1The Unbundling of Sovereignty and Cyprus: a Case of Contested Sovereignty

Erol KaymakEastern Mediterranean University

Prepared for delivery at the 2003 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 28 - August 31, 2003. Copyright by the American Political Science Association

2Introduction

Sovereignty is increasingly contested, both in the political realm and in International Relations theory. Political developments emanating from the end of the Cold War have prompted questions regarding the role of conventional rules of sovereignty in facilitating, if not shaping, the political, economic, security, or ideological objectives pursued by actors or agents (Krasner 1999; Krasner 2001). Treating sovereignty as a social construct allows for theoretical space to study how rules have evolved and consideration of transformation in the locus of authority (Biersteker and Weber 1996; Philpott 2001). A number of anomalous cases, such as Tibet, Hong Kong, Bosnia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, and Palestine, among others, point to scenarios where principles associated with sovereignty have affected choices. Although the script of sovereignty envisions internationally independent legal sovereignty, the concept of juridical independence, and internationally recognized territorial entities, cases like these raise the question as to how and when rules are or are not bent.

The island of Cyprus merits attention. Like other problematic cases, arrangements and de facto realities on Cyprus are inconsistent with some of the principles associated with sovereignty. This paper proposes to analyze the Cyprus problem within the context of contested rules and sovereignty. Cyprus is often treated as a case study by scholars of conflict resolution studies (Fisher 2001), but the question of problematic sovereignty would broaden the analytical focus.

Those who approach the Cyprus problem from the perspective of conflict resolution tend to focus on how to establish trust and an environment for effective mediation. There is a tendency to focus on the ideational basis of the conflict (Fisher 2001). Familiarity with the Cyprus problem tends to discourage academics and diplomats alike. The result is that adjectives like intractable commonly precede Cyprus problem. Cyprus remains a Gordian knot, and has claimed chinks in the armor of many diplomats over the years. Many initiatives put forth by successive UN Secretary Generals have been rejected by one side or another, and often by both sides, as if they were working in tandem. Even US diplomat Richard Holbrooke, of the Dayton accord fame, left Cyprus empty handed.

Frustrated with the Cyprus imbroglio, some academics have shifted their gaze from the allegedly inept third party mediation process to view the antagonists or disputants themselves. Perhaps the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots negotiate for reasons other than finding a final, comprehensive solution to the Cyprus problem. One scholar is of the view that the sides negotiate out of fear (Richmond 1999); fear that the sovereignty claims of one side may trump the other. In fact, this struggle over sovereignty has dominated not only the intercommunal talks, but also bicommunal activities, where nationalists on both sides have exploited the notion of implied recognition, alleging that even face to face contacts have the effect of lending credence to the official sovereign claims of the other (Constantinou and Papadakis 2001). In short, any one familiar with the Cyprus case recognizes that the struggle over sovereignty is a dominant narrative among the disputants.

3Problematic Sovereignty in International Relations

In recent years the international community has faced a dilemma in choosing between Westphalian principles and what has been dubbed humanitarian intervention into internal ethnic wars. Do you abrogate sovereignty, and if so, how? Policy oriented scholars deal with the practical aspect of the problem (Saideman 2002). Questions of intervention and partition are increasingly salient. If intervention is a policy, then what kind of international cooperation is necessary to make it viable?

Some claim that the norms to which the international community adheres are counterproductive and unrealistic. Chaim Kaufmann, an ardent supporter of ethnic partitioning, advocates population transfers as a means to alleviate the ethnic security dilemma associated with intermingling populations (Kaufmann 1998). Some say that the international system needs to devise means to cope with the reality of de facto states (Pegg 2000).

Such pragmatism, however, does not get to the core of the matter on the causes of ethnic conflict and thus never considers the possibility that practices of sovereignty may actually have the unintended consequence of contributing to ethnic warfare. Nor does it address the degree to which embarking on a new interventionist doctrine affects the practice of sovereignty in the international system.

It is hardly surprising that the end of the Cold War has prompted questions and kindled interest in the concept and practice of sovereignty. In International Relations theory the mainstream neo-neo synthesis took sovereignty as an ontological given, given the theoretical proclivities motivating such approaches. Neo-realists, for instance, tend to treat sovereignty as a bundled notion, including population, territory, authority, and recognition. The bundled approach allowed for the unproblematic treatment of a single actor. Yet, this was to be disputed by scholars who sought to understand change and transformation in the international system (Weber 1995; Biersteker and Weber 1996). Such scholars aimed to understand how, in an era of globalization and increasing intervention, practices of states and non-state actors produced, reformed, and redefined sovereignty, especially in terms of its constitutive elements. How do changes in definitions of populations, recognition, authority, and territory relate to the practice of sovereignty? These questions focus on change and transformation, and require an appreciation of time and space. Thus questions such as why quasi-states states that enjoy juridical sovereignty, yet would be considered failed states persist in the contemporary international system could be addressed (Jackson 1990). The constructivist challenge is sociological. It deals with structures and agents that are constantly reconstituting one another and cannot be taken for granted.

Not all scholars are convinced of the efficacy of norms or ideas. Materialists, be they of a realist or Marxist persuasion, privilege objective interests over supposedly constructed ones. In essence, constructivists advocate the significance of social facts. Intersubjective beliefs construct the interests and identities of purposive actors (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001). The question then is how social facts change and how they influence politics. As constructivists cannot take interests and identities as ontologically given, they therefore seek to understand their origins. As such, some researchers inquire into the proliferation of international norms, and others, more

4critically, assess how constructions of reality reify relations of power. Still others address foreign policy from the perspective of state identities (Katzenstein 1996; Wendt 1999).

A recent question or debate regards the degree to which the script of sovereignty, a sociological construct, constrains choices and outcomes when dealing with anomalous cases in the international system. The more cynical view is espoused by Stephen Krasner who claims that sovereignty is constantly, and historically, compromised (1999). Whereas a cognitive script exists that filters perceptions as classificatory schemes, ultimately the logic of consequences outweighs the logic of appropriateness. Sovereignty is hardly constraining, as it allows for such malleability that any political outcome is possible, given the interests and power of rulers. As such, sovereignty as an institution is nothing more than organized hypocrisy (Krasner 1999). Rulers are perpetually compromising sovereignty, and it is not restricted to coercion orimposition, since, in Krasners view contracts or treaties as well as conventions are also compromises.

Krasner produces a classification scheme for unbundling sovereignty. There are four types: domestic sovereignty, interdependence sovereignty, international legal sovereignty, and Westphalian sovereignty. Domestic sovereignty refers to the extent of control a government or authority exercises within its borders. Jacksons quasi-states serve as a reminder here that not all states enjoy such control. Interdependence sovereignty refers to control of border traffic, which is increasingly compromised in an era of globalization. International legal sovereignty refers to the practice of state and government recognition, thus it is a matter of external legitimacy. Finally, Westphalian sovereignty refers to the exclusivity of domestic authority from oversight. The first two types of sovereignty entail control, whereas the latter two are matters of authority.

Krasner treats a wide array of practices and arrangements that tend to curtail Westphalian autonomy in particular; anything from minority treaties to human rights conventions, as well as from sovereign lending agreements to humanitarian intervention,are presented as evidence of widespread hypocrisy. Krasner concedes that the script of sovereignty may play itself out, but only in cases where neither coercion nor cooperation is viable (Krasner 2001).

Others counter that Krasners iconoclastic dethronement of sovereignty fails (Philpott 2001). From this view the constitutive norms of sovereignty are far more constraining. Rules are constitutive. This does not mean that they are static, though. In fact, over the 350 years since the Peace of Westphalia the constitutive norms of sovereignty have gone through a number of revolutions (Philpott 2001). Each revolution has led to a new international constitution that entails three faces of sovereignty. The first face answers what kinds of entities the international system consists of; the second answers how exclusive or inclusive membership is; and the third face answers what the prerogatives of the entities are. Since Westphalia the faces have all undergone some change or revision. Revisions are not merely cosmetic facelifts. For instance, in the aftermath of Westphalia (1648) non-intervention was a sine qua non norm of sovereignty. States were to be Christian. With the advent of the League of Nations and minority treaties (circa 1878 through World War One) new states were subject to oversight with respect to their treatment of minorities, hence intervention. This example, for Philpott, would not be construed as evidence of hypocrisy, but a new norm emanating

5from a revision in all three faces of sovereignty. In other words, sovereignty has not always been treated as absolute.

