.D ru;!'·'liePAilJ&~~~~G\b .. :.~ t i ... ' KtiHOLEJ /NUPORN/ /Xi .......... ··················

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION ····································(b)·(3)-P.L. 86-36

NSA STAFF PROCESSING FORM EXREG CONTROL NUMBER KCC CONTROL NUMBER

<61-l\1. IG-10160-03 THRU ACTION EXREG SUSPENSE

ELEMENT SUSPENSE

_;D~fD~I;.:R:..=:==~:....:::~=:..::=::::~===------~ D APPROVAL SUBJECT

Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board I!] SIGNATURE

on NSA Activitie:s-t••••••l D INFORMATION

KCC SUSPENSE

DISTRIBUTION

SUMMARY ·

PURPOSE: (U//FOUO) To forward to the Intelligence Oversight Board (lOB) of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, via the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)), NSA's quarterly report on its intelligence activities.

BACKGROUND: . (U/.LFOUO) Executive Order 12333 and Executive Order 12863 require Intelligence Community agency heads and Intelligence Community General Counsels and Inspectors General, respectively, to report to the IOB on a quarterly basis concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. The enclosed memorandum covers all reportable activities known to the Inspector General and General Counsel. Per PIOB letter of 6 Augtist 1982, Agency heads are responsible for reporting separately any additional reportable activities known to them, unless the President has specifically instructed that the Board is not to be informed. The Director's signature signifies that no other activities that require reporting are known to him.

RECOMMENDATION: (U//FOUO) Director sign the enclosed memorandum.

JApproved for Release by NSA on 12-19-2014. FOIA Case# 70809 (Litigation)

DECLASSIFY UPON REMOVAL OF THE ENCLOSURE(8.) .... .,: .. : .. :::::;;.:>''''''\ (b) ( 3) - P. L. 8 6-3 6

COORDIN[!.TIONIAPPROVAL

OFFiCE NAME AND DATE

ActingGC Vito .Potenza ~'tJ , AGC(O)

IG <.~oeil': J::Sren~

AIG(IO)

rBIQINATOR

FORM A6796 FEB 94 NSN: 7540·FM·001·5465

91~18 .. · .. ·

l~/.2lf/O,j 3544s

:>RG.

Jil

Ul!ol\1 v r...Li l''R~j»: J'r,SA/CSSM 123-2 DATED: 24 Feorua/.v 1998 DECLASSIFY ON:. Xl

v

,,:(':·

.NAME AND DATE\ sEr.••R~" PHONE

PHONE (Secure)

963-2984 DATE PREPARED

29;MAY2003

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

41;;;).;s;i$. E;.Jlf, < .. UMIH I r.;..._ :o OCI D : t. :> .J. :;.t .J.

I

~~----~S~E~CU~R~In~c·~~SS~IF~IC~ATI -------

NSA STAFF PROCESSING FORM TO NSA IG, NSA GC

- I EXREG CONTROL NUMBER I KCC CONTROL NUMBER I ,...... OC-101-03

KCC SUSPENSE

THRU ( 1) "') \ ACTION EXREG SUSPENSE

~S~I::::-G-=IN=-T_D_i_r_ec_t_or _ ___:1yllo.l.~=--'l.! \·-~.,.,.='::::>::::.__Z_'i_· _4.!_:__• _o_> ___ 1 0 APPROVAL

SUBJECT ~ , \ } (U) SID Quarterly Complia.:b.'ce Report, 1 January to 31 0 SIGNATURE

March 2003 - Addendum [X] INFORMATION ELEMENT susPENse

DISTRIBUTION

SUMMARY

PURPOSE: (U/fti'OOO)To forward additional information to the NSA Inspector General and the NSA General Counsel for the second quarter ofFY2003 (1 January 2003 to 31 March 2003) on SIGINT Directorate compliance with E.O. 12333 and related directives.

