D. Watson - Molotov, The Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942 (4)

8/13/2019 D. Watson - Molotov, The Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942 (4)

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University of Glasgow

Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942Author(s): Derek WatsonReviewed work(s):Source: Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 54, No. 1 (Jan., 2002), pp. 51-85Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.

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Carfax ublishingEUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, Taylor&FrancisroupVol. 54, No. 1, 2002, 51-85

Molotov, the Making of the GrandAlliance and the Second Front 1939-1942DEREK WATSON*

RELATIONSETWEENRITAIN,he USA and the USSR were better during the GreatPatrioticWarthanat any othertime, and the agreement hat Molotov negotiatedwithBritain duringhis visit in 1942 was the foundation for cooperation duringthe waryears. It was clearly in the interestsof both sides to work togetherto strengthen hecoalitionto defeatHitler,althoughthere was a ratherunfortunate rehistory.Molotovhad been the chief Soviet negotiator in the failed Triple Alliance negotiations of1939,' and in the infamous Nazi-Soviet pact. On the Soviet side policy was foundedon ideology; there was suspicion of the great capitalist powers, and the legacy ofappeasement.Diplomatic and political developmentsbetween September 1939 andMay 1942, which formed the backgroundto the talks, also greatly complicatedMolotov's task in the negotiations, as did changes in Soviet prioritiesreceived ininstructionsfrom Stalin.The Grand Alliance negotiations, which provide a comment on the diplomaticmethods of Churchill, Eden, and Roosevelt and his advisers, as well as those ofMolotov, are significant,not only because they were the foundationof the wartimealliance but also because the main problemswhich were to dog relationsduringthewar were evident duringthe talks:the questionof a Second Front;2he way in whichthe alliance should be strengthenedand developed;the natureof the peace treatiestobe negotiated at the end of the war, including the recognition of Soviet frontiersincorporatingheir territorial ains duringthe 1939-41 period;andthe organisationofinternationalcooperationto maintainpeace at the end of the war. These questionsdemonstrated he differentprioritiesof the two sides and one may question whetherthe GrandAlliance was the real focal point of the negotiations.New archiveevidence, now available,highlightsthese issues, providingadditionalinsightsanddetail that allows a morenuancedunderstanding f the negotiations.Thismaterial ncludes the papersof AnthonyEden, the BritishForeign secretary,unpub-lished documentsfrom the RussianForeign Ministryarchive,and recentlypublishedcorrespondence between Stalin and Molotov during the negotiations, from thePresidentialArchive. These documentsmake it possible to write a revised account ofthe negotiations using both Western and Soviet archive material, and highlightquestions aboutthe formulationof Soviet foreign policy, the extent to which it wasmade by Stalin alone, and Molotov's role in foreign policy making. Khrushchevrecalled that MolotovISSN 0966-8136 print;ISSN 1465-3427 online/02/010051-35 ? 2002 University of GlasgowDOI: 10.1080/09668130120098241

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DEREKWATSONwas the only personin the Politburowho opposedStalin on this or thatquestionfor a secondtime ... There was not a conflict, but ... comments and a certain manifestation ofstubbornness.3

Gromyko and Zhukov were more specific: Gromyko recalled that Stalin 'left Molotovresponsible for dealing with a number of issues involving other countries', and that'Molotov exercised a considerable degree of influence on Stalin'.4 Zhukov claimedthat

at times it reached the point, that Stalin raised his voice and lost his temper,but Molotov,smiling,arose fromhis seat and defended his pointof view ... Molotov was not only a verydeterminedandstubbornman,who was difficult to move froma stanceif he reallyoccupiedany kind of position ... At that time he exercised a seriousinfluence on Stalin,in particularon questions of foreign policy, in which Stalin always, up to the war considered himcompetent.5

Anglo-Sovietrelations September1939-May 1942Before the German attack on the USSRWith the failure of the TripleAlliance negotiations n August 1939, the signatureofthe Nazi-Soviet pact, and the confrontationbetween Sir William Seeds, the Britishambassador, nd Molotov which followed,6Anglo-Sovietrelationshadbecome ratherfrigid.This continuedwith the expulsionof the USSR from the Leagueof NationsinDecember1939 following the attackon Finland,whenpressure n Britainfor severingdiplomaticrelations grew, Seeds leaving Moscow on 2 January1940. In his finalinterview with Molotov, Seeds, who perhaps unwisely carped about Molotov'streatmentof Britain in the Triple Alliance negotiations,stated that he regrettedthehostile attitude of the USSR as displayed in speeches and the Soviet press. He askedfor a message to the British Foreign Secretary to help reduce tension. In reply,Molotov declared that the Soviet government bore no enmity to Great Britain 'butwas convinced by acts all over the world that His Majesty's government wasunfriendly to Russia'.7 On Seeds's return to Britain he was said to be on holiday, butthere was considerable speculation in the British press that this was a formalseverance of diplomatic relations. In Moscow, Soviet leaders were aware that Britainwas sending military supplies to Finland, and had plans to intervene in the Finnishwar.8

In early February 1940 Sir Stafford Cripps, who was on a fact-finding tour of IndiaandChina,following a conversationwith the Soviet ambassador o China,offered tovisit Moscow if 'one of those in authority' wished to discuss Anglo-Soviet relationswith him. Cripps,who believed that the Soviet pact with Germanywas understrain,and had already tried to initiate a trade agreement and represent the views of theUSSR to the British government, found his offer accepted.9 He met Molotov, whomaintained hat the attackon Finland was the result of the location of Leningradandthe naval position in the Baltic. Crippsfelt that Molotov was 'anxious to cultivatebetter relations with GreatBritain',but found him non-committal.Althoughhe saidthat the USSR was prepared o make a tradeor political agreementwith Britain,he'indicated very clearly that any long delay might lead Russia to commit herself

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MOLOTOV,THE GRAND ALLIANCEAND THE SECONDFRONT 53elsewhere'. When M. Tikhomirnov,one of Molotov's subordinates,became awarethat Crippswas not due back in London until April, he had stated that this was 'toolong to wait'.'0 Discounting the usefulness of Cripps as an intermediarywith theBritishgovernment,Molotov now attempted o thwartBritishplansto intervene n theFinnishwar by having I. Maisky, the Soviet Ambassador o Britain,proposeto R.A.Butler, the Under-Secretaryor ForeignAffairs, that Britain should act as a mediatorbetween the USSR and Finland,an offer which was declined." Molotov's speech tothe SupremeSoviet in late March was very hostile to Britain.12The next major contact between the two powers occurred immediately afterChurchill's appointmentas Prime Minister in May 1940, when Crippswas sent toMoscow 'to create betterrelations', basically on a trademission, but with authorityfor his talks to 'flow over' into political matters. On Soviet insistence, Crippswasgiven ambassadorialstatus (less likely to antagonise the Germansthan sending aspecial envoy), Molotov arguingthat, in the light of the 1939 talks, it was not worthsending somebody only empowered to carry out exploratory negotiations. AsGorodetskyhas commented, 'the Russians hadgainedthe unprecedented chievementof ... forcing the British to returnan ambassador o Moscow'. In the light of Sovietsuspicions of English socialists, however, it is less likely that they secured 'theappointmentof their own candidate'.'3At two meetings,on 14 and 27 June,Crippstried to concentrateon politicalmattersandjudged thatMolotov, with the gravesituation n Europe,was receptiveto the ideaof more cooperation.14 Following the fall of France, an event which caused greatgloom amongthe Soviet leadership15s well as in Britain,Churchillpersonallysigneda letter to Stalin on 26 June, seeking an improvement n Anglo-Soviet relations;theletter, despite Churchill'sclaims that he was the author,was draftedin the ForeignOffice.16Crippshandedthe letter to Stalin with Molotov present,on 1 July,and a longbut inconclusive discussion ensued. Stalin stated that before 1939 the USSR, likeGermany,wanted to change the old equilibrium,whereas Britain and France wishedto restore it. If Churchillstill wished to do that,he could not agree with him and didnot think it possible.17The 1 July meeting was followed by a periodwhen Molotov refused to see Cripps,referringhim to A. Mikoyan,at firstbecause his approachwas on tradematters,andlater because Mikoyanwas a deputychairmanof Sovnarkom,as well as Commissarfor Foreign Trade.18Molotov eventually saw Cripps on 7 August, at an interviewdescribed by Cripps as 'a rathernegative one', Molotov explaining that the USSR'had failed to obtain in Britain the political, economic, and strategicbenefits whichshe gained from Germany'.19 upplementarymeetings followed on 24 August and 4October,but Crippswas now referred o deputycommissarA. Ya. Vyshinsky20-per-haps not surprisingas the Soviet leadershipwould not have wished to do anythingtodisturbrelations with Germanyat the time of Molotov's visit to Berlin. This wasbeing plannedfrom 17 October,with Molotov leaving for Berlin on 11 November.Crippswas clearly rattledwhen he found out aboutthe visit,21 writingto the ForeignOffice:

Vyshinsky's previousassurance o me thatMolotov's refusal to receive me had no politicalsignificance was now disprovedconclusively by his Berlin visit. Molotov's treatmentof



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DEREKWATSONmyself and my non-Axiscolleagueswas unprecedentednd showedunmistakablyiscompletely n-neutralttitude.22

Fear of antagonisingGermanyprobably ay behind Molotov's continuedrefusalto seeCrippsuntil 1 February1940. Then, after complaints by Eden, the British ForeignSecretary, o Maisky,about Soviet behaviour,Molotov tried to excuse his unavailabil-ity by telling Crippsthat, as Sovnarkomchairman,he had to spend much time ondomestic as well as foreign affairs. When Cripps challengedVyshinsky's authority,Molotov assured him that the Deputy Commissar had a full mandate to pursuenegotiations.23In April 1941 Cripps handed Vyshinsky a long memorandum,addressed toMolotov, analysingthe situationfacing the USSR and setting out the advantagesofjoining the allied powers. Churchill's famous warningto Stalin, that the Germans,following the defeat of Yugoslavia, were moving two divisions from Romania toPoland, was sent a few days later.24 f, as Gorodetskyargues, these initiatives onlyconvinced the Soviet leaders that the British were desperateto involve the USSR inthe war, the flight of Hess to Britain, on 12 May, also greatly alarmed the Sovietleadership hat a separatepeace was about to be negotiated;or even that Britainmightbe entering nto an alliance with Nazi Germanyagainstthe USSR. This situationwasexacerbatedas Cripps,to put pressureon the Soviet leadership, n his memorandumto Molotov, had hinted about the possibility of Britain making a separatepeace.2There was thus little changein Anglo-Sovietrelationsfrom 1939 until the time Hitlerlaunched Barbarossa.

Thefirst monthsof warAs is well known, Molotov, not Stalin, announced he Germanattack,on Sunday22June 1941. Recent accounts and Stalin's office diary, however, belie the traditionalstorythat this was because the Soviet leader was incapacitated or the firstfew weeksof the war.26At 9 p.m. Churchillmadehis firstresponseto the invasionof the USSRin a broadcast n which he said:

Anymanor statewhofightson againstNazidomwill have our aid ... It followsthereforewe shallgive whatever elpwe can to Russiaandthe Russianpeople,although,as he went on to point out, he had always been an inveterateenemy of theUSSR, and the broadcast ncluded no welcome to an ally.27On the sameday,Molotovtelegraphed Maisky that the Soviet governmentcould not receive assistance fromBritainwithoutrecompense,and was prepared o render aid to Britain.28Crippshad been recalled to Londonat the time of the Germanattack.He returnedto the USSR on 26 June with a British military mission, but with no well-definedbrief, and saw Molotov twice on 27 June.29At these meetingshe found that Molotovwas alreadyinsistent on the need for 'a political agreementto define the basis ofcooperation',the statementbeing linked to questionsabout Hess's landingin Britainin May.30Molotov began the first interviewby raisingthe Hess issue, and would nothave been reassuredwhen Crippsreplied

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MOLOTOV,THE GRAND ALLIANCEAND THE SECOND FRONT 55that n thepastHesshadbeen inkedwitha circleof youngEnglishwithpro-Nazi pinionsand believed hathe couldnegotiate nd concludepeacewith thatgroup..

In the secondmeetingMolotov questionedCripps n detailon the scale of help Britainwas likely to be able to offer the USSR, and ended by pressing the ambassadoronthe politicalbasis of cooperation.In the light of heightenedSoviet fears about Britainmaking a separatepeace, or an alliance with Nazi Germanyas a result of the Hessaffair,this was hardly surprising.Molotov foundCrippsevasive: he said thatmilitaryand economic cooperationwas essential, political collaborationcould come later.31Cripps saw Molotov again on 29 June, when he raised the question of militarycooperationin the Murmanskarea (to secure the only route available for supplies).Molotov, duringthis meeting, described the situation on the fronts as 'fluid'.32Molotov now began to see Crippsand members of the Britishmilitarymission onan almostdaily basis, but the Soviet leadershad alreadyrealised that the USA wouldhave to be the chief supplierof war materials.33Molotov telegraphedK. Umansky,the Soviet Ambassador n Washington,on 29 June,askinghim to approachRooseveltabout the possibility of assisting with 6000 aeroplanesand large quantitiesof otherequipment.34Regarding he USA as the main source of war suppliesnot only put theemphasis in negotiationswith the British on political matters and militaryassistancebut also made the British more cautious about cooperating, because vital warmaterialsfrom the USA were now being diverted to the USSR.35Molotov continuedto press Crippsabout a political agreement,saying that his previousattitudehad beendetermined by an attempt to postpone war, and that negotiations could now beconducted without reservations.36When Stalin saw Cripps on 8 July he againdemonstrated that Soviet fears had been heightened by the Hess episode. Hereinforced the need for a political understanding, aying he wanted an agreement'ofa purely general nature' on two points:

(1) mutualhelpwithoutany precision s to quantity r quality,(2) neither ountryo conclude separate eace.37Following a further meeting between Stalin, Molotov and Cripps on 10 July,principally o discuss wording,38hese two points were the centralclauses of thejointagreement signed on 12 July by Molotov and Cripps, which marked the peak ofCripps'sinfluence in Moscow. On Stalin's insistence the war was described as beingagainst 'HitleriteGermany'.This meant that if Hitler was overthrown nternallyandreplaced by a communist regime, the USSR could reconsider the question of aseparatepeace.39In the Soviet Union the need to make Germany fight on two or more fronts wasassumed to be a priorityfrom the very early days of the war, and Maisky had raisedthis with Beaverbrookas early as 27 June 1941.40Molotov broached he topic of theSecond Front in an interview with Crippson 18 July.41On the same day Stalin senthis first personal message to Churchill in which he too raised the question of theopening of a Second Front. Not yet separated rom requestsfor military equipment,the issue was stressedin further etters to Churchillwritten on 3 and 13 September,as the situationon the front deteriorated.42t was a hint of frictionthat was to come,and from the beginning the outlook was not good, because the British political and



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DEREKWATSONmilitary eadershipwere only lukewarm n supportof the agreementsigned by Crippsand Molotov.43The preliminary oint agreementwas followed by a trade and credit agreementsigned on 16 August, and by the 'three-powerconference' in Moscow, held 29September-1October.This had been proposedby Roosevelt andChurchillwhen theyformulated he Atlantic Charter n August.44Molotov took the chair at this confer-ence, Beaverbrook eading the British delegation and Averell Harriman he Ameri-can.45Harriman ound Molotov overbearing, acking in humour and inflexible. Heinsisted that there must be a signed formal protocol, probablythinking this wouldcommit the 'capitalist powers'. The protocol extended the Lend-Lease scheme andpromised large quantities of supplies to the USSR.46 On 30 September Stalinproposeda formalAnglo-Soviet alliance, 'not only for the war, but for the post-waras well'. The final negotiationsfor this treaty,conductedby Molotov in London inMay 1942, causeddifferencesbetween the two Westernpowers,which Molotov latertried to exploit to Soviet advantage,both to gain recognitionof Soviet frontierclaimsand a high priorityfor the Second Front.With the deterioratingmilitary situation in the USSR, Stalin's and Molotov'semphasis in negotiationswith Britain moved from a political agreementto militaryassistance, for which they were desperate. The initial British response made byCripps,on 14 October,was to offer Britishtroopsto control the growing disorder nPersia, thus freeing Soviet troops for service on the eastern front. Molotov dislikedthis proposal. He pointed out that no British troops were assisting the USSR, andarguedthat Persia and the easternfront were two differentquestions. He suggestedthat Britishtroops might help defend the Caucasus from the Germans.When Crippsenquiredhow Britishtroopswould be suppliedif sent to the USSR, Molotov repliedthat 'until that time comes the question has a platonic, abstractcharacter'.4 At afurthermeeting,on 22 October,when the Britishhad offeredtroopsfor service in theCaucasus,Molotovresponded hatthere was not a frontthere,andaskedif the Britishgovernment really wanted to send their forces to fight the Germans.48As recentlypublished documents make clear, in a conversation with Sikorski, in June 1942,Molotov let slip that the lack of enthusiasmof the Soviet government o have Englishtroops in the Caucasusarose from its fear of the effect on the local populationofwithdrawingSoviet troops from the area.49Cripps was becoming steadily more frustratedwith his position, Beaverbrookhaving deliberatelyexcluded him from the 'three-powerconference' and deprivedhim of information.50His relationswith Molotov were not improvedwhen he forcedthe latterto appointM. Litvinov,Molotov's enemy andpredecessoras NarkomIndel,as interpreter o the 'three-powerconference,' instead of Umansky, who was unac-ceptableto the Americans.5With the evacuationof Moscow, Molotov too was underconsiderablestrain,Crippswriting of him on 15 October that he had never beforelooked

so tiredand ll ... he wasdeadlypaleandhiscollarallawrywherehe is generally eryneatandtidy.52S. Kot, the ambassadorfor the Polish government-in-exile,who saw Molotov inKuibyshev on 22 October,described him as 'obsessed with the seriousness of the