Although Philpott would probably reject the label, he has much in common with constructivists who also share his orientation on the role of ideas in shaping international phenomena. Constructivists aim to bring sociology back into IR. Philpott and the constructivists face an uphill battle against skeptics who tend to be of a structuralist or materialist persuasion. From a constructivist view, the rules of sovereignty are constitutive. That is, as with the game of chess, there are basic rules without which the game could not be played. Admittedly the rules are not always as strict as in chess. Philpotts preferred analogy is to sandlot basketball, where the general parameters exist, but where there is considerable leeway. More importantly, the rules of the game are far from static, and the game can evolve. In fact, we know that many contemporary games, say American football, have their origins in older games (rugby in this case). Philpott alleges that Krasners analysis of anomalies suffers from selection bias, in that it is impossible to assess the claim that logics of consequences always trump logics of appropriateness. Empirically one must also consider cases that follow the script of sovereignty.

Even in cases of apparent organized hypocrisy there may be evidence of the role of the constitutive rules of the game actually constraining choices. Around the globe are a number of cases that constitute problematic cases of sovereignty. Such anomalous cases include Tibet, Hong Kong, Bosnia, the Commonwealth of Independent States, Palestine, and others. For instance, according to Michel Oksenberg (Oksenberg 2001)the importation of sovereignty, especially Westphalian notions, has had a profound impact in Asia/China. The quasi-autonomous status of the tributary state is no longer a viable option for cases like Tibet. The debate on sovereignty is pertinent to understanding the role of external powers in post Cold War internal conflicts. Hardly had the ink dried on Fukuyamas end of history thesis than the international community, and the EU in particular, faced a dilemma associated with the emerging world order. Intervention, in and of itself, implies that norms of sovereignty are violated, but a closer analysis reveals that the US and European countries remained very cognizant of the norms and principles of sovereignty in the breakup of the former Yugoslavia, and later in the controversial decisions to intervene in Bosnia, and finally Kosovo.

Cases such as Bosnia may seem to corroborate Krasners basic thesis, yet a closer reading may reveal a much more nuanced perspective of how outside powers actually intervened there (Woodward 2001). Susan Woodwards general analysis of the dissolution of the former Yugoslavia suggests that although one could make the case for a straightforward realist interpretation of the events and decisions that led to the recognition of republics like Slovenia and Croatia, and which had the effect of promoting ethnic warring, this would in fact be a superficial reading.

At first blush the case for realism is strong. In 1991 Western powers, and the European Community in particular, apparently considering that Yugoslavias strategic position had diminished in the wake of the Cold War, engaged in a policy of partitioning. Germany pushed for the recognition of Slovenia, and in short order other Republics were also clamoring for recognition.

On the other hand, the way cases for sovereignty were framed suggests the significance of the sovereignty script. Woodward points to the way Slovene nationalists

6framed their actions in terms of the norm of sovereignty. Slovenes claimed that their independence would not clash with the norm, but would rather be in conformity, thus providing cover for the major powers.

Slovene nationalists avoided the stigma of secession. The basic argument was that Yugoslavia was an artificial state; one that did not conform to the norms of democracy, human rights, and the market economy. The Slovenes were able to make the case that this was a dichotomous choice between democracy and unity.

Meanwhile, the major powers disregarded the constitutional anomaly that was Yugoslavia. The Yugoslavian constitutional order gave the right of self-determination to the nations, not the Republics. The sovereignty of each nation was lodged in a particular Republic, but the borders of the Republics did not conform to that of the nations or to residential patterns, with the exception of Slovenia. The national rights of individuals were guaranteed equal exercise in the all the Republics. Certain national minorities, those of the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, however, did not bear sovereign rights because they lacked constituent nation status.

Woodward alleges that after warring broke out, outsiders engaged in significant historical revisionism, framing the issue as one of Serbian aggression. Not only was Yugoslavias unique status disregarded, but the relative successes of the Markovic reform package were likewise. Further, outsiders ignored the popularity of Markovic and the federal level, and focused exclusively on the Milosevic at the Republic level.

Woodward claims that early efforts at building a confederation for the former Yugoslavia were stymied because outsiders and the EC in particular did not appreciate such an institutional hybrid.

The case of Bosnia, on the other hand, represents in many ways a very problematic case of outside intervention and would seem to suggest that scripts of sovereignty are easily disregarded. Bosnia enjoys formal juridical independence, but this is in tension with its lack of de facto autonomy, or Westphalian sovereignty. Yet, even here the script looms large. Dayton Bosnia does not conform to any normal pattern of domestic sovereignty. The autonomy principle is being defied in order to create an autonomous state. Although this reeks of hypocrisy, Woodward contends that, in fact, what we see are major powers and international organizations constrained in how they intervene in Westphalian sovereignty. For example, it was important for the outside powers to secure the consent of the parties in Bosnia, thus parties willingly signed the Dayton accord. Therefore, although the High Representative in Dayton Bosnia enjoys Bonn powers whereby he can dictate or impose decisions, this is all with a view to create a system that is autonomous, viable and self-sustaining.

As the Yugoslavian case suggests, normative framing becomes significant when outsiders and local political entrepreneurs can provide cover for one another. The Slovene nationalists were able to secede and the outsiders were able to partition Yugoslavia without having violated the sovereignty norm. However, the right to self-determination was curtailed by a bias favoring territorial integrity.

According to Rodney Bruce Hall (1999), the realist case is undermined byhistorical cases of inexplicable state behavior, such as during the Franco-Prussian War where Bismarck resisted mass mobilization and Napoleon III committed France to a war in the milieu of nationalism, not rational realpolitik. Bismarcks territorial state, Prussia, was loath to concede authority, hence chose to ignore international competitive pressures

7to adopt new military strategies. Napoleon could not avoid war without facing a legitimacy crisis, irrespective of the objective conditions that prevailed internationally. From Halls perspective the roots to any prevailing international system is to be found not in the distribution of power (i.e. the will-to-power), but in the collective identities of groups that constitute states (i.e. the will-to-manifest-identity). France and Prussiarepresent two domestic systems that differ in terms of collective identities. Historically contingent norms associated with sovereignty reflect the prevailing domestic orders, and not vice versa. As collective identities have changed, so has the legitimate form of authority and polity. Thus, in time, with the passing of the Augsburg (dynastic) system, the kingdom gave way to the territorial state. The territorial state and its sovereignty refer to the Westphalian system and the principle of raison detat. Finally the nation-state displaces the territorial state and thus is born the nation-state system internationally, a system predicated on national self-determination.

Territoriality is an historical phenomenon and has a legacy. The Westphalian turn entailed shifts from an aspatial ontology to one that is territorial (Carporaso 2000). Although developments in the European Union may be the harbinger of a decoupling of territory and rule, territoriality remains the dominant script, especially in cases where there is tension between it and self-determination.

Hendrik Spruyt (Spruyt 2000) argues that the role of norms among peripheral elites was crucial in the decline of colonialism. In an analysis of discourses in metropoles and the peripheries, he finds little evidence of norms impacting metropoles in regard to decolonization. On the other hand, peripheral elites were fully aware of the hypocrisies of Western rule, as reality clashed with ideals of democratic equality, state building, and national self-determination. They also recognized limitations on their own career paths. Successful peripheral elites adopted modern forms of public office and governance over precolonial forms of rule. This corresponds neatly with David Strangs (Strang 1996)concept of defensive Westernization, that a Euro-centric notion of statehood limited recognition to entities that emulated modern states.

While adopting sovereign territoriality as the dominant script, peripheral elites were far more cautious about the principle of self-determination as it applied to all nationalist claims. His example is how the Javanese claim for Indonesian independence had the effect of subverting the possibility of independence for many areas and ethnic groups within the East Indies. This selective appropriation of the sovereignty script curtailed self-determination. Spruyt points to the irony that non-Western powers became the strongest proponents of the sovereignty script. In short, the local elites successfully turned Western principles against their rulers, and the constitutive rule of sovereignty defined the range of behaviors that nationalists could adopt, the result being that those conforming most closely to Western norms were rewarded by the system.

Self-determination fell short of becoming an international constitutional provision, since it only applied to the colonial context, but not to minorities (Philpott 2001, p. 43). Self-determination only applies to peoples or to a specific territory to choose its own form of government. If self-determination is applied to a people, then what is a people? The answer is political. Any people so defined is considered a self-determining unit.

External self-determination is at odds with internal self-determination, or the principle that all segments of a population have a right to influence the political and

8constitutional structure of the system under which they live. Many secessionist attempts have sought justification in the principle of self -determination, notably in Bangladesh where legitimacy was granted as an act of self-help in the face of oppression. However, Bangladesh still remains and exception that proves the rule.