BACKGROlJND:'i8/YSI) E>ue to personnel changes, the counterterrorism desk failed to submit the number of U.S. telephone numbers released under authority of SID policy memo, "Implemen­tation Policy for Support to Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community with Provision of U.S. SIGINT Calling Data Related to Counterterrorism." Oversight and Compliance noted the omission after the SIGINT Directorate Quarterly Compliance Report to the NSA Inspector Gen­eral was completed and contacted the CT desk for the data.

DISCUSSION: (S/,£~H) A total ofQ.s. telephone numbers were released in~~pp~rsj over the second fiscal quarter of 2003. , ····· ....__ ___ _.

•,

··.\····························· (b) (1) (b) ( 3) - P. L. 8 6-3 6

b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

OFFICE NAME AND DATE ...... · 1/ SECUREJ OF~ICE NAME AND DATE S_5:CIJ.~ PHONEJ PHONE

SID Sr. Oversight Exec.l ........... ·· 1-if 7,{. 3 fi1 H

I / /

••• ••••••• POC I 963-8175

1"\01,... .. ORG. PHONE (Secure) DATE PREPARED l'&.h\of n. • •l,i- R. (',..,...,,...y;.,,...,...,. /

I' 963-8170 23 April 2003

FORM A6796 'I;;IO>;;J't Derived from: NSA/CSSM 123-2 SECURin C~SSIFICATION

NSN: 7540-FM-001-5465 Dated: 24 February 1999 SEC~E'fh'COMIIcJTftX 11

Declassify On: Xl

,DOClD: 4165191 - ~ 'l'OP SECRE'I'/7Ct_.:tm'r-ECIEO]tTALENT·KEY~i~:E1fNd#OKNtnh 86

-36

NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE

FORT GEORGE G. MEADE, MARYLAND 20755-6000

8 July 2003

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHAIRMAN, INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD

THRU: Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intelligence Oversight)

SUBJECT: (U/tf!'OUO) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board on NSA Activities - INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

(U//FOUO) Except as previously reported to you or the President, or otherwise stated in the enclosure, we have no reason to believe that any intelligence activities of the National Security Agency during the quarter ending 31 March 2003, . were unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive, and thus required to be reported pursuant to Section 1.7.(d) of Executive Order 12333.

(U/IFOUOr The Inspector General and the General Counsel continue to exercise oversight of Agency activities by means of inspections, surveys, training, review of directives and guidelines, and advice and counsel. These activities and other data requested by the rd or members the staff of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Intel · Oversight · r described in the enclosure.

Acting General Counsel

(UJ7Ii'OU07-I concur in the report of the Inspector General and the General Counsel and hereby make it our combined report.

Encl: a/s

This Memorandum is Unclassified Upon Removal of Enclosure

fJ! ~ 1/. 1-L.~. MICHAEL V. ~~

Lieutenant General, USAF Director, NSA/Chief, CSS

DERIVED FROM: NSAJCSSM 123-2 DATED: 24 FEB 98 DECLASSIFY ON: XI

_DOt;:lD: 4165191

P.L. 86-36

1. (U) INSPECTOR GENERAl ACTIVITIES

a. tC//SI) During this quarter, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviewed various intelligence activities of the National Security Agency /Central Security Service (NSA/CSS) to determine whether they Were conducted in accordance with applicable statutes, Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and DoD and internal directives. With few exceptions, the issues presented were routine and indicated that the operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS

activities. ..·• ··;(b)_( __ ~l-p. L.

b. (U I /FOUO) The NSA OIG completed an inspection of the NSJ)I . ····) Division. All Division personnel interviewed reported schedyled periodic re"Wews of E.O. 12333 and the derivative documents. Most memb.~rshad long-standi.rig experience in the conduct of NSA operations and weJ;.e·aware of the their ', · intelligence oversight responsibilities. ~

c. ''tb) .... (l) (o f·{3J.,!?. L. ~~~---------..,..,,...;;;...~..,....,,......,.,,.._,c""o""'m"""p~e""'e...,-,an="'ms="""p""'e""c="'o"""n,....o,..,..,,..,..,.___. (b·-l ( 3 i·""~:o···uS.·,__~,..,..,."'""'""--------....1.,;;.;.___..;,.;;...;;..__,

