G.R. No. L-21223 August 31, 1966PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS CO., INC. (As Employer) and FRANCISCO TONG (As Assistant General Manager) and Attorney-in-Fact of SUSUMO SONODA, SENJI TANAKA, TAKASHIKO KUMAMOTO, HITOSHI NAKAMURA, TETSUO KODU, (Employees),petitioners and appellants,vs.SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM,respondent and appellee.Demetrio B. Salem for petitioners and appellants.Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason for respondent and appellee.BARRERA,J.:The facts of this case are not disputed:The Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc., a domestic corporation since the start of its operations in 1957, has been employing Japanese technicians under a pre-arranged contract of employment, the minimum period of which employment is 6 months and the maximum is 24 months.From April 28, 1957, to October 26, 1958, the corporation had in its employ 6 Japanese technicians. In connection with the employment of these aliens, it sent an inquiry to the Social Security System (SSS) whether these employees are subject to compulsory coverage under the System, which inquiry was answered by the First Deputy Administrator of the SSS, under date of August 29, 1957, as follows:SIR:With reference to your letter of August 24, 1957, hereunder are our answers to your queries:Aliens employed in the Philippines:Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily covered. But aliens who are employed temporarily shall, upon their departure from the Philippines, be entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their contributions; their employers shall be entitled to the same proportionate rebate of their contributions in behalf of said aliens employed by them. (Rule I, Sec. 3[d], Rules and Regulations.)Starting September, 1957, and until the aforementioned Japanese employees left the Philippines on October 26, 1958, the corresponding premium contributions of the employer and the employees on the latter's memberships in the SSS were as follows:NameSS NumberMonthly SalaryAmount of PremiumsContributed

