Centrum vyzkumu Rez

CZECH COUNTRY REPORT Part I:

CZECH SNF HEU SHIPMENT NO. 2

Jiri Rychecky

05 June 2013

1 1

CZECH COUNTRY REPORT:

CZECH SNF HEU SHIPMENT NO. 2

The 2nd CZ HEU SNF shipment has been made from March

22nd to April 10th

The preparation of the shipment was started on 2011 by

calculation of burn up, fission products, decay heat, activity,

etc.

Due to the short time of delay after the last fuel unloading from

the reactor core, the loading of the casks was divided into 2

parts (Part I. – 2 casks on May – June 2012 and Part II. – 4 casks

on February – March 2013) and the number of SFAs in each

cask was decreased to 24 SFAs at Part I. and to 16 FAs at Part II

There is no HEU fuel in Czech Republic after this shipment.

2. Project Management, Administrative Preparation

Unified Project for importing and handling the Czech Republic

HEU-SNF into the RF

Russian Reviews and Technical Support - Czech HEU-SNF

Shipment No. 2

Foreign Trade Contract

Licenses: 8 CZ, 3 RF, 2 PL

2. Project Management, Administrative Preparation LL

Co-signatory of ESA is obligatory. Remarks (rather formal) to

the FTC from ESA were obtained after FTC signature between

FCNRS and ÚJV. FCNRS was not able to sign the new FTC

version without a new evaluation process; ESA was not able to

co-sing the existing contract without the revision.

The solution was a Memorandum of Understanding between

FCNRS and ÚJV containing the necessary statements

according to the ESA requirements The FTC was negotiated

very long. Mainly it was a discussion among lawyers – place of

arbitrary, legislation used, etc. It is necessary to start the

contract preparation early

The administrative preparation need the same or more time as

at the first SNF shipment.

.

3. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Preparation for

Transport

Calculations of fission products, decay heat, activity, etc., for

each fuel assembly have been made by program ORIGEN on

September – October 2011. Calculations of burn up for each

fuel assembly have been made by program NODER.

Spectrometric water activity measurements after each SFAS

sipping test were performed to identify damaged fuel

assemblies, if any, which has been removed from the LVR-15

reactor. No damaged fuel assembly was detected.

Visual Inspection of all FAs has been done on 14. - 18. May

2012. The new Radiation tolerant TV inspection system STS-

40M (Manufacturer: DIAKONT) for TV inspection was used for

visual inspection of irradiated fuel.

3. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Preparation for

Transport - TV inspection system STS-40M

3. Storage of Spent Nuclear Fuel and Preparation for

Transport LL

The careful manipulation with fuel assemblies and the good

quality of water at spent fuel storage pools prevented of fuel

leaking. There was no leaking fuel assembly in fuel which has

been shipped to Russia under the 2nd Czech SNF Shipment.

The new Radiation tolerant TV inspection systems STS-40M,

( DIAKONT St. Petersburg) have been bought for visual TV

inspection of irradiated fuel during preparation and loading.

The TV systems are very effective, reliable and easy to use for

underwater TV inspections under high dose rate conditions.

There was no failure or systems instability during operation.

The systems enabled to decrease the time for inspections, and

to considerable simplify the process of monitoring conditions.

4. HLWSF Dry Run LL (1)

Dry Run was held in order to verify knowledge of cask handling

and operability of various tools and equipment before

transportation of the loaded ŠKODA VPVR/M packages between

the LVR-15 reactor and the Building 211/8 - HLWSF.

The Dry Run was connected with transportation of two casks

from HLWSF to the LVR-15 reactor site for SNF loading.

The dry run is necessary and useful. The last manipulation for

some workers was 5 years ago (in 2007). Many workers

manipulated with the casks during preparation for shipment to

other countries, but there were new workers without any

experience too.

4. HLWSF Dry Run cont.

ISO container being loaded

VPVR/M cask being loaded into the ISO Container

4. HLWSF Dry Run LL (2)

There were two textiles cords (shorter and longer). The shorter

one was delivered to the reactor site and there were doubts

whether it was not too long. So there was a risk of delay caused

by delivering of the shorter cord from the reactor site.

Nevertheless, the shorter one was tested and was fine. Even

seemingly little things are of great importance.

There was a truck with trailer parking on the road going to the

entrance to ÚJV site – to HLWSF. The truck partially blocks the

road. At last, the DMS truck was able to use the road. The

problem was anticipated and a guard was there, but left early.

The solutions applied during the shipment of SNF to the railway

station was that there were marks that the parking is not

allowed.

5. LVR-15 Reactor Dry Run LL

The dry run is necessary because the last manipulation for

some workers was 5 years ago (in 2007); there were new

workers too.

The basket was stuck inside the cask. The basket was removed

from the top of the cask – this operation has never been tested

before.

Another problem was higher preload of manipulation rods when

retracting the basket inside the cask due to less operator

attention. The crane has a little faster movements including

micro lifting.

Broken video camera for loading and dry run recording.

5. LVR-15 Dry Run -Removal and Testing of Basket

6. Loading of IRT-2M from the Reactor Pool and

Transport of the VPVR/M Casks to HLWSF LL (1)

Before the shipment of the ŠKODA VPVR/M casks loaded with

spent fuel from the LVR-15 reactor site to the HLWS storage

facility, the shipment documentation was prepared.