Clearly the integrity of states lies in tension with self-determination. With respect to secession it seems that at present international jurists lack even the rudimentary consensus required to decide the legitimacy of secession (Necatigil 1998).

How Sovereign Practices Affect Cyprus

The central argument of this paper is that practices of sovereignty have had a detrimental effect on what is known as the Cyprus problem. Part of the problem has to with the way Cyprus was constructed, and how the sides on the island have interpreted that construction. Further, through their respective histiographies both sides have attempted to totalize, demonize, and domesticate the other, with a view to discrediting claims to sovereignty (Constantinou and Papadakis 2001). The pernicious effect of such histiographies is not only to make the case of either side, but also to provide cover for ethnic separatism who argue that contacts tend to promote implied recognition of the other sides claim to sovereignty. Thus, boundaries, through sovereignty, are drawn around communities.

In general the script of sovereignty works in favor of the Greek Cypriot side, insofar as the territorial integrity of the island is at stake and compromised by Turkeys presence. Given the commitment to the Republic of Cyprus as the recognized government, the EU and other international organizations have been able to treat Cyprus, a case of problematic sovereignty, as if there were no real contradictions.

Outsiders often have a difficult time understanding Turkish discourse on Cyprus. For many Turks the history of Cyprus and that of modern Turkey are intertwined. British imperialism is seen as treacherous and the annexation of Cyprus, although acknowledged by Turkey through the Lausanne Treaty, is resented. Basically the Turkish claim to Cyprus stems from this notion that Cyprus belonged to the Ottomans, not Greece, hence it stands to reason that Turkey should have priority over Greece in sovereignty claims. In other words, taksim itself may be considered a compromise! Turkish histiography reinforces this claim through denigrating Greek claims. The argument runs that Greece never controlled Cyprus. Although this contradicts Byzantine history, Turkish histiography also makes the distinction between mainland Greeks, known as Yunan (or Ionian) and local Greek Cypriots, called Rum (Turkish for Roman, referring to subjects of the Byzantine Empire). In fact, all Greeks outside of modern day Greece, including those in Turkey, are called Rum. Rum also has connotations of subject culture, given the privileged status of Muslim Turks vis--vis Greeks in the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish narrative also asserts that the Republic of Cyprus was a partnership republic, and thus the Westphalian sovereignty or autonomy of Cyprus is questioned. Indeed, this is exactly what Turkey argues diplomatically when failing to recognize the Greek Cypriot led Republic of Cyprus as the legitimate government on Cyprus, and in rejecting Cypriot accession to the EU, given that it supposedly contradicts the London-Zurich agreements.

9The Greek Cypriot perspective is easier for outsiders to appreciate. Greek Cypriots claim that enosis was entirely consistent with the principle of self-determination. Even after the Republic was established, the Greek Cypriot argument against the encroachment of outsiders received a warm audience in the Non-Aligned Movement and in the UN General Assembly. This could be explained more cynically, through political alignments and interests, as realists might make the case, but there is also the case to be made in favor of the sovereignty script. Therefore, Greek Cypriot revisionism and enosisvia self-determination, had more credence, hence support, than Turkish Cypriot secessionism, even if it was also sugar coated within the cloak of self-determination. Greek Cypriot efforts to annul the Treaty of Guarantee were to be viewed as a legitimate effort at doing away with the vestiges of imperialism, whereas Turkish Cypriot efforts to partition the island were seen as minority secession. Of course, it is the case that many new members of the UN had inherited heterogeneous populations and restive minorities, hence the cynical thesis holds, but this does not contradict the basic premise that normative framing matters.

The Greek Cypriot perspective since 1974 is even more straightforward. Turkey, a foreign country, has invaded and occupied a significant amount of Cyprus territory that resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands and the deaths of thousands. As such, the Greek Cypriot side successfully argues that the Cyprus problem is international in nature.

Why are the sides so unwilling to compromise on this absolutist notion of sovereignty? I will argue that part of the answers emanates from the problematic nature of the practice of sovereignty in the international system. Although the international community has been less than ambiguous in its recognition of the Greek Cypriot run Republic of Cyprus as the sole government on the island, this in and of itself is a function, I argue, of how the script of sovereignty has the unintended consequence of exacerbating ethnic conflict, given that the indivisibility of sovereignty drives parties to uncompromising positions. The parties themselves also recognize the impact of sovereignty norms on third party mediation efforts. As such, the Turkish Cypriot side views the UN peacemaking operation as an agent of the internationalization of the Cyprus dispute. The Turkish Cypriots tend to push for direct talks, indicative of the view that the UN operation is part of the conflict environment. Conversely, the Greek Cypriot side favors moving the talks into the UN framework. This is not to argue that the Turkish Cypriot side wants nothing to do with the UN. Quite the contrary, the UN serves as an agent of legitimatization for claims on both sides. Without the UN, the Cyprus problem is not between sides within the rubric of the UN mandate, but merely a domestic, internal matter, as is often the case with ethnic conflicts around the globe.

The Cyprus case is also caught in something of a time warp. The 1960 Constitution and the relevant treaties that established the Republic of Cyprus are, to some extent, at odds with contemporary ideals of sovereignty, especially in terms of autonomy, or what is referred to as Westphalian sovereignty. Cypriot sovereignty is curtailed by virtue of treaties that prohibit partitioning and union with other states, and third parties, namely the guarantor powers of motherlands Greece and Turkey, as well as former colonial power Britain, together or individually, have the right to intervene in the domestic of affairs of Cyprus.

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Republic of Cyprus: Minority treaty or Partnership Republic?

The oddity or anomaly that is Cyprus defies the neat categorizations that law imposes and that many academics prefer. E ven Stephen Krasner, a scholar most concerned with ambiguous cases, treats the 1960 Constitutional provisions within the rubric of minority rights (1999, pp. 97-98). In other words, he treats it as a case analogous to the various minority treaties that Western powers imposed after World War I as a precondition for recognition. The entire debate in Cyprus, however, revolves around the notion of whether or not Turkish Cypriots constitute a minority, or whether they are a co-founding people who thus exercised their right to self-determination in signing relevant treaties that established what Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash refers to as a partnership republic.

As the Republic of Cyprus came into being in 1960 this date corresponds with a major shift in the international system with respect to the practice of the right to self-determination, which had been conditional (see General Assembly Resolution 1514). Thereafter many new states came into existence, and although far from homogeneous, came together in international fora, such as the UN General Assembly, as a political bloc. Greek Cypriots, claiming that the London-Zurich agreements that established the Republic of Cyprus, were signed under duress, and that the Treaty of Guarantee, in particular, was at odds with the norms of sovereignty. As the non-aligned movement strengthened as a bloc, it is not surprising that it emphasized the principle of non-intervention as part and parcel to sovereign rights.

Although many outsiders and Greek Cypriots treat 1974 as the origins of the Cyprus problem, Turkish Cypriots prefer pointing to the events in the 1960s, when communal fighting ushered in a United Nations peacekeeping force and UN peacemaking efforts. Both sides attempted to gain legitimacy from that process. The 1964 UN resolution establishing United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) required the consent of the Cypriot government. This was to be a milestone in the Cyprus problem, as the Republic of Cyprus was, given the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from their posts, in effect a de facto Greek Cypriot administration. On the other hand, Turkish Cypriots could claim to be treated as a party to a conflict within the auspices of the UN. The very fact that UN intervention required consent demonstrates the significance of the sovereignty script in the deployment of peacekeepers, and the political implications this decision had in the framing of the political conflict.

Initially the United Nations tried to resolve the conflict through mediation. However, these efforts demonstrate the significance of territoriality in the sovereignty script. Whereas Turkish Cypriots pushed for a federal settlement, the then UN mediator, Galo Plaza, considered it impractical, given that populations were dispersed throughout the island, and that therefore there was no territorial basis for federation. He suggested, instead, a unitary state with provisions for minority rights. Turkish Cypriots, who argued that they had been equal partners with Greek Cypriots in establishing the Republic balked at this, and the United Nations was forced to withdraw from its mediating role for the time being. After the Turkish military intervention of 1974 and de facto partitioning of the island, however, the parameters for a political settlement shifted in favor of the Turkish Cypriots. Since then the United Nations framework, with the approval of the sides, has incorporated bi-zonality and federation.

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As intercommunal talks dragged on over the years without resolution, Greek Cypriots moved to internationalize the Cyprus problem. They took their case to various forums, including the UN General Assembly, where with the aid of Greece, were successful in securing resolutions that condemned the Turkish occupation of North Cyprus. In response, the Turkish Cypriot side declared itself to be the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (henceforth TRNC), an apparent act of unilateral declaration of independence (UDI). The Turkish Cypriots deny that this was an act of secession, but argued that it was, in fact, an expression of self-determination with a view to reestablishing political equality that would pave the way for a federal solution on the island. Even if the argument may be construed to be disingenuous, it nevertheless demonstrates that Turkish Cypriots want to legitimize their actions within the norms of sovereignty.