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MOLOTOV,THE GRAND ALLIANCEAND THE SECOND FRONT 57situation,but endeavouringnevertheless o masterhis exhaustion'. Cripp'sinterviewwith Molotov on 23 October in Kuibyshev, when W. Citrine was visiting with aBritish trade union delegation, degeneratedinto little more than a squabble, withMolotov accusing the British of avoiding their military responsibilities and notreplyingto requestsfor militaryassistance.Crippsdenied this, saying that the USSRhad not responded to questions as to where the troops should be deployed.54ThesympatheticCitrinedid not reportthe altercationwith Cripps in the account of hisvisit to the USSR. Impressedwith the grandeurof Molotov's office in Kuibyshev,henoted only that Molotov was pale, gesticulatingwith his hands as he spoke in shortsharpsentences.55Molotov continued to increase Cripps'sunease. In early November, when Crippsclaimed he was pressurisingthe British government,Molotov replied that he fearedthat Cripps 'had no power of persuading hem'. Anxious to return o Britain,Crippswrote to Eden that he saw no point in remaining in Moscow to be used as an'occasionalpost box'. He wished to resign, unless the Britishgovernmentwas goingto negotiate a full treatyof alliance to replace the July agreement.56Shortly after this interview Stalin sent Churchill his angry letter of 8 November,declaring that there was neither a definite understandingbetween Britain and theUSSR on war aims and plans for post-warorganisation,nor an agreementon mutualmilitary assistance against Hitler. He stated that he did not wish to meet GeneralsWavell and Paget, whom Churchillproposedto send to inform him of the militarysituation,unless they had powers to conclude an agreementon assistance and waraims, and claimed that British warsupplieswere arrivingbadly packedandbroken.57On 21 November Churchill, after delaying a response, offered to send Eden andmilitary advisers to visit Stalin. This was pleasing to Cripps, who found Edensympathetic.58On 6 December, in preparation or the visit, the British governmentannounced hat a state of war existed between Britain,on the one hand,andFinland,Hungaryand Romania on the other.59The Eden visitDespite his efforts to ensure the success of the Moscow conference before he leftBritain, Eden, who preferredan alliance with the USSR to one with the USA,60wassent to Moscow with no detailedbrief, whereas,as his letter of 8 Novembershowed,Stalin had very fixed ideas. This meant that a positive outcome was unlikely.Moreover, by the time Eden arrived, for both sides the greatest urgency for anagreement had passed. Japan had attacked Pearl Harbour,the United States hadentered the war, and the British need for an alliance with the Soviet Union becamea much lower priority. Not only did British politicians believe that the eventualoutcome of the war was decided, but the Japaneseattack on Malaya meant that theopening of a British front in Europeto aid the USSR was a secondaryconsideration.In addition,as Churchillhad decided to travel to the United States, the negotiationsto be carriedon in Moscow were no longercentrestage. Eden,who had been lookingfor a diplomatic coup, knew this. In the USSR the initial German onslaught onMoscow had been repelled,which meant that the Soviet leaders were no longer quiteso desperatefor assistance.61From the Eden Papers and recently published Soviet



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DEREKWATSONdocumentswe have a much clearerpictureof the detail of the negotiationsand of theprioritiesof the Soviet leadershipat this point.Eden arrived at Murmanskon 12 December and was met by Molotov when hearrived in Moscow on 15 December.62At the first meeting with Eden, on 17December, Stalin producedtwo drafts,on a militaryalliance duringthe war and onpost-war cooperation.63These were to replace the July agreement,but with a muchmore binding formula.In response,Eden produceda document which was basicallysimilar, but about which Stalin made his famous comment that Eden's documentresembled a declaration,that declarationswere algebra,whilst treaties were simplepracticalarithmetic,and he wanted arithmetic.64Stalin also proposeda secretprotocolto be attached o the second document.It wasto deal with two matters: irstly, the recognitionof both the Soviet Union's westernfrontieron the basis of the 'Curzon ine' amended n favour of the USSR, and of theUSSR's absorptionof the Baltic states and Bessarabia;and secondly, the future ofEurope, including Germany,which the document indicated was to be dismembered.In the light of the Atlantic Charterand the lack of an agreed British policy, Edencould do no more than say that furtherconsultations with Churchill,the USA andDominions were necessaryon these matters;but he left Stalin with theimpression hathe accepted de facto the Soviet claims with regardto the Baltic states.65From thistime Stalin and Molotov always behaved, in negotiationswith the British, as if thefuture of the Baltic states was settled, althoughon a number of occasions Churchillmade clear thatit was not.66 f they did not believe that it was the case, it was a usefulbargainingposition. It is also clear that, from the beginning, for Stalin and Molotovthe post-war settlement was as importantan issue for negotiation as a war-timealliance.

On the next day, although an acceptable formula had been worked out on thetreaties, Stalin, claiming that the Atlantic Charterignored Soviet security needs,refused to sign them unless Russia's 1941 western frontiers were recognised at thesame time.67The positionremained he sameat a thirdmeeting,Edenrecording n hisdiary and memoirs 'Molotov was most unhelpful', adding in his memoirs 'and theclose of our discussionfrigid'.68The negotiationswere thus deadlocked:Britain wasprepared o makea treatyonly to win the war whilst Stalinwas intent on guaranteeingsecure Soviet bordersin the post-warworld.There was now a break in the conference to allow Eden to consult the cabinet.During this time, whilst the British Foreign Secretary was away from Moscowvisiting the front, Cripps 'nobly volunteeredto stay behind to give Molotoff [sic] alecture'.69He informed the Commissar or ForeignAffairs of the priorcommitmentswhich the British cabinet had to honour, and stressed that the failure of the Edenmission would strengthen orces in Britainopposed to cooperationwith the USSR.Molotov's response was to emphasiseStalin's position on the frontierquestion,andto point out the previous Soviet approacheson the matter. He denied Eden's claimthat a new issue was being raisedduringthe talks, and arguedthat the alliance mustbe based on the new

relationswhichhave been formedbetween heUSSRand Britainn the strugglewith thecommon enemy...

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MOLOTOV,THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND THE SECONDFRONT 59The warringcountries-Britain, the USSR and the USA-must know what each of themwasfightingfor. The elementary nterestsof these countriesmust be recognised.The questionoffrontierswas the most elementaryquestion.Withoutsettlingthis questionthere could be noreal lasting alliance, and we would like to have one ...We could not sign an agreement after six months of the war leaving quite substantialquestions open. ComradeStalinhad statedoutright hat neitherhe nor the Government ouldappearbefore the people with such an answer. He had even said thatthe people might wantsuch a Government o go to hell.70

The British cabinet supported he line Eden was taking, opposing the recognitionofthe 1941 Soviet frontiers and stressingthe need to consult the USA and Dominions.At the finalmeeting Stalin made the Soviet position clear in a statementreflectingthetemporaryslight improvement n the Soviet military position:He had proposedattachingprotocolsto the treaties,but the Britishside hadbeen againstit,and he had discardedthe protocols.He had also droppedhis requestfor opening a SecondFront.It was also unclear what the state of affairs was concerning he questionof a northernoperation n the areaof Petsamo. In view of these concessions, Comrade Stalin thoughthehad the right to requestsome compensation n the form of recognitionof our 1941 westernfrontier.71

Eden therefore eft Moscow without an agreement,Stalinreluctantlyagreeingto waitfor three more weeks for furtherconsultationsin London.72The carefully wordedcommunique which was issued at the end of the talks spoke only of a friendlyatmosphere,agreementon the necessity for the 'utterdefeat of HitleriteGermany',anexchange of views on post-war peace and security, and a step towards closercooperation.73Althoughhe met Eden when he arrived n Moscow, saw him off when he departed,and received him in the Kremlin, 'dressed in a little buff uniform coat and Russianboots', when Eden arrived for a formal dinner,74Molotov played only a minor role,stressing Soviet priorities. This was typical when Stalin was present at negotiations.When Stalin pressed for the recognition of the Soviet western frontier,

Comrade Molotov expressed surpriseat Eden's persistentdefence of his position. We aretalking of common military goals, common struggle, but in one of the most importantmilitarygoals, our western frontier,we cannot derive supportfrom Great Britain.Is thisreally normal?

Later, when Eden insisted that it was necessary to consult the British government onthis matter, he continued:I am of the opinion that this questionof the westernfrontiers s the major questionfor us,and if no definite answercan be obtainedupon it I thinkit is better to put off the signingof the agreements.

At the next session on the same topic he added:We are going to sign a treatyof mutual assistance or alliance and we must know what weare fightingfor and where we stand.

