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1 Innovative Social Policies for Inclusive and Resilient Labour Markets in Europe D4.1 D5.1 Swedish report on the development, implementation and performance of selected innovations; and processes of policy learning The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 320121 (Project INSPIRES) INSPIRES Working paper series 2013 no. 1 ISSN 2215-1605

D4.1 D5.1 Swedish report on the development ... WP4-5 FINAL VERSION (without... · Swedish report on the development, implementation and performance of selected innovations; and processes

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1

Innovative Social Policies for Inclusive and Resilient Labour Markets in Europe

D4.1 D5.1

Swedish report on the development, implementation and performance of selected innovations; and processes of policy learning

The research leading to these results has received funding from the European Community’s Seventh

Framework Programme under grant agreement No. 320121 (Project INSPIRES)

INSPIRES

Working paper series 2013 no. 1

ISSN 2215-1605

2

Project title:

INSPIRES Funding scheme:

FP7 Project acronym:

INSPIRES Project ID:

320121

Consortium coordinator:

Erasmus University Rotterdam Start date project:

01-02-2013 Project duration:

42 Months

Deliverable number:

Work package

number:

4-5

Due date of

deliverable:

20-08-2015

Actual delivery date:

20-08-2015

Lead beneficiary for this deliverable:

Document version:

Authors:

Dr. Renate Minas

Phd. Student, Lisa Andersson

Keywords:

Abstract:

Dissemination Level

PU Public

PP Restricted to other programme participants

RE Restricted to a group specified to the consortium

CO Confidential, only for members of the consortium

3

Contents

D4.1 ......................................................................................................................................................... 1

D5.1 ......................................................................................................................................................... 1

Swedish report on the development, implementation and performance of selected innovations; and processes of policy learning .................................................................................................................... 1

Abbreviations ...................................................................................................................................... 5

National report Sweden .......................................................................................................................... 6

General introduction ........................................................................................................................... 6

Finsam ................................................................................................................................................. 7

Background ...................................................................................................................................... 7

Initiation of FINSAM ........................................................................................................................ 9

Implementation ............................................................................................................................. 10

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the innovations .................................................................................................................................... 13

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 15

Complementary actors (CA) ............................................................................................................. 16

Background and initiation ............................................................................................................. 16

Introducing complementary actors ............................................................................................... 17

Implementation ............................................................................................................................. 20

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the innovations .................................................................................................................................... 24

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 25

Gy11................................................................................................................................................... 26

Introduction & Background ........................................................................................................... 26

Introduction of Gy11 ..................................................................................................................... 27

Implementation ............................................................................................................................. 29

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the innovations .................................................................................................................................... 30

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 31

Activity compensation (CA) ............................................................................................................... 33

Introduction & background ........................................................................................................... 33

Initiating activity compensation .................................................................................................... 34

Start-up of Activity Compensation ................................................................................................ 35

Implementation ............................................................................................................................. 36

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the innovations .................................................................................................................................... 37

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 38

Job guarantee for youth ..................................................................................................................... 39

Introduction & Background ........................................................................................................... 39

4

Initiating the reform ...................................................................................................................... 39

Implementation ............................................................................................................................. 41

Sources of finance ......................................................................................................................... 42

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the innovations .................................................................................................................................... 42

Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 43

Synthetic analysis .......................................................................................................................... 43

Processes of policy learning in Sweden ............................................................................................. 47

The policy learning infrastructure ................................................................................................. 47

Upper Secondary School reform ................................................................................................... 48

Activity compensation ................................................................................................................... 50

The job guarantee for youth ......................................................................................................... 52

General conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 54

Interviews performed for WP4 .......................................................................................................... 56

References ......................................................................................................................................... 57

5

Abbreviations

CA Complementary actors

ESF European Social Fund

FINSAM Finansiell samordning (financial coordination)

IFAU Institute for Evaluation of Labour market and Education Policy

ISF The Swedish Social Insurance Inspectorate

JOB The Job and Development Guarantee

LOU Public Procurement Act

LOV Act on System of Choice

mucf The Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society

NBHW National Board of Health and Welfare

NCFC National Council for Financial Coordination

NAE National Agency for EducationNLMB The National Labour Market Board

NNS National Network for Federal Coordination

PES Public Employment Services

RRV The Swedish National Audit Office

SACO The Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations

SALAR Swedish Association of Local Authorities and Regions

SIA Swedish Social Insurance Agency

Sieps Swedish institute for European policy studies

Statskontoret Swedish Agency for Public Management

TCO Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees and Regions

UGA Job Guarantee for Youth

USSILD Upper secondary school for individuals with learning disabilities

6

National report Sweden

General introduction

In the Swedish case we focus on five innovations representing different clusters as identified earlier

in the project. In a first step we decided to include innovations directed at unemployed youth that

cover different types of innovations. First, one innovation that stress the work principle (labour

supply). In that category the job guarantee for young people, 16-24, (Jobbgaranti för unga, 2007)

serves as an example. The job guarantee for young people was introduced with the aim to reinforce

job-search activity, followed by a matching process and complemented with reinforcing efforts such

as training or education but also involves a strengthened work incentives by quicker reducing benefit

compensations (stick and carrot). Also directed at youth but representing another kind of innovation

is the education reform of upper secondary education (Gy11). Tis reform can be placed under the

category of risk prevention and is one of the most prominent examples, where changes to the

different upper secondary education programs have been introduced aiming to provide a better

opportunity for direct employment after graduation. Finally we decided to include activity

compensation as an example for risk prevention and rehabilitation. Activity guarantee is a financial

benefit for youth 19-30 who most likely will not be able to work for at least a year, due to sickness,

disabilities or other damages.

Secondly we included two innovations that are about governance and the introduction of new modes

of steering and cooperation. A first example is the ordinance on complementary actors (Förordning

om kompletterande aktörer) that was introduced in 2007. The Swedish Public Employment Service

was commissioned by the Government to purchase private employment services using extern actors

as complements to the activities of the Public Employment Service. The government emphasized that

other actors’ knowledge and competence is important to help unemployed finding jobs, especially

with respect to young unemployed and that private actors would improve matching of the

unemployed and so avoid social exclusion. The second example is the so called FINSAM cooperation.

With FINSAM the Swedish Social Insurance agency (NSIA), Swedish Public Employment Services (PES),

the counties councils and municipalities have the opportunity to jointly pursue rehabilitation with

financial coordination. These two innovations are very different in their character. Whereas FINSAM

is rather unknown, the introduction of complementary actors (CA) received a lot of attention and had

an enormous impact on labor market policy.

7

Table 1: Selected innovations

Innovation Goals Target groups

Scope Type of policy

Type of strategies

Expected or estimated impact on resilience

The ordinance on complementary actors

Gives the possibilities to coordinate resources across organizational boundaries, more efficient use of social spendings and resources in general

People with complex problems and in need of rehabilitation and measures of several stakeholders

Whole country, in form of regional cooperation associations

It is about delivery of policies in form of new modes of coordination

Get people far from the labor market in employment, decrease social expenditures

FINSAM Offer a more diversified range of brokerage services

Various Whole country

Governance, marketisation

Improve matching of unemployed and avoid social exclusion

Finsam

Background

Introduction of FINSAM has to be seen in the light of two developments. One is the need of and

search for modes of cooperation between various actors when it comes to help people far from the

labor market suffering from complex problems and who are in need of rehabilitation measures.

These agencies include the National Social Insurance Agency, the National Swedish Public

Employment Services, the County Councils (responsible for health) and the municipal social services.

Efforts to coordinate activities of various governmental agencies and local services had already been

introduced throughout the 1990s, mainly consisting of temporary local experiments and involving

the above listed agencies in various combinations. Several times it was stressed that improved

cooperation could result in significant synergy effects and it was further argued that joint actions

would in particular improve the situation for individuals’ with need for coordinating measures from

several agencies. In particular people being long term unemployed, or having psycho-social or more

complex health problems were assessed as to end up in a gray zone between the different

compensation and support systems. The need for joint work and action plans at central and regional

8

level was emphasized several times and also introduced, yet on voluntary and local base. The most

well-known effort was the so called SOCASAM experiment that provided a platform for cross-

sectorial activities for municipalities, county councils and the National Social Insurance Agency (yet,

not including the Public Employment Services)1. Vague regulations with respect to steering resulted

however in divergent ways of implementation. Furthermore, an evaluation of SOCSAM stressed the

need of continuity, the involvement of the political level in the cooperation and a cooperation of

financial resources (Andersson et al, 2014; Socialstyrelsen, 2001).

The other development is the dramatic increase in the number of sickness benefits recipients during

the last years in Sweden. From 1999 to 2003, the number of people on long-term sick-leave and

disability pension has increased from 520,000 to 764,000, which in 2003 was equivalent to 17

percent of the workforce (Selander et al, 2005). Consequently, the trend of increasing absence from

work due to sickness and disability was a key item on the political agenda in Sweden. Yet, in the

beginning of 2000s the focus on sick leave shifted from considering absenteeism as a symptom of

workplace related problems to the increasingly intense discussions about overuse of health

insurance, lack of activation measures and the above mentioned coordination problem (S 2010:04).

In general labor market policy at that time focused on people with difficulties entering and remaining

in the labor market and the public employment services should combat exclusion from the labor

market. A special unit within the Swedish Public Employment Services2 offered services in vocational

rehabilitation for people with ill health to business, public administration, and to the Swedish Social

Insurance Agency (SIA). This activity implied a purchaser-provider relationship (not cooperation)

between SIA and the Swedish Public Employment Services (PES). The procedures regarding the

assessment if somebody was eligible for rehabilitation measures were that local social services,

regional health care agencies and the Swedish Social Insurance Agencies remitted clients to that unit

which determined the extent to which the person was ready to take part in vocational rehabilitation.

To take advantage of the rehabilitation measures it was required that the person's medical

conditions for work were fully investigated and a full time participation in the rehabilitation was

possible. Costs for the purchase of such rehabilitation services increased however sharply during the

early 2000s and in 2002 the opportunity for the Swedish Social Insurance Agency to purchase

occupational rehabilitation services at the PES was stopped. Instead a specific project directed at

long term sick was introduced where new methods and procedures should be tested and among

1 SOCSAM served later on as a model for FINSAM

2 The agency then was called National Labour Market Administration.

9

others external providers for work capability assessments procured (S 2010:04).

Initiation of FINSAM

Initiator: In December 2001, the parliament asked the government to work with a proposal for a

financial coordination involving the National Social Insurance Agency, health care agencies, municipal

social services and Public Employment Services. In addition, the possibility of financial coordination

should be permanent and nationwide. The reason why this initiative was started by the parliament

was the experiences and evaluations of previous coordination efforts (see above). The active part in

this process was the parliamentary committee on social insurance. The assignment was rather

specific formulated and clearly influenced by one of the earlier efforts (SOCSAM). However, in that

cooperation the Swedish Public Employment Services had not been included and this was a

requirement now. Another requirement was that the mode of coordination should not imply a larger

organizational reform. A working group of officials from the Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of

Finance, Ministry of Industry and Ministry of Justice was formed at the Government Office (one of

the interviewed persons belonged to that working group) with the task to draft a proposal for a

financial coordination in the area of rehabilitation. So the initiative came from the parliament and

not from the government. The reaction on the proposal was in general positive (among others the

Swedish Social Insurance Agency agreed, whereas the PES delivered a negative opinion) and the

legislation was introduced.

Actors involved in rehabilitation measures

Several actors are involved in providing and handling rehabilitation measures; these are employers,

occupational health professional organization, the Swedish Social Insurance Agency, health care,

local social services and the Public Employment Services. Each actor has its specific mission and

responsibility for the individual's rehabilitation. At the same time, the various actors' actions depend

on each other. The Swedish Social Insurance Agency is e.g. responsible for coordinating and

overseeing the efforts an individual needs for rehabilitation activities. The aim is to get people into

the labor market. For insured persons who have no employer, the agency is responsible for setting

up a rehabilitation inquiry. The health service is responsible for medical rehabilitation. Health care

responsibilities are regulated by the Health Care Act; responsibilities include the provision of medical

care, treatment, habilitation and rehabilitation. Goals for medical rehabilitation are that the

individual should achieve the best possible functional ability and physical and mental well-being. The

municipalities are responsible for the individual's social rehabilitation in accordance with the social

service act. The support granted intends to improve the individual's ability to live independently.

Finally, the Public Employment Services are responsible for job placement, counseling, vocational

10

rehabilitation and training in order to help people to get a job (DS 2003:2). Hence, all actors involved

have quite different missions and do not necessarily agree on a common perspective and needed

measure.

A number of investigations has scrutinized the question of cooperation in recent years and has

proposed various findings and solutions. One investigation (SOU, 1996:113) suggested the

establishment of local coordination associations for planning and ordering of rehabilitation initiatives

and other work preparatory efforts, another one (SOU, 2000:78) suggested the establishment of a

new insurance (rehabilitation insurance) that should replace sickness insurance and disability

pension under one new agency. A third investigation (SOU, 2002:5) proposed that employment

services had the best expertise when it comes to help people into employment. Their expertise

should be utilized even for people with reduced work ability. A similar suggestion is proposed by the

Swedish Agency for Public Management (Statskontoret) (1997:27) arguing for that the Public

Employment Services should have the entire responsibility supporting individuals to return to work.