······· ... r---r.----:~~--=-~--~-~. The inspection found that the 's accompljshing Intelligence Oversight (I/0) training and

~----~ documentation. Although the initial 1/0 training and the ~ual refresher training meet the requirements for educating the general workforce, there is no specific USSID 18 training for personnel working in operations. The inspectors recommended that the I/0 Officer develop additional training on procedures governing activities of intelligence components for personnel within the operations organization. The inspectors also recommended that the site's l/0

,_ policy for cleared custodial and facility workers needs to be reviewed, resolved, ·'- .. p.nd formally documented by NSA andl I uuU u••·········uu•••u••u•• ·····u uU uU u ...... (b) ( 3)- p. L.

•,

86-36

ci:·.~e OIG has learned of two instances, one in 2001 and one in 2002, when. thel___jretained and disseminated uruninimized U.S. person information in order to demonstrate the site's mission ca abilities. The first instance involved a voice cut of th

··The second instance involved the voiccl corrimunications ofU$. participants in . . ,/ . .Both cuts have now been destroyed and the"·site h~~ been advised ~y'the NSAOGC to use more benign communications to demonstrate its <::c.tpab~:ti~~~ :>

·····-....... _1:: .• ·'=··

DERIVED FROM: NSA/CSSM 123-2 DATED: 24 FEB 98 DECLASSJFY ON: XI

(b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -18 usc 798 (b) (3)-50 usc 3024 (i)

86-36

DOCID: 4165191 .. ... . 86-36

2. (U) qENERAl COUNSEL ACTIVITIES

(C/ /el) The NSA Office of General Counsel (OGC) reviewed various intelligence activities of the NSA/CSS to determine whether they were conducted in accordance with applicable statutes, Executive Orders, Attorney General procedures, and DoD and internal directives. The OGC advised Agency elements on a number of questions, including the collection and dissemination of communications of or concerning U.S. persons; the reporting of possible violations of federal criminal law contained in SIGINT product; the testing of electronic equipment; and the applicability of the FISA. With few exceptions, the issues presented were routine and indkated that the operating elements understand the restrictions on NSA/CSS activities. The OGC did not file any reports with the Intelligence Oversight Board during this quarter.

3. (U) SIGINT ACTIVITIES ... ·.:/'"(b.) (1)

a. (S//SI) Collection Against U.S. Persons ........... ... ·./' (bit~) -P.L_. 86-36

..... ·················· (1) (U) Intentional

(e//el! DurU:g Is }11:i;),;r.tef,"the DIRN,~A granted approval for c~rts~~ual collection agamst ·persons, one U .. $·:-owned tele hone number, and U.S.-owned e-mail addresses, whic;Jj-'wer

._ __ __,:---~~---:--':"T""'~.-:::---___.·QI.RNSA-approved .·· consensual collection against .s. persons was rou~~ly terminat7d··"this quarter.

. ...... __ ,,::::~b) ( 1)

(S//Si) The Attorney G.e:heral granted authority to colle<;.t::the ,/b) (3) -P. L. 86-36

communicationsof[]U.S. personsdurincr this quaJ;ter~::..-· .'/(~) (3) -18 ·usc 798 0

.. · .. · ... "! (q~) (3) -50 usc 3024 (i)

(2) (U) Unintentional .

·.·.·.·.·.·.·.·· ... : ::....... . i " ....... ······ ..... / _.! "

.· \\

(TS//51)

·as a natura e . . citizen, no . as e a initially ~....,;-be_e_n-:i-::d-en~tifi"':"':. :::-'.ed.l ~taskingandcoll;ectionuagaihSfhlsu uu )(b)(1)

telephone number was stopped, all pertinent transc;tipts were purged fr.oin j(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

the transcript storage database, and all associated .r·eporting was canseled. .

(TS/ /51) I !determined th9t~· .· I tasked telephone number belonged to a U.S. person. I has confirmed that there was no dissemination of information from this number and that the number was immediately removed from all databases.