Cyprus and Turkey

Beyond the international mediators there is the dubious role of the respective motherlands. Neither Greece, nor Turkey, initially conceived of Cyprus as an independent country, and both vied to incorporate it into their respective spheres of influence. Today, with accession to the EU secured, the recognition of the Greek Cypriot led Republic of Cyprus is problematic to Turkey, and this, in turn, threatens to derail Turkeys own aspirations to join the Union.1 In the current context, therefore, the position of Turkey vis--vis Cypriot sovereignty is the far more interesting.

The Republic of Cyprus, from the perspective of Turkish officialdom, was a partnership republic, hence contingent upon the mutual acquiescence of the sides to its governance. Since, it is argued, the 1960 accords have been unilaterally abrogated (by the Greek side) then the Constitution itself is in abeyance. Curiously, though, the Turkish side has felt justified in recognizing the self-proclaimed Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, itself in contravention of the very treaties Turkey refers to. There is also marked resistance from various parts of the Turkish establishment, including the influential military, to a mediated settlement based on a federation, as opposed to the preferred two-state model. In a confederation the sides would vest their respective sovereignties in the new Cyprus state, whereas a federation would be more akin to devolution from the extant Republic of Cyprus to accommodate federalism. The UN, to its credit, has tried to mediate or, indeed, virtually arbitrate a solution that fudges the distinction, making the question of successor states and the locus of sovereignty obscure. This is not to the liking of the bureaucrats in the Turkish foreign ministry, nor to the military who consider that if Cyprus joins the EU, irrespective of international treaties, Turkeys de facto ability to intervene in Cyprus in the future will be effectively curtailed.

The preferred Turkish solution that of two states that are ethnically homogenous and where property issues are resolved through a global exchange is universally rejected. Despite this, Turkish diplomacy has been working hard to preempt a settlement

1 The Republic of Cyprus signed the Accession Treaty with the EU on 16 April 2003, despite the failure of

the sides to settle the Cyprus problem along the lines suggested by the UN. This means that the island remains de facto divided, and the EU is to ratify the treaty by 1May 2003 without the North, or the TRNC. Without a settlement the EU will suspend the application of the acquis communautaire in the North pending a settlement.

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that negates these principles. It would appear that Turkish officials face the Herculean task of convincing multicultural Europe to embrace ethnic ghettoes, which the EU may not see worthy of membership. The contradiction seems to be that when pushed into pragmatism, the international community recognizes fait accomplis, such as the ethnic division in the former Yugoslavia. What Turkey fails to see, however, is that the EU does not condone it, nor does the US. As a result, the de facto segregated communities of Bosnia, Kosovo and elsewhere are formally living under constitutional orders where all their rights, as refugees for instance, are guaranteed, not undermined. In this way, the West oversees de facto partitioning, but falls short of sanctioning it. In the case of Cyprus, this would be the predicament. Therefore, the international community seem to have left the resolution to the disputants themselves. If, as in the UNs latest effort dubbed the Annan plan the Greek Cypriots, in a referendum, ratify the various derogations from the European Convention of Human Rights that would be obtained in the event of such a settlement, then this would not have been overt interference into the affairs of the people of Cyprus per se.

For Turkey the EU integration process, meanwhile, has proven complicated due to its own anachronistic principles regarding domestic authority. Whereas the modern Turkish republic, founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatrk, shared most of the attributes of modern nation-states circa 1920, its aversion to potentially secessionist minority politics has put it at odds with the EU. Modern Turkey replaced the sick man of Europe; a decaying and hapless Ottoman Empire that was less than a shadow of its glorious past. It should be recalled that the rise of nationalism had a pernicious affect on all empires, and in time the Ottoman millet system became a casualty of the shift. Whereas Europe later experienced the excesses of the nation-state with the vast destruction unleashed through the Second World War, Turkey was spared it, and remained neutral. Globalization has only recently reached its shores, first with the neo-liberal experiment of the late Turgut zal, and more rapidly since the mid-1990s and the Customs Union agreement with the EU. Whereas the logic of integration with the EU is appealing to many Turks, the question of sovereignty is a sensitive one. Some Turks, often for populist consumption, liken the demands of the EU in the form of Copenhagen criteria to a second Sevres treaty, designed to weaken and partition Turkey. The Sevres treaty, and later the Lausanne, are examples of so-called minority treaties, the price of admission into the club of sovereign states. In the Turkish case, minorities are designated by the Lausanne treaty, which excludes Muslims from its list. Hence, only non-Muslim (i.e. Christian) minorities are granted such status. Not, of course, that the status has always been much privileged, as can be attested by the events in the 1950s in particular, but as a legal matter, Turkey does not recognize Kurds, for instance, as a minority. Today, the EU applies its own criteria to those who wish to join the relatively exclusive Union. The basic political criteria include democratization and respect for human rights. So, whereas the question of whether Kurds constitute a minority or not will be skirted around, the Europeans apply the more ambiguous rubric of human rights.

The process of reform is painful for various Turkish elites, whose collective identity is based on reverence of the Kemalist republic. There is a conservative element, not unlike Metternichs mindset, that sees democracy as fine for the Europeans, but a luxury for Turkey, given its geographical neighborhood. The debate in Turkey is

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animated by those who prefer the status quo versus those who champion the EU and its associated reforms.

Many influential Turkish elites see Cyprus from the vantage point of Lausanne. While Cyprus was officially ceded to Britain through that treaty, some rights over Cyprus were effectively reinstated through the Zurich-London accords. Instead of facing a strategic dilemma with Cyprus as another Greek island enveloping Anatolia, Turkey secured Cyprus as a bicommunal republic, thus denying the application of the principle of self-determination to the majority population of Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots, unhappy with their status, were ultimately responsible for abrogating the accords, and this led to intercommunal fighting and ultimately the landing of Turkish forces on the island in 1974. The de facto situation, although not optimal, given the international practice of non-recognition of the TRNC and Turkeys related diplomatic problems with the West, is preferable to the Turkish establishment than a return to the status quo ante. Whats more, some Turkish elites seem to prefer the status quo to a mediated settlement that ostensibly answered many of the demands of Turkish side.

Turkey does not consider Turkish Cypriots to be a minority, but rather as a people who have vested in the 1960 accords a right to self-determination, and as such, statehood. Popular sovereignty, however, proves to be something of a double edged sword. With the pronouncement of the Annan plan in November 2002 many indigenous Turkish Cypriots protested their leadership for not negotiating the plan. The TRNC government and president ultimately rejected the plan, although polls seemed to indicate that a clear majority intended to ratify the plan, had it been put to referenda as the UN envisioned. This creates a problem for the Turkish side, as the norm of democracy, particularly in the context of the EU, rivals that of sovereignty. Annan, the UN Secretary General, recognizing an impasse, offered the leaders of the Greek and Turkish sides to allow their respective communities to go to referendum without the plan having been signed by them first. Annan clearly aimed to sideline the leaders and make a direct appeal to the people. In the end, though, the leaders did not agree to these terms, and the Annan plan was effectively shelved with the UN retreating from its mediating role thereafter.

Cyprus and the EU acquis

Clearly, the norms of the EU are shifting toward post-nationalism, and multiculturalism. That Cyprus must be multicultural and not comprised of ethnic ghettoes in principle seems to drive the international mediators, although the principles are ultimately compromised. It is no coincidence, therefore, that Greek Cypriots often use the words like Apartheid as rhetorical devices in their cause, irrespective of whether their own policies and actions have actually had the effect of segregation in the past and present. What is more important are first principles, therefore, and not deeds. In the Annan plan, for instance, derogations from these principles include restrictions on settlement (or effectively the repopulation of the north with significant numbers of Greek Cypriots that would threaten the integrity of the Turkish community) and limitations on property reinstatements. Greek Cypriots have been holier than the pope in decrying the provisions as seriously at odds with the EU acquis communautaire. EU officials, on the

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other hand, remain much more sanguine about their chances of being adopted as derogations.