The Parliamentary Committee on social insurance decided in 2014 to conduct a follow-up of FINSAM.

Regarding to an interview with a representative of the National Council for Financial Coordination

the decision to carry out a follow up was mainly due to informal contacts and relations between

members of the committee and other main actors. The follow-up focuses on describing and analyzing

the activities undertaken within the framework of Finsam, results of the interventions in terms of

outputs and outcomes and the benefits they had – in particular from a user perspective - and how

collaboration, coordination and cooperation between the partners has evolved but also how

activities were monitored and evaluated. The follow-up is expected to be completed in summer

2015.

Implementation

At the turn of 2004/2005, 12 associations were established including 25 municipalities. Until 2014,

the number had increased to 80 associations spreading from north to south and from big cities to

smaller towns; 240 of the 290 municipalities are members of an association. All associations work

differently according to local priorities. Early evaluations pointed to strengths and weaknesses in the

implementation processes. The Swedish Agency for Public Management got the assignment to

evaluate Finsam and published four reports. A first evaluation (Statskontoret, 2005) showed that

mainly the Swedish Social Insurance Agency and the municipalities were initiating the coordination

associations, and that the interest in establishing associations varied locally. Problems that were

11

mentioned in this stage were e.g. a lack of consensus on the need to cooperate on the target group

(e.g. by the county councils) and problems reaching consensus on defining a target group. Weak

political interest and /or no interest from one agency/party were named as the most important

obstacles for establishing coordination associations. In particular the National Social Insurance

Agency and the Public Employment Services were pointed out as not being interested in cooperating

(see also Minas, 2012). The lack of interest is mainly explained with the assumption that Finsam is

seen as a supplement and not as a complement for other forms of cooperation and some parties

preferred to continue with current cooperation instead of building new ones (Statskontoret, 2005).

In particular the governmental agencies preferred to cooperate with each other instead of

cooperating with the municipalities. The municipalities in turn, were highly interested in

participating and establishing of associations. A second and third evaluation (Statskontoret, 2006,

2007) focused on the associations’ priorities regarding target group and what measures were

introduced, likewise studied the associations’ way of working. The report concluded that associations

followed the bill's intentions regarding target groups and actions. It was also found that the

associations' budgets and scale of operation varied significantly and that questions of responsibility

were in some respects unclear. A final evaluation (Statskontret, 2008) identified communication

problems between the national actors and the representatives of the associations and stress that an

institutionalized way of communication is missing.

Other actors important for implementation of Finsam

As a reaction to the establishment of cooperation associations, two national organizations were

founded. One had its origin in an informal group of officials from the Swedish Social Insurance

Agency, Public Employment Service, the National Board of Health and Welfare and the Swedish Local

Authorities and Regions that had the task to support the development and establishment of

coordination association. This group worked with supporting new associations and to promote the

exchange of experiences between these. Yet, because of a lack of cohesion between the

coordination associations it was decided to replace the informal group with a clearer and more

formal organization; a National Council for Financial Coordination that was established in October

2008. Within the council the responsible officials for coordination of the respective

authority/organization were represented. The purpose of the Council was to give the associations

greater legitimacy and to provide a forum for developing common positions on strategic issues, and

the possibility for discussions regarding the overarching idea with coordination associations. The

Council also works for maintaining a common goal of collaboration and contribute to an increased

accumulation of knowledge in the field. It gives juridical support, organizes conferences, published a

handbook etc.

12

Two persons interviewed worked for the Council on behalf of the Swedish Social Insurance Agency.

They witness for an increasing interest for cooperation associations “it is just becoming more and

more”. They also explain that the starting period was a time of insecurity, the agencies were not sure

how to handle the associations and what to do: “What are our tasks, what are we supposed to think,

to do…” According to them, people perceive cooperation today as something positive and talk in

positive terms about the cooperation associations. There is a convincement that cooperation

associations should exist throughout the country. One explanation for this change is the existence of

guidelines; regulating the procedures about how to build a new association, but also on a political

level there is a greater awareness about cooperation associations.

In addition, a member-based network, the National Network for Federal Coordination (NNS) has

been established in 2009. The network aims to be the spokesperson for the local associations (S

2010:04). According to the interview named above, these two organizations can be described as the

council being the employers’ organizations and the network the union. Some years ago, the

relationship between the two organizations was not so easy depending on the unclear role of both.

According to an interview with the head of one of the biggest coordination associations the

relationship between the network and the council nowadays has improved. However, it was

indicated that the division of tasks and responsibility in the starting period still was not quite clear;

“we work with the same issues”. In contrast to that, the two persons interviewed that worked for

the Council on behalf of the Swedish Social Insurance Agency experienced the relationship between

the network and the council as still not easy, “something does not work”.

Another factor that had an impact was the re-organisation of both governmental agencies (the Public

Employment Services and the Swedish Social Insurance Agency). In both cases the re-organization

implied a centralization and streamlining and the elimination of local offices; that of course was an

obstacle for cooperation at the local level (interview with an official from the government office that

worked with coordination issues).

Current situation for one of the biggest cooperation association

In an interview performed with one of the bigger associations in Sweden (founded 2007/2008), the

head of the administrative board witnessed for an development that in the beginning was

characterized by uncertainty in the relationship between the administrative staff and the local

politicians but also by a commitment from the politicians side for the cooperation. The associations’

structure became more stable over time. Like all associations, it has a steering group that makes

13

decisions over priorities and goals and a project group (responsible for the operative level). No

problems occur in this associations steering group, they all agree to prioritize long-term projects. The

interview partner also point to the fact that cooperation is spread to other areas in the

municipalities, “after meetings, people don’t leave immediately but talk about other issues”.

Meetings with other associations and with the National Council for financial coordination generate

spreading of knowledge and local experiences.

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the innovations

The legislation procedure in Sweden

Most legislative proposals presented to the Riksdag (Swedish parliament) are initiated by the

Government. Before the Government can draw up a legislative proposal, the matter in question is

analyzed and evaluated. The task may be assigned to officials from the ministry concerned, a

commission of inquiry or a one-man committee. This tradition of inquiries has a long tradition and

goes back to 1922. Inquiry bodies, which operate independently of the Government, may include or

co-opt experts, public officials and politicians. The reports setting out their conclusions are published

in the Swedish Government Official Reports series (Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU). Before the

Government takes up a position on the recommendations of a commission of inquiry, its report is

referred for consideration to relevant bodies. These referral bodies may be central government

agencies, special interest groups, local government authorities or other bodies whose activities may

be affected by the proposals. This process provides feedback and allows the Government to assess

the level of support it is likely to receive. If a number of referral bodies respond unfavorably to the

recommendations, the Government may try to find an alternative solution. When the referral bodies

have submitted their comments, the ministry responsible drafts the bill that will be submitted to the

Riksdag.

Re-organisation of PES and National Insurance Agency

An extensive reorganization of governmental agencies was carried out in the mid- 2000s. First out

was a reorganization of the National Social Insurance Agency that took place in 2005. The previous 21

autonomous social insurance offices and the National Social Insurance Board were joined together to

form one agency. One driving force behind the decision to centralise the social insurance

administration was the large increase in long-term sick leave which had been going on for many

years. The intention with the reform was to increase central control of the work within the Swedish

Social Insurance Agency, to reach a more uniform application of laws and regulations and increased

public insight. In a similar way, the National Labor Market Administration and the 20 county labour

14

boards were transformed into the Swedish Public Employment Service in 2008. Also here motives

were to guarantee a more efficient government, to adapt the organization to new challenges that

occurred in society and to increase the quality of the organization. The Public Employment Service

got a new operational focus with stronger emphasis on employment and matching. Both re-

organisations imply a streamlining of the work carried out by governmental agencies and at the same

time impede cooperation at the local level. The number local employment services and social

insurance offices were drastically reduced and access to officers became difficult.

Four partners required

The law on financial coordination was adopted in 2004 and enables the Swedish Social Insurance

Agency, the Public Employment Services, municipalities and county councils to cooperate

rehabilitation measures (Finsam). To Finsam able to conduct, it is required that all four parties are

involved and that a coordination association is established. The Swedish Social Insurance Agency

contributes with half of the financing, the county council by a quarter and the municipalit(ies)

involved by another quarter; the parties dispose and decide jointly on the budget. The coordination

associations are managed by a board where the four parties are represented. It is important to

emphasize that Finsam is not supposed to change the current division of responsibility within the

agencies; instead resources are used for improve or increase the individual's living and working

capabilities, also initiatives that are of preventive nature may be financed as well as joint team work

or experimentation with alternative interventions for long-term unemployed. The funds can be used

for both strengthening resource of the parties' regular activities and for temporary activities or

projects. This includes education and information for different groups of staff, surveys and analyzes,

interventions directed directly to individuals as well as monitoring and evaluation. Individual-

oriented activities should aim at achieving and improving the ability to support one-selves and

provide support to enter the labor market. The following types of activity have been identified as the

most common: coaching to labor market, activation, supporting and motivating operations

(preparing for more job-oriented programs), and structural measures (not directed on individuals,

where work conducted within the overall structure of the association's activities) (S 2010:04).

The mode of financing has changed over time. In the beginning (with only a few associations), five

per cent of the general sickness funds that the National Social Insurance Agency received were

assigned for coordination measures within FINSAM. The individual associations applied for

resources. However, the system was assessed as arbitrary. Some associations succeeded in receiving

quite a lot of money, and even saving a lot whereas other got less. With the increasing number of

15

associations it was clear that another solution had to be found. Now a financing model has been

worked out taking into account the local preconditions.

Conclusion

A general summary is that the interviewed stakeholders assess the mode of cooperation in form of

cooperation associations as successful. After initial problems and insecurities, the associations seem

to become established (but flexible) organizations. There is however, so far no evidence that

(re)integration of people with a need of support from several agencies functions better than before,

but so far a change in culture around cooperation seemed to have occurred.

Obstacles

Still cooperation associations are not well-known; no politician lifts the issue of coordination

on the political agenda.

Still no knowledge about aggregate effects. All associations are responsible for their own

evaluations. There is now general monitoring. Two studies performed by the Swedish Social

Insurance Inspectorate (ISF) (2010:2, 2011:14) point to the gap in knowledge on effects of

the offered measures. Several reasons for this knowledge gap are identified: the lack of

specialist competence for performing advanced evaluation studies within the cooperation

associations, missing registers over participating clients, the complexity of problems

participating unemployed have, the long-term perspective of measures and the difficulties to

perform random studies.

Another weakness (and strength at the same time) is that the local need is decisive for what

is done. The consequence is a large variety in projects and measures and now accumulation

of knowledge, no identification of general patterns/solutions.

Money/resources involved is not enough

Strengths

Is rooted locally, can see and work with the needs of the local society.

Holistic perspective

Small associations merge to become stronger, associations work closer together

The flexible form of FINSAM

16

Complementary actors (CA)

Background and initiation

Swedish Public Employment Services (PES) (until 2008 The National Labor Market Board) play a

central role for Swedish labor market policy. In addition to matching and general labor market

counseling, case workers assign jobseekers to labor market programs and administer labor market

related rehabilitation for those with reduced work capacity (e.g. disabled). The PES also has a control

function in the unemployment insurance by monitoring that claimants fulfill the requirements in the

insurance of actively searching for jobs (Bennmarker et al 2013). Yet, the PES has faced severe

criticism for low productivity over a long period of time. In a report from the Swedish National Audit

Office (SNAO, Riksrevisionsverket) published in 2006 the local PES capacities to match the

unemployed with available jobs over the past decades was heavily criticized (Riksrevisionsverket,

2006). Productivity and efficacy was judged to be weak or even decreasing over time. In addition,

significant differences in effectiveness between various employment services were observed, which

was seen as a sign that there was room for improvement. The report also found that most vacancies

in the labor market were appointed without interference from any employment officer. Compared to

the early 1990s, the PES importance for the matching process had decreased (SNS, 2011). The

conclusion of the National Audit Office's report was that the shortcomings of the PES’s activities were

so severe that the government should do a thorough review. It was also pointed out in the report

that private employment services have been introduced in other OECD countries and that there are

some studies that suggest that it may produce efficiencies.

So far the role for private providers in Swedish labor market policy has been limited. Until the

beginning of the 1990s the PES had a monopoly on employment services on the Swedish labor

market. (Although private employment services did actually exist already in 1884 but were

prohibited later on.) First in the beginning of the 1990s private agencies were allowed. Initially the

National Labour Market Board had the overall control but this was abolished short afterwards.

However, it is still not allowed to charge jobseekers for matching services (Lundin, 2011). There is no

systematic evidence about the scope of private employment services within the overall employment

service market. Two studies indicate however, that private employment services are used to an

increasing extent (Lundin, 2011). With respect to provision of labor market training we can see a

similar development. A former governmental agency that provided the lion share of labor market

training was transformed into a company with state ownership in 1993. Since then private providers

have become more common. Private actors provided in 1992 training for 14 percent of participants

and for 55 percent in 1999 (Ds, 2000:38). However, even if the share private providers in labor

17

market training increased, the share vocational labor market training within active labor market

policy as such decreased dramatically in 2000s. CA within coaching and matching measures

appeared with the shift in governance in 2006/07.