The new Radiation tolerant TV inspection systems STS-40M

was used for visual inspection of fuel assemblies during

loading and for checking the ID numbers. The systems enabled

to decrease the time for inspections, and to considerable

simplify the process of monitoring.

The calculations of the activities and dose rates were in very

good conformity with the dose rates values detected on the

surface of casks after fuel loading.

6. Loading of IRT-2M from the Reactor Pool and

Transport of the VPVR/M Casks to HLWSF LL (2)

It was very useful to divide the cask loading into two parts.

Smaller changes of FAs positions at the casks baskets could be

made after Part I for minimize the dose rates. The verification of

calculations dose rates also had been made. Possibility of

loading fuel after only 1.5 year of decay, if the number of fuel

assemblies at cask was decreased also was verified. The

distribution of fuel assemblies to 6 casks (decreasing of the

number of FAs to 24 resp. 16) kept to minimize of the dose rate

during loading and transport.

The accurate preparation of documents and good

communication with the SONS, IAEA and EURATOM kept the

inspection activities effective and without problems.

Manipulation with VPVR/M Cask

Cask prepared for basket lowering

Manipulation with the cask

Transfer Cask from ISO

Loading of IRT-2M from the Reactor Pool and Transport

of the VPVR/M Casks to HLWSF

Cask prepared for loading

Drying and He leaking testing

Loading of spent

fuel into the basket

7. Final Shipment Operation

The transport carrier and equipment, e.g., trucks, trailers,

mobile cranes, and etc., physical security, safety, customs, and

regulatory inspectors, and etc., as appropriate were arranged

and coordinated.

The ISO containers were prepared for transport, customs

inspection and seal were performed, and the loaded trucks

were removed from the facility and prepared for the shipment.

The casks were transported to the railway station.

Six ŠKODA VPVR/M casks loaded with spent fuel were

successfully loaded and prepared for transportation to the

Russian Federation.

Cooperation with all participants of the shipment was effective

and without problems.

7. Final Shipment Operation

8. Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel

Road transport from ÚJV to the rail freight yard took place in one batch (three trucks, one ISO container with two ŠKODA VPVR/M casks in each).

The rail transport route was laid out in accordance with documentation; the version selected led from the Czech Republic to Poland via a selected border station, and then to the Gdynia port.

Timetables were compiled by the department of special transport of ČD Cargo and PKP Cargo.

At Gdynia Port, the containers were transferred from the train onto the “Mikhail Dudin” ship.

At Murmansk Port, the containers were transferred from the ship to train sent out from FGUP Mayak. The train was delayed and that was why the load was reload on April 3.

Transport of SNF – Preparation of Loading Cask

VPVR Loading to the ISO Conteiner

8. Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel LL

The above transport of SNF through the Czech Republic and

Poland was prepared by the transporter in cooperation with

affected organizations and officials of the Czech Republic and

Poland from the beginning of 2011.

During transport, no deviations from plan occurred. The

transport documentation had been prepared 3 months before

the shipment, and several times accordingly checked.

Transport, as a whole, occurred smoothly and safely, and all

conditions set out in the decision of SONS and the PAA, both of

whom issued permission for transport, were met.

All bodies and organizations concerned proceeded in absolute

conformance with permits from relevant authorities, planning

documentation, their commitments, and with directives.

8. Transport of Spent Nuclear Fuel - Dates

The last four days before the shipment, the representative of

FGUP Mayak and SOSNY worked at ÚJV to check the

completeness of the documentation from the point of view of

the SNF receiver. This checking is very important.

Czech Republic: March 22 to March 23, 2013

Poland: March 23 to March 24, 2013

Marine transport: March 24 to April 1, 2013

Russian Federation: April 3 to April 10, 2013

Reloading to the Vessel and Sea

8. Organizations and Government Bodies Directly

Concerned with Transport

Czech Republic

ÚJV Řež, a. s.

Centrum výzkumu Řež s.r.o.

State Office for Nuclear Safety (SÚJB – SONS)

DMS s.r.o. (DMS) – transport organization, road transport

Police of the Czech Republic – security (PČR)

ČD Cargo, a. s. – operator of railway infrastructure

Czech Fire Department (HZS ČR)

Radioactive Waste Repository Authority (RAWRA – SÚRAO)

Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT)

8. Organizations and Government Bodies Directly

Concerned with Transport

International Organizations

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

EURATOM of the European Commission

Poland

Państwowa Agencja Atomistyki (PAA – Polish regulatory body)

PKP CARGO S.A. with its subcontractors – PKP Polskie Linie

Kolejowe S.A. and Straż Ochrony Kolei (rail transportation via

Poland)

Zakład Unieszkodliwiania Odpadów Promieniotwórczych

(RWMP), Swierk

8. Organizations and Government Bodies Directly

Concerned with Transport

Russian Federation

J/S ASPOL Baltic Corporation (marine transportation)

Federal State Unitary Enterprise «Mayak» Production

Association (FSUE «Mayak» PA (consignee)

Federal State Unitary Enterprise «Federal Centre for Nuclear

and Radiation Safety» (FSUE «FCNRS»)

R&D Company “Sosny” (transport documentation support)

THANK YOU FOR YOUR ATTENTION