As the Accession Treaty was actually signed without a settlement the degree of uncertainty in Cyprus is greater or less, depending on your view. As the treaty makes no explicit reference to the TRNC, it precludes its accession as an independent and sovereign entity. The acquis will remain suspended in the North pending a political settlement. In that sense, there is a degree of certainty that EU members will not recognize the TRNC, although this does not negate the possibility that contrary to UN Security Resolutions that another country or other countries outside the EU might one day decide to do so. The greater uncertainty rests with how the EU will treat the Northern entity. Is the green line that separates the island geographically to be treated as a border of Europe? And what of the rights of Turkish Cypriots who live in the North? Further, the solution to the Cyprus problem raises questions about what kind of derogations would still be possible (as secondary law, presumably)? Would the East German model be of relevance?

How the Republic of Cyprus was Constructed

By the 1950s developments in world politics would aid the Greek Cypriot cause, in that enosis could be promoted as self-determination. Although the British resisted by 1955 they faced a violent campaign in the form of the National Organization of Cypriot Fighter (EOKA) led by George Grivas and condoned by the political figure, Archbishop Makarios. On the diplomatic front Britain faced challenges to its rule from Greece, who internationalized the Cyprus dispute through the United Nations in 1954. Although Britain prevailed, it soon negotiated terms of decolonization. However, in order not to hand over the island to Greece, it also introduced Turkey into the talks. Greece eventually gave way on insisting that Cyprus unite with Greece, and instead agreed to the establishment of an independent state. Through Greco-Turkish negotiations in 1959 emerged the London-Zurich framework that established a power sharing arrangement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, forbidding either enosis or taksim(Turkish for partitioning, the policy pursued by Turkish Cypriots in response to enosis). To achieve this, the sides agreed to guarantee the arrangement, and codified this in a series of treaties, most important of which was the Treaty of Guarantee. The British were also incorporated into this framework, and made co-guarantors, together with Turkey and Greece. The British withdrawal from the island, however, was only partial, in that Britain was granted sovereign base areas (SBAs) that, through negotiation, were to eventually cover approximately 100 square miles.

Greece itself first internationalized the Cyprus at the United Nations in 1954. This was a period of time in world politics when it was becoming clear to the colonial powers that they were less protected against public inquiry into their imperial affairs than they had anticipated (James 1998). The UN Charter included a Declaration on non-self-governing territories (Article 73) that gave the General Assembly a license to discuss such matters, and in short time the undermining of colonialism became a goal of the UN. The British successfully countered through Article 2(7) which forbade intervention in internal affairs or the domestic jurisdiction of any state. However, the international system was in transition, and soon colonies would be granted independence without

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preconditions. Philpott (2001) refers to this as a revision in the second face of authority, whereby membership became global in scope, enshrined in General Assembly Resolution 1514 in 1960. According to that resolution the inadequacy of political, economic, and social and educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence. A deal for Cyprus, however, would be cut before this resolution.

Britain recognized the need to find a way out its dilemma that it faced. On the one hand Cyprus was not a typical colony, straddling Europe and of great interest to Greece and Turkey. On the other hand, British rule was complicated by the EOKA insurgency. By 1957 Britain had changed tactics and allowed for the General Assembly to address Cyprus but as an international rather than a colonial question. Although the Assembly responded sympathetically Greece was not convinced. Diplomatic wrangling continued through 1958 with Britain gaining the upper hand, pushing for an international conference. Meanwhile, the British were putting forth proposal of their own, including the MacMillan plan that was not to the liking of the Greek Cypriots as it entailed Turkish participation in governance. Greek Cypriots feared that the plan would lead to partitioning along communal lines. Further, the British did not discourage the establishment of the countervailing force to EOKA, the TMT (Turkish Defense Organization) from forming. Turkey was also brought into the framework to balance Greek claims to Cyprus. These tactics on the part of the British forced Greece and Greek Cypriots to compromise on enosis.

Negotiations between Greek and Turkish diplomats at the UN led to the historic Zurich agreement of 1959. The agreement envisioned an independent state of Cyprus. It included four documents. A Gentlemens agreement that foreclosed the possibility of a communist regime in Cyprus; a Treaty of Alliance that allowed for mainland Greek and Turkish military contingents on the island; a Treaty of Guarantee by which Greece, Turkey, and Britain were to recognize and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity, and security of Cyprus, and guaranteed that neither enosis nor taksim would be tolerated; and finally an outline of the Basic Articles of a Cyprus Constitution. Further negotiations in London were held to bring Britain and the Cypriot sides themselves aboard. The British negotiated for the retention of two sovereign base areas (SBAs). The Treaty of Guarantee was then fashioned to accommodate the United Kingdom thus an additional article was penned that called on all signatories to respect the integrity of the areas to be retained under British sovereignty. The Cypriots were also encouraged to sign the agreements on behalf their respective communities. Dr. Fazl Kk represented the Turkish community, and Archbishop Makarios the Greek Cypriot community. Securing Makarios acquiescence at the London conference proved tricky. He was especially troubled with the Treaty of Alliance and Treaty of Guarantee. Greece was in no mood for his antics, though, and in the end he relented and signed.

The Republic of Cyprus was borne of this historic agreement that, in effect, severely curtailed the Westphalian sovereignty of the state. In fact, as the details were being negotiated and hammered out at the technical level, there is evidence that the British, Greeks, and Turks were cognizant of the problematic nature of the Treaty of Guarantee in particular, insofar as it contravened the UN Charter with respect to prohibitions on the use of force against a states territorial integrity or political independence, and considering that the Charter also states that its provisions override those of other treaties (James 1998, p.22).

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The status of Cyprus as a state was also stigmatized in that it was - for that time -an anomaly in terms of size. The international acceptability of small states was going through a transition, together with the decolonization process. Small states, like Iceland and Luxembourg, were the exceptions that proved the rule. Although Britain tried to pursue a paternalistic line, it soon became apparent that despite the fact it agreed to a financial package apparently as a form of rent for the SBAs that Cyprus would be, with the exception of the Treaty of Guarantee restrictions, formally in control of internal affairs. The British were also frustrated in their efforts to dissuade Cyprus from applying for full membership in the Commonwealth. A Special Association offer, whereby Cyprus would be excluded from the Commonwealth Prime Ministers Meetings was not enticing enough, as Cyprus secured the support of most Commonwealth states in its bid. Thus Britain was also losing its control of its exclusive gentlemens club, a process paralleled in the United Nations through the 1960s. Cyprus itself became independent on 16 August 1960.

Cyprus and the Constitutional Legitimacy Crises

It has been said that the Republic of Cyprus was unloved and unwanted. In the case of the Greek Cypriots in particular, it had the effect of frustrating self-determination in the form of enosis (i.e. union with Greece). The Republic of Cyprus did not run smoothly, and there were fundamental disagreements during implementation. The Turkish Cypriot side, which enjoyed a Vice Presidential veto power, frequently invoked it. Greek Cypriots claimed the entire constitutional framework was unworkable and pushed for amendments. President Makarios approached Vice President Kk with a series of amendments, which annuled, among other things, the Vice Presidents veto powers. In short, the Turkish Cypriots considered these demands to be of a fundamental nature and rejected them. Fighting soon broke out, and Turkey threatened to intervene on behalf of its brethen in Cyprus. The United States blunt diplomatic intervention deterred Turkey, but led to the introduction of UN peacekeepers.

Changes in what Philpott calls the second face of authority impacted political developments in the Republic of Cyprus. Makarios was quick to complain that the 1960 agreements were in character colonial treaties (Dodd 1999). The agreements denied the right of majority rule, a right based on the grounds that Turkish Cypriots constituted a minority who comprised no more than eighteen percent of the population. Issues such as the maintenance of separate municipalities along communal lines; the filling of guaranteed quotas for civil service posts (30% for Turkish Cypriots); the exclusion of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President from foreign affairs; the question as to whether army units would be separate or mixed; and a crisis over taxation soon led to mutual acrimony. The Constitution itself was intricate and based on what Arend Lijphart calls consociationalism. Depending on ones view the Constitution was either too elaborate, hence unworkable, as the Greek Cypriots claimed, or the problem was a dearth of good will on either side, a perspective more charitable to the Turkish Cypriot side.

Power sharing merely restricts majority rule. On the other hand, the Constitution entailed some elements that restricted Westphalian autonomy. For instance, the Constitutional Court consisted of three judges; one Turkish Cypriot, one Greek Cypriot, and to break deadlocks, one non-Cypriot judge, the ex officio of the Court, appointed

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jointly by the President and Vice President. This is not as intrusive as, say, the Dayton Bosnia arrangements, but still contradicts the Westphalian ideal. High courts also included foreign judges. Further, and more importantly, the Zurich-London agreements were incorporated into the Constitution such that they have constitutional force (see Part XIII, articles 179-186). The Constitution also forbade amendments in any of the basic articles that included the executive final veto, separate majority vote in the House of Representatives, the 70:30 ratio in the House of Representatives and in the Public Service, and the 60:40 ratio in the Army.