Introducing complementary actors

After the change of government in 2006, the elected centre-right government formulated the goal to

increase private elements in labour market policy. The goal was already mentioned in the Statement

of Government in 2006 and concretised thereafter in the Government's first budget in 2007. The

(then existing) National Labour Market Board received in the appropriation for the financial year

2007 the assignment to more actively use private actors or so-called complementary actors

(Regleringsbrev, 20073). The explicit purpose was to improve matching and combat job seekers

exclusion. It was emphasized that other actors’ knowledge and competence is important to help

unemployed finding jobs, especially with respect to young unemployed and should be seen as a

complementary part of the activities carried out of the PES. By that job seekers should get more

personalized services resulting in shorter unemployment periods. The Swedish Public Employment

Service was required to report on which complementary actors were assigned, how many applicants

used these, and the results obtained. One year later the goal was specified by that at least 30 percent

of job seekers should receive help of complementary actors (Regleringsbrev, 20084). A pilot project

with private actors was introduced in 2007 and in 2008 complementary actors became part of the

Employment Service's regular services. In 2012, the PES had contracts with 796 private actors, which

delivered additional intermediary services to more than 121 000 participants. Providers included

everything from sole proprietors to large corporations.

Another reform with bearing on the establishment of private actors came in force in Sweden in 2007.

The reform abolished the obligation for employers to notify vacancies to the employment service.

The reasons for the abolishment were, among other things, that the act was not followed in practice.

Since 2010, the PES has the opportunity (not the obligation) to procure services according the

customer choice model where the participants themselves choose which provider to provide the

service. This was introduced for the service introduction guide (etableringslotser) for newly arrived

immigrants.

3 Appropriation for financial year 20078 in respect of the Employment Service and

appropriations in Category 13 Labor market; 4 Appropriation for financial year 2008 in respect of the Employment Service and appropriations in Category 13

Labor market

18

Services provided by complementary actors

The services provided by CA are of different kind and have changed over time. Some of the more

well-known services are/were two services that classify under the so called guarantees (the Job and

Development Guarantee (JOB) and the Job Guarantee for Youth (UGA)), services for rehabilitation

(rehabiliteringstjänster), the introduction guide (etableringslots), job coaches, job coach employment

places for unemployed with mental impairment (sysselsättningsplatser), and job coach over the

threshold (coach över tröskeln) (Arbetsförmedlingen 2013).

The Job and Development Guarantee and the Job Guarantee for Youth

The target group for the CA-services within the guarantees are participants in labour market

programs Job and Development Guarantee (JOB) and the Job Guarantee for Youth (UGA); people

that have been unemployed for quite a while. Participants and the CA decide jointly what efforts are

needed and activities consist mainly of mapping the individuals’ capacities and problems, support

with job search activities and preparation efforts. The intention is that the efforts will lead to

employment. The services are divided in three phases: one including mapping, job search activities

with coaching and preparation efforts, the second including work experience, job training and

enhanced job training and a third one mainly consisting of simple employment tasks. Services in the

last category have been heavily criticized as being meaningless and inefficient. The target group does

not include people with special needs because of a disability that results in reduced ability to work.

Those remain in activities provided by the PES. With respect to youth, two services belong to this

category: one directed at youth that are close to the labor market and one for those far away.

Activities involve in-depth mapping, guidance and counseling, job search activities with coaching, and

job training and education. CA services in the guarantees show lower “custom satisfaction” than

other services. They are procured under Public Procurement Act (LOU) and the participants have no

possibility to change providers. The guarantees are the largest among all services (see below).

Introduction Guide

The service introduction guide was introduced in 2010 (and abolished in 2015). It was targeted

towards job seekers who newly had arrived in Sweden. The purpose with that service was to provide

the job seeker as soon as possible with professional support to enter the labour market and society.

The idea was that the guide should help with building networks, language skills and knowledge of

Swedish society and working life. In addition, the guides' networks should provide wider contacts and

better opportunities for the newly arrived job seekers compared to if they just used the PES services.

The introduction guide had the most satisfied participants according to surveys carried out by the

19

PES. Many participants took the advantage of replacing coaches if they were not satisfied. However,

there were severe problems with marketization of that specific service. For example, the PES

received signals that some providers tried to promise participants gifts of various kinds if they would

change to their company. When it got known that some introduction guides carried out illegal

activities including recruiting unemployed to the terror group IS the PES decided to stop the service.

Job coach

The government assigned the PES to establish personal job coaching to short-term unemployed in

December 2008 (ended in 2011). Job coaching was supposed for a maximum of three months and

should run in parallel with the PES ordinary brokerage. The service ended 2013 due to the reduced

budget appropriation for the target group the service addressed. The target group comprised all job

seekers registered at the employment services that risk becoming unemployed or newly unemployed

that were not relevant for the guarantees (the JOB and UGA). The service was intended to give the

jobseeker a better understanding of the job-seeking process, concrete tools for job search and

matching to labour market demand. The support should be initiated at an early stage in form of

personalized job coaching. The activity was not full time, but complemented the PES workers

matching task. The PES had received relatively few complaints on the Job coach services. A reason for

that might be that the service was well established and both the providers, participants and advisers

were well aware of the content and aim of the service. The service was procured according the Act

on System of Choice (LOV) and the participants were free to choose their supplier.

The procedure around the introduction of job coaches is a good example of the situation in that

time: The government required in 2009 the establishment of both PES in-house job coaching and

external coaching conducted by contracted private providers. The objective of the coaching was to

give the "unemployed extra support to job search" in the difficult labor market situation that

followed the 2008 financial crisis. The PES had to act quickly and as has been stressed in various

interviews performed, the procurement process and the employment of coaches in 2009 occurred

under time pressure (Liljeberg et al 2012). The reason for that was that unemployment rose rapidly,

the PES had a lot of money that should be used in 2009 and the government’s targets for the number

of job coaching participants were high. The PES received funds to 110 000 job seekers that should

receive coaching in 2009, for 2010 the target was even higher with 120 000 unemployed. Due to

better economic conditions in 2011 the target was then only 60,000 participants.

20

It was difficult for the PES to reach the ambitious targets as procurement and implementation took

time to begin with. This led to that not all money was used for 2009. There are also sings that time

pressure resulted in a priority of quantity instead of quality (Liljeberg et al 2012). Local PES tried to

get job seekers to participate in job coach services to reach the set targets, rather than to look at the

best solution for the job seeker. The PES hired about 740 internal job coaches during 2009. A new

professional role was created and a shorter training of two weeks was carried out for the job

coaches. Many of those employed had been registered as work-seekers by themselves, which also

seems to have been a stated intention at enrollment. No requirement for work experience existed.

The number of internal coaches increased in 2010 to approximately 850 but the employment of job

coaches was ended at the end of the same year. In December 2013 the coaches' contracts with PES

ended and were not prolonged. The economic upturn and decreased unemployment made that the

PES needed to save money and instead transferred the service on regular permanent employment

agents.

Implementation

Special unit for CA at PES

The PES decided in late 2008 that all activities with CA should be coordinated in a separate unit. This

unit is responsible for cooperation with private providers and the entire process from procurement

to the monitoring of delivery, including quality assurance of cooperation with private providers. It

thus this units that signs contracts with the CA. The PES is obliged to carry out regularly reviews

about CA, about the documentation, competencies of staff, attendance reporting, handling of

complaints e.c.t. (Arbetsförmedlingen 2013).

Number of job seekers involved

In 2013 a total of 1017 actors provided complementary services to about 150 000 participants. Most

participants were found in the activities of the guarantees, followed by job coaching and introduction

guide. As mentioned above, the service job coaching was ended in December 2013. Job Coaching was

a solution to meet the high unemployment during the economic crisis. PES decided to end the service

in line with the government’s intentions with labor market policy - the PES had to prioritize their

resources to counter and break long-term unemployment (Arbetsförmedlingens

arbetsmarknadsrapport 2014).

21

Table 1: Number of people in services provided from CA. 2011-2013

Services 2011 2012 2013

Guarantees (JOB, UGA) 50100 58600 65300

Others Job coach In-depth coach New arrived immigrants Introduction guide Services for rehabilitation

- 84900 2100 5400 660

42300 - 700 13800 10100

40900 - - 2900 17700

Total 137600 121400 148500

Source: Arbetsförmedlingens arbetsmarknadsrapport 2014: 34

The composition of the job seekers participating in procured services has changed during the time

period (Figure 1). From 2010 to 2012, the service job coaching was primarily directed to newly

unemployed. This meant that the proportion of vulnerable groups among participants using private

providers was relatively low. Since 2012, the number of participants belonging to vulnerable groups

increased significantly. The increase is partly due to more participants in rehabilitation services, and

partly because more and more participants in the service introduction guide. Three out of four

participants in CA services belonged in the early 2014 to vulnerable groups.

Figure 1. Number of applicants with pending decisions with private providers, monthly 2009-201332

Source: Arbetsförmedlingens arbetsmarknadsrapport 2014: 34 Red line = far from labour market Blue line= close to labour market Black line= total The number participants that remained in measures provide by CA has increased since the start of

2008 (Figure 2). Between December 2008 and June 2009 the number of remaining participants

22

increased by 37 percent, from 9,800 to 13,800 participants. The decrease in Maj 2009 occurred

because a contract with a supplier was terminated in eleven locations and the affected jobseekers

were assigned to other complementary actors or to the Employment Service's own activities in

guarantees.

Figure 2. Number of jobseekers who have started or provided a program provided by a CA, and remaining job seekers at CA, monthly 080701-090630

Source: Arbetsförmedlingens arbetsmarknadsrapport 2014

Blue line- remaining job seekers

Red line- left job seekers

Green line – started job seekers

Different reimbursement models

The reimbursement system for CA differs depending on client groups. Generally, a model is applied in

which one part of the compensation is paid at the beginning of an activity. Then, there is a

performance-based compensation that depends on if the job seeker gets a job and manages to keep

it for a certain period of time. CA get better paid for groups far from the labour market

(Arbetsförmedlingen2013).

Participants

A comparison between participants in activities provided by CA and those provided by the PES

showed many similarities (Martin and Sibbmark 2010a, 2010b). Participants in PES organized

programs had been unemployed somewhat longer and had participated in the program for a longer

time. This implies that the participants were somewhat weaker when it comes to employability.

23

Rating systems

Some of the labor market services are procured by the system of customer choice. Regarding these,

job seekers are free to choose the CA they want. However, jobseekers have found it difficult to make

rational choices based on the information they received about the various CA. The PES is not allowed

to recommend or give tips about how well various CA have previously succeeded in their mission. To

deal with that, a trial was carried out for a period of six months in 2013 with a performance-based

grading system for the CA offering job coaching services. The rating system was based on how well

the various CA previously succeeded in getting jobseekers into work. The best performers received

three stars, the highest rating, two stars were medium and one star the worst rating. The ratings

were published on the PES website in April 2013. A follow-of the up rating system shows that the CA

who received three stars had managed to associate itself more participants than the actors who had

received fewer stars. The results suggest that this grading system led to that actors who performed

better increased its market share while those who performed less well decreased their market share

(Arbetsförmedlingens arbetsmarknadsrapport, 2014).

Evaluations

As described above, the PES launched in 2007 a pilot project with private employment services in

three regions. The pilot had the form of a randomized experiment to empirically assess the

effectiveness of contracting out employment services to private placement agencies. The results

show that unemployed at private placement agencies had a closer interaction with their placement

worker than unemployed at the PES. In particular, unemployed at private agencies receive more

assistance in improving their job search technology. However, no overall difference in the probability

of employment between private placement agencies and the PES could be found. There was also

evidence that private providers are better at providing employment services to immigrants, and also

indications that they may be worse for adolescents. Any effects tend to fade away over time

(Bennmarker et al, 2013). Also another study used a randomized design to investigate the

effectiveness of private alternatives in vocational rehabilitation, that is, measures that are directed

towards long-term sick people who are unemployed or not able to return to their former workplace

(Jönsson and Skogman Thoursie, 2012). Over 4,000 participants were randomly offered private and

public rehabilitation. The authors did not observe differences in employment rates between

individuals who received rehabilitation by private or by public providers.

Another attempt was carried out by the PES where the outcome of job coaching services was

investigated. Individuals with relatively short registration periods were studied with a focus on

24

differences in employment status between individuals who had participated in job coaching and

individuals who have not participated5. Moreover, the results were compared to individuals who

participated in internal (PES) and external job coaching. All individuals who received job coaching

services between September 1 and October 31 are included in the study. The study showed no

statistically significant difference between individuals who have had external and internal job

coaching. The results also showed that individuals who have had job coaching are more likely to be in

practice, but less likely to have a job than individuals who have not had job coaching. The differences

are statistically significant, but not very big. In general, it is stressed that knowledge on the impact of

private solutions in labor market policy is fairly meager (Lundin, 2011).

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the innovations

Initially no market for CA existed. The PES had to start from scratch and the introduction of CA was

an enormous challenge. The PES was under large pressure to procure CA in particular during the

second half of 2008 to meet the high targets set by the government. There was a great uncertainty

within the PES how to handle the requirements, the government gave no guidelines how to find the

CA , how to build up a new market but was at the same time impatient (interview with a

governmental official). The whole procedure was a situation like “learning by doing”. After the first

year, it became obvious that CAs were dominated by large companies and in the following letter of

appropriation to the PES (2009) the government changed the requirements to facilitate the

applications from small companies. Then, the crisis hit Sweden, the labour market situation changed

and number of unemployed increased. The procedure to procure CA was however, not meant for

large volumes and requirements changed again. Now, the PES was supposed to procure intern and

extern job coaches in large numbers in short time. The situation appeared as chaotic when former

unemployed in large numbers were assigned as job coaches for other unemployed.