. DOC~ID: 4165191

P.L. 86-36

(Tii/ /81) During this reporting Eeriod, there wereOinst~ces whereO I lissued . .b.yL ....... m ••••••• h·vere later fottnd.tp.Eefer ~6 parties identified as U.S. persons. Thel Fere·diri~~~~~·:··.:::::::::::=:::::=""""""'":":::::::::;;;;,..\b)(1 )

............. ···";·.. • • (1:?)(3)-P.L. 86-36 (TS//SI)I .......... lp~ocessed a vo1c~ cut m which one \ side of U:.':.~.?.!l:Y~rsation·~ould.~ot be heai&>~po~ furthe~. inves~gationQ ·

ete"rmmed that the maud1ble commurucartt . .m the conversation was a U.S. official I I Th~ interc~ptat1d all\:?lated numbers associated with it I J were deleted and the NSA Office of Primary Interest was adVised):l:ot-~cr'process the intercept. ··:: :(j~'l::(-1.)

.. · ...... (b) "(3.):::p.,,:Y.. 86-36 · ... 3024 (i)

~~~~--------------~~--~--~~

''{;p.) (1) (b·)·.'.(<~)- P. L. 8 6-36 (J:>J..\·~·).'-.';10 usc 3024 l

(TS//~1//NF) During routine verification o£1 l~tercepts, p.S. ·. · · · .... . originated I I messages were detected, apparently because of..<:YJ.·::).{b) (

1)

·. .., 1 ... -~e(p) (3) -P.L.

problem has been corrected. . .. . ·· · · ·······

.. ···

•,

•,

•,

86-36

, (T£ I /En~ I all aru>iY:~t accessing a raw traffje d~tabase_i /was ip_ le ·····~..1--::---:--:------:---~--=-=---'Jfor which he was not.deared. S .stems \

administrators ~ubse uently discovered •,

•,

•,

•,

"(bTT3')·~·P;·L-, --8.6.:::.3.9:, "···;;;;y;c;·f"fcT··'E'P.:rr-J, ,.,._ ~\~.--------------~.

I under a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) order thatL

I TheFISC.s.y,psequentlyamended the ord.er to authorize and directl

\UJ \.LJ

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3) -50 usc 3024 (i)

.______,r:---r:-..,.....,r:---:-;-~----::----:-~-::::-------:-::-::-:---:-~-:----~·· a w traffic files •• • n ••• ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• •• resulted-in cidents against u.s. persons. All incidents w~re reported to (b) (1) (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

TOP SECR£TII€0hi!Pffo£CI~ff KEYtiOLiSiiNOfO~£ )-P' L' 86-36

. DOC.ID: 4165191

To~ sr:etmrt/coMINf-EclBAIEN'f·KE"i1iomiN.oFoiJW,1fil -p · L ·

responsible oversight officials and corrective actions were taken. All unauthorized traffic collected has been destroyed.

b. (U//FOUO) Dissemination of U.S. Identities

(1) (U) Intentional

"13//~ In accordance with section 7 of USSID 18,1 lp.s. identities were disseminated. The following table shows the justification···qn.d the number of instances of dissemination: In the "Unmasked" column, th~ U.S. identity was revealed in a serialized end product; in the "User Requested~~ column, a U.S. identity was released to a user at the user's request. ·

· .

JUSTIFICATION .. .... .. ~ .· ;!:-·····'+·.~, ~-- .. · .. . "·:·!'::~:.. .:::·--~ .. ~-;, ;~:~:_;~-:: ;\:'.~·:·• •. : ..• , ...•. - , ..

·~-::.~~:_ ... ·:; .:..:~ .. -~.:~ . :, .. _ '! : .... ··:!;.~:·· . .. : .......... ft.':J· .. \·-· .• . . • • . . ~.-;· .~ ; .. ·~_i,l~ . ':..·:.

Unmasked.- ·User Request~d <· .. ·TOTAL ···. . ', . -~ .. :.:.:..·.~·:,.-":-' . ...... . . • .. ~ . . . .. . .·· '• .. \:. ,. :·:·

···::-·· ····.····· ..

7.2.c Necessary

7.2.c.l Foreign Official

7.2.c.2 Disclosure of class. Info

7.2.c.3 International narcotics

7.2.c.4 Criminal activity

7.2.c.7 U.S. Government Official1/. • / ..

TOTAL2

·::.: .• •· ..