Disagreements on the implementation of these provisions led to a crisis whereby Turkish Cypriots refused to allow for an annual income tax until they were satisfied with respect to implementation of public service jobs ratio. The sides also had differing interpretations regarding the maintenance of separate communal municipalities. The Supreme Court actually ruled in favor of the Turkish Cypriots position, namely that they were constitutional. However, the decisions on the issue were not unanimous, as the Greek Cypriot justice dissented, thus the Court was divided along ethnic lines. As a result, the institutions of the Republic of Cyprus, at least in the eyes of the Greek Cypriots, impinged on their right as the majority to rule, given that the Court decisions were based on the deadlock broken by a foreign judge.

The Constitutional crisis reached a crescendo with President Makarios presentation to Vice President Kk of thirteen proposed amendments to the Constitution. The net effect of the amendments would have meant the abrogation of the original Constitutional framework. It called for the abandonment of the right of executive veto, and paved the way for majority rule, doing away with most communal provisions. The Turkish side rejected the thirteen point proposal.

Intercommunal Warring and International Intervention

Fighting broke out in December 1963. Apparently Makarios and the Greek Cypriot leadership believed it could abrogate the Zurich-London agreements and that it would find support internationally for the fait accompli. International legal sovereignty proved to be his best ally. In portraying the Turkish Cypriot fighters (mjahits) as rebels, and the Greek Cypriot army as the legal state forces he had a tailor made argument for the international community. Britain initially assumed the role of policing a brokered ceasefire, but wanted to involve the other guarantors. One plan was for a NATO force, but this was rejected by Makarios. Instead, Makarios hoped to bring the issue to the United Nations where he hoped to gain the organizations condemnation of the 1960 accords (Necatigil 1998, p.47).

Makarios successfully took his case to international forums, from the United Nations to the Commonwealth to the Conference of the Non-Aligned Nations. His claim to self-determination resonated. Of course much of the success can easily be attributed to politics, as Britain was a convenient scapegoat due to its colonial past and legacy, and Turkish Cypriots were easily exploited as a minority given the problem many new states faced domestically. On the other hand, the norm of non-intervention together with that of self-determination was strengthening.

The United Nations Security Council intervened on March 4, 1964. Resolution 186 recommended the creation of a peacekeeping force, UNFICYP, with the consent of

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the Government of Cyprus. As the government at the time was de facto Greek Cypriot, given that Turkish Cypriots were not represented following their withdrawal under duress during the communal fighting, one can interpret this as meaning that henceforth the Greek Cypriot led Republic of Cyprus would be treated as the only recognized government on the island. The Security Council also recommended the designation of a Mediator to resolve the Cyprus problem.

The Turkish Cypriots had hoped that Resolution 186 and the introduction of UNFICYP would pave the way for a return to the status quo ante and a restoration of the order under the 1960 Constitution. This was not to be the case. In fact, the introduction of UNFICYP troops had the effect of freezing the conflict on the ground at that point where Greek Cypriots had achieved the upper hand (Richmond 1999).

Meanwhile the United States was firm with Turkey, warning it not to intervene in Cyprus. The Americans tried their hand in conflict resolution by promoting the Acheson Plan in 1964, which envisioned enosis, but also included provisions for Turkish Cypriot self-administration and a Turkish sovereign base. Fearing double enosis Greek Cypriots rejected the plan.

UN mediation efforts were not very successful and the Republic of Cyprus continued to function as a de facto Greek Cypriot state with Turkish Cypriots withdrawing from government and into enclaves. An uneasy ceasefire was disrupted in 1967 with an eruption of further hostilities, once again prompting Turkish military overtures, and this time the threat was taken more seriously, as the diplomatic intervention of the US and others secured the withdrawal of mainland Greek troops and Grivas from the island. Following this intercommunal talks on the island began, but failed to produce a settlement.

Mediation and negotiations, from the beginning, have been seen by either side as part of the conflict environment (Richmond 1999). This contradicts the view that mediation is a more or less neutral method of conflict resolution. Both sides have built exclusionary negotiating frameworks, both of which are based on conflicting international norms. The Greek Cypriots promote their cause through the norms of territorial integrity, international legal recognition, and human rights. The Turkish Cypriots assert their right to self-determination, a competing norm. They also claim that they are not and were not a minority under the Zurich-London framework. As the norm against partitioning is the stronger, the integrity of the Republic of Cyprus is favored. According to Richmond, both sides, thus, have incorporated an absolutist view of sovereignty into their respective negotiating positions. Both sides treat sovereignty asindivisible. In particular, given the advantages of the Greek side, the Turkish side tends to shy away from third party mediation, especially in light of the Galo Plaza mission in 1965. The Greek Cypriots see negotiation as a means of precluding secession.

The UN Mediator, Dr. Lasso Galo Plaza, issued his formulation in 1965, which recommended a unitary state rather than a federal or power sharing arrangement, as well as provisions for the protection of minority rights. Galo Plaza who was very critical of what he called the constitutional oddity of the Republic of Cyprus (Necatigil 1998, p.52). Clearly Galo Plaza was very influenced by normative views of what constituted a viable state. He rejected federation on the basis that the establishment of such a regime required a territorial basis that did not exist. Not surprisingly the Turkish Cypriot side

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rejected the Galo Plaza recommendations. The Galo Plaza episode implies that the script of sovereignty can be so alluring that models that do not conform get short shrift.

Greek Cypriots have, since 1964, been governing themselves through the Republic of Cyprus, but in order to accommodate the problem of the consent of Turkish Cypriots, who are no longer represented in government, the Greek Cypriots had to resort to the doctrine of necessity, which meant a series of laws that, in effect, amend a number of constitutional articles.

Turkish Cypriots, since the Galo Plaza report, have shied away from UN peacemaking efforts, preferring instead to pursue direct intercommunal talks through the good offices of the UN (Richmond 1999). This was the case through the late 1960s and early 1970s when intercommunal talks first began. Throughout the years, though, the Turkish side has been less successful at constraining lesser forms of peacemaking operations. The UN Secretary Generals mandate stems from Security Council resolutions. Both resolutions in the UN Security Council, as well as those in the General Assembly constitute obstacles for the Turkish side, since both sides recognize that the Greek Cypriots have enjoyed more support in UN peacemaking operations.

Turkish Intervention

By 1974 schisms among Greek Cypriots led to civil warring. The Greek junta sponsored a coup against President Archbishop Makarios on 15 July 1974. Makarios overthrow was followed by the professed will to effect enosis. This prompted Turkey to take action, and on 20 July 1974 mainland Turkish troops landed on the island. Although a ceasefire was achieved within days, negotiations faltered, and Turkey consolidated its position by partitioning the island in a second operation in August of the same year. The resulting ethnic partition, however, was not complete, with populations stranded on side of the divide or the other. In 1975, ostensibly for humanitarian reasons, the sides agreed to a voluntary exchange of populations, after which, aside from pockets of Greeks and Maronites in the North, and some Turkish Cypriots on the south, two homogeneous ethnic enclaves were established.

Greek Cypriots had hoped that the United Nations intervention through UNFICYP in 1964 would shield them from Turkish intervention. Of course, the events of 1974 belied this, but this was to be expected given the extraordinary developments. The Athens inspired coup of 15 July 1974 designed to overthrow Makarios and achieve enosis was a clear violation of Westphalian sovereignty. Most significantly, Makarios who survived the coup attended the UN Security Council meeting on 19 July 1974 where he told the Council that the Greek junta had violated Cypriot independence and that this was tantamount to an invasion and a flagrant violation of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. Thus, he pointed out, the events in Cyprus were not an internal affair (see Security Council Official Records, S/PV 1780).

Turkey intervened or invaded depending on ones political proclivities on 20 July 1974 under the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee. The operation began with a landing in Kyrenia. A ceasefire, in compliance with UN Security Council resolution 353 calling on the guarantor powers to enter in negotiations to restore constitutional governance in the Republic of Cyprus, was achieved. Two rounds of talks were held at the Geneva Conference, but consensus was not reached on how to achieve a political

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settlement. At the second round relations were strained. The Turkish side tried to impose a federal settlement. Eventually the talks broke down with the Greek side calling for an adjournment and the Turkish side rejecting it. Turkish operations commenced for a second time on 14 August 1974, Greece announced its decision to withdraw from NATO, but would return some years later. The island was partitioned into two sections, with a de facto Turkish zone, later to be self-fashioned as the TRNC in the north. As it became clear that the partitioning was somewhat permanent, the sides agreed to voluntary regrouping of populations in 1975 at the Vienna intercommunal talks held under the auspices of the UN Secretary General. The Turkish Cypriot leadership holds that the agreements are irreversible, and does not envision the repatriation of Greek Cypriots to the north. Greek Cypriots counter that the agreement was humanitarian in nature, and that Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot displaced persons have the right to return to their former homes in the event of a settlement.