Furthermore, during all these years the PES had a hard work to improve its knowledge on how to

purchase, how to define quality, and to find follow up routines – all that complete new tasks for the

PES. Altogether the period was characterized by shifting requirements, detailed steering by the

government, and no time for implementation (too much in too short time, interview with a

governmental official). In addition, scandals about companies exposing unemployed and making a lot

of profit on unemployment appeared in the media on regularly base. With respect to results also the

right-wring government was disappointed, expectations had been high (see above, evaluation

5 http://www.arbetsformedlingen.se/download/18.3e418bad12dec33840580007048/rapport

25

studies). With the new left-wing government in 2013 and the fact that the crisis was almost over, the

situation calmed down. The mode of steering changed from detailed to frame work steering and the

PES had the possibility to build up continuity in their activities.

Conclusion

The introduction of CA has implied some radical changes in Swedish labor market policy. The

development was mainly driven by the right –wing government in 2006/07 using arguments like

increased consumer choices, better service production and efficiency. Also the Green Party was

positive to private actors in labor market policy. Nowadays, some consensus exist that private actors

have a role in complementing the PES, the question is rather how many are needed and in what form

(Lundin, 2011).

The introduction of private actors still entails challenges that are high on the agenda in the political

debate in Sweden. One issue is how contracts and reimbursement systems should look like. This

touches upon issues as how detailed contracts should be formulated (vs flexibility), should they be

built on result, how should follow up systems look like and so on. Critics from the employers’ side

highlighted for example the lack of continuity in contracted services and the focus on price instead of

quality (interview with employer organization). Others (like the unions) questioned the numbers of

CA and rather would like to see them as a complement, thus, limiting the number of private actors

(interview with representative of Swedish trade union confederation). A further consequence lifted

was that the control of the unemployed (that is a task of the PES) has become more difficult with the

involvement of the CA.

An infected debate has blown up about the possibility for private actors to make profits in tax

financed welfare state services. This debate has its origin in cases where private investors made

exorbitant profits in tax financed welfare services (elderly care, education). With the shift in

government in 2013, the social democratic lead government tried to shift reimbursement system to

focus on quality and limit the possibility to generate profits, the left party wants to prohibit profits

entirely, whereas the right wing parties don’t want to limit the possibility to make profits. Yet, the

development during this period and the introduction of the CA also highlighted another issue, that of

steering of the PES. The PES is and was a highly criticized agency and the right wing government tried

to improve the work of the agency by rigorous top-down steering. Also the CEO of the PES received

massive criticism for a strict steering mode and had to resign in 2013.

26

Gy11

Introduction & Background

The education reform of upper secondary education can be placed under the category of risk

prevention and is one of the most prominent examples, where changes to the different upper

secondary education programs have been introduced aiming to provide a better opportunity for

direct employment after graduation.

The upper secondary reform was introduced as a legislative proposal in 2008 and implemented in

2011. The previous upper secondary school was introduced in 1994 with a three year duration for all

programs, a focus of what was called core subjects, and a guaranteed basic eligibility for further

education for all those who graduated. The core subjects, and other common subjects were

complemented with an increase in a wide range of choices aimed to provide individual choice for

students in terms of direction and special interests. The target group for upper secondary school is

based on age and qualifications and hasn’t changed with the reform. It is available for all students

who qualify by having complete grades in English, Swedish and math, and may be initiated no later

than the fall of the year you turn 20. In the beginning of the 21st century, upper secondary school

became a focal point in education politics due to poor testing scores in international evaluations on

knowledge among students. Despite having a high rate of young people enrolling in, and graduating

from upper secondary school, the international PISA tests revealed serious gaps in knowledge

(Skolverket, 2007). Along with the general purpose of upper secondary school in Sweden, the specific

agenda of the 2011 reform was to decrease drop-out rates, improve knowledge level among

students, increase quality of education and provide a smoother transition from school to work. The

idea was to achieve this by changing the programs as well as teaching process of different subjects.

Mainly, the idea was to provide student with more specialized skills and knowledge, both by

extending and revising the vocational programs and promoting the teaching of core competences in

subject-specific environments.

Initiating Gy11

In 2007, the right wing government assigned a committee to investigate how a new structure for

upper secondary education could be designed, looking in to everything from entry and qualifications

to exit and graduation. In working with the government report, which traditionally serves as the basis

for new legislation, the committee cooperated with seven focus-group municipalities and four

universities, as well as several trade organizations, social partners, school unions and student

organizations (SOU 2008:27). While the report states a wide and “open” perspective, in working with

the report, the rightwing coalition had suggested major changes to upper secondary education

27

already in their election platform during 2006. Most prominent were the ideas of strengthening the

connection to the labour market via industries and firms. With this in mind, the idea of

apprenticeships were launched, along side a revised vocational training, extending on-the-job

training at the expense of abolishing the basic qualification to higher education for these students.

Instead the qualifications for higher education for those enrolled in a vocational training program

would be electable as added courses (Allians för Sverige, 2006).

The reform of upper secondary education was introduced on national level after introductory

lectures nation wide for both principals and teachers (interview, National Agency for Education: NAE,

2015-04-14). In the Swedish school system the National agency for Education are responsible for

producing goals and learning requirements, as well as general advice and prescriptions while the

municipalities are responsible for the operative part, where the principal at each school is the lowest

level authority for implementation12 (Upper secondary School Ordenance, 2010:2039)

Introduction of Gy11

The right wing coalition government, based on a government report requested by them in 2007

when they took office, put the bill for a reformed upper secondary education forward. After having

been submitted for comments, the proposed bill was passed through parliament by the end of 2008

and implemented in 2011, which is a rather swift process of only two years given the changes

needing to be made regarding not only new programs, alterations in lay-up and content of old

programs, new curriculum and new education goals and grading scale. In addition these changes

require both altered and brand new textbooks as well as recruiting of staff for the new programs to

be introduced. When the proposed bill was first sent out for referrals, this was an open process

where the bill proposal was available to the public for commenting. This process was meant to

provide the possibility of input from civil society as a whole, rather than just different organized

representative bodies. In addition roughly 200 experts were consulted, representing different

industries and business sectors, universities and teachers. Most of the referral comments also came

from the usual consultative bodies, with varying degree of conflicting opinions on different parts of

the reform. Mostly, the areas where there was disagreement reveled around the changes made to

vocational programs as well as the introduction of an apprenticeship program, and the structures

surrounding them.

12

http://www.skolverket.se/om-skolverket/det-har-gor-skolverket-1.61165

28

For instance, the government proposed strengthening the relation between school and business and

industrial sectors, which gained wide positive response. But the committee who put together the

underlying government report also wanted a council of this sort within the NAE, with the authority to

submit independent advice and suggestions to the government while still being part of the NAE. This

was critiqued for unclear responsibilities between the Swedish Council for Higher Education and the

NAE conflicting with the advisory function of the NAE, as well as being costly and likely increase

bureaucratization. In this instance the government was sided with the consultative bodies rather

than their own investigative committee, and the national councils were positioned externally and as

an advisory body to the NAE instead of the government (Prop. 2008/09:199). There is also the issue

of dividing education in upper secondary school by making the theoretical programs preparatory for

higher education, but not the vocational training/apprenticeship programs. While positive responses

are seen regarding the expansion of vocational and apprenticeships programs and the aim to provide

a smoother transition from school to work for these pupils, there is worry that it will exclude youth

from other routes and that it demands that young people position them selves in the labour market

very early. The government stands by their proposal and underlines that the possibility for each

student to extend their vocational or apprenticeship program to achieve basic eligibility for higher

education within their diploma (ibid). However, as these programs have been promoted by the

government as options for those who are tired or unmotivated to take part in further theoretical

education (Swedish Public Radio, 2012; Interview Swedish ESF, 2015-04-19), one could question the

likelihood that they will choose to extend their theoretical studies to gain access to further education

in the future, if this is not required. There was also worry that apprenticeship positions may be

difficult to find for some occupations, as well as a general concern that employability for a specific

type of work (which was part of the governments stated intention), will be difficult to guarantee

within the realm of an upper secondary education. Other changes made are the abolition of locally

designed and implemented courses, decided upon at municipal level. This was abolished with the

introduction of the new upper secondary reform, argued for by the government as a way of assuring

national equity in terms of the basic quality of education. While some municipalities called for more

flexibility than simply abolishing local courses, for instance by quality auditing by the NAE, the

government wholly ignored this and local courses decided upon at municipal level are no longer

allowed. This can be seen in the light of the governments stated ambition to assure a national

education at upper secondary level of high quality and on equal grounds for everyone. A tightening

of national level control and decision making on programs and courses are thought to make it easier

to assure this. On the other hand it counteracts the idea of entrepreneurship which is also a focal

point of the reform, given that local course were first introduced as a way of taking advantage of

local initiatives.

29

Concerning the apprenticeship programs, an interesting aspect is the fact that many of the argument

circulating in the debate today and during the past couple of years, strongly resemble the debates

concerning apprenticeship and vocational training programs that have resurfaced periodically since

the 1920’s when they were first introduced. For ex: that not all student have the motivation, ability

or will to complete the theoretical education at upper secondary level (or even finish the last year of

elementary school), that it is more cost-effective than labor market measures for this group and that

apprenticeship-placements with actual wages will increase the tax base. Reoccurring arguments

against these programs have been that there isn’t a correspondence between available places and

demand from students vs. employers, and that the theoretical vocational training programs already

covered a large section of occupations. There was also the position, in line with the Swedish model,

that any regulation of apprenticeship programs was a matter for social partners rather than the

state.

Implementation

The previous format for upper secondary school, which was introduced in the 90’s, meant a

decentralized structure and an education format described as goal-driven and program oriented. As

mentioned the municipalities and thereafter the principal at each school are the main implementing

bodies, supported by directions and prescriptive documents from the national board of education,

and of course ultimately in accordance with legislation. The main regulative legal texts are the

education act and the upper secondary ordinance. The education act is passed by the parliament and

contains general provisions for all school forms, including the upper secondary school, regulations

more specific for upper secondary school are stated in the upper secondary ordinance which is

designed and decided on by the government (Skolverket, 2012) In addition to the legislation there

are regulative documents such as the curriculums, diploma goals and subject syllabus. The curriculum

for non-compulsory school forms is designed and decided upon by the government, describing the

main tasks, values goals and guidelines for the upper secondary school. The diploma goals contain

specific guidelines for each programmed states the goals and forms the base for planning of each

program’s education and teaching. The government, based on suggestions made by the National

board of education, decides on the diploma goals. Finally, each subject has its only subject syllabus

stating what courses are included in each subject, the basic subjects (history, English, physical

education and health, math, science studies, religion, social studies, and Swedish or Swedish as a

second language) are decided on by the government, whereas the other subjects are decided on

independently by the NAE. In other words, the chief regulative authority of the upper secondary

education is the government, followed by the government run National Board of education. This

30

implies a division between regulative and implementing authority between state and municipality. In

practice it may lead to discrepancies, or glitches, in the process from regulations and goals to actual

implementation. For ex, there may be misinterpretations or lacking of knowledge on how/what to

implement, insufficient time and/or finances to implement properly etc. This means that it is

imperative to have an ongoing dialogue between school boards and Department of Education as well

as the National Board of Education. An evaluation of teachers opinions on the implementation of the

upper secondary reform showed that a vast majority of teachers13 felt that neither the time nor the

information provided for the implementation had been sufficient (Skolverket, 2014). When the bill

for a reformed upper secondary was passed at the end of 2008, the changes were stated to be valid

from 1st of March 2010, and implemented at national level without trial periods or schools. Before

the implementation, 100 reference schools were decided upon and kept in touch with the NAE so

that they would be able to follow the implementation continuously. The reference schools are still in

place and they meet with the NAE a few times a year.

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the innovations

The main goals of the upper secondary reform were to increase standards for learning and quality of

education and to provide a speedier transition from school to work. This has been sought to achieve

by restructuring of goals for curses and programs, re-designed the content of courses and programs

and introducing a new format and scale for grading. In addition, less formal factors that have

impacted the development and implementation regard the pubic debate and political discourse on

the upper secondary school, and the allotted time for implementation at local level. The way in

which the changes to has been framed and debated both politically, in the media and in public

debate have many believing that this has most likely had an impact on the perception and also

attractiveness of it. To a large extent the debates have revolved around the extension of vocational

training programs and the introduction of apprenticeship programs within the upper secondary

school. Within the upper secondary school reform of 2011, the basic eligibility for higher studies that

previously was achieved within the realm of all completed programs was excluded from the

vocational training and apprenticeship programs. While there was, and still is, possible for students

within these programs to individually add on the required courses for basic eligibility to higher

studies, much of the media and public debate revolved around the new division between theoretical

studies with possibility for going on to university and practical programs preparing students for

working life but excluding them from higher studies. Some of the debate on the surprisingly low level

13

Regarding the implementation of the Upper Secondary School reform 2011, 56% of teachers replied that information given was insufficient, and 79 % replied that time alloted was insufficient.