1-tSffffitOfthe total U.S. Go,y.e~~n(~~cials n9t~~.l !were disseminated! . ..- • Jiri. a total of0products covered by Blanket Waivers. Thes~ lare ava1la le upon request

~Each mention of an individual identifier in a single report is counted as one dissemination. Thus, if an individual is mentioned five times in one report, that is tallied as five disseminations.

(57/ 51) In support of the. counterterrorism mission, the SID released a total of ~telephone numbers,! I L_Juring this reporting period.

,:.::.:·:··(b) (1)

(2} {U) Unintentional (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

tS//SI) During this quarter.,[]siGINT products were canceled because they contained the identiti~~oft.J.S. persons, organizations, or entities. Additionally,c:JS1GINT products that did not contain any U.S. identities

4 TOP SECR:ETNCO~flNT-ECl[M)FALBN1' KEYIIOLPJ~JOFO~t#Xi l P.L. 86-36

-D09:ID: 4165191 ...

P.L. 86-36

were cancelled because they contained information derived from U.S. person communications.

(3) (U) Raw Traffic Dissemination Outside the SIGINT Production Chain

The OIG has learned tha

nonpublished SIGINT during briefings~.:--~--=-:-:-.:----:~--=~~~ some cases, the information was later released in published produq~ and thus was evaluated for foreign intelligence information and minimizati<Pn _ purposes; however, not all materials were subject to this review. I __ .. -!has been advised that it must follow standard procedures for P~c:>.Yid.J:n$-( 1 l evaluated, minimized traffic. - · ·· .-:_: .. (b\) (3)-P.L. 86-36

{b)"(3):::P-;b-86~3.9___ _ ______ . · - _..-_ (b)\ (3) -50 usc 3024 (il

~hie~ .... ersoru:\el at the

~--~--~--~~~----=~~~----~~~~------~had unauthor_~:;?;~d acces-s to raw traffic databases. They we,,r~ extracting data on

c::Jtatgets and forwarding the data to I _..- !·without accounting for the dissemination. Access was terminatesl·and alternative procedures were put in place for providing) I With the information it needs.

(a I /61) A contractor in the ..... ------= ''"""''""'""!"";;;;m""'i!~:~::o:5')\ ( 1 l a<;~essedtawSIGJNT- (bl\( 3 )-P.L. 86- 36

L-a_p_p_r-ox"""rm....-a-:-t-e.-r-,._ti:rh:""'·~---~-e""'s....-u-rm.-;····;;;.;;--g~ ____ :T ___ .... s-p--e-r'Ti:o""'····.,.. . ...~He did not query for data, but\ examined session~that we-re collected based onl .. ------- I .A.nOanalfst"iater determined that the c_9:p.traC:tor should not have had access to this data. The contractor's ac._cesswas immediately restricted through the authentication proc~d-uies required to gain access.

(5//Si)l lac~~~:ctor serving as a system administrator (SA) at the Kunia Regional Security Operations Center (KRSOC) accessed a raw traffic database using another user's account. The SA was not authorized to enter the user's account and had not been briefed for proper handling of raw traffic data and access to raw traffic databases. The KRSOC coun5eled the SA

(b)(l) __ ----I regarding proper securitx procedures and added a new interface, removing

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36 . j

(U I /FOUO' One individual who is not in the SIGINT Production Chain had access to raw SIGINT data _ ... ---------- ·::""""'Tb l ( 3 l - P. L. 8 6-3 6

Specifically, the individual's e-mail a~q:resswa.~n:rustakerily agded to the alias for thel ls~aries; The summar_i:~s contain information fron:~<:>~P:UternetWork elploitatir~c~:m~ operations. On I I the md1v1dual contacted a:nd md1cated that he had

