding recommendations.

This was because the ESC was inormed by OD:

Currently, there are no unds in either account. The ARU is currently negotiating withboth parties in relation to urther unding. Negotiations are also in progress concerninghow and when these unds are to be distributed and what management practices are tobe adopted. It is anticipated that SOPs will be rewritten upon unds being received and

negotiations being nalised.

This inormation was untrue.

At the relevant time, although the ABA contribution to the inormant unds had been ehausted,

$4010 remained o the CUSF contribution. Further, between 15 September and 15 November

2004, CUSF member institutions contributed two urther payments to the inormant unds, each

o $2000. Between 10 November 2004 and 24 May 2005, ABA member banks made a urtherthree contributions to the inormant unds, totalling $6500.

Payments to inormants rom the inormant unds ceased on 8 December 2005. As at that date,

and over the entire period o the operation o the inormant unds, 77 payments had been

made, totalling $17 990. The balance o the unds stood at just over $13 000.

According to Assistant Commissioner Swindells, the ARU ceased using the inormant unds

because there were not a lot o institutional armed robberies taking place, and the original ARU

members had moved to other areas within the QPS. (Senior Sergeant OD had been promoted

to the rank o Inspector, and transerred.)

Assistant Commissioner Swindells retired rom the QPS in July 2008.7

Inigain pc pamnAs part o Operation Capri, investigators rom the Ethical Standards Command analysed the

creation and operation o the inormant unds.

They established that, between 26 February 2001 and 8 December 2005, 77 payments had

been recorded as having been made to inormants rom the unds. They considered each o the

payments, eamining whether the monies had actually been paid to the inormants recorded. In

a signicant number o cases, inormants interviewed during the investigation claimed that they

had not in act received the monies that QPS ocers purported to have paid them or

inormation.

7 Assistant Commissioner Swindells retired in the normal course o events.


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The ESCs investigation, codenamed Operation Fotrot Distinct, uncovered evidence which,

i accepted, gives rise to a suspicion that some ocers attached to the Armed Robbery Unit:

engaged in misappropriation o money rom the inormant unds

alsely asserted that payments had been made to inormants

abricated audio recordings and written receipts as evidence that payments had been made

knowingly urnished alse documents

knowingly signed receipts alsely asserting to have been a witness to the payment o

money to an inormant

orged the signature o inormants

ailed to manage unds in a transparent and accountable manner

provided alse and misleading inormation in an earlier audit in relation to the administration

o the inormant unds.

Specic eamples o improper conduct are reerred to below:

Ocers abricated an audiotape and produced it as proo o a payment to an inormant.

The audio recording purported to evidence a meeting between two ocers and an

inormant at a coee shop in West End. Forensic analysis o the recording showed it washighly icosistet with havig bee made at the [the coee shop] ad, based o

peculiarities ad the backgroud oise o the recordig, was highly cosistet with havig

bee made i proximity to car park bay 148 o level B2 o Police Headquarters.

The investigation also conrmed that a police ocer assumed the role o the inormant or

the purposes o the recording.

Ocers signed receipts asserting they had been present when payments were made to

inormants where other evidence conrmed the ocers could not have been present. In

one case, records rom the Department o Immigration established that the ocer was

overseas at the time o the payment.

Suspicion also eists in respect o instances where:

no receipt could be located to evidence particular payments

ocers were reimbursed or payments which the ocer claimed to have been personally

made to an inormant, but ailed to produce any supporting evidence

split payments were said to have occurred with a portion o the approved reward

money deposited into a prisoners trust account, and the balance said to have been handed

to a third person (such as the prisoners girlriend) but without supporting evidence to

conrm that the third person actually received the sum.

O the 77 separate transactions considered as part o Operation Fotrot Distinct, ESC

investigators were satised there had been ull compliance with the receipting requirements8 on

only 33 occasions; that is, the payment o rewards monies was appropriately witnessed by two

police ocers. In respect o a number o other transactions, there had been partial compliance.