31

of applicants to the practical programs has revolved around the fact that it was given quite a bad

reputation, making students, (and their parents) unwilling to apply for it. Adding to this debate, the

government at the time and particularly the minister of education pushed the extended vocational

training and apprenticeship programs as alternatives for students who were tired of the school desk,

tired of education and overall had a low level performance leaving elementary school. It is not

difficult to understand that such a description may not be so appealing to students nor their parents,

or to businesses that may be prospects for admitting vocational training or apprenticeship-students.

Within the increasing debate on education issues seen over the past couple of years, their has been a

growing media coverage and following debate on private companies making profits in tax financed

welfare services such as schools. Coinciding with a huge increase in private schools, media has

reported on schools who at the start of the semester lacked teachers, supplies and sometimes even

classrooms for their pupils, as well as schools having to shut down mid-semester, leaving students

without a provider for their education, on occasion for substantial periods of time. This can be

connected to the wider debate on profits in tax financed welfare services which has been ongoing for

several years (see pp.22), and was one of the big issues in the election of 2014.

Adding to the role of public, media and political debate and discourse, the prerequisites for

implementation of the reform in schools all over the country seem to have been lacking, particularly

in the matter of time. When the reform was first thought to be implemented in 2007, the NAE begun

their preparatory work, but then the reform plans were called back and initiated again for the

implementation of 2011. In an interview at the NAE, the fact that some preparatory work had begun

in 2007, is described as having been beneficial as they didn’t have to start from scratch when the

reform was back on the table again and the process at this level isn’t described as have been lacking

in time. While on grassroots-level, at the actual schools, a study published by the NAE show a high

degree of teachers stating that the time allotted to them fro implementing the reform was much to

brief and that it want entirely possible to go through the necessary preparations.

Conclusion

While the overarching prerequisites for implementation are at the mandate of the government and

the state run NAE, the substantial prerequisite for implementation are in the hands of the

municipalities and the time, space and financing allotted to the implementation process is according

to the NAE ultimately in the hands of the principal at each school (Interview, Christina Månsson).

When it comes to possibilities to adjust parts of the reform if deemed necessary this is tied to the

steering of the upper secondary school where the curriculum is in the hands of the NAE and

32

overarching legislation and/or steering documents are under the authority of the government and

parliament. This means that steering and financial responsibilities lie on different levels, something

which potentially creates problems in the procedure of implementing the reform.

The NAE’s follow up on the implementation of the reform, only one year after it was launched,

showed that a majority of teachers felt that there had been insufficient time and information before

initiating the implementation. Meanwhile almost half of the teacher in the theoretical programs

experienced a lack in discretion and freedom to design their courses and classes alongside a

perceived increase in content per course and a heavier administrative burden. This may be a

consequence of additional responsibilities not being met by additional personnel resources. Given

that no funding was allotted the schools from central level, the degree of sufficient time and

resources provided for schools to implement the reform is likely a matter of municipal-level politics.

We unfortunately have no cross national wide data on this, what we can say is that the governance

structure (with municipal governing over finances and implementation) opens up for the possibility

of diverging trends among municipalities in implementation-resources. The teachers perspective on

the future results of the reform was that it would add stress for both pupils and teachers, while

knowledge levels and drop-out rates would probably remain the same (Skolverket, 2014). For

students attending upper secondary school under the curriculum prior to the reform 2011, the

average grade is 14,0 which is approximately the level it’s been at since 200814. Three of four student

enrolling in Upper Secondary School graduated within 4 years and 87% of these had in their degree

acquired basic eligibility for further studies. Looking at statistics available today we can see that

roughly 88% of student enrolled in Upper secondary school graduated with a complete degree, and

around 11% graduated with an incomplete degree, a so called study-certificate. This means that the

throughput doesn’t look much different today than in the years prior to the reform, in spite of

government’s intentions. The average grade is not as readily comparable given the new grading scale

and process of assessment that came with/alongside the reform.

14

Grade average has been between 14,0 and 14,1 since the Swedish Associations of Local authorities and Regions started their yearly comparative follow-up in 2008

33

Activity compensation (CA)

Introduction & background

Activity compensation is an example of innovations focused on risk-prevention and preventing

sickness. This innovation is directed toward two overlapping vulnerable groups, youth 19-30 with

disabilities or long-term illness and is thereby an interesting example as it captures some of the main

trends in Swedish policy making in this area during the 21st century; restructuring of the social

insurance system for those unable to work and targeting young people outside the labor market.

There are of course other features of policy making connected to labor market participation that are

noticeable, and we have tried to highlight these in our other selected innovations.

Activity compensation covers young people unable to work due to sickness, disability or prolonged

upper secondary education, with cash benefit as well as the opportunities to remain activated in

ways and to an extent that is possible given their condition. The benefit was introduced on national

level through legislation in January 2003. Previously this income replacement was available either as

sick pay or early retirement for youth and financed through the pensions-system despite being

available from the age of 16 (isf, 2011:10). When replaced by activity compensation and sickness

benefits, the financing for the benefits also changed and are since 2003 funded via the national

health-insurance system. The changing of the title early retirement for youth, to activity

compensation was another step in the agenda to increase labor force participation. The new benefit

came with new rules, stating that activity compensation should be available to young people no

earlier than July of the year they turn 19, and no later than the year they turn 30. This means a higher

age limit than the previous compensation, motivated with the idea that activity compensation is to

start only after the age when upper secondary school is usually completed15 (at the age of 18) (SOU

2008:102). Activity compensation can be granted on essentially two different grounds, covering two

groups which are in fact both quite heterogenic. In the case of prolonged secondary education, this

refers to those attending upper secondary school for individuals with learning disabilities (USSILD).

When attending USSILD, all programs lasts four years instead of three and is grounds for receiving full

time activity compensation16. When granted due to reduced working capacity, the cause needs to be

assessed as likely to last for at least a year and must be a reduced capacity of at least 25 %. This

group is quite diverse in the range and cause of their inability to work. The prerequisites for this

group also changed as amendments to the activity compensation were introduced in 2007.

Previously, the working capacity was tried in relation to commonly occurring types of work. After

changes amended in 2007, it is now stated that working capacity should be tried in relation to paid

15

Upper secondary school is not mandatory, but very common (National Board of Education, 2008) 16

http://www.skolverket.se/om-skolverket/andra-sprak-och-lattlast/in-english/the-swedish-education-

system/upper-secondary-school/2.898

34

work on the labor market, which is interpreted as a wider range of work than that suggested in the

previous wording from 2003 (SOU 2008:102). Another change made in 2007 was the fact that the de-

contextualization when conducting an assessment of working capacity. Previously, surrounding

circumstances such as level of education, previous experience, living situation and age were allowed

to be taken into consideration in this assessment. This is no longer the case (ibid.). Over time, there

has been a huge influx in people receiving activity compensation, from 1900 people receiving first

time or renewed compensation in 1998, to 6700 people in 2007. There has also been quite a low

turnover rate of people leaving the activity compensation scheme, no more than 3 % in 2006

(Försäkringskassan 2007:11 in SOU 2008:102, pp.64). Lately there has been an increase in young

people with long-term decreased work capacity receiving health insurance benefits..

Initiating activity compensation

The activation compensation came about as a result of the changes made to previous early

retirement and disability-pension schemes (ref). In 2003 it was the social democrats who abolished

early retirement and disability pension and introduced activation compensation and sickness benefit.

In 2007, the right-wing alliance government made changes to these benefit systems and the resulting

regulations of those changes are the ones in place today. During the time when the previous early

retirement and disability pension schemes were abolished, the social democratic government had

been in power since 1982. Since the 70’s, part of the regulations of early retirement allowed for older

workers to be granted early retirement for so called labour market reasons. This regulation was

introduced as a way of taking into consideration how rationalizations on the labour market often hit

older workers harder. These rules were abolished in the early 90’s, both as a mean of keeping public

expenditure down, and as a way of avoiding early retirement as a political measure to keep

unemployment figures down during economic downturns (SCB, 2003). Prior to the actual legislative

changes establishing the activation compensation as a new reform, a committee on early retirement

was assigned the task of putting together a proposition for a new benefit-system for those who have

a reduced work-capacity over a long period of time (Dir. 1997:9). The committee on early retirement

was appointed by the social democratic government and consisted of 22 civil servants, special

advisers and experts, with the assignment to put forward a proposition for a renewed benefit system

for those who fins them selves permanently or long-term or permanently unable to work full time

due to sickness or disabilities. This process of drawing up a committee directive, followed by an

investigation according to that directive is characteristic of the Swedish policy making process

(interview Eva Franzen). And this investigation was just one in a long line of previous investigations

according to previous directives, which describes the usual process of chiseling out sufficient

35

background information through repeated studies and investigations, so that satisfactory suggestions

can put forward as a legislative proposal.

The proposal for a new activation compensation and sickness-benefit scheme, as part of the social

security system, was proposed and passed as national legislation. The activation compensation

covers those between the ages 19-30 years old, who can be categorized as young adults, and who in

addition have a reduced working capacity due to sickness or disability for a longer period of time

(prop 2000/01:96). Already in the committee directives (Ds, 1997:9) for the government report on

early retirement, it was stated that special consideration was to be shown younger people with long-

term reduced working capacity. Social changes impacting the average age of labor market entrance

(due to prolonged average education) was one motive. Another was the will to provide opportunities

for those with disabilities to participate fully society. With regards to young people, it was stated in

the proposed bill that a longer timer perspective must be applied concerning the habilitation and

rehabilitation of those with disability or long-term illness. The idea was for the reform to encourage

young individuals to engage in habilitating or rehabilitating activities, and to remain active during

their youth (ibid.)

Start-up of Activity Compensation

In the process of law making in Sweden, the proposals for a bill are always sent out on referral to

different stakeholders in the field in question. Coming to a concluding list of stakeholder is a process

where lists of proposed relevant parties circulate the responsible department until a final draft can

be agreed upon (Interview Ministry of Health and Social Affairs, 2015-05-05). In general, the activity

compensation had broad support as a measure to provide a more active/activating measure for

young people with reduced working capacity rather than just retiring them, out of the labor market

at an early age. However, the referrals show that there were disagreements on the role of the main

implementing agent, the Swedish SIA as regards the coordinating responsibility of possible activities.

In general, there were concerns that the responsibilities of the Swedish SIA were unclear. The bill

states that while the SIA should encourage activation and habilitating/rehabilitating efforts, it must

be the responsibility of relevant actors and organizations in society on a broad front to work towards

encouraging and making available such activities for young people. When it comes to activities, the

main conflicts seemed to revolve around whether this should be a possibility or a responsibility, and

whether the appropriate activities should really be decided upon by the SIA, an assignment which

some stakeholders believes to promote a strong government perspective on the lives and

habilitation/rehabilitation of these individuals. A main concern is that the habilitating or

rehabilitating effect of activities requires there to be a broad range of them available, therefore it is

36

important that this possibility not be stifled by the SIA determining what activities could be useful

rather than the individual. For these reasons some think that the SIA shouldn’t be given such a

central task as coordinator of efforts for those receiving AC as mentioned, while others believe it to

be unfair that the individual should be handed the responsibility of coordinating the efforts he/she

has a right to. Regarding the concern that activities become conditional the government clearly

states that this will not be the case, rather the SIA is tasked with the responsibility to offer and make

suggestions of activities and coordinate them. There is a recognition that the individual will and

motivation are key to a successful activation, and therefore sanctioned activities are off the table.

Regarding compensation for activities that charge a fee, or where there are related travel costs,

there is no more than a mention that such compensation may in some cases be granted. There is no

further specification or recommendation as to how this should be assessed in practice. As

mentioned, the age of introduction was changed from 16 to 19, in order to follow the change in

average age of labor market entry. While stakeholders agreed on raising the age limit, referrals show

that different groups had opinions on what the new age limit should be, mainly regarding

coordination with other benefit systems and legislation. This demonstrates the relevance of

connected or adjacent policies, when designing (and implementing) new reforms. An important part

of the AC reform was the fact that it covered young people with disabilities in need of prolonged

secondary education. The conflicts regarding this part of the reform mainly revolved around whether

compensation should be study grants or AC, and whether AC should be possible to grant pupils

without assessing their work capacity. The government chose to disregard both this critique. Some

stakeholders also proposed that the AC should be available during higher studies as well (university-

level), as many young people with disabilities refrain from applying for study grants as they are afraid

of not being able to pay them back. In this instance the government states an understanding for the

plea, but chooses to not take a stand on the issue until it has been further researched.

Implementation

The main implementing agent has from the start been the Swedish SIA, since 2005 the previous 21

regional insurance agencies were replaced by a national SIA. Since 2009, the SEA is under supervision

of the Swedish social insurance inspectorate. They have since their establishment published two

reports on activity compensation, following up on their function and results. Judging from these two

reports, some areas that warrant concern regard the coordinating responsibility, the activity rate and

the in vs. outflow of persons to the activity compensation. Starting with the role of coordinator

delegated to the SIA, this does not seem to have functioned well. In 2007, the rightwing coalition

government appointed a special analyst to oversee the regulations of the AC and present preventive

measures to suppress further influx (Dir. 2007:183). What the report revealed was that merely 40%

37

of those with AC took part in any activity coordinated, suggested or initiated by the SIA, and of those

who did the majority were participating in the measure Daily Activity, granted by the municipal social

service, and were engaged in this activity before being granted AC (SOU 2008:102). In other words,

the SIAs involvement in coordinating, suggesting or assessing suitable activities has been largely

ignored. Three reasons for this stand out in the literature, organization, finances and competence. In

a follow-up as early as 2005 SIA agents were interviewed about the coordinating responsibility of the

AC, the organizational features mainly impacting this task were the degree of specialized work, and

whether there were substantial goals connected to the activation. Regarding the competence, it

proved that that simply getting in contact with the individuals, and then motivating and finding fitting

activities was far more complex and difficult than anticipated. The financial conditions seemed to

vary between municipalities, and during the budget-year, which clearly affected the possibility of

granting remuneration for activities (Försäkringskassan, 2005:12). The report from 2008 (SOU

2008:102) also mentions the fact that there is wide range in the number and forms of activations

available between different municipalities. This can be related back to the initial proposition for the

AC were the government clearly stated that developing and providing activities has to be a

responsibility shared by other stakeholders and service providers in society, yet without further

specifying who they refer to and how that responsibility should take form. Something which makes it

difficult to both evaluate and demand a certain response, with the risk of no one sufficiently

addressing said responsibility.