5 TOP SECJl!i:T.lJCQ:tvUt-TT ECIEJrALEHl'K&YIIOLEI/tiOFO~f l - P • L • 86-36

.DOCID: 4165191 ---..

been receiving the Summaries in error. He further indicated that he had b~en deleting them unread. Upon receipt of his message,! !immediately \ removed his e-mail address from the alias. ·

'

'

' ~C//51)1 ·1

.Staffwa~s-ru~e-rt-e~d-t-o~th~e-f~a-ct-th~a-t~th-e~l----------------~~h~~-d~b~e-e-n--~

making raw SIGINT accessible to a number ~f individurus wii#,out oversight mechanisms. To prevent improper access, new account r.:.9,B~~:~;il?})Offidures were developed and put in place. . .... ,:::::::':'""'"' -:::/ f {b·):::(3J -P. L. 86-36

. . .... f (p) (3f"-J,8 usc 798 . . . · .. ·. sc 3024 (i)

(S/ /SI/TK) The newly assigned Chief of I j.iqentified activity ov .... er'"""N=-=s~AN-=-=-e-t_am __ o_n_g_c_e_rt_am~. ~N~S,...,A--._,.;.~ ....

contractor personnel afthe! I .. • I .J I L Much of this interaction has been an attempt to circuihveJ:1.t restrictio~ on the rele~:S·e of SIGINT technical data and raw SIGINT to nort"-Sl9INT prh~uction ~Jerrrents. The Chiefl lhasmp,f!~.~.;msiderable progressin~urt~g tl}eactivity and has established measures to elittt:inate the .. interaction·in the ftftiire. . ········ ............. : .... ................. ::::::::::';;·;·, .. /-~---

(b) (1)

4. (U) OTHER ACTIVITIES (b) (3)-P.L. 86-36 (b) (3)-50 usc 3024(i).

(U) lntegrees in Analysis and Production

6 TOP SECRET!/COMfNT ECI EJrAL<et:FKEYWOLEIINOfOR~fl3 l - P · L. 8 6-3 6

· DOGID: 4165191

TOP ~mcRETucoMJ~rr :ocJ~'\£Ep;lTKEvttom!iioFoR#?hH) -p • L · 8 6

-3 6

. .·· .. ..·:<Y\.Cb ) ( 1 ) / 05:)::-(..1.). .,,,,,•::·· . ..- \(b) (3) -P L 86-36

(U) Assistance to Law Enforcemen~·/ (b) ·c3l~:~::··L· •.... e..?.:::.~--~.-:::::::::<'::::: .. ···:_ ....... \\;·)..._(3) -+B ~sc 798 / ·····... ..··::;;;;/''·:;:-< ...... / ~,b) (· .. 3) -50 usc 3024 (i)

(5;;gi)I .~/ .. ::;;;;;==!"· ........ · rvia .. iliW I I !'requested thafNSA.atguire voice gi$.ts .. and. transcripts for all calls made to and from I .. ····: ... >"·:" .· ... \\ \ I was in contact with I .... ····fknow:r:t·to be livingl Jari\;i I .. ········: ... ····· ...-·· l~enit became known thatl Jhtended tp·meet with I I

I ....... t:'equested NSA assistance with intercepting their_plans, for the purpose of arresting the individual upon arrival

I a · l·tmmediately after NSA account managers were informed of the request and learned additional details of the case, they notified the NSA OGC. Although ·collection assets were activated before the OGC was notified, no data· was collected before the collection was stopped by the OGC because the collection satisfied law enforcement rather than foreign intelligence requirements.

~As a result of this inddent, several new procedures were developed and implemented:

l)i€7SID law enforcement account managers provide dealing with law enforcement field personnel to ~efore deployment. The are rovided with contact · ormation or NSA representatives to t N$A Headquarters an spec c gm e mes or requesting ormatiort··a)_,.p technical support from NSA. . .... ·······:::::''''''"'"'::::::::::=;;:;.-(b) (1)

2~ Th~ lta:~?A::aev~iop~a ~;~Cd.i~?e~~~e.P:a (b l ( 3

l - p · L ·

memorandum t~ ~haf"delineated proced~~~sJ6r request¢.g NSA support. . .... , ... ,, ...