In 1975 the Turkish Cypriots declared the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus, which was regreted by the UN Security Council, followed in 1983 by the declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), recognized only by Turkey. Despite intercommunal talks, which produced the High Level Agreement of 1977, as well as a further agreement in 1979, beyond principle little agreement in practice has been secured. The 1977 framework, agreed to by the Makarios and Rauf Denkta, the Turkish Cypriot leader, calls for the establishment of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federal republic. The 1979 arrangements calls for more substantial action such as the reopening of Varosha to settlement, currently a ghost town controlled by Turkish troops since 1974. This has not occurred.

The Contemporary Cyprus Problem

The events of 1974 had the effect of transforming the Cyprus problem. First, it paved the way for talks on federalism, which had not been taken seriously by Greek Cypriots till then. It also meant that the presence of Turkish troops on the island introduced an international element. Initially intercommunal talks were more conciliatory, in that 1977 saw the High Level Agreement brokered by Makarios and Denkta. The groundbreaking 1977 agreement entailed in principle the establishment of a non-aligned, bi-communal, federal republic. Issues such as territory and land ownership were to be negotiated based on considerations of economic viability. This was a big step forward for the Turkish Cypriot side. Further agreement between Denkta and Kyprianou was secured in 1979. The resettlement of Varosha and demilitarization were the most important items on the Ten point list.

Talks did not go much further, though, as the election of a new Prime minister, Andreas Papandreou, in Athens signaled a new strategy of internationalizing the Cyprus problem. Papandreou and Greek Cypriot president Kyprianou took the Cyprus issue to the Non-Aligned Movement and the UN General Assembly where they successfully achieved declarations and raesolutions favoring the Greek Cypriot cause (Necatigil 1998, pp. 188-194). The 7th Non Aligned Conference reiterated its support for the Government of the Republic of Cyprus and reaffirmed support for the countrys independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity, unity, and non-alignment. United Nations

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General Assembly Resolution 37/253 called for the withdrawal of all occupation forces and the voluntary return of refugees to their former homes, as well as for demilitarization.

Whereas Greek Cypriot efforts to internationalize the Cyprus problem bore fruit, Turkish Cypriot actions found less approval from the international community. In particular, the 15 November 1983 declaration of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus prompted UN condemnation. The unilateral declaration of independence (UDI) and purported secession was deplored in Security Council Resolution 541 (1983). The declaration was considered legally invalid and a call was made for its withdrawal. Whereas the Turkish side argued that the aim of the declaration was to assert the status of Turkish Cypriots as co-founders of the future federal republic of Cyprus, this argument did not find much sympathy. In short, Turkish Cypriot arguments that they had a right to self-determination stemming from the London-Zurich framework did not resonate with an international community which sees Turkish secession as a violation of sovereignty and territorial integrity.

By the mid-1980s, and following the declaration of the TRNC, efforts to push for a settlement were initiated by then UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar. This initiative failed, as Greek Cypriot president Spyros Kyprianou rejected it.

In the mid-1980s the UN attempted to bring the sides together again through proximity talks, but Secretary General Perez de Cuellars good offices mission would ultimately fail. Perez de Cuellars efforts continued through the 1980s, though, and he handed the mantle to incoming Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali.

It was not until after the Cold War that the UN would try again, this time under Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali. The 1992 set of ideas envisioned a federal Cyprus, but its fate, like previous efforts was doomed, as the sides to greater of lesser degrees rejected it. In lieu of a comprehensive settlement the UN and other third parties pushed for the implementation of confidence building measures (CBMs), most significantly the opening of Varosha and the Nicosia International Airport (which is currently in the buffer zone, a casualty of the fighting in 1974). These too failed, despite some progress in promoting bicommunal activities. However, responding to the decision of the EU to enter accession negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot side has prevented the continuation of bicommunal contacts in the buffer zone since December 1997.

The set of ideas resulted from previous proximity talks. Boutros-Ghalis stance was more assertive in that for the first time since Galo Plaza the UN was advancing its own proposals and suggestions, as well (Richmond 1999). However, as with previous efforts, the sides held out for a better deal. According to Oliver Richmond this is because the sides recognized peacemaking as a relatively cost-free method of continuing the struggle for concessions from the opposition while avoiding making them. Recently, however, this strategy has become more counterproductive for the Turkish Cypriot side, because of the introduction of the European Union factor.

Enter the EU

The EU factor has been controversial in the Cyprus problem, since on the one hand it is seen as a probable catalyst for a settlement, providing a win-win scenario. On the other hand, it has had the effect of polarizing the sides, since under the leadership of

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TRNC president Denkta the Turkish side insists that any settlement must be based on two equal states in the form of a confederation, and anything less than this will prompt the Turkish side to seek a parallel association with Turkey should the Republic of Cyprus join the EU prior to a settlement. This position, however, has been compromised by recent developments. First, the government in Turkey as of November 2002 has been less keen on disrupting relations with the EU over Cyprus, given its own ambitions to achieve Turkish accession into the EU. Second, if the policy was intended to deter the EU, it has failed, as the Copenhagen summit ended with a membership offer to Cyprus, although it remains divided.

Most recently sovereignty has been further complicated by the European Union (EU) accession process. In 1990 the Greek Cypriot side filed an application with the EU on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot side, together with guarantor Turkey, claimed that the application violated the letter and spirit of the London-Zurich framework, and insisted that the process be halted or else the political negotiations for a settlement on the island would suffer. This development is most interesting, because Turkish governments and diplomats suggest that Turkey has a right to veto Cyprus accession to the EU, based on a particular interpretation of the Treaty of Guarantee.

The EU, for its part, has treated Cyprus application unproblematically. Cyprus de facto partitioning and the reality that the Republic of Cyprus cannot exercise jurisdiction over more than a third of its territory have not dissuaded the EU. The EU did not put forth any political preconditions for accession beyond what are dubbed Copenhagen criteria. In the end, the EU decided to offer accession to Cyprus at the 2002 Copenhagen summit, with the caveat that every effort be made to resolve the conflict on the island based on a comprehensive plan tabled by the UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, prior to the signing of the accession treaty in April 2003. Failing this, the EU would go ahead with accession, but the acquis communautaire would extend only to the buffer zone and not to the territory of the TRNC. The acquis would be suspended in the north pending a political settlement and the reunification of the island. The implication is that a future settlement would be along the lines of the incorporation of the former East Germany into the Federal Republic of Germany. Of course, given that the acquis would entail no derogations following the signing of the accession treaty, there are questions as to how, practically and politically speaking, the sides will be able to negotiate a settlement that entails the incorporation of bi-zonality and bi-communality as envisioned in the UN framework. Today the sovereignty problem is thus further complicated by EU membership and the application of EU norms and laws in lieu of a political settlement.

The European Union has treated Cyprus unproblematically. Indeed, the EU declared at the 1999 Helsinki Summit that a solution to the Cyprus problem did not constitute a precondition to accession. True to that, the EU concluded negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus. At the 2002 Copenhagen Summit Cyprus was offered EU membership. The EU factor has complicated intercommunal negotiations since the Turkish side claimed to be excluded from the process, and had not consented to the application for EU membership. The Greek Cypriot side and the EU Commission repeatedly invited the Turkish side to join the Greek Cypriot delegation negotiating accession, but to do so would be to validate the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, which the Turkish Cypriot leadership did not recognize as the legitimate representative of all of Cyprus. The result was that the Turkish side refused to engage in further talks

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unless they were state to state and unless Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denkta, was addressed as a head of state.

Turkish Cypriots believe that the limitations on Westphalian sovereignty imposed on Cyprus in 1960 are pertinent to this matter. The Turkish Cypriot position is that the Greek Cypriot application to the EU is illegal (Mendelson 1997). This is based on a particular interpretation of the Treaty of Guarantee stipulating that the Republic of Cyprus undertook not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever (Article 1.2). Further, Article 50 of the Constitution gave the Turkish Cypriot Vice President a veto over Cyprus membership in any international organization unless Greece and Turkey were both members. This argument has been rejected by the EU (Crawford et.al. 1997). The EU considers that the Treaty of Guarantee does not prohibit EU membership, as the EU is not a state but a regional organization, that the spirit of the treaty was to forbid enosis or taksim. Further, since the Vice Presidency is vacant and thus could not be exercised.