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the

innovations

The purpose of abolishing the early retirement policy and replacing it with a sickness-benefit scheme

and the activity compensation scheme was to decrease the social and labour market exclusion of

early retired young people (and people of working age), increase reintegration to employment and

change the direction of policies for this group from passive to active measures. This was undertaken

using several tools, the symbolic (and financial) act of moving this group from the retirement-system

to the social insurance system, actually assessing the capability of working continuously and

arranging for the possibility of staying active in the ways and to the extent that it was possible.

Looking at evaluations and studies on the output and outcomes of the activation compensation, the

most visible factors having impacted on the intentions of the AC and the formal tools for achieving

them, are the lacking cooperation structures and the introduction of AC for those qualifying for

prolonged-schooling. The cooperation difficulties have been noticed in government reports, SIA

reports and evaluations from the ISF. As was stated as early on as the proposition for the bill, there is

a need for actors outside of the SIA, both private and public, to develop, present and arrange

38

activities for this group. There also seems to be a lacking clarity and exactly what the coordinative

responsibility for these activities are for the SIA, and for the individual. As of today, the level of

activation taking place in planning and communication with the SIA for these clients is astoundingly

low (isf, 2011). Looking at the intention of reintegrating young people to the labour market is also a

goal that seems to have been counteracted in reality. With the numbers of people applying for AC

increasing, without the outflow doing so, the number of young people in this category keeps

growing. In 2009, 80% of 19 year olds granted AC were automatically qualified on grounds of

prolonged schooling for youth with intellectual disabilities (ISF, 2011). The fact that many of them

may stay within the scheme after having left school, due to diminished working capacity, combined

with the increase of pupils to schools for intellectually disabled places great pressure on the SIA and

political forces to respond. At this time, the AC is functioning as precisely the type of passive schemes

locking people in that was sought to be abolished in the first place.

Conclusion

The literature suggests both an increase in influx to the AC over the past few years combined with a

small share in efflux, which is worrisome as this excludes or “locks-in” young people from the labor

market over an extended period of time. In addition, the activation feature of this innovation which

was supposed to support and encourage the conditions for increased work capacity through

habilitation or rehabilitation, has clearly failed. The rate of activation among the AC recipients and

the coordinating function of the SIA have little to show for. The government report from 2008 (SOU

2008:102) on the AC, as well as one from 2013 (SOU 2013: 74) on NEETs made several suggestions on

how to address these issues including new forms of legislation. No such proposal has yet been put

forward to parliament.

39

Job guarantee for youth

Introduction & Background

The job guarantee for youth was introduced along with the shift in government in 2006, when the

right-wing coalition government called the Alliance took office. The Alliance presented numbers on

the high youth unemployment as an argument for their effort to reform labor market efforts for this

group. In their government bill proposing the job-guarantee for youth they include figures from

Statistics Sweden, showing that between 2001-2006 youth unemployment had risen from an average

of 38000 to 70000 individuals per month. With the introduction of the job-guarantee for youth,

previous efforts for unemployed youth called the youth-guarantee and the municipal youth

programs were abolished. The municipal youth programs made it possible for a municipality to

arrange internships or other similar activities for unemployed youth under the age of 20 not enrolled

in upper secondary school or comparable education. The youth-guarantee was also a municipal

programs aimed at unemployed youth, part of the labour force between the ages of 20-25 who had

been unemployed for 90 days. Similar to the new job-guarantee for youth, both the previous

municipal youth programs and the youth guarantee were to begin with guidance and job-search

activities, but now far more intensified, for a longer duration of time and connected to sanctions. The

target group for the new job-guarantee for youth is unemployed young people between the ages of

16-24 who have been registered at the unemployment office for 90 days. If assigned to the job-

guarantee for youth, a young person must participate in order to keep receiving remuneration from

the unemployment office. This requirement is a significant part of what separates the new job

guarantee from the old youth guarantee. The main implementer of the job-guarantee is the

unemployment office, which has been centralized and is now a government run agency since 200817.

During the first 6 months of the year 2011, 53% of all youth registered at the PES were enreolled in

the job-guarantee for youth. This amounted to an average of 2 billion SEK (Martinsson & Sibbmark,

2010b).

Initiating the reform

The job guarantee for young people (16-24) was introduced with the aim to reinforce job-search

activity, followed by a matching process and complemented with reinforcing efforts such as training

or education but also involves a strengthened work incentive by quicker reducing benefit

compensations (stick and carrot). The purpose is to help unemployed youth enter the labour market

at an early stage, partly with the effort to avoid longer spells of, and more permanent long-term

unemployment (Prop: 2006/07:118). This could be interpreted as the Aliance government seeing

17

http://www.arbetsformedlingen.se/Om-oss/Var-verksamhet/Allmant-om-oss/Historia.html

40

shorter spells of unemployment as less of a risk for this group, either because of its shorter duration

which may lead to it being assessed as less severe or because it was not expected to occur to any

greater degree. While the government propose that part-time unemployed youth or youth with

temporary employments should not be targeted by the job-guarantee, all youth who are part of the

target group and are entitled to unemployment benefits, regardless of it’s scope, should be included

on the same conditions regarding remuneration, regardless of differences in what scope of

unemployment benefit their unemployment insurance has granted them so far. The reasons for this

according to the Alliance government, is to insure the possibilities of providing financial incentives for

young people to find work (ibid.). The Alliance government referred to a government report on

labour market efforts for youth, concluding that job-search activities are the most cost-effective

measure to help youth enter into employment, and that higher demands on job-search activities

have had positive effects in other countries, for ex. In Denmark and GB where this type of measure is

described as having helped youth move from unemployment to employment at a quicker pace.

Most of the agenda setting process took place before the government took office; the job guarantee

for youth was part of the political platform than the Rightwing coalition ran on. They took office in

the fall of 2006, and announced in their first budget proposal for 2006/2007 the discontinuation of

the Municipal youth programs and youth guarantee and the introduction of a job guarantee for

youth. Unlike what is common in the procedure of proposing a bill, the job guarantee for youth was

not the result of a government report or committee having looked in to the matter of policy reforms

for unemployed youth. However, the proposal was sent out on referral to a number of stakeholders.

In the submission for comment on the government bill, a lack of conformity around certain aspects

of the job-guarantee for youth was brought forward. The negative comments where mostly

regarding the conditionality of and sanctions connected to the program, and the lower benefit rate

for non-graduates of upper secondary education. While the late National Labour Market Board

(today the Public Employment Service) and the Confederation of Swedish Enterprises (Svenskt

Näringsliv) fully supported adopting the law as proposed, the National Board of health and Welfare,

and the Swedish Agency for Youth and Civil Society), the Swedish Associations of Local authorities,

the Swedish Confederation of Professional Employees and Regions (TCO) and the Swedish Agency for

Public Management were all concerned that 90 days was too long of a time to make young

unemployed people wait for efforts. On the other hand, both the Institute for Evaluation of Labour

market and Education Policy (IFAU) and the Swedish Confederation of Professional Associations

(SACO) stated that they find the content of the job guarantee for youth more suitable to help

unemployed youth than the previous youth guarantee and municipal youth programs (Prop:

41

2006/07:118). It is however unclear if this means that they do not have any reservations regarding

the job-guarantee for youth. The Swedish Trade Union Confederation (LO) was the only consultative

body motioning for the bill not to be passed. LO along with SACO was also concerned that the job-

guarantee for youth might encourage young people to prolong their education period up to the age

of 25, while the Public Authority for Education Development were instead concerned that it might

discourage students from enrolling in and completing an upper secondary education (ibid). The

critique that lowered benefit rate for those under 25 may lead to prolonged education was dismissed

by the government saying that the likelihood of employment will affect student motivation more

than the unemployment benefit rate. As a response to concerns that the guarantee being

introduced at the age of 16 will risk increasing drop-outs form upper secondary education, the

government pointed to the importance of benefit levels not exceeding that of student grants, as it is

important that the regulations don’t undercut the incentives to find work and engage in activation

measures.

The government mostly point to the importance of cooperation, which is brought up as an essential

part of the function of measures against youth unemployment. This is revisited in later government

reports and follow-ups of policy responses to youth unemployment. In most of these, the

cooperation is described as underdeveloped and largely malfunctioning (Interview at Stockholm

Labour Administration, 2015-04-22). One of the directors at the municipal labour market agency in

Stockholm confirms this, and gives a recount of cooperation with the unemployment agency as

fragmented.

Implementation

The government run PES is the main government body in charge of the implementation. The

guidelines are developed from government goals through the yearly letters of regulation, to the

managerial staff drawing up goals for the agency to work toward. The reform is primarily regulated

by the ordinance on the job guarantee for youth.

Already in the submissions for comments on the proposed bill, the Swedish National Agency for

Education were concerned with the division of responsibilities between the municipalities and the

Public Employment Service as both actors have a responsibility for youth under the age of 20 who

have not completed an upper secondary education (Prop: 2006/07:118). The municipalities have a

responsibility to keep them selves informed about the occupation of youth between 16-19 years old

who are not partaking in an upper secondary education in order to offer them suitable individual

42

measures (Skolverket, 2011). The former Board for Youth matters also express their concern

regarding what responsibilities these two actors have in relation to the municipal information-

obligation. The Alliance government has clarified that the job-guarantee for youth in no way

precludes or replaces the municipal information-obligation, which should be an ongoing

responsibility where as the job-guarantee is to be seen as intensified measures which are also tied to

a certain period of unemployment (3 months) unlike the information-obligation. They also stress the

importance of a close collaboration between municipalities and the Public Employment Service (PES)

(Prop: 2006/07:118), there is however no closer description of how this collaboration should take

place and where the responsibility for assuring such collaboration lies.

Sources of finance

In the proposed bill for a job guarantee for youth, the financial consequences are described in terms

of number of expected participants per month and implications for the budget. For the year 2008,

the job-guarantee for youth is expected to cover roughly 30 000 young people per month, and it was

deemed possible to implement the program within the allocated funds for the Swedish NEA, as

specified in the national budget proposal. The specific funding for the NEA is regulated in the so

called regulatory letter provided by the government on a year by year basis.

Assessment of the influence of different factors and parameters on the performance of the

innovations

The intention of the Job Guarantee for Youth (JGY) introduced in 2007 was to create a more coherent

battery of measures that were also more cost-efficient and provided a speedier process from

unemployment to employment for young people (Ds. Promemoria; 2006). This was to be achieved in

part by restructuring the provision of youth measures from the local municipalities to the state PES

and focusing on job-search. Looking at an evaluation from the IFAU, it seems that one of the most

important factors helping to achieve this is the fact that the job-search was mandatory for all and

regulated at a state level meaning that it applied nation-wide. The deterring effect from facing the

risk of having to partake in full time mandatory job-search seemed to have increased job-search to

the extent that those not too far from the labour market gained employment before the point in

time when they would have had to partake in the guarantee. In other words it is not so much

activities in the program itself, as the filtering effect manifested just prior to when a young person

would have had to start the program, that has had positive effect. Looking at the evaluation, it is also

clear that over 63% of participants put in no more than 10h per week (Martinsson & Sibbmark,

2010b). In other words, it is in practice not a full time program. In an interview with Anders Forslund

(2015-06-17), professor and director at the IFAU, he reasons that the lacking in personnel resources

43

within the PES may be a reason for why the program effect for those actually participating in the

program has been so bleak. In an interview at the PES headquarters in Stockholm (2015-06-24), the

lacking in personnel resources to aid participants in the program more extensively is verified. In fact,

the Ministry of Labor has been briefed on the lacking resources and has not disputed their accuracy

or legitimacy but referred to a lack of resources to allocate. In other word there is both knowledge

and admittance of this deficit within the program and its likely consequences, but reallocating

resources to increase staffing levels to this program has evidently not been a priority.

Conclusion

The results from the Job Guarantee for youth are so far quite bleak, with the main effect being a

deterring effect by which the confrontation with having to enter the program increases job-search in

the weeks before mandatory entry. This filters out those who are able to find work by intensified job-

search. But the lack of personnel resources within the actual program is a significant problem, and as

there is awareness of this at central level it demonstrates a disregard for better aiding those young

people who need extensive support to gain work. It is possible that the swift push-through of the bill

may have had the consequence of not sufficiently planning and scrutinizing the forms for

implementing the Job Guarantee for Youth. In the proposed bill, only one referral body commented

that there should be at least a six month window for dismantling the previous program before

introducing the new one. This comment was disregarded (prop.2006/07:118).