His other main contribution was to support Stalin when the General Secretary raised



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DEREK WATSONthe questionof the Second Front,but this was a minorinputthatoccurredquite nearthe end of the meetings.75At the banquet at the end of the conference Stalin blamed Molotov for theNazi-Soviet pact.He also narrated he storyof Molotov's visit to Berlin in November1940, which Churchill claimed Stalin told him when he visited Moscow in August1942. Accordingto this, when Molotov met Ribbentrop n a dugout duringa Britishairraid,andRibbentrop laimed that Britainwas finished,Molotov asked: 'Whythenare we in this dugout and whose bombs have put us here?' Eden claimed that, inresponse to Stalin's story, Molotov smiled and nodded.76Outside the main conference meetings, Molotov behaved more typically in dis-cussing subsidiarymatters,Eden writingto Crippsabout one of these on 13 January1942:

When was in Moscow, hadspoken o M. Molotovon thesubject f theKurds ndhadgivenhim a notewhich, hadexplained,wasnotstrictly diplomaticocument ut was anotepreparedor me. It was not, therefore,ouched n verysuitable erms or a foreigngovernment.We have now receiveda reply romM. Molotovwhichwas somewhatharpin tone, and I feared that this mightwell have been my fault for giving the Sovietgovernment documentn this form.77

From Eden in Moscow to Molotov in LondonMolotov had indicated to Cripps on 19 December his displeasureat the failure tosecure an agreement on frontiers. On 26 December he tried to persuade theambassador hat the original belligerent powers, Britain and the USSR, should actindependentlyof the USA against Germany,but Crippsdid not respondfavourably.78This, a clear reflection of Molotov's commitment to an ideological framework,appears o be his firstattempt o createdivisions between the 'imperialistpowers'. Itis less certainthat he was proposingan Anglo-Soviet alliance which could eventuallybe directedagainst the USA.Molotov was clearly hostile at Cripps's last two interviews,79and the latter leftMoscow on 9 January 1942 without any of the civilities normally shown to adepartingambassador.80 is replacement,A. ClarkKerr,did not arriveuntil March,81which left somethingof a hiatus.At their first meeting, on 28 March,Molotov tookup the question of the Second Front.82 t had clearly come to the top of the Sovietagenda again, an indication of the militarysituation at the time.83If, in Moscow, Eden had given de facto recognitionof the USSR's claims to theBaltic States,84back in London, Churchillcontinued to oppose recognition of theSoviet Union's 1941 westernfrontiers.Moreover,the British cabinet and permanentstaff of the foreign office were divided. This meant that the consultationsfor whichStalin had allowed three weeks took considerably longer. In Februarythe Britishcabinet agreed to approachRoosevelt about the frontier question, but found himstrongly opposedto the Russianproposal.85n March,throughLitvinov,now servingas ambassador o the USA, Roosevelt appealed o Stalinto defer the frontierquestionuntil the end of the war. Stalin's reply was a curtmessage from Molotov to Litvinovinstructinghim to tell Roosevelt that the Soviet government ook note of his views.Molotov's relations with Litvinov continued to be strained. When the ambassador

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MOLOTOV, THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND THE SECOND FRONT 61suggestedhe shouldapproachRoosevelt aboutthe Second Front,Molotov forbadhimto raise the matter,saying that they had alreadyhad three refusals and did not wanta fourth.86With continuingBritish militaryreverses in the FarEast, Churchill,by 25 March,was prepared o consider opening negotiationswith the USSR and making conces-sions on the frontierquestion.The British cabinetagreedon 8 April,87when Molotovwas invited to come to London to negotiate the proposed treaty.88Roosevelt, whoregisteredhis dissatisfaction,agreednot to criticise the proposedtreatypublicly.But,to counterthe Britishinitiative,he invited Molotov to Washington o discuss militarymatters,hinting at the possibility of a Second Front. He wrote to Stalin that he had

in minda very mportantmilitary roposalnvolving he utilisation f ourarmedorces na mannero relieveyourcriticalWesternront.Thisobject arries reatweightwithme ...time is of the essence f we are to helpin an important ay.89

On 13 April Maisky told Eden that althoughMolotov appreciated he invitation tocome to London, he was unable to acceptbecausehe had been chargedby Stalin with moreimportant uties in connectionwithproductions well as his dutiesas Commissaror ForeignAffairsand could not absenthimself romMoscowduring he next few criticalmonths.90

With regard o Roosevelt's invitation,Molotov first directedUmanskyto obtain moredetails of what was to be discussed.Then, on 20 April, Stalin wrote to Roosevelt thatit was essential to arrangea meeting between Molotov and Rooseveltto exchangeopinionson the organisationf a SecondFront n Europe n the shortestpossible ime,and that he agreedto Molotov visiting London,as well as Washington.91He wrote toChurchill on 22 April that

the Sovietgovernment, espiteall the difficulties, as decided o sendV. M Molotov oLondon o settleby personal onversationsll theproblems ndobstacles n the way ofsigning hetreaty.This is particularlyssentialbecause hequestion f forming SecondFront n Europe, aised n a recentmessage o mepersonally y the President f theUSA,Mr Roosevelt,with an invitation o Washingtono discuss this question,demandsapreparatoryxchange f opinionsbetween epresentativesf ourgovernments.92The USA was holding out the possibility of a Second Front;Molotov was thereforeto go to London first to test the less enthusiastic British opinion. Eden haddemonstrated hat Britainmight make concessions on Soviet territorial laims. If hewent to Washington first, Molotov might have to trade these for a promise of aSecond Front.93 n London he might get some firm agreementon frontiers beforegoing on to Washington. Again, Stalin and Molotov were trying to divide the'imperialistcamp'.

Eden's drafttreatyfor the meetings, which recognised Soviet claims to the Balticstates, includedprovisionsto allow emigration rom them, and he suggestedthat theUSSR should make a declarationallowing the Baltic Statesto preservesome measureof autonomy.The Soviet drafts submittedby Maiskyon 1 May ignoredthis proposal.They proposedthat the question of the Russian frontier with Poland was to be dealt



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DEREK WATSONwith in a separatenote: the outcome of direct negotiationsbetween the USSR andPoland in which the British were not to be involved. A secret protocol was alsoproposedallowingthe USSR to give guarantees o Romaniaand Finlandand establishbases in those two countries.94As a result, Eden had Sir Alexander Cadogan,thePermanentUnder-Secretary f State at the ForeignOffice, who had accompaniedhimto Moscow, preparea modified draft document which dropped the proposals foremigrationfrom the Baltic states, together with a second document to be held inreserve in case negotiationson the main treatybroke down. This was essentially awartimeallianceandagreementon post-warcooperationwith no mention of post-warfrontiers, he advantageof which, Eden claimed, was that it was no longer necessaryfor Great Britainto safeguard he Polish position.95Eden had two main purposesinhis drafts: to increase Stalin's confidence in Britain, and by making concessions tolimit his appetite for territory.Behind this there still lurked a fear that the USSRmight make a separatepeace.96In Moscow there was a marked mprovement n Anglo-Americanrelations beforethe visit took place, ClarkKerrwriting to Eden on 27 April:

The huddle went nto withStalinproved o be cosierandpleasanterhanI ever dared ohope.Probablyt was no more hanajuxtapositionf two oldrogues, achone seeing heroguery f the otherandfinding omfort ndharmonyn it, andchuckling ver t-chuck-ling all the more shamelesslybecause of the goveressy presenceof that bootfacedMolotov .. I havegreathopesof the talksyou are to have with bootface.97It seems quite clear thatClark Kerr did not understandStalin, or the Stalin-Molotovrelationship.In that he had not been in post a month, this is not surprising,butperhapshe might have been better briefed on these matters.