2.5%(Employee)3.5%(Employer)Total

Susumu Sonoda03-075177P520.00P175.00P245.00P420.00

Senji Tanaka03-075178520.00175.00245.00420.00

Kahei Tanaka03-075179500.00175.00245.00420.00

Takashiko Kumamoto03-075180500.00175.00245.00420.00

Hitoshi Nakamura03-075181500.00175.00245.00420.00

Tetsuo Kudo03-075182500.00175.00245.00420.00

T o t a l P1,050.00P1,470.00P2,520.00

On October 7, 1958, the Assistant General Manager of the corporation, on its behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the Japanese technicians, filed a claim with the SSS for the refund of the premiums paid to the System, on the ground of termination of the members' employment. As this claim was denied, they filed a petition with the Social Security Commission for the return or refund of the premiums, in the total sum of P2,520.00, paid by the employer corporation and the 6 Japanese employees, plus attorneys' fees. This claim was controverted by the SSS, alleging that Rule IX of the Rules and Regulations of the System, as amended, requires membership in the System for at least 2 years before a separated or resigned employee may be allowed a return of his personal contributions. Under the same rule, the employer is not also entitled to a refund of the premium contributions it had paid.After hearing, the Commission denied the petition for the reason that, although under the original provisions of Section 3 (d) of Rule I of the Rules and Regulations of the SSS, alien-employees (who are employed temporarily) and their employers are entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their respective contributions upon the employees' departure from the Philippines, said rule was amended by eliminating that portion granting a return of the premium contributions. This amendment became effective on January 14, 1958, or before the employment of the subject aliens terminated. The rights of covered employees who are separated from employment, under the present Rules, are covered by Rule IX which allows a return of the premiums only if they have been members for at least 2 years.It is this resolution of the Commission that is the subject of the present appeal, appellants contending that the amendment of the Rules and Regulations of the SSS, insofar as it eliminates the provision on the return of premium contributions, originally embodied in Section 3(d) of Rule I, constituted an impairment of obligations of contract. It is claimed, in effect, that when appellants-employees became members in September, 1957, and paid the corresponding premiums to the System, it1is subject to the condition that upon their departure from the Philippines, these employees, as well as their employer, are entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their respective contributions.The contention cannot be sustained. Appellants' argument is based on the theory that the employees' membership in the System established contractual relationship between the members and the System, in the sense contemplated and protected by the constitutional prohibition against its impairment by law. But, membership in this institution is not the result of a bilateral, consensual agreement where the rights and obligations of the parties are defined by and subject to their will. Republic Act 1161 requires compulsory coverage of employers and employees under the System. It is actually a legal imposition, on said employers and employees, designed to provide social security to the workingmen. Membership in the SSS is, therefore, in compliance with a lawful exercise of the police power of the State, to which the principle of non-impairment of the obligation of contract is not a proper defense.As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the issue that should be determined in this case is whether, in implementing the SSS law and denying appellants' claim for refund of their premium contributions, due process was observed.The Rules and Regulations promulgated by the SSS, pursuant to the rule-making authority granted in Section 4(a) of Republic Act 1161, was duly approved by the President on July 18, 1957, and published in the Official Gazette on September 15, 1957.2These rules and regulations, among others, provide:IDETERMINATION OF COMPULSORY COVERAGE3. The determination of whether an employer or an employee shall be compulsorily covered shall be vested in the Commission. The following general principles shall guide the Commission in deciding each case:x x x x x x x x x(d) Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily covered. But aliens who ate employed temporarily and whose visas are only for fixed terms shall, upon their departure from the Philippines, be entitled to a rebate of a proportionate amount of their contributions; their employers shall be entitled to the same proportionate rebate of their contributions in behalf of said aliens employed by them.XIAMENDMENTS AND EFFECTIVITY1. The Commission may, by appropriate resolution, amend, repeal, revise and/or modify all or any part or parts of these Rules and Regulations, as well as adopt any additional rule or rules, whenever the need therefor should arise. Any amendment and/or additional rule, however, shall not take effect until and after the corresponding resolution of the Commission has been submitted to and approved by the President of the Philippines.2. These Rules and Regulations, any amendment thereof, or any additional rule or rules subsequently adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date they are approved by the President of the Philippines.Rule I Section 3 (d) and Rule IX, however, were later amended, which amendment was approved by the President on January 14, 1958, to read as follows:(d) Aliens who are employed in the Philippines shall also be compulsorily covered (Sec. 3, Rule I)EFFECT OF SEPARATION FROM EMPLOYMENTWhen an employee under compulsory coverage is separated from employment, his employer's contribution on his account shall cease at the end of the month of separation; but such employee may continue his membership in the System and receive the benefits of the Act, as amended, in accordance with these rules. If he continues paying the 6 per cent monthly premiums representing his as well as the employer's contribution, based on his monthly salary at the time of his separation; but if at the time of his separation the covered employee has been a member of the System for at least two years, he shall have the option to choose any one of the following adjustments of his membership in the System:1. A refund of an amount equivalent to his total contributions of two and one-half per centum plus interests at the rate of three per centum per annum, compounded annually;x x x x x x x x x (Rule IX)These amended Rules were published in the November 10, 1958 issue of the Official Gazette.3It is not here disputed that the Rules and Regulations of the SSS, having been promulgated in implementation of a law, have the force and effect of a statute;" that the amendment thereto, although approved by the President on January 14, 1958, was published in the Official Gazette in November, 1958, or after the employment of the Japanese technicians had ceased and the corresponding claim for the refund of the premium contributions was filed with the System. The question pertinent to this case now is whether or not appellants are bound by the amended Rules requiring membership for two years before refund of the premium contributions may be allowed.1wph1.tThese rules and regulations were promulgated to provide guidelines to be observed in the enforcement of the law. As a matter of fact, Section 3 of Rule I is merely an enumeration of