Amn h incThe evidence suggests that the manner in which ocers attached to the Armed Robbery Unit

dealt with the inormant unds ails the most basic levels o accountability. Indeed, the

record-keeping was such that it is virtually impossible to establish the boa des o payments.

In the majority o instances, one is let with nothing more than the claim o the police ocer

that a transaction occurred, and that it was legitimate.

8 A transaction where the payment o money to an inormant was witnessed by two police ocers,evidenced by a contemporaneous receipt.


27/140


Evidence gathered during Operation Fotrot Distinct suggests that opportunistic ocers

eploited a lack o both accountability and o supervision to take personal advantage o the

inormant unds.

dicin i

Failr priinBy the time he was interviewed about this aspect o Operation Capri, Senior Sergeant OD had

been promoted to the rank o Detective Inspector. Detective Inspector OD denied any personal

involvement in, or knowledge o, misconduct by his subordinates within the ARU, and this

report does not suggest otherwise.

However, OD conceded there was a ailure to implement adequate measures to ensure proper

accountability. He said:

No, I didnt. And I was happy with the way it was run, and I thought it was being doneappropriately. I can see now, when you come and [show] this to me, that yeah, thereshould have been probably more checks and balances. But back then, everyone

appeared happy with what was going on. I can see now, si years down the track, that,hey, there is a management policy, there is an accounting procedure that hasnt been

ollowed. But I mean it was dierent back then.

As the ocer in charge o the Armed Robbery Unit, OD bears responsibility or that ailure and

its consequences. O the 77 transactions eamined as part o Operation Fotrot Distinct, OD

had a role in authorising 40, amounting to a total o $9150. He had input into both issuing and

receiving payments rom the inormant unds, and as a witness to the payment o money to

others.

A number o issues arise with respect to ODs own conduct. Principal among those is his

ailure, as ocer in charge o the ARU, to ensure compliance with the relevant inormant

management procedures the SIMS policy adherence to which would have removed much

o the opportunity or misapplication o the inormant unds.

Failr manag inrman apprprialInspector OD initially disclaimed knowledge o the SIMS policy, subsequently insisted that it

was not applicable to management o the inormant unds, and ultimately asserted the policy

was unworkable in so ar as the ARU was dealing with prisoner inormants.

The results achieved by the squad ah would not have been achieved i we had to work

under that policy. And I think everyone above me agreed with that and no-one at anystage said to me youre acting outside that policy and you are to change it.

For eample, OD epressed the view that documenting the identity o the inormant, an

essential element o the SIMS policy, was unnecessary as log as the iormatio was right.

As the evidence has shown, OD was prepared to permit the payment o money rom the

inormant unds where the recipient was reerred to only by a meaningless pseudonym and

in most instances, to individuals who were not even registered as inormants. This undermines

a undamental tenet o inormant management.9

The ollowing etracts rom a CMC investigative hearing with Detective Senior Sergeant EN

oer some insight into the ARUs approach to the management o inormants (including keeping

records and making payments).

9 The CMC recognises that, or the purposes o inormant condentiality, it might be appropriate to avoid theuse o ull and correct names, and to adopt pseudonyms instead. However, in order to comply withregistration requirements, the use o a registered number or similar identier would ensure condentiality.In the case o the inormant unds, there is no independent or ready means by which to ensure the probityo payments.


28/140


EN had worked in the Armed Robbery Unit at material times. At the hearing he was eamined

about the work o the ARU and about payments to particular inormants:

Q: She was your inormant?

A: I dont remember her.

Q: Why would you have given her money?

A: Shed given someone, possibly me, inormation.

Q: I you look at the ledger it talks about paid out by [EN]?

A: Uh-huh.

Q: So looks like you paid it out, no-one else?

A: Oh, there is no doubt I am the one who gave her the money.

Q: There is simply no way we can identiy this Jane Doe?

A: Not at the moment, no.

Q: Well, when you say not at the moment, are you capable o identiying her?

A: I dont remember her. I I remember her I will tell you.

Q: Can you remember what inormation she gave you?A: No.

Q: So we cant even go to a conviction and work backwards rom it?

A: Oh, possibly. We will have to go through all the people that were convicted orarrested or armed robberies around 2002.

Q: Do you regard this as a satisactory way to record payments to inormants?

A: Yes.

Q: You do?

A: Yes.

Q: What, so no-one else can trace where the money has gone?

A: I cant remember. Can you remember everything you did ve years ago?Q: Thats why I keep records.

A: As do I.

Q: And your records lead us nowhere?

A: You dont you have every record you have identies eactly what you did veyears ago.

Q: Witness, please, you agree your records lead us nowhere?

A: No, they lead us to the act that on this date I paid Jane Doe $200.

Q: Now, who is Jane Doe?

A: Dont know.

Q: Your records wont tell us?

A: No.

.

Q: Who is Fruitie?

A: Dont know.

Q: Whose inormant was he?

A: I dont remember him.

Q: You dont remember him at all?

A: No.


29/140


Q: Yet you paid him $500?

A: Yes.

Q: Thats a sizeable bit o money, isnt it? Thats a large reward?

A: There has been bigger or smaller.

Q: Thats a large reward in terms o what you have been paying previously. Would you

accept that?

A: It is bigger than the ones I would normally pay but I just eplained that I would string

some people out so they would end up with the same amount over a period o time.

Q: And you cant help us at all who this Fruitie is?

A: Not at the moment, no.

Q: When you say not at the moment, have you got access to other materials that wouldhelp you to determine who Fruitie is?

A: Well, you have got every note and notebook and diary I have ever used in the lastve years, so that would have been presumably what I would have gone to. Theydont appear to be helping us.

Q: So once again were in a position where you cant give us any urther inormationto identiy either any police ocer who on-orwarded Fruitie to you or to identiyFruitie urther?

A: Well, not rom sitting here. Not to say that I cant, as with the little tit or tat we wentthrough beore, I cant tell you rom sitting here, no.

Q: Where would you go? I we gave you a couple o days, where would you go tosearch or the inormation?

A: I would go and speak with people Id worked with.

For the sake o completeness, it should be noted that Senior Sergeant EN subsequently had the

opportunity to check the identity o Fruitie with people he had worked with. At a subsequent

disciplinary hearing against him, he produced a statement rom an e-ARU ocer who hadbeen too ill to attend an interview with the ESC investigators. The ormer ARU ocer claimed

that Fruitie was his inormant. He described Fruitie as a man named Dave with a simple

surname which he could not recall, but something like Smith or Jones.

The ormer ARU ocer claimed that he had taken out money rom the inormant unds to pay

Fruitie, but was unable to attend the arranged meeting and, instead, in August 2004, gave the

money to Senior Sergeant EN to make the payment. The obvious diculty with this claim was

that the ARU records show that Senior Sergeant EN obtained the $500 paid to Fruitie some

two months earlier, in June 2004.

The Deputy Commissioner hearing the disciplinary charge rejected the ormer ARU ocers

claims as borderig o the aciul.

There is no evidence that any member o the ARU managed prisoner inormants in accordance

with the SIMS policy. Moreover, it was apparent rom their evidence to the CMC that police

ocers within the Unit OD included took the view that the ends justied the means.

Failr kp aqa rcrNotwithstanding that he spent three and a hal years in charge o the ARU, OD ailed to

implement any pertinent standard operating procedures. More signicantly, none o his

subordinates were trained in the requirements attaching to the payment o money rom the

inormant unds.


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With regard to the process o receipting o payments made to an inormant, Inspector OD

eplained (in an interview conducted with him in November 2007):

The sergeants or mysel would eplain to them that what the situation was in terms o

having the receipt signed, and having the transaction tape recorded.

Inspector OD was reminded o the terms and conditions set out when the inormant unds

were created in particular, the conditions attaching to the ABA und. He said:Back in 1999 that may well have been the case. But as, but as dierent things occurreddown the track and the success rate was so good, a lot o those things were, were relaeda bit by the Assistant Commissioners and people down the line, to say, Well listen. Youknow. Youre doing a great job there, just pay the inormants.

The audit o the inormant unds conducted by the ESC in late 2003 recognised shortcomings

in the way the unds were being administered, and resulted in a recommendation that ew

stadard operatig procedures be drated ad adopted re the maagemet o these uds.

In response, OD had submitted a report in July 2004 seeking more time to urnish such

procedures.10 He was promoted to the rank o Inspector in October 2004, and no standard

operating procedures were ever implemented.

It was a requirement applying to both inormant unds that two responsible police ocers were

to witness every payment made to an inormant, and that all such payments were to be

accounted or. This basic requirement was rarely complied with, such that most o the

payments were authorised without sucient or adequate supporting documentation.

As justication or this, Inspector OD said he relied upon the trust he had in the ocers he had

hand-picked or the Unit, and did not require any proo beyond the word o his subordinate

whom he trusted.

In a number o instances, police ocers (OD included) signed a receipt purporting to be a

witness to the payment o money to an inormant, when in act that ocer had played no role

at all in the transaction. OD deended this action by claiming that although signing as awitness, he had merely:

signed it to say that Ive given [the police ocer] the money On a lot o occasions Iwould sign receipts when Im not there. All Im doing is acknowledging giving them themoney. Im not acknowledging actually being there.

Where as has occurred inormants have subsequently denied receiving any money, there

is no reliable evidence to conrm the payment and a suspicion remains that the relevant sum o

money was simply misappropriated by an ocer or ocers.

The situation is that one is now let with the word o a police ocer who claims he paid a sum

o money to an inormant against the word o the inormant who claims no such payment was

ever made, in circumstances where the receipt generated in order to evidence the payment is

worthless or simply does not eist.

Importantly, as the Ocer in Charge, OD appears not to have considered (or perhaps chose to

ignore) the signal that such behaviour by a supervisor would send as to the standard o integrity

epected o his subordinate police ocers. When the head o the ARU was prepared to act in

that way, it is not surprising that his subordinates acted as they did.

10 Senior Sergeant ODs report to the ESC alsely asserted that the inormant unds were completely empty.


31/140


diciplinar prcingAlthough the investigation identied sucient evidence to warrant consideration o criminal

charges against a number o ocers, the CMC and QPS decided that the public interest would

be best served by dealing with suspected misconduct through the police disciplinary process.

A number o considerations infuenced this decision, including the act that criminal

prosecutions would:

require evidence rom witnesses whose credibility would be open to challenge;

potentially endanger the saety o a number o inormants, by eposing their identities; and

discourage potential uture inormants.

It was also a relevant consideration that the events in question were now largely historical,

having occurred some years ago, and that the prosecution o criminal proceedings was likely

to result in considerable additional delay beore the matters could be nalised.

In the result, in January 2008 the CMC approved an ESC report recommending disciplinary

action against Detective Inspector OD and our other ocers. (OD retired prior to the

conclusion o the disciplinary process.)

A decision on a urther ocer, against whom disciplinary action might have been

considered, was deerred because the ocer took long-term sick leave, beore later retiring

on medical grounds.


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seGMeNt 2: ReMovING PRIsoNeRs FRoMCustody

tim ram: 2001 2005

thi gmn h rpr c pn allgain ha plic fcr aach h

Arm Rr uni, an lwhr, ac imprprl in rming prinr rm

crrcinal cnr a an incmn cn nl arm rr an hr

nc. A prinr har h arrangmn, h in rn gh h rmal

prc r hir wn n. th gmn al hw h lpmn an inapprpria

aciain plic fcr wih prin inrman L own Hnrn.

The ocus was: Weve got 92 unsolved armed robberies. You put that to bed. Andthat direction was given to me by a number o senior sta over the intervening years right up to Assistant Commissioner: Your role is to solve armed robberies. Get itdone.

I believe in a our-year period I did that. We were involved in a whole range o otherinvestigations along the way. It was seen as the go-to squad to get the job done. I admitthat compliance [with policies and procedures] issues could have been better, butagain, my role was to solve armed robberies. In relation to SOPs and things like that, Iwas told, Dont worry about any o that, you just get the job done.

dci Inpcr od, rmr fcr-in-charg ARu, inriw, 20 Jn 2008

backgrn h inigainOver a three-year period rom late 2003, the CMC received a number o complaints alleging

misconduct by police ocers in temporarily removing prisoners rom some o Queenslands

correctional centres. A distinct pattern emerged to the allegations, which gave rise to asuspicion that certain police ocers in particular, ocers attached to the ARU had

engaged in a practice o oering inducements to serving prisoners so as to elicit their

conessions to unsolved crimes.

The initial complaints were reerred to the Ethical Standards Command or internal

investigation. Later, when the etent o alleged behaviour became apparent, and links were

identied with other aspects o Operation Capri, it was determined that the complaints about

prisoner removals should become the subject o investigation by the CMC.

Instead o piecemeal investigations o individual complaints, Operation Capri aorded the

CMC an opportunity to eamine and compare the circumstances o all o the suspect prisoner

removals. When eamined in this way, the available evidence indicates police misconduct by

at least a dozen ocers.


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SEGMENT 2: REMOVING PRISONERS FROM CUSTODY 21

Lgal ai r rming prinr rm cThere are two methods by which a police ocer may seek to lawully remove a prisoner rom

a Correctional Centre:

under section 70 o the Corrective Services Act 20061 (a CSA removal); or

under the provisions o Chapter 7 Part 2 o the Police Powers ad Resposibilities Act2

(a PPRA removal).

Under a CSA removal, the general manager o a prison may authorise the removal o a prisoner

so that the prisoner may assist police in the conduct o an investigation, or be questioned by

police about an oence it is suspected the prisoner has committed. The CSA removal is the

widest in scope, and may be used where police ocers engaged in an investigation seek to

recruit a prisoner as a witness, or as a longer term inormant. The limiting eature o the CSA

removal is that it is subject to the prisoner rst giving his/her consent in writing. The risk to the

prisoner is that he/she may be more easily eposed as a police inormant.

None o the matters investigated as part o Operation Capri involved a removal authorised

pursuant to the CSA.

All prisoner removals eamined by the CMC were PPRA removals where a police ocerapplies to a magistrate or the issue o a ormal order, authorising the removal o a prisoner rom

a correctional centre to enable the investigation o an indictable oence.

Unlike CSA removals, PPRA removals are restricted to situations where the subject prisoner is

suspected o havig committed a idictable oece. In such cases, a magistrate may make a

removal order when satised it is reasonably necessary or questioig the (prisoer) about

the oece; or the ivestigatio o the oece.

The relevant provisions o the PPRA stipulate:

That the application must relate to a prisoner who is suspected o having committed an

indictable oence and is in custody.A police ocer may apply or the removal o the prisoner or questioning about theoence, or the investigation o the oence. (The magistrate may make a removal order olyi

satised the order is reasonably necessary i.e. or questioning the person about the oence,or the investigation o the oence.)

The application must be made in person, and the applicant must swear to the grounds on

which the order is sought.

The removal order must contain

the name o the prisoner and the relevant prison;

the name o the police ocer who will have control o the prisoner;

a statement that the person in charge o the prison must release the prisoner to the police

ocer named in the order;the reason or the prisoners removal;

the place to which the prisoner is to be removed;

a statement that the prisoner must be returned to custody as soon as reasonablypracticable ater the approved detention period ends.

1 Formerly section 55 Corrective Services Act 2000.

2 The various provisions were re-numbered in January 2005. Unless otherwise stated, reerencescontained in this report are to the provisions as they were previously numbered i.e. rom 1 July 2000 toJanuary 2005.


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In other words, to obtain a PPRA removal order, the person to be removed rom custody must

be a suspect or the oence then being investigated. For this reason, the consent o the prisoner

is not required.

The PPRA envisages that the prisoner, upon removal, will be taken to a police establishment.

However, a police ocer may take a removed prisoner to a place other tha a police

establishmet i the police ocer cosiders it reasoably ecessary.

Police ocers seeking to remove prisoners rom custody under either a CSA removal or a PPRA

removal are required to maintain and update applicable custody/search indees, notebooks

and diaries. Other provisions in the QPS Operation Procedures Manual (OPM) governing the

conduct o interviews and recording o conessional evidence also apply.

Wha h inigain ralAs part the investigation o the prisoner removals, the CMC eamined 43 separate removals o

nine prisoners between 2001 and early 2005. Operation Capri ultimately ocused on 36

removals involving those nine prisoners. The ollowing case studies outline the removals rom

custody o si o those prisoners.

The case studies suggest that the motivation o the police ocers who removed prisoners rom

custody varied:

Some police ocers acted in the epectation prisoners would coness to criminal acts, and

thus would solve outstanding oences;

Some police ocers used the removal process to reward prisoners or the assistance the

prisoner had given, or was thought likely to give, in the investigation o other crimes;

Some police ocers arranged removals purely as a avour or the prisoner.

Whatever the motivation, the case studies demonstrate how the allegations o police

misconduct which might easily have been reuted i untrue are unable to be resolved,

because police ocers ailed to complete routine paperwork, thus leaving incomplete ornon-eistent records.

Although the evidence reveals that the Armed Robbery Unit made the greatest use o the

prisoner removal system, the suspicion o police misconduct etends beyond the ARU.

Eamples are provided o the removal rom custody o one prisoner in 2001, and another in

2005; both cases involved conessions made in respect o property oences (e.g. oences o

breaking-and-entering).

Rmal Prinr bR3

On 24 December 2002, two police ocers rom the Dutton Park police station arrested and

charged Prisoner BR with an oence arising rom his alleged involvement in an armed robbery.

Over the course o 2003, BR was temporarily removed rom custody on seven separate

occasions (on our by ocers rom Dutton Park, and on three by ocers attached to the

Armed Robbery Unit). In each instance, the removal was acilitated so that BR could be

interviewed about, and oer admissions to, unsolved armed robbery oences.

Based on his admissions, BR was ultimately indicted in respect o 16 oences o armed

robbery.

At his trial in 2005, BR asserted that he had conessed to some o the oences because police

had oered him inducements, such as being allowed to spend time unsupervised with his wie

3 The allegations arising rom the case o Prisoner BR were mentioned in the Introduction to the report.


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SEGMENT 2: REMOVING PRISONERS FROM CUSTODY 23

in police buildings, and being taken on home visits. Having heard evidence on the point, the

trial judge was not satised as to the voluntariness o BRs conessions, and declined to admit

details o the conessions into evidence.

BR was eventually convicted and sentenced in respect o si oences being matters where

the prosecution possessed evidence o his guilt that was independent o his conessions. The

prosecution was orced to discontinue the other 10 charges.

The BR case was eamined initially by the Ethical Standards Command and subsequently as

part o Operation Capri.

Support or the claims made by BR (and his wie) was ound in recordings that eist o prison

telephone conversations, both preceding and ollowing dealings between BR and police.4 On a

number o occasions, inormation passed in conversations between BR and his wie in the days

leading up to police removing BR rom custody was conrmed by subsequent events and by

police records (such as entries in the visitor records maintained at Police Headquarters, and

telephone call charge records o individual ocers).

Moreover, the evidence uncovered by the CMC as to manner in which police ocers dealt

with BR reveals repeated occurrences o procedural non-compliance, including ailure torecord conversations, ailure to make entries in notebooks and diaries, ailure to make CRISP5

entries, and routine wilul non-compliance with the terms o the orders authorising BRs

removals rom custody.

The CMC provided the QPS with a detailed report o its investigation o the BR matter. The

report recommended consideration o disciplinary action against ve serving police ocers.

Three other ocers against whom disciplinary action might have been appropriate have now

resigned rom the QPS. The CMC is unable to complete its investigation o one ocer who,

or medical reasons, is not t to be interviewed.

Rmal Prinr tHIn the course o its investigation o BRs removals, the CMCs attention was drawn to an

apparently similar course o conduct by police ocers dealing with another prisoner, TH.

Prisoner TH had been sentenced in 2000 to si years imprisonment or two oences o

armed robbery. Inquiries revealed that in a period o just over 12 months rom 16 January 2003

police attached to the Armed Robbery Unit removed TH rom custody on nine occasions

(twice overnight).

During the course o the rst three removals (16, 21 and 29 January 2003), police interviewed

TH in relation to three armed robbery oences, or which he was charged on 29 January 2003.

Police removed him rom custody on a urther our occasions in 2003 (18 February,

2627 March, 10 April, 3031 July), supposedly to provide statements against co-oenders orto provide inormation as part o Operation Salt (a QPS investigation into the armed robbery

o a bank at Browns Plains in which an oender had shot a police ocer).

In September 2003, TH was sentenced or the three armed robbery oences or which he had

been charged on 29 January. Supported by a letter o comort6 provided by an ARU ocer, he

received a wholly suspended sentence o imprisonment or ve years.

4 The circumstances in which telephone calls made by prisoners are recorded are identied in segment 3.

5 Computerised Reporting Inormation System or Police

6 A letter o comort is a document provided by a law enorcement agency on behal o an accused being

sentenced, advising the court o any assistance the oender may have given police. The letter is usually inthe orm o an adavit sworn by a senior police ocer, and the court is required to take into account theinormation when determining the appropriate sentence or the oender (the procedure is in partormalised by s13A Pealties ad Setecig Act 1992.


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Due to the paucity o record-keeping by the ARU ocers who removed TH on two urther

occasions (21 November 2003, 27 January 2004), the reasons or these removals are

impossible to ascertain.

Operation Capri identied evidence suggesting that in the course o his various removals rom

custody during 200304, TH was permitted to have contact with his partner in the ARU

oces, was taken to his grandparents house on three occasions, and on one occasion waspermitted to meet his partner and young children in the Roma Street Parklands. On more than

one occasion, police took TH to his partners address, where he was able to spend time with

his children.

As with the other prisoner removals eamined by the CMC, the circumstances surrounding

the removal o TH rom custody show a very high degree o procedural non-compliance by

police including ailure to properly record conversations, and a ailure to keep accurate notes

and diaries.

The CMC has eamined the letter o comort etended to the court on THs behal. The

document purports to describe in general terms the assistance TH had provided to police in a

number o investigations.

Having identied the matters reerred to in the letter o comort, the CMC compared the letters

contents to known evidence o THs level o assistance to police. There is a degree o suspicion

that much o the inormation conveyed in the letter o comort either eaggerates the level o

THs assistance, or is completely alse.

Rmal Prinr HoAccording to Prisoner HO, in early 2004, while serving a sentence o imprisonment in the

Wolston Correctional Centre, he was told by Prisoner TH about how he could coness to

criminal oences in return or an opportunity to enjoy a visit with amily.

TH subsequently made contact with a police ocer attached to the Armed Robbery Unit and

put in train arrangements or HOs removal rom custody on 28 January 2004 so that HO could

coness to outstanding armed robbery oences.

Police ocers rom the ARU then obtained a magistrates order authorising HOs removal

rom custody. This took place on 28 January 2004, at which time, according to HO, an

understanding was reached between HO and police ocers that HO would be rewarded with

a visit to his home in return or his conession.

HO was transported to QPS Headquarters, where he conessed to a number o oences,

including a 1999 armed robbery o a tai driver, an oence HO committed when 15 years

o age.

A notice requiring HO to appear in court (in respect o the oence against the tai driver) wasserved on him. HO claims that it was eplained that it was not possible to achieve a home visit

on that day, but police promised arrangements would be made to have him removed rom

custody on another day, at which time he could be taken to his amilys residence.

As promised, two police ocers rom the ARU removed HO rom custody again on

26 February 2004 and transported him to QPS Headquarters where he made a voluntary

conession to a urther robbery. HO was then taken to his mothers residence, where he

enjoyed time with amily members and an e-girlriend.

Police ocers involved in this removal told the CMC that a search was perormed at the

residence or clothing HO claimed he had

Documents

Dangerous Liaisons Capri 2009