Molotov's visit to Britain and the USA,May-June 1942London,22-27 May 1942In his telegramof 20 April to Roosevelt, Stalin had specified 10-15 May as the datesfor Molotov's visit to Washington.98Roosevelt suggested to Churchillthat Molotovmight visit Washington first, but this idea was headed off by the British primeminister, who said that Molotov might already have left by the time Roosevelt'smessage arrivedin Moscow. Churchillproposed that Molotov should visit Britainfirst,thenthe USA, finally returningo Britain, o sign an agreement.99t soon becameclear that initially Molotov did not envisage returning o Britain after visiting theUSA. 00GeneralA. E. Golovanov was responsiblefor planningthe mission, the knowledgeof which was apparently imited to him, Molotov and Stalin, who, it appears,inDecember 1941 had proposed making such a visit personally. Golovanov led theadvanced party which arrivedon 29 April,101 ut Stalin and Molotov insisted onkeepingthe date of Molotov's arrivalsecret,which made the British feel thatMolotovwas keeping other options open for the time.'02Clearly, secrecy was essential forMolotov's personal safety, but he would have become even more wary when the

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MOLOTOV,THE GRAND ALLIANCEAND THE SECOND FRONT 63USSR air attache and three other Soviet officials, including a secretarywho was amemberof the advancedpartyfor the Molotov visit, were killed in late April, whena RAF plane in which they were flying burst into flames.103Cadoganwas deputedto meet Molotov. He spent 10-14 May in Scotland,awaitingMolotov's arrival at Tealing airportnear Dundee, taking Maisky and other Sovietofficials on sightseeingvisits to Edinburgh,Balmoraland other venues in the interim.Six days after Cadogan'sreturnto London,Molotov arrivedon 20 May,104 fter anovernightflight of 10.25 hours. He travelledin a Tb-7 (to be renamedPe-8 after itsdesigner V. M. Petlyakov, who was killed in 1942), a four-enginedheavy bomber,only nine of which were in existence. These planes were capable of flying at highaltitudes and Molotov flew over the front and occupied Europe at an altitude of30 000 feet, thus avoiding Germanfighters.The pilot was MajorE. R. Pusep, whomade a number of flights of this nature.On arrival, Molotov, who travelled as 'MrBrown', reported,a little alarmingly,that one engine was leaking oil and neededservicing.105Cadoganboardedthe special trainbringingMolotov and his partyto LondonnearHatfield,and found Molotov dressed n a smartbrownsuit, 'at the top of his formandmost chatty'. He had refusedto fly to London,probablybecause of the recentplanecrashkilling Soviet personnel.FromLondon,Molotov was drivento Chequerswherehe and his party, including Maisky, were to stay for the visit.'06 According toChurchill,staff at Chequerswere surprisedwhen the Soviet partyasked for their roomkeys and insisted on keeping theirdoors locked. When the staff eventually managedto gain access, to make the beds, they were disturbed o find thatMolotov and otherleading officials slept with pistols under their pillows. In addition to male NKVDbodyguards,Molotov had a female attendantwho was responsiblefor looking afterhis clothes and keeping his room tidy. She kept constant guard in the room inMolotov's absence. On Molotov's arrival he NKVD bodyguardsmade a meticuloussearch of the room and every piece of furniture n it. The bedding was so arrangedthat Molotov could springout of it at a moment's notice, and a revolver was placednext to his briefcase by the bed each night. Churchill's comment on these arrange-ments was that Molotov should have asked whetheranyone on the British side hadany interest in killing him.'07Molotov recorded in his memoirs:WestayedatChequersifty-sixtykilometresromLondon. arranged dinnerhereonthefirstdayof thevisit.Churchill, denandI were here.Therewas somesortof smallgarden.Not a palatial ldbuilding.Apparently,omeold nobleman adgiven t to thegovernmentto use. It was theprimeminister's esidence.Therewas a bathroom utno shower.ThenwhenI visitedRoosevelt, stayed n the White House.Everything f Roosevelt'swasup-to-date;e had a bathroomwith a showeras well.108Formal negotiations commenced on 21 May. Molotov was assisted by Maiskythroughoutthe negotiations, the chief British representativeswere Churchill andEden. Molotov immediatelydemonstrated hat the USSR clearly had multipleobjec-tives for the conference. He began the proceedingsby statingthathe was authorisedto negotiateon two matters,althoughdiscussion of otherswas notprecluded.The firstwas the treaties, protocol and related matters, already discussed with Eden thepreviousDecember;the second was the 'establishmentof a SecondFront n the west',



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DEREKWATSONwhich he would be travellingto discuss in the USA as well as in Britain. Molotovadded that the Soviet governmentconsideredthe Second Front, an issue raised byRoosevelt, to be especially/more mportantandto be primarilya political rather hanmilitarymatter.109his statementclearly brought he questionof the Second Fronttothe top of the agenda,but its significanceduring he negotiationswas to varywith theSoviet militarysituation,and Soviet post-warsecuritywas somethingthat could betraded off for it. On both issues, Molotov could exploit differencesbetween Britainand the USA.After talk about Molotov's appealfor secrecy, particularly s he was travellingonto the USA, there was a generaldiscussion of the draftdocuments,and of the Sovietdemand for treaties which recognisedthe 1941 frontiersof the USSR as a guaranteefor Soviet security.Molotov claimed that the Soviet governmentwould do everythingto reach an amicable settlement with the Polish government, despite the currentdifferences. Churchill,who said that the Soviet claims created 'grave difficulties'because they contravenedthe Atlantic Charter,ended this first meeting trying todeflect Molotov's demand for a Second Front,by going into details on the logisticsof a proposed oint US-British invasionof the continent,which he saidwas a militaryquestion.Molotov insisted that he wishedto clarifythe political aspectsof the SecondFront.10? adoganmade the comment 'Blackmail' in his diary "'Molotov had a more detailed conversationwith Eden later the same day, most ofthe meeting being a long wrangleover the Polish frontierquestion. They agreedthat,at the end of the war, Poland might be compensatedwith Germanterritory n thewest, but Molotov insisted on the 1941 Soviet-Polish frontierbased on the Curzonline, and the rightof the Soviet government o negotiatethis directlywith the Polishgovernment.Eden, pointing out that since December the British governmenthadmade concessions with regard to the Baltic states, was adamant that the Britishgovernmenthad pledges to Poland which it had to honour under the August 1939Mutual AssistanceAgreement,reaffirmedat the time of the Soviet-Polish agreementof 30 July 1941.12 Eden may have been attempting o obtain a Soviet concession onthe Polish frontier in return for the British concession on the Baltic states, butMolotov insisted that the British governmenthad made no concessions, since 'theBaltic states had been partof Russia for hundredsof years'. He claimed that the onlycompromisewas being madeby the USSR, in agreeingto settle the frontierquestionamicablywith Poland, eaving open the determination f the very largeremainingpartof the USSR's western frontier. He believed that Britain should make a concessionin agreeing not to insist on her statementof July 1941 to the Poles. 13Molotov'sreport o Stalinon these two meetingsconfirmed he aims of Soviet policy. He wrote:

I stressed the particular mportanceand urgency of the question of the Second Front,referring o Roosevelt's initiative,in connection with the invitation to me to visit the USAto discuss this question...The minimum for us is the restorationof what has been violated by Hitler,plus additionalminimumguaranteesof security,in the firstplace, north-westand south-west of the USSRfrontiers.If the Britishgovernmentmaintains hat an agreementon this basis is impossibleat the moment,it is better to postponethe issue of treaties until a more favourable ime inthe future ..

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MOLOTOV, THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND THE SECOND FRONT 65Churchillmade a brief statementon the questionof the SecondFront,the meaningof whichis that the BritishGovernmentand the US governmenthave decidedin principleto establishsuch a front in Europe,with maximumforces at their disposal and at the earliest possibledate, and they are making energeticpreparationsor that.Nonetheless Churchill refrainedfrom elaboratingon these general statements,while refer-ring to the greattechnical difficulties involved in the realisationof a Second Front... I heldto the view that this was not a purely military question, but was above all a politicalquestion, and one of great urgency.... The questionof Poland was discussedat length.I wanted to provethat,in ourwillingnessto meet the wishes of Britain, we were proposing a compromise and making a bigconcessionby not demandingBritain'sapprovalof the restorationof the 1941 Soviet-Polishbordernow, and,promisingto settle this matterdirectlywithPolandin an amicableway, weare asking Britain for a smallerconcession, namely, that she not reiterateher statementof10 [mistake for 31] July 1940."l4On the following day the morning was taken up by a meeting on the military

logistics of the Second Front proposed by Churchill.115Molotov, who Cadogan noted'had all the grace and conciliation of a totem pole',"16 insisting on a political focus,argued that although the idea was Roosevelt's, since the true burden of establishinga Second Front in Europe must necessarily fall on Britain, it should be discussed therebefore he went to the USA. He continued by pointing out that the main burden ofresisting Hitler was falling on the USSR, and, in the light of the desperate situationhis country faced, asked whether the Allies of the Soviet Union, above all Britain,could not divert 40 German divisions to fighting a battle in Western Europe in thesummer of 1942. This, he argued, might determine the eventual outcome of the warthat year, and not later. Rather than begging for help, he was telling the Westernpowers how victory could be achieved most quickly. In response, Churchill spoke ofthe lack of British and American resources to mount a European offensive in 1942.He claimed, however, that operations in Libya occupied eleven Axis divisions,including three German, and that Hitler had to maintain thirty three divisions inNorway, France and Holland. He said that Britain intended to invade Europe in 1943.During this discussion, Molotov (perhaps looking for divisions in the 'imperialistcamp') repeatedly tried to clarify whether Churchill was stating an agreed Anglo-American position or was speaking only on behalf of Britain.ll7 Embarrassingly, heinsisted on reminding the British prime minister of the small proportion of Britishforces actively engaged in military operations in May 1942, and of the relativelyminor losses the British had suffered. In response, Churchill could say only thatBritain had stood alone after the fall of France until the German attack on the USSR,and try to explain the difficulty of mounting an attack on the continent. He suggestedthat the military representatives meet for this to be elucidated. The Soviet record ofthis conversation, which makes clear Molotov's misgivings, states:

Molotov asked with a touch or irony 'What are in fact the prospects of the generals'meeting?'18Later in the day Molotov met Eden again. There were further inconclusive discussionson the Soviet-Polish frontier, on the British proposal on a right of emigration in the



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DEREKWATSONBaltic states, and on the Soviet demandfor mutual assistance treatieswith Finlandand Romania.Molotov claimed that the USSR needed to protect itself from furtherattacks rom these countries n alliance withGermany,butthe Britishsuspected t wasto allow the USSR to occupy them if it chose.'19After his return rom Downing Street on 22 May, to Molotov's surprise,Churchilland Eden arrivedat Chequers or anothermeeting. This was an attemptby Churchilland Eden to browbeat Molotov into concessions. Held in a room where, Molotovreportedto Stalin, 'there happenedto be a large revolving globe', the discussionscontinued from 10 p.m. to 1 a.m. the following morning, and were centred onChurchill'sanalysis of the militarysituation.Following this, Churchilltalked aboutthe need to avoid controversialmatters such as frontiers,and Eden introducedhis'reserve' treaty,in which there was no mention of frontiers,the details of which, hesaid, he would supply tomorrow. The implication was clear: British concessionswould be withdrawn f Molotov continuedto insist on the Soviet proposalsfor thePolish eastern frontier.Interestingly,there is no record of this meeting in Britisharchives, only hints in diaries. Molotov's report to Stalin and the Narkomlndelarchive, however, now make clear that this additionalmeeting took place-and itssignificance.120In threereportson 23 May Molotov explainedthe position to Stalin. If he did notagree to the originalBritishproposalof two treaties withoutany statementattachedregarding rontiers, he British leaders were falling back on Eden's reservedocument,keeping the originaldocumentopen for signatureonly if Molotov agreedto discussit in the USA and then return o Britain. Molotov resistedthis, saying that a secondvisit to Britain aftertravellingto the USA was not in his instructions.He knew thatdiscussions with Roosevelt were not going to strengthenhis position on the USSR'sfrontiers. Churchill and Eden clearly believed that when Molotov found that Roo-sevelt was unsympathetic o Soviet securitydemands,he would be persuaded o signa treatythat referred rontierquestionsto the end of the war. On his side, Molotov,who reported o Stalin the personalpressureChurchilland Eden were puttingon him,was trying desperatelyto obtain a statementon post-warfrontiersacceptableto theUSSR, if not in the treatyitself, in a note accompanying t. He informed Stalin thatChurchillwas unsympatheticboth on the questionof the Second Frontand on Sovietfrontiers,writing:

CONCLUSIONS1. All the recentconversationsive me theimpressionhatChurchill.. is not in a hurryto agreewith us at the moment.2. I consider it pointless to return to Britain after my visit to the USA, because I see noprospectsof improvementresultingfrom this.3. Most probably,the prospectsfor my trip to the USA are not favourable,either,but thepromise to go has to be kept.'12

On 23 May Eden presented his alternative document, which he said he was sure thatthe USA would support. He explained that the new treaty combined the agreedportions of the first two drafts: a treaty of alliance during the war and post-warcooperation. It excluded points in dispute, especially the USSR's frontier with Poland,

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MOLOTOV,THE GRAND ALLIANCEAND THE SECOND FRONT 67and Article 4 of the Britishdraft-the proposalto allow emigration.Eden statedthatthe distinguishingfeature of the new draftwas an article stipulatingthat the USSRand GreatBritainshould renderreciprocalassistance to each other for 20 years afterthe war. This would put the relations between the two partieson a firmfooting, andcould be suspended if the post-war organisationof Europe was achieved to theirmutual satisfaction. Molotov's response was guarded: he Soviet governmentwouldhave to be consulted, and, with a completely new draft, this was not possible bytelegraphwhilst he was in Britain. He also said that he had reservations about theexclusion of matters in the earlier versions.Whilst not rejectingthe new document,Molotov asked to conclude discussion onthe originaldrafts. This Eden agreedto, and Molotov focused discussion on amend-ments to the Soviet proposalson Finland and Romania.He also tried to whittle downthe Britishproposal regardingright of emigration,restricting t to national minoritiesonly.122He had not received a telegramfrom Stalin, written that day, telling him tofocus on the Second Frontandgiving him permissionto return o Britainaftervisitingthe USA.'23Little progress was made in the discussions and Molotov reportedtoStalin:

Eden... waspreparedo derail he two treatiesunderdiscussion, ndgavethedraftof anew, emasculated,treatyas cover.'24He also sent to Stalin Eden's new drafttreaty.Stalin replied promptly,on 24 May,with an abruptchange of policy:

1. We have received he draft reatyEdenhandedyou. We do not consider t an emptydeclaration ut regardt as an important ocument. t lacks the questionof securityoffrontiers, ut this is notbadperhaps,or it givesus a freehand.Thequestion f frontiers,or to be moreexact,of guaranteesor thesecurity f ourfrontiers t one or another ectionof ourcountry,will be decidedby force.2. Weproposeamendmentso old draft reaties e discarded ndthatEden'sdraftunitingthetwo treatiesbe accepted s the basis.

5. It is desirable o signthe treatyas soonas possibleand thenfly to America.Instantsiya125

Typically, Stalin used the familiar second person singular to address Molotov,showing thathe was writingpersonally,but thensigned the telegramInstantsiya-thehighest authority-the term usually used to refer to the Central Committee orPolitburo.A major factor behind Stalin's sudden change in policy was the rapidlydeterioratingSoviet military situation, the Germanshaving broken throughin theCrimeaon 22-24 May. An alliance and military help were of overriding mportance.In addition,Stalin may have believed that he had gained as much as he could hopefor in the British concessions on the Baltic states, which he could use at futurenegotiations,andthat Molotov was not going to gain concessions on Polish frontiers.Moreover,if Molotov signed the treatyhe could travel on rapidlyto the USA, whereStalinbelieved the prospectof the Second Front was being held out.126He knew that



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DEREK WATSONthe USA was opposed to Soviet territorial laims, and perhapsthoughthe could usedifferences between the 'imperialist powers' to persuade the USA to launch theSecond Front at an early date. Securitywas to be traded or the Second Front.Thereare few clues to the way in which Stalin made his decision, although,on 23 and 24May, he saw V. G. Dekanozov, Molotov's deputy at Narkomlndel n his office, theonly occasions in that year when Dekanozov visited Stalin's office.127Unfortunately,Molotov had not received Stalin's message before the next sessionof talks on 24 May. Here Eden claimed that the new treaty 'made a bigger offer thanHis Majesty's governmenthad ever made in the course of history'. It would allowdiscussion of the complete map of Europe,not only of Romaniaand Finland. Themain discussion, however, which again proved inconclusive, focused on Sovietsecurity interests,Molotov apparentlybeing prepared o make some concessions onthe Polish frontierquestion. Cadogancommented:

Theyare extraordinaryeople o dealwith-they wear heirsuspicions n theirsleeve.128Molotov did receive some encouragementon the questionof the Second Frontwhenhe saw Beaverbrookon 24 May. Beaverbrookemphasisedthat 'Roosevelt was theman to talk to about the Second Front',and that in the USA the governmentwas infront of the people on the matter,whilst in Britain,although public opinion was infavour,the governmentslowed it down.'29He also received encouragement rom theAmericanambassador o Britain,J. G. Winant,who told him that Roosevelt, H. L.(Harry)Hopkins and General G. C. Marshallwere ardentsupportersof the SecondFront. According to the Soviet record of the meeting, Winant told Molotov thatChurchilland Eden werebeing held backby the Britishmilitary eadership,especiallySir A. F. (Alan) Brooke. According to Winant's report to Roosevelt, Molotovinformedhim of this. After the meeting WinanttelegraphedRoosevelt, saying howimportant he Second Front was to the Russians.130Late on 24 MayMolotov had received Stalin's instructionson the secondtreatyandimmediatelyfell into line on the new policy:

1. I shallact n accordance ith he directiverom nstantsiyandbelieve hat he new drafttreaty an also have a positivevalue.I failedto appreciatet at once.2.... I shallpresentourconsent o consider he new draft reatyas a big concession oChurchill, ndespecially o Roosevelt,whose dissatisfaction ith the formerdraftswasstressed y Churchill ndEden.3. On 25 MayI shallpropose o Edenthatwe discusshis new draftandtry my best toconclude he matter n 26 May.4. We shallcertainlyryto carry hrough ouramendments.f I have otheramendments,shall send them o youpromptly.5. In addition amsendingyouthepreambleo thetreaty. f thereare amendmentso it,please write to me.131

The telegramsmakeclear that Molotov acceptedthe new treatyand abandonedSovietterritorialclaims because of instructions rom Stalin, not, as some older authoritiessuggested,as a resultof his interview with Winant.132 he tone of the correspondencealso raises the questionof how far Stalin and Molotov believed the Westernpowers

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MOLOTOV, THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND THE SECOND FRONT 69were interceptingtheir messages. Unless Molotov and Stalin were endeavouringtosignal Stalin's dictatorialauthority,the answer must be they had no suspicions.