the "general principles to (shall) guide the Commission" in the determination of the extent or scope of the compulsory coverage of the law. One of these guiding principles is paragraph (d) relied upon by appellants, on the coverage of temporarily-employed aliens. It is not here pretended, that the amendment of this Section 3(d) of Rule I, as to eliminate the provision granting to these aliens the right to a refund of part of their premium contributions upon their departure from the Philippines, is not in implementation of the law or beyond the authority of the Commission to do.It may be argued, however, that while the amendment to the Rules may have been lawfully made by the Commission and duly approved by the President on January 14, 1958, such amendment was only published in the November 1958 issue of the Official Gazette, and after appellants' employment had already ceased. Suffice it to say, in this regard, that under Article 2 of the Civil Code,5the date of publication of laws in the Official Gazette is material for the purpose of determining their effectivity, only if the statutes themselves do not so provide.In the present case, the original Rules and Regulations of the SSS specifically provide that any amendment thereto subsequently adopted by the Commission, shall take effect on the date of its approval by the President. Consequently, the delayed publication of the amended rules in the Official Gazette did not affect the date of their effectivity, which is January 14, 1958, when they were approved by the President. It follows that when the Japanese technicians were separated from employment in October, 1958, the rule governing refund of premiums is Rule IX of the amended Rules and Regulations, which requires membership for 2 years before such refund of premiums may be allowed.Wherefore, finding no error in the resolution of the Commission appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So ordered.Concepcion, C.J., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.Reyes J.B.L., J., reserves his vote.Regala, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],petitioners,vs.HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,respondents.ESCOLIN,J.:Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,1as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question2said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case ofSeverino vs. Governor General,3this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.6It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said inPeralta vs. COMELEC7:In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth inChicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank8to wit:The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.Consistently with the above principle, this Court inRutter vs. Esteban9sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.10Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. InPesigan vs. Angeles,11the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.SO ORDERED.PLANA,J.,concurring (with qualification):The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere.*It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in theOfficial Gazetterequired by any statute asa prerequisite for their effectivity, ifsaid laws already provide for their effectivity date.Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,unless it is otherwise provided" Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition thatfor their effectivity,laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.FERNANDO,C.J.,concurring (with qualification):There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.I shall explain why.1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.1I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.23. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all.3It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.4Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.5In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity.6In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. 101279 August 6, 1992PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC.,petitioner,vs.HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION,respondents.De Guzman, Meneses & Associates for petitioner.GRIO-AQUINO,J.:This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers.On June 1, 1991, as a result of published stories regarding the abuses suffered by Filipino housemaids employed in Hong Kong, DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of "Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong" (p. 30,Rollo). The DOLE itself, through the POEA took over the business of deploying such Hong Kong-bound workers.In view of the need to establish mechanisms that willenhance the protection for Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong,the recruitment of the same by private employment agencies ishereby temporarily suspendedeffective 1 July 1991. As such, the DOLE through the facilities of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration shall take over the processing and deployment of household workers bound for Hong Kong, subject to guidelines to be issued for said purpose.In support of this policy, all DOLE Regional Directors and the Bureau of Local Employment's regional offices are likewise directed to coordinate with the POEA in maintaining a manpower pool of prospective domestic helpers to Hong Kong on a regional basis.For compliance. (Emphasis ours; p. 30,Rollo.)Pursuant to the above DOLE circular, the POEA issued Memorandum Circular No. 30, Series of 1991, dated July 10, 1991, providing GUIDELINES on the Government processing and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers to Hong Kong and the accreditation of Hong Kong recruitment agencies intending to hire Filipino domestic helpers.Subject: Guidelines on the Temporary Government Processing and Deployment of Domestic Helpers to Hong Kong.Pursuant to Department Order No. 16, series of 1991 and in order to operationalize the temporary government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong resulting from the temporary suspension of recruitment by private employment agencies for said skill and host market, the following guidelines and mechanisms shall govern the implementation of said policy.I. Creation of a joint POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit (HWPU)An ad hoc, one stop Household Workers Placement Unit [or HWPU] under the supervision of the POEA shall take charge of the various operations involved in the Hong Kong-DH industry segment:The HWPU shall have the following functions in coordination with appropriate units and other entities concerned:1. Negotiations with and Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies2. Manpower Pooling3. Worker Training and Briefing4. Processing and Deployment5. Welfare ProgramsII. Documentary Requirements and Other Conditions for Accreditation of Hong Kong Recruitment Agencies or PrincipalsRecruitment agencies in Hong Kong intending to hire Filipino DHs for their employers may negotiate with the HWPU in Manila directly or through the Philippine Labor Attache's Office in Hong Kong.xxx xxx xxxX. Interim ArrangementAll contracts stamped in Hong Kong as of June 30 shall continue to be processed by POEA until 31 July 1991 under the name of the Philippine agencies concerned. Thereafter, all contracts shall be processed with the HWPU.Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong shall submit to the Philippine Consulate General in Hong kong a list of their accepted applicants in their pool within the last week of July. The last day of acceptance shall be July 31 which shall then be the basis of HWPU in accepting contracts for processing. After the exhaustion of their respective pools the only source of applicants will be the POEA manpower pool.For strict compliance of all concerned. (pp. 31-35,Rollo.)On August 1, 1991, the POEA Administrator also issued Memorandum Circular No. 37, Series of 1991, on the processing of employment contracts of domestic workers for Hong Kong.TO: All Philippine and Hong Kong Agencies engaged in the recruitment of Domestic helpers for Hong KongFurther to Memorandum Circular No. 30, series of 1991 pertaining to the government processing and deployment of domestic helpers (DHs) to Hong Kong,processing of employment contractswhich have been attested by the Hong Kong Commissioner of Labor up to 30 June 1991 shall be processed by the POEA Employment Contracts Processing Branch up to 15 August 1991 only.Effective 16 August 1991, all Hong Kong recruitment agent/s hiring DHs from the Philippines shall recruit under the new scheme which requires prior accreditation which the POEA.Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong may apply for accreditation at the Office of the Labor Attache, Philippine Consulate General where a POEA team is posted until 31 August 1991. Thereafter, those who failed to have themselves accredited in Hong Kong may proceed to the POEA-OWWA Household Workers Placement Unit in Manila for accreditation before their recruitment and processing of DHs shall be allowed.Recruitment agencies in Hong Kong who have some accepted applicants in their pool after the cut-off period shall submit this list of workers upon accreditation. Only those DHs in said list will be allowed processing outside of the HWPU manpower pool.For strict compliance of all concerned. (Emphasis supplied, p. 36,Rollo.)On September 2, 1991, the petitioner, PASEI, filed this petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned DOLE and POEA circulars and to prohibit their implementation for the following reasons:1. that the respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars;2. that the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and3. that the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with.There is no merit in the first and second grounds of the petition.Article 36 of the Labor Code grants the Labor Secretary the power to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities.Art. 36. Regulatory Power. The Secretary of Labor shall have the powerto restrictand regulatethe recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] andis hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. (Emphasis ours.)On the other hand, the scope of the regulatory authority of the POEA, which was created by Executive Order No. 797 on May 1, 1982 to take over the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board, the National Seamen Board, and the overseas employment functions of the Bureau of Employment Services, is broad and far-ranging for:1. Among the functions inherited by the POEA from the defunct Bureau of Employment Services was the power and duty:"2. To establish and maintain a registration and/or licensing systemto regulate private sector participation in the recruitment and placement of workers, locally and overseas, . . ." (Art. 15, Labor Code, Emphasis supplied). (p. 13,Rollo.)2. It assumed from the defunct Overseas Employment Development Board the power and duty:3. To recruit and place workers for overseas employment of Filipino contract workers on a government to government arrangement and in such other sectors as policy may dictate . . . (Art. 17, Labor Code.) (p. 13,Rollo.)3. From the National Seamen Board, the POEA took over:2. To regulate and supervise the activities of agents or representatives of shipping companies in the hiring of seamen for overseas employment; and secure the best possible terms of employment for contract seamen workers and secure compliance therewith. (Art. 20, Labor Code.)The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred" upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p. 62,Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).The Solicitor General, in his Comment, aptly observed:. . . Said Administrative Order [i.e., DOLE Administrative Order No. 16] merely restricted the scope or area of petitioner's business operations by excluding therefrom recruitment and deployment of domestic helpers for Hong Kong till after the establishment of the "mechanisms" that will enhance the protection of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong. In fine,other than the recruitment and deployment of Filipino domestic helpers for Hongkong, petitioner may still deploy other class of Filipino workerseither for Hongkong and other countries and all other classes of Filipino workers for other countries.Said administrative issuances, intended to curtail, if not to end, rampant violations of the rule against excessive collections of placement and documentation fees, travel fees and other charges committed by private employment agencies recruiting and deploying domestic helpers to Hongkong.[They are reasonable, valid and justified under the general welfare clause of the Constitution, since the recruitment and deployment business, as it is conducted today, is affected with public interest.xxx xxx xxxThe alleged takeover [of the business of recruiting and placing Filipino domestic helpers in Hongkong] is merely a remedial measure, and expires after its purpose shall have been attained. This is evident from the tenor of Administrative Order No. 16 that recruitment of Filipino domestic helpers going to Hongkong by private employment agencies are hereby "temporarily suspendedeffective July 1, 1991."The alleged takeover is limited in scope, being confined to recruitment of domestic helpers going to Hongkong only.xxx xxx xxx. . . the justification for the takeover of the processing and deploying of domestic helpers for Hongkong resulting from the restriction of the scope of petitioner's business is confined solely to the unscrupulous practice of private employment agencies victimizing applicants for employment as domestic helpers for Hongkong and not the whole recruitment business in the Philippines. (pp. 62-65,Rollo.)The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as delegated to the executive branch of Government.Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide:Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided. . . . (Civil Code.)Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) daysafter announcement of their adoptionin newspapers of general circulation. (Emphasis supplied, Labor Code, as amended.)Sec. 3. Filing. (1)Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.)Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above providedunless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).Once, more we advert to our ruling inTaada vs. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 that:. . . Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (p. 447.)Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. (p. 448.)We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws. (p. 448.)For lack of proper publication, the administrative circulars in question may not be enforced and implemented.WHEREFORE, the writ of prohibition is GRANTED. The implementation of DOLE Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991, and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37, Series of 1991, by the public respondents is hereby SUSPENDED pending compliance with the statutory requirements of publication and filing under the aforementioned laws of the land.SO ORDERED.