Politically the complicating factor of Turkeys own EU ambitions has forced the Turkish Cypriot leadership into a more conciliatory position, and talks were restarted when Denkta accepted that the leaders be addressed as excellencies by the UN. Hardliners on the Turkish side had hoped that the EU would not go through with Cyprus accession without a solution, but they were proved wrong at the Copenhagen Summit of 2002. Therefore, UN mediation efforts have gained intensity, and in November 2002 the Annan plan for a comprehensive settlement was tabled.

The Annan Plan

Greek Cypriots have sought justice through the European Convention on Human Rights, and have found some satisfaction in decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. In essence, these cases, especially that of Loizidou vs. Turkey as case law, make it less likely that the settlement on the island would entail a global exchange of properties and populations, making the job of the sides and UN in crafting a settlement more sensitive to these developments. The Annan plan of 2002 tries to negotiate a middle way between bi-zonality and individual rights. The plan is in many respects a revised set of ideas and incorporates a number of provisions that compromise Westphalian sovereignty, through the maintenance of the Treaty of Guarantee and foreign judges, as well as foreigners appointed to the Aliens Board and Property Board, among other anomalies. It continues to frustrate the Turkish Cypriot leadership in its current form, because it does not make clear whether the Annan Cyprus is a successor state to the Republic of Cyprus or whether the TRNC and the Greek Cypriot state are, in fact, establishing a new confederal state. UN officials claim that this ambiguity is by design, given sensitivities on both sides to the sovereignty issue. The plan calls for a new state of affairs and entail the continuation of the treaties that establishment to 1960 state of affairs with some amendments and new protocols. Indicative of continuation with the past is the fact that the new state will not reapply for UN membership, nor will the EU accession process start anew. On the other hand, it legalizes the effect of past acts and legitimizes the division of the island since 1974, and it entails significant devolution of powers from the federal government to what are designated component states. Territorial adjustments favoring the Greek Cypriots are not apparently enticing enough to

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convince the public that the Annan plan is worth endorsing. The plan was seen as a last ditch effort to ensure that Cyprus signs the EU accession treaty on April 16, 2003 as areunited country. The EU will face a great dilemma, in that it will have admitted a divided country without derogations to the accession treaty. A negotiated settlement after that point would be problematic, given that the UN would have less leverage over the Greek Cypriots to compromise on human rights. It would also mean that Turkeys debts through a series of verdicts at the European Court of Human Rights would pile up, perhaps forcing the Council of Europe to remove Turkey from membership. In other words, Turkeys European orientation is at stake, and thus the sovereignty of Cyprus.

Human Rights and Sovereignty

Issues of human rights have had a profound impact on the negotiation process, especially stemming from verdicts in the European Court of Human Rights. Daniel Philpott is among those who denigrates the significance of the European Convention on Human Rights, claiming that its accomplishments extend little farther than banishing the spanking of British schoolchildren and a few other altered legal procedures in a handful of its member states (2001, p.43). Thus, for Philpott, the Convention doesnt meet his demanding criteria for a revision of one of his faces of authority in the international constitution. Perhaps he would revise this assessment in light of its impact on Cyprus.

The Annan plan is in one sense significantly different in that it forbids any global exchange of properties, as had been the case in the 1992 set of ideas. Under the set of ideas each community was to establish an agency to deal with matters related to displaced persons. In particular the ownership of the property of displaced persons, in respect of which those persons seek compensation, will be transferred to the ownership of the community in which the person is located. It goes on to say that all titles of properties will be exchanged on a global communal basis between the two agencies. This did not preclude the rights of individuals from resuming their previous residence, but in practice this would have been unlikely. Again sovereignty plays a large part. The European Convention on Human Rights has been crucial in determining the compromise between the political framework of bi-zonality and bi-communality, on the one hand, and the individual rights of displaced persons, on the other. Whereas under the Annan plan Greek Cypriot residence is to be subject to quotas, so as to ensure that Turkish Cypriots remain a numerical and political majority in what will become the northern component state of the federal State of Cyprus, individual property rights are theoretically safeguarded. Instead of two communal agencies the Annan plan establishes a central Property Board which in petitioned by individuals, who have the right to opt for reinstatement, compensation, or the services of the Board to lease or sell properties to third parties. Although there will be restrictions for reinstatement, especially in light of the fact that many properties have been developed by Turkish Cypriots over the course of three decades of separation, nevertheless the plan clearly does away with the potential for global exchange.

The issue of global exchange has long been a sticking point in negotiations. At an unofficial level some Greek Cypriots concede that such an exchange may actually be logical, given the implications of the forced reintegration of mixed villages, and that it could be reconciled with the First Protocol of the European Convention of Human Rights,

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which while disallowing dispossession of properties in general, nevertheless accepts that a state can expropriate properties in the public interest (Stavrinides 1999).

The Loizidou2 verdict in the European Court of Human Rights, however, makes global exchange problematic. Thus the Annan plan is designed to balance this and other verdicts with the UN framework. Since 1974, due to the partitioning of the island, Greek Cypriots have not been able to access their properties in the north. The European Court of Human Rights found that Turkey, by virtue of its military presence, exercises effective control over the territory of Northern Cyprus. Further, in referring to the universal nonrecognition of the TRNC the Court rejected as legally invalid TRNC Constitutional provisions for the expropriation of abandoned properties in the north. Article 159 of the 1985 TRNC Constitution provided that abandoned property devolves to the TRNC. As the Court concluded that the applicant, Loizidou, was thus still the owner of the land in question, it ruled that Turkey was in continuing violation of her right to peaceful enjoyment of her property. Thus not only are acts of the TRNC deemed legally invalid, but refusal of access to properties is imputed to Turkey.

The issue of recognition, and thus sovereignty, is crucial here. Had the TRNC been recognized by the Court, the Court would not only have been at odds with the prevailing international legal opinion of the international community, but it would also have rendered the territory of the TRNC outside the scope of the Courts human rights jurisdiction (Oxman and Rudolf 1997).

As Loizidou now represents case law the verdict on property rights is likely to be reaffirmed in subsequent cases brought to Court. This manifested itself in another important verdict in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey3. This was a more comprehensive case than Loizidou in that it dealt with the issues of missing persons since 1974, the rights of displaced persons to their homes and properties, among others. Here the Court ruled that the intercommunal talks could not be used to justify a continuing violation of rights established by the Convention. Article 8 of the Convention concerns the inviolable right to ones home.

According to Frank Hoffmeister of the European Commission, these verdicts and others like them are relevant to the political debate regarding a final settlement on the island (Hoffmeister 2002). The imputability of human rights violations to Turkey weakens the TRNC claim to be acting as an independent state, confirming the international consensus that the TRNC is not politically and economically independent. As for property rights, it establishes that the expropriation of Greek Cypriot titles was illegal, but this does not preclude distinguishing between reinstitution and compensation in different areas in northern Cyprus. With respect to refugees the Courts decision can be interpreted to mean that the mere prospect of bi-zonality is not justification for restricting rights to ones home.

Hoffmeister actually envisions the provisions of the Annan plan, in that he concludes that it would be likely that the property regime for a bi-zonal Cyprus would include a regulated right to restitution and resettlement, and might receive the Courts approval, given that UN Security Council Resolution 774 (1992) approved such a framework and since this had been the intercommunal framework since the 1977 High Level Agreement. Therefore, it is probable that certain restrictions to the right to ones

2 Loizidou v. Turkey. No. 40/1993/435/514. December 18, 1996.

3 Cyprus v. Turkey. App. No. 25781/94. May 10, 2001.

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home can be justified under Article 8(2) of the Convention given the public interest, which may provide the Court with the rationale to overcome objections.

One positive aspect of the Annan plan for the Republic of Turkey is that if adopted it would shield Turkey from any future lawsuits stemming from its military presence, or occupation of part of the Republic of Cyprus. Henceforth, Cypriot citizens would have to pursue their rights through the Cypriot Property Board, and failing to achieve a satisfactory result might have to file a case with the European Court of Human Rights against Cyprus, not Turkey. As of this writing, the TRNC had set up property commissions in the North meant to assess compensation amounts for dispossessed Greek Cypriots, but it remains unclear as to what precisely the ECHR will do in response to this move.

Unofficial Mediation and the Discourse of Recognition

Frustration with the official mediation efforts led to an emphasis on unofficial intervention into what is ostensibly a case of an identity based conflict. Cyprus is said to suffer from a double minority problem. Depending on ones view, either