Maisky now telephonedEden to say that Molotov was prepared o discuss the newtreaty,'33and on 25 May the effect of Stalin's instructionswas clear. Molotov wasenthusiastic for the new document, introducing wo minor technical amendments owordingproposedby Stalin, and one of his own referringto the 'securityinterests'of the signatories.'34He also proposed a formal title for the treaty, which Stalinamended,insertingthe word 'Hitlerite' before Germany (again leaving room for theUSSR to negotiate a separate peace if Hitler was overthrown).Stalin also altered'Collaboration n the Settlement of Post-war Matters' to 'Collaborationafter theWar'.135Eden commented: 'A more or less satisfactorycompromise on the Polishquestion is now possible'.136

A further meeting, from 10.00 p.m. to 1.00 a.m. at Downing Street, like theprevious late night meeting at Chequers, was again limited to Molotov, Maisky,Churchill, who, Molotov noted, 'never stopped smoking his cigar and sipping froma glass of whisky', and Eden. It was primarily concerned with military matters,Molotov informing Churchill and Eden that he was authorisedto returnto Britainafter visiting the USA.137 He now received final approvalfrom Stalin for the newtreaty:

1. The preambleto Eden's draft is quite acceptableand does not need amendments.2. We recommendyou not to introduceany more amendments o the draftexcept the twowe sent you yesterday.3. You should not make hints to Churchill about Roosevelt enteringthe treaty [somethingMolotov had suggested to Stalin he should do] since this will be indelicate and the Britishmight consider it as diminishingtheir role.4. Should the Americansor Churchillhimself put forward he questionof the USA enteringthe treaty,you should accept it with full readiness.

Instantsiya 38The treatywas signed on 26 May, and Molotov departed or the USA fromPrestwickairportat noon on 27 May. 39Commentingon these negotiationsto Chuev in 1976he said:

We insistedon a document ealingwith ourpost-war rontiers. do not rememberhedetails, but well remember the essence, of course. We were insisting on it all the time; Ipressedas had Stalinin 1941, thenI arrivedwith a draft n 1942. Churchillsaid: 'In no waycan we do it'.I dodgedthis way and that.I sent a telegramto Stalin.He replied: 'Agree without this'. ButI am getting ahead of the story.The whole questionturnedon the recognitionof the Balticas ours.They would not agree.And when we backed down-which was certainlynecessaryat the time-they were surprised.Churchillwas amazed. Eden was deliriouswe had agreedto their terms.140

Reflecting on the negotiations in 1963, Cadogan commented on the ability of the



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DEREK WATSONRussians overnightto make 'right-about urns without exposing themselves to anyembarrassment'.141At the time Churchillwrote to Roosevelt:

We have donevery goodworkthis and last week with Molotov .. we havecompletelytransformedhetreatyproposals. heyare now in my judgementree from heobjectionswe bothentertained,ndareentirely ompatible ith our AtlanticCharter. hetreatywassignedyesterday fternoon ithgreat ordialityn bothsides.Molotov s a statesman,ndhasa freedom f actionverydifferentromwhatyouandI saw n Litvinov. amverysureyouwill be able to reachgoodunderstandingsithhim...142Clearly, Churchillhad reached the wrong conclusion on the reasons for Molotovacceptingthe new treaty.

Washingtonand the Second FrontAfter his appointmentas head of NarkomIndel n May 1939, Molotov had far lesscontact with L. Steinhardt, he AmericanAmbassador, han with his British counter-parts, and cool relations after the failure of the Triple Alliance negotiations wereworsenedby the Finnish war and Soviet treatmentof the Baltic states.143 hey wereto improveonly after the Germanattack and the visit of HarryHopkinsto Moscowin July 1941, Hopkins having a personal interview with Molotov.l44But the realturningpoints in Soviet-Americanrelations were the entryof the USA into the war,the correspondencen the springof the following year which resulted n the Molotovvisit, and the replacementof Steinhardt n April 1942by AdmiralW. Standley,a new,moresympathetic,Americanambassador.145efore this, Molotov hadalreadyclashedwith Litvinov, the new Soviet ambassador n Washington, rejecting his advice tocondemn the Japaneseattack on Pearl Harbourand to accept the invitation for theUSSR to join the proposedAnglo-AmericanSupremeWar Council.'46Molotov travelled to Washingtonexpecting large-scale militaryhelp-the SecondFront-in return for the Soviet concession in signing a treaty that did not specifySoviet post-war frontiers. He was not aware that, by the time he had arrived inLondon, Churchillhad not only rejectedthe Americanplan for 'Sledgehammer'(asecondary nvasion of Europein 1942 in the Cherbourgarea)but had also informedRoosevelt of this, placing the responsibility for informing Molotov of it on thePresident'sshoulders,or allowing him to commit Americanresourcesindependentlyto the Second Front in 1942.'47On the journey the plane was delayed at Reykjavikby bad weather. Here Pusep,the pilot, met an American Air Force colonel who advised him to divert to refuel atGoose Bay. He did this and landed at WashingtonDC on 29 May, 19 hours afterleaving Iceland. The plane suffered from overheating engines and burst a tyre onlanding.Molotov was met by CordellHull, the AmericanSecretaryof State,and went'somewhat dishevelled and unwashed', as he admitted,immediately to meet Roo-sevelt. Litvinov andHopkinswere also presentat this preliminarynterview. Molotovrecorded n his memoirs:

[Litvinov]was at ourgeneralmeetingwhenRoosevelt aid to me: 'Introduceme to yourdelegation'.hadChekists ndeveryonerom heministrywithme. Thepilotwasthere.SoRooseveltgreeted veryone.'48

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MOLOTOV,THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND THE SECOND FRONT 71There was a review of the militarysituationwith regardto both GermanyandJapan,and Roosevelt raised some minor matters, ncludingasking Molotov why the USSRhad not joined the Geneva Convention to improve the lot of its prisonersof war.Molotov replied that the USSR did not wish to join, as it did not wish to give theimpressionthat Germanyobserved international ules in any way.149Later the same day, at the first full session with Roosevelt, where, besides theprincipals, only Hopkins and interpreterswere present, Molotov immediatelymadeclear thatalthoughhe had signed a treatywhich did not mentionSoviet frontiers, heUSSR's position on that matter had not changed. Roosevelt then proposed an'international olice force' of the fourmajorpowers(USA, USSR, BritainandChina)in the post-war world. These powers would retain their arms to ensure Germany,Japanandtheirallies remaineddisarmedand to preventfurtheraggression.Rooseveltasked Molotov to convey this plan to Stalin.l50In furtherconversationsbetween Roosevelt, Molotov and Hopkins, lasting seven-and-a-halfhours, duringand afterdinner,Roosevelt tackled head-on the questionofthe Second Front.He said that it was necessaryto defeatHitler beforeJapan,and thatalthoughpreparations or an invasion of Europethat stood a real chance of successcould be completedonly in 1943, he was tryingto persuadehis military eadersto risklandingfrom six to 10 divisions in France n 1942. Molotov, in response,stressed theperilousmilitaryposition of the USSR, and thathelp in 1942 to draw off 40 Germandivisions was vital.151Clearlythe figurewas in Molotov's brief for the mission. Afterthe meeting Hopkins came to Molotov's room and told him to be pessimisticabout the Soviet position at the conference on the Second Front, scheduled for thenext day. This might persuadethe American generals of its necessity.'52Hopkinscommented:

The whole evening'sconversation n Mr Molotov'spartwas markedby a somewhatunexpectedrankness ndamiability,which eads,notunnaturally,o thesuppositionhat,since the Sovietswantsomethingeriously,he wordhas goneout fromMrStalin o besomewhatmoreagreeablehan s Mr Molotov's ustom.153Hopkins seems to have sensed that Molotov followed Stalin's instructions.