Synthetic analysis

Looking at the innovations presented, they clearly demonstrate trends in governance on both a

vertical level where dispersal of powers has shifted between municipal, regional and central level,

and a horizontal level where a multiplication of actors is expressed both by virtue of the reform on

Complementary Actors, but also present in projects and collaborations within the realm of, or

connected to the other reforms.

Regarding the role of social partners, trade unions and employer organization are sometimes

consulted in the preparatory government reports often preceding new legislation, as in the case with

Gy11. They are also standardly included among the referral bodies to which bill proposals are sent

for feedback before possibly revised and presented to the parliament. However, the impact of social

partners on the design of the bill varies. In the case of Gy11 the rightwing coalition government had

proposed a quite extensive reform agenda concerning upper secondary school already during their

election campaign, which indicates a limited amount of leeway in design and content of the reform

44

when sent out for referral. Looking at the referral comments, a large portion regards the introduction

of an apprenticeship program where both employer organizations and unions express concern and

support in different specific matters. Another reform pushed through by the rightwing coalition was

the Job Guarantee for Youth, which was not preceded by a government report on the bill and where

the referral round was conducted with a shorter response-time than usual. This infringes on the

general input provided for stakeholders, including social partners. Among the comment there were

both employer organizations and unions critiquing and backing the proposal. The only referral body

wholly dismissing the bill was one of the largest umbrella organizations for unions, LO (The Swedish

Trade Union Confederation). Regarding the Activity Compensation, two large umbrella organizations

were critical of having the SIA determine what is/is not suitable activities for the participants, to

which the government responded to alter the suggestion so that the SIA would be responsible for

suggesting or offering activities to the participants. However, as stated in an interview at the SIA

head office in Stockholm (2015-06-23), the legislation is not very precise leaving the SIA and their

legal advisors to interpret and create guidelines after the bill is passed. This means that there is

generally some leeway between legal text and guidelines informing the day-to-day work, in which

the concerns made by referral bodies may be undercut. In conclusion, while there is a procedure by

which social partners may make their voices heard, the number of instances and time allotted for this

is not specifically regulated and the government is not obligated to adjust the bill according to the

opinions of any referral bodies. It may however serve as a soft-tool of allowing influence from

stakeholders such as social partners. Specifically in cases where they are clearly aligned with a

specific party or party-line.

On the vertical level, a dispersion of power from local, mainly municipal level to state level is

demonstrated within two of the innovations targeting youth: the Upper Secondary School reform

(Gy11), the Job Guarantee for Youth. The clearest case of centralization is in the Job Guarantee for

Youth. With the abolition of the municipal activation programs and the PES run Youth Guarantee, the

active role of the municipalities in youth employment policies was severely undercut, to point of

almost being reduced. During the previous Youth Guarantee, the PES would provide financial

compensation to the municipalities for youth assigned to their programs (Interview at Stockholm

Labour Administration, 2015,04-22). As pointed out in interviews at both the Ministry for

employment (2015-06-16) and the Stockholm municipality Labour Administration (2015-04-22), this

was a great concern for the municipalities already in the stages of preparing the bill, and the critique

that is visible in the referral bodies replies to it. Along with the changes made in unemployment

benefits at the time, making it more difficult for young people with little work experience to qualify,

this has also had the consequence of shoveling financial responsibilities in to the municipalities in

45

terms of young unemployed people forced to apply for social welfare benefits. As pointed out by an

economist at the ESF, this puts pressure on the municipalities to create labour market responses to

get these young people in to employment. Part of the shift in power from municipal to national level

was also the prohibition of the national PES to compensate the municipalities for providing labour

market programs when the PES could assign unemployed youth. Thus leaving the municipalities with

an increased financial burden, and a decreased ability to act. This change is something that also

deprives the municipalities of their municipal-autonomy, which is a long-standing upheld principle in

the Swedish governing structure. In the upper secondary school reform the possibility for

municipalities to decide on local courses in different schools was abolished. The reason was to have a

better insight into and knowledge about the education alternatives offered, providing better

possibilities of monitoring and evaluating, and also achieving the goal of an equal education cross-

nationally. This strengthened the role of the state and central public agencies tied to the educations

system.

An innovation somewhat counteracting this trend is FINSAM, which has developed local coordination

systems of rehabilitation measures. In 2014, FINSAM had 88 associations involving 240 of Sweden’s

290 municipalities. While interviews with those involved in these collaborations speak of their

progression and spread, as well as an interest from those not (yet) involved, it is difficult to say

whether it has had any substantial impact on rehabilitation measures on a wider scale. An example is

the Activity Compensation, which has been a growing program since its initiation in 2003. The

involvement of FINSAM has mainly been as the financier of time-limited projects at local level,

whereas implementation of successful methods from these projects at national level has so far been

sparse (Interview at SIA, 2015-06-23). This means that the usage of FINSAM for coordination of

Activity Compensation on a national scale is largely absent, in spite the knowledge of FINSAM and

participation in FINSAM-projects for the target group of Activity Compensation. This demonstrates

the difficulties in overcoming the national - local division of governing.

On the horizontal level there has been an in increase in private actors manifested on the one hand in

a cooperation, and on the other hand a fragmentation of measures offered. The ordinance on

complementary actors is the most telling example among our five innovations of how the number of

actors has increased through privatization of the provision of labour market measures. This

regulation has pushed the Swedish PES to implement part of their reforms, for example the Job

Guarantee for Youth, by using private actors. The financing of these complementary actors is mainly

based on a set payment at the start and a performance based payment. Evaluations indicate that

those with longer spells of unemployment are more often using service within the PES, while those

46

with shorter spells of unemployment are more often found at Complementory Actors. Given that the

choice between PES services and CA services is not always up to the individual but the PES, this

difference may be a so called creaming effect. This essentially means that unemployed too far from

the labour market are not assigned to CA as this would reflect poorly on their results. In any case the

introduction of private actors visible through the ordinance on complementary actors as well as the

Job Guarantee for Youth demonstrate a loss of power from public administration to the advantage of

private interests through a process of fragmentation (see pp.22). This also indicates a dispersal of

power to private actors at mid- to grasroot levels within the administrative structure of the PES.

Beyond the trends in governing structures there is a general lack in resources at both central and

local level, primarily regarding implementation but also the design and development of new reforms.

The ordenance of complementary actors was assigned by the government to be implemented at

national level within the PES, while lacking any developed methods or pathways of finding, assessing

and procuring these actors. Similarly the Job Guarantee for Youth was implemented after a very brief

referral round in terms of time allotted for the referral bodies to respond with comments, the

amount of time for developing the reform at the Ministry of Labour and the implementing agency,

the Swedish PES. Insufficient time in these processes is visible regarding the Upper Secondary School

reform as well. As described in an interview at the NAE (2015-04-14), the conditions of the

implementation process presented to the NAE were that it basically shouldn’t cost a dime. In

addition, evaluations of the implementation at schools around the country show a high rate of

teachers felt that neither the time allotted nor the information provided was sufficient. From an

institutional perspective this demonstrates the power located at the central state, as it has a strong

hold over the framework of resources (time, money and competence) that local levels have to work

within.

47

Processes of policy learning in Sweden

The policy learning infrastructure

Most legislative proposals presented to the Riksdag (Swedish parliament) are initiated by the

Government. Before the Government can draw up a legislative proposal, the matter in question is

analyzed and evaluated. The task may be assigned to officials from the ministry concerned, a

commission of inquiry or a one-man committee. This tradition of inquiries has a long history and goes

back to 1922. Inquiry bodies, which operate independently of the Government, may include or co-

opt experts, public officials and politicians. The reports setting out their conclusions are published in

the Swedish Government Official Reports series (Statens Offentliga Utredningar, SOU). Before the

Government takes up a position on the recommendations of a commission of inquiry, its report is

referred for consideration to relevant bodies. These referral bodies may be central government

agencies, special interest groups, local government authorities or other bodies whose activities may

be affected by the proposals. This process provides feedback and allows the Government to assess

the level of support it is likely to receive. If a number of referral bodies respond unfavorably to the

recommendations, the Government may try to find an alternative solution. When the referral bodies

have submitted their comments, the ministry responsible drafts the bill that will be submitted to the

Riksdag. The including of expertise from different areas, as well as interest groups and other levels of

government in the preparation for legislative proposals creates a very thorough but also inclusive

process. The review procedure is also a way of creating as great consensus as possible in the process

of law making. However, the government are in their full right to dismiss critique and opinions put

forward by the referall bodies, and referral bodies may very well express critique when their

concerns are ignored. These are not uncommon occurrences. The review process can rather be seen

as a soft tool to achieve consensus as the governing party often rules as a minority government with

supporting parties. They are thereby dependent on a sufficient degree of common ground with these

parties, and making necessary concessions to achieve a bill which can be passed (depending off

course on their mandate in parliament and how close/far they are positioned from supporting

parties).

In addition, a growing interest in integrating evaluations, audits, and scientific studies in public policy

can be observed during the last 15/20 years. This is noticeable in terms and demands of "what

works" and "evidence-based policy". Evaluations of policies, i.e. the search for good decision basis,

has become widespread and new types of agencies have been established (eg, IAF), but most of all

existing authorities were assigned new demands to evaluate, not least through the reporting

requirements that are built in performance management (Ahlbäck & Öberg 2011). One of the most

48

important auditing bodies in Sweden is the National Audit Office (NAO). They are the official, auditing

body of all public authorities in Sweden, and their status as an independent auditing body is

established in the Swedish constitution. They perform both scheduled yearly revisions, and

performance audits where they are free to decide on the areas and issues most in need of such

audits. While the parliament and government are not obligated to adhere to the agency’s

recommendations, they are obligated to present to the parliament how they intend to deal with the

problems or insufficiencies put forward18.

A third way of policy learning is local experiments. These took place for example in the 1990s when

municipalities developed various local models in how to work with the increasing number of social

assistance (Minas 2008). Another example is the need to create formal conditions for joint

interventions across agency boundaries around people of working age that had been unemployed for

a long time. Also here efforts started in the 1990’s in form of local experiments. Since the year 2000,

Sweden established the Swedish ESF-fund which operates at the mandate of the Ministry of Labour

and the Ministry of Health and Social Affairs and administers money from EU-funds, such as the

European Social Fund. In accordance with EU-directives for the funds, the ESF advertices means for

different project areas which may be applied for by municipalities and organisations at local level.

Upper Secondary School reform

Before the proposed bill on the Upper secondary reform of 2011 was presented, there was both a

committee assigned to look into how the upper secondary education could be reformed, and one

specifically interested in developing apprenticeships programs which were at that time not a part of

the upper secondary education. When it comes to both vocational training programs and

apprenticeships programs, news coverage, government reports and publications, as well as think

tanks and research agencies have pointed out other European countries as good examples and

sources of inspiration (SNS, 2014; SOU 2011:72). Most often mentioned are the models from

continental Europe, focusing on Germany and Switzerland. The Danish system is also a point of

reference as it is the country with the most extensive vocational and apprenticeship program among

the Nordic countries (SNS, 2014). One of the key elements of these successful examples mentioned is

to develop an apprenticeship and vocational training which better corresponds to the demands on

the labor market, something which is sought to be achieved via an extended involvement of firms,

enterprises and business sectors in the development and design of these programs. While the idea is

to encourage social partners and individual businesses to engage more in this process, the

18

http://www.riksdagen.se/en/How-the-Riksdag-works/What-does-the-Riksdag-do/Parliamentary-control/The-

National-Audit-Office/

49

government is suggested to take greater responsibility for encouraging employers to develop specific

introductory employments attached to these programs, so that a student graduating from vocational

or apprenticeship training program may stay on at the business in question as a “tutorial-employee”

with lower wage but more on-the-job education (SNS, 2014). This is clearly an idea developed from

looking at the German system, where firms are engaged in providing apprenticeships program for

students as they then get to hang on to them and train them, further as employees but at a lower

wage cost. Thus gaining workforce specifically educated for the needs of that firm/business.

Audits are performed by the Swedish Schools Inspectorate (SSI), and evaluations and follow ups are

the responsibility of the NAE. The NAE also promotes and develops Evidence based practices for

different levels of education. The Swedish Associations of Local and Regional Authorities produce and

present comparative evaluations of upper secondary education on a yearly basis since 2008. The

Government also has expert groups gathering and reporting on evidence and learning from other

countries, for example the expert group for studies in social economy (ESS, 2006) which in 2006

presented a report on lessons and inspiration from other European countries regarding

apprenticeship programs.

The apprenticeship programs were introduced as trials in a selected number of municipalities in

2008, lasting for three years, and under continuous supervision of the government assigned

committee for apprenticeships programs (SOU 2011:72). In fact, since the apprenticeships education

was introduced in Sweden in 1921 (at this time not as a part of regular school forms), it has been

introduced, retracted, reintroduced and reformed a number of times. Since the 90’s several pilot

projects have been introduced, and some prolonged, aiming to find a form for this branch of

education that would be most suitable for students and employers. Some of the problematic aspects

of these attempts have been insufficient financial compensation for employers, low level of

business/firm involvement in the design and implementation of vocational- and apprenticeship

programs, lacking interest among both students at employers, and lack of correspondence between

demand in labour force and competence and available apprenticeships programs. Looking at the

form for the extended vocational training and apprenticeship programs, there is an apparent attempt

to involve employers to a greater extent in the content and size of the programs, which has been a

problem in previous projects. However, the low number of applicant to these programs reveals a

continued low interest among students19 As regards the financial compensation; the regulations

19

Since 2008 the share applying for occupational programs has decreased from 37% to 27% in 2014.