3)iE7-NSA OGC provide~ fiitha tailored, form~l'briefing on NSA authorities and restrict.!.ons~· This training includes NJ.ST-authorized downgrading and sanJ,tizallons of SIGINT, tasking of NS~/CSS national assets to satisfy[Jrequirements and special exceptions, such as ta_rgeting of non-U.S. persons' communications for a law enforce.ment purpose.

(S//51//NF) During the quarter, NSA receivedOequests of assistance from law enforcement agencies. NSA also received a request from the Department of Justice under Section 105a of the National Security Act of 1947, which allows NSA to provide support to law enforcement if the target is foreign and is located overseas. In accordance with standard practices for such requests, the SID forwarded the results directly to the OGC for vetting before

86-36

dissemination. NSA support included I (~) ( 1)

~~----------------~~--------•·----------------------------·~) (3)-P.L. 86-36 . -) (3) 18 usc 798 1----------------------------------------~(b) ( 3) -50 usc 3 02 4 ( i

. DOCID: 4165191 . '·

86-36

(b.) (1)

ihl 131 ~so- usc 3o241il

(b}{.3) -Pl86-J6 (b) (3}-::-18 usc 798

(U//f'OU87 In our quarterly report of 25 March 2003, were orted that the NSA Office of Securi had rovided aQ.d training last fall tthe .. r~_quest of In.r~spo~e to a query from the D/ ATSD(IO), the following additforialdetails.a:r~.provicled.:.···· ...

................................. ::::::::::::::::::::::,,

(U jll:.Y"'\TI~ (b l ( 1) . ( 3) - P. L. 8 6-3 6

(U I fFOUG~ 1······· ·· ···· · \hi\ ( 1 l ~--~~~~~~----------------------------~~--~~~P.L. 86-36

(U; ;~~>og:uy.eer:rr----------------m(ttl\ ( 1)

\(3)-P.L. 86-36

8 TOP SECRET/fCOMINT-ECf[:JrALENT Irn'i1IOLEllfiOFOFU#n'cP l-P · L · 86-36

· DOGID: 4165191

(U) Working Aids

(U) All SID personnel at NSA Headquarters and in the Extended Enterprise have access to the document, "U. 5. Identities in SIGINT," and other guidance documents either in hard copy or via NSANet. Its personnel are cognizant ofNSA/CSS Directive 10-30 and review it as necessary to ensure ccrr:.pliance \Vith the directive.

(b)\( 1) (b)\3) P.L. 86-36

(U 1 f.l?OUO) NSAI.-----------.Iredesign:~~Jt~rhome:::w:iiib'::"""T'fil ·( 3 l - P. L. 8 6-36

page to include an Intelligence Oversight I¥.I.<:.~ .. As . .part·oftheir quarterly training,! !Personnel are required to access the site, read its contents and complete the form at the end signifying they completed the required training.

(U) Databases

collected against or named in product.

...... ~---····· (b) ( 3) - P. L. 8 6-3 6

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION

NSA STAFF PROCESSING FORM TO v \ J,Y" I EXREG CONTROL NUMBER I KCC CONTROL NUMBER DIRECTOR 9(:1.1 <bl-1 \ ~ IG-10160-03

THAU /('y v ACTION EXREG SUSPENSE

_;;D~!D~I;;.R:.:.::~:::::=::~··~D:...:::SE=C=R:::E:..:T:.:~=~:.:T~===-------1 D APPROVAL SUBJECT

Quarterly Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board I!] SIGNATURE

KCC SUSPENSE

on NSA Activities-Second Quarter FY03 (U//FOUO) -- D INFORMATION ELEMENT susPENse

DISTRIBUTION

SUMMARY

PURPOSE: (U//FOUO~To forward to the Intelligence Oversight ·Board (lOB) of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, via the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Intelligence Oversight (ATSD(IO)), NSA's quarterly report on its intelligence activities.