The following morning, 30 May, when General G. Marshall and Admiral E. J.King, the Americanmilitary eaders,were present,Roosevelt took up Molotov's pleato draw off 40 Germandivisions. Supportinghim, Molotov stressed that the SecondFront was above all a political question:Hitler was now capableof using most of theresourcesof Europeagainst the USSR, and if his countrycould not hold its presentposition, Hitler's resourcesmightbe further trengthened romcapturedSoviet assets,particularlyoil. This would make the allied position more difficultin 1943. He wenton to make the point he had made in London:that if 40 Germandivisions could bedrawnoff in 1942, the war might be decided in thatyear. He statedthat he had notreceived a positive answerto this question in London and asked for the help of theUSA. In responseto Roosevelt's questionwhetherMolotov could report o Stalinthatthe USA was 'preparing he establishmentof' and 'hoping to open' a Second Frontin 1942, King talkingaboutthe difficultiesof gettingconvoys to Murmansk.Marshallemphasisedthe logistical difficulties of transferringAmericantroops to Britain,andthe shortageof landingcraft to invade the continentfrom thatcountry.He suggested



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DEREKWATSONthat the most that could be achieved was the transferof Americanplanes to Britainto engage the Germanair force.'54Having been led to believe that Marshallwas asupporterof the Second Front,his attitudemusthave disappointedMolotov. He laterwrote to Stalin: 'The insincerity of this reply was obvious to me'.155The mostoptimisticAmerican version of the reporton this meeting states that Marshallagreedto Roosevelt authorisingMolotov to inform Stalin that 'we expect the formationofa second front this year'.156If this was the case, Molotov still concluded his reporton the meeting to Stalin:

Theytold me nothingconcrete .. My missionto Washingtonmaybe consideredom-plete.157

At lunch, after the meeting,Roosevelt tactlesslyaskedMolotov, in view of his recentexperiences,to give his impressionsof Hitler He repliedthatit was possible to arriveat a commonunderstandingwith anyone,but he had never had to deal with two moredisagreeablepeople than Hitler and Ribbentrop.'58Molotov may have considered his mission complete, but he was preventedfromleaving the USA by the need to repairhis plane, the Goodrichcompany having tocompletely rebuild the huge tyre which had burst.'59During the delay, Rooseveltagaintried to persuadeChurchill o cooperate n opening a Second Frontin 1942 onthe lines suggested by Marshall,using air attacks,but the plan was rejected by thetime Molotov met Roosevelt againon 1 June.'60After a ratherbrittleexchangewhenRoosevelt offered to mediate between the USSR and Finland, the President talkedabout air communicationsbetween the USA and USSR, Lend-Lease, the post-warsettlementand his plans for an internationalpolice force. Molotov, having receiveda telegram from Stalin on this, was able to be positive.16' Roosevelt finished byexpressing hopes for the opening of the Second Front in 1942 on the basis of airattacks,as suggested by GeneralMarshall,saying that this would be more practicalif the USSR reduced ts demandsfor suppliesfrom 8 000 000 tons to 2 000 000 tons,thus freeing ships to transportmen and arms to Britain.'62This faced Molotov witha dilemma,and, accordingto one Americanreport,he 'bristled'.He agreedto reportthe proposalto 'the Soviet government',but stressed the need for equipment.He thenasked Roosevelt to summarisehis views on the Second Front. Roosevelt repliedthat'the US Governmentwas strivingandhoping to create the Second Frontin 1942'. Ifthe USSR reduced its demandfor war materials,the chances would be improved.Itwas necessary, however, to consult Britain,as that countrywould have to bear themainburden.He was placingthe decision firmlyon Churchill'sshoulders.Accordingto an Americanrecordof the conversation,Molotov then

retortedwithsomeemphasishat he SecondFrontwouldbe strongerf the FirstFront tillstood ast,and nquiredwithdeliberatearcasmwhatwouldhappenf the Sovietscut downtheir equirementsnd hennoSecondFront ventuated.hen,becomingtill morensistent,he emphasisedhathe hadbroughthenewtreaty romBritain. Whatanswer',he asked,'shall takeback oLondon ndMoscowonthegeneral uestionhathasbeenraised?Whatis the President'snswerwithrespect o the SecondFront?'163In conclusion, Molotov handed Roosevelt Stalin's list of supplies the USSR wasrequesting.'64Following this meeting, Roosevelt wrote to Churchill:

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MOLOTOV, THE GRAND ALLIANCE AND THE SECOND FRONT 73Molotov's visit is, I think, a real success, because we have got on a personal footing ofcandourand as good friendshipas can be acquiredthroughan interpreter.. He has madevery clear his very real anxietyas to the next four or five months,and I think this is sincereand not put forward o force our hand. I have a very strongfeeling that the Russianpositionis precariousand may grow steadily worse duringthe coming weeks.I will telegraphwhen Molotov leaves, and I am specially anxious that he carryback somereal results of his mission and that he will give a favourable account to Stalin ... But theimportant hing is that we may be and probablyare faced with real trouble on the Russianfront and must make our plans to meet it.165

On the same day Molotov met Hopkins, who restated and elaborated the Americanposition on the Second Front, pressing Molotov for the Soviet demand for suppliesto be reduced. At the end of the conversation Molotov said he was satisfied that theUSA wanted to help the USSR and create a Second Front, but he would like moreclarity.'66 Molotov reported to Stalin Roosevelt's proposal for the reduction ofsupplies, noting a discrepancy between Roosevelt's figures and the Soviet calcula-tions. He concluded:

To my question, what in the final analysis I should say in London and Moscow of thePresident's attitude o the questionof the SecondFront,he repliedhe was all for the SecondFrontopening this year, that much work was being done in the USA and Britain to bringit about, and he was promotingthe issue in every way, but that it all depended on theBritish. 167Molotov now drafted a bland communique, covering both sets of talks, for Stalin'sapproval. There was no mention of the Second Front or Soviet frontiers.168But Stalinwas now alarmed and furious, replying to Molotov on 3 June:

1. The Instantsiyais dissatisfied with the terseness and reticence of your communications,You convey to us ... only what you yourself consider importantand omit all the rest.Meanwhile the Instantsiyawould like to know everything,whatyou considerimportantandwhat you thinkunimportant.2. This refersto the draftof the communiqudas well. You have not informedus whose draftit is, whether t has been agreedon by the British in full, andwhy, afterall, there could notbe two communiquds .. we are having to guess because of your reticence.3. We considerit expedientto have two draftcommuniquds-one on the negotiationswithBritain,and another on the talks in the USA.We furtherconsiderit absolutely necessarythat both communiquesshouldmention,amongotherthings, the subjectof creatingthe Second Front in Europeand that full understandinghas been reached on this matter.We also consider it necessary that both communiquesshould mention the supply of war materials to the Soviet Union from Britain and theUSA ...169

Instructions from Stalin to Molotov were to dominate the remainder of Molotov'svisit. His response to the first angry telegram was immediate. When he met CordellHull the same day, Hull found him 'very insistent on the question of the SecondFront', totally preoccupied with the war situation, and not interested in post-warquestions.170Molotov suggested amendments to the communique, the most important



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DEREK WATSONof which were statements that 'full understanding' had been reached on the SecondFront-these being Stalin's words-and that supplies from the USA to the USSRwere to be increased.'71 This arose from a new agreement in course of negotiation,but was no doubt meant to pacify Stalin's ire about the proposal for the reduction ofsupplies. Molotov also sent a long telegram to Stalin that began:

I have taken into account the direction of the Instantsiyato provide complete informationaboutmy meetings and talks includingthose of lesser significance.Of course, all my talksare thoroughlyrecorded and the records will be submittedby me to the Instanstiyainaddition to the code messages.He concluded:

... I agree that it would be better to have two communiqueson the talks in Britain and theUSA, ratherthan a common one.... Hull said thatthe mention of the Second Frontsuggestedby me should be conveyed tothe President for consideration;he did not object to the otheramendments ..

He went on to describe in detail his meeting with Hull, and the other talks he washaving. He concluded by saying that he had travelled to New York and been on athree to four hour sightseeing tour of the city by car.172This was when, in the backof a car, the famous argument with Litvinov on 'appeasement' witnessed by Gromykotook place.173On 4 June Stalin sent another telegram in which he agreed to reduce the demandfor supplies, assuming that this would release ships to transport troops to Europe forthe Second Front. After summarising the 'final results of your negotiations with theUSA', and repeating his earlier instructions that the communique should mention boththe Second Front and military supplies to the USSR, he concluded:

This is imperativebecause it will bring confusion to the ranks of the Hitlerites and theneutralcountries in the whole of Europe.Instantsiya174

Either Stalin was more optimistic than Molotov about the establishment of the SecondFront in 1942, or he was intent on trying to get a commitment to it, believing that thismight force the hand of the Western powers. He was also aware of its propagandavalue.

Molotov now forwarded the agreed text of his communique on his talks in the USA(no longer a joint communique on the two sets of talks). It included the followingstatements:

Full understandingwas reachedwithregardto the urgenttaskof creatinga SecondFront nEuropein 1942. In addition,measures for increasingand speedingup the supplyof planes,tanks and other kinds of war materials from the United States to the Soviet Union werediscussed.75Stalin replied tersely:

Have received the draft of joint communiqudwith the Americans.The communiqudhascome out quite satisfactory. Instantsiya

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DEREKWATSONSecondFront n 1942, the USSR would reduce its requirements.He emphasisedagainthe need to draw off 40 divisions, mentioning Roosevelt's idea for a limitedexpedition and a 'second Dunkirk', something which aroused Churchill's ire. Herem

Documents

D. Watson - Molotov, The Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942 (4)