The numbers are based on statistics gathered by the NAE:

50

state a fixed sum to be allocated to the schools per student partaking in an apprenticeship program.

The financing may be used to cover developmental expenses at the school and costs for business

who take in an apprenticeship-student. The idea was for the financial contribution to cover added

expenses for the businesses, but as shown by the evaluation of trials with apprenticeship programs,

the largest sum has been retained by the schools themselves. Initially some schools kept all of the

financial benefits, but this is no longer possible as regulations have been altered so that no more

than 2/3 of the benefit may remain at the individual schools (SOU 2011: 72). The learning process in

efforts made to establish a successful apprenticeship program within Swedish upper secondary

school, has to some degree been fueled by the problems and critique brought to the surface during

the past few decades. From the 80’s and forward, alterations have been made in financial

compensation to employers, the structure of programs where apprenticeship placements were to be

available, and the degree of work-placed versus school-based education. All of which has followed

unsatisfying results of pilot projects or permanent changes, and the analysis of these results (ESS

2006:4).

Other local experiences within the realm of upper secondary education can be found within the

realm of ESF -funded projects at municipal level. The NAE also have an external national monitoring

keeping up to date with different projects or work processes that have been particularly successful.

Activity compensation

The introduction of the activity compensation was preceded by two government reports, where one

focused on suggested reforms to be introduced if the early retirement was abolished (SOU

1997:166), and the other focused solely on activity compensation (SOU 1998:106). While there is

reference to medical research showing activity to enhance rehabilitation and habilitaion while

passivity has the opposite effect, there is no reference to countries or specific studies. The

development toward an activity compensation for youth have been incremental, with discussions

about the age-limits for early retirement and the risk of passivity among young people in early

retirement dating back to the 50’s. Primarily the development of AC is described as an effect of a

changing labor market and more inclusive and expanded handicap-policy, alongside varying efforts to

maintain sufficient income protection for those unable to participate fully on the labor market.

The regulatory agency for the SIA is the inspection of the social insurance directorate (ISF). The ISF

evaluate and monitor the effectiveness and efficiency in the area of social insurance and is a public

administrative body under the ministry of social policy. They were established in 2009 and have so

http://www.skolverket.se/om-skolverket/press/pressmeddelanden/2014/allt-farre-elever-pa-yrkesprogram-

1.227603

51

far conducted two studies on the function of the AC. In addition there have been three government

reports since the AC was introduced, suggesting changes to the program but also studying its

implementation and function in terms of cooperation between SIA and the PES. In a government

follow-up report from 2008 (SOU, 2008:102), AC was proposed to be replaced by sickness insurance

for youth which would target those who are assessed unable to participate on the labor market for

the foreseeable future. Here, the goals of Swedish disability policy is suggested to replace the goals

of social insurance policy. The reason being that those who will never be able to gain employment

risk a lifetime of poverty due to the principle that social insurance benefits should be kept low

enough to make gainful employment the more attractive choice. In addition, the report proposed

that those who need prolonged schooling receive benefits via prolonged education grant, and that

the rest of the target group ought to be in the hands of the PES rather than the SIA. These

suggestions are in line with an interpretation of active labor market policy which pushes for

increased employment related activation and education, combined with a stricter assessment of

access to sole financial protection. The need for reform of the AC is supported by the ISF as well, as

their first follow-up on the AC in 2011 showed the number of recipients to have doubled since 1995

with over 30 000 people receiving AC in 2011, combined with less than 1% of recipients leaving the

AC for regular employment between 1995-2005. The suggestions made in the government report

from 2008 (SOU 2008:102) have yet to be proposed in any bill. As mentioned in an interview at the

Ministry of Health and Social Affairs (2015-05-19), the grounds for neglecting conclusions and

recommendations of a government tasked report may be that it contradicts the party line, but may

just as well be a matter of priorities in terms of resources available for proposing different policy

changes. In addition to external evaluations and follow-ups, the SIAalso perform self evaluations and

follow ups on their different programs.

In connection to some of the general developments in areas of social insurance and labor market

policies, and to the critique brought forward in evaluations and follow ups of the AC during the 21st

century, a number of pilot projects have been initiated by assignment of the government. In 2008 the

government assigned the SIA and PES to initiate on a trial basis, alternative actors to aid those on

long-term sickleave in returning to the labor market. Alternative actors were introduced in four

Swedish regions, to provide support for people in the process of regaining working capacity and

gaining regular employment, within a model where the actors received remuneration based on

performance and results. Between 2008-2010, 3060 people participated, of which roughly half

received aid form private actors and roughly half from public actors20. The results however, showed

20

Private actors: 1571 participants; Public actors: 1489 participants; Third sector actors: 223 participants

52

no support for the performance-based model to impact results or content among private or public

actors (SOU, S2010:4). In another project instigated by the government to increase and speed-up

return to employment among those on sickness-benefits, the SIA and the PES were to develop more

efficient routines for assessing work-capacity, measures for rehabilitation and support in returning to

work. After being developed as a pilot project, the program was introduced on national level.

However, a very small portion of the target group, and especially small for instance among those on

AC, were assessed as having sufficient work-capacity to return to employment (ibid.).

In an interview at SIA headquarters in Stockholm (2015-06-23), the agency is described as having a

history of working in project forms in order to try out and/or develop new models and methods of

working. Some of these are based on lessons drawn from other countries, such as Supported

Employment and Individual Placement Support, which are both methods developed in the US. In

2013 the government assigned the SIA to conduct and evaluate the effects of projects using

supported employment methods in their work with young people receiving Activity Compensation

(Interview at SIA, 2015-06-23). Beyond this, there are within the SIA several project areas, where

best practices and knowledge production act as the basis for policy learning by inviting municipalities

and regions to apply for funds in order to apply competence, strategies or other useful tools to their

daily practice. One of these is the AFU (assessment of activity capacity), a pilot project initiated in

2013. The AFU is a tool for work capacity assessment developed by the SIA, the national board of

health and welfare and the Swedish employment agency. The work assessment is a main part of the

base on which the SIA grounds its decision when granting, for instance, Activity Compensation. The

tool encompasses self-assessment, medical and psychological evaluation and a knowledge base on

labor market requirements for comparison and can be seen both as a way of spreading best

practices, and as a way of streamlining assessments and gaining better control and overview of what

the SIA bases their decisions on. In addition to this, several ESF-projects and also FINSAM projects

have targeted the group of youth who are benefit recipients of Activity Compensation (Interview at

SIA, 2015-06-23). As described in the interview at SIA headquarters, the SIA have on broad front

started to focus on continuously implementing successful areas and lessons drawn from projects into

the day-to-day work within the agency (2015-06-23).

The job guarantee for youth

The idea for the reform was designed as part of the party platform and reform-agenda during the

election campaign before the right-wing coalition was in office. According to Anders Forslund (2015-

06-17), the reform was most likely designed, at least in part, by the labour market researchers of the

53

conservative party Moderaterna, and more or less ready to be launched by the time they took office.

This is supported by the fact that unlike what is common in the process of legislating on new reforms,

the job Guarantee for youth was not preceded by assigning a task force or committee to study and

present a basis for designing the new reform. However, the memorandum for the proposed bill

refers to a government report partly studying labour market measures for unemployed youth.

Referring to this report, the memorandum concludes that success factors for reducing youth

unemployment in a cost-efficient way are guidance, mentoring, and most of all job-search activities,

preferably with negative incentives attached. Lessons from other countries are also visible, the

memorandum refers to a government report on labour market measures where both Denmark and

the UK serve as examples of countries where intensified job-search has lead to decrease in youth

unemployment. The bill proposal was sent out for referrals in the end of 2006, only a few months

after the right-wing alliance government had won the election. In fact, the time for referral of the bill

was quite short in relation to what is common, something which the government was also criticized

for by the referral bodies.

Aside from lessons from other countries and international research, the proposal to abolish the prior

Youth guarantee and municipal youth programs was also based on evaluations and audits by public

offices and research institutes. The main argument found in the evaluations was that the previous

programs had substantial lock-in effects, making the time to gain employment longer as an effect of

participating in a labour market program. The other argument revolved around the great variety in

what measures were actually offered (or not offered) in different municipalities, and lack of

knowledge both regarding what took place in these programs, and an oversight of the range in

programs available around the country (Interview at IFAU, 2015-06-17; Interview at Department of

labour, 2015-06-16). Instead lessons from the UK and Denmark were presented and partly simulated

in the new job guarantee for youth, were the initial face of the program was now intensified job-

search. This has had the effect of weeding out those who in fact stand quite close to the labour

market. As a response to the risk of ending up in the mandatory, full-time job search through the job-

guarantee after being unemployed for 90 days, at the end of their 90 day period most youth intensify

their job-search on their own with the result that those who do not stand far from the labour market

gain employment before the job guarantee is meant to set in. This was most likely, according to

professor Anders Forslund (Interview at IFAU, 205-06-17) no coincidence, as the lay-up of the

program it pretty much a blue print for how to design programs for getting young people into jobs as

effective as possible. Still, this means that those more marginalized on the labour market are those

who will actually be entering the program, and evaluations show that very few of them actually get

full-time aid in getting a job at the PES. One interpretation is that these results are due to a lack of

54

resources allocated to the PES, leaving them unable to provide full-time programs for these youth

(ibid). Beside the government’s own reports, there is the research institute under the Swedish

ministry of employment, IFAU (Institute for Evaluation of Labour Market and Education). While their

activity is budgeted and framed by the ministry of employment, through a letter of regulation, they

have a high level of independence in how and what studies they wish to conduct (ibid). In 2010 and

2011 they conducted two studies on the job-guarantee for youth, one on the experiences of youth in

the guarantee, and the other and effect study on the outcome of participating in the program.

One of the inputs told repeatedly by the IFAU to the department of labour is to initially implement

larger reforms in a smaller scale, as projects, which are possible to evaluate. In this case, the reform

was instead implemented faster than what is usual.

General conclusion

When it comes to policy learning there are visible processes at both central and local level, they do

however look a bit different in processes, type of knowledge taken in and spread, as well as different

forms of likely impact.

At central level, reports and committees are the bulk of the state government processes of learning

and spreading knowledge. Within these, there are different channels used, most common seem to be

the use of experts and researchers, but also experiences from other countries. In the event of the

upper secondary reform we can see that the input, experience and knowledge from business and

industrial sectors has had, and continues to have an impact on the design, content and revision of

the occupational programs. There is, as described, a process at government level of including lower

levels of government in the aim of achieving as broad support as possible for a proposed bill.

However, the experiences from the job guarantee for youth, and to some extent also the upper

secondary school reform are examples of how the government may more or less rush through this

process and propose a bill without much preceding dialog. This demonstrates the authoritative

power that still rests with the central government.

At local level, we fond more of experiment, pilot-projects and time-limited trials. These are often

ESF-funded (and to some extent FINSAM-funded) projects. When it comes to these types of

experiments, there is critique from other agencies and research institutes that there is a lack in

proper and thorough evaluations of these projects, which is instrumental if lessons from them are to

be spread to ongoing activities in different agencies and levels of government (Interview at IFAU,

55

2015-06-17; Interview at Almega21 2015-04-15). However there are examples of when the

government gives an assignment to initiate a project, or when government run agencies conduct

projects. Examples of this is the trail period for apprenticeship programs which was initiated by the

right-wing government and headed as well as evaluated by a government appointed committee, and

also the current project at the SIA where the government has ordered an evaluative project of

supported employment methods (Interview at the SIA, 2015-06-23).

21

Almega is an employer and trade organisation for the Swedish service sector.

56

Interviews performed for WP4

National Council for Financial Coordination (2 persons from the National Social Insurance Agency,

Cooperation association Huddinge, Salem and Botkyrka

Official from the Government office (coordination)

Representative for the National Council for Financial Coordination and coordination association in

South Sweden

Official from the Government office (unit for finance)

Former policy officer from PES I2,

The Swedish Trade union confederation,

Almega – employer and trade organisation for the Swedish service sector

The Swedish National Agency for Education

Stockholm Labour Administration

Swedish ESF-council

Ministry of Health and Social Affairs

Ministry of Labour

The Swedish Social Insurance Agency

The Swedish Public Employment Service

57

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SOU (2000:78) Utredningen om den arbetslivsinriktade rehabiliteringen. Fritzes, Stockholm

SOU (2002:5) Utredningen Handlingsplan för ökad hälsa i arbetslivet. Fritzes, Stockholm

SOU (2008:27) Framtidsvägen – enreformerad gymnasieskola Fritzes, Stockholm

SOU (2008:102) Brist på brådska - en översyn av aktivitetsersättningen. Socialdepartementet

SOU (S2010:04) Samverkan mellan arbetsförmedlingen och försäkringskassan under 200-talet.

Underlagsrapport till den parlamentariska socialförsäkringskassan. Socialdepartementet

SOU (2011:72) Gymnasial lärlingsutbildning - med fokus på kvalitet! Utbildningsdepartementet

SOU (2013:74) Unga som varken arbetar eller studerar – statistik, stöd och samverkan.

Utbildningsdepartementet

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