BACKGROUND: (U/I¥0UO)'Executive Order 12333 and Executive Order 12863 require Intelligence Community agency heads and Intelligence Community General Counsels and Inspectors General, respectively, to report to the lOB on a quarterly basis concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order or Presidential Directive. The enclosed memorandum covers all reportable activities known to the Inspector General and General Counsel. Per PIOB letter of 6 August 1982, Agency heads are responsible for reporting separately any additional reportable activities known to them, unless the President has specifically instructed that the Board is not to be informed. The Director's signature signifies that no other activities that require reporting are known to him.

RECOMMENDATION: (U/IFOUO~Director sign the enclosed memorandum .

. ·)·:;-;{b) ( 3) - P. L. 8 6-3 6 .··_..·.::

.· ··><~/

.· .. ::>" :/ !

DECLASSIFY UPON REMOVAL OF THE E~CLOSURE(S) COORtliNATIONIAPPROVAL

OFFiCS NAME AND DATE .. · .•.•. · ... ::;E(_fUAt: OfFICE \NAME AND DATE SECURE · PHONE PHONE

J)05 {_\ ll .> 'ieA .3~' ActingGC v u.u s:o~enza ~ -~"-·• ~548s

AGC(O) / / 3121s

IG .Joel 11: J:SreD91' '!f'!;;'. 3544s AIG(IO) . ldf2<i/Oj 3544s

I ·RG. PHONE (Secure) DATE PREPARED

~11 963-2984 29 MAY2003

FORM A6796 FEB 94 oA!E:o724 F;i~ary 1998

123-2 SECURITY CLASSIFICATION NSN: 7540-FM-001·5465

-......---, .. DECLASSIFY ON: Xl -·~ L...J ·~···~--~ ..

J ··-·

. . SliCRe:FgcoMINTY4 · DO~.ID :. 41651 1

. ;; .-. SI:CURITY CLA~I

I

NSA STAFF PROCESSING FORM TO - I EXREG CONTROL. NUMBER I KCC CONTROl. NUMBER I NSA IG, N~A GC OC-101-03 THRU ( l "':\ \ ACTION EXREG SUSPENSE

SIGINT Director ~ \_"' ..., z.'i ~~ """"> 0 APPROVAL -s=u=e~JE~C~T----------~~-~.:_ ,~}~~--~--~--------~ rKwc~c~sums~P~EN~S~E---------(U) SID Quarterly Complitm'Ce Report, 1 January to 31 0 SIGNATURE

March 2003 - Addendum !!] INFORMATION EL.EMENT susPENse

DISTRIBUTION

SUMMARY

PURPOSE: {U//FOUO) To forward additional information to the NSA Inspector General and the NSA General Counsel for the second quarter ofFY2003 (1 January 2003 to 31 March 2003) on SIGINT Directorate compliance with E.O. 12333 and related directives.

BACKGROUND: tSIJSI) Due to personnel changes, the counterterrorism desk failed to submit the number of U.S. telephone numbers released under authority of SID .policy memo, "Implemen­tation Policy for Support to Law Enforcement and the Intelligence Community ''ith Provision of U.S. SIGINT Calling Data Relate~ to Counterterrorism." Oversight and Compliance noted the omission after the SIGIN"'T Directorate Quarterly Compliance Report to the NSA Inspector Gen­eral was completed and contacted the CT desk for the data.

DISCUSSION: (S//S!) A total oOU.S. telephone numbers were rel~~:.:4.:i.9:t.ipper, over the second fiscal quarter of 2003. . . . · · '-· ____ _.

: ............ .

'(b')'(i)'··· (b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

/f(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

CQ6RDI.NA TION/~PROVAL. OFi=ICE NAME AND DATE :);~~~ .OFFICE NAME AND DATE s;~~~

SID Sr. O~ersight Exec.l j;'cp '1~3 J!i?H I I I

.... · POC I 963-8175 n~lr.II\IATno

vrehiPf o ORG. PHONE (Secure) DATE PREPARED

• -• & ComnHanc~

I I 963-8170 23Ap~2003

FORM A6796 FEB 94 Da~ived from: NSA/CSSM 123·2

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION NSN: 7540·FM.(l01·5465

Datad: 24 February 1998 SsCRETff66MINTi/X II Declassify On: X1