G.R. No. 186138               September 11, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.LORETO DARIA, JR. y CRUZ, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant appeal assails the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated 25 October 2007 in CA-G.R. CR H.C. No. 02544 which affirmed the 14 June 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 267, in Criminal Cases No. 12832-D and No. 12833-D, finding accused-appellant Loreto C. Daria, Jr., a.k.a Tayap (Loreto), guilty of illegal sale and illegal possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride more popularly known as "shabu."

On 1 September 2003, two separate Informations were filed against Loreto before the RTC of Pasig City for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, as amended, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, for allegedly (a) selling 0.46 gram of shabu and (b) being in illegal possession of 1.11 grams of shabu.

The offense involved in Criminal Case No. 12832-D for violation of Section 5,3 Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, was allegedly committed as follows:

On or about August 18, 2003, in Pasig City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to PO1 Victor S. Bantog, Jr., a police poseur-buyer, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing forty-six decigrams (0.46 gram) of white crystalline substance, which was found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.4

The accusatory portion of the second Information pertaining to Criminal Case No. 12833-D for violation of Section 11,5 Article II of the same law, reads:

On or about August 18, 2003, in Pasig City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess or otherwise use any dangerous drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his custody and control ten (10) heat sealed transparent plastic sachets containing the following weights, to wit:

a. five centigrams (0.05 gram)

b. twenty decigrams (0.20gram)c. sixteen decigrams (0.16 gram)d. thirteen decigrams (0.13 gram)e. thirteen decigrams (0.13 gram)f. ten decigrams (0.10 gram)g. three centigrams (0.03 gram)h. three centigrams (0.03 gram)i. ten decigrams (0.10 gram)j. eighteen decigrams (0.18)

or a total weight of one (1) gram and eleven (11) decigrams (1.11 gram) of white crystalline substance were found positive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug, in violation of the said law.6

When arraigned on 3 February 2004, Loreto pleaded not guilty to the two charges. Thereafter, joint trial ensued.

The prosecution presented the oral testimony of its lone witness, Police Officer (PO) 1 Victor S. Bantog, Jr. (PO1 Bantog), of the District Anti-Illegal Drugs Special Operations Task Force (DAID-SOTF), Eastern Police District, Pasig City. It also offered documentary evidence, which consists of the following: Exhibit "A"- Affidavit of Arrest signed by PO1 Bantog, and a certain Police Inspector Hoover SM Pascual (Inspector Pascual); Exhibit "B" – Request for Laboratory Examination of the specimen suspected to be shabu allegedly confiscated from Loreto; Exhibit "C" – Chemistry Report stating that the confiscated specimen tested positive for shabu; Exhibit "D" – envelope containing the specimens; and Exhibit "E" – the Buy-Bust Money.

From the foregoing evidence adduced by the prosecution, it appears that at around 7:30 p.m. on 18 August 2003, a confidential informant showed up at the DAID-SOTF of the Eastern Police District, Pasig City reporting that Loreto was peddling shabu at Sitio Bolante, Barangay Pinagbuhatan, Pasig City.7 Inspector Pascual immediately briefed the narcotics operatives present composed of Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Bernardo, PO1 Jocelyn Samson, PO1 Martinez, PO1 Genove, PO1 Orig, PO1 Damasco, PO1 Ramos, PO1 Montefalcon and PO1 Bantog and ordered them to conduct a buy-bust operation.8 PO1 Bantog was tasked to act as the poseur-buyer.9 The buy-bust money, a P500-peso bill, which came from Inspector Pascual, was marked by PO1 Bantog with his initials "VSB." At around 8:30 p.m., the team went to the target area and arrived there at around 9:30 p.m. Inspector Pascual instructed the asset to verify the location of Loreto in the vicinity. As soon as the asset came back and confirmed the presence of Loreto in the area, the former, together with PO1 Bantog, approached the target.10Behind them was PO1 Montefalcon, who acted as back-up. The confidential informant introduced PO1 Bantog to Loreto and told the latter that the former wanted to buy shabu.11 After a brief negotiation, PO1 Bantog handed the buy-bust money to Loreto who, in turn, gave one plastic sachet containing crystalline substance.12 At once, PO1 Bantog held Loreto and introduced

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himself as a police officer. PO1 Montefalcon also rushed in and held Loreto.13PO1 Bantog retrieved the marked money from Loreto’s hand and ten more plastic sachets from the pocket of the latter’s pants. PO1 Bantog marked the sachet subject of the buy-bust as "A" and the ten confiscated plastic sachets as "A-1" to "A-10."14 PO1 Bantog informed Loreto of his constitutional rights. Without delay, the latter was brought to the police station.15 The recovered plastic sachets were sent to the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory, Eastern Police District Crime Laboratory Office.16 Per the chemistry report, it was found that the 11 sachets were positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.17 The chemistry report states:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

1. Eleven (11) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachets with markings "EXH-A LCD/180803 through EXH-A10 LCD/180803" marked as A through K respectively, each containing white crystalline substance having the following recorded net weights:

A = 0.46 gram E = 0.13 gram I = 0.03 gramB = 0.05 gram F = 0.13 gram J = 0.10 gramC = 0.20 gram G = 0.10 gram K = 0.18 gramD = 0.16 gram H = 0.03 gram  

PURPOSE LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of any dangerous drug.

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave POSITIVE result to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

CONCLUSION:

Specimens A through K contain Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.

The defense, on the other hand, put up the defense of denial and frame-up through the testimonies of Loreto and Rosana de Guzman Daria (Rosana), Loretos’s sister-in-law.

According to Loreto, a market vendor, it was on 16 August 2003, and not on 18 August 2003, in the house of his sister-in-law, Rosana, that he was illegally arrested by police officers Orig, Damasco and Montefalcon. He said that at around 10:30 in the

evening of 16 June 2003, while he was visiting his sister-in-law and his nephew and niece, said police officers barged inside the living room and pointed guns at him. One of them kicked him in the chest as PO1 Orig sprayed tear gas on his eyes. Despite his protestations, he was forcibly dragged downstairs and loaded into a car and brought to the police district office of Pasig City. Rosana was also accosted and brought to the police station. There, the said police officers demanded P50,000.00 in exchange for his release. Rosana was released later having been tasked to raise and produce the said amount, while Loreto remained incarcerated. He also testified that the P500.00 buy-bust money and the sachets of shabu came from PO1 Orig’s pocket and were only shown to him in the police station. He declared that he saw PO1 Bantog for the first time at the police station. He further claimed that the police officers implicated him because he and Melinda, one of his three wives, filed a complaint against Inspector Pascual, PO1 Ramos, PO1 Orig and PO3 Bernardo for the illegal arrest, planting of evidence and robbery in relation to Loreto’s first arrest on 22 July 2003, but the complaint was eventually dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Loreto admitted that his first arrest on 22 July 2003 led to his conviction and imprisonment.

Rosana testified that on 16 August 2003, at around 10:00 to 10:30 p.m., while she was on the second floor of her house, she heard a commotion coming from the ground floor where her children and Loreto were. Thereafter, she saw Loreto and one of her children go upstairs escorted by three police officers with their guns pointed at Loreto. The same police officers ordered him to surrender his gun and the shabu. He denied possession of said items. He was then handcuffed and frisked by the police officers. They confiscated his wallet and cellular phone. After a while, he and Rosana were brought by said police officers to the police station. There, both were shown several plastic sachets containing shabu, the ownership of which were imputed to them. PO1 Orig and PO1 Damasco told Rosana that she would be released, so she could produce P50,000 to settle the charge against her and Loreto. She did not return to the police station and instead went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to file a complaint against said police officers. The case did not progress since she failed to follow it up, as she had gone abroad.

In a Joint Decision dated 14 June 2006, the RTC found Loreto guilty of the two charges. In the illegal sale, Criminal Case No. 12832-D, the RTC imposed upon him the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00; while for illegal possession, Criminal Case No. 12833-D, he was sentenced to suffer imprisonment ranging from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and to pay a fine of P300,000.00.

Loreto filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by the RTC.

Dissatisfied, he elevated his convictions to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, however, affirmed his convictions.

Hence, the instant appeal.

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Loreto faults the RTC and the Court of Appeals for convicting him despite the fact that the apprehending officers failed to follow the procedures for making a pre-operation report, coordinating with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), taking photographs and a physical inventory of the confiscated items, and subjecting the accused to the mandatory drug test provided for by Republic Act No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. He implies that failure to follow these procedures makes the apprehension irregular and unauthorized, thereby destroying the presumption of regularity given to police authorities in the performance of their official duties.

Loreto’s arguments are unconvincing.

Section 86(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 encourages other enforcement agencies to coordinate with the PDEA prior to anti-drug operations, to wit:

The PDEA shall be the lead agency in the enforcement of the Act, while the PNP, the NBI and other law enforcement agencies shall continue to conduct anti-drug operations in support of the PDEA; Provided, that the said agencies shall, as far as practicable, coordinate with the PDEA prior to anti-drug operations. x x x.

Section 21(a), paragraph 1, Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 states:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. x x x.

Section 36(f) of the same statute provides:

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall have to undergo a mandatory drug test.

This is not the first time that the Court is confronted with this same issue. In People v. Agulay,18 therein accused-appellant contended that the non-compliance with the procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, created an irregularity that overcame the presumption of regularity accorded to police authorities in the performance of their official duties. There, the Court decreed that failure to strictly follow the procedure set forth under Section 21(1), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act

No. 9165, did not invalidate the seizure and custody of confiscated items during the buy-bust operation, viz:

The dissent agreed with accused-appellant’s assertion that the police operatives failed to comply with the proper procedure in the custody of the seized drugs. It premised that non-compliance with the procedure in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165 creates an irregularity and overcomes the presumption of regularity accorded police authorities in the performance of their official duties. This assumption is without merit.

First, it must be made clear that in several cases19 decided by the Court, failure by the buy-bust team to comply with said section did not prevent the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty from applying.

Second, even prior to the enactment of R.A. 9165, the requirements contained in Section 21(a) were already there per Dangerous Drugs Board Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979. Despite the presence of such regulation and its non-compliance by the buy-bust team, the Court still applied such presumption.20 We held:

"The failure of the arresting police officers to comply with said DDB Regulation No. 3, Series of 1979 is a matter strictly between the Dangerous Drugs Board and the arresting officers and is totally irrelevant to the prosecution of the criminal case for the reason that the commission of the crime of illegal sale of a prohibited drug is considered consummated once the sale or transaction is established and the prosecution thereof is not undermined by the failure of the arresting officers to comply with the regulations of the Dangerous Drugs Board."

x x x x

Moreover, non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.21 (Emphases supplied.)

From the foregoing disquisition, it can easily be gleaned that non-compliance with the procedural requirements under Republic Act No. 9165 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations relative to the custody, photographing and drug-testing of the apprehended persons, are not serious flaws that can render void the seizures and custody of drugs in a buy-bust operation. In addition, the Court has already ruled that the non-presentation of the pre-operation report is not fatal to the cause of the prosecution, because it is not indispensable in a buy-bust operation.221avvphi1

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What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor, which the prosecution has satisfactorily established. The prosecution satisfactorily proved the illegal sale of dangerous drugs and presented in court the evidence of corpus delicti.23

In the instant case, all the elements of the crime have been sufficiently established by the prosecution. The witness for the prosecution was able to prove that the buy-bust operation indeed took place, and the shabu subject of the sale was brought to and duly identified in court. The poseur-buyer (PO1 Bantog) positively identified Loreto as the one who had sold to him one heat-sealed, transparent plastic sachet containing forty-six decigrams (0.46 gram) of shabu. After Loreto received the marked money and handed to PO1 Bantog one plastic sachet of shabu, the latter introduced himself as a police officer and right away frisked the former. From the body search, PO1 Bantog recovered from the possession of Loreto, specifically from the latter’s pocket, another 10 sachets of shabu. PO1 Bantog straightforwardly narrated the circumstances leading to the consummation of the sale of illegal drugs, the possession of ten plastic sachets and the arrest of Loreto:

PROS. Bautista:Q: Where were you at around 7:30 p.m. on August 18, 2003?A: I was at the office, sir.Q: What happened while you were inside the office?A: A civilian informant came informing us that there is a rampant selling of shabu along Bolante, sir.Q: What was the information relayed to you by the informant other than the rampant selling?A: Allegedly the supplier is one alias Tayap, sir.Q: Was this Tayap particularly described by this informant?A: Yes, sir.Q: How was he described?A: He has a big built, tall person, has fair complexion.x x x xQ: After receiving the information, what happened?A: P/Insp. Hoover Pascual conducted a briefing.Q: How many of you were present at that time?A: Nine operatives, sir.Q: And who are these operatives? Will you name them?A: SPO1 Bernardo, PO1 Jocelyn Samson, PO1 Martinez, PO1 Genove, PO1 Orig, PO1 Damasco, PO1 Ramos.Q: Was there a briefing conducted by your chief?A: Yes, sir.Q: What was the briefing all about?A: To locate the suspect, to verify if he’s really selling shabu in that place, to make a surveillance at the place, to monitor the place.Q: What else? Who acted as a poseur-buyer here?

A: I, sir.Q: And as poseur-buyer, what were you supposed to do?A: I was given P500 peso bill, sir.Q: What did you do with that P500 peso bill?A: I put secret markings, sir.Q: What markings?A: My initials, sir?Q: What initials?A: VSB, sir.Q: What does VSB stands for?A: Victor S. Bantog, sir.24

PO1 Bantog testified futher:Q: What was your specific instruction at that time?A: I will act as poseur buyer, sir.Q: What else?A: At 9:30, we arrived at the area, sir.x x x xQ: When you reached the target area, what happened?A: Insp. Pascual told the confidential informant to locate Tayap.x x x xQ: Were you able to locate this Tayap?A: Yes, sir.Q: Who was able to locate this Tayap?A: At first, the confidential informant, sir.Q: Not you?A: Not me, sir.Q: So what happened after that, after this confidential informant was able to locate Tayap?A: He went back to us and told us that Tayap is there, sir.Q: And what did you do after that?A: I went along with the confidential informant.Q: Only two of you proceeded to the area?A: Montefalcon acted as my back-up, sir.x x x xQ: What happened when you reached the place where Tayap was located?A: I was introduced by the confidential informant to Tayap, sir.Q: How were you introduced?A: That I will get shabu, sir.Q: What was the reply of Tayap, of the accused?A: I asked him if he has shabu, sir.Q: And what was his answer?A: He answered, "yes."Q: Will you narrate to us how this transaction took place?A: When I gave him the P500, he handed me the shabu, sir.Q: How many?A: One piece, sir.Q: And how much is that shabu worth?A: P500.00, sir.

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x x x xQ: So when you handed this P500.00 bill, the accused gave to you the one sachet?A: Yes, sir.Q: And after the accused gave to you this sachet, what did you do?A: I introduced myself to him, sir.Q: You introduced yourself as police?A: Yes, sir.Q: And after introducing yourself as police officers, what did you do?A: I held him, sir.Q: And then, what happened?A: PO1 Bedo Montefalcon arrived, sir.Q: What did Montefalcon do?A: We both held the accused, sir.Q: And then, what happened?A: I was able to recover the marked money from the accused, sir.Q: You yourself recovered the money?A: Yes, sir.Q: Where did you get this marked money?A: From his hand, sir.Q: After that, what did you do?A: I also recovered ten (10) pieces of small plastic sachets aside from the one I bought, sir.Q: Where did you see it?A: From his maong pants, sir.x x x xQ: How did you get that?A: After frisking him, sir.x x x xQ: And when you frisked this accused, you were able to get how many pieces of shabu or plastic sachet?A: Ten (10) pieces and the one I bought from him, a total of eleven (11), sir.Q: After that, what did you do?A: I put markings on the plastic sachet,sir.x x x xQ: And from these things you confiscated from the accused, how do you know the thing subject of a buy-bust operation and the things subject of possession?A: The one I bought contains more, sir.Q: And what did you mark on the one you bought?A: I marked "A" the shabu I bought from him, sir.x x x xQ: And then what did you do, what happened next?A: We brought him to the office, but before that, I informed him of his constitutional rights, sir.x x x xQ: If shown to you these sachets of shabu confiscated from the accused, can you identify the same?A: Yes, sir.

Interpreter: Witness is going over the envelope containing the specimen confiscated from the accused. Witness is going over the plastic sachets.A: This is the one, sir.25

Contrary to what Loreto wants to portray, the chain of custody of the seized prohibited drugs was shown to have not been broken. While still in the crime scene, PO1 Bantog marked the one plastic sachet he bought and the other 10 sachets he seized from Loreto’s possession. These plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance were immediately forwarded to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination to determine the presence of dangerous drugs. The forensic chemist found that the white crystalline substance inside the 11 confiscated sachets was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug. Besides, Loreto did not question the custody and disposition of the drugs that were taken from him in the proceedings before the RTC. In fact, he stipulated the existence of the specimens, the existence of the arresting officer’s request for laboratory examination, and the fact that the same were examined by Forensic Chemist Annalee Forro. The examination yielded a positive result for methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as shabu.26 There can be no doubt that the drug bought and seized from Loreto was the same one examined in the crime laboratory. Plainly, the prosecution established the crucial link in the chain of custody of the sold and seized sachets of shabu, from the time they were first bought and seized from Loreto, until they were brought for examination. We, thus, find the integrity and the evidentiary value of the drugs coming from Loreto to have not been compromised.

Loreto also insists that his defense of having been framed up is supported by clear and convincing evidence, since the involved police officers had a sufficient motive to get back at him for filing a case against said officers. Furthermore, he questions the credibility of the lone testimony of the witness for the prosecution, since said witness could not remember from which pocket of the accused he got the ten plastic sachets, and what quantity of shabu the witness bought from the accused.

Simply, Loreto wants this Court to evaluate the credibility of the prosecution witnesses vis-a-vis the defense witness. It has often been said, however, that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best examined by, and left to, the trial courts. 27 The time-tested doctrine is that the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most competently performed by the trial judge who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in light of the declarant’s demeanor, conduct and position to discriminate between truth and falsehood.28 Thus, appellate courts will not disturb the credence, or lack of it, accorded by the trial court to the testimonies of witnesses. 29 This is especially true when the trial court’s findings have been affirmed by the appellate court, because said findings are generally conclusive and binding upon this Court, unless it be manifestly shown that the trial court had overlooked or disregarded arbitrarily the facts and circumstances of significance in the case.30

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However, in view of the fact that at stake here is no less than the liberty of accused-appellant, this Court thoroughly examined the entire records of this case, scrutinized the testimonies and the pieces of documentary evidence tendered by both parties, and observed them at close range. Regrettably for Loreto, this Court failed to identify any error committed by the RTC or the Court of Appeals, both in their respective appreciations of the evidence presented before them and in the conclusion they arrived at.

There was no reason why the police officers involved would exact retribution from Loreto. It must be noted that one of his wives filed a complaint against Inspector Pascual, PO1 Ramos, PO1 Orig and PO3 Bernardo for illegal arrest, planting of evidence and robbery in relation to Loreto’s first arrest on 22 July 2003, but, said complaint was already dismissed on 18 May 2004. Not only were the police officers cleared, they were also vindicated when Loreto was convicted in a drug case in relation to his first arrest on 22 July 2003. In addition, he cannot ascribe any ill motive on the part of PO1 Bantog, the lone prosecution witness. What further militates against Loreto’s proposition is that it vascillates on whether to stick to the defense that he is a subject of the police officer’s revenge or that he is a victim of extortion, both of which remained unsubstantiated. The supposed corroborative testimony mustered by the defense came from Loreto’s sister-in-law, a testimony that the court viewed with disfavor since it could easily be fabricated.31

Although PO1 Bantog failed to recall from which pants pocket he seized the ten sachets and the exact quantity of drugs he bought from Loreto, said omission cannot affect the cause of the prosecution. This only shows an honest lack of recollection of the minor and inconsequential aspect of what transpired during the entrapment operation. It would be a tall order, indeed, to require the witness to recall every minute detail of an incident, i.e., from which pocket PO1 got the ten sachets and the quantity of the shabu sold. If the event had transpired in rapid succession amid the flurry and excitement of the moment, it would be hard for the arresting officer to absorb all the nitty gritty of what went on during the incident in question.

Comparing the defense version with that of the arresting/entrapping police officer as to what really happened at about 9:30 p.m. of 18 August 2003 or on 16 August 2003 (defense’s version), this Court finds, as did the RTC and the Court of Appeals, the account of the prosecution witness more credible. Aside from the presumption that they — PO1 Bantog and his companions — regularly performed their duties, this Court notes that the prosecution witness gave a consistent and straightforward narration of what transpired on the day in question. The version depicted by the prosecution, through the testimony of the entrapping officer, could have only been described by a person who actually witnessed the event that took place on 18 August 2003. Only a trustworthy witness could have narrated with such clarity and realism what really happened on the date referred to.

Once again, this Court stresses that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and

distributors.32 It is often utilized by law enforcers for the purpose of trapping and capturing lawbreakers in the execution of their nefarious activities.33 This Court, of course, is not unaware that in some instances, law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to harass civilians. But the defense of frame-up in drug cases requires strong and convincing evidence because of the presumption that the law enforcement agencies acted in the regular performance of their official duties. Moreover, the defense of denial or frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed by the court with disfavor, for it can just as easily be concocted and is a common and standard defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the drugs law.

In sum, in Criminal Case No. 12832-D, the Court, just like the RTC and the Court of Appeals, is convinced that the prosecution’s evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt the charge of violation of Section 5, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal sale of shabu). Also proven by the same quantum of evidence was the charge for violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165 (illegal possession of shabu) in Criminal Case No. 12833-D, Loreto having knowingly carried with him the ten plastic sachets of shabu without legal authority at the time he was apprehended during the buy-bust operation.

In the illegal sale, in Criminal Case No. 12832-D, the RTC imposed upon Loreto the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00; while in the illegal possession, in Criminal Case No. 12833-D, he was sentenced to the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and to pay the fine ofP300,000.00.

Under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, the unauthorized sale of shabu, regardless of its quantity and purity, carries with it the penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Pursuant, however, to the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 entitled, "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," only life imprisonment and fine shall be imposed. Thus, the RTC properly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and fine of P500,000.00 on Loreto for the illegal sale of shabu.

The possession of dangerous drugs is punished under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. Paragraph 2, No. 3 thereof, reads:

Sec. 11. Possession of Dangerous Drugs. – x x x.

x x x x

3) Imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years and a fine ranging from Three hundred thousand pesos (P300,000.00) to Four hundred

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thousand pesos (P400,000.00), if the quantities of dangerous drugs are less than five (5) grams of x x x methamphetamine hydrochloride x x x.

In the instant case, Loreto was caught in possession of one gram and 11 decigrams (1.11 grams) of shabu. The penalty imposed by the RTC is proper.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR H.C No. 02544 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 267 convicting Loreto C. Daria, Jr. "alias" Tayap of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, and imposing upon him a fine of P500,000.00, and, for violation of Section 11, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, imposing upon him the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and 1 day to 14 years and a fine of P300,000.00, is AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 184957               October 27, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs.GRACE VENTURA y NATIVIDAD, Accused-Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

For Review under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court is the Decision1 dated 30 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02127, entitled People of the Philippines v. Grace Ventura y Natividad affirming the Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, dated 20 January 2006 in Criminal Case No. 3244-M-2003, convicting Grace Ventura y Natividad (accused-appellant) of violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165.3 Accused-appellant was meted the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.

In an Information dated 12 August 2003, accused-appellant Grace Ventura y Natividad and Danilo Ventura y Laloza were charged before the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan with illegal sale of shabu in violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 3244-M-2003 and raffled to Branch 78 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. The Information contained the following allegations:

The undersigned Asst. Provincial Prosecutor accuses Grace Ventura y Natividad and Danilo Ventura y Laloza @ Danny of Violation of Sec. 5, in relation to Sec. 26, Art. II of R.A. 9165, otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002," committed as follows:

That on or about the 10th day of August 2003, in the City of Malolos, province of Bulacan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law and legal justification, in conspiracy with each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, trade, deliver, give away, dispatch in transit and transport dangerous drug consisting of one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride weighing 0.124 gram.4

During arraignment, both accused entered "NOT GUILTY" pleas. Trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented as witnesses Police Officer (PO) 2 Lorenzo Sarmiento (Sarmiento) and PO3 Leonardo Magsakay (Magsakay). Accused-appellant Grace Ventura and Bernard Ventura were witnesses for the defense.

PO2 Sarmiento, 37 years old, married, police officer and a resident of Sagrada Familia, Hagonoy, Bulacan, and PO3 Magsakay, 40 years old, married, police officer, and a resident of Sikatuna St., San Gabriel, Malolos, Bulacan, testified to receiving information from concerned citizens of Sto. Rosario, Malolos, Bulacan, and reports received by Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) Secretary Joey Lina on the alleged involvement of Danilo alias "Danny" (father of accused-appellant) and accused-appellant in illegal drugs trade. On the strength of this confidential information, a surveillance operation was conducted by operatives of the Malolos Police Station in Malolos, Bulacan, two days before the buy-bust operation. Results of the surveillance operation were relayed to the chief of police, who thereafter instructed them to conduct a buy-bust operation against accused-appellant and Danilo. The team was composed of PO2 Sarmiento, PO1 Michael Silla, PO3 Magsakay, and a police asset.

On 10 August 2003, a briefing was conducted among the members of the buy-bust team. During said briefing, PO2 Sarmiento placed the markings "LCS," which correspond to his initials, on the buy-bust money. The marked money consisted of three P100.00 bills and one P50.00 bill. A police asset was also designated as poseur-buyer. Both the buy-bust operation and serial numbers of the bills to be used as buy-bust money were recorded in the police blotter. Prior to proceeding with the operation, the buy-bust team coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) and was assigned a control number for the operation, with its pre-operational sheet signed by Hashim Maung of PDEA.

After being briefed on the operation, the buy-bust team proceeded to the target site. While the members of the team positioned themselves at the alley leading towards

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the house of accused-appellant, the police asset went directly to the gate of Danilo and accused-appellant. The gate was approximately ten meters away from them.

From where they were standing, the police officers saw the police asset knocking at the gate. Thereupon, Danilo stepped out. The police asset handed the marked money to Danilo. Danilo closed the gate and went inside the house. Moments later, Grace (accused-appellant) went out and handed something to the police asset. Indicating the sale was consummated, the police asset then executed his pre-arranged signal by touching his hair with his right hand. The police officers rushed towards the gate but accused-appellant noticed them and closed the gate. PO2 Sarmiento pushed open the gate. As PO2 Sarmiento was entering the compound, he saw a man holding a "gulok." It turned out that the man holding the "gulok" or bolo was one of Danilo’s sons, Vergel Ventura, who attempted to hack PO2 Sarmiento. PO2 Sarmiento informed him that he was a police officer, but Vergel still tried to hack him with the bolo causing him to seek cover outside the gate while parrying the attack. PO3 Magsakay drew his gun and poked it at Vergel, who ran inside the house. PO2 Sarmiento entered the gate and arrested Danilo, while PO2 Magsakay arrested accused-appellant. PO1 Silla arrested Vergel. After frisking Danilo, PO2 Sarmiento recovered from him the marked money used for the buy-bust operation. The police asset handed to PO2 Sarmiento the shabu he bought from accused-appellant. The Venturas were apprised of their rights and informed of the offense committed. Thereafter, the suspects were brought to the police station for further investigation.

The testimony of forensic chemist Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria was dispensed with due to the admission of the defense as to the existence and due execution of the Request for Laboratory Examination, Chemistry Report No. D-606-2003, and the specimens subject of the examination.

The laboratory examination conducted by Police Inspector (P/Insp.) and Forensic Chemical Officer Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria on the confiscated specimen yielded the following results:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

A- One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with markings "LCS BB" containing 0.124 gram of white crystalline substance.

PURPOSE OF THE LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of dangerous drug. x x x.

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimen gave POSITIVE result to the test for the presence of Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. x x x.

CONCLUSION:

Specimen A contains Methylamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug.5

The defense denied all material allegations of the prosecution. Grace Ventura, 28 years old, single and a resident of Sabitan, Sto. Rosario, Malolos, Bulacan testified that she was at her house along Sabitan on 10 August 2003 when she saw her brother Bernard Ventura, alias "Bening," having an argument with "Badong," a tricycle driver. As Badong was leaving, accused-appellant heard him threatening his brother, saying he would exact vengeance on him. Thereafter, at about 3 to 4 o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, a group of policemen in civilian clothes barged into their house by kicking the door. The group was apparently looking for his brother alias "Bening." The group searched the house. Not satisfied, the policemen took their money and told her to point to them her brother’s house. She informed them that his house was at the crossing. The policemen took her. As she was being taken by the police, she managed to tell her father, who was at the other house, to follow her because the policemen were taking her. The policemen took her to the municipal hall, where she was followed by one of her brothers an hour later and by her father half an hour later. She then saw her father talking to the policemen. Later on, both she and her father were placed inside the detention cell.

On cross-examination, accused-appellant testified that she was with her father at their house in Sabitan at the time of arrest. She denied that her brother Vergel was at their house at the time, but admitted there was a pending direct assault case against him, for interfering in her and her father’s arrest. Accused-appellant admitted that it was only at the time of their arrest that she came to know of the police officers who arrested them, and that she and her father had no personal quarrel with the policemen. Accused-appellant maintained that the drugs allegedly taken from her possession were only planted by the police officers. She admitted to not filing any charges against them for the planting of evidence.

On redirect, accused-appellant reiterated her testimony on direct examination that she was merely taken by the police authorities so she could show them her brother’s house. She again stated that it was Bening, her brother, who had a misunderstanding with a certain Badong for the latter’s failure to remit the boundary for the tricycle he was driving.

Bernard Ventura, alias "Bening," 31 years old, married, a tricycle driver, and a resident of Sumapang Matanda, Malolos, Bulacan, testified that he was the brother of accused-appellant. On 10 August 2003, he was at his house along Sumapang Matanda watching television, when a group of police officers went inside his house asking if he had shabu. They were accompanied by Badong, the same man he had

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an argument with earlier that day. The policemen informed him that his father Danilo and sister, accused-appellant, had been arrested for selling prohibited drugs. He was taken to the Malolos municipal hall and charged with violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The case was dismissed by Branch 20 of the RTC of Malolos, Bulacan. He denied all the allegations against him, his father, and his sister, contending that the only reason for their arrest was the quarrel he had with Badong, who was a police asset.

On 9 February 2005, an order was issued by the trial court dismissing the charge against accused Danilo Ventura y Laloza pursuant to Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code, after Ariel B. Santiago, warden of the Bulacan Provincial Jail, informed said court of the untimely demise of said accused in his custody.

According full faith and credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the trial court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt in Criminal Case No. 3244-M-2003 for violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and sentencing her with the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P500,000.00.6

Via a Notice of Appeal,7 accused-appellant sought to appeal the RTC ruling with the Court of Appeals. The case was docketed by the appellate court as CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 02127.

The Court of Appeals gave more weight to the prosecution’s claim that the entrapment operation in fact took place and denied the appeal. Concurring in the factual findings of the trial court, the appellate court resolved the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78 of Malolos, Bulacan dated January 20, 2006 finding the accused-appellant Grace Ventura y Natividad guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00 is hereby AFFIRMED.8

Electing to seek a final recourse before this Court, accused-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal9 on 28 July 2008.

Accused-appellant filed a supplemental brief while the prosecution adopted its appellee’s brief earlier submitted to the Court of Appeals.

Accused-appellant seeks her acquittal, praying for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the illegal drugs case. The defense claims that the appellate court committed serious error in (a) finding the existence of an unbroken chain in the custody of the shabu subject of the buy-bust operation as well as its evidentiary

value; and (b) ruling that non-compliance with Section 21 of Republic Act No. 9165 is not fatal.

At the heart of the defense argument is that the defense failed to account for the chain of custody of the evidence.

The petition lacks merit.

The presumption of innocence10 of an accused in criminal cases is a most fundamental constitutional right that must be upheld at all times. Applying the foregoing principle, it has been established that the burden of proof is a duty borne by the prosecution.11 Ei incumbit probatio qui dicit, non qui negat, i.e., "He who asserts, not he who denies, must prove." With this in mind, conviction of an accused must stand on the weight and strength of the evidence of the prosecution and cannot rest on the weakness of the defense.12

The straightforward testimonies of the principal witnesses for the prosecution established that at around 3 o’clock in the afternoon of 10 August 2003, a group of police officers composed of PO2 Sarmiento, PO3 Magsakay, Silla, and an asset, acting as poseur-buyer, went to the house of Danilo and accused-appellant Grace Ventura. The team was to conduct a buy-bust operation on instruction of the chief of police. Upon reaching the area, PO2 Sarmiento and PO3 Magsakay positioned themselves near the gate of accused-appellant. While they were stationed in their respective places, the police asset went to accused-appellant’s gate. He knocked thereon. They then saw Danilo opening the gate and stepping out. The asset handed the marked money to Danilo, who then went inside and closed the gate. A few minutes later, accused-appellant opened the gate and handed a plastic sachet containing shabu to the police asset.

They then saw the police asset execute the pre-arranged signal by scratching his head, indicating that the sale had been consummated. The police officers then ran towards them, but accused-appellant managed to close the gate. PO2 Sarmiento pushed open the gate, but he was met by Vergel, the brother of accused-appellant, who was armed with a bolo and about to hack him. Attempting to parry the attacks on him, PO2 Sarmiento went out of the gate and closed it. PO3 Magsakay drew his firearm and pointed it at accused-appellant’s brother, who ran towards the direction of the house, but was accosted by PO1 Silla. PO3 Magsakay arrested accused-appellant inside the house, while PO2 Sarmiento arrested Danilo.

Danilo was frisked upon being arrested at his house and the marked money, consisting of three P100.00 bills and one P50.00 bill, was recovered from him.13 Immediately after the buy-bust operation, the police asset turned over the plastic sachet containing a white crystalline substance to PO3 Magsakay at the crime scene.14

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PO3 Magsakay and PO2 Sarmiento thereafter took accused-appellant Grace, Danilo, Vergel, and the recovered evidence, i.e., marked money15 and one plastic sachet16 containing white crystalline substance, to the police station for further investigation. At the police station, PO2 Sarmiento marked the confiscated plastic sachet with "LCS BB," corresponding to the initials of his name, Lorenzo Cruz Sarmiento, and the word "buy-bust."17 After the sachet was marked with "LCS BB," a request for laboratory examination was prepared by Chief of Police and Police Superintendent Salvador I. Santos.18 The sachet and request for laboratory examination were thereafter brought to the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office of the Philippine National Police by PO3 Magsakay. The sachet was turned over by PO3 Magsakay to PO1 Boluran of the Bulacan Provincial Crime Laboratory Office.19 At the crime laboratory, Forensic Chemical Officer and Police Inspector Nellson Cruz Sta. Maria conducted laboratory examination on the 0.124 grams of white crystalline substance found inside the plastic sachet. Per Chemistry Report No. D-506-2003, the tests performed on the specimen yielded positive results for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.20

It is clear from the foregoing that the identity of the seized item was duly preserved and established by the prosecution. There is no doubt that the sachet with the markings "LCS BB" and submitted for laboratory examination, found to be positive for shabu, was the same one sold to the poseur-buyer during the buy-bust operation.

In prosecutions involving the illegal sale of drugs, what is material is proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited or regulated drug as evidence.21 For conviction of the crime of illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs, the following elements must concur: (1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment for it.22 The testimonial and documentary pieces of evidence adduced by the prosecution in support of its case against accused-appellant establish the presence of these elements.

The two police officers, PO2 Sarmiento and PO3 Magsakay, positively identified Danilo and Grace Ventura as the same persons from whom their asset purchased the plastic sachet of shabu. As correctly found by the trial court, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses narrated the events leading towards the conclusion that accused-appellant conspired with deceased Danilo in selling the methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, thus:

The act of accused Danilo in taking the marked money from the asset and the act of Grace in handing the plastic sachet of shabu to the asset unmistakably shows that they were in concert and both share a common interest in selling the illegal substance. x x x.23

There was no need to present the poseur-buyer, since PO2 Sarmiento and PO3 Magsakay witnessed the whole transaction, where the marked money was exchanged for one sachet of shabu. The poseur-buyer was clearly visible from where

PO2 Sarmiento and PO3 Magsakay were standing. In fact, the testimony of a lone prosecution witness, as long as it is positive and clear and not arising from an improper motive to impute a serious offense to the accused, deserves full credit. Non-presentation of the informer, where his testimony would be merely corroborative or cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's case.24

Moreover, the testimonies of the two police operatives are aptly supported by the documentary evidence presented by the prosecution, to wit: (a) Request for Laboratory Examination;25 (b) Chemistry Report No. D-606-2003;26 (c) photocopy of the marked money consisting of three P100.00 bills and one P50.00 bill;27 (d) the confiscated sachet containing shabu, with markings "LCS BB"; and (e) the pre-operation report.28

Accused-appellant’s twin defenses of denial and frame-up must fail.

Mere denial and allegations of frame-up have been invariably viewed by the courts with disfavor, for these defenses are easily concocted.29 These are common and standard defenses in prosecutions involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs Law. In a long line of cases, we have ruled that the testimonies of police officers involved in a buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit, given the presumption that they have performed their duties regularly.30 This presumption can be overturned if clear and convincing evidence is presented to prove either of two things: (1) that they were not properly performing their duty, or (2) that they were inspired by an improper motive.31 Otherwise, the police officers’ testimonies on the operation deserve full faith and credit.32

Accused-appellant failed to adduce evidence to substantiate her claim of irregularity in the performance of duty on the part of the police officers. This bare allegation of irregularity in the performance of duty remained self-serving and bereft of any supporting evidence.33 Neither was any ill motive imputed on the part of the police officers, thus failing to buttress the defense’s claim of frame-up. Against the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, accused-appellant’s plain denial of the offenses charged, unsubstantiated by any credible and convincing evidence, must simply fail.34 This Court realizes the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well being of society, if the courts accept in every instance this form of defense, which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed exists. If she were truly aggrieved, it is quite surprising why accused-appellant did not even attempt to file a criminal or an administrative complaint, e.g., for planting drugs, against the arresting officers. Such inaction runs counter to the normal human conduct and behavior of one who feels truly aggrieved by the act complained of.35 The totality of the evidence points to the fact of the sale of the prohibited drug, with the prosecution witnesses clearly identifying accused-appellant as the offender.

Accused-appellant asserts that the police officers failed to account for the chain of custody of the seized item alleged to be shabu.

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Contrary to accused-appellant’s claim, there is no broken chain in the custody of the seized item, found to be shabu, from the time the police asset turned it over to PO3 Magsakay, to the time it was turned over to the investigating officer, and up to the time it was brought to the forensic chemist at the PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination.

The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21, paragraph 1 of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as follows:

(1) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof.

Section 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, stipulates:

(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy thereof: x x x Provided, further that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items.

Under the same proviso, non-compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officers.

Clearly, the purpose of the procedure outlined in the implementing rules is centered on the preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items. The testimony of PO2 Sarmiento outlines the chain of custody of the confiscated item, i.e., sachet of shabu:

Q. And you said that the shabu, plastic sachet was recovered from whom?A. The police asset immediately handed to me.Q. What did you do with the plastic sachet that was handed by your police asset to you?

A. At the station, I placed markings, prepared the request for laboratory examination.Q. What marking did you place on the plastic sachet?A. BB with initial LCS.Q. What do you mean by BB?A. Buybust.Q. LCS?A. My initial.Q. If this plastic sachet will be shown to you, will you be able to identify the same?A. Yes, sir. This is the shabu we bought from them.Q. We move that the plastic sachet identified by the witness be marked as Exh. B.COURTMark it.FISCALYou said you requested for an examination of the plastic sachet of shabu, can you tell us what was the result of the examination?A. I have read from the result it was positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride.Q. I am showing you the request and the result, tell us if these are the same documents you are referring to?A. This is the request for laboratory examination.Q. We move that the request for laboratory examination be marked as Exh. F and the findings or result as Exh. G.COURTMark them.36

Corroborating the statements of PO2 Sarmiento, PO3 Magsakay testified to what was done to the recovered sachet alleged to be containing shabu:Q. What about Grace Ventura and Danilo Ventura, what happened to them?A. I arrested Grace Ventura and PO2 Sarmiento arrested Danilo Ventura.Q. What happened when they were arrested?A. PO2 Sarmiento recovered the marked money from Danilo Ventura.Q. Was that all that were recovered from these 2 subjects?A. The police asset gave the specimen and the bolo.Q. What else?A. No more.Q. When the persons of the accused were restrained and all the evidences were gathered, what finally did you do?A. We informed them that they violated Sec. 5 of R.A. 9165 for selling of illegal drugs and we also informed them of their constitutional rights.Q. After that what did you do with them?A. Grace Ventura, Danilo Ventura and Vergel Ventura were brought to the police station for further investigation.Q. What did you do with the specimen?A. We prepared a request for laboratory examination and the request for drug test.Q. Before you prepared those requests, what did you do with those documents in order to distinguish it to the other shabu that were recovered from the operation?A. We placed the marking.Q. And the marking that you placed?A. The initial of PO2 Sarmiento.Q. Which happened to be in what letters?

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A. LCS.Q. And later did you come to know the findings of the forensic chemist of the crime laboratory?A. Positive for shabu and positive for drug test.x x x xQ. You claimed also that you recovered one sachet of shabu as a result of the operation. Attached to the record is a plastic sachet containing of (sic) what appears to be white crystalline substance, what relation has this to the one that you claimed as the shabu sold to your group?A. This is the same.PROS. MEDRANO:It was already marked as Exh. "E". We pray that the marking placed therein be submarked as "E-1."COURT:Mark them.PROS. MEDRANO:Q. You made mention of a request made by your unit to the PNP Crime Laboratory. I’m showing to you such document please confirm to us if this is the same document that you made mention of?A. Yes, sir. This is the one. It was previously marked as Exh. "F." We pray that the stamp mark RECEIVED of the PNP Crime Laboratory be submarked as "F-1."37

All documentary, testimonial, and object pieces of evidence, including the markings on the plastic sachet containing the shabu, prove that the substance tested by the forensic chemist, whose laboratory tests were well-documented, was the same as that taken from accused-appellant. The foregoing evidence established and preserved the identity of the confiscated shabu. Moreover, the integrity of the evidence is presumed to be preserved, unless there is a showing of bad faith, ill will, or proof that the evidence has been tampered with.38Accused-appellant, in this case, bears the burden to make some showing that the evidence was tampered or meddled with, to overcome a presumption of regularity in the handling of exhibits by public officers and a presumption that they properly discharged their duties.

In the case at bar, the evidence clearly shows that accused-appellant was involved in the buy-bust operation. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, accused-appellant’s participation cannot be doubted.

Following the provisions of Section 5 in relation to Section 26 of Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, the illegal sale of prohibited or regulated drugs is penalized with life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 toP10,000,000.00. The statute, in prescribing the range of penalties imposable, does not concern itself with the amount of dangerous drug sold by an accused.

Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 stipulates:

SEC. 5. Sale, Trading, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Dangerous Drugs and/or Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – The penalty of life imprisonment to death and a fine ranging from Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person, who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Section 26 of the same Act provides:

Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. – Any attempt or conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the commission of the same as provided under this Act:

(a) Importation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;

(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical;

(c) Maintenance of a den, dive or resort where any dangerous drug is used in any form;

(d) Manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical; and

(e) Cultivation or culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs.

Applying the foregoing provisions of Republic Act No. 9165, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is proper.

There being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances attending accused-appellant’s violation of the law, the penalty to be imposed is life imprisonment. Considering that the weight of the shabu confiscated from accused-appellant is 0.124 gram, the amount of P500,000.00 imposed by the court a quo, being in accordance with law and upheld by the appellate court, is similarly sustained by this Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated 30 June 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 02127, affirming the Decision promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 78, in Criminal Case No. 3244-M-2003, finding accused-appellant Grace Ventura y Natividad guilty beyond reasonable

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doubt of selling 0.124 gram of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a prohibited drug, in violation of Section 5 in relation to Section 26, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, and imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), is hereby AFFIRMED.1avvphi1

In the service of her sentence, accused-appellant Grace Ventura y Natividad, who is a detention prisoner, shall be credited with the entire period during which she has undergone preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 177163               April 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff and Appellee, vs.ALEX BALAGAT, Defendant and Appellant.

D E C I S I O N

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Alex Balagat (appellant) was, by Information filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, charged with violating Section 5, Article 11 of Republic Act No. 9165 as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of September 2002, in the Municipality of San Juan, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without being authorized by law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly sell, deliver and give away to a poseur buyer, PO2 Erwin Taasin, one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing 0.03 grams of white crystalline substance, which were foundpositive to the test for methamphetamine hydrochloride, also known as "shabu", which is a dangerous drug, in consideration of the amount of Php 100.00, in violation of the above-cited law.1 (Underscoring supplied)

During the pre-trial, the parties stipulated

that [Forensic Chemist Annalee R. Forro] received the Request for Laboratory Examination dated September 16, 2002 and the specimen allegedly confiscated from the accused, that upon her examination, the specimen marked in the Chemistry Report No. D-1834-02E A to I proved positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug while specimen J to M gave negative result.2 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Via the testimonies of its witnesses PO1 Erwin Taasin (Taasin) and PO2 Mario Madarang (Madarang), the following version of the prosecution3 is culled:

At 5:30 PM of September 16, 2002, Taasin, then stationed at the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), Office of the San Juan Metro Manila Police Station, received a report from an informant that someone was selling shabu at Tabing-Ilog Street, Barangay Salapan, San Juan. The informant described the suspect as wearing short pants and a red sando with the words "bugle boy" printed thereon. The SDEU chief thus organized a buy-bust team composed of Taasin who was designated poseur buyer, PO1 Romeo G. Lañada (Lañada), and Madarang.

On reaching Tabing-Ilog Street in a private car at around 6:00 PM of September 16, 2002, Taasin alighted and, at a distance of 25 meters, saw appellant who matched the description given by the informant.1avvphil

Taasin thereupon approached appellant, told him "Ii-score ako ng piso," and handed appellant a previously marked P100 bill. Appellant took the bill in exchange for which he handed therein a plastic sachet of suspected shabu.

Lañada and Madarang at once approached appellant who repaired to his 15-meter away house where he was apprehended. They recovered the buy-bust money from appellant. As a man, later identified to be Wilfredo Rodriguez (Rodriguez) and a woman, later identified to be Jennifer Narvaes (Jennifer), were sitting on a plywood bed in front of which were drug paraphernalia, the team also apprehended the two and confiscated the paraphernalia. A plastic sachet of suspected shabu and a plastic bag containing four small plastic sachets also of suspected shabu were also seized from appellant’s house.

Taasin turned over to an investigator at the SDEU Office the plastic sachet recovered from appellant on which the investigator marked "AMB." When tested, the contents of the plastic sachet yielded positive for the presence of shabu.4

In his defense,5 appellant claimed as follows: He was arguing with Jennifer in his house when Rodriguez arrived to collect from him service charge for laundry. As he started talking with Rodriguez, two persons entered his house, one of whom drew a gun saying "Huwag kayong kikilos, diyan lang kayo." The two frisked him and took money from Jennifer who voluntarily gave them shabu which she took from her brassiere.

The two armed men then searched the house, boarded him and his companions on a vehicle, and brought them to the San Juan Police Station where he and Rodriguez were detained.

Madarang soon asked him for P30,000 in exchange for his liberty. On the advice of his (appellant’s) brother, Romeo Balagat (Romeo), he did not heed the demand.

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By Decision dated April 20, 2005,6 Branch 157 of the Pasig City RTC convicted appellant, disposing as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused ALEX BALAGAT Y MAKIGANGAY GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 and hereby sentences him to suffer Life Imprisonment and to pay a fine of PHP 500,000.00.

The evidence subject of the instant case are forfeited in favor of the Government and the Officer-in-Charge of this Court is directed to cause their immediate transmittal to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for disposal in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.

On appeal before the Court of Appeals, appellant alleged that the trial court

I. X X X GROSSLY MISAPPRECIATED THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE;

II. X X X ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EVIDENCE OF THE PROSECUTION DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE WITNESSES’ ACTS INDICATE AN ULTERIOR AND SINISTER MOTIVE IN THE FILING OF THE CASE. STATED OTHERWISE, IT IS ERROR FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO DECLARE THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT’S DENIAL CANNOT BE GIVEN WEIGHT DUE TO THE OBVIOUS SHOWING OF ILL-MOTIVE ON THE PART OF THE POLICE;

III. X X X ERRED IN NOT GIVING WEIGHT TO THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WHICH CLEARLY NEGATES THE SUPPOSED OCCURRENCE OF THE BUY-BUST OPERATION; AND

IV. X X X ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.7

The Court of Appeals, by Decision of October 23, 2006,8 affirmed the RTC decision.

Hence, the present appeal.9 Appellant filed a Supplemental Brief,10 while the Solicitor General manifested that she would no longer file a Supplemental Brief.

An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review. The reviewing tribunal can correct errors though unassigned in the appeal, or even reverse the trial court’s decision on grounds other than those raised as errors by the parties.11

From a review of the records of the case, the Court entertains nagging doubts on whether the substance allegedly confiscated from appellant was the same specimen examined and established to be a regulated drug.

As stated early on, the prosecution and the defense stipulated during the pre-trial

that [Forensic Chemist Annalee R. Forro] received the Request for Laboratory Examination dated September 16, 2002 and the specimen allegedly confiscated from the accused, that upon her examination, the specimen marked in the Chemistry Report No. D-1834-02E A to I proved positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug while specimen J to M gave negative result.12 (Underscoring and emphasis supplied)

The stipulation referred to the chemist’s receipt of an "allegedly" confiscated specimen which tested positive for shabu. In other words, there is no certainty that what was submitted and subjected for chemical examination wasthe specimen obtained from appellant.lawphil.net

By Taasin’s claim, he turned over the shabu to PO2 Ricardo Cristobal (Cristobal) who marked it with "AMB" and prepared the request for laboratory examination; and the buy-bust team members were the ones who brought the request, together with the specimen, to the laboratory for examination.13 The records show, however, that the specimen examined by the forensic chemist was delivered by PO3 Arnel Cave (Cave)14 who does not appear to have been part of the buy-bust team. Cave did not even take the witness stand. Apropos is this Court’s pronouncement in People v. Dismuke:15

x x x [T]he prosecution failed to prove that the specimens examined by the forensic chemist were the ones purportedly sold by the accused to PO3 Labrador. According to the latter, when they arrived at their headquarters after the buy-bust operation, he turned over the accused to their investigator, a certain Reynaldo Lichido, for proper disposition and investigation. Lichido also "immediately prepared the referral to the PC Laboratory for examination in order to be sure if the specimen is positive." What the forensic chemist examined were the contents of "two transparent plastic bag [sic] containing flowering tops with rolling papers suspected to be marijuana" transmitted by PNP Inspector Asuncion Santos, Officer-in-Charge of the District Dangerous Enforcement Division of the Northern Police District Command. Both Lichido and Santos were not presented by the prosecution to testify in this case. Thus, there is no evidence to prove that what were allegedly sold by the accused to PO3 Labrador were actually the ones turned over to Lichido, that what the latter received were turned over to Santos, and that what Santos transmitted to the forensic chemist were those allegedly sold by the accused. The failure to establish the evidence’s chain of custody is damaging to the prosecution’s case.16 (Underscoring supplied)

14

On this score, the Court finds the prosecution’s failure to prove the evidence’s chain of custody to merit appellant’s acquittal. Dwelling on the assigned errors is thus rendered unnecessary.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant, Alex Balagat, is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Director of the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa City who is DIRECTED to immediately release appellant from detention unless he is being held for some other lawful cause, and to inform this Court within five days of action taken thereon.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 157870             November 3, 2008

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), petitioner vs.DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA),respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 158633             November 3, 2008

ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., petitioner vs.DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY, respondents.

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

G.R. No. 161658             November 3, 2008

AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioner vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

D E C I S I O N

VELASCO, JR., J.:

In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutor's office with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.

As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:

x x x x

(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. - Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in the school's student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random drug testing x x x;

(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. - Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;

x x x x

(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;

(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.

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G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)

On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the said resolution read as follows:

WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:

SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing. - x x x

x x x x

(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.

WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides that public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;

WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they are electing and they will be assured that only those who can serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency would be elected x x x.

NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public office[:]

SECTION 1. Coverage. - All candidates for public office, both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of Health.

SEC. 3. x x x

On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two (2) separate lists of candidates. The first

list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply x x x.

SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of candidates. - Before the start of the campaign period, the [COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test. x x x

SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and file drug test certificate. - No person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein required. (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re - election in the May 10, 2004 elections,1 filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.

Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the Constitution, which states:

SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he is a natural - born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of the election, is at least thirty - five years of age, able to read and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of the election.

According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.

G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. DangerousDrugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

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In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.

G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. DangerousDrugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)

Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self - incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.

The Issue on Locus Standi

First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their separate petitions.2

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in connection with a bona fidecontroversy which involves the statute sought to be reviewed.3 But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy, the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to challenge it.4 To have standing, one must establish that he or she has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.5

The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be relaxed for non - traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of paramount public interest.6 There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to the

transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.

The Consolidated Issues

The principal issues before us are as follows:

(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?

Pimentel Petition(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and

COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)

In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,7 or alter or enlarge the Constitution.

Pimentel's contention is well - taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.9

Congress' inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following wise:

17

Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot leap.10

Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation.11 The substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights12 and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.

In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.13

Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal - drug clean, obviously as a pre - condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be proclaimed as senator - elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain with the proviso that "[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test." Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate. Whether or not the drug - free bar set up under the challenged provision is to be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non - compliance with the drug - testing requirement.

It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non - compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug - testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to

suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.

While it is anti - climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an implementing issuance.

It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

SJS Petition(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process "the well being of [the] citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous drugs." This statutory purpose, per the policy - declaration portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti - drug abuse policies, programs and projects."14 The primary legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:

Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation. - A drug dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application, the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If the examination x x x results in the certification that the applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center designated by the Board x x x.

18

x x x x

Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under the Voluntary Submission Program. - A drug dependent under the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:

x x x x

School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low rate.15

The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure16 under Sec. 2, Art. III17 of the Constitution. But while the right to privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that the validity of a state - decreed search or intrusion through the medium of mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these proceedings is veritably one of first impression.

US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school children, we turn to the teachings of Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia) and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),18 both fairly pertinent US Supreme Court - decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental search.

In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to address the drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents, they required random urinalysis drug testing for the school's athletes. James Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued, claiming that the school's drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth Amendment19 of the US Constitution.

The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights than non - athletes since the former observe communal undress before and after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation; (5) requiring urine samples does not invade a

student's privacy since a student need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the Fourth20 and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug - testing policy constitutional.

In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring to join extra - curricular activities. Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir, marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and averred that the drug - testing policy made to apply to non - athletes violated the Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker rooms, non - athletes are entitled to more privacy.

The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality of drug testing even among non - athletes on the basis of the school's custodial responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction between a non - athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its random drug - testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.

In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have a duty to safeguard the health and well - being of their students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.

Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements.

The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well - being of the people,21 particularly the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, "[d]eterring

19

drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation's laws against the importation of drugs"; the necessity for the State to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug - infested school are visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and faculty.22Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting individual students.

Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than saying that "subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy,"23 has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.24Petitioner Laserna's lament is just as simplistic, sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider what he wrote without elaboration:

The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the mandatory drug tests violate a citizen's constitutional right to privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.25

The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone.26 In context, the right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one's person or from intrusion into one's private activities in such a way as to cause humiliation to a person's ordinary sensibilities. 27 And while there has been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against unwarranted search, "translation of the abstract prohibition against ‘unreasonable searches and seizures' into workable broad guidelines for the decision of particular cases is a difficult task," to borrow from C. Camara v. Municipal Court.28Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state's exercise of police power.29

As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and as has been held, "reasonableness" is the touchstone of the validity of a government search or intrusion.30 And whether a search at issue hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the government - mandated intrusion on the individual's privacy interest against the promotion of some compelling state interest.31 In the criminal context, reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally determined by a judge. Given that the drug - testing policy for employees--and students for that matter--under RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search

needing what was referred to in Vernonia as "swift and informal disciplinary procedures," the probable - cause standard is not required or even practicable. Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the challenged administrative search in question.

The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing requirement. The employees' privacy interest in an office is to a large extent circumscribed by the company's work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been upheld.

Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated inOple v. Torres, is the enabling law authorizing a search "narrowly drawn" or "narrowly focused"?32

The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched, contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to "random drug test as contained in the company's work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place."

For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employee's privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained professionals in access - controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.33 In addition, the IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the "need to know" basis;34 that the "drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results."35Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or evidence relating to the violation of

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the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees' privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.

To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well - being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test.36 To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individual's privacy interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and social - economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with their ready market, would be an investor's dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern - day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.

Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well - defined limits set forth in the law to properly guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.

Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.37 And if RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and efficiency.38

Petitioner SJS' next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take into

account the company's work rules. In either case, the random procedure shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are established.

Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue, in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be conducted.

The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the constitutional landscape.39 In the face of the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.

Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)

Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.

We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless." In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office, a mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor's office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy.40 To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a

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medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons' right